NGO and Donor Coordination To Speeds up Reconstruction and Avoid NGO Competition

NGO and Donor Coordination to Speeds up Reconstruction and Avoid NGO Competition
Arwin Soelaksono
Website: http://www.disaster-response.cc Email: arwinsoelaksono@gmail.com
November 9, 2009 2008-2009: Deputy Director Construction Department Aceh Program Save the Children 2005-2008: Operations Director Tsunami Disaster Response Project Habitat for Humanity Indonesia

Abstract During 2005-2006, in cities like Banda Aceh, Meulaboh and other parts in West Coast, the presence of Non Government Organizations (NGOs) made these places feel small. These places were crowded of organizations. Nearly everyone was in a high spirit to run their program. Bad things happened when NGOs persuaded beneficiaries to receive someone's program and in the same time reject others. Conflicting programs amongst NGOs was another problem as a result of the lack of NGO or donor coordination. The presence of one program affected the quality and delivery schedule of other program. When it getting worse the size of the program reduced and impeded. And at the end it created bad attitudes amongst the beneficiaries. There should be a way on strengthening NGO coordination otherwise there will be a hard competition amongst NGO. Keyword: tsunami, coordination reconstruction, NGO, competition,

Indonesia, many 2005 New Years parties were cancelled and people donated their money to government offices, social and religious organizations. The fundraising was a remarkable success. By the end of 2005, the world raised an estimated $13.6 billion. Some 92 countries provided assistance during the first year, including countries such as North Korea and Niger, themselves in need of aid [3]. For Aceh the total commitment of USD 7.7 billion was the biggest funding ever committed for the relief effort [4]. By mid 2005 more than 5,000 international humanitarian workers started arriving in Aceh [5]. During the heyday of rehabilitation and reconstruction of Aceh there were 124 International NGOs, dozens of United Nations (UN) organizations and 430 local NGOs [6]. Funded with a substantial amount of money, workers from big NGOs came and hit the ground running. However everyone faced difficulties due to the massive devastation of infrastructure and in some places mainly in the West Coast even public services were wiped out by the tsunami. The implementation of relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction projects under those circumstances was even more difficult due to the uniqueness of the beneficiaries background. The tsunami victims trying to rebuild their lives were people who had lived through a 32 years high intensity of conflict, both vertical and horizontal [7]. People in this circumstance tend to be insecure about their future. Due to peace and war repeatedly happening, they have difficulties running their business in long term process. The war can destroy their wealth or investment overnight which makes many of them live just for short term opportunity. It is difficult to combine their mindset to work and manage their expectation with NGOs approach in the development work. Previously in development work there were no large construction projects. In Aceh, NGOs who had no previous experience in construction became real estate developers promising to build hundreds or even thousands of houses. Others started to look like a construction company when pledging to build quite a number of schools, clinics and other public infrastructures. NGOs with strong support from donors who provide large

I. INTRODUCTION Officials describe the December 26, 2004 tsunami as one of the worst natural disasters in recent history [1]. The five countries that suffered most due to their coastlines being swallowed up by tsunami were India, Indonesia, the Maldives, Sri Lanka and Thailand. Several other countries were also affected including Bangladesh, Myanmar, Kenya, Malaysia, the Seychelles, Somalia and Tanzania [2] . Extensive media coverage reported the impact in the aftermath of the tsunami. Massive destruction of infrastructure, public facilities and housing in those countries was widely reported through many media from traditional publications as newspapers to more recent technology such as video streaming. The coverage became more dramatic when the media reported on the loss of life. Approximately 225,000 people died or are still missing. Overall, an estimated two million people were directly or indirectly affected, and 1.7 million of these were internally displaced [2]. During the preparation of the 2005 New Year and weeks after, television companies inundated their viewers with horrific and heartbreaking footage of the tsunami victims. Contrasting the cheerfulness of New Year celebration to the tragedy, it created deep sympathy. For instance, in Jakarta,

