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Tlis summarv las been aJapteJ bv Coletta /. Youngers from Drucs auJ Demccracy :u lat:u -mer:ca. T|e mact c| L.S. c|:cy
T
le LniteJ States las been nglting tle war on Jrugs for JecaJes, across tle nation
anJ tlrouglout tle lemisplere. lolice ofncers, prosecutors, Joctors, social
workers, solJiers, counselors anJ countless otlers lave investeJ tleir energv anJ
expertise-anJ lave even riskeJ tleir lives-to combat Jrug trafncking anJ Jrug abuse.
Tleir efforts are impressive anJ appreciateJ.
Twentv-nve vears anJ 25 billion Jollars later, lowever, we are no closer to solving tle
problem-tlat is, to reJucing Jrug abuse anJ availabilitv in tle LniteJ States. ln fact, we
seem to be fartler awav tlan ever.
L.S. international Jrug control policv is JesigneJ to reJuce or eliminate tle supplv
of illicit Jrugs in tlis countrv. ln tleorv, tleir scarcitv woulJ tlen Jrive up prices anJ
consequentlv Jiscourage JemanJ. However, tle price of cocaine anJ leroin are at or near
all-time lows in spite of intensive efforts to eraJicate crops anJ interJict Jrug slipments.
Meanwlile, tle ]ustice Department consiJers cocaine anJ leroin to be reaJilv available";
powJer anJ crack cocaine use are apparentlv on tle rise, anJ leroin use remains stable
after surging Juring tle 199Os.
2
Clearlv, tle supplv-reJuction moJel Joes not work.
ln Latin /merica, tle source of most of tle cocaine anJ leroin on L.S. streets, tle Jrug
war las not onlv faileJ to curb proJuction anJ trafncking, but las weakeneJ Jemocratic
institutions. lt also Jisproportionatelv targets tle rural poor, wlo lave few economic
alternatives asiJe from growing illicit crops anJ wlo benent tle least from tle Jrug traJe.
ConcerneJ bv tle collateral Jamage of tle Jrug war, WL/ commissioneJ an in-Jeptl
investigation into tle impact of Jrug control policies on luman riglts anJ Jemocracv
|
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8
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2 Lxecut:ve Summary " Drugs and Democracy ln Latln Amerlca: Tbe |mpact o| U.S. Po|lcy
in Latin /merica, giving particular
attention to low counterJrug policies
lave affecteJ tle region's militaries, police
forces, anJ juJicial anJ legal svstems. Tle
book incluJes JetaileJ stuJies on L.S.
militarv anJ police Jrug control assistance
programs, anJ case stuJies from Lolivia,
Colombia, LcuaJor, Mexico, leru, anJ
tle Caribbean, all major cultivation,
proJuction, or transit zones.
We founJ tlat in one nation after anotler,
L.S. Jrug control policies are unJermining
luman riglts anJ Jemocracv anJ causing
enormous Jamage to some of tle most
vulnerable populations in tle lemisplere.
Tle LniteJ States' insistence on zero
tolerance for Jrug crops las leJ to massive
forceJ eraJication of coca anJ opium
poppv crops, often tle principal source of
income for impoverisleJ farmers. Witl few
alternatives available, tlese families are
ratcleteJ Jown into Jeeper povertv wlen
tleir most important casl crop is JestroveJ.
Tle region's militaries, wlicl lave not
been lelJ accountable for wiJespreaJ
luman riglts abuses anJ autloritarian
Jictatorslips in tle 197Os anJ 198Os,
lave been brouglt back into Jomestic law
enforcement because tle local police forces
are eitler incapable or too corrupt to Jeal
witl tle tlreat from Jrug trafncking anJ its
associateJ violence.
/s tle focus of L.S. Jrug strategies slift,
so Joes Jrug proJuction anJ trafncking,
bringing tle scourge of tle Jrug traJe
to new parts of tle lemisplere. Most
Jecisions on national Jrug policies in
Latin /merica are maJe unJer leavv
L.S. pressure for stronger measures. Tlis
one-size-nts-all approacl to Jrug strategv
prevents countries from responJing to local
concerns anJ sti1es creative approacles.
ur stuJv pointeJ to two major conclusions:
nrst, tle supplv-reJuction moJel simplv
Joes not work; anJ seconJ, tlis moJel
las sparkeJ con1ict, fueleJ luman riglts
violations, anJ unJermineJ Jemocracv in
countries wlere Jrugs are proJuceJ anJ
trafnckeJ. Tlese lessons sloulJ guiJe a
new international Jrug control policv-one
tlat gets at tle roots of tle Jrug problem
bv clanneling more resources to treatment
anJ eJucation in tle LniteJ States
anJ to economic Jevelopment in Latin
/merica wlile continuing to go after tle
transnational criminal organizations tlat
engage in larger-scale trafncking of Jrugs,
arms, anJ migrants, anJ tlen lelp foment
corruption anJ economic Jistortions
tlrougl monev-launJering sclemes anJ tle
strategic use of tleir assets.
We are not questioning tle commitment or
tle integritv of tlose wlo work tirelesslv,
against Jaunting oJJs, to keep Jrugs off
/merica's streets. We are not saving tlat
nglting Jrugs is impossible anJ tlat we
sloulJ just give up. n tle contrarv-we are
saving tlat we can Jo better. More effective
anJ lumane approacles to tle enormous
problems of Jrug trafncking anJ illicit Jrug
use Jo exist. Lut aclieving success will
require an lonest assessment of wletler or
not we are moving closer to our goals-anJ
if not, wlat we neeJ to be Joing Jifferentlv.
We must go bevonJ tle mentalitv of fear
slareJ bv L.S. policvmakers anJ tle public
at large tlat las maJe anv clallenges to
current Jrug policv taboo.
No perfect solutions exist. lt is unlikelv
tlat illicit Jrug use can be eliminateJ in
tle foreseeable future, or tlat transnational
crimes like Jrug trafncking can be
completelv stampeJ out. Lut if we can
open up a Jebate, evaluate tle problems
anJ tle range of possible strategies to
confront tlem, anJ tlen implement tle
policies eitler proven or slowing tle most
promise to be effective, we can meet our
funJamental goal of reJucing Jrug abuse in
tle LniteJ States. /long tle wav, we will
ensure tlat in Latin /merica, L.S. Jrug
control policies Jo not continue to violate
luman riglts anJ civil liberties, spark
social upleaval, anJ unJermine Jemocracv.
Wlat follows are WL/'s main concerns,
arguments, anJ policv recommenJations.
We lope tlat tlev proviJe new
perspectives to our reaJers for tlinking
constructivelv anJ creativelv about low to
confront tle extremelv complex issue of
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\as|:uctcu |nce cu lat:u -mer:ca " November 2OO4 3
international Jrug trafncking, anJ in a wav
tlat is more effective at lome anJ least
larmful abroaJ.
The U.5. "War on Drugs"
Tle miJ-198Os explosion of crack cocaine
anJ its relateJ violence in tle LniteJ
States set in motion manv of tle L.S.
Jrug control policies still in effect toJav.
ln 1986, lresiJent lonalJ leagan nrst
JeclareJ illicit Jrugs to be a national
securitv tlreat. Tlree vears later, lresiJent
Ceorge H. W. Lusl launcleJ tle /nJean
lnitiative as part of lis strategv for an
intensineJ Jrug war. Tle centerpiece of
tle /nJean lnitiative was to empower
Latin /merican militarv anJ police forces
to carrv out counterJrug initiatives, anJ
signincant L.S. training anJ support
was proviJeJ to tlose forces willing to
participate. /t tle same time, tle lentagon
was JesignateJ bv tle L.S. Congress as
tle single leaJ agencv" for tle Jetection
anJ monitoring of illicit Jrug slipments
into tle LniteJ States. Lecause of tle role
given to Latin /merican anJ L.S. militarv
forces, tle term militarization" became
wiJelv useJ to Jescribe L.S. efforts.
L.S. Jrug control policies are carrieJ
out tlrougl coorJination between tle
LniteJ States anJ Latin /merican anJ
Caribbean governments, often witl input
from tle relevant boJies of tle LniteJ
Nations anJ tle rganization of /merican
States (/S). Sometimes tle programs
are collaborative in nature. More often,
lowever, tle L.S. government uses
its economic anJ Jiplomatic leverage
to ensure cooperation, making use in
particular of tle annual certincation"
process, wlicl Jenies L.S. aiJ anJ traJe
benents to countries not vieweJ as Joing
tleir part to combat illicit Jrugs. Lecause
of tleir JepenJence on economic aiJ anJ
Jesire for traJe agreements, manv countries
Source: L.S. State Department, uteruat:cua| Narcct:cs Ccutrc| Stratecy Recrt 200, lolicv anJ lrogram
Developments," table, pp. 22-23.
l988 l990 l992 l994 l996 l998 2000 2002
0
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l50
200
250
8olivia
Peru
Colombia
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Years
Coca Cu|tivation in the Andes, 1988~2003
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4 Lxecut:ve Summary " Drugs and Democracy ln Latln Amerlca: Tbe |mpact o| U.S. Po|lcy
nnJ tlemselves obligeJ to aJopt policies
anJ programs supporteJ bv Waslington.
Tle Jrug traJe itself, anJ tle violence it
generates, las laJ a Jevastating impact
tlrouglout tle region. Drug trafncking
breeJs criminalitv, exacerbates criminal
anJ political violence, anJ fuels armeJ
groups. lt greatlv increases problems of
citizen securitv, public orJer anJ ultimatelv
law enforcement. /cross tle region, Jrug
trafncking-relateJ corruption las furtler
weakeneJ national anJ local governments,
juJiciaries anJ police forces. Cocaine
proJuction Jamages tle environment, anJ
its pronts Jistort local economies. lllicit
Jrug use, once consiJereJ a problem of
JevelopeJ countries, is now rampant across
tle region. \iolent crime associateJ witl
tle Jrug traJe escalates accorJinglv. Tle
social fabric, particularlv in poor urban
areas wlere botl Jrug use anJ Jrug-relateJ
violence tenJ to be liglest, is torn apart.
Tlose aJvocating tle supplv-siJe approacl
to Jrug control argue tlat tle problems
relateJ to illegal Jrug proJuction anJ
consumption woulJ be even worse witlout
tle international counterJrug programs
presentlv in place. lf tlese programs were
abanJoneJ, tlev sav, tle situation woulJ
Jeteriorate anJ illicit Jrugs woulJ be even
more reaJilv available-even a marginal
impact resulting from tlese efforts is
better tlan none. Wlat is missing from
tlis line of reasoning, lowever, is a frank
assessment of tle collateral Jamage causeJ
bv tlis approacl, anJ wletler sucl Jamage
outweigls anv as vet unproven positive
impact of current programs.
Similarlv, government ofncials point to tle
lectares of coca eraJicateJ, tle number of
cocaine labs JestroveJ, low manv arrests
were maJe, or tle amount of illicit Jrugs
seizeJ, as inJicators of successful policv
implementation. Sucl boJv count"
statistics mav inJeeJ make for gooJ public
relations anJ convev a sense of action,
increasing tle likelilooJ of continueJ
resources at a time wlen manv agencies
face buJget cuts. Lut tlev sleJ no liglt on
wletler tle tactics useJ actuallv translate
into progress towarJ aclieving basic policv
goals of reJuceJ Jrug use in tle LniteJ
States. Tle stanJarJs commonlv useJ for
measuring tle effectiveness of international
Jrug policv are, quite simplv, off tle mark;
3
winning tle Jrug war" is as elusive toJav
as it was wlen tle effort was nrst launcleJ.
Fundamenta| F|aws in the
5upp|y-side Approach
L.S. ofncials routinelv assert tlat
international counterJrug programs are
successful. Slort-term tactical successes are
inJeeJ eviJent-coca crops are eraJicateJ,
trafnckers are arresteJ, anJ slipments
are intercepteJ. Nonetleless, total coca
proJuction las remaineJ remarkablv steaJv
anJ tlere is no eviJence Jemonstrating a
signincant reJuction in tle supplv of illicit
Jrugs on L.S. citv streets. To tle contrarv-
tle stabilitv of illicit Jrugs' price anJ puritv
levels points to tleir continueJ accessibilitv.
Tle Jrug traJe is more like a balloon tlan
a battlenelJ-wlen one part of a balloon
is squeezeJ, its contents are JisplaceJ to
anotler. Similarlv, wlen coca proJuction
is suppresseJ in one area, it quicklv pops
up somewlere else, JisregarJing national
borJers. /rresteJ Jrug lorJs are quicklv
replaceJ bv otlers wlo move up tle ranks;
JismantleJ cartels are replaceJ bv smaller,
leaner operations tlat are larJer to Jetect
anJ Jeter. Wlen Jrug-trafncking routes
are JisrupteJ bv intensive interJiction
campaigns, tlev are simplv slifteJ elsewlere.
/nJean coca cultivation, as JepicteJ
bv tle State Department's own annual
estimates, is remarkable for its stabilitv
at arounJ 2OO,OOO lectares per vear (see
clart on page 3). Wlile tle slare of crops
raiseJ in eacl coca-proJucing countrv
las 1uctuateJ, tle total lanJ area unJer
cultivation eacl vear las not varieJ
Jramaticallv.
+
Moreover, accorJing to L.S.
government statistics, tle average vielJ of
coca leaves per lectare las risen over time,
so tlat even apparent Jeclines in cultivateJ
lanJ area mav not translate into less coca
available for processing into cocaine.
5
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\as|:uctcu |nce cu lat:u -mer:ca " November 2OO4 5
ln announcing tle L.S. government
ngures for 2OO3 coca proJuction, L.S.
ofncials all but JeclareJ victorv. / slarp
Jrop in /nJean region coca cultivation,
from 223,7OO lectares in 2OO1 to 173,+5O
lectares in 2OO3, was attributeJ to a
signincant reJuction of Colombia's coca
crop anJ a smaller reJuction in leru.
6
Wlile L.S. ofncials took tle Jrop as a
sign of success, tle reJuction represents
onlv a 5 percent Jecrease, if measureJ
from 1999 insteaJ of tle 2OO1 ligl point.
7
LviJence is alreaJv mounting of a slift in
coca proJuction witlin Colombia to new
areas, as farmers 1ee massive fumigation
campaigns, anJ coca proJuction in Lolivia
is again on tle rise.
/ similar plenomenon lappens witl
arrests of trafnckers. lemoving one set of
international Jrug Jealers las often simplv
cleareJ tle wav for rivals anJ new entrants
to tle Jrug traJe, ratler tlan reJucing tle
size of tle Jrug market. Smasling tle large
Mexican anJ Colombian cartels leJ to tle
formation of groups tlat are smaller anJ
larJer to Jetect. Larger anJ more frequent
Jrug seizures, often offereJ as eviJence
of policv success, are in fact inlerentlv
ambiguous inJicators. Tlev mav insteaJ
re1ect increaseJ Jrug proJuction anJ
trafncking, as trafnckers seek to compensate
for tleir anticipateJ losses.
Tle L.S. strategv focuses on wiping out
Jrugs at tleir source or seizing tlem in
transit. Tle objective of tlis approacl
is to Jecrease tleir availabilitv in tle
LniteJ States, bv causing Jrug prices to
rise anJ tlus Jiscouraging some percentage
of potential buvers. fncial L.S. ngures,
lowever, slow tlat cocaine's retail price
JroppeJ fairlv steaJilv Juring tle 198Os anJ
earlv 199Os. Tle price never rebounJeJ,
even as puritv rose anJ tlen stabilizeJ.
Tle same patterns lolJ true for leroin.
Tlese low anJ stable prices for cocaine anJ
leroin tlat lave prevaileJ over tle last
JecaJe slow tlat, Jespite L.S. efforts, tle
supplv of Jrugs continues to be robust.
