Egypt Politics

Egypt Harvard/Berkley 1/148
Cross-X.com Thursday File
Egypt Harvard/Berkley
Egypt Harvard/Berkley..................................................................................................................1 ***Notes***.....................................................................................................................................5 ***1NC Shell***...............................................................................................................................6 *****Uniqueness*****..............................................................................................10 *****Uniqueness*****....................................................................................................................10 UQ Ext A2: Dip Cap Low..............................................................................................................11 UQ Ext A2: Military Control = N/U...............................................................................................12 UQ Ext Focused Diplomacy.........................................................................................................13 Diplomacy Focus Key....................................................................................................................15 UQ Ext Military Diplomacy..........................................................................................................16 UQ Ext US Has Influence Over Military.......................................................................................18 UQ Ext Timeframe Next Few Months Key.................................................................................19 UQ Ext Dip. K2 Election Timing...................................................................................................20 *****Links*****.......................................................................................................20 *****Links*****..............................................................................................................................20 A2: Link Turns: Timing (A Must Read).........................................................................................21 2NC Link Magnifier - Focus............................................................................................................22 2NC Link Magnifier Perception....................................................................................................23 2NC Aid Link Magnifier..................................................................................................................24 Ext Aid Link: A2 Aid Cuts Now.....................................................................................................26 Ext Aid Link: Econ Spark Instability.............................................................................................27 2NC Links Plan Kills Coercive Diplomacy ..................................................................................28 Link General...............................................................................................................................30 Link Military Change...................................................................................................................35 Link Afghanistan ........................................................................................................................36 Links Asia....................................................................................................................................39 Link Japan...................................................................................................................................41 Link South Korea.........................................................................................................................42 Link Iraq .....................................................................................................................................43 Link TNWs ..................................................................................................................................48 Link Turkey.................................................................................................................................51 *****Internal Links*****..........................................................................................51 *****Internal Links*****.................................................................................................................51 2NC Ext - Dip Cap Finite Egypt...................................................................................................52 2NC Ext Dip Cap Finite Middle East..........................................................................................53 2NC Ext Dip Cap Finite...............................................................................................................54 2NC Ext Diplomatic Capital Key Plan Cost................................................................................56 Military K2 Secular Transition........................................................................................................57 A2: Military Not Relinquish Power.................................................................................................59 Dip. K2 Transition Military...........................................................................................................60 Sustained Diplomacy Checks Extremist Rise.................................................................................62 Dip Cap Checks Spillover..............................................................................................................63 A2: No Influence............................................................................................................................64 *****Impact Scenarios*****.....................................................................................64 *****Impact Scenarios*****...........................................................................................................64 ***Suez Canal Shell***............................................................................................64 ***Suez Canal Shell***..................................................................................................................64
Egypt Harvard/Berkley Cross-X.com 2/148 Thursday File Close Suez Canal = Price Shocks..................................................................................................66 Egypt K2 Oil Markets.....................................................................................................................67 Egypt Military K2 Suez Canal......................................................................................................68 Impact Magnifier: Saudi Arabia.....................................................................................................69 ***Leadership Shell***..................................................................................................................70 Ext - Leadership............................................................................................................................74 ***Terrorism Shell***..............................................................................................74 ***Terrorism Shell***....................................................................................................................74 Egypt Intel = Best.........................................................................................................................76 Egypt Counterterrorism..............................................................................................................77 Yemen Spillover............................................................................................................................78 Spillover -> Yemen = Terrorism....................................................................................................79 ***Instability Shell***.............................................................................................79 ***Instability Shell***....................................................................................................................79 Ext Instability..............................................................................................................................81 ME Diplomacy Bahrain & Yemen................................................................................................82 Yemen Counter Terrorism.............................................................................................................83 ***Bahrain Shell***.................................................................................................83 ***Bahrain Shell***........................................................................................................................83 Bahrain 5th Fleet........................................................................................................................87 Bahrain Spillover -> Gulf Oil States...............................................................................................88 Egypt -> Bahrain...........................................................................................................................89 ***Israel Relations Shell***.....................................................................................89 ***Israel Relations Shell***............................................................................................................89 Israel Brink....................................................................................................................................92 A2: Brotherhood Not A Threat.......................................................................................................93 ***Muslim Brotherhood***......................................................................................93 ***Muslim Brotherhood***.............................................................................................................93 Muslim Brotherhood Pushing For Control .....................................................................................94 A2: Muslim Brotherhood Not Win Enough Seats............................................................................95 Egypt Influence K2 Avoid Islam Rise...........................................................................................96 Brotherhood = Price Spikes...........................................................................................................98 Brotherhood = Econ Collapse........................................................................................................99 Brotherhood = ME Instability......................................................................................................100 Muslim Brother Hood Pushing For Power.....................................................................................101 Brotherhood = No MEPP..............................................................................................................102 Transition K2 Check Muslim Brotherhood....................................................................................103 A2: Muslim Brotherhood Not Threat............................................................................................104 ***Foreign Aid***.................................................................................................104 ***Foreign Aid***.........................................................................................................................104 Congress Cut Aid.........................................................................................................................105 Aid: Peaceful Transition K2 Prevent Cut......................................................................................106 Aid K2 Leverage..........................................................................................................................107 Aid K2 Arms Sales.......................................................................................................................108 Aid Cut Quickly............................................................................................................................109 Egypt A2: No Aid Cut Budget.................................................................................................110 Egypt Aid On Table...................................................................................................................111
Egypt Harvard/Berkley Cross-X.com 3/148 Thursday File ***Iran***............................................................................................................111 ***Iran***....................................................................................................................................111 Diplomacy = Iran Transition........................................................................................................112 ***** Affirmative Answers*****..............................................................................113 ***** Affirmative Answers*****...................................................................................................113 ***2AC F/L***..............................................................................................................................114 ***Uniqueness Ans.***..........................................................................................117 ***Uniqueness Ans.***................................................................................................................117 Aff Egypt N/U: Dip Cap Low....................................................................................................118 ***Link Level***...................................................................................................118 ***Link Level***...........................................................................................................................118 Iraq Aff Link Turn......................................................................................................................119 Afghanistan Aff Link Turn ........................................................................................................120 Iraq Aff Link Turn......................................................................................................................122 Japan Aff Link Turn...................................................................................................................123 Link Link Turn South Korea K Aff............................................................................................124 ***Internal Answers***.........................................................................................124 ***Internal Answers***................................................................................................................124 Aff Egypt: No Influence.............................................................................................................125 Aff Egypt: Aid =/= Influence.....................................................................................................126 Aff Egypt No Influence...........................................................................................................127 Aff Egypt No Influence: Military..............................................................................................129 ***Impact Ans.***.................................................................................................129 ***Impact Ans.***........................................................................................................................129 ***A2: Counterterrorism***...................................................................................129 ***A2: Counterterrorism***.........................................................................................................129 A2: Counterterrorism Impacts.....................................................................................................130 ***A2: Spillover/Instability***................................................................................130 ***A2: Spillover/Instability***......................................................................................................130 Aff No Egypt Spillover...............................................................................................................131 ***A2: Iran Reform***...........................................................................................132 ***A2: Iran Reform***..................................................................................................................132 Aff No Iran Reform....................................................................................................................133 ***A2: Muslim Brotherhood Bad***........................................................................134 ***A2: Muslim Brotherhood Bad***.............................................................................................134 Aff Egypt No I/L: Muslim Brotherhood....................................................................................135 Aff Egypt Brotherhood Wont Run..........................................................................................136 Aff Egypt A2: Muslim Brotherhood Bad..................................................................................137 Aff Egypt A2: Muslim Brotherhood Takeover..........................................................................139 ***A2: Suez Canal***............................................................................................140 ***A2: Suez Canal***...................................................................................................................140 Aff Egypt US Will Keep Suez Canal Open...............................................................................141 Aff Egypt A2: Oil Cut-Off.........................................................................................................142 A2: Suez Canal Shut Down = No Impact.....................................................................................143
Egypt Harvard/Berkley Cross-X.com 4/148 Thursday File ***A2: Aid Cuts***................................................................................................143 ***A2: Aid Cuts***.......................................................................................................................143 Aff Egypt No Aid Cuts.............................................................................................................144 Aff Egypt Policy -> Israel Inev. Change.....................................................................................145 ***A2: Israel***....................................................................................................145 ***A2: Israel***............................................................................................................................145 ***Offense***.......................................................................................................145 ***Offense***..............................................................................................................................145 Aff Egypt Turn: Peace Process...............................................................................................146 Aff Withdraw = More Democratic Reforms...............................................................................147
***Notes***
Why you should choose to run Egypt. A. Awesome Timeframes. Nothing in the Status Quo or Affirmative can top the timeframe of the Link, Internal Link, and Impacts. All three happen very quickly. All of the Uniqueness evidence and Internals take into account the fact that Mubarak has left power and is only talking in terms of US diplomatic response to the transition to elections. B. The internal link evidence about our focus on Egypt is fantastic right now. Sometimes it is just good to be on the side of truth in the world, this argument puts you there. C. Impact Scenarios: All of your favorites are right there at your finger-tips from the general Econ impacts from Oil Price Shocks to hyper-specific scenarios about U.S. Carriers in the Gulf. All of these impacts feed from one source, US diplomatic response in the Middle East as a result of the Egypt Crisis. D. You are not limited to Egypt after the 1NC, you can branch out because the US is forced to deal with all of the Middle East turmoil at once as a result of Egypt allowing you to diversify and magnify your impacts.