NGO and Donor Coordination To Speeds up Reconstruction and Avoid NGO Competition

amount generous funding can do this. However, funding aside, is there any in-house-capacity in the organization to manage the construction work? The question becomes more critical when realizing the circumstances in Aceh and the massive construction that needs to carried out. The lack of in-house-capacity eventually becomes a big problem for many NGOs, which results in quality concerns, fraud and costly implementation. In short there are three components which made the Aceh reconstruction unique: enormous donations flooding Aceh, conflict affected beneficiaries and lack of in-housecapacity in the NGO to work in construction. These three components eventually lead to a larger problem which is competition amongst NGOs. II. COMPETITION ON THE FIELD In the early coordination meetings with local government almost every NGO submitted their plan on types of their interventions. This included the size of the program such as how many houses will be built or other public infrastructure such as clinics, schools, water sanitation facilities and local government facilities as well. Obviously the program varies from one NGO to another depending on the funding availability. Then responding to the commitment, local government issued Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on who will work where. Competition on having beneficiaries It was not clearly realized the when allotting the area of work before long started to create tension between NGOs. On the MOU between local governments and the NGOs, the agreement says how many clinics or schools or houses in certain sub-district an NGO will build. But it did not mention the village. In the early pledge NGOs gave ambitious commitment. Pledges of more than a thousand houses were a common promise. But the commitment was given before the cost of construction surged to more than double along the fourth quarter of 2005 [8]. The price of construction material was at the peak along first half of 2006. The sky rocketing prices were shocking to every NGO. They were forced to redo the budget; many of them seeking approval from donors. For instance in housing construction many NGO had to reduce their commitment by up to 50% its earliest commitment. Theirs took time some needed several months to explaining to the donor and get approval for reducing the target. During this time the construction in the field was slowed down or even halted. The beneficiaries were frustrated since they thought the NGO had abandoned their commitment. Even if the donor has no objection to any target changes, there was no assurance the progress in the field was in full swing. Beneficiaries selection to ensure their eligibility was a long and tedious process and impeded their progress. Process of procuring construction materials and awarding to the job to contractors was also a challenging job. Reports on low quality materials or bogus contractors appeared many times in the NGO meetings.

The situation made the progress in the field was quite slow. The construction sites were looked desolated and neglected by the NGO. Other NGOs who were newly arrived, saw this as an opportunity to help the beneficiaries out from their frustration. With opened arms the beneficiaries accepted the new plan. Sometimes the new NGO gave promises that they could work faster and build better houses. Soon in that village two or even NGOs or even more were competing to get the beneficiaries. Both NGO have legal agreement with the local government. One resumed their work and the other was doing assessment and socializing their program. The competition started to keep or to get the beneficiaries to accept the program. In this case, it meant competition to win beneficiaries to give them houses. Situation mentioned above is just an example. Other similar conditions occurred in others area in housing reconstruction. For example there were two NGOs in Langung village at Meurebo sub-district in Aceh Barat District and in Crak Mong Village Mukim Kulam Mulia at Sampoiniet sub-district, Aceh Jaya District who competed for beneficiaries. The case of competition in Crak Mong Village in Lhok Kruet Area On February 2005 Yayasan Obor Berkat Indonesia (OBI) in partnership with Habitat for Humanity Indonesia (HFHI) signed MOU with the Head of Aceh Jaya District to build 1,600 houses in the area of Lhok Kruet, Kudhee Patek and Pulo Raya. The MOU did not mention clearly that those are located in Sampoiniet sub district. But in the MOU the District Head was assured there will be no other NGO work in those areas working with the same intervention. Lhok Kruet itself is a village from out of total 12 villages in Mukim Kulam Mutia. Lhok Kruet is widely known for its beautiful beach and its public facilities, particularly because they have Puskesmas (regional community health center). That is why Mukim Kulam Mulia is also known as Lhok Kruet area. One village in this area is Crak Mong village in which HFHI opened their office and main warehouse as the operation center of its construction work in 4 villages in Lhok Kruet area. Those villages are Alue Gro, Meunasah Kulam, Housing construction in other three villages progressed, but not in Crak Mong. In this village the beneficiaries had disagreement amongst themselves. Some of them wanted to have on-site reconstruction, which is on the land of their previous houses which were wiped out by tsunami. Meanwhile others wanted to have a relocation site at the hill. HFHI told the community to settled their differences and choose where they wanted to build. The dispute went on for 10 months, keeping HFHI from commencing their work. On February 2006, the problem is got bigger.

