The Roman Catholic Church and Democracy in Poland Mirella W. Eberts Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 50, No. 5. (Jul.

, 1998), pp. 817-842.

Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0966-8136%28199807%2950%3A5%3C817%3ATRCCAD%3E2.0.CO%3B2-I Europe-Asia Studies is currently published by Taylor & Francis, Ltd..

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/about/terms.html. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at http://www.jstor.org/journals/taylorfrancis.html. Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission.

The JSTOR Archive is a trusted digital repository providing for long-term preservation and access to leading academic journals and scholarly literature from around the world. The Archive is supported by libraries, scholarly societies, publishers, and foundations. It is an initiative of JSTOR, a not-for-profit organization with a mission to help the scholarly community take advantage of advances in technology. For more information regarding JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

http://www.jstor.org Sat Aug 25 00:09:02 2007

EUROPE-ASIA STUDIES, Vol. 50, NO. 5, 1998, 817-842

The Roman Catholic Church and

Democracy in Poland

MIRELLA W. EBERTS
Let us say this openly, people in Poland have begun to fear the priests, and this is not a good sign. Czeslaw Milosz My concept is of a liberal democracy . ... My God is the God of a free people. Fr. Jozef Tischner According to a well-known stereotype, Polish Catholicism is rustic and primitive, antiintellectual and shallow, ethnocentric and intolerant. It would be a frivolous lie to claim that such Catholics do not exist in Poland. It would be equally false, however, to argue that they dominate the Polish Church. Adam Michnik

THETRANSITION PROCESS TO DEMOCRACY and a market economy in Poland is being driven and shaped by a variety of important forces, but particularly by the Roman Catholic Church. It is impossible to understand the current political and socio-economic dynamics in Poland without discerning the power and role of the Church in Polish society. In the most recent past, for the majority of Poles, the Church has been a bastion of freedom and a source of protection from and opposition to the communist authorities. Activists engaged in the opposition to the communist regime, believers and non-believers alike, were aided by the Catholic clergy and given refuge in churches across the country. The Church, in sharp contrast to the ruling Polish United Workers' Party (PZPR), enjoyed immense support and respect. In fact, despite encountering obstacles and various forms of repression under the communist regime, particularly during the Stalinist phase, the Church grew in strength and influence. It emerged from the communist period not only as the highest moral authority but also, in large measure by securing important concessions from the communist authorities, as the most powerful institution in the country. Yet the powerful and privileged position of the Church has posed an important dilemma for the democratisation process in Poland. Not unlike the PZPR hierarchy in the past, the Church has been attempting to secure a leading role in Polish society, both in public and private spheres. With the fall of the communist order, the Church immediately sought to obtain the widest possible influence over the emerging democratic institutions and the policy-making process. It has aimed to ensure that its positions on religious education, abortion and birth control, among others, become
0966-81361981050817-26 O 1998 University of Glasgow

MIRELLA W. EBERTS firmly entrenched in the new democracy. Although there has been growing opposition to the political activism of the Church, there is little indication that its involvement has diminished. Most significantly, the Church's role in the new Poland has not yet been fully defined. The important question facing the Poles today is no longer whether Poland will become a consolidated democracy, particularly since all political forces, including the former communists, seem firmly committed to this type of political system. Rather, the crucial question is what model of democracy Poland will follow. Will it be a democracy in which Church-state separation is constitutionally guaranteed and upheld in practice? In other words, will the Polish state be religiously and ideologically neutral? Or will Poland be a democracy in which there is no formal Churchstate separation, and the Church is in a privileged position to exercise influence over state institutions and the lives of all citizens? This article provides an overview of the Church-state situation in Poland, focusing specifically on the role of the Church in post-communist politics and public affairs. First, the nature of Church-state relations under communism is briefly summarised, with particular attention to the reasons for the unique position of the Church in Polish society. Second, the article looks at the Church's engagement in post-communist politics and public affairs, addressing the most explosive and controversial areas targeted by the Church: religious education, abortion, elections and the media. Third, the post-communist attempts to officially define the status of the Church in Polish society and establish a new basis for Church-state relations are discussed. More specifically, the most important aspects of both the new agreement with the Holy See and the new Polish Constitution are examined. Finally, the article presents an overall assessment of the Church-state situation in post-communist Poland. The Church-state situatioa under commuaisin For centuries Roman Catholicism has been an important part of the Polish national identity, and the Church has been a symbol of freedom and opposition to foreign oppressors. During the partition period of Polish history the Polak-katolik identity became firmly solidified. When the Polish state ceased to exist after the partition of 1795, the Church became the guardian of Polish national identity. Membership in the Church represented in fact a form of 'resistance to foreign domination and oppression by non-Catholic powers',' and Catholicism became equated with Polish patriotism. When Poland fell to communism after the end of World War 11, the Party could not undermine the historical significance of the Church and its central role in the lives of the majority of Poles. As Stalin had correctly judged, turning Poland into a communist state was indeed like 'fitting a cow with a saddle'. The difficulty of the task was augmented by the fact that almost the whole population was Catholic in post-war Poland. As a result of the war, Poland lost its sizeable non-Catholic minorities and became, both ethnically and denominationally, a relatively homogeneous state. Since the end of the war, Roman Catholics have accounted for over 90% of the country's total population.2 The communist period can best be described as one of both conflicts and coexistence between the Church and the state. The communist regime made consider-

THE CHURCH AND DEMOCRACY IN POLAND

819

able attempts to weaken the role of the Church in Polish society and to bring the Church hierarchy under its control. But, at certain times, it also cooperated with the Church, often granting it important concessions in the process. In September 1945 the Polish government terminated the 1925 Concordat,' effectively abolishing any privileges that the agreement gave to the church.' But in the immediate post-war years the communist regime generally sought to coexist with the Church and even attempted to appease it: 'worship was freed from interference, Communist dignitaries attended public religious ceremonies, numerous church buildings were reconstructed with State assistance, and even the army was ordered to assist Corpus Christi p r ~ c e s s i o n s ' . T he regime's perception during this period was that cooperation ~ between the Church and the state was beneficial for the war-torn country. The Church and its lay circles benefited from the regime's friendly attitude, and even two important Catholic periodicals began to be published in this period: Tygodnik Powszechny (Universal Weekly) and Zrzak (The Sign).6 In the late 1940s and early 1950s the regime's friendly attitude was replaced by a growing attack on the ~ h u r c h It~ . brought in tight censorship on Church publications and suspended the Church's radio programmes. The regime also took over the Church's largest charitable organisation, Caritas, and nationalised its hospitals. In March 1950 it expropriated most of the Church's land. However, in April 1950 the Church and the government unexpectedly signed an agreement which promised certain freedoms and benefits to the Church in exchange for its willingness to promote respect for the communist authorities8 Among other things, the government promised that the Catholic University of Lublin could continue to function as usual, and that the existing religious education programmes in public schools would not be restricted. Despite the agreement, the regime continued to interfere in the Church's affairs and curb its activities. In 1952 a new Polish Constitution was passed, officially establishing Church-state separation. In reality, the state did not abide by the principle, as it continued to bring the Church under its control. In September 1953 the regime arrested the Polish Primate, Cardinal Stefan Wyszynski, and by the end of the year eight bishops and 900 priests also found themselves in prison.9 Moreover, the authorities filled some of the most important posts within the Church hierarchy with the so-called 'patriotic priests', or priests the communists found a ~ c e p t a b l e . ' ~ However, when in 1956 the regime needed the Church's help to solve the unstable internal situation following the workers' revolt in Poznan, the authorities once again attempted to appease the Church. In turn, the Church cooperated with the regime, in exchange for a number of concessions, including the release of Primate Wyszynski from house arrest." After his release, Wyszynski made a quick appeal to the Poles: 'Our motherland demands now from you much calm, much caution, and many, many prayers'.I2 In exchange for the Church's cooperation, the authorities signed a new agreement with the Episcopate in December 1956.'"mong other things, the agreement reinstated the Church's control over its internal affairs and appointments. Shortly afterwards, however, the regime curbed some of the privileges recently granted to the Church, including banning religious education from public schools. This pattern continued throughout the communist period. Whenever the regime needed the Church's help to deal with internal crises, it gave concessions to the Church, and in return, the Church cooperated with the authorities and appealed to