***1NC Shell***
A. US diplomacy has been launched throughout the Middle East to deal with the transition of power to the military and future transition to democracy. Diplomacy is tentative requiring focused and persistent efforts to maintain diplomatic contact. Current efforts will succeed. CNN 2/12 (Elise Labott and Barbara Starr, CNN Reporters; U.S. seeks diplomatic clarity in Mideast; February 12, 2011; http://www.cnn.com/2011/POLITICS/02/12/us.mubarak/index.html? eref=rss_politics&utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+rss %2Fcnn_allpolitics+%28RSS%3A+Politics%29) CJC The Obama administration launched into diplomatic outreach throughout the Middle East Saturday, even as it tries to determine the composition of the Egyptian military council and the line of authority in the future Egyptian government. While the U.S. is already familiar with the players of the council, it is still unclear who is handling diplomatic issues, senior officials said. "They will have to clarify who is now the head of the government," one senior State Department official said. "We have to figure out the pecking order." But the official added, "Whomever the Egyptians chose, we can have a relationship and deal with that person." He spoke anonymously
Washington (CNN) -due to the sensitivity of the ongoing diplomacy. A big unanswered question is the future of Vice President Omar Suleiman, the official said. Top State Department officials are contacting every Arab foreign minister, and
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton is expected to call leaders in the region this weekend, officials said. Clinton also is dispatching Under Secretary William Burns to Jordan to discuss "the historic events in Egypt as well as a range of other regional and bilateral issues," a State Department statement said. Burns, the No. 3 official at the State Department, previously served as an ambassador to Jordan. Adm. Michael Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, is headed to Israel on a scheduled visit, and will visit Jordan as well. Diplomacy between the United States and Egypt been effectively cut off, said a Republican congressman familiar with the administration's efforts. The congressman briefed reporters Friday afternoon on the condition they not use his name. "It's been very difficult to get information through normal diplomatic channels given the rapid changes. And you can imagine, they don't want to sit down with an American right now when they've got their whole world kind of collapsing on them as we speak," the congressman said. State Department officials acknowledged it has been hard to reach members of the new Egyptian government during the last 48 hours. U.S. Ambassador to Egypt Margaret Scobey has had some contact with the foreign ministry, and Defense Secretary Robert Gates and Mullen had some contact with their military counterparts. Gates spoke with Egypt's defense minister, Field Marshal Mohammed Hussein Tantawi, on Saturday, U.S. spokesman Geoff Morrell said. The discussion, Gates' sixth phone
conversation with the Egyptian Defense Minister since the situation in Egypt began, is the first high-level contact between the two governments since President Hosni Mubarak resigned. U.S. and Egyptian officials said they expected the
two sides to resume broader and more regular consultations this weekend. B. (Insert Specific Link or read this generic evidence) Decreasing military deployments kills diplomatic influence. Holmes, 2009 [Kim, Ph.d., VP for Foreign and Defense Policy Studies and Director of the David Institute for International Studies at the Heritage Foundation, 6-1, Sustaining American Leadership with Military Power, http://s3.amazonaws.com/thf_media/2009/pdf/sr0052.pdf] MGM The consequences of hard-power atrophy will be a direct deterioration of Americas diplomatic clout. This is already on display in the western Pacific Ocean, where Americas ability to hedge against the growing ambitions of a rising China is being called into question by some of our key Asian allies. Recently, Australia released a defense White Paper that is concerned primarily with the potential decline of U.S. military primacy and the implications that this decline would have for Australian security and stability in the AsiaPacific. These developments are anything but reassuring. The ability of the United States to reassure
Egypt Harvard/Berkley Cross-X.com 7/148 Thursday File friends, deter competitors, coerce belligerent states, and defeat enemies does not rest on the strength of our political leaders commitment to diplomacy; it rests on the foundation of a powerful military. Only by retaining a big stick can the United States succeed in advancing its diplomatic priorities. Only by building a full-spectrum military force can America reassure its many friends and allies and count on their future support. C. Diplomatic capital is finite each new issue trades off with existing issues Anderson & Grewell 01 (Terry L. Anderson is executive director of Political Economy Research Center ("PERC")The Center for Free Market Environmentalism, Bozeman, Montana, and senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University. J. Bishop Grewell is a research associate with PERC. Fall, 2001 2 Chi. J. Int'l L. 427) CJC Foreign policy is a bag of goods that includes issues from free trade to arms trading to human rights. Each new issue in the bag weighs it down, lessening the focus on other issues and even creating conflicts between issues. Increased environmental regulations could cause countries to lessen their focus on international threats of violence, such as the sale of ballistic missiles or border conflicts between nations. As countries must watch over more and more issues arising in the international policy arena, they will stretch the resources necessary to deal with traditional international issues. As Schaefer writes, "Because diplomatic currency is finite . . . it is critically important that the United States focus its diplomatic efforts on issues of paramount importance to the nation. Traditionally, these priorities have been opposing hostile domination of key geographic regions, supporting our allies, securing vital resources, and ensuring access to foreign economies." D. US influence over the Egyptian military is critical to ensure there is enough time for liberal political groups to organize to prevent a takeover by the Muslim Brotherhood in elections. Quick elections would result in a radical Egypt. Dorell 2/14 (Oren Dorell, Reporter at USA TODAY; Ideology shadows fight to rule the new Egypt; 2/14/2011; http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2011-02-14-1Aegypt14_CV_N.htm) CJC Leaders of political parties that dominated the protest movement disagree. In the upper-class
neighborhood of Zamalek, members of Egypt's liberal opposition gathered Saturday night at the penthouse apartment of former presidential candidate Ayman Nour. Nour talked as his guests sat on gilded armchairs, sipped sparkling fruit juices and dined on baked shrimp, fish and stuffed crab under a clear night sky beside the roof-top swimming pool. People talked about a new dawn for Egypt and what it took to get to this point. Egyptians want a government that adheres to the universal
declaration of human rights agreed to by the United Nations, said Wael Nawara, secretary general of Nour's liberal party, Al Ghad. "Egyptians are very mellow," Nawara said, gesturing to a crowd listening to
blaring music outside Al Ghad's downtown office, where a man danced with a gyrating woman wearing a hijab, surrounded by clapping onlookers. "The Muslim Brotherhood don't like music or dancing." Egyptians of all political persuasions
celebrated the departure of Mubarak, 82, who was forced out of the presidential palace Friday by the military and was staying at the Red Sea resort of Sharm el-Sheik, according to Prime Minister Ahmed Shafiq. Liberals and Islamists have announced that they intend to seek power through elections that, under Mubarak, had been rigged for years. Parties that largely were banned by Mubarak, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, are looking forward to running candidates openly. Politicians such as Nour, who spent years in jail for challenging Mubarak's repressive regime, are wooing supporters. Many in the West are hopeful that a democratic Egypt, the most populous
nation in the Middle East with a population of about 82 million, will herald a new age in a troubled region where Arab despots, monarchs and sheiks have presided over restive populations from which militancy and terrorism have been exported for years. Reuel Marc Gerecht, senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, has argued that the United States should welcome the upheaval as a chance for the Arab world to modernize and allow moderate forces to gain the upper hand. Others say democracy in Egypt could help radicals gain power. "The shorter the time before new elections, the
better the chance for the already well-organized Brotherhood to maximize its gains," said Wayne White, former deputy director of the State Department's Near East & South Asia Intelligence Office. Laying the groundwork for elections The Muslim Brotherhood was founded in Egypt in 1928
Egypt Harvard/Berkley Cross-X.com 8/148 Thursday File as a strict Islamic alternative to Western influences. It spawned a radical cell that assassinated Egyptian President Anwar Sadat in 1981. It inspired al-Qaeda founder Osama Bin Laden and his deputy, Ayman Al-Zawahiri, an Egyptian and former member of the Brotherhood. The Brotherhood's Abdel Fattah says the group wants Egypt's army to quickly pave the way for civilian rule, as well as changes to the constitution that would lay the groundwork for elections soon. On Sunday the Brotherhood got half of what it wanted. Egypt's Armed Forces Supreme Council, which is ruling the nation for now, announced that it had dissolved Mubarak's handpicked parliament and suspended the constitution, which had been packed with provisions to prevent free elections and opposition parties. The liberal parties and youth groups that kept the protests going for 20 days have a platform, and some of their goals are similar to those that the Brotherhood supports. For example, both
want to crack down on corruption and a culture of bribery that shopkeepers, businesses and ordinary Egyptians say has made daily life here difficult. Nawara says sweeping out the corrupt members of the regime is a first step toward encouraging foreign investment in Egypt that will lead to jobs, but the Brotherhood wants investment strategies to abide by Islamic law. Nawara
says Egypt's military which has long had close ties to the U.S. military should remain in charge of Egypt until a civilian government is running smoothly. The liberal parties say they also want the United States which sends about $1.5 billion in aid to Egypt each year to use its influence to ensure Egyptian officers continue reforms. Mona Makram-Ebeid, a Coptic Christian and
former member of the Egyptian parliament, plans to push for a greatly expanded student exchange program with the West so young Egyptians can learn how to development the economy. A sharia-based state would be "totally refused" if put to a referendum in Egypt, she predicted, surrounded in her office by wooden furnishings and framed oil paintings that hark to the early 20th century, when Cairo was home to Jewish and Christian refugees from Europe. The Brotherhood is "a cause
for concern, but not a cause for fearful reaction," Makram-Ebeid said. Its strength, he said, is a result of Mubarak's repression of liberals, who were not allowed to organize while the Brotherhood was able to do so in mosques and through its teachers and charities. "You counter (the Brotherhood) by allowing new parties to form without any restriction," Makram-Ebeid
said. "They can mobilize the street. But the youth can mobilize more."
E. Allowing the Muslim Brotherhood to gain control of Egypt would result in a closure of the Suez Canal, collapsing European Economies, war with Israel, Middle East Instability, oil price shocks, and all out war. Hilliker 2/2 (Joel Hilliker Columnist, Will the Muslim Brotherhood Close the Suez Canal?, February 2, 2011,
http://thetrumpet.com/?q=7928.6537.0.0) CJC
Almost immediately after angry Egyptians took to the streets last week, oil jumped to over $100 a barrel. It was the first time oil hit triple digits since the record spike to $147 two years ago. Clearly, investors were spooked at even the thought of a disruption in energy production and shipping. On Monday, we got a glimpse at one important reason why. A leading Muslim Brotherhood member said the Suez Canal should be immediately shut down. Muhammad Ghannem made the provocative statement to an Arabic-language Iranian news network. He also said Egyptians should be prepared for war against Israel. It was a chilling peek at what might happen once the dust settles from these popular protests sweeping Egypt. Western optimism notwithstanding, the Muslim Brotherhood will likely end up in powerwhich means the Middle Easts most populous and influential Arab country is about to lurch from relatively stable, moderate ally to volatile, radical enemy. The shock waves will be massive. This will revolutionize the landscape in the most combustible part of the world. It will embolden extremists like nothing since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, and place formidable levers of power in their hands. Control over the Suez Canal is definitely one of those levers. Its a prime example of why Europe is watching events in Egypt so intently. The Suez Canal is one of the engineering marvels of the modern world. It cuts through 118
miles of Egyptian countryside, connecting the Red Sea with the Mediterranean, thus linking Europe with East Africa and Asia. Initially completed over 140 years agoafter 1.5 million laborers moved more than 1.2 billion cubic feet of soil with picks and shovelsto this day it remains a conduit for roughly 8 percent of global seaborne trade. Of
particular concern is oil. Though Egypt exports none itself, the U.S. Energy Department still classifies it as one of the few World Oil Transit Chokepoints. Every day, 3 million barrels of oil and fuel products pass
through the canal and the Suez-Mediterranean Pipeline, which also traverses Egypt. That amounts to 2.5 percent of global oil production. About two thirds of that energy is traveling north toward Europe. It accounts for 5 to
Egypt Harvard/Berkley Cross-X.com 9/148 Thursday File 7 percent of Europes oil consumption. Disrupt these shipments, and European supplyand global priceswould be affected tremendously, Dalton Garis, an associate professor at an Abu Dhabi energy-research center, told the Wall Street Journal. The New York Times reported on the same possibility: While [oil] prices are set globally, the immediate impact of any interruption would be felt primarily in Europe, which relies heavily on jet fuel, heating oil and other distillates refined in the Middle East and shipped via the canal and pipeline (emphasis mine). Already this past week, European oil prices have soaredeven higher than those in America. Investors are concerned that Egypts instability makes ships passing through the canal more susceptible to attack. Worse, though, is the prospect of a radical, anti-West government taking over Cairo and shutting the canal down altogether, a likelihood Barclays Capital warned of this week. Oil tankers transporting Middle East oil westward would have to travel the extra 6,000 miles around Africa, delaying delivery times and markedly increasing costs. Thats the last
thing a continent mired in economic problems wants. One could be forgiven for thinking that Ghannems call to close the canal was calculated to panic Europeans. People talking about the closure of the Suez Canal are talking
about a collapse of the state, which it is in our interest to avoid at all costs, Italys foreign minister, Franco Frattini, said Monday. This is one of the reasons why Egypts stability is fundamental for the economy too, as a result of trade in the Mediterranean and therefore with Europe. Remember, the Suez Canal was once before at the heart of a war. In fact, current conditions resound with
echoes of that history. On one side was an Egyptian leader with a vision of militant pan-Arabism that put him at odds with European colonial powers. Colonel Gamal Nasser had taken part in a coup against the Egyptian monarchy in 1952 and then overthrown the president two years later. In July 1956, in a purposeful display of Arab strength, he seized control of the Suez Canal. On the other side were the canals European owners. The canal was the Wests most prominent asset in the Middle East: At the time, a full four fifths of Western Europes oil was passing through it. France, Britain and Israel responded to Nassers provocation by combining forces to invade. In what has proven to be a terrible blunder, the United States broke from its British ally and came out firmly against the action. The United Nations, beholden to Third World opinion, also dissented. In the end, a ceasefire was imposed, and control of the vital Suez Canal was yielded up to Egypt. It was a massive defeat for Britain in particular, marking its unmistakable loss of status as a great powerand the fulfillment of a biblical prophecy that it would lose control of its sea gates. Since that event, Europe has significantly reduced its dependence on Suez. Nevertheless, in these
economically strained, extremely oil-dependent times, the Suez Canal remains very significant strategically. The prospect of a Muslim Brotherhood government gaining control over this assetpunctuated by the explicit call for its closure by a prominent membermakes it easy to imagine a militant Egyptian government again using the canal to provoke a European power. This time, however, the players would be somewhat different. On one side would be the Muslim Brotherhood, an organization sure to prove even more aggressive than Nasser was (at one time, it actually tried to assassinate Nasser). And on the other, rather than a fading Britain, would be a surging, unified Europe. These differences would result in a far different outcome than the war in 1956. Longtime
Trumpet readers are well familiar with the end-time prophecy in Daniel 11set to be fulfilled soonof a push by an Iranian-led, Islamist Middle Eastern power (the king of the south) of a German-led European empire (the king of the north). Our editor in chief has speculated about the likelihood of oil factoring into this provocation: Iran could well gain control over
supplies to such an extent as to be able to drive prices to uncomfortable highs. This in turn could cause Europe to quickly unite into the most powerful economic bloc in the world, he wrote in the Trumpets December 1994 edition. The European empire described in biblical prophecyand presently coalescing, even amid financial troublesis a voracious economic power, and unimaginably ferocious in securing the energy and other resources it needs to fuel itself. It is important to note
that, in Daniels prophecy, when a unified Europe wipes out Iran, it violently overthrows Egypt in the process (and the land of Egypt shall not escape, Daniel 11:42 tells us). Clearly, the links between Iran and Egypt will be strong and
deep by that pointso much so that Europe will feel compelled to eliminate them both in a stroke. F. And, MIDDLE EAST WAR WILL PRODUCE GLOBAL NUCLEAR CONFLAGRATION. Steinbach, 2002. http://wagingpeace.org/articles /0203/0331steinbachisraeli.htm
Meanwhile, the existence of an arsenal of mass destruction in such an unstable region in turn has serious implications for future arms control and disarmament negotiations, and
Should war break out in the Middle East again,... or should any Arab nation fire missiles against Israel, as the Iraqis did, a nuclear escalation, once unthinkable except as a last resort, would now be a strong probability."(41) and Ezar Weissman, Israel's current President said "The nuclear issue is gaining momentum(and the) next war will not be conventional."(42) Russia and before it the Soviet Union has long been a major(if not the major) target of Israeli nukes. It is widely reported that the principal purpose of
even the threat of nuclear war. Seymour Hersh warns, " Jonathan Pollard's spying for Israel was to furnish satellite images of Soviet targets and other super sensitive data relating to U.S. nuclear targeting strategy. (43) (Since launching its own satellite in 1988, Israel no longer needs U.S. spy secrets.) Israeli nukes aimed at the Russian heartland seriously complicate disarmament and arms control negotiations
Cross-X.com Thursday File and, at the very least, the unilateral possession of nuclear weapons by Israel is enormously destabilizing, and dramatically lowers the threshold for their actual use, if not for all out nuclear war. In the words of Mark Gaffney, "... if the familar pattern(Israel refining its weapons of mass destruction with U.S. complicity) is not reversed soon- for whatever reason- the deepening Middle East conflict could trigger a world conflagration."
*****Uniqueness*****
UQ Ext A2: Dip Cap Low

Clinton efforts have restored credibility to American diplomacy. Labott 2/16 (Elise Labott, CNN Senior State Department Producer; Can Clinton remake U.S. diplomacy?; February 16, 2011; http://www.cnn.com/2011/POLITICS/02/16/clinton.sweep/index.html?iref=allsearch) CJC For Clinton, no country is too small to partner with the United States. Even as she managed a reset with Russia, expanded ties with China, and deepened relationships with traditional U.S. allies in Europe, she also traveled to the tiny Pacific island of Papua New Guinea, which has massive undeveloped fields of petroleum and natural gas. "These capital investments helped us deal with what was the biggest problem that we came in facing -- the idea that there was an American decline," said Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg. "That our credibility and leadership were shot, either because we were too unilateral or we weren't dealing with what we needed to deal with. That narrative is beginning to fade."
UQ Ext A2: Military Control = N/U

Mubarak step down just beings a new round of diplomacy with the military to ensure the transition. Gulf Times 2/11 (Daily Newspaper published by Gulf Publishing & Printing Co. Doha, Qatar; Going, going, GONE; 11 February, 2011; http://www.gulf-times.com/site/topics/article.asp? cu_no=2&item_no=415614&version=1&template_id=57&parent_id=56) CJC There was a note of caution in the background, however, over how far the military under Field Marshal Mohamed Hussein Tantawi, Mubaraks veteran defence minister, are ready to permit a democracy -- especially since the hitherto banned Islamist Muslim Brotherhood is one of the best organised forces. This is just the end of the beginning, said Jon Alterman of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies. Egypt isnt moving toward democracy, its moved into martial law and where it goes is now subject to debate. US officials familiar with the US-sponsored Egyptian military say Tantawi, 75, has long seemed resistant to change. He has been defence minister for more than 20 years with a past rooted firmly in the old guards ruling elite. In a statement, the higher military council said it would take measures for an interim phase and hoped to realise peoples hopes. Striking the even-handed
note the military has maintained throughout the crisis, it praised Mubarak for resigning in the interests of the nation and the martyrs who died protesting.
UQ Ext Focused Diplomacy

Egypt still requires US diplomacy and regionally an increased role currently to deal with rising wave of protests to reassure allies. LA Times 2/15 (Michael A. Memoli and Michael Muskal, LA Times Staff Writers; Obama praises Egypt, talks budget at news conference; February 15, 2011; http://www.latimes.com/news/politics/la-pn-news-conference-obama-20110216,0,5580994.story? track=rss) CJC
The question-and-answer session was Obama's first solo press conference since late December and gave reporters a chance to question the president on economic issues and to more fully probe the president's views on the situation in Egypt and other prodemocracy movements throughout the Arab world. "Obviously, there is still a lot of work to be done in Egypt
itself," Obama said in the wake of the resignation of President Hosni Mubarak and the takeover of government by the army. "What we have seen so far is positive." Obama said Egypt is going to require help in developing democratic institutions, but so far the country is sending "the right signals." Noting that a wave of protests has spread across the region, Obama posed a plan for United States policy. "Each country is different, each country has its own traditions," Obama said. "America can't dictate," but "there are certain universal
principles we adhere to, we don't believe in violence, we don't believe in coercion." Obama said people should have a right to express their opinions in public. He drew a contrast between the demonstrations in Egypt and those in Iran, which have been stifled by the government. "We have sent a strong message to allies in the region, 'Let us look at Egypt's example
as opposed to Iran's.' " Obama also argued that change was an ongoing process. "Real change in these
societies is not going to happen because of terrorism, it will happen because people come together," the president said. "We are obviously concerned about stability," he said. "The world is changing," and the issue is to "get ahead of
change." US must continue to keep the pressure on the Egyptian military to ensure a smooth transition to elections. LA Times 2/13 (Peter Nicholas, Los Angeles Times, Obama's strategy was to pressure Mubarak without intruding; February 13, 2011; http://www.latimes.com/news/politics/la-fgegypt-obama-strategy-20110213,0,5736229.story? page=2&utm_medium=feed&track=rss&utm_campaign=Feed%3A%20latimes%2Fnews %2Fpolitics%20%28L.A.%20Times%20-%20Politics%29&utm_source=feedburner) CJC Obama at his most eloquent, lauding Egyptian demonstrators who peacefully "bent the arc of history toward justice included a pointed message for the military leaders who now were in charge. He would be watching, he warned them, for a "transition that is credible in the eyes of the Egyptian people." There were no celebrations at the White House; no champagne toasts on the Truman Balcony like the one Obama hosted after Congress passed his healthcare overhaul last year. The administration has been busy making calls to senior Egyptian officers, trying to keep the pressure on. A White House aide said: "This is hardly over.''
It was once more." But he also
Diplomats know the situation is volatile and could easily spin out of control if they lack focus of their influence in Egypt. LA Times 2/11 (David S. Cloud and Paul Richter, Los Angeles Times Reporters; U.S. faces critical test of influence on Egypt; February 11, 2011; http://www.latimes.com/news/politics/lafg-egypt-us-20110212,0,3805635.story?track=rss) CJC diplomats also acknowledge that events could still easily spin out of control given Egypt's lack of experience with democracy, and say there are clear limits to Washington's influence on key players in Cairo. A senior administration official suggested Friday that the opposition should be satisfied with Mubarak's departure and other concessions. "This opens the door for them to begin a full dialogue," he said. But State
U.S.
Egypt Harvard/Berkley Cross-X.com 14/148 Thursday File Department officials warned that political reform will be a "medium term" undertaking, requiring time to develop and nurture institutions that will give the country a stable and inclusive political process. The task is difficult because Mubarak brutally suppressed any party that threatened his stranglehold on power, requiring Egyptians to now build a democracy almost from scratch. Yet the U.S. is not without leverage. It provides Egypt with $1.5 billion in aid every year, and preserving that flow as well as the Egyptian military's longstanding ties with the Pentagon is likely to be a major goal for the country's new
leaders. Obama appeared to reach out to the military in his White House address, commending the army for not firing upon the vast crowds protesting Mubarak's continued rule. But he reserved most of his praise for the protesters. He drew a link between the rebellion that began Jan. 25 and some of the epochal political movements of the 20th century: Gandhi's nonviolent struggle for India's independence; the Berlin Wall's crumbling; Martin Luther King Jr.'s fight for racial equality in the United States. Tom Malinowski, Washington director for Human Rights Watch, said that the Obama administration was already
reaching out to other Middle Eastern allies to warn that they should respond to calls for reform to avoid the same sort of upheaval seen in Egypt. US is using the full force and speed of its diplomacy to handle the transition in Egypt. LA Times 2/11 (David S. Cloud and Paul Richter, Los Angeles Times Reporters; U.S. faces critical test of influence on Egypt; February 11, 2011; http://www.latimes.com/news/politics/lafg-egypt-us-20110212,0,3805635.story?track=rss) CJC The Obama administration got what it said it wanted when Hosni Mubarak surrendered power. Now it must deal with another daunting task: coaxing the country's new military rulers to deliver genuine democratic reforms they have resisted for decades. After days of being buffeted by events, President Obama moved quickly within hours of Mubarak's departure to try to influence the Egypt that will follow. In a seven-minute address from the White House, Obama made it clear that the U.S. expects the Egyptian generals to dismantle the machinery of a repressive state, warning they would "have to ensure a transition that is credible in the eyes of the Egyptian people." "That means protecting the
rights of Egypt's citizens, lifting the emergency law, revising the constitution and other laws to make this change irreversible, and laying out a clear path to elections that are fair and free," Obama said. But even as Obama hailed the
triumph of democracy in the Cairo streets, his administration was adjusting to the loss of a bedrock ally in a volatile region. Mubarak's departure threatens to end 30 years of certainty in which American administrations
could count on Egypt maintaining its 1979 peace treaty with Israel, as well as cooperating on counter-terrorism efforts.
Diplomacy Focus Key

Clinton and her diplomacy team are critical to a successful transition. It requires all hands on deck to manage the situation. Thrush 2/2 (Glenn Thrush covers Capitol Hill for Politico, Hillary Clinton plays key role in dance with Hosni Mubarak, February 2, 2011, http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0211/48658.html) CJC Obama, known for relying on a tight circle of foreign policy advisers based in the West Wing and Vice President Joe Bidens office, has turned to Clinton in the past for advice and to serve as the public face for the administrations policies. But Clinton, who entered Foggy Bottom without the policy agenda of many of her predecessors, has never occupied such a central role in such an unpredictable situation. Thats because the administration has never faced a foreign crisis of this magnitude that requires all hands on deck, according to a senior administration official. But its also because the pragmatic
Clinton is one of the few remaining grown-ups, in the words of one former State Department higher-up, who can speak authoritatively at a time of rapid staff turnover in the West Wing. Shes the obvious choice to adopt this role, says Daniel Kurtzer who served as ambassador to Egypt under Bill Clinton and as President George W. Bushs ambassador to Israel. You need someone out there who understands the complexity of this situation, adds Kurtzer. And shes one of the only
people who could step in. She knows all of these players very well, and thats critical at a time when the administration is presented with so few good alternatives.
UQ Ext Military Diplomacy

Dealing with the Egyptian crisis is requiring huge amounts of military diplomatic capital. Our success relies on our military diplomacy to reassure allies that we have their back. Bloomberg 2/13 (Viola Gienger, reporter for Bloomberg News; Public Praise, Private Calls Keep Pentagon Connected to Egypt's Military; Feb 13, 2011; http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-02-13/public-praise-private-calls-keep-pentagonconnected-to-egypt-s-military.html) CJC The military, for its part, is going to have to show some results right away, said Daniel Kurtzer, a former ambassador to Egypt who is a lecturer at Princeton University. Lifting the state of emergency
thats been in effect for 30 years and given power to security forces would send a powerful signal throughout the society, he said. As Gates and Mullen have tried to keep on top of events in Egypt, theyve also sought to
reassure allies and partners in the region of U.S. backing. Gates and other top U.S. officials met with Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak at the White House this week, and Mullen headed to Jordan and Israel to meet with senior civilian and military leaders there yesterday and today. Mullen will attend a ceremony marking the end of Israeli Lieutenant General Gabi Ashkenazis term as chief of staff. In both countries, he will discuss security issues of mutual concern and reassure both these key partners of the U.S. militarys commitment to that partnership, Kirby said. Military diplomacy with Egypt is critical to ensuring a stable transition. Bloomberg 2/13 (Viola Gienger, reporter for Bloomberg News; Public Praise, Private Calls Keep Pentagon Connected to Egypt's Military; Feb 13, 2011; http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-02-13/public-praise-private-calls-keep-pentagonconnected-to-egypt-s-military.html) CJC Pentagon officials are using public praise and private phone calls to help the Obama administration maintain connections and influence with the Egyptian military, which took control of the country Feb. 11 and promised a transition to democracy. U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates and Admiral Mike Mullen, President Barack Obamas top military adviser, have made regular telephone calls to their counterparts, according to Pentagon spokesmen Geoff Morrell and Navy Captain John Kirby, who provided few details
on the substance of the conversations. The calls arent intended to pressure the Egyptian military to do anything specific, a U.S. military official said on condition of anonymity. Decades of ties, including training of Egyptian officers at
elite U.S. military schools, has established relationships between the two forces and made pressure unnecessary so far, said the official, who wasnt authorized to speak publicly on the calls. The connections may be critical in the coming weeks and months as Egypts Supreme Council of the Armed Forces directs a process toward elections and democratic rule, after President Hosni
Mubarak ceded his powers to it Feb. 11.
Military if left to their own devices will not transition to democracy. Diplomacy will require continued aid, energy and patience. McManus 2/13 (Doyle McManus, Washington columnist for the Los Angeles Times, has reported on national and international issues from Washington for more than 25 years; Mission not yet accomplished; February 13, 2011; http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/commentary/laoe-mcmanus-column-egypt-20110213,0,3212459.column) CJC Left to their own devices, it's unlikely the generals, though they've promised constitutional changes, an end to the repressive state of emergency and new elections, will push for a swift transition to a full and free democracy. Mohamed ElBaradei, the former chief of the U.N. International Atomic Energy Agency who has offered himself as
a transitional leader, has proposed a three-man "presidential council" with only one of the seats reserved for the military. He is also calling for the drafting of a wholly new constitution and elections within a year. But Egypt's next step is far from
certain. The inevitable messiness of the ensuing process will present hard choices for the
Egypt Harvard/Berkley Cross-X.com 17/148 Thursday File Obama administration too. President Obama said last week that he hoped Egypt's democratization would be both
"orderly and genuine." He must know that those two goals, while not contradictory, are in tension. The administration wants more from Egypt than just democracy; it also want to maintain Egypt's stability, its close military relationship with the U.S. and its peace with Israel. That's why the word U.S. officials used most often over the last 18 days was "orderly," and why Obama felt it necessary, as late as Thursday, to add the democracy-friendly modifier "genuine." They administration is understandably concerned that Egypt's next political leaders whether they turn out to be the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, the Facebook insurgents in Tahrir Square or even the Muslim Brotherhood won't be as strongly pro-U.S. as Mubarak was. "They must know that they will continue to have a friend in the United States of America," Obama said. But after more than 30 years of support for the military governments of Mubarak and his predecessor, Anwar Sadat, it may prove difficult to convince Egypt's democrats that the United States was on their side all along. Obama made a start on that process with his
when he praised Egypt's military for its role as "caretaker to the state" but pointedly defined its mission now as guaranteeing a real transition. "Nothing less than genuine democracy will carry the day," he said. And, he added, the United States will help. "We stand ready to provide whatever assistance is necessary," he said. But that was a promise that may be difficult to keep. The new Republican majority
statement Friday, in the House has already proposed deep cuts in foreign aid, including the programs that would help Egyptian democracy. Sen. Rand Paul (R-Ky.), the leader of the Senate's new "tea party" caucus, has proposed eliminating foreign aid entirely, including for both Egypt and Israel. Others would cut Egypt but spare Israel, a move that wouldn't make the U.S. popular in Tahrir Square. Some of those same House Republicans pressed the State Department last week to bar the Muslim Brotherhood from playing any role in a new Egyptian government. They didn't explain how to do that while reducing U.S. aid and thus U.S. leverage at the same time. The insurgencies in Egypt and Tunisia have presented the United States with an
extraordinary opportunity: a chance to nudge, advise and aid countries that are moving toward democracy in the world's most dangerous region. Taking advantage of that opening, which leaders of both U.S. political parties have sought for decades, will require money, energy and patience. It's
a pity that such an opportunity has arrived when we seem to be short of all three.
Influence over the military is critical to ensure that transition is stable. Bloomberg 2/13 (Viola Gienger, reporter for Bloomberg News; Public Praise, Private Calls Keep Pentagon Connected to Egypt's Military; Feb 13, 2011; http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-02-13/public-praise-private-calls-keep-pentagonconnected-to-egypt-s-military.html) CJC Negroponte, the first U.S. director of national intelligence under President George W. Bush, said that the U.S government will play a role of holding the militarys feet to the fire to ensure it makes democratic reforms, such as revising the constitution and enabling multiple political parties.
John on CNNs State of the Union yesterday
UQ Ext US Has Influence Over Military

US has influence over the military. It forced them to push out Mubarak. C-TV News 2/11 (CTV.ca News Staff-Canada; Obama pledges to help Egypt transition to democracy; Feb. 11 2011; http://winnipeg.ctv.ca/servlet/an/local/CTVNews/20110211/egypttransition-us-role-110211/20110211/?hub=WinnipegHome) CJC Basham, director of the Washington-based Democracy Institute, told CTV News Channel that the Egyptian military finally pushed the president out, in part because of American influence. "Whatever the motivations for the Egyptian military's move against Mubarak clearly they told him he had to go U.S. influence played no small part," he said. "The U.S. taxpayer basically funds the Egyptian military and has done so for many years. The Egyptian military certainly has good relations with the United States, but is very much aware that it is the United States that is paying the bill that affords them the prestige and the influence in Egyptian politics that they enjoy."
Patrick
UQ Ext Timeframe Next Few Months Key

Next few months are critical to ensure that Egypt does not collapse. Applebaum 2/14 (Anne Applebaum is a Washington Post and Slate columnist. Her most recent book is Gulag: A History; The Roar of the Crowd; Feb. 14, 2011; http://www.slate.com/id/2285041/?from=rss) CJC
Coming down from the high of a crowd experience and returning to the humdrum ordinariness of an individual life can never be easy, especially if one has been part of a crowd for almost three weeks. It's not remotely surprising that demonstrators
keep returning to Tahrir Square after Mubarak's resignation, not just to celebrate but to demand more: "We won't leave because we have to make sure this country is set on the right path," declared one protester, described as unemployed. On Sunday and Monday, soldiers clashed with demonstrators who were reluctant to go home, and the army even threatened to arrest those who refused to leave. A letdown is inevitable. Disappointment in the slow pace of post-revolutionary change cannot be avoided. Historically, the months following a revolution can therefore be more dangerous than the revolution itself. The dissatisfaction with the February revolution of 1917 led to the Bolshevik
coup d'etat in October of that year. In France, the mob kept resurrecting itself in the years following 1789 (a tradition that continues into the present). Disaster and dictatorship are not inevitable, but if Egypt is to avoid either a coup
d'etat or a return to mob rule, the soldiers now ruling the country will have to do more than send everyone home. As Le Bon understood, the essence of crowd euphoria is the feeling that one is part of something greater than oneself. Now the country's leaders must help channel all that enthusiasm into institutional change, not next month or next year but right now. By whatever means possible, the army should encourage the formation of political parties, the creation of citizens' committees, the building of neighborhood watch groups and clean-up brigadesanything to prevent those
unemployed men in Tahrir Square from going home, staring at the wall, and then slumping down again in front of Facebook or Al Jazeera. Online activism is not a substitute for real activism. The satisfaction one receives from Twitter is not the same satisfaction one receives from spending hours in a room with a group of people, planning an election campaign.
UQ Ext Dip. K2 Election Timing

Continued focused diplomacy is critical to ensure credible elections. Stremlau 2/16 (John Stremlau is vice president for peace programs at the nonprofit Carter Center, which has observed 82 elections in 34 countries; Two vital steps on path to democracy in Egypt; February 16, 2011; http://www.cnn.com/2011/OPINION/02/15/stremlau.egypt.democracy/) CJC The Obama administration has shown a consistent preference for inclusive agreements among all significant factions on basic election principles, with an implementation strategy and timetable. It has engaged in the hard work of quiet diplomacy to encourage and, more importantly, sustain these agreements, while facilitating as many international partners as possible, including regional organizations and the United Nations, to lend their support. And it
has welcomed the growing role of domestic and international nongovernmental organizations willing and able to support the process.
Radicals will use elections to gain power. Elections now mean they gain control because they are already well organized, that is why timing is everything. Dorell 2/14 (Oren Dorell, Reporter at USA TODAY; Ideology shadows fight to rule the new Egypt; 2/14/2011; http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2011-02-14-1Aegypt14_CV_N.htm) CJC Pipes, editor of the Middle East Forum, says if radical Islamists come to power, they will foment a revolution along the lines of Iran's in 1979. In Iran, the ruling Islamists' belief in God's sovereignty trumps political participation by the masses. The Islamist movement is "inherently anti-democratic," because leaders reject democratic laws that run counter to Islamic texts but Islamists are willing to use elections to gain power, Pipes said. The movement may already be the bestorganized opposition group because of a network of charities, hospitals and aid programs for the poor. The group's grass-roots network is a source of power that liberals may have a hard time countering, especially if not given enough time to organize. Egypt's old Wafd and newer liberal and
Daniel reform parties "may have a tough slog" reaching out, especially to Egypt's large lower class, White said.
*****Links*****
A2: Link Turns: Timing (A Must Read)

Other issues will move forward diplomatically, but NO issue will currently take a back seat to our effort in Egypt in the near future. Their link turns do not assume the refocusing to the Egypt crisis. This link is a timing issue. The timing of withdraw would undermine near term focus on Egypt. The long-term is irrelevant, when the impact is triggered in the short term. Labott 2/16 (Elise Labott, CNN Senior State Department Producer; Can Clinton remake U.S. diplomacy?; February 16, 2011; http://www.cnn.com/2011/POLITICS/02/16/clinton.sweep/index.html?iref=allsearch) CJC If the first six weeks of 2011 are any indicator, Clinton will be doing a lot more juggling, as a long list of foreign policy issues becomes the province of the State Department. In addition to moving forward with engaging North Korea in the coming months, Clinton will also need to work closely with allies about increasing pressure on Iran over its nuclear program. Progress in creating a credible Afghan government and sustainable economy has also been an uphill battle, with Karzai an unreliable partner. It will largely fall to Clinton to advance the strategy that she and Holbrooke envisioned, marrying the fragile and reversible military gains with a political process that includes international diplomacy, regional involvement, and political reconciliation among the Taliban and other militant groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan. In the
coming weeks Clinton will have to defend her smart power efforts before Republicans in Congress intent on taking an ax to President Obama's budget, particularly when it comes to foreign aid. And down the road, she and the State
Department will assume full responsibility for U.S. involvement in Iraq, when the remainder of U.S. troops come home at the end of the year. Rolling up her sleeves Yet no issue will likely demand more of Clinton's time in the near future than the political upheaval in Egypt, which has quickly become the first major foreign policy crisis for the Obama administration. While Mubarak has left the political scene, the chapter on Egypt's march toward democracy is far from complete. In fact, for Clinton, it is really the beginning. Since Mubarak stepped down, Clinton is said to have been in a "war-room mentality," talking to European and Arab allies about how the U.S. can nurture and facilitate a military-led transition. It's a personal challenge that
speaks to the dilemma she has faced since becoming secretary of state. On one hand, she wants to stay true to the themes of political, economic and social reforms and respect for human rights that she pressed for in Qatar, yearnings which were ignited in Tunisia, spread like wildfire to Cairo and which are now permeating throughout the region -- issues which remain close to her heart. "She respects what the people had to do to go out in (Tahrir Square)," Mills said. "She feels the overwhelming weight of it." But Clinton knows the push for democracy is fraught with risk. She is mindful of regional
stability and wants to reassure other Middle East governments that the U.S. will not abandon important and longtime allies. And she must save the stalled Israeli-Palestinian peace talks from becoming a permanent casualty of recent events. That will take time as well as diplomatic dexterity. "The secretary is going to roll up her sleeves," said Jake Sullivan, director of policy planning and deputy chief of staff. "She sees this as one of the most significant strategic projects of the Obama presidency, and she would
like to support the president in advancing American values, interests and security in a region that is going through real transformation."
2NC Link Magnifier - Focus

US Diplomats are at the breaking point and barely able to keep up with the current situations on their plates. They need all of the focus they have to deal with the Egyptian crisis. Thrush 2/2 (Glenn Thrush covers Capitol Hill for Politico, Obama huddles with aides on Egypt, February 2, 2011,
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0211/48700.html) CJC
As Obama kept close tabs on the deepening crisis, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton warned U.S. diplomats the pitched street battles erupting in Cairo and elsewhere have pushed the country into uncharted territory. Clinton, who has become the administrations public face during the crisis, warned a gathering of U.S. ambassadors that the current crisis was part of a tough road ahead for U.S. diplomats. The challenges, she said, include the possibility of instability in other countries, more WikiLeaks revelations and pressure from Congress to cut the State Departments budget. As we see, with whats going on today, recent events in Egypt and certainly in that broader region, (they) remind us all of how crucial it is to have top-notch leadership on the ground. And how quickly that ground can shift under our feet, she added. There are too many forces at
work, some of which we are only beginning to understand.
2NC Link Magnifier Perception

US credibility for diplomacy is hanging by a thread in the Middle East. Perception of US backing away again would crush any influence that we have. CBS News 2/11 (Ken Millstone, Staff Reporter; Diplomat: Egypt Dislikes Suleiman's "Slimy Background"; February 11, 2011; http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503544_162-20031554503544.html) CJC Ambassador Edward Peck, a career diplomat who served in Egypt and Tunisia, said that Suleiman
in many ways takes an even harsher and more authoritarian view of power than Mubarak. "He's been involved in a number of things that the people of Egypt do not like," including being the CIA's point man for the rendition and torture of terror suspects in Egypt, Peck said. He said Suleiman has "kind of a slimy background." Mubarak ceded power not to Suleiman but to the Egyptian armed forces and it is not clear what Suleiman's eventual role will be, if any. Still, Suleiman is a former military and intelligence officer with close ties to the military power structure. He "is always going to be a little trickle of saliva" that could be slurped back up into power at any time, Peck said. With or without Suleiman, a transition to democracy is no certainty, Peck
"It just takes one or two generals to say, 'Hey I kind of like being in charge.' That's happened before." Peck suggested that the U.S. has strained its credibility with other Arab world leaders by its somewhat erratic response to the events in Egypt - seemingly shifting allegiance to whatever actor seemed to be in the lead. "We have a just a tattered thread in that part of the world of the respect and reliability that we used to think we enjoyed on a regular basis," Peck said.
said:
2NC Aid Link Magnifier

(_) Aid Package Link: A. And, Independently of influence over the Egyptian military, the US is negotiating an international aid package that would be critical to ensuring a smooth transition because the protests have gutted its economy. Richter 2/14 (Paul Richter, Tribune Washington Bureau Reporter; Obama administration seeks emergency financial package for Egypt; Feb. 14, 2011; http://www.bellinghamherald.com/2011/02/14/1867987/obama-administration-seeksemergency.html) CJC Amid calls in Washington for sharp cuts in foreign aid, the Obama administration is seeking an emergency financial package for Egypt, fearing that further strains on its economy could thwart Cairo's fledgling reform effort almost before it begins. U.S. officials have been working international partners to seek pledges for a package, probably worth several hundred million dollars, as well as money to help build political parties and other democratic institutions, say U.S. and foreign diplomats. Public anxiety over Egypt's struggling economy, including high unemployment and rising prices, was one of the key drivers of an 18-day uprising that toppled former President Hosni Mubarak, who resigned on Friday. Now that Mubarak is gone, analysts say Egyptians may be overly optimistic in expecting rapid economic improvements. Michele Dunne, a Mideast specialist who has advised the Obama administration on Egypt in recent weeks, said the economy is "one of the greatest vulnerabilities for a country that's in a transition like this." The Egyptian finance ministry has estimated that the unrest cost the economy about $310 million a
WASHINGTON day, and some private analysts have estimated that investors have been withdrawing investment at a rate of about $1 billion a day. Annual economic growth of 5 percent was predicted for Egypt before the demonstrations; now the consensus is closer to 1 percent. Dunne, now with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, said if Egyptians have unreasonable
expectations about economic opportunities and instead conditions worsen, "it could really sour relations between people" and the transitional government. U.S. officials, who have been consulting widely on Egypt in recent days, declined to discuss their aid goals in details, saying they are in the early stages of discussions. They said they expect international development banks may also play a part in the aid.
B. Economic aid package to Eygpt would give positive light to the US with the Egyptian population, undercutting Muslim Brotherhood influence and message they would use to gain control. Bryen 2/11 (Shoshana Bryen is senior director for security policy at The Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs in Washington; Egypt needs more U.S. aid, not less; 2/11/11; http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0211/49384.html) CJC Two factors may force the Administration to reconsider the size and scope of the aid. First is the attitude of the Egyptian people toward the United States. Though there has been little overt antiAmericanism in the demonstrations, Egyptians are acutely aware that U.S. aid largely flows to the military with little benefit to them. The Muslim Brotherhood, with its network of religious schools and social programs, has capitalized on the difference between U.S. military aid and religiously inspired social services. It is not surprising that a recent Pew survey shows Egyptians preferring Islamic
government to those who would modernize the country, by 59 to 27 percent, and attitudes toward Americans running nearly 4:1 negative. The demonstrations and looting during the protests have wreaked havoc on the
Egyptian economy and capital is expected to flow out as soon as the banks reopen. The answer to how much may be sent abroad no one knows, but estimates run into the hundreds of millions at a minimum. Emergency food and economic stabilization aid from America could help average Egyptians see the United States as a benefactor and remove one anti-American prop from the Muslim Brotherhood and from Iran. Second is what the Egyptian military has acquired over the years.
Egypt Harvard/Berkley Cross-X.com 25/148 Thursday File The U.S. permitted Egypt to buy systems that directly threaten Israel Harpoon Block II anti-ship missiles, for example with little opposition from Israel or its friends in Congress because of Mubaraks commitment to the peace treaty. Should the Muslim Brotherhood take a commanding position in a multi-party interim government, an implacable enemy of both Israel and the United States will have at least some say in the use of those military assets. Elsewhere in
the region, Hezbollah never won a majority in any Lebanese election, but imposes its will on the Lebanese government by threat of force and now has a say in the operation of the U.S.-supported Lebanese Armed Forces. In a similar situation,
Washington would have no choice but to suspend military aid and cooperation with Egypt with the loss of benefits to the United States that implies.
Ext Aid Link: A2 Aid Cuts Now

Aid package will pass in the US despite calls for cuts in the Aid budget, it has bipartisan support. Continued diplomacy is critical to building international support for the aid package. Richter 2/14 (Paul Richter, Tribune Washington Bureau Reporter; Obama administration seeks emergency financial package for Egypt; Feb. 14, 2011; http://www.bellinghamherald.com/2011/02/14/1867987/obama-administration-seeksemergency.html) CJC
The U.S. currently gives Egypt about $1.5 billion per year, most of it going to the Egyptian military. The
push for more aid comes at a difficult time for the United States and many allies, who are already struggling with severe austerity budgets. The Obama administration is trying to prevent Republicans from imposing steep cuts
on foreign aid. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton met with House Speaker John Boehner, R-Ohio, on Monday and expressed her concern about proposed reductions for the State Department and aid programs. Clinton said she hopes that as Congress considers "the national security and economic consequences of these cuts, they will chart a different course." The
U.S. must promote stability in countries such as Egypt or "we will pay a higher price later in crises that are allowed to simmer and boil over into conflicts," Clinton said. Yet the overthrow of Mubarak has been welcomed by Democrats and Republicans, and some analysts predict there will be bipartisan support for at least some increase in Egypt's aid. "I think they'll feel this cause
is worth it," said Stephen McInerney, executive director of the Project on Middle East Democracy. Maja Kocijancic, a spokeswoman for Lady Catherine Ashton, the European Union's foreign affairs chief, said the EU is considering the possibility of aid, perhaps through loans by the European Investment Bank, an EU international finance arm. President Barack Obama, in a
said the United States was committed to offering aid that was needed by Egypt "to pursue a credible and orderly transition to democracy, including by working with international partners to provide financial support." The aid discussions have come at a time when the administration has been reaching out to allies in the Middle East, Europe and elsewhere, trying to work out a common position on how to encourage democratic change in Egypt.
statement last weekend,
Ext Aid Link: Econ Spark Instability

Egypt economic issues continued would spark another wave of instability. WSJ 2/17 (Jay Solomon, Matt Bradley, 2/17/11, " Treasury Calls for Scrutiny of Egypt ", http://india.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703373404576148073209074728.html) Egypt's new military rulers faced growing hurdles in their efforts to restore normalcy to the country, as labor strikes continued and school openings were delayed. The labor crisis has been the most formidable challenge for the country's new military leaders and threatens to pierce a fragile calm that has prevailed since political protests ended Friday after nearly three weeks. Strikes could add to mounting economic woes. Egypt's stock exchange again delayed its opening,
Meanwhile,
pushing it to Monday, according to MENA, the official Egyptian state news agency. Banks said they won't reopen until Sunday, as employees protest poor wages and demand that bank leaders be prosecuted for alleged corruption.
2NC Links Plan Kills Coercive Diplomacy

Obama needs to strengthen the military the perception of declining commitments kills our diplomatic influence. Holmes, 2009 [Kim, Ph.d., VP for Foreign and Defense Policy Studies and Director of the David Institute for International Studies at the Heritage Foundation,The Importance of Hard Power, 6-12, http://www.heritage.org/Research/Commentary/2009/06/The-importance-of-hard-power] MGM The problem here is not merely an overconfidence in the process of "talking" and trying to achieve "mutual understanding" - as if diplomacy were merely about communications and eliminating hurt feelings. Rather, it is about the interaction and sometimes clash of hardened interests and ideologies. These are serious matters, and you don't take them seriously by wishing away the necessity, when need be, of using the hard power of force to settle things. It's this connection of hard to soft power that Mr. Obama appears not to understand. In what is becoming a signature trait of saying one thing and doing another, Mr. Obama has argued that America must "combine military power with strengthened diplomacy." But since becoming president he has done little to demonstrate an actual commitment to forging a policy that combines America's military power with diplomatic strategies. For America to be an effective leader and arbiter of the international order, it must be willing to maintain a world-class military. That requires resources: spending, on average, no less
than 4 percent of the nation's gross domestic product on defense. Unfortunately, Mr. Obama's next proposed defense budget and Secretary of defense Robert M. Gates' vision for "rebalancing" the military are drastically disconnected from the broad range of strategic priorities that a superpower like the United States must influence and achieve. If our country allows its
hard power to wane, our leaders will lose crucial diplomatic clout. This is already on display in the western Pacific Ocean, where America's ability to hedge against the growing ambitions of a rising China is being called into question by some of our key Asian allies. Recently, Australia released a defense white paper concerned primarily with the potential decline of U.S. military primacy and its implications for Australian security and stability in the Asia-Pacific. These developments are anything but reassuring. The ability of the United States to reassure friends, deter competitors, coerce belligerent states, and defeat enemies does not rest on the strength of our political leaders' commitment to diplomacy; it rests on the foundation of a powerful military. The United States can succeed in advancing its priorities by diplomatic means only so long as it retains a "big stick." Only by building a full-spectrum military force can America reassure its many friends and allies and count on their future support. The next British leader - and the rest of our allies - need to know they can count on the U.S. to intervene on their behalf any time, anywhere it has to. That will require hard power, not just soft, diplomatic words murmured whilst strolling serenely along "Obama Beach." Decrease in US military presence directly trades-off with diplomatic influence.
Chiu & Dworken, 1991

[Daniel and Jonathan, Senior Executive Service and principal director, strategy, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of defense for Strategy, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Force Development AND **member of the Center for Naval Analyses assigned to III Marine Expeditionary Force, Center for Naval Analysis, The Political Effects of U.S. Military Presence in the Asian-Pacific Region, April, pg. 5]MGM political effect of presence is that it augments diplomatic influence. An ally's reliance on U.S. presence to deter a threat and the positive effects of assurance derived from deterrence can be used in diplomatic negotiations through linking the topic of negotiations to the continuation of that presence. The threat, explicit or implicit, of the withdrawal of forces is present, for example, when negotiating trade policy and burden-sharing with Japan, as well as in talks on trade policy and political reform in the ROK. Similarly, though only indirectly related to presence, a link exists between reform in the PRC and the U.S. military relationship (technology transfers and port visits) with that country.8
The third
Pulling out when threats are high wrecks our influence. Chiu & Dworken, 1991
[Daniel and Jonathan, Senior Executive Service and principal director, strategy, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of defense for Strategy, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Force Development AND **member of the Center for Naval Analyses assigned to III Marine Expeditionary Force, Center for Naval Analysis, The Political Effects of U.S. Military Presence in the Asian-Pacific Region, April, pg. 23] MGM
Note: This is a footnote explaining diplomatic presence and US military presence 8. There is a severe limitation to this effect. When the perceived
threats decline, so does the value of U.S. presence, making the leverage in negotiations slim, at best.
Link General
Decreasing military deployments kills diplomatic influence. Holmes, 2009 (Kim Holmes, Ph.d., VP for Foreign and Defense Policy Studies and Director of the David Institute for International Studies at the Heritage Foundation, 6-1-2009, Sustaining American Leadership with Military Power, http://s3.amazonaws.com/thf_media/2009/pdf/sr0052.pdf) The consequences of hard-power atrophy will be a direct deterioration of Americas diplomatic clout. This is already on display in the western Pacific Ocean, where Americas ability to hedge against the growing ambitions of a rising China is being called into question by some of our key Asian allies. Recently, Australia released a defense White Paper that is concerned primarily with the potential decline of U.S. military primacy and the implications that this decline would have for Australian security and stability in the AsiaPacific. These developments are anything but reassuring. The ability of the United States to reassure friends, deter competitors, coerce belligerent states, and defeat enemies does not rest on the strength of our political leaders commitment to diplomacy; it rests on the foundation of a powerful military. Only by retaining a big stick can the United States succeed in advancing its diplomatic priorities. Only by building a full-spectrum military force can America reassure its many friends and allies and count on their future support. Reducing military presence prompts State Department intervention focuses diplomatic efforts on minimizing effects of the aff. Bloomfield, 2006 [Lincoln, Former US Special Envoy for Man-Portable Air Defense Systems Threat Reduction, and Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs from 2001-2005. Mr. Bloomfield previously served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs (1992-93), Deputy Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs (1991-92), and Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (1988-89) among other policy positions in the Defense Department dating to 1981. He graduated from Harvard College and received a M.A.L.D. from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Reposturing the Force: U.S. Overseas Presence in the Twenty-first Century, Chapter 3: Politics and Diplomacy of the Global Defense Posture Review, http://www.usnwc.edu/Publications/Naval-War-CollegePress/Newport-Papers/Documents/26-pdf.aspx]
An Ambitious Concept When historians look back on the Defense Departments biggest undertakings during its first six decades of existence, they will of course cite the prosecution of wars both hot and cold, the fielding of powerful and complex weapons systems, and the promulgation of defense and security strategies to prepare for and deter threats to the national interest. Rarely to be found among these major tasks will be any large-scale updating, streamlining, or
reconfiguration of an organizational empire that includes well over two million soldiers and civilians, approximately five thousand facilities spread all over the country and the world, and
an annual budget now surpassing $400 billion. The Global Defense Posture Review (GDPR) is such an undertaking. At the same time, this massive exercise in managerial housekeeping by the secretary of defense cannot be
viewed exclusively as one cabinet executives effort to make more productive use of the people, assets, and funding allotted to his department. For all the calculations of greater efficiency and utility that commend the idea of reconfiguring Americas global military footprint, this initiative is inescapably, indeed overwhelmingly, political in terms of its effect on the rest of the world. To think otherwise would be to overlook the belief, resident in allied populations in more than fifty countries by latest count, that America is committedvia the North Atlantic Treaty, the Rio Treaty, and bilateral security treaties with Japan, Korea, the Philippines, Thailand, and Australia to come to their defense in extremis. These are national commitments, solemnly made, and the sight of U.S. armed
forces standing the watch in almost every latitude and time zone has calmed regional rivalries and dissuaded armed escalations for sixty years. A global posture realignment that involves moving large numbers of those sentries
and their weapons inevitably begs the most urgent of security questions, excites foreign
Egypt Harvard/Berkley Cross-X.com 31/148 Thursday File anxieties in many quarters, and therefore runs the risk, depending on how the matter is handled, of perturbing the very stability that Americas global military presence is meant to ensure. An Ambitious Concept The idea that U.S. military force units, their equipment, their facilities, and their support
structure should be physically positioned according to the logic of global geography is very appealing. Conceptually, an efficiently designed, globally managed force posture would optimize the flow of combat power along sea, air, and land routes from one region to the next, directly to the point of engagement, without overly taxing the system. Such a concept would best allow future presidents to position viable military options to employ anywhere in response to a sudden danger on the shortest of notice, even when the nature and location of the crisis had not been foreseen. Of all of Donald Rumsfelds actions during his headline-filled second tenure as secretary of defense, his determination to rethink, redesign, and reposition the U.S. militarys posture at home and abroad according to a rational design reflecting contemporary security conditions should stand as a positive mark in his legacy. That Mr. Rumsfeld took on this monumental management task, braving the predictable resistance of settled constituencies from one end of the globe to the other, is noteworthy; certainly none of his predecessors seriously attempted it. That he did it during wartime is extraordinary. Over the long term, a well-executed streamlining of the U.S. global defense posture could profit the nations security, if not in monetary terms certainly in the ability of a finite force structure to deliver the maximum military benefit through the greater efficiencies and capabilities of the new global posture. Big Change, Big Decision: Getting to Yes What with the profound implications of a posture change for allied countries
hosting U.S. forces and the state of Americas diplomatic relations with them, the decision to embark on a global realignment was the presidents to make, and it embodied major foreign policy equities. The Department of State, and the allied governments themselves, would inevitably make their voices heard before the Department of Defenses new scheme based on geographic convenience and logistical efficiency could supplant longstanding basing patterns in foreign localities. One could well imagine the Pentagons potential misgivings about placing this hugely ambitious venture at the mercy of other departments, never mind foreign policy bureaucrats, whose reaction to any disturbance of the diplomatic status quo might be expected to be one of resistance to change, indeed opposition, even to discussing prospective force reductions with allied countries. The concern was not imaginary; there were indeed some in the State Department who wanted nothing more than for the initiative to go away and who feared damage to alliances if it went forward. On the other hand, concerns in the State Department that some Department of Defense (DoD) officials, by their manner, might aggravate rather than defuse foreign anxieties were also not entirely misplaced. In at least one country DoD doggedly sought to announce and implement a drawdown of military assets against that allys wishes and with an evident relish that required diplomatic damage control and led the president to withhold to himself the withdrawal decision. Within the U.S. policy bureaucracy as a whole,
there were varying perceptions about whether the advertised merits of particular changes under the Global Defense Posture Review would indeed redound to the long-term security benefit of the United States; such concerns were not limited to experienced regional specialists in the State Department.
The plan requires significant diplomatic resources to reassure allies. Bloomfield, 2006 [Lincoln, Former US Special Envoy for Man-Portable Air Defense Systems Threat Reduction, and Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs from 2001-2005. Mr. Bloomfield previously served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs (1992-93), Deputy Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs (1991-92), and Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (1988-89) among other policy positions in the Defense Department dating to 1981. He graduated from Harvard College and received a M.A.L.D. from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Reposturing the Force: U.S. Overseas Presence in the Twenty-first Century, Chapter 3: Politics and Diplomacy of the Global Defense Posture Review, http://www.usnwc.edu/Publications/Naval-War-CollegePress/Newport-Papers/Documents/26-pdf.aspx] a major change in defense doctrine and practice requires a significant public diplomacy effort if it is to be accepted abroad. European and Asian foreign-policy experts, journalists, and officials need to be not simply told but persuaded that Americas commitments to them, and capabilities to fulfill those commitments, are no longer usefully measured by numbers of troops. The foreign press has focused on troops scheduled to be pulled back to U.S. bases or consolidated in other locales. There remains a need for allies, particularly in Asia, to have a clear and compelling vision of how the new global defense postureembracing U.S. forces outside
Still,
Egypt Harvard/Berkley Cross-X.com 32/148 Thursday File as well as within their borderswill ensure their security as before. Precision strike, mobility, and
stealth, among other advances, make possible this assurance.
Empirical proof. Bloomfield, 2006 [Lincoln, Former US Special Envoy for Man-Portable Air Defense Systems Threat Reduction, and Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs from 2001-2005. Mr. Bloomfield previously served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs (1992-93), Deputy Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs (1991-92), and Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (1988-89) among other policy positions in the Defense Department dating to 1981. He graduated from Harvard College and received a M.A.L.D. from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Reposturing the Force: U.S. Overseas Presence in the Twenty-first Century, Chapter 3: Politics and Diplomacy of the Global Defense Posture Review, http://www.usnwc.edu/Publications/Naval-War-CollegePress/Newport-Papers/Documents/26-pdf.aspx]
Since this large, difficult project was not driven by exigencies of current military operations, there was also a temptation, whenever the issue was raised within senior interagency circles, to ask Why now? and put it off for another day. What finally forced the issue was the link between prospective overseas withdrawals of military assets and units and the planned round of the Base Closure and Realignment (BRAC) Commission, which developed a final list of recommended domestic base closures during 2005. Many in Congress, understandably fearful of losing home-district bases under BRAC, had told the administration not to start that process until it had first scrubbed the overseas basing system for other ways to streamline the global footprint. By mid2003, time was running short if GDPR decisions were to be in hand for the BRAC analytical work that was to commence in early 2004. By the fall of 2003, with the DoD worldwide realignment plan finally ready for top-level
interagency consideration, Secretary of State Colin Powell understood DoDs concern that the initiative could be subjected to death by a thousand cuts. When the principals finally engaged at the White House, Secretary Rumsfeld rolled out his map, articulated his concept, and asked his aides to brief the rationale for this transformational initiative, emphasizing the need to move past a World War IIera basing structure. Other agencies offered their comments, and when they had finished, all eyes turned to the secretary of state. Secretary
Powell said he thought the briefing had misstated the facts about European bases being obsolete because of their relevance to World War II. A few hearts stopped, and silence pervaded the room. The secretary continued, deadpan, that in some locations including German facilities under his command in the 1980sthe bases dated all the way back to the Franco-Prussian War. His point was effectively madeof course we needed to update and rationalize our force posture. With that pithy intervention by Secretary Powell, the administration found itself in consensus that the GDPR was timely, worthy, and deserving of priority support subject to the presidents approval. Secretary Powell pledged his and the State Departments
support and assistance to the Global Defense Posture Review under one condition, one that won quick endorsement from DoD and the interagency realmthat this initiative had to be conducted in full consultation with affected governments around the world. It must not be a fait accompli imposed on allies from Washington. From there the issue went to the president, who approved it to proceed to
public rollout and consultation with other governments. Specific force posture changes would require presidential approval at a later stage. Rolling Out the Initiative On 25 November 2003, the White House released President George Bushs statement
announcing the new initiative, which said in part: Beginning today, the United States will intensify our consultations with the Congress and our friends, allies, and partners overseas on our ongoing review of our overseas force posture. The words were carefully chosen; none of the recommended changes in overseas American presence was yet decided. From the presidents perspective, this review was ongoing, and consultations were to be integral to his decision process. Secretaries Powell and Rumsfeld launched diplomatic consultations on the GDPR at the December 2003 NATO ministerial meetings. This was followed within days by a joint appearance at the North Atlantic Council by Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Marc Grossman and Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith, following which these two officials, backed by respective interagency delegations, split up and barnstormed a total of twelve European capitals. In March 2004 Under Secretary Feith led a delegation (including the author) that briefed this initiative in Beijing, Canberra, and Singapore, while the author made a side trip to Manila for the same purpose. Major allies Japan and Korea, already undergoing very careful, comprehensive posture reviews on a bilateral basis, were of course part of the GDPR picture; however, as the host governments in each case were deeply involved in discussions about potential adjustments, there was no requirement for a special briefing to either. High-level administration visitors to Asian capitals, such as Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, who visited Canberra, Beijing, and Tokyo
Egypt Harvard/Berkley Cross-X.com 33/148 Thursday File during the winter of 20032004, readily responded to public and official queries about GDPR.
Deputy Secretary Armitage was able to calm negative foreign press speculation by, for example, assuring the Australian public that the United States did not seek to base combat units in Australia. This is not to say, however, that all these consultations in Europe and Asia divulged specifics on planned movements and locations of units, closure of facilities, or timetables; in fact, none of this was included in the initial briefings. Instead, the approach was to explain the merits of rationalizing
the global U.S. military network so as to reflect the considerable changes over several decades in the way American soldiers, platforms, and technologies now operated. Persuading allies that military operations had evolved over time was not difficult. The recent examples of relatively lean
forces dislodging the Taliban regime from Kabul and then the Saddam Hussein regime from Baghdad spoke volumes about conceptual leaps forward in the military arts by the United States since World War II, indeed since Vietnam. As this was truly a global initiative, the administration provided briefing points for ambassadors to scores of countries, and the State Departments regional assistant secretaries for Near East, South Asia, Africa, and Latin America, respectively, carried to those regions the message that others had already given to Europe and Asia. Every geographic combatant commanders area of responsibility was slated to experience change.
More ev US will have to reassure allies. Bloomfield, 2006 [Lincoln, Former US Special Envoy for Man-Portable Air Defense Systems Threat Reduction, and Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs from 2001-2005. Mr. Bloomfield previously served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs (1992-93), Deputy Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs (1991-92), and Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (1988-89) among other policy positions in the Defense Department dating to 1981. He graduated from Harvard College and received a M.A.L.D. from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Reposturing the Force: U.S. Overseas Presence in the Twenty-first Century, Chapter 3: Politics and Diplomacy of the Global Defense Posture Review, http://www.usnwc.edu/Publications/Naval-War-CollegePress/Newport-Papers/Documents/26-pdf.aspx] As the GDPR moves toward the implementation phase, it will serve the United States and its traditional allies best if the sides come to a mutual understanding on how to meet the needs of all. European governments will do well to revisit their ability to act immediately on time-sensitive intelligence, even when there is no formal mandate from NATO, the UN, the EU or their parliaments. The United States will do well to work out with allied governments modalities to satisfy host countries legitimate needs for information and consent, regardless of the urgency, as American military power is staged from their territories in future crises. And, State Department is stretched thin and military-diplomatic issues are inextricably linked. Hastings, 6-26-2010 [Michael, freelance writer, Rolling Stone, Michael Hastings Interview Transcript, http://www.antiwar.com/blog/2010/06/26/michael-hastings-interview-transcript/] theres a larger kind of structural issue here about you just compare the DOD budget to the State Department budget, $600 billion to $50 billion. You know, you look at every foreign service officer you know, theres more people in the Army band than there are foreign service officers. You know, you could fit every foreign service officer on an aircraft carrier. You know, so you look like at just the sort of decay of the State Department and basically our foreign policy has become our defense policy. You know, the two are one. And I think that translates
Hastings: I think into the fact that a lot of the time just the leaders get the blame for all the wars, and they should take their fair share of blame, but I think we also have to start looking at the military leaders in a much more critical way than theyre accustomed to be looked at. Were packing up here and so Ive got to take off, but I appreciate your time and well talk again soon.
Also negotiating SOFAs requires time and resources. Mason, 2009 [Chuck, 6/16, Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA): What Is It, and How Might One Be Utilized In Iraq?, http://www.law.umaryland.edu/marshall/crsreports/crsdocuments/RL34531_06162008.pdf]
With the exception of the multilateral SOFA among the United States and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries, a
SOFA is specific to an individual country and is in the form of an executive agreement.6 The Department of State and the Department of Defense, working together, identify the need for a SOFA with a particular country and negotiate the terms of the agreement. The NATO SOFA7 is the
only SOFA that was concluded as part of a treaty.8 The Senate approved ratification of the NATO SOFA on March 19, 1970, subject to reservations. The resolution included a statement that nothing in the Agreement
diminishes, abridges, or alters the right of the United States to safeguard its own security by excluding or removing persons whose presence in the United States is deemed prejudicial to its safety or security, and that no person whose presence in the United States is deemed prejudicial to its safety or security shall be permitted to enter or remain in the United States.9
The Senate reservations to the NATO SOFA include four conditions: (1) the criminal jurisdiction provisions contained in Article VII of the agreement do not constitute a precedent for future agreements; (2) when a servicemember is to be tried by authorities in a receiving state, the commanding officer of the U.S. armed forces in that state shall review the laws of the receiving state with reference to the procedural safeguards of the U.S. Constitution; (3) if the commanding officer believes there is danger that the servicemember will not be protected because of the absence or denial of constitutional rights the accused would receive in the United States, the commanding officer shall request that the receiving state waive its jurisdiction; and, (4) a representative of the United States be appointed to attend the trial of any servicemember being tried by the receiving state and act to protect the constitutional rights of the servicemember.10
Renegotiating treaties like SOFAs to withdraw troops take large amounts of diplomatic capital because many parties have veto power. Meyer Fellow Institue for Global Conflict 2009 (Timothy, Public Policy and Nuclear Threats Fellow, Institute for Global Conflict and Cooperation and the National Science Foundation; Ph.D., Jurisprudence and Social Policy, University of California, Berkeley; J.D., University of California, Berkeley School of Law, Fordham University School of Law Fordham International Law Journal, 32 Fordham Int'l L.J. 888, February 2009, SOFT LAW AS DELEGATION, Lexis)
Binding international agreements (i.e., treaties) often exacerbate the difficulties with renegotiation because unless a treaty provides otherwise, every party to a treaty exercises a veto over amendments. ... Flexibility as a Device to Promote Agreement Other scholars have suggested that a variety of
... flexibility-enhancing devices are available to states to promote agreement in situations in which the parties might otherwise be unable to reach an accord. ... Because the rule prohibiting the transfer of X is not directly binding, perceptions about the relationship between the two rules may vary, which has the effect of reducing the reputational sanction for violating the soft law rule (because not all states will see a violation of the one as a violation of the other). ... Because states are likely to have ex ante expectations about who the first movers will be, establishing a soft law regime recognizes that the
benefits to permitting those states to update legal rules over time outweighs the costs in terms of an opportunistic updating of such rules, as well as opportunistic violations of the soft regime that could
for new conditions,
have been deterred by a hard regime. ... From an evolutionary standpoint, however, in which rules change over time to account
flexibility can enhance global welfare over time, holding expected levels of compliance constant, by permitting adjustment of the legal rules and expectations. ... However, the cost to the United States of trade sanctions from a minor trading partner may be small
compared with the benefits of such a violation because of the relative importance of the trading relationship to each state. ... The U.S. sought to make India an exception to the NSG rules that transfers can only be made to non-nuclear weapons states that have accepted safeguards on all of their nuclear operations (India, like the nuclear weapons states, would not put safeguards on its military nuclear operations). ... First, as an export control regime, PSI's purpose is to enforce international nonproliferation obligations by making it more difficult to acquire sensitive technology, material, and equipment. ... This increase in the supply of counterproliferation is a public good that in some measure offsets the cost to other states of accepting their less-preferred counterproliferation rules.
Link Military Change

Military reforms and changes to our SQ policy require tons of diplomatic capital consultation and reviews will happen at all levels of government. The Quadrennial Defense Review in 2010 (QDR Report prepared for Congress, February 1, 2010)
Part of the Departments obligation to defend and advance U.S. interests while taking care of our people is the imperative to reform how it does business. The Department is working to help build a whole-of-government approach to the provision of security assistance, improving our defense acquisition and logistics processes to better support our personnel in harms way, strengthening our technology and industrial bases to facilitate innovation, and crafting a strategic approach to climate and energy challenges.
Given the complex security environment and the range of missions, capabilities, and institutional reforms necessary to protect and advance U.S. interests, the QDR highlights the importance of revitalizing defense relationships with allies and partners in key regions. An important
element of revitalizing key relationships is the need to craft an approach to the U.S. defense posture that emphasizes cooperation with allies and partners and retailoring military forces, facilities, and defense agreements across regions. This QDR
extensive engagement with key stakeholders. As the QDR generated insights and interim findings, these were shared with and reviewed by a wide range of experts, both within DoD and beