Ortigas and Co. vs. Feati Bank Santos, J. Facts: Ortigas and Co. Ltd.

Partnership sold Lots 5 & 6 located at Block 31 of the Highway hills Subd., Mandaluyong, Rizal to Emma Chavez. The contract contained a stipulation that the lands will be exclusively used for residential purposes. Later on, these two lots titled TCT Nos. 101509 and 10511 were sold to Feati Bank and Trust Co., and Republic Flour Mills free from the stipulation stated. When Feati Bank and Trust Co. started constructing a building devoted to banking purposes, Ortgas and Co., demanded it to stop. Feati Bank reasoned out that it was building it in accordance with zoning regulations. Ortigas filed an application for writ of preliminary injunction, restraining and enjoining the continuation and completion of the building. The RTC dismissed the case. The subject restrictions were subordinate to Municipal Resolution No. 27. Upheld the classification of the area along EDSA as commercial and industrial zone.

Ortigas and Co. appealed to the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether or not Resol. No. 27-S-1960 is a valid exercise of police power and whether the said resolution can nullify or supersede the contractual obligations assumed by Feati Bank Trust Held: Resol. No. 27-S-1960 is a valid exercise of police power to safeguard and promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people. EDSA is the main arter of traffic, noise pollution, and it is hardly conducive to the health, safety or welfare of the residents in its route. Municipality of Mandaluyong is perfectly justified under the circumstances in passing the subject resolution. Non-impairment of contracts is constitutionally guarded but the rule is not absolute since it has to be reconciled with the legitimate exercise of police power. Contractual obligations so assumed cannot prevail over Resol. No. 27 which validly exercised its Police Power through the said resolution.

Pulido vs. Court of Appeals Facts: The President of the Philippines reserved 94 lots, 2 of which owned by the govt, 49 owned by Phil. Natl Co., corp.owned by govt and the rest owned by private landholders for the construction of the Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA). Some owners abided; some refused. The private land owners appealed to the Municipal Agrarian Reform which failed to act. The 76 farmers filed complaint against Cornelio T. Rivera, OIC, Cavite Export Processing Zone and J.H. Pajara Const. Corp to the Court of Agrarian Relations which issued a TRO.Later on, the case was dismissed for the lots were no longer agricultural lots by operation of law . Farmers appealed to the Court of Appeals which issued a TRO. The same was lifted upon posting of the bond of P500,000.00. Hence, the recourse to annul and set aside the appellate courts decision. The Court issued TRO.

Other farmers withdrew the petition. The court lifted TRO except to the lands of Avelino Pulido. However, the latter was also lifted after payment of 10@ of the just compensation for the land of Pulido. ISSUE: Whether or not the court was justified in lifting the TRO upon payment of 10% of the just compensation of the property of Avelino Pulido HELD: The complaint for expropriation of the property occupied by Pulido had been filed with the Court of First Instance, Cavite. The amount of P17,027.00 equivalent to 10% of the just compensation of the property had already been deposited with the Cavite Branch of the PNB. Furthermore,the Court had already issued an order for the issuance of a writ of execution over the property occupied by Avelino Pulido. Hence, the issue is moot and academic. Wisdom of converting their ricelands into an industrial site is within the proper exercise of Presidential prerogatives and the court may not inquire into it. The necessity and expediency of exercising the right of eminent domains are questions essentially political and not judicial in their character. Interest of family should not stand in the way of progress and benefit of the greater majority of the inhabitants of the country.

Barangay San Roque Talisay Cebu vs. Heirs of Francisco Pastor Panganiban, J. Brgy. San Roque Talisay Cebu filed before MTC of Talisay, Cebu, a complaint to expropriate a property of the heirs of Francisco Pastor. The case was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The case was also dismissed by the RTC for lack of jurisdiction because the value of the land was less than 20,000. It held that it was within the jurisdiction of the MTC pursuant to R.A. 7691. Petitioner appealed to the Supreme Court. Issue: Which court has jurisdiction over cases for eminent domain or expropriation proceedings Held: An expropriation suit does not involve the recovery of a sum of money. Rather it deals with the exercise by the govt of its authority and right to take private property for public use. Courts determine the authority of the govt entity, the necessity of public expropriation and the observance of due processs. The subject is the governments exercise of eminent domain, a matter that is incapable of pecuniary estimation. The just compensation is incidental to the expropriation suit.It is determined only after the court is satisfied with the propriety of the expropriation. As held in Rep. vs Zabaro, condemnation proceedings are within the jurisdiction of the CFI. Overall civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is not capable of pecuniary estimation. It is not the title or possession of a parcel of land. The present suit is whether the government may expropriate property under the given set of cir cumstances. The govt does not dispute respondents title or possession of the same.

Indeed , it is not a question of who has a better title or right, for the govt does not even claim that it has title to property. It merely asserts its inherent sovereign power to appropriate and control individual property for the public benefit as the public necessity, convenience or welfare may demand. The petition was granted. The order was set aside. The RTC was directed to hear nithe case.

Municipality of Pililla Rizal, vs. Court of Appeals,Hon.Arturo Marave et.al. Facts: The RTC of Tanay Rizal, Branch 80 rendered judgment in favor of Mun.of Pillila Rizal against PPC.It ordered PPC to pay plaintiff tax business due, storage permit fee, Mayors permit fee, sanitary inspection fee, cost of suit. SC affirmed the judgment with modification. It became final and executory.It was remanded to RTC for execution. Atty. Felix E. Mendiola filed motion in behalf of Pillila Rizal for the examination of PPCs gross sales. The motion was denied for the judgement was already satisfied. On the Motin for Reconsideration, Atty. Mendiola argued that the Mayor could not have waived the balance for there was already a lien on it for his consultancy fees. The motion was denied.Atty. Mendiola filed petition for certiorari at the SC. The case was referred to the CA. PPC filed a motion questioning Atty. Mendiolas authority to represent the municipality. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for having been filed by a private counsel in violation of law and jurisprudence. ISSUE: Whether or not the filing of the petition by the private counsel is in violation of law and jurisprudence HELD: Sec. 1683-Revised Administrative Code- Duty of fiscal to represent provinces and provincial subdivisions in litigations. Only provincial fiscal/municipal attorney can represent a province or municipality in their lawsuits. The provision is mandatory. The municipalitys authority to employ a private lawyer is expressly limited only to situations where the provincial fiscal is disqualified to represent it. There is nothing in the records to show that the provl fiscal is disqualified, hence, the appearance of herein private counsel is without authority of law. Fiscals refusal is not legal justification from employing the services of private counsel. Municipal council should request the Sec.of Justice to appoint an acting provincial fiscal in place of the provincial who declined to handle and prosecute its case in court (Sec.1679 of Revised Ad.Code). Legality of his representation can be questions at any stage of the proceedings. It was deemed to be revoked when the municipal mayor entered into the Compromise Agreement and when it filed Satisfaction of Judgment and a Release of Quitclaim.It impliedly dismissed his lawyer. The petition was denied for lack for lack merit. The decision of the Court of Appeals was affirmed.

Hon. Tomas R. Osmena vs. COA and Hon. Eufemio C. Domingo Facts: City of Cebu decided to construct a modern Abattoir. City Treasurer, Ricardo Pestano issued a certification of availability of funds of P5, 419,180.00. The Cebu City Abattoir project was awarded to H.Franco Const.Co for the construction. Mayor Ronald R. Duterte entered into a contract with HFCCI with the contract cost of 8, 368,920.00. The Cebu City treasurer certified availability of funds amounting to 2, 092,230 which was due and payable. Budget for calendar year 1986 included the 6, 276, 690 as the 3rd and final payment to contractor. Senator John H. Osemena-OIC of Cebu ordered the suspension of the project and review of the contract by the COA. HFCCI claimed the amount of 2, 142,964.29 for the value of the work. HFCCI instituted a civil action for recovery of investment and damages. The COA declared that the City of Cebu entered into a null and void contract in its 2nd indorsement. The amount due to HFCCI is the sole liability of the officer or officers who entered to the said contract. The PPC and City of Cebu entered into a Compromise Agreement with 1,500,000 as full and final settlement. It was referred to COAs regional director. COAs 3rd indorsement declared the C.A. invalid. Issue: Whether or not the COA has the autvhority to declare a contract already executed by a city void. Held: COA has the power, authority and duty to examine,audit and settle all accounts pertaining to revenue and receipts of and expenditures or uses of funds and property, owned or held in trust by, or pertaining to, the Govt or any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities. The Auditing Code of the Phils( PD 1445) further provides that no contract involving the expenditure of public funds shall be entered into unless there is an appropriation therefor and the proper accounting official of the agency concerned shall have certified to the officer entering into the obligation that funds have been duly appropriated for the purpose and the amount necessary to cover the proposed contract for the current fiscal year is available for expenditure on account thereof. Any contract entered into contrary to the foregoing requirements shall be void. The contract entered into by the former Mayor Duterte was void from the very beginning since the agreed cost for the project (8,368,920) was way beyond the appropriated amount (5,419,180) as certified by the City Treasurer. Hence the contract was properly declared void and unenforceable. Fund availability could is an indispensable pre-requisite to the execution of any govt contract involving the expenditure of public funds by all govt agencies at all levels. Such contracts are not to be considered as final or binding unless such a certification as to funds availability is issued. Antecedent of advance appropriation is thus essential to govtal liability on contracts. The Compromise Agreement could not have ratified contract because it was a derivative of a previously void void Abattoir contract. The obligation is a personal

liability of petitioner pursuant to Sec 87 & 103 of PD 1445. Petition was dismissed for lack of merit.

Percival Moday, Zoturo Moday (deceased) and Leonora Moday vs. Court of Appeals, Judge Eva ngline S. Yurpio and Municipality of Burawan Romero, J: This is a petition for review of the expropriation proceedings of the land of Moday. A TRO was issued against Judge Yurpio and the Mun. of Burawan thru its mayor enjoining it from using and occupying all buildings constructed within and from further constructing and building on the land. Moday sought resolution of Omnibus Motion for reinforcement of Restraining Order and Contempt. Mun.Mayor continued to use the building on the subject land, and even constructed new blocktiendas. Mayor admitted the allegations but explained that they were due to be demolished and they were not for personal purposes but for public interests. Issue: Whether or not the Mayor Moday should be cited for contempt for constructing the blocktiendas Whether or not her explanation that the buildings were for public use is tenable Held: The explanation is unacceptable. The purpose for which the buildings were used is immaterial. Respondent was duty bound to obey the injunction issued by the court. Municipality of Burawan, Agusan del Sur through its incumbent Mayor was cited for contempt and ordered to demolish the structures.

HON. FRANKLIN M. DRILON IN HIS CAPACITY AS SEC. OF JUSTICE VS. MAYOR ALFREDO S. LIM, VCIE-MAYOR JOSE L. ATIENZA, CITY TREAS. ANTHONY ACEVIDO, SANGGUNIANG PANLAAWIGAN AND THE CITY OF MANILA

FACTS: The Sec. Of Justice had an appeal to him four oil companies and a tax payer. He declared Ordinance No. 7784 otherwise known as the Manila Revenue Code null and void for non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in the enactment of tax ordinances and certain provisions were contrary to law. Judge Rodolfo C. Pallatao declared Section 187 of the Local Gov't Code unconstitutional insofar as it empowered the Sec.of Justice to review the tax ordinances and inferentially to annul them. He concluded that the challenged section gave to the secretary the power of control and not of supervision only as vested by the constitution in the Pres. Of the Phils. Violation is not only of Art.X, specifically Sec. 4 thereof and of Sec 5 on the taxing powers of local gov't and the policy of local autonomy in general.

ISSUE: Whether or not Sec. Drilon exercised the power or control and not of supervision in declaring the Manila Revenue Code null and void for non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in the enactment of tax ordinances

HELD: Sec. Drilon did set aside the Manila Revenue Code, but he did not replace it with his own version of what the Code should be. All he did in reviewing the said measure was determine if the petitioners were performing their functions in accordance with law. It was not an act of control but of mere supervision Judgement was reversed.