820

MIRELLA W. EBERTS

the Poles for calm. This was particularly the case during the periods of workers' unrest in the 1970s and the Solidarity movement in the 1980s. At the same time, the Church was a safe haven for dissidents. Poles flocked to the churches in symbolic opposition to the communist authorities, as they had done for centuries whenever Poland was under foreign occupation. During the turbulent Solidarity years, Catholic and non-Catholic activists and intellectuals gathered in churches across the country. The Church once again became a symbol of freedom, and firmly established itself as the only legitimate authority in the country. As the communist authorities became increasingly dependent on the Church to help stabilise the explosive domestic situations, the Church gradually gained more political influence. As a result, the number of concessions given to the Church also gradually expanded. In the 1980s, for example, the authorities increased the number of permits for new church buildings, such that, as Ost notes, 'despite the worst housing crisis in decades, the decay of schools and hospitals, and an appalling lack of day care and nursing home facilities, the Church enjoyed a construction b ~ o m ' . In 1984 the head '~ of the Office of Religious Denominations reported that the number of churches and chapels, as well as priests, had doubled under the communist regime.15 Then, immediately before the collapse of the communist order, on 17 May 1989, the Sejm passed a number of important statutes regulating matters affecting Churchstate relations.'"his legislation represented the last phase of the communist regime's liberalisation concessions toward the Church and all believers. The Statute on Freedom of Conscience and Creed guaranteed, among other things, the freedom of religious convictions and the right to keep silent on matters of religious beliefs and to participate in religious celebrations. The Statute on Social Insurance of Clergyman ensured that the state would bear a large share of the social insurance costs of the clergy. But the most important regulation for the Church passed by the Sejm was the Statute on the Relationship Between the Catholic Church and the State. The statute defined the legal position of the Church in Poland, guaranteeing it autonomy from the state, including sole control over its offices. It also provided the Church with a variety of tax and customs exemptions, including property tax release. In addition, it included regulations for restitution of Church properties. These statutes are still in effect today. In the end, the Church emerged from the communist period not only as the highest moral authority but also as the most powerful institution in the country. With the important concessions from the de-legitimised communist regime in hand, the Church set out to further expand and secure its privileged position in the new democratic environment. Attempting to institute its own vision of democracy through direct and indirect political engagement, the Church became the most dominant force in the transition period.
The Church irz post-communist politics and public affairs

Having perfolmed the roles of the de facto official opposition and of the mediator between the communist government and Solidarity, the Church entered the postcommunist period as a heavily politicised institution. Taking advantage of its prestigious position, the Church moved quickly to expand its influence in the public

THE CHURCH AND DEMOCRACY IN POLAND sphere. Religious education and abortion became the first important targets of the Church's political agenda, producing controversial debates within Polish society and challenging the principle of Church-state separation. An equally problematic area of the Church's growing involvement in politics and public affairs became its engagement in elections, including often aggressive agitation in support of a particular candidate or coalition. Finally, having considerable difficulties adjusting to the new pluralist environment, the Church has also attempted to influence the Polish media, sparking fears of renewed censorship and restrictions on freedom of expression.
Religious education in public schools

Less than a year after the fall of the communist order in Poland, the Church began to exert considerable pressure on the government to re-establish religious education in public schools. On 2 May 1990 the Polish Episcopate issued a communiquC in which it declared 'unanimous support for a full return of religious education to public schools and for the need to guarantee it in the constitution and in the statute on education'.17 The communiquC was followed by an Episcopal Letter in which the Polish bishops justified the call for a return of religious instruction to the public education system.18 The primary reason given by the bishops in support of their position was the historical significance of religion and religious education in the country, and particularly its role in the preservation of Polish national identity. The bishops also argued that re-establishment of religious education in public schools would serve as a form of compensation to Polish society for the wrongdoings of the former totalitarian regime, including its attempt to eradicate the presence of God in the lives of Poles. Under considerable pressure from the Church, the Mazowiecki government moved quickly to address the problem of religious education, refraining from conducting any broad consultations on the matter or putting the issue in front of the ~arliament." In August 1990 a special sub-committee of the Joint Commission of Government and Episcopate simply issued a communique announcing the re-establishment of religious instruction in public schools. Following the announcement, the Minister of Education, Henryk Samsonowicz, signed the Instructions on Religious Education in the 19901 1991 School Year, re-establishing religion lessons in public schools and kindergartens. According to the instructions, religion could now be taught in all public schools and kindergartens on the expressed wish of parents. The subject itself was declared to be optional, and the grade received in it would not be counted toward assessing the student's overall performance. The sudden reintroduction of religious instruction into the public school system caught most Poles by surprise. The country's Ombudsman, Ewa Letowska, quickly brought an action against the instructions before the Constitutional Tribunal on the basis that they violated the constitutional principle of Church-state separation, the 1961 Statute on Education (which established the secular character of public schools), the 1989 Statute on the Relationship Between the Catholic Church and the State, and the 1989 Statute on Freedom of Conscience and Letowska objected particularly to the undemocratic means by which religious instruction was reintroduced, arguing that it was up to the Polish Parliament to make decisions of

MIRELLA W. EBERTS such magnitude. On 30 January 1991 the Constitutional Tribunal ruled that the instructions did not violate the principle of Church-state separation nor any other statutory provisions. According to the Tribunal, since the programmes of religious education were determined by the Church itself, and since the education programmes designed by the state were not filled with religious content, the neutral and secular character of the state was being p r e ~ e r v e d . ~ ~ The ministerial instructions were followed by a new Statute on Education, passed by the Polish Parliament in September 1991, which further regulates public religious education.22 A particularly controversial point of the statute is contained in its preamble, which states that Christian values are to be respected in education. This threatens to undermine the secular character of public education in Poland and opens the possibility for Church interference in curricula. The statute also contains a provision that the specific conditions for and way of organising religious education in Poland are to be determined by the minister of education with the agreement of the Church and other religious denominations. On 14 April 1992 the new Minister of Education, Andrzej Stelmachowski, signed a ministerial order specifying the details of organising religious education in public schools.23The order increased the number of religious classes from one period to two periods a week, and introduced a new subject, ethics, which can be chosen in place of religion. Both religion and ethics were declared to be optional, but parents are obliged to present a declaration if they do not wish to enrol their children in either of the courses. The minister decided that students would receive a grade for religion/ ethics, and those not attending either of the courses would have a dash placed on their transcripts. Despite being non-mandatory, the subject of religionlethics would be placed in the second position on the transcript, next to the grade for conduct. The order also allowed the recitation of prayer and the placing of religious symbols in classrooms. Commenting on the presence of religious education in schools, Stelmachowski declared that 'there is no such thing as separation of the state from religion, because no human being is one hundred per cent a - r e l i g i o ~ s ' . ~ ~ Shortly after the ministerial order on religious education was signed, a heated debate on the matter was held in the Sejm. Deputy Danuta Waniek strongly objected to the order, arguing that it violated the freedom of conscience and creed and the principle of Church-state separation.25 According to Waniek the issue should have been debated in the Sejm, and in addition to the clergy, the teachers should have been consulted on the matter. She accused the minister of colluding with the Church in its attempt to turn Poland into a denominational state. Objections to the order, and to religious education in public schools in general also came from some right-wing, Catholic deputies, such as Janusz Korwin-Mikke, but for entirely different reasons. Declaring proudly that he was is not a democrat but a Catholic, Korwin-Mikke objected to the introduction of religious education in public schools, fearing that such a move would turn Polish youth against religion.26 He pointed to the example of Sweden, where the Lutheran Church is the official state religion, but where citizens are predominantly irreligious. In response to the debate, Minister Stelmachowski defended his order, concluding that 'the rights of minorities must be guaranteed, but a situation cannot arise where a sensitivity toward minorities paralyses the rights of the majority'.27

THE CHURCH AND DEMOCRACY IN POLAND In August 1992 the new Polish Ombudsman, Tadeusz Zielinski, brought an action against the order before the Constitutional Tribunal on the grounds that it violated the constitutional principle of Church-state separation.28 The Tribunal in essence upheld the order, challenging only the article specifying that a parental declaration must be given if a student was not to be enrolled in religionlethics classes, and the article allowing prayer and the presence of religious symbols in classrooms. Thus, it seems that the Church has successfully fulfilled its goal of reintroducing religious education in public schools. Once the new Concordat, guaranteeing religious instruction in public schools, is implemented, there will be little debate on the matter. Administrative and regulative issues with respect to public religious education will continue to be addressed, but, as Gowin points out, 'it seems to be already decided that religion lessons will remain a permanent feature of school life'.*' Nonetheless, the issue of religious education in public schools will continue to be a problem for Polish democracy. It is yet to be seen to what extent the Church will be able to influence educational curricula, particularly since Christian values are to be respected in public education. There is an indication that in some cases teachers have come under pressure from the local clergy, failing, for example, to provide sex education courses to students." Nevertheless, according to opinion surveys, the majority of Poles appear to favour religious instruction in public schools. An October 1995 survey, conducted by the Public Opinion Research Centre (CBOS), indicated that 67% of those polled approved of religious education in public schools, whereas only 30% opposed it.31Given the strong public support for it, there is little chance that religious instruction will be returned to parochial schools. Abortion Perhaps the most controversial and socially divisive area of the Church's involvement in post-communist politics and public affairs is the issue of abortion. Under the 1956 abortion law women could obtain abortions practically on demand, and to most Polish women the procedure served as a form of birth control." The Church and its pro-life supporters have always opposed the law, but it was not until the fall of the communist order that their call for a ban on abortion was able to come to the forefront of important political issues. Even before the partially free parliamentary elections took place in June 1989, an anti-abortion draft bill was introduced in the Sejm, calling for an unconditional ban on abortion." The bill was drawn up by deputies sympathetic to the Church, under the direction of lawyers appointed by the Polish pisc cop ate.^^ But the parliamentary debate on the draft was postponed, and the abortion controversy did not resurface again until August 1990, when the Senate began work on a new anti-abortion draft. At this time, just after it had successfully pressured the government to reintroduce religious instruction in public schools, the Church set out on a large-scale anti-abortion campaign.35 The Church's sudden push to ensure the outlawing of abortion was connected in large measure to the coming visit of John Paul 11. The Pontiff declared firm support for the Polish Episcopate's anti-abortion efforts, and the bishops wanted to present their countryman with an anti-abortion law on his visit in June 1 9 9 1 . ~ ~ The Episcopate's Commission on Family Matters submitted its own proposals to the