Serious evaluation of present policies
anJ open-minJeJ Jebate on Jrug control
alternatives are sorelv neeJeJ if we lope
to make anv progress. / more effective
anJ more lumane policv sloulJ be baseJ
on tle recognition tlat, wlile controlling
illicit Jrug abuse is a legitimate anJ
important goal, Jrugs will be proJuceJ as
long as tlere is JemanJ for tlem. Tle goal
sloulJ tlerefore be to reJuce botl JemanJ
anJ tle Jamage tlat illicit Jrugs cause
to inJiviJuals anJ societv. lolicvmakers
sloulJ seek to minimize tle negative
consequences at lome anJ abroaJ of botl
illicit Jrug proJuction anJ use anJ tle
strategies JesigneJ to curtail tlem.
The U.5. Drug War's
Co||atera| Damage
Tle case stuJies collecteJ bv WL/
alloweJ for tle iJentincation of issues
anJ plenomena tlat occur in strikinglv
similar wavs in most, if not all, of
tle countries stuJieJ. Tle following
summarizes tle primarv conclusions
Jrawn from our researcl in eiglt main
areas, anJ presents recommenJations for
alternative policv options.
The ro|e of the mi|itary
Tle increasing reliance on militarv forces to
plav a leaJ role in combating tle illicit Jrug
traJe set off alarm bells for civilian leaJers
across tle region. Tle experience of militarv
coups, anJ perlaps most Jisturbinglv, of
massive luman riglts violations committeJ
in tle name of combating internal
subversion," was all too recent. ln proviJing
tle resources, training anJ Joctrinal
justincation for militaries to plav a signincant
role in Jomestic counterJrug operations, tle
L.S. government was vieweJ as legitimating
Latin /merican securitv forces in vet
anotler internal securitv role, now JirecteJ
at new enemies. /nJ it JiJ so even tlougl
sufncient meclanisms for civilian control,
transparencv anJ accountabilitv were-anJ
remain-sorelv lacking.
/ltlougl manv in tle L.S. Defense
Department objecteJ to tle role being
tlrust upon tlem, in tle post-ColJ War
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6 Lxecut:ve Summary " Drugs and Democracy ln Latln Amerlca: Tbe |mpact o| U.S. Po|lcy
environment tle Jrug war became tle
velicle for maintaining anJ in some cases
expanJing botl tle lentagon's presence anJ
its militarv-to-militarv relations witl Latin
/merican anJ Caribbean counterparts. f
particular concern, tlese programs legallv
circumvent traJitional congressional
oversiglt anJ monitoring requirements,
as well as tle State Department's role in
Jetermining tle nature anJ content of
foreign aiJ anJ overseeing its Jeliverv.
Militarv forces Jo lave a role to plav in
Jetecting anJ monitoring tle 1ow of
illicit Jrugs. Tleir involvement in borJer,
aerial anJ maritime interJiction efforts
nts clearlv into tle militarv's traJitional
mission. lroviJeJ tlat tlese programs
are carrieJ out unJer tle Jirection
of civilian leaJers, witl appropriate
oversiglt, transparencv, anJ luman riglts
safeguarJs, tlev Jo not linJer Jemocratic
Jevelopment. However, tlrougl its Jrug
policv, tle LniteJ States las promoteJ
tle insertion of Latin /merican militarv
forces into Jomestic law enforcement anJ
internal securitv operations.
ln everv countrv stuJieJ tlat receives
signincant L.S. counterJrug assistance, L.S.
support was instrumental in bringing tle
militarv into a Jomestic law enforcement
role anJ las createJ a confusion of roles anJ
con1icts between militarv anJ police forces.
/ relateJ problem is L.S. militarv training
of foreign police forces. Sucl training goes
Jirectlv against efforts across tle region
Juring tle 198Os anJ 199Os to bring police
forces unJer civilian control. Moreover,
funJing for tlis training is largelv proviJeJ
bv tle L.S. Defense Department buJget
anJ lence circumvents botl oversiglt anJ
luman riglts safeguarJs. Training of local
police forces bv L.S. Special lorces is of
particular concern.
Tle connJential" nature of counterJrug
programs can furtler exacerbate problems
of lack of civilian oversiglt anJ impunitv
witlin militarv forces, tlerebv contributing
to tle proliferation of corruption wlen
militarv personnel are brouglt into more
Jirect contact witl tle Jrug traJe.
Poicv RecommenJations
Tle L.S. government, tlrougl its
counterJrug policv as well as its
interaction witl regional militaries,
sloulJ promote tle aJoption of anJ
aJlerence to tle principle of losse
Comitatus wlicl, as written in L.S.
law, forbiJs tle militarv from assuming
internal police roles anJ tasks.
/ll autloritv for foreign militarv
training anJ assistance sloulJ be
returneJ to tle State Department,
wlicl sloulJ lave sole responsibilitv
for overseeing sucl programs in orJer to
ensure tlat tlev nt witlin overarcling
L.S. foreign policv objectives anJ come
unJer establisleJ oversiglt proceJures.
No brancl of tle L.S. government,
incluJing tle Defense Department,
sloulJ proviJe assistance, training or
anv otler support to militarv forces for
Jomestic Jrug enforcement efforts.
Tle L.S. militarv sloulJ not train
local police forces. Training of local
police bv L.S. Special lorces is
particularlv problematic anJ sloulJ be
suspenJeJ immeJiatelv.
The ro|e of the po|ice
Confronting criminal networks, wletler of
Jrug trafnckers, monev launJerers, smugglers,
or otlers, is primarilv a law enforcement
task-anJ tlat task is formiJable in Latin
/merica anJ tle Caribbean toJav. /s
citizen securitv concerns grow, botl local
communities anJ governments look to tle
police-anJ sometimes militarv forces-to
impose tougl law anJ orJer measures. ln
tlis context, it is easv to unJerstanJ wlv
governments resort to larsl anJ repressive
law enforcement measures. However,
experience witl sucl practices to Jate
inJicates tlat tle slort-term successes
sometimes obtaineJ are rarelv sustainable.
Simplv slifting Jrug control resources from
militarv to police forces will not proviJe an
immeJiate answer, as police forces across
tle region remain abusive anJ corrupt
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\as|:uctcu |nce cu lat:u -mer:ca " November 2OO4 7
anJ lave also at times taken on Jisturbing
paramilitarv claracteristics. Lltimatelv,
police forces-as well as juJiciaries-must
be funJamentallv reformeJ for tle rule of
law to take root. Lessons learneJ in recent
post-con1ict situations for Jeveloping
Jemocratic policing incluJe tle importance
of effective oversiglt, accountabilitv anJ
transparencv, respect for luman riglts, tle
Jemilitarization" of botl tle commanJ
structures anJ roles of police forces, anJ
responsiveness to tle communities tlev
serve. However, all too often, in tle
face of crime anJ violence, long-term
Jevelopmental reform issues necessarv for
reJucing corruption anJ strengtlening
effective policing take a back seat to slort-
term, larJ-line policing tactics.
lor example, in an effort to circumvent
corruption, tle L.S. government often
creates specializeJ investigative units tlat
primarilv carrv out investigations into
Jrug-trafncking networks. larticipating
ofncers are vetteJ, anJ intensive training
is given to a specinc group wlicl can tlen
be isolateJ from tle rest of tle force to
prevent sensitive information from leaking
out. Tlese units bv tleir verv nature are
secretive, anJ rarelv lelJ accountable.
Wlile specializeJ units lave laJ some
tactical successes, experience also slows
tlat tlese units cannot be immunizeJ
against corruption anJ are frequentlv
JisbanJeJ anJ replaceJ witl vet otler units.
Some ongoing law enforcement efforts
are paving off anJ Jeserve continueJ or
increaseJ support. Tle ]ustice Department's
lnternational Criminal lnvestigative
Training /ssistance lrogram (lClT/l),
for example, promotes police reform anJ
efforts to builJ sounJ policing skills anJ
investigative capacitv witlin local forces.
Tle Lureau of /lcolol, Tobacco anJ
lirearms is taskeJ witl lelping to reJuce tle
1ow of small arms in tle region; stemming
tle 1ow of weapons coulJ bring concrete
benents to local communities anJ law
enforcement ofncials. Tle L.S. government
also proviJes important assistance to local
autlorities in tleir efforts to stop precursor
clemicals (neeJeJ to proJuce cocaine)
from entering Jrug-proJucing countries or
being JiverteJ from licit to illicit use, anJ
in Jeveloping anJ enforcing regulations anJ
proceJures for banks anJ otler nnancial
institutions in orJer to prevent Jrug
trafncking-relateJ monev launJering.
Poicv RecommenJations
L.S. police assistance sloulJ be orienteJ
towarJ police reform efforts, witl special
attention paiJ to issues of transparencv,
effective oversiglt anJ accountabilitv,
anJ respect for luman riglts.
Civilian police forces sloulJ not receive
L.S. militarv training.
latler tlan create specializeJ units per
se, tle L.S. government sloulJ continue
to proviJe specializeJ training anJ skills,
incluJing tle carrving out of sounJ
criminal investigations, to units tlat are
accountable to local, civilian autlorities.
More L.S. resources sloulJ be JeJicateJ
to signincantlv reJucing tle illegal arms
traJe in Latin /merica anJ to stemming
tle 1ow of precursor clemicals.
Human rights vio|ations
ln orJer to furtler its Jrug control
policv, tle L.S. government las forgeJ
alliances witl militarv anJ police forces
witl questionable anJ even Jeplorable
luman riglts recorJs. Tlougl sometimes
tle luman riglts problem is recognizeJ,
training anJ assistance is usuallv proviJeJ
to recipient governments anJ securitv forces
even before tlev lave slown clear signs of
political will to alter past patterns of abuse.
Moreover, successive L.S. aJministrations
lave, at Jifferent times, JownplaveJ or
misrepresenteJ luman riglts situations in
orJer to obtain congressional support for
counterJrug assistance. ln some cases, tle
L.S. government is still supporting forces
witl a listorv of luman riglts violations
anJ impunitv. ln otlers, L.S. policv Jirectlv
results in luman riglts abuses.
ln tle nnal analvsis, it is morallv wrong anJ
ultimatelv counterproJuctive to proviJe
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8 Lxecut:ve Summary " Drugs and Democracy ln Latln Amerlca: Tbe |mpact o| U.S. Po|lcy
L.S. assistance to anv militarv or police
force tlat operates outsiJe tle bounJaries
of tle rule of law.
Concern about tle impact of L.S. securitv
assistance on luman riglts leJ members
of Congress to place strict luman riglts
conJitions on tle provision of L.S.
counterJrug anJ otler forms of securitv
assistance. Tle Lealv amenJment, nameJ
after \ermont's Senator latrick Lealv,
stipulates tlat no L.S. securitv assistance
can be proviJeJ to foreign militarv or
police units implicateJ in luman riglts
violations unless effective measures are
being taken to bring tle case to justice.
lirst passeJ in 1997, tle Lealv amenJment
las also been incluJeJ in subsequent
foreign aiJ appropriations legislation, anJ
Jefense appropriations legislation now las
a version of it as well. Tlis legislation las
been lelpful in raising tle pronle of luman
riglts issues witl L.S. embassies anJ tle
L.S. militarv, anJ in some cases tlis las
resulteJ in signincantlv closer scrutinv of
tle luman riglts recorJ of recipient forces.
Yet tle amenJment itself las onlv been
invokeJ in a lanJful of cases, anJ its
application is uneven. ln some countries,
L.S. embassies lave faileJ to put into
place even minimal proceJures for
vetting units for inJiviJuals implicateJ
in luman riglts violations. ln tle case of
Lolivia, sufncient Jocumentation exists
in numerous cases tlat woulJ justifv tle
implementation of tle Lealv amenJment,
vet tlis las not occurreJ. Nor Jo embassv
ofncials object publiclv wlen Lolivian
militarv anJ police ofncials linkeJ to
atrocities are promoteJ. ln Mexico, luman
riglts monitors claim tlat tle embassv
Jatabase tlat keeps track of luman riglts
violations is seriouslv incomplete.
Poicv RecommenJations
CounterJrug activities carrieJ out bv tle
L.S. anJ otler regional governments
sloulJ be guiJeJ bv tle luman riglts
stanJarJs establisleJ in tle jurispruJence
of tle inter-/merican svstem.
Tle Lealv amenJment sloulJ
be vigorouslv applieJ. Tle L.S.
government sloulJ not proviJe anv
form of assistance to securitv forces tlat
violate luman riglts anJ fail to bring
allegeJ luman riglts violators to justice.
Tle vetting proceJures tlat neeJ
to be put in place to effectivelv
implement tle Lealv amenJment
sloulJ be tlorougl anJ serious. ln
aJJition, after-training tracking coulJ
be incorporateJ to monitor wletler or
not tlose wlo receive training go on to
commit luman riglts abuses or become
involveJ in acts of corruption.
Tle Lealv amenJment remains an
unfunJeJ manJate; sufncient resources
sloulJ be earmarkeJ to encourage its
effective implementation.
Restrictions on civi| |iberties
L.S. Jrug policv las also promoteJ tle
aJoption of larsl antiJrug laws tlat are at
oJJs witl basic international norms anJ
stanJarJs of Jue process anJ unJermine
alreaJv tenuous civil liberties. ln almost
everv countrv stuJieJ, sucl laws lave been
approveJ, often creating eitler courts or
proceJures tlat greatlv limit Jue process
guarantees, sucl as tle presumption of
innocence, tle riglt to an aJequate Jefense,
anJ tle requirement tlat tle punislment
be commensurate witl tle gravitv of tle
crime. Sucl legislation is often moJeleJ
Jirectlv on L.S. laws; otler times it goes
even furtler as local ofncials seek to please
Waslington witl larsl measures.
ln some countries, L.S.-backeJ legislation
was aJopteJ in wlicl tle burJen of proof
for conviction of Jrug offenJers was so low
tlat local luman riglts lawvers complaineJ
tlat tleir JefenJants were forceJ to prove
tleir innocence. /ntiJrug legislation,
incluJing manJatorv minimum sentencing
laws, anJ tle use of numerical quotas for
arrests, lave nlleJ tle prisons of countries
across tle region witl low-level offenJers,
or even innocent people, wlo lave little
access to aJequate legal Jefense. ln some
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\as|:uctcu |nce cu lat:u -mer:ca " November 2OO4 9
countries, onlv a small percentage of tlose
arresteJ are actuallv convicteJ, wlile in
otlers conviction rates are astounJinglv
ligl. lervasive corruption anJ weak
juJiciaries mean tlat major Jrug trafnckers
are rarelv sanctioneJ. /nJ if tlev are, tlev
often benent from far more acceptable
prison conJitions, as tlev lave tle
resources to purclase a range of amenities.
LS/lD proviJes economic anJ teclnical
support to local juJiciaries. However,
L.S. justice sector support las sometimes
incluJeJ programs tlat work at cross-
purposes. ]ustice sector reform efforts
are essential in orJer botl to guarantee
respect for civil liberties anJ Jue process,
anJ to ensure tlat tlose wlo are guiltv of
serious crimes are effectivelv prosecuteJ.
LS/lD, tle WorlJ Lank, anJ tle lnter-
/merican Development Lank all support
rule of law programs tlat assist local
reform efforts, seek to increase access of
tle poor to tle justice sector, anJ proviJe
training anJ professional Jevelopment.
last experience las slown tlat tle
political will for reform on tle part of
recipient governments is crucial, as is tle
role of civil societv organizations in botl
maintaining momentum for reform anJ
proviJing valuable input into tle process.