NGO and Donor Coordination To Speeds up Reconstruction and Avoid NGO Competition

Canadian Red Cross (CRC) came to HFHI showed their MOU with the Sub-district Head, showing that Crak Mong was their working area. The same area with two MOUs signed by different government entities, one is the District Head and the other is Sub-District Head. Soon the situation instilled tension between the two NGOs. CRC asked HFHI to hand over the area. At that time it was difficult for HFHI to release Crak Mong because of three reasons. They had already built its operation center there, reported Crak Mong as their working area to Headquarters and people from Crak Mong who are working in HFHI still expected HFHI build their village. Then the competition started. HFHI proposed to build houses on their previous land instead on the hill. The decision to work on-site reconstruction was based on engineering calculations that to build on the hill they would have to have additional cost on road infrastructure. Obviously it is costly to open a new road to the hill. CRC came to Crak Mong villagers, and promised them that they would get temporary shelter from International Federation of Red Cross (IFRC) on their previous land. CRC also promised that by June 2006 they would have a brand new house on the hill. So Crak Mong beneficiaries would have two houses. One is the temporary shelter and soon they will have the brick house too. The proposal from CRC certainly outbid HFHIs offer. To settle the dispute, the Office of the UN Recovery Coordinator for Aceh and Nias (UNORC) organized the villagers to vote. They had to choose who will build their houses. On May 19, 2006 the voting took place and as predicted, CRC won the vote [9]. Competition on the completeness of the services When the construction works started there is no uniformity on the design of houses that will be built. The Government of Indonesia (GOI) clearly stated that they would build 36 sq meter house for the tsunami victims [10]. And from the guidelines as from Sphere standard of 3.5 meters per person, a 36 sq meter home can accommodate 10 people [11]. Based on these many NGOs calculated their budget; to decide how many houses can be built on their pledge. This was good since each NGO can determine what kind of house they will build including choosing what kind of material to use for construction. By the middle of 2005 when the construction works were beginning across Aceh, people started to see differences. There were so many variations on the type of houses. There were one story and two story houses. One NGO built a stone masonry house, others built timber houses or combination on both of them. One built 36 sq meters other built 45 sq meters. Then the people start to compare and became troubled with jealousy. In May 2005 [12] at a coordination meeting in Meulaboh (Aceh Barat District) an NGO presented their plan to build 45 sq meters houses, which is 9 sq meters bigger than the

standard. The local authorities then ruled that the minimum size for all homes to be built in Meulaboh in the future would be 45 sq meters [13]. Local authorities were aware this will leads to reducing the number of houses. They prefered to choose fewer houses rather than have dispute and jealousy in their communities. Subsequently people in other district such as Aceh Jaya District, which is geographically side by side with Aceh Barat District started to asked their NGO to build 45 sq meters instead of 36 sq meters, too. During 2005-2006 for NGOs who built houses of 36 sq meters, it was common that the beneficiaries came to their NGO asking them to reconsider their design. At that time Turkish Red Crescent Societies set the bar as the most favorable design. They were widely recognized as providing a complete and well-designed house. German Red Cross was another one of the favorite since they delivered two stories and with robust structures. Some communities even asked NGOs to stop and leave if they were not going to give them bigger house. To some extent the competition brought good result. Every NGO tried to deliver good quality houses. But then another development came up. Some NGO gave their beneficiaries furniture such as bed in their new house. Others gave money so the beneficiaries can move to their new houses. The money is for paying transportation cost for their belonging or to purchase appliances. Again, another bar was set. The question is why there are so many gaps or differences among the NGO on how to deliver their houses. It happened because every NGO has their own approach. On giving complete houses or services, the NGO wants the beneficiaries to have a better life than before tsunami as soon as possible. This can help the tsunami victim out of their traumatic experience sooner. On the other hand NGOs who are strict with the standard size house have a different approach. They actually build a core house. And ask beneficiaries to make it complete or even bigger by themselves. On constructing the core house, the beneficiaries asked for participation. The house was given freely but they have to participate in construction such as guarding the material. The term for this is sweat equity. Competition due to conflicting programs These competitions were definitely different with those 2 competitions mentioned previously. The competition can happen in one area but affected because of the housing construction or diminish it. One of the example of this conflict is competition between Cash for Work (CfW) and construction work. How long CfW program should be done? The answer is always debatable. But for sure this CfW program should be stopped when the reconstruction work commenced. There are three arguments why CfW may hamper reconstruction works. First, it is difficult to find workers for construction. This is the common sense, working in