MIRELLA W. EBERTS anti-abortion draft committee, favouring a complete ban on abortion. While the issue was being addressed in Parliament, the clergymen concentrated in their sermons and statements on the plight of the 'conceived child'.37 They also mobilised the Church's followers to sign petitions against 'the killing of innocent children', threatening, in some cases, to refuse the sacrament to anyone not opposing abortion." The most profoundly anti-democratic stand taken by the Church with respect to abortion was its firm opposition to a proposed referendum on the issue in 1991.'~ The Episcopate strongly objected to the idea, arguing that the right to life could never be subjected to people's opinion.40 Undoubtedly, the Church and its right-wing supporters objected so strongly to a referendum in large measure because opinion polls conducted at the time indicated overwhelming support for a b ~ r t i o n . Defending the ~' Church's position on the matter, a deputy of the Christian National Union (ZChN) argued that 'a referendum shows what people think about specific subjects. But in this case we are dealing with a moral issue. In such matters, you don't go around asking people's opinions. Good is good and evil is evil regardless of what the majority or the minority think'.42 Firmly convinced that they held the superior moral position, the Church and its zealous supporters successfully prevented the Poles from being able to decide on such a critical matter. As was the case with religious education, decision makers in Poland would succumb to the pressure from the Church. After three years of heated exchanges on the issue, the Sejm passed an antiabortion law on 7 January 1993.~'The Polish Primate. Cardinal Jozef Glemp, referred to the law as only 'a step in the right di~ection','~ since it did not fulfil the Church's wishes completely. Instead of ensuring a total ban on abortion, the law permitted abortions in a number of exceptional cases: (1) when the woman's life or health is seriously threatened; (2) when the fetus is irreparably damaged; and (3) when the pregnancy occurred as a result of rape or incest. Anyone performing an abortion illegally could face up to two years imprisonment, but the woman undergoing the procedure would not be punished. The law was perhaps more liberal than the Church wanted it to be, but was in effect extremely restrictive, since a decisive majority of Polish women who underwent the procedure previously did so for reasons other than those accepted under the law.4" Even before the law was passed, women had already begun to experience considerable difficulties in obtaining abortions. In 1992 a new code of medical ethics was introduced by the board of the Chamber of Physicians, which forbade doctors from perfonning abortions except in some limited cases.46 Those not abiding by the new code were threatened with having their professional licences revoked, and, as a result, most physicians refused to perfonn abortions in public hospitals. The passage of the new anti-abortion law placed women in a graver situation, particularly since in some instances even those qualifying for an abortion were refused the procedure: a pregnant woman from Krakow was refused an abortion despite providing an official police report that she had been raped.47 According to Hadley, the law produced 'the desolately familiar symptoms of outlawed abortion ... police raids on clinics, small ads appearing in the newspapers: "Gynaecologist: Interventions" '.48 The 1993 anti-abortion law represented a serious attack on women's civil liberties, and amounted to yet another advance in the Church's attempt to impose its moral vision on Polish society. Although the Church was not completely satisfied with the

THE CHURCH AND DEMOCRACY IN POLAND

825

law, since it has never agreed to the legalisation of abortion even in the case when the woman's life is threatened. it did not continue to campaign for a total ban on abortion.49 undoubtedly, the Church's decision not to press harder for a stricter anti-abortion law stemmed from the fact that opinion surveys continued to indicate strong support for less restrictive legi~lation.~' According to a CBOS poll conducted in February 1993, 58.2% of respondents opposed the Church's position on abortion. and only 33.2% supported it." It is perhaps not surprising. then. that in the September 1993 elections, parties vowing to liberalise the restrictive abortion law obtained the majority of seats in the Sejm. The Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) and the Labour Union (UP) had particularly favoured such liberalisation and set out to fulfil their election promises. In summer 1994 the Sejm passed an amendment to the abortion law, which would allow abortions when the woman had 'difficult living conditions or a difficult personal ~ i t u a t i o n ' But the pro-Church and anti-abortion President, Lech Walesa, vetoed the .~~ amendment, arguing that 'No economic barriers can legalise assassination of a human life, especially personal conditions of a woman, which cannot be objectively verified' .53 The issue was not put to rest, though, and in August 1996 the Sejm once again passed a liberalised anti-abortion bill. The law met with harsh criticism from the Church, and the Secretary of the Polish Episcopate, Bishop Tadeusz Pieronek, called it 'a crime against humanity'.54 Similarly outraged, in a letter to the Episcopate, Pope John Paul I1 declared that the 'Church in Poland is in mourning because of the criminal law approved by the Sejm'.55 Bishop Kazimierz Ryczan provided an even more critical and hostile response: 'Unworthy parliamentarians, I pay tribute to the mothers who decided to give birth to you, though it would have been better for Poland if they had thought like you did. Then you simply wouldn't be here'.j6 In churches across the country clergymen abhorred the liberalised law, and, in some cases. expressed their anger in a most extreme and questionable fashion. For example, in St Joseph's Church in Torun one of the worshippers was shocked to discover an anti-abortion creche displayed during the 1996 Christmas holiday: 'My child asked: "What is it?" I looked, and instead of baby Jesus, there were gynaecological tools in the cradle'.57 Interpreting the passage of the new law as an attack on its fundamental beliefs and institutional basis, the Church found it extremely difficult, in this case, to respect a democratically reached decision." Despite the hostile Church-state climate spurred by the Sejm's decision and the Church's anti-democratic stand, President Aleksander Kwasniewski signed the liberalised law on 20 November 1996.~'Under the new law, women facing difficult living conditions or having personal problems could terminate their pregnancies before the 12th week. In order to obtain the procedure for either of these reasons, women had to give their written consent and undergo counselling. The law allowed abortions to be performed in both state hospitals and private clinics, where the procedures could not be legally offered before. The law also contained a provision to improve the knowledge and affordability of contraceptives. In fact, President Kwasniewski urged that it was 'necessary for the state, the Church and social organisations to cooperate to liquidate the reasons for a b ~ r t i o n ' . ~ '

826

MIRELLA W. EBERTS

It is very unlikely, however. that the Church will cooperate with anyone on this matter, as its position on birth control, like that on abortion, offers little room for compromise. Upholding the traditional Matka-Polka image. the Church considers procreation and motherhood to be the 'supreme mission' of Polish women.61Supporting unreliable 'natural' forms of birth control and preaching the evils of artificial methods, the Church would eagerly outlaw modem contraceptive techniques if it were possible. But even here the Church's position seems to be out of tune with that of most Poles, who increasingly do not share its unyielding attitude toward birth control. According to a 1992 poll conducted by CBOS, 67.9% of respondents did not approve of the Church's opposition to the usage of contraceptives, and in 1996 this figure rose to 73.3%.62 In December 1996 a group of senators took the liberalised anti-abortion law to the Constitutional Tribunal, alleging that it violated the ~onstitution.~' 28 May 1997 On the Constitutional Tribunal ruled that five of the articles of the liberalised antiabortion law were unconstitutional. including the provision allowing women to obtain abortions for material or personal reasons.64 Generating a considerable legal controversy, the Tribunal justified its decision on the basis that in a democratic state, human life, being the fundamental value, was implicitly protected from its conception by law. The Tribunal's decision was welcomed by the Church, including Bishop Pieronek, who exclaimed that he 'felt safer in Poland' 65 after the ruling. On 17 December 1997 the newly elected Sejm accepted the Tribunal's decision by a margin of 71 votes, thereby reintroducing the 1993 abortion restrictions. But it is very unlikely that the matter will end here, given not only its controversial nature but also the Church's support for a complete ban on abortions. In view of its firm position on the issue, it is doubtful whether, in the near future, the Church will abandon its anti-democratically charged engagement in abortion politics, and devote its energy to appealing to the people's conscience from the pulpit instead. One can expect that abortion will continue to divide the Poles, and the Church will play an important role in the continuing debate on the issue. Electiorzs The Church's eagerness to shape Polish democracy according to its own vision and design has become particularly visible during elections. and more specifically in election campaigns. During the partially free democratic elections of June 1989 the Church became an active and vocal participant in the campaign process.66 Most parishes were turned into campaign headquarters for Solidarity, and some priests took part in selecting the opposition candidates. Those attending church services were instructed for whom to vote and why. In effect, clergymen became campaign spokesmen for individual candidates. However, given the momentous significance of the 1989 elections. the Church's engagement in this particular campaign was met with overwhelming approval from the public. According to Gowin, 'the elections were seen to be a plebiscite for or against the totalitarian regime; the Church's engagement was perceived, then, in moral, not political, ~ a t e g o r i e s ' .Given that the Church ~~ served as the centre of opposition to the communist regime, its engagement in the first democratic, albeit semi-free, elections since the inter-war period was condoned by the