Poicv RecommenJations
L.S. anJ Latin /merican Jrug laws
sloulJ be brouglt into compliance witl
international stanJarJs of Jue process
anJ respect for luman riglts. L.S.
counterJrug assistance sloulJ respect
Jue process stanJarJs anJ reinforce tle
rule of law in criminal cases.
ManJatorv minimums sloulJ be
eliminateJ anJ sentences aJopteJ tlat
corresponJ to tle gravitv of tle crime
committeJ. Major Jrug trafnckers
sloulJ face extenJeJ sentences; tlose
at tle lowest enJ of tle Jrug-trafncking
clain sloulJ inJeeJ be sanctioneJ, but
on a Jifferent scale.
More L.S. attention anJ assistance
neeJs to be given to promoting
justice sector reform anJ institutional
strengtlening across tle region, witl
particular attention to civil liberties anJ
Jue process issues.
Fostering po|itica| instabi|ity
lt is in tle interest of tle LniteJ States
to lave stable, Jemocratic governments
in its lemisplere. Yet L.S. international
Jrug control policies can lave a profounJlv
Jestabilizing effect, economicallv as well
as politicallv. Lven wlen signincant social
con1ict anJ political instabilitv is generateJ
bv tle implementation of Jrug policv,
more often tlan not L.S. policvmakers fail
to aJjust tle policv to tle realities-anJ
consequences-on tle grounJ. larticularlv
in tle convulsive /nJean region, L.S.
Jrug policv mav in fact be Jestabilizing
Jemocracies tlat are alreaJv quite fragile.
/ll too often, tle use of narcoterrorist"
rletoric in coca-proJucing countries
iJentines small coca farmers as militarv
tlreats anJ suggests tlat tlev are
somelow relateJ to global terrorist
networks. lt also paints tlem as criminals,
ratler tlan valiJ interlocutors, so tlat
anv efforts to seek Jialogue anJ common
grounJ are cast as illegitimate. Tlis in
turn marginalizes signincant sectors of
tle population anJ creates a situation in
wlicl con1ict anJ violence are almost
inevitable. Tle political consequences of
ignoring signincant sectors of societv coulJ
be explosive.
ln tle wake of September 11, botl tle
Jrug war anJ tle Latin /merican region
lave lost political grounJ in Waslington.
Tle attention of policvmakers las slifteJ
to tle terrorism tlreat anJ to otler parts
of tle worlJ, wlile Latin /merica anJ tle
Caribbean lave moveJ to tle bottom of
tle L.S. foreign policv agenJa. ln response,
ofncials in clarge of L.S. policv towarJ
tle region lave souglt attention anJ
resources bv lumping a broaJ range of issues
togetler in tle counterterrorism-anJ
narcoterrorist-basket. Manv L.S. ofncials
anJ policvmakers now talk about all
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1O Lxecut:ve Summary " Drugs and Democracy ln Latln Amerlca: Tbe |mpact o| U.S. Po|lcy
illicit transborJer activities as potential
terrorist tlreats, incluJing Jrug proJuction
anJ trafncking, illegal migration, arms
trafncking anJ monev launJering.
lt is certainlv possible tlat illicit
transborJer activities coulJ be useJ to
support terrorism, but Latin /merica is
not tle MiJJle Last. Denning all of tlese
problems as terrorist tlreats is unlelpful
anJ potentiallv Jestabilizing. Taking tle
fervor over antiterrorism a step furtler is
tle L.S. Soutlern CommanJ, wlicl las
now taken to calling Jrugs a "weapon of
mass Jestruction."
8
Tlis rletoric promotes
continuation of a faileJ approacl anJ tle
notion tlat tle LniteJ States, tlrougl its
Jrug policv towarJ Latin /merica, must
protect itself at anv cost against tlis evil
proJuct emanating from tle region.
Poicv RecommenJations
Tle L.S. government sloulJ slow
greater 1exibilitv witl regarJ to tle
counterJrug policies proposeJ or
aJopteJ bv governments in tle region,
taking into account tle socioeconomic
anJ political situation on tle grounJ.
Deepening Jemocracv anJ stabilitv
sloulJ be prioritizeJ over slort-term
counterJrug gains.
Tle present clallenge for L.S.
policvmakers is to stop seeing tle region
tlrougl tle counterterrorism lens,
wlicl Jistorts tle view of real problems
anJ tlreats in tle region; use of tle
narcoterrorist" rletoric tlat las come
to Jominate present L.S. Jrug control
policv sloulJ cease.
Small farmers wlo proJuce crops for
illicit Jrug proJuction sloulJ not be
stigmatizeJ as criminal narcofarmers" but
ratler be treateJ as valiJ interlocutors.
Undermining nationa|
governments' decisionmaking
L.S. Jrug control policv is unJermining
Jemocratic Jevelopments in tle region in
otler wavs as well. Tlrougl its Jiplomatic
anJ economic leverage, tle LniteJ States
las all too often JictateJ tle counterJrug
policies aJopteJ bv countries across tle
lemisplere, often over tle objections of
important sectors of botl governments anJ
civil societv, anJ at times Jraining scarce
resources from otler national priorities.
ln everv countrv stuJieJ tlat receives
signincant L.S. counterJrug assistance,
Jrug policies anJ programs are negotiateJ
bv L.S. ofncials Jirectlv witl a small group
of local political elites, in aJJition to local
militarv anJ police forces. Tlere is little
role for legislative oversiglt, public Jebate
or engagement witl civil societv actors.
Some countries, particularlv in tle /nJean
region, cloose to cooperate witl L.S.
counterJrug policies to avoiJ economic,
traJe or otler sanctions. Sometimes,
constitutionallv manJateJ legislative
approval processes are purposefullv avoiJeJ.
/ntiJrug laws moJeleJ on tlose in tle
L.S. are often presenteJ to legislatures for
rubberstamp approval. f all of tle Latin
/merican anJ Caribbean countries stuJieJ,
not one laJ eviJence of serious legislative
oversiglt of counterJrug policv.
ne of tle most powerful sticks useJ bv
Waslington is tle certincation process,
JescribeJ above. lecent legislative clanges
lave maJe tle process somewlat less
offensive. lunJamentallv, lowever, tlese
clanges lave faileJ to alter tle approacl
of laving an annual scorecarJ, on wlicl
tle largest consumer of illicit Jrugs in tle
worlJ graJes tle progress of otler countries
in seeking to limit its supplv. L.S. traJe
benents to tle /nJean region are also
now Jirectlv linkeJ to aclieving coca
eraJication anJ otler counterJrug goals,
as explicitlv stateJ in tle /nJean TraJe
lreference anJ Drug Lnforcement /ct.
Concern witl tle animositv generateJ
bv tle L.S. certincation process leJ tle
/S to Jevelop its own Multilateral
Lvaluation Meclanism (MLM), wlicl
manv countries see as a more palatable
alternative. lt is a transparent process-
information proviJeJ bv countries for
tle MLM evaluation is public anJ easilv
obtaineJ.
9
Wlile tle MLM process also las
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\as|:uctcu |nce cu lat:u -mer:ca " November 2OO4 11
its pitfalls, it Joes proviJe a multilateral
approacl to a multilateral issue. Tle /S
lnter-/merican Drug /buse Control
Commission (ClC/D) also proviJes
a multilateral forum for Jiscussing anJ
Jebating Jrug control tlat coulJ serve as a
space for Jeveloping sounJ policies.
lor a multilateral approacl to succeeJ,
Latin /merican anJ Caribbean leaJers
neeJ to seek unitv on common concerns
anJ alternative approacles. Witlin tle
LniteJ Nations, an informal coalition of
like-minJeJ countries las emergeJ seeking
to open up Jebate witlin tle LN svstem.
1O
/ Latin /merican coalition of countries
willing to Jebate alternative policies woulJ
nnJ eclo witl tlese countries at tle level of
tle LN anJ coulJ contribute signincantlv
to tle Jevelopment of a more lumane anJ
effective approacl in tle region.
Poicv RecommenJations
Tle annual certincation process sloulJ
be eliminateJ; more carrot anJ less stick
is neeJeJ in L.S. Jrug policv.
L.S. traJe agreements sloulJ be
JelinkeJ from explicit counterJrug
objectives, in particular coca anJ poppv
eraJication targets.
L.S. Jrug policv sloulJ, ultimatelv,
be a multilateral effort coorJinateJ
tlrougl tle LN anJ tle /S anJ
in close collaboration witl otler
Jonor countries, particularlv tle
Luropean Lnion.
Tle formation of an informal coalition
of like-minJeJ countries in Latin
/merica anJ tle Caribbean woulJ
proviJe an important forum for
Jebating Jrug policv alternatives.
Transparency and accountabi|ity
lssues of transparencv anJ accountabilitv are
not onlv relevant in tle countries receiving
L.S. assistance-lack of transparencv anJ
effective oversiglt pervaJes L.S. assistance
anJ training programs as well. / mvriaJ
of government agencies anJ programs
are involveJ in illicit Jrug control efforts,
wlicl makes Jetermining expenJitures anJ
monitoring programs Jifncult. lnformation
on militarv anJ police programs is
particularlv larJ to obtain.
lnaJequate reporting on L.S. militarv anJ
police assistance anJ training programs
impeJes botl tle transparencv of L.S.
efforts anJ accountabilitv wlen tlev fail to
meet tleir JesireJ objectives or generate
negative consequences. Lotl congressional
monitoring anJ tle abilitv of civil societv
organizations to evaluate L.S.-backeJ
programs are essential to ensuring tle
efncient anJ effective use of resources.
Tlev are also necessarv to ensure tlat L.S.
funJing furtlers L.S. policv objectives
anJ tlat sucl assistance is not useJ in a
wav tlat is Jetrimental to tle promotion
of luman riglts, tle rule of law anJ
Jemocratic principles.
L.S. legislative oversiglt of certain Jrug
control programs is a problem anJ is
particularlv ineffective witl regarJ to
Defense Department anJ Drug Lnforcement
/Jministration (DL/) programs. /part
from manJating tle loreign Militarv
Training leport, wlicl proviJes annual Jata
on L.S. militarv training of foreign troops,
public learings tlat seriouslv evaluate tle
effectiveness of lentagon counterJrug efforts
are neeJeJ. Likewise, wlile DL/ ofncials
are often calleJ to testifv on Jrug-trafncking
trenJs anJ tle like, meaningful evaluation
of tle success or failure of tleir efforts in
a given countrv sloulJ be unJertaken.
Monitoring L.S. police assistance programs
anJ tle content of tlose programs is
particularlv Jifncult. No svstematic reporting
requirements exist, anJ agencies sucl as tle
DL/ often refuse to proviJe even tle most
basic information.
lf tle abilitv of civil societv groups to
monitor L.S. Jrug policv is Jifncult in tle
LniteJ States, it is next to impossible in
Latin /merica anJ tle Caribbean. \erv
little information is maJe available bv eitler
regional governments or L.S. embassies to
local civil societv actors on tle nuts anJ
bolts of L.S. assistance or local operations.
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12 Lxecut:ve Summary " Drugs and Democracy ln Latln Amerlca: Tbe |mpact o| U.S. Po|lcy
Poicv RecommenJations
Tle L.S. Congress sloulJ ensure
tlat tle aJministration proviJes
comprelensive anJ JetaileJ reporting
on L.S. militarv anJ police assistance
anJ training programs. Tle loreign
Militarv Training leport requirement
sloulJ be maintaineJ in tle law. ln
aJJition, Congress sloulJ require a
single, comprelensive annual report
on all police assistance, incluJing
information on courses, units traineJ
anJ trainees, compiling information
from all L.S. agencies involveJ in
police training.
legular, public congressional learings
sloulJ be lelJ to evaluate lentagon
anJ DL/ antiJrug efforts, witl
testimonv bv inJepenJent experts.
Tle L.S. Congress coulJ also unJertake
a serious stuJv of tle stateJ objectives
of L.S. Jrug control agencies, listeJ
eacl vear in tle Wlite House's
National Drug Control Strategv leport,
anJ examine wlat las actuallv been
aclieveJ over tle last JecaJe.
Creater efforts sloulJ be unJertaken in
tle region bv L.S. embassies to reacl out
to local NCs anJ otler civil societv
organizations in orJer to proviJe more
information anJ seek more input into
tle Jrug-policv making process.
Crop eradication and a|ternative
deve|opment programs
Tlis book presents powerful eviJence tlat
forceJ coca eraJication efforts are futile in
tle long run. ln everv case stuJieJ, slort-
term gains lave been quicklv reverseJ.
Crop eraJication efforts lave stimulateJ
proJuction in new areas, creating even
greater clallenges for tle long term, as
coca proJuction spreaJs. lroJuction las
also slifteJ Jue to clanges in tle Jrug-
trafncking inJustrv. Yet tle costs of tle
policv are ligl-forceJ eraJication efforts,
anJ in particular aerial fumigation, often
lave Jire consequences, generating social
unrest, instabilitv anJ violence.
lovertv, poor conJitions for sustainable
agricultural proJuction, anJ tle
growing of crops for illicit Jrugs go
lanJ-in-lanJ. lromoting integrateJ
economic Jevelopment in tlese areas
is not impossible; lowever, tle term
crop substitution" is useJ less anJ
less frequentlv. /s simplv replacing
coca witl anotler crop or proJuct is
usuallv not economicallv viable, Jonors
increasinglv talk of sustainable, anJ
equitable, Jevelopment tlat will slowlv
reJuce farmers' JepenJence on coca
cultivation bv creating tle conJitions for
improveJ agriculture, emplovment anJ
income generation more broaJlv. Tlev
also recognize tle importance of local
participation, builJing on farmers' existing
knowleJge. Tlis leaJs to projects tlat are
more appropriate for local conJitions anJ
ensuring local buv-in."
lncreasinglv, international Jonors are
explicitlv recognizing tlat simultaneous
forceJ eraJication anJ alternative
Jevelopment efforts are incompatible.
Tle repressive nature of tle former
greatlv limits, or linJers altogetler, tle
cooperation neeJeJ for tle latter. ne
LN Jocument notes: ln areas wlere
alternative Jevelopment programs lave
not createJ viable alternative income
opportunities, tle application of forceJ
eraJication miglt enJanger tle success of
alternative Jevelopment programs."
11
Tle Cerman government's foreign aiJ
agencv, CTz, points out tlat wlen povertv
is tle root cause of proJuction, repressive
eraJication measures are inappropriate anJ
counterproJuctive. LaseJ on its extensive
experience working in coca-growing
regions of tle /nJes, CTz concluJes tlat
even tlougl substituting tle safetv net
tlat coca proJuction proviJes mav take
time, tlat approacl-witlout tle tlreat
of eraJication-is tle onlv manner to
aclieve a sustainable reJuction in Jrug crop
cultivation."
12
Wlen Jealing witl small-
scale coca proJucers, eraJication targets
can be agreeJ upon anJ met onlv wlen
otler sources of income are put in place.
Development experts also point out tlat
|rc.o.s|rg|v.
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\as|:uctcu |nce cu lat:u -mer:ca " November 2OO4 13
repressive measures against coca proJucers
raise prices on tle market, wlicl in turn
stimulates new cultivation.
13
lncorporating tlese lessons learneJ"
implies a funJamental slift in L.S. policv. lt
means Jeveloping a new anJ more equitable
relationslip witl families involveJ in coca
anJ poppv proJuction, accepting tlem
as legitimate partners in Jevelopment
efforts, anJ removing tle tlreat of forceJ
eraJication. lt also means investing more
resources in economic Jevelopment,
particularlv in rural sectors, anJ recognizing
tle neeJ for local governments to
lave greater economic Jecisionmaking
abilitv. linallv, strengtlening Jemocratic
institutions at tle local level is essential to
ensuring tle sustainabilitv of Jevelopment
efforts in poor rural areas.
Two signincant steps sloulJ be taken to
reJuce tle larm causeJ bv present Jrug
control policies. lirst, cultivation of coca
for traJitional uses sloulJ not result in
criminal sanctions. SeconJ, coca anJ
poppv proJuction bv small proJucers
sloulJ be JecriminalizeJ; small growers
sloulJ be consiJereJ economic victims"
witl few viable options for survival, ratler
tlan criminals.
1+
Tlis approacl takes as
its starting point tle principle tlat all
inJiviJuals lave a riglt to a life witl Jignitv
anJ lence sloulJ not be JepriveJ of tleir
onlv income source. lnnovative Jiscussion
is beginning among some Luropean
government ofncials anJ Jrug policv analvsts
as to low tlis approacl-wlat some call a
pro-poor Jrug control policv"
15
-coulJ be
implementeJ in practice.
Poicv RecommenJations
Tle L.S. government sloulJ aJopt
a pro-poor" Jrug control policv,
integrating tle lessons learneJ bv CTz,
LNDl, anJ otler international Jonors in
its approacl to Jevelopment assistance.
/erial anJ otler forms of forceJ
eraJication sloulJ be eliminateJ, as
sloulJ coca anJ poppv eraJication
targets. lorceJ eraJication more broaJlv
sloulJ be replaceJ witl voluntarv crop
reJuction efforts carrieJ out in accorJance
witl tle local population anJ onlv wlen
viable alternatives for income generation
exist. Tle provision of Jevelopment
aiJ to growers sloulJ be completelv
inJepenJent from eraJication goals.
Coca anJ poppv proJuction bv small,
subsistence-level proJucers sloulJ be
JecriminalizeJ.
L.S. economic support anJ teclnical
assistance for economic Jevelopment,
particularlv in rural areas, sloulJ be
increaseJ signincantlv across Latin
/merica anJ tle Caribbean.
Toward an A|ternative Po|icy
/ constructive miJJle grounJ lies between
tle Jrug lawks"-tlose aJvocating no-
tolerance, supplv-siJe strategies-anJ tle
Jrug legalizers." Tle LniteJ States neeJs
to be botl tougl anJ smart about Jrugs-
but tlis will require new approacles.
ut of all tle links in tle clain of Jrug
proJuction anJ trafncking tlat coulJ be
targeteJ, Jrug crops like coca leaves or
opium poppv proviJe tle smallest return
for tle effort. larmers receive onlv a tinv
fraction of tle retail prices of illicit Jrugs
on L.S. streets, making onlv enougl monev
to survive. Crowing alternative crops
proJuces even less income, so as long as
tlere is JemanJ for Jrugs, tlere will be
proJuction of Jrug crops.
lorceJ eraJication is an enJless anJ
counterproJuctive game. Small proJucers
witlout alternative livelilooJs will simplv
replant. lf subjecteJ to repeat eraJication,
tlev plant in new areas, taking Jrug
proJuction anJ all of its corresponJing
problems along witl tlem. /nJ, if
temporarilv successful in Jriving up tle
price of tle coca leaf, more people start
planting to slare in tle economic gain.
Tle LniteJ States must nglt tle illicit Jrug
traJe, but tlere are more effective wavs to
Jo tlis tlan attempting to wipe out Jrug
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14 Lxecut:ve Summary " Drugs and Democracy ln Latln Amerlca: Tbe |mpact o| U.S. Po|lcy
crops. lnterJiction of Jrugs closer to tleir
nnal Jestination is less costlv to us, anJ
more costlv to trafnckers. We neeJ to step
up L.S. efforts to follow tle monev, since
tlat is tle most Jangerous anJ corrupting
part of tle Jrug traJe. We sloulJ continue
to nnJ new wavs to track anJ Jisrupt monev
launJering wlile we capture anJ prosecute
tle big-nsl trafnckers wlo are making luge
pronts, ratler tlan tle small frv wlose
incarceration las no effect on trafncking.
To Jiscourage tle cultivation of Jrug
crops, it woulJ also be more effective for
tle LniteJ States to support long-term
integrateJ rural Jevelopment. We are
now paving tle price of JecaJes of social
marginalization, economic abanJonment
anJ state neglect of tle rural sector. We
can work witl lost nations to Jevelop
strategies to incorporate rural areas into tle
countrv's life anJ economv.
ln aJJition, we must strengtlen tle
civilian institutions tlat will combat Jrug
trafncking now anJ in tle future. lolice
forces neeJ support, incluJing training,
resources, anJ reform, if tlev are to
confront criminal activitv; using militarv
forces in tleir steaJ weakens anJ Jistorts
tle roles of botl. ]uJicial reform anJ
strengtlening must go lanJ-in-lanJ witl
police reform-functioning police anJ
juJicial svstems are neeJeJ to combat Jrug
trafncking. Tle LniteJ States must learn to
lave patience anJ invest for tle long laul
in institutional reform.
Tle L.S. sloulJ not encourage militarv
forces, in tle name of expeJiencv, to take
on policing roles. /nJ in nations wlere
tle militarv las assumeJ policing functions
because tle police are eitler too corrupt or
incapable of confronting Jrug crimes, tle
L.S. must support tle police reform neeJeJ
to allow tle police to reassume tleir
appropriate role.
Wlat woulJ lave tle greatest impact on
Jrug proJuction anJ trafncking, lowever,
woulJ be to reJuce JemanJ. StuJv after
stuJv slows tlat as long as we consume
Jrugs, someone will proJuce tlem, wletler
overseas or witlin tle LniteJ States. We
neeJ to reorient our priorities to focus
intenselv on prevention anJ treatment in
tle LniteJ States.
linallv, we neeJ new inJicators for success.
Tons seizeJ anJ acres eraJicateJ onlv
tell us tlat we are Joing sometling, not
tlat we are laving an impact on Jrug
consumption in tle LniteJ States. We
neeJ inJicators tlat are linkeJ to wlat we
are actuallv trving to aclieve-reJuceJ
Jrug consumption.
Leing lonest about tle numbers anJ
refocusing L.S. counterJrug efforts in
tle wavs JescribeJ above las a far greater
potential for reJucing Jrug consumption
in tle LniteJ States wlile mitigating tle
Jamage causeJ bv tle Jrug war in Latin
/merica. We can be botl tougl anJ smart
on Jrugs.
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\as|:uctcu |nce cu lat:u -mer:ca " November 2OO4 15
WOLA 5taff
loy O|son
Lxecutlve Dlrector
Kimber|y 5tanton
Deputy Dlrector and
Dlrector o| Studles
Gastn Chi||ier
Senlor Assoclate, Human
Plgbts and Pub|lc Securlty
Geoff Tha|e
Senlor Assoclate |or L| Sa|vador,
Cuba and Nlcaragua
leff Vogt
Senlor Assoclate |or Plgbts
and Deve|opment
lohn Wa|sh
Senlor Assoclate |or tbe
Andes and Drug Po|lcy
Adriana Be|trn
Assoclate |or Guatema|a
and Medla Coordlnator
Laurie Freeman
Assoclate |or Mexlco and Drug Po|lcy
Ei|een Rosin
Manager, Drug Po|lcy Project
Rache| Far|ey
Program O|cer |or Cuba
E|sa Fa|kenburger
Program Asslstant |or Centra|
Amerlca, Cuba and Lconomlc |ssues
Katie Ma|ouf
Program Asslstant |or Mexlco,
tbe Andes, and Pub|lc Securlty
Lori Picco|o
Assoclate |or Plnancla| Deve|opment
Ana Pau|a Duarte
Deve|opment Coordlnator
lason 5chwartz
O|ce Manager
Rache| Nei|d
Senlor Pe||ow
Co|etta Youngers
Senlor Pe||ow
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Endnotes
1
Coletta /. Youngers anJ Lileen losin, Drucs auJ
Demccracy :u lat:u -mer:ca. T|e mact c| L.S. c|:cy
(LoulJer, LonJon: Lvnne lienner lublislers, 2OO5).
2
L.S. ]ustice Department, Nat:cua| Druc ute||:ceuce
Ceuter. Nat:cua| Druc T|reat -ssessmeut 200+
(]olnstown, l/: NDlC, /pril 2OO+); anJ ]oln Walsl,
Druc \ar Mcu:tcr, /re We Tlere Yet`" Waslington
fnce on Latin /merica, November 2OO+.
3
lbiJ. Walsl.
+
lt is wortl noting tlat tle surveillance metloJs for
estimating illicit crop proJuction Jo not necessarilv
proJuce accurate statistics, anJ Jisputes often arise as
to crop proJuction levels. ln general, wlile Jrug policv
statistics mav be useful for comparative purposes, tlev
sloulJ be vieweJ witl some skepticism. llease see
Youngers anJ losin, Drucs auJ Demccracy, /ppenJix 1,
for a fuller explanation; anJ Walsl.
5
NCSR 2001, Soutl /merica." ln aJJition, L.S.
autlorities are investigating rumors of a new strain
of coca in Colombia tlat is faster-growing, taller,
leaner, anJ more resistant to lerbiciJes. Dan Molinski
for tle /ssociateJ lress in L| Hera|Jc arrauu:||a,
luncionarios Je LL investigan 'super coca,'" 1
September 2OO+, Logota.
6
Center for lnternational lolicv, T|e State Deartmeut`s
Jata cu Jruc crc cu|t:vat:cu, memo, 22 Marcl 2OO+, p. 3.
7
See NCSR 1999.
8
Lu:teJ ress uteruat:cua|, DD Wants More lorces for
Colombia," 21 Marcl 2OO+.
9
See tle /S website at www.oas.org anJ cloose tle
topic Drugs." Tle MLM is accessible from tlere.
1O
lor aJJitional information on tle LN Jrug control
svstem see Martin ]elsma anJ lien Metaal, Druc \ar
Mcu:tcr, Cracks in tle \ienna Consensus: Tle LN
Drug Control Debate," WL/, ]anuarv 2OO+.
11
LniteJ Nations, /ction llan on lnternational
Cooperation on tle LraJication of lllicit Drug Crops
anJ on /lternative Development," Ceneral /ssemblv
Special Session (LNC/SS) on Drugs, //lLS/S-2O/+
(New York: 1O ]une 1998).
12
CTz, Drucs auJ cverty. T|e Ccutr:out:cu c|
Deve|cmeut-r:euteJ Druc Ccutrc| tc cverty ReJuct:cu,
a cooperative stuJv of tle Drugs anJ Development
lrogramme (/DL) anJ tle lovertv leJuction lroject of
CTz, ]une 2OO3, p. 19.
13
lbiJ, p. 27.
1+
Martin ]elsma, levising anJ lntegrating Drug lolicies
at tle National anJ lnternational Level: How Can Drug
leform Le /clieveJ`" paper presenteJ at tle Wilton
lark Conference on Drug lolicies anJ tleir lmpact, 27
Marcl 2OO2. /vailable on Transnational lnstitute (TNl)
website unJer Drug lolicv lapers.
15
Drucs auJ cverty, p. 26.
Wasblngton O|ce on Latln Amerlca
163O Connectlcut Avenue, NW, Wasblngton, D.C. 2OOO9
7"
Tle Waslington fnce on Latin /merica (WL/) is a nonpront policv, researcl anJ Tle Waslington fnce on Latin /merica (WL/) is a nonpront policv, researcl anJ Tle Waslington fnce on Latin /merica (WL/) is a nonpront policv, researcl anJ Tle Waslington fnce on Latin /merica (WL/) is a nonpront policv, researcl anJ
aJvocacv organization working to aJvance Jemocracv, luman riglts anJ social justice aJvocacv organization working to aJvance Jemocracv, luman riglts anJ social justice aJvocacv organization working to aJvance Jemocracv, luman riglts anJ social justice aJvocacv organization working to aJvance Jemocracv, luman riglts anJ social justice aJvocacv organization working to aJvance Jemocracv, luman riglts anJ social justice
in Latin /merica anJ tle Caribbean. lounJeJ in 197+, WL/ plavs a leaJing role in in Latin /merica anJ tle Caribbean. lounJeJ in 197+, WL/ plavs a leaJing role in in Latin /merica anJ tle Caribbean. lounJeJ in 197+, WL/ plavs a leaJing role in in Latin /merica anJ tle Caribbean. lounJeJ in 197+, WL/ plavs a leaJing role in in Latin /merica anJ tle Caribbean. lounJeJ in 197+, WL/ plavs a leaJing role in in Latin /merica anJ tle Caribbean. lounJeJ in 197+, WL/ plavs a leaJing role in
Waslington policv Jebates about Latin /merica. WL/ facilitates Jialogue between Waslington policv Jebates about Latin /merica. WL/ facilitates Jialogue between Waslington policv Jebates about Latin /merica. WL/ facilitates Jialogue between Waslington policv Jebates about Latin /merica. WL/ facilitates Jialogue between Waslington policv Jebates about Latin /merica. WL/ facilitates Jialogue between Waslington policv Jebates about Latin /merica. WL/ facilitates Jialogue between Waslington policv Jebates about Latin /merica. WL/ facilitates Jialogue between Waslington policv Jebates about Latin /merica. WL/ facilitates Jialogue between
governmental anJ non-governmental actors, monitors tle impact of policies anJ governmental anJ non-governmental actors, monitors tle impact of policies anJ governmental anJ non-governmental actors, monitors tle impact of policies anJ governmental anJ non-governmental actors, monitors tle impact of policies anJ governmental anJ non-governmental actors, monitors tle impact of policies anJ governmental anJ non-governmental actors, monitors tle impact of policies anJ
programs of governments anJ international organizations, anJ promotes alternatives programs of governments anJ international organizations, anJ promotes alternatives programs of governments anJ international organizations, anJ promotes alternatives programs of governments anJ international organizations, anJ promotes alternatives programs of governments anJ international organizations, anJ promotes alternatives programs of governments anJ international organizations, anJ promotes alternatives
tlrougl reporting, eJucation, training anJ aJvocacv. tlrougl reporting, eJucation, training anJ aJvocacv. tlrougl reporting, eJucation, training anJ aJvocacv. tlrougl reporting, eJucation, training anJ aJvocacv. tlrougl reporting, eJucation, training anJ aJvocacv.
WL/ las a wiJe range of publications available on luman riglts in Latin /merica WL/ las a wiJe range of publications available on luman riglts in Latin /merica WL/ las a wiJe range of publications available on luman riglts in Latin /merica WL/ las a wiJe range of publications available on luman riglts in Latin /merica WL/ las a wiJe range of publications available on luman riglts in Latin /merica WL/ las a wiJe range of publications available on luman riglts in Latin /merica
anJ L.S. policv. WL/ also publisles a quarterlv newsletter: Cross Currents" in anJ L.S. policv. WL/ also publisles a quarterlv newsletter: Cross Currents" in anJ L.S. policv. WL/ also publisles a quarterlv newsletter: Cross Currents" in anJ L.S. policv. WL/ also publisles a quarterlv newsletter: Cross Currents" in anJ L.S. policv. WL/ also publisles a quarterlv newsletter: Cross Currents" in anJ L.S. policv. WL/ also publisles a quarterlv newsletter: Cross Currents" in anJ L.S. policv. WL/ also publisles a quarterlv newsletter: Cross Currents" in
Lnglisl anJ Lnlace" in Spanisl. See our website for a complete list of publications Lnglisl anJ Lnlace" in Spanisl. See our website for a complete list of publications Lnglisl anJ Lnlace" in Spanisl. See our website for a complete list of publications Lnglisl anJ Lnlace" in Spanisl. See our website for a complete list of publications Lnglisl anJ Lnlace" in Spanisl. See our website for a complete list of publications
anJ contact our ofnce to orJer. anJ contact our ofnce to orJer. anJ contact our ofnce to orJer. anJ contact our ofnce to orJer.
Waslington fnce on Latin /merica Waslington fnce on Latin /merica
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