NGO and Donor Coordination To Speeds up Reconstruction and Avoid NGO Competition

construction works is a hard work. Why would choose construction which is harder if they can earn almost equal amount of money from CfW. From their experience, controls from the supervisors are stricter in the reconstruction work since the number of working people is less compared to CfW and the amount of works are easier to quantify. The other argument is the competition created higher cost for construction works. One of the most important characteristics of construction works is continuity. It means the work can not be stopped unless the project is completed. It is always costly to stop the work and then resume. Every restart takes mobilization cost and in the idle time, the equipments and field staffs still need to be paid regularly. In order to retain workers higher wages should be provided. The third argument is the beneficiarys participation was deteriorated. In a humanitarian approach, when doing intervention, including the reconstruction work, beneficiary participation is one of the keys of success. For example in housing reconstruction, the beneficiary can work as a labor when his house is being reconstructed. He/she can receive wages for this work and at the same time he/she built his sense of ownership during the construction. The CfW can distract them to leave working on their housing reconstruction to work in CfW program. In reality, the last argument seems not practical in Aceh reconstruction, since many beneficiaries were still working on their houses but sometimes has to work in other livelihood area such as fishermen or farmers as well. III. CONSEQUENCES OF COMPETITION On the 4th quarter of 2005, many agencies started to aware that they were on competition. But to stop it was too difficult since they endured tremendous pressure from the donor whom wanted them to complete their program real soon [14]. Then to keep the program running and to keep the communities as their beneficiaries, free-for-all competition amongst NGO went to a vicious circle. Even they wanted to stop it, the problem was getting bigger and they started to bear the consequences. No cost conscious on construction process, deteriorate the business practices prudence and inflicted severe inflation NGOs scrambled to purchase construction material such as red brick, timber, cement and reinforcement steel. Due to limited of local supplier or local producer to supply sufficiently to the demand, NGOs were willing to pay at any price to outbid other NGOs. This was enjoyable moment for the suppliers since in one day the price can be changed 2 or 3 times in a day. The depressing situation was not stopped there. Since surging price was no issue to NGOs, then suppliers set a new rule of the game. The paramount of the suppliers successes were they made NGOs paid full up-front without any collateral such as bank guarantee. In NGO which has no in-house-capacity in construction business they fell in this very risky game.

ADB reported that after the tsunami, prices increased more sharply than nationwide, particularly in Banda Aceh, where year-on-year inflation in October 2005 reached 37.5%largely due to the heavy demand for construction materials. The construction boom has also led to a 30 40% surge in wages across all professions [15]. Decreasing on quality of construction materials and the contractors The construction market was not ready for the construction boom. During the 32 years of conflict there were not so many construction works in Aceh. This affects to the construction material availability and the workmanship. 2005 marked as a challenging year for construction. It was difficult to find good quality on construction material and contractors. Houses which were built in that year heavily criticized due to poor quality materials. It happened since NGO purchased vigorously any construction material which available in the market. For instance based on the analysis of brick needed in construction works for 4 years, Aceh will shortfall of 350 million high quality bricks but has a surplus of 5.05 billion low quality one [16]. In the early year of reconstruction many contractors came and submit their company profile then asking for the job. Due to the competition amongst NGO, it was quite easy for a contractor to win a contract. And with the lack of in-house-capacity on managing construction work, the problem on quality concerns increase significantly. NGO do not have time or capacity to check thoroughly and professionally their applicant before awarding the contract. To have understanding on how challenging to choose the right contractor, the case of Badan Rehabilitasi dan Rekonstruki (BRR) on contractor prequalification phase is a good example. On March 2006, BRR open its prequalification for contractors who were interested in participating for rehabilitation and reconstruction. And the number was astonishing. There were 3,088 companies, mostly local contractors, who took the prequalification document. They were 2,885 contractors and 203 consultants. Later on 2,338 companies submitted the documents. And the result was 1,586 companies passed the prequalification. They were 140 consultants and 1,446 contractors [17]. The question is, if before tsunami there were not so many construction activities in Aceh, how come in that month there were a lot construction company want to get the job? Competition amongst NGOs blindfolded the agencies on choosing the genuine contractors. Ever demanding beneficiaries People who suffered prolonged conflict have difficulties managing their expectations for results which need long term process. They prefer to take the opportunity what is already in front of them. When they