THE CHURCH AND DEMOCRACY IN POLAND public. For the most part, the Church supported all opposition candidates. though in some cases representatives of small Catholic groups ran against the Solidarity candidates with the backing of the Primate. Jozef ~ l e m ~ . ~ ~ In the 1990 presidential election the Church remained officially neutral, as there were two important Catholic contenders, Lech Walesa and Tadeusz ~ a z o w i e c k i . ~ ~ Mazowiecki, espousing a more liberal version of Catholicism than Walesa, was probably less favoured by the Church. While the Polish Episcopate did not officially endorse either of the candidates, individual priests clearly supported and urged their parishioners to vote for Walesa. Thus, despite official claims to the contrary. the Church became unwilling to withdraw from the country's political life. The Church's political engagement grew even stronger during the October 1991 parliamentary election. In the period leading up to the election, as Gowin points out, 'many priests gave organisational and moral support to the emerging right-wing political group^'.^' The Church was eager to influence the Polish political landscape by lending support to parties and coalitions which represented its values and interests. But despite these partisan efforts, the first official statements issued by the Episcopate in the months before the election professed the Church's political neutrality:
In response to the accusations sometimes raised that the Church is intervening in politics, we answer categorically that Catholics in Poland have a duty and a right to defend Christian values in public life, just as do other communities based on different beliefs. We are also stating clearly that we do not express support for any concrete side. We do not point to any pre-election lists. We will ensure that, in churches and chapels, the priests do not carry out, or allow others to carry out, an election campaign or agitation on behalf of any particular

andi id ate.^'
However, there was already an indication that the bishops preferred those candidates who espoused Christian values. In reality, one was hard-pressed to find the Church's position during the 1991 parliamentary election neutral. Abortion became the most important election issue, and the bishops urged all Catholics to judge each candidate based on her or his attitude toward the protection of the unborn.72Just days before the election took place, the Episcopate issued a communiquC in which it cautioned that 'only those political groups which clearly support the protection of life from conception, respect the rights of families, and show concern and respect for Poland and its Christian traditions, should receive from believers a mandate to establish laws and work for the common good'.73 Attached to the communique was an unofficial and unsigned document containing a list of political groups which gained the Church's approval. Copies of the document were sent to parishes across the country, and local priests treated the list as an official instruction to the Church's followers on how they should vote. Individual clergymen gave equally open guidance during masses, including Bishop Jozef Michalik, who exclaimed: 'A Catholic has the responsibility to vote for a Catholic, a Christian for a Christian, a Muslim for a Muslim, a Jew for a Jew, a Mason for a Mason, and a Communist for a C o m m ~ n i s t ' Even during the day of .~~ the election, and contrary to the Polish electoral law, the Church was actively campaigning for its choice of candidates during the Sunday masses. Yet perhaps to the Church's total surprise, the results of its aggressive engagement during the 1991 election were an increased division within the Catholic community

MIRELLA W. EBERTS and a growing fear that the Church was attempting to take the place of the Communist The political results of the election must have been equally disappointing to the Church, as only 49 of its heavily favoured Electoral Catholic Action candidates were elected to the extremely fragmented ~ e j mIn ~ ~ . contrast, the Democratic Union (UD), which was subject to severe attacks from the clergy, gained 62 seats in the Sejm. Ironically, as Gowin points out, 'the parties most severely attacked from the pulpit were not the former communist ones, but the UD, in which there were many The Catholics who did not share the political preferences of the Church h i e r a r ~ h y ' . ~ ~ Church's decision to engage in the 1991 election campaign severely weakened its moral authority in Poland. A November 1992 poll conducted by CBOS indicated that an overwhelming majority of Poles, 81.3% of the respondents, opposed the Church's direct engagement in political life. Aware of its weakening authority, the Church was more cautious during the 1993 parliamentary election. The Episcopate once again issued a communiquC addressing the electorate, stating that the Church 'has a voice on every important social and political matter, though, given its mission and competence, in no way does it identify with a political group, or with any political system'.78 Moreover, the communiquC declared that 'bishops and priests do not participate in public political debates, do not run for office, and do not participate in the election campaign; instead, they point to the moral criteria which, according to the Church's teachings, should be followed by Catholics when choosing representative^'.^^ The Episcopate avoided any aggressive steering of voters toward a particular political group or issue, but it did insist that Catholics should not choose candidates whose political programmes did not support the good of the nation and Christian morality.80Not directly telling the voters to reject the revamped communists, the bishops did remind them that they 'cannot forget about the painful experience of the recent past'." Again, the Episcopate's cautious appeal did not produce the expected results, as Poles voted the former communists back into power. The results were interpreted as a moral and political defeat of the Church itself, since the winners turned out to be political parties whose positions on such issues as abortion, for example, differed considerably from those of the church.'' The bishops appeared calm after the election: 'We respect the results of the election . . . and express readiness to cooperate in all matters serving the individual and the common good'.8' In the bishops' view, the Church did not suffer a defeat in the election because it did not officially back any of the candidates. But in the opinion of some Church supporters this was precisely the reason why the conservative, pro-Church parties were so unsuccessful, and they blamed the bishops for not loudly backing those defending Catholic interest^.^" In the 1995 presidential election the Church did not officially abandon its cautious political stand. A few of the presidential contenders were clearly favoured in Church circles, such as Lech Walesa, Hanna Gronkiewicz-Waltz or Jan Olszewski, but no official statements were issued by the Episcopate in support of these candidates. The Episcopate did, however, issue two formal communiquCs on the question of the presidential election. In the first statement the bishops declared that 'believers have a moral obligation to vote for candidates who represent their views, values and interest^'.^^ Most importantly, however, the Episcopate advised its followers against choosing for the presidential post anyone 'who during the time of the totalitarian

THE CHURCH AND DEMOCRACY IN POLAND

829

regime wielded power at the highest party-government The bishops' statement was clearly directed against Kwasniewski, a former leading PZPR member, whose victory the Church feared. In the second communiquC the bishops took a much sharper tone, and, although not pronouncing his name directly, explicitly warned people against voting for Kwasniewski. At the same time, the Episcopate maintained that it remained neutral in the election campaign: 'We do not want to force anything on anyone or make the choice for anyone'.87 While the Episcopate did not officially endorse any of the candidates by name, individual bishops and priests were less careful. In churches across the country, priests urged their parishioners to vote for a given candidate.88 On the parish announcement boards one could find election advertisements: 'Catholics! On 5 November we are voting only for [name of the favourite candidate]', and on the doors and fences of churches hung large posters appealing to the candidates themselves: many schools, in religion '[name of the favourite candidate] save poland! ' .8"n classes, the children were sent home with the task of convincing their parents to vote for a given presidential candidate, being told that by doing so they would please the Holy ath her." The engagement of the clergy in the election campaign became even more pronounced during the second round, when only two contenders remained, Lech Walesa and Aleksander Kwasniewski. According to some observers, 'after the results of the first round of the election were announced, where until now only the language of metaphors was used, there appeared a language of direct agitation and instruction'." Individual bishops and priests openly voiced their support for Walesa, and the Polish Primate instructed the clergy to hold masses and to pray for 'the election of President W a l e ~ a ' . ' ~ Despite the Church's efforts, and contrary to its wishes. the overwhelmingly Catholic Poles decided to vote for Aleksander Kwasniewski, who received 51.72% of the eligible votes. Lech Walesa obtained 48.28% of the votes. Notwithstanding the relatively small margin, Kwasniewski's victory was seen, just as the SLD's victory in the 1993 parliamentary election, as a moral and political defeat for the Church i t ~ e l f . ~ ' The reactions of various members of the Church hierarchy were wide-ranging, but few among them agreed that it was the Church that emerged as the biggest loser in the election. Archbishop Henryk Muszynski argued that the terms winner and loser did not apply to the Church, because it did not officially support any particular candidate." On the other hand, Father Michal Czajkowski thought that the Church had both lost and not lost in the election: 'It lost in the sense that it turned out that our preaching is evidently too weak, . . . it was ineffective toward many people . . . But, on the other hand, I see in the electoral results also a chance for the Church. The two pieces of furniture that stood too close to each other, the altar and the throne, will move away from each other a little bit'." Father Henryk Jankowski had difficulty accepting the election results: 'I cannot imagine how declared Catholics could have voted for a candidate with a communist past'." When asked whether the Church lost the election, the Secretary of the Episcopate, Bishop Pieronek, responded: 'The Church loses when the human being loses, when something bad happens to him, when he makes the wrong choice in the moral sense. If he makes the wrong choice in the political sense, that is actually a matter of indifference to the Church, even though it is not indifferent to people in the Church'.97