NGO and Donor Coordination To Speeds up Reconstruction and Avoid NGO Competition

met NGO whose approach and mind set for development it is hard to blend with their expectation. For instance they prefer to receive house donation which provided as a turnkey approach rather than community participation and sweat equity. For some extent this condition still tolerable. But due to the competition, one NGO came persuaded the community to accept their program which promised to be better and faster but the community has to drop their agreement to the previous contractor. Then the community can easily reject the previous commitment and then waiting the new program. It happens easily to be persuaded even in reality they still have to wait without knowing when the new program will start. Competition open the way to fraud and manipulation Beneficiary selection is one of the crucial steps to be taken to ensure NGOs program reach the eligible person. The process can be long, tedious and also takes time. So along the process someone can receive the donation. But other even they neighbors, since they are not eligible they are rejected. The modus operandi is the non-eligible person come to any NGO and persuades the NGO to work in their community. They usually mentioned there are still many people need help and it was not coverage by the previous NGO. It can be also happen by someone who has received one house from one NGO then came to other NGO asking for house. When the competition was tough such request easily granted. IV. COMMON APPROACH TO STRENGTHEN COORDINATION During Aceh reconstruction there were quite number of coordination meetings, but still we found tough competitions. It does not mean the meeting was useless, since the there were many issues and problems were resolved. The problem was because agreement reached in the coordination meeting was difficult to be implemented on the field. Hence the problem was not lack of coordination meeting, but because every NGO has their own approach on the implementation. At least there are 4 approaches should be embedded in every stakeholder strategy on working in reconstruction. Local government should support any NGO activities to ensure all programs incorporating these approaches before the any kind of work on rehabilitation or reconstruction commenced. Without all of these the effort will be difficult to have long term impact and sustainable. Beneficiaries participation Based on the lessons learned from the Tsunami Response (2004-2009) and from Yogyakarta Earthquake (2006) shows beneficiaries and communities participation is the most important component in the program success. Yogyakarta shows huge difference in beneficiaries participation compare to Aceh which lead to the faster result and less cost of reconstruction. This participation brought to a stronger ownership and responsibility.

Admittedly there are wide spectrums of participations. The fullest extent is they provide construction material and skilled labors for the rehabilitation of their houses or community infrastructure. On the lowest, they can guard the material or provide access when the construction materials come to their area. The participation can be anything but it should be there. All intervention by NGOs should complemented by their sweat equity. This is the only way if we want to develop mutual respect, synergies and long term cooperation. At the end of the day the communities will be able not only survive when other disaster strike again but have the skills to help other communities surrounding Engineering structural safety If it comes to safety, all rehabilitation work should apply the engineering concept on structural safety. This becomes more important on the earthquake disaster prone area. Catastrophic failure happens on houses, clinics, schools and other infrastructure buildings which built not follow the engineering code. As per engineering concept, structural elements can be design as ductile elements which absorb earthquake energy. If the earthquake loads big enough but within its specified loading code, the elements may be broken but no sudden collapse will happen. In every earthquake shows that buildings without proper engineering design and construction, the structural behave as a brittle material and collapse without any warning to people inside the building to escape. Local resource There is no one size fits all intervention by NGO. We can not easily replicate the solution from one area to the other. If we want to rehabilitate or reconstruct housing or other infrastructure we can not just go copying the previous intervention in other area. Each disaster area has its own uniqueness. One of the uniqueness is the local resource. We have to consider skilled builders, construction material, common technology and equipment available on the site. On the structural safety side there is no compromise, it should be followed strictly but for using local resource we have to be innovative. We have to use what is available on site as much as we can otherwise local resource can be idle. We have to balance the appropriateness on engineering and its cost with the local resource availability. These affects to the decision on the engineering side which lead to materials to be used and builders who will works. If we use bigger component from outside the area it will reduce their participation. In this case NGO intervention will be partner in reconstruction to train, supervise and provide management in reconstruction. In case of Aceh rehabilitation and reconstruction with massive construction work, it was valid to bring resources from out side. Construction material such as timber, brick, cement, steel bar and many others should be purchased from other area; otherwise local resource will not be sufficient. Human resource such as engineering experts, project managers and contractors were valid decision on joining this reconstruction effort. Massive construction works always need people with long experience in this