830

MIRELLA W. EBERTS

One would be hard-pressed to claim that the Church was not, even if only symbolically, a loser in the election. Despite the assertion that the Church did not officially support a particular candidate, in reality, most Poles felt that the Episcopate had its clear favourite. A poll conducted by CBOS in September 1995 indicated that two-thirds of the respondents thought that the Church favoured Lech W a l e ~ a The~ .~ triumph of Kwasniewski in the 1995 presidential election was, if anything, indicative of the weakened authority of the Church. It was also indicative of the people's opposition to the Church's active engagement in Polish politics. In 1996, according to a poll conducted by CBOS, an overwhelming 85.8% of respondents declared that they were against the Church's direct participation in political life.99 But despite the negative public attitude toward its political activism, the Church has proved reluctant to relinquish its fight to secure a 'leading role' in public life. Pursuing its evangelical mission and attempting to influence the nature of Polish democracy, the Church claims to have little concern for public opinion: 'It is actresses and politicians who seek popularity. While engaging in public matters, the Church often acts against popularity-gaining rules. We are not a girl who is taking part in a beauty contest'.'00 Despite this claim, and perhaps because it had learned an important lesson, the Church took an even more careful stand during the 1997 parliamentary election than it did during the November 1995 presidential election. In August 1997 the Episcopate issued a communiquC in which it urged Poles to take part in the parliamentary election on 21 September 1997, but it cautioned that the mission of the Church could not be tied to any specific political party."' At the same time, the bishops declared that they were not indifferent to the fact that some political groups embraced Christian values while others rejected them. The bishops also declared their dissatisfaction with the decisions made by the SLD-led Sejm, but did not specify which parties, if elected, could be expected to produce better results. Commenting on the cautious stand of the Church officials during the election, Bishop Pieronek stated that it was 'the result of specific experience, and experience is not gained easily'.'02A priest, Pieronek argued, 'should not, as a representative of the Church, agitate for a specific party'.'03 At the same time, he was adamant that a Catholic 'cannot under any circumstances support a party which shows totalitarian aspirations or resorts to immoral methods in its activitie~'.'~%owever, he also noted that 'this does not mean that all of the actions of a party to which Catholics should not belong must be boycotted'.lo5 This time the Church's cautious attitude paid off as the pro-Church Solidarity Electoral Action (AWS) won the most votes, 33.83%, and obtained 201 seats in the sejm.lo6The SLD received 27.13% of the votes, securing 164 seats in the Sejm. Unable to secure enough votes, the AWS was forced to form a coalition government with the centre-right Freedom Union (UW), whose views do not always concur with those of the Church. Nevertheless, the Church was obviously pleased with the election results. Speaking on behalf of Church officials, Bishop Pieronek has stated his expectation that the AWS politicians will help to protect Church interests in the new sejm.lo7 Obviously one cannot attribute the victory of AWS to the Church's cautious stand during the election in a simplistic manner, but its result may direct Church officials toward a greater neutrality in future elections. At the same time, given the Church's position and interests, one would be little surprised if it continued to play a prominent role during future political contests, regardless of whether others approved of it or not.

THE CHURCH AND DEMOCRACY IN POLAND

Media

83 1

The media have also become a problematic area of the Church's engagement in post-communist politics and public affairs, contributing to the growing tension between the Church and Polish society.108In December 1992, after a heated debated, the Sejm adopted the Statute on Radio and Television Broadcasting, which compels broadcasters to produce programmes which 'respect the Christian system of values'.lO"o some observers, the law amounts to a renewed censorship attempt on the Polish media, particularly since the 'Christian values' criterion is rather vague and can be subject to questionable interpretations. To the members of conservative Catholic circles, such as Stefan Niesiolowski of the ZChN, there is little vagueness in the law, as it clearly implies a ban on satirical remarks about the Church and prohibition of anything dealing with sexually explicit material, including the advertising of condom~."~ There has been some attempt, on the part of the Church and its conservative supporters, to influence the content of the Polish media. For example, the ZChN deputies pressed charges against a Polish rock band for producing a song about a priest who had a car accident while drunk, and had the song taken off the air.'" The same deputies have also attempted to control the type of movies shown to late night Polish viewers, successfully opposing the screening of some films.112 The Church has also attempted to exert pressure on the country's National Radio and Television Council. In February 1997 the representatives of the Polish Episcopate met the Council in order to express their concern over what they saw as excessive commercialisation of public television' .ll' According to the Episcopate's representatives, among them Bishop Pieronek, there are too few programmes promoting ethical and moral values being shown on Polish television. Given the Church's interest in the type of programming being offered to Polish viewers, it is not surprising that some Poles see it as an attempt to impose Catholic censorship on the Polish media. At the same time, there is some indication that Poles are almost equally divided on the issue of religious censorship. According to a 1996 CBOS poll, almost 50% of respondents were in favour of censorship protecting religious feelings of believers, whereas 35.3% of respondents were against it.ll%nce again, public opinion may prove irrelevant in this matter, as the Church will most probably continue to put pressure on the National Radio and Television Council to ensure that radio and television programmes reflect Christian values according to the Church's own interpretation.

Dejining the Clzurclz's oj$cial status in the new democracy

The Church's problematic engagement in post-communist politics and public affairs can, in large measure, be explained by the fact that the role of the Church in the new political system remains to be clearly defined. The law which has so far regulated Church-state relations in Poland, and defined the legal status of the Church, has been the already mentioned 1989 Statute on the Relationship Between the Catholic Church and the State, passed under the old regime. The statute guaranteed the Church autonomy from the state, including sole control over its offices, and, among other

832

MIRELLA W. EBERTS

things, provided it with a variety of tax and customs exemptions. But the two more fundamental documents which will firmly define and entrench the Church's position in the new democracy are the Concordat and the Constitution. A new Concordat, which will replace the 1989 Statute regulating Church-state relations, was signed by the Suchocka government in 1993, but was not accepted by the Polish Parliament until January 1998. Also, after years of heated debates, a new Polish Constitution was passed by the Zgromadzenie Narodowe (National Assembly) in April 1997, and approved by citizens in a referendum in May of the same year. Both documents establish the basis for a new form of Church-state relations, and will have a profound effect on the type of democracy Poland will be. Given the significance of the documents, both the context in which they came into being and their most relevant provisions merit a brief examination.
The Concor-dat

With the fall of the communist system in 1989, the Catholic hierarchy increased pressure on the government to normalise Church-state relations in Poland, and particularly to re-establish the official ties between the country and the Vatican. The first important move in that direction was the renewal of full diplomatic relations between the Holy See and Poland on 17 July 1989.~'"nce Poland's relations with the Vatican were normalised, the Catholic hierarchy became particularly eager to obtain a more permanent document regulating Church-state relations within the country. As a consequence of the growing Church pressure, the ongoing negotiations on a new Concordat were speeded up, and a final document was quickly signed by the Suchocka government on 28 July 1993."~ Because the agreement was signed very quickly, without any political debate and after President Walesa dissolved the Parliament, not only some of its provisions but even the manner in which the Concordat was concluded were severely criticised."' In fact, it seems that the Suchocka government had yielded to the Church's pressure and simply forced the agreement on Polish society. The Church itself has also been criticised for the secretive way in which the Concordat was concluded. According to Gowin, the Church 'once again ignored the need to inform and convince the public of the rightness of its proposal'.118 Not surprisingly, then, the agreement spurred controversy and became the subject of heated political debates. Although the Church has been eager to have the document implemented, it took over four years for the Concordat to be finally approved by the Parliament and President Kwasniewski. Having serious legal reservations about the Concordat's provisions, the SLD, the leading partner in the 1993-97 governing coalition, opposed the ratification of the In 1996 Tadeusz Iwinski, the party's deputy, stated that the SLD 'is not opposed to the Concordat as such, but [is] against this specific version'.20 Eventually, the party declared its willingness to take a second look at the document in the Sejm, but only after the referendum on the new C~nstitution.'~' In fact, the party's position on the matter was in agreement with the 1996 Sejm decision to ratify the Concordat only after the new Constitution was accepted.12' In April 1997 the Cimoszewicz government signed a unilateral declaration clarifying and interpreting a number of provisions of the agreement, thereby indicating its willingness to

THE CHURCH AND DEMOCRACY IN POLAND

833

move forward on the issue.123 However, amidst continuing objections and reservations to the agreement, it failed to resolve the Concordat problem before the September 1997 parliamentary election. Ratifying the Concordat became a top priority for the new AWS-UW coalition government. Marian Krzaklewski, the AWS leader and a strong Church supporter, was particularly anxious to live up to his election promise of quickly addressing the issue: 'Poland needs the Concordat, and public opinion polls show that the majority of Poles support the agreement. There is no reason to prolong this matter'.12"n 8 January 1998, with 273 votes supporting the motion and 161 opposing it, the Sejm accepted the 1993 onc cord at.'^^ The Senate complied with the Sejm's decision and gave its support to the agreement on 22 January 1998, which was then quickly signed by President ~ w a s n i e w s k i . 'Once implemented, the agreement will substantially ~~ redefine Church-state relations in Poland. The purpose of the Concordat is to firmly set out the rights and duties of the Church in Poland, and, at least from the perspective of the Holy See, to obtain the largest possible number of prerogatives for the Church. The Church was able to secure a particularly favourable range of privileges in the agreement, further strengthening its position in Poland. In fact, as Daniel points out, 'in the Polish case, the general objective of the Concordat seems to be establishing the entanglement between the Church and state'.lZ7 Some of the provisions contained in the agreement are indeed problematic, and pose a considerable challenge to the principle of Churchstate separation. The first article of the Concordat declares that 'the State and Catholic Church are, each in its own domain, independent and a u t ~ n o m o u s ' , but~ it does not mention the '~ word 'separate'. In fact, the same article assumes that the Church and state will 'cooperate for the development of mankind and the common good'.'29 This 'soft' or 'friendly' Church-state separation ensures that the Church will hold a privileged position in Polish society. The agreement expands some state obligations toward the Church, ensuring, for example, the provision of state subsidies for Catholic schools and educational institutions owned and operated by the ~ h u r c h . ' " It also obliges the state to provide financial support for the maintenance of buildings and works of art belonging to the C h u r ~ h . ' ~ ' The Concordat also contains a guarantee that public schools and kindergartens will organise, whenever there is a demand, religious education courses as part of their regular c u r r i c ~ l a . " ~ the same time, however, the programmes of religious eduAt cation, including any textbooks to be used in religion courses, are to be determined solely by the Church, without any consultation with the government. Moreover, the teachers have to be appointed by the Church, although their professional qualifications are to be regulated by agreements between the Episcopate and the government. The teachers, on all matters relating to religious education, are responsible only to the Church, and can instruct religion courses only as long as they have the permission of the local bishop to do so. These and other provisions contained in the Concordat ensure and reinforce the privileged status of the Church, and substantially blur the line of Church-state separation in Poland. Some of the provisions of the agreement are inconsistent with the existing laws, which will probably be changed once the document comes into

MIRELLA W. EBERTS effect. For example, the current marital law will have to be modified in order to accommodate the Concordat's provision that canon law matrimonies hold the same legal status as civil marriages. Thus, the Concordat, as Daniel points out, 'not only significantly strengthens the position of the Catholic Church, but it also indicates a gradual inclusion of Christian values in the axiological base of the changing legal system7.'" The actual application of the agreement may yet prove problematic for the new Polish democracy. Tlze Constitiition The fundamental law which formally defines the Church's place in the democratic Poland is the new Polish Constitution. It was in the making since 1989, and the final draft, approved by the Zgromadzenie Narodowe on 2 April 1997, was the product of a wide-ranging compromise. As a result, with few exceptions, the document accommodates the Church's vision of a democratic Poland and ensures its special status in Polish society. On 25 May 1997, in a referendum with a voter turnout of 42.86%, Poles approved the document by a small margin: 52.71% were in favour and 45.89% against it.134 he new Constitution came into effect on 17 October 1997. Given its significance, the Church took an active stand in the constitution-making process, and the current document reflects the Church's efforts. The Church had a firm position on what it wanted to find in the new Polish Constitution. In May 1996 Bishop Pieronek stated that the Church 'wants the document to respect national traditions and Christian values'.'35 In February 1997 the Episcopate issued an official statement on the ~ o n s t i t u t i o n . First, the bishops demanded a reference to God (the '~~ I~zvocatioDei) in the preamble. Second, they declared that the Constitution should guarantee the protection of human life from conception until death. Third, the bishops insisted that 'the Constitution cannot leave any doubt that a marriage can only be granted to members of the opposite sex, that is, to a man and a woman'.'37 Finally, the Episcopate declared that the Constitution should contain a reference to the Polish Nation, since this identity encapsulates the history and culture of Poles. Thus, although the Episcopate did not demand that a clear reference to Christianity be made in the new Constitution, it did want the document to reflect Christian values, as defined by the Church. The new Polish Constitution, as a document of political compromise, incorporates many of the Church's demands, but does not turn Poland into a denominational state. The preamble of the Constitution invokes God as the source of 'truth, justice, goodness and beauty' ' 1 8 but also mentions non-believers, who may derive these universal values from other sources. The preamble also refers to the Christian heritage of the Polish Nation, but does not point to Catholicism or the Church specifically. According to Article 25 of the Constitution, the Polish state is religiously and ideologically neutral, and the relations between the state and all denominations are based on the principle of the 'autonomy and independence' 13' of each. As in the Concordat, the article does not specifically mention the word 'separation', and also points to the 'cooperation for the good of mankind and for the common good' between the state and all denominations. Thus, one can argue that the Constitution, too, provides for a friendly Church-state separation. The same article also states that

THE CHURCH AND DEMOCRACY IN POLAND

835

'the relations between the Republic of Poland and the Catholic Church are based on the international agreement with the Holy See and on other laws'. The Catholic Church is singled out here, pointing obviously to its important status in Polish society. Article 53 of the Constitution guarantees to everyone the freedom of conscience and religious beliefs, and allows religious education in schools, providing that it does not 'violate the freedom of conscience and religious beliefs of others'.14' The same article also states that 'no one can be forced to take part or not take part in religious practices'. Finally, as the Church demanded, the Constitution specifically states that marriage is a union between a woman and a man.141 However, to the great disapproval of the Church, the Constitution does not ensure the protection of human life from conception until birth. Instead, the document states that 'the Republic of Poland guarantees each person legal protection of life'.'" Bishop Tadeusz Pieronek has pointed out that, from the perspective of the Church, the failure to protect human life from conception until birth is an important flaw of the constitution.'" At the same time, he also argued that the document did not contain anything unacceptable to believers. The Church, at least officially, took a neutral stand on the issue of the Constitution, and did not actively engage in the constitutional referendum campaign. Before the referendum Bishop Pieronek announced that the 'Church will urge participation in the referendum, but the way each citizen votes is their own business'. 14' However, in some churches anti-constitutional leaflets were being distributed to parishioners, calling on them to reject the new Constitution in the referendum.'" But the Church claimed no responsibility for the dissemination of the leaflets. The AWS and the right-wing Movement for the Reconstruction of Poland (ROP) have been the primary political opponents of the new Constitution, but they also claimed no responsibility for the distribution of anti-constitutional material in churches. Commenting on the problem of the leaflets, Bishop Pieronek appealed to worshippers not to use churches for political purposes, but said that the Church would not take any action on the matter: 'In a way we are helpless when faced with the pushy attitude of various politicians and propaganda men. We would have to clear up these leaflets and throw them away all the time. This is something for the rubbish men'.146This position obviously contradicted the Church's official declaration of neutrality toward the referendum on the new Constitution. With the new Constitution now in effect, one can expect that the Church-state situation in Poland will gradually become more stable and less politically charged in nature. The fact that the Constitution does contain guarantees that the state will not have a denominational character represents good news for the supporters of liberal democracy in Poland. However, it must be noted that once the new Concordat is implemented, the Church will hold a privileged position vis-u-vi~other denominations. In the end, it is, of course, impossible to assess at this point how the new Constitution will be interpreted and applied in practice. Looking at the document, one can speculate that the Church-state relations in Poland will most probably resemble those in a number of other democratic and predominantly Catholic countries, such as Spain. According to Linz, 'Spain is the model of a friendly or at least nonantagonistic separation of church and state'.'" One can expect that Poland will follow Spain's example. Moreover, Spain 'is normatively different from the American model of

MSRELLA W. EBERTS separation in the sense that it allows cooperation between the church and the state and recognises the special position of Catholicism in Spanish ~ociety'.~" this regard In too, the Polish case will very probably resemble the Spanish one.
Assessitzg tlze Churclz-state situatiotz itz post-conznziinist Poland

The democratic transition process in Poland has been compounded by the additional challenge of Church interference in politics and public affairs. Holding the status of the highest moral authority in the country, the Church expected to play a dominant role in the new democracy. Given that the Church's engagement in public affairs has had a long history in Poland, one should be little surprised that the Church has not been willing to leave the political scene in the post-communist period. The most problematic aspect of the Church's political engagement has been the institution's attempt both to impose its own system of values on all Poles, regardless of their personal convictions, and to shape the emerging Polish democracy according to its own interests. The radical changes in areas such as religious education and abortion have been the result of the Church's direct pressure on the post-communist governments, and, in turn, of their receptiveness to its ideas. As was pointed out here, many of the important changes were introduced in a secretive and rapid manner, sparking growing opposition to the Church's involvement in politics and public affairs. In fact, one can argue that, in the name of the Catholic majority, the Church has been attempting to impose its own system of values against the same majority's popular opinions. As the CBOS surveys have indicated, the majority of Poles do not agree with the Church's stance on divorce, abortion, birth control or pre-marital sex.1491t seems that in the case of Poland, what the Church has not been able to achieve by persuasion from the pulpit, it has attempted to implement by force through state laws. Despite its leading role in the struggle for democracy, the Church was obviously unprepared for the political and social realities of a democratic system. With the introduction of democratic decision-making processes, there no longer remained a need for the Church to act as the 'official' opposition or to play the role of a political mediator. It is evident that the Church is experiencing considerable difficulties in adjusting to the new pluralist and democratic environment, and particularly to the fact that it is no longer the only authoritative and legitimate institution in the country. It also seems that the Church is reluctant to accept fully the democratic rules of the game. In the case of abortion, for example, the Church firmly opposed any referendum on the issue, but had no trouble accepting the Sejm's anti-abortion decision. Thus, it is evident that the Church supports democracy and democratic decisionmaking processes only as long as the results achieved are in agreement with its position or serve its interests. In the view of the Church, 'the Polish state was supposed to be democratic in form, but Christian in content'.'" But the nature of a pluralist and democratic system is such that the content cannot be firmly predetermined in advance, and the Church quickly learned that the new Polish democracy does not fit perfectly into its Christian mould. As a result, as Gowin points out, 'antagonism toward democracy and a tendency to pit it against the natural law principle grew in Church circle^'.'^' The

THE CHURCH AND DEMOCRACY IN POLAND problem of the Church's hostility to the modern, pluralist and liberal conception of a democratic state may be explained, in part, by the fact that many, if not the majority, of the Church hierarchy hold an inter-war vision of a democratic Poland. According to Father Michal Czajkowski, 'there is an attempt to restore the type of public life that existed before the war, forgetting that Poland has changed, the world has changed, and the Church has also changed'.'52 Unfortunately, a return to the inter-war type of democratic and Christian Poland would also mean, as Czajkowski admits, 'a return to that which was not the prettiest in our Church, which we are slowly unlearning from the time of the Second Vatican ~ o u n c i l ' . In ~ ' ~ other words, a return to the inter-war model of a democratic Poland would mean a return to the nationalist and intolerant Catholicism, where the Polnk-kntolik identity would reign supreme and the Church would be prominent in the public sphere.'54 Although officially the Polish Episcopate has not supported the inter-war vision of a democratic Poland, some clergymen have been espousing a nationalist and intolerant Catholicism. One of the most prominent examples is Father Henryk Jankowski of the St Brygida Church in Gdansk. Jankowski's well-publicised sermons have been filled with nationalistic and anti-semitic overtones, sparking opposition from Jews and non-Jews alike. In 1995 Jankowski placed in his church an Easter grave display which contained the symbols of what he thought were the greatest plagues that have hit Poland in the past 50 years.'" These included, among others, the swastika, the hammer and the sickle, and even the name of the liberal-democratic Freedom Union. Commenting on the grave, Jankowski stated that he did not have to include the Star of David in the display because it was already embedded in two of the symbols.'56 In 1996, referring to the Polish Prime Minister's apology to Jews for the 1946 Kielce pogrom, Jankowski remarked that 'apologising to Jews is an insult to the Polish nation'.'57 Jankowski's remarks are obviously indicative of the intolerance and anti-semitism which can be found within the ranks of the Church. It is this type of nationalist and intolerant Catholicism that would be most likely to characterise the new Polish democracy if it were to follow the inter-war model. However, the Church is not a monolith and there do exist more liberal tendencies among its ranks. Father Jozef Tischner is an excellent example of the more tolerant and open Catholicism, which rejects any attempt to create a confessional state. Tischner has urged the Church to accept the new Polish democracy, even if its content is not as Christian as the Church would wish: 'Here I think that the Church should do a very heroic thing and start accepting the state, even if it is not exactly as the Church would like it to be-even if the state is not a saint'.158Tischner also does not want the Church to become too entangled in politics because he sees the danger of the Church replacing the Party as the power broker. Tischner cites an example of the common perception that the Church has privileged access to the corridors of political power and can intervene on behalf of individual Poles as the communist hierarchy had done in the past: 'Some time ago, a hospital director in this area was dismissed by the new Solidarity authorities. This man came to me and asked if I would intervene to help him. He asked me to intervene in the same way that, before, people went to the local Secretary of the Communist Party. There are many cases like this all over'.'5y ultimately, Tischner is optimistic that the Church eventually will find its proper place and Poland will become a liberal state.Ib0

MIRELLA W. EBERTS There are essentially three general models that Poland may follow when it comes to Church-state relations. First, it can become a country with a clear Church-state separation, such as is the case in the United States. In this situation, a secularisation of the public sphere and privatisation of religion would most probably follow, sparking fervent opposition from the Church and the conservative Catholic elements in Polish society. Second, it can take the path of a denominational state, in which the Church would play a prominent role in the public sphere and exercise considerable influence over the lives of all Poles, regardless of their religious or personal convictions. Finally, it may follow the Spanish example of a friendly Church-state separation, which recognises the special role of Catholicism in Spanish society. Poland is most likely to follow the third model of Church-state relations, whereby the Church and the state officially will be autonomous and independent but will cooperate closely in many areas. One can also expect that gradually the Church will become less aggressive in the public realm and find its proper place in Polish democracy. However, the Church will probably never become apolitical. In fact, as Linz points out, the Church 'is not apolitical, it can never be, but is as nonpartisan as possible, and that is what most of the faithful and those who are nonpractising and religiously indifferent expect from it'.I6' According to Bishop Pieronek, the Church's role cannot be restricted 'to some association of canary breeders that deals with only one problem'.'62 Although officially the Church does not want Poland to become a confessional state, it will always attempt to shape Polish society according to its own views: 'If the people want to have one type or another political and economic system, then it is all right with us. We respect this, but it does not mean that we will remain ~ i l e n t ' . ' ~ ~ o n s e ~ u eonel can only hope that the Church's voice will never be nt ~, powerful enough to completely silence those who do not share its vision of a democratic Poland.

Conclusion

In the end, Church-state relations in Poland have still to take on a clear shape. As evidenced here, the post-communist period has been characterised by considerable tension between the Church and Polish democracy. Given the new Polish Constitution and the Concordat, one can expect that the Church-state situation in Poland will become more stable. At the same time, one can also expect that the tension between the Church and the democratic state will never dissipate completely. The Church will most probably continue to press for its own vision of a democratic Poland, and whether it will be able to do so by political force or by the power of persuasion from the pulpit will remain a crucial question. In an important sense, the Church's mission poses an inherent danger to Polish democracy because, as Michnik points out, the 'vision of a clean world is a totalitarian vision par excellence'.'" It remains to be seen whether the Church will accept the imperfections of a pluralist and democratic model of Polish society.
University of Toronto

THE CHURCH AND DEMOCRACY IN POLAND

I R. C. Monticone, The Catholic Church in Conznzulzist Poland 1945-1985 (New York, Columbia University Press, 1986), p. 3. K. Daniel, 'The Church-State Situation in Poland After the Collapse of Communism', Brighanz Yo~ingUniversity Lnwl Review, 2, 1995, p. 402. A concordat is an international agreement between the Holy See and a given state, which defines the rights. privileges, andlor duties of the Roman Catholic Church in that state. '' B. Szajkowski, Next to God ... Poland (London, Frances Pinter, 1983), p. 9.
Ibiil.. 10.
Ibiil.. p. 11.
Ibid., p. 13. Ibid., p. 14.
lbid., p. 16.
Ibid.
Ibiil.. p. 17.
'I Ibid.
I' Ibiil.. pp. 18-19.
" D. Ost, Solidarity and the Politics o f Anti-Politics (Philadelphia, Temple University Press,
1990), p. 157 I' Monticone, p. 199. l 6 Daniel, pp. 4 0 6 4 0 8 . l 7 J. Gowin, Kosciol DO kornuniznzie (Krakow, ZNAK, 1995), p. 140. l8 Ibid., pp. 140-141. l 9 Ibid., pp. 141-142. Ibid., pp. 142-143.
Ibid., p. 143.
" Ibid.. D. 144.
Ibid., 145.
'4 J. Hayden, Poles Apart (Portland, Irish Academic Press, 1994), p. 169.
" D. Waniek, Speech in the Sejm, 25 April 1992 [http://ks.sejm.gov.pl].
J. Korwin-Mikke, Speech in the Sejm, 25 April 1992 [http:/ks.sejm.gov.pl]. '7 A. Stelmachowski, Speech in the Sejm, 25 April 1992 [http:/ks.sejm.gov.pl] Daniel, p. 409, n. 47. Gowin, p. 146. " ~ a y d e n , - p169. . " J. Kaminski. 'Poles Divided Over Church's Renewed Political Role', Transition, 2, 7, 1996, p. 13. M. Fuszara, 'Legal Regulation of Abortion in Poland', Signs, 17, 1, 1991, pp. 117-118. Ibid., p. 124. '%. Kulczycki, 'Abortion Policy in Postcommunist Europe: The Conflict in Poland', Popzilation and Development R e ~ ~ i e ~ t , , 3, 1995, p. 483. 21, Gowin, p. 106. Ibid. '7 Kulczycki, p. 484.
J. Hadley, 'God's Bullies: Attacks on Abortion', Fenzinist Rel'ien;, 48, 1994, p. 98.
39 Hayden, p. 167.
Gowin, p. 108.
" Hayden, p. 167.
" Ibid., pp. 167-168.
" Gowin, p, 11 1.
" Kulczycki, p. 485.
" Hadley, pp. 98-99.
" Ibid., p. 98.
47 Ibid., p. 99.
" Ibid.
Gowin, p. 107.
Ibict., p. 112.
J. Bijak, 'Rachunek sumienia', Poltiyka, 20 April 1996, p. 21.
" Gowin, p. 114.
" Ibid.
5"~ew Law, Old Debate', Warsaw Voice, 8 September 1996 [http:ll
www.warsawvoice.con~.pl].

p.

'

' "' "

" ''

h.

'' '"

" ''

'' '' ''

'' "' "

MIRELLA W. EBERTS

Ibid Ibid. " .Heard in Passing', Warsalv Voice, 19 January 1997 [http:llwww.warsa\v\~oice.com.pl]. " 'New Law, Old Debate'. 'Kwasniewski Signs Liberalized Anti-Abortion Law', FBIS Daily Report, 20 November 1996 [http://wnc.fedworl~ov]. Ibict. " Fuszara, p. 125. Bijak, p. 21. " K. Montgomery, 'Sedziowie o aborcji', Gnzeta Wyborczn, 30 May 1997, p. 1 64 ~bict. " 'Znow walka o aborcje', Gnzetu Wyborcza, 30 May 1997, p. 4. Gowin, pp. 44-45. " Ibid., p. 45. 68 Ibict. 69 Ibid., p. 46. " Ibid. " Ibid., p. 47.
Ibict., p. 48. ' 7 " Ibid., p. 49. '"bid.. D. 51. 75 Ibid., ;). 50. A. Antoszewski & R. Herbut (eds), Leksykon politologii (Wroclaw, atla 2, 19951, p. 475. 77 Gowin, p. 50. l 8 .Decydowac o ksztalcie dobra wspolnego', Tygodnik Po~t,szechny, 27 June 1993, p. 13.
55

"

'" ''

'"

''

''
"

79

bid..

Ibid. ' I Ibid. " Gowin, p. 53 83 Ibid. '"bid., p. 54. " Z. Nosowski, 'Katharsis? Kosciol a wybory prezydenckie 1995', Wiez, January 1996, p. 61. Ibid. " Ibid., p. 62. A. Krzeminski & E. Nowakowska, 'Suma po wyborach', Polityka, 2 December 1995, p. 5. 89 Ibid. 90 Ibid. 9' Ibid. " Ibict. Ibid., p. 3. 94 Ibict., p. 8. 95 Ibid., p. 4. " Ibid., p. 6. " 'Church Official Interviewed on Elections', FBIS Daily Report, 21 November 1995 [http://wnc.fedworldgov]. 98 'Majority: Church Should Stay Away from Politics', FBIS Dailj' Report, 21 September 1995 [http://wnc.fedworld.gov]. ~ i j a k p. 21. , lo" 'Catholic Church Fears SLD Win in Elections', FBIS Daily Report, 19 September 1995 [http://wnc.fedworld.gov]. "" '290. Zebranie Plenarne Episkopatu Polski . . .', Tygodnik Powszechny, 7 September 1997, p. 2. lo' 'Nie wierze w polityke katolicka' (interview with Bishop Tadeusz Pieronek), Tygodnik Pou~szech~zy, September 1997, p. 5. 21 lo' Ibid. lo' Ibid. lo5Ibid. 'Oh A. Kubik & P. Pacewicz, .Wreszcie znamy Sejm', Gazeta Wyborczii, 25 September 1997, p. 1. '"' 'Ludzie chcieli zmian' (interview with Bishop Tadeusz Pieronek), Politykci, 27 September 1997, p. 8.

'' ''

"'

"'

THE CHURCH AND DEMOCRACY IN POLAND

Daniel, p. 413.
Gowin, p. 154.
Hayden. p. 170
"I Il7id.. o. 171.
"'
Ibid. 'TVP zagraza ko~nercja i politycy', Rze~z~ovpolita,5 February 1997 [http:/l www.rzeczpospolita.p1]. "'Bijak, p. 21. "'Gowin, p, 166. Ibid. "' owin, p. 169. G Ibid., p. 176. 'SLD Deputy Notes Problems with Concordat', FBIS Daily Report, 22 July 1996 [http:llwnc.fedworld.gov]. lZo Ibid. I" J. Paradowska & M. Janicki, 'Finisz bez mety', Polifyka, 19 April 1997, p. 21. .Bad Faith?', Wcir.ya,v Voice, 14 July 1996 [http://www.warsawvoice.com.pl]. 'Konkordat: rzad przyjal deklaracje', Rzeczpos/,olita, 16 April 1997 [http:l/ www.rzeczpospolita.pl]. 12' M. L i z ~ ~.Konkordat i diabel', Gazetn Wyborczn, 9 January 1998, p. 1. t, I" Ihicl. lz6 'Tak dla konkordatu', Rzeczpospolita, 23 January 1998 [http://www.rzeczpospolita.pl]. "'Daniel, p. 410. 128 The Polish Concordat of 1993, Art. 1, in J. Gruca, Spor o konkordnt (Warsaw, Adam. 1994), p. 66. "" Ibid. "O The Polish Concordat of 1993, Art. 14, in Gruca, p. 70.
"I Ibid., Art. 22, 54, in Gruca, p. 74.
"'Ibid., Art. 12, in Gruca, p. 70.
Daniel, p. 412. 13"Konstytucja przyjeta', Rzeczpovpolita, 28 May 1997 [http:l/www.rzeczpospolita.pll. 135 .Church Official on Concordat, Constitution', FBIS Daily Report, 24 May 1996 [http:l/ wnc.fedworld.gov]. .Oswiadczenie Rady Stalej Konferencji Episkopatu Polski w sprawie projektu Konstytucji', Tygodnik Powszechny, 23 February 1997, p. 1 1.
Ibid.
The Constitution qf the Republic of Poland, 2 April 1997, Preamble
[http://www.rzeczpospolita.pl].
bid., Art. 25.
Ibid., Art. 53. I" Ibict., Art. 18. "'Ibicl., Art. 38. I" "Now Comes the Hard Part', Warsaw Voice, 13 April 1997 [http:l/ www.warsawvoice.com.pl]. [bid. I " 'Church Official Denies Handing Out Anticonstitutional Items', FBIS D a i l ~ Report, 28 April 1997 [http://wnc.fed~orld.go\~]. Ibid. Id' 7. J. Linz, 'Church and State in Spain from the Civil War to the Return of Democracy', Daedalus. 120, 1991, p. 174. 14' Ibid. Bijak, p. 21.
Is" Gowin, p. 73.
I s ' Ibid.
Is' S. Grabska et nl., 'Cry Polsce grozi teokracja?', Wiez, November/Decernber 1990, p. 9.
Is' Ibid., p. 10.
"' wi in, pp. 18-19. o .The Golem of Gdansk', U'nrsn~. Voice, 11 August 1996 [http:ilwww.warsawvoice.com.pl). P. Raina, Ks. Henryk Jankou,ski rlie ma za co przeprasznc (Warsaw, Ksiazka Polska. 1995). p. 10.
15' .The Golem of Gdansk'.

Io8 Io9

MIRELLA W. EBERTS

'51
'59 16' 16'

IG4

Hayden, p. 165. Ibid., p. 164. Ibid., p. 166. Linz, p. 175. 'Catholic Church Fears SLD Win In Elections'. Ibtd. A. Michnik et nl., ~Miedzypnnem n plebalzern (Krakow, Z N A K , 1995), p. 655.