NGO and Donor Coordination To Speeds up Reconstruction and Avoid NGO Competition

kind of work, not just someone that jump in the opportunity to get a job. Therefore the presence of the experts is how to develop local resource and maximizing it by combining it with imported resource. Sustainability The sad part of Aceh reconstruction is there is no significant and longer term effect in local economic growth. World Bank reported on Aceh Economic Update May 2009 Acehs non-oil and gas gross domestic product growth had dropped to 1.9 percent in 2008, far below the national figure of 6.5 percent. When NGOs started their reconstruction works in 2005 the non-oil and gas GDP was 1.2%. Then on the heyday of reconstruction and rehabilitation in 2006 and 2007 the GDP became 7.7% and 7.0% respectively. But when NGOs phasing out in 2008 the GDP plummeted to 1.9% [18]. There are several issues such as security issue, which made the 7.7 billion USD funding committed for the reconstruction of Aceh and Nias have very minimum impact in sustainability in local economic growth. To minimize such problems NGOs have to leave the competition on waving flags and move forward to form a solid group. This group should produce pressure to every party which can impede all rehabilitation and reconstruction effort. The obstruction can be security issues, improper business practices since massive reconstruction effort may attract everyone seeks for opportunity and to some extent, very demanding beneficiaries. V. CONCLUSION Competition amongst NGO happens where there is big funding available to support the program. It means such competition is inevitable. To minimize those potential problems, every stakeholder should agree on common approach as the basis of their implementation. This should work to every party, local authority and the NGO. Then the local authority should have the capacity to support the NGO based on their core competence and this includes ensuring the continuum of the program. DISCLAIMER The material here is purely my personal opinion and do not necessarily reflect the views of institutions I am affiliated with. ACKNOWLEDGMENT I would like to acknowledge the inputs and support from my direct supervisors during I am working for more than 4 years in Aceh, until all construction program completed, Leonilo Escalada (Habitat for Humanity) and Hari Darshan Shrestha (Save the Children). I am grateful to Helen C Smith for her critical reading of this paper. REFERENCES [1] Seth Mydans, Warren Hoge, Wayne Arnold, Asias Deadly Waves: The Overview; Toll in Undersea Earthquake Passes 25,000; A Third of the Dead Are Said To Be Children, The New York Times, December 28, 2004.

[2] Dr Claude de Ville de Goyet& Lezlie C Morinire, International Centre for Migration and Health (ICMH), "The role of needs assessment in the tsunami response", Tsunami Evaluation Coalition, July 2006. [3] Karl F. Inderfurth, David Fabrycky, Stephen P. Cohen, The Tsunami Report Card, Foreign Policy Magazine, December 2005. [4] Jock McKeon, Aceh Reconstruction Expenditure Update June 2007 data The World Bank, November 2007. [5] Carsten Vlz, "Koordinasi kemanusiaan di Indonesia: dari sudut pandang LSM" Forced Migration Review Edisi Khusus Agustus 2005, Refugee Studies Centre, University of Oxford, pp.26. [6] Amir Sodikin quoted John Clark from World Bank, Sia-sia Rekonstruksi Jika Tanpa Rumah, Kompas Cyber Media, December 24, 2005. [7] Fachrul Razi, "Reintegrasi Ala Aceh" Acheh Press, May 6, 2009. http://achehpress.com/www.php/news/id/3327/Reintegrasi-AlaAceh.jp [8] Accenture, Construction Boom Task Force, Construction Boom Analysis Pilot analysis for bricks, Banda Aceh, UNDP, January 2006. [9] Humanitarian Recovery Update, UNORC, May 2006. [10] 110 Jembatan Putus Total *Kerugian Akibat Tsunami Rp. 15 Trilyun, Kompas Cyber Media, January 14, 2005. [11] Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response. Sphere Project 2006. . [12] Tina Kiehn, Tsunami Reconstruction Initiative Indonesia staff Workshop Habitat for Humanity, Meulaboh, Indonesia, March 13, 2007, unpublished [13] Steven Weir Habitat For Humanity International; Earl Kessler Asian Disaster Preparedness Center. Community-based Disaster Response: Only One Component of An Effective Shelter Framework. Habitat For Humanity International, Asian Disaster Preparedness Center, International Housing Coalition, May 10, 2006. [14] Fayen Wong, "W. Bank says rebuilding in Aceh taking too long" Reuters, December 14, 2005. [15] From Disaster to Reconstruction: ADBs Response to the Indian Ocean Tsunami, Asian Development Bank, pp.50. [16] Accenture, Construction Boom Task Force, Construction Boom Analysis Pilot analysis for bricks, Banda Aceh, UNDP, January 2006, pp.17. [17] Hasil Prakualifikasi BRR Diumumkan Serambi Indonesia, April 6, 2006. [18] Aceh Economic Update World Bank, May 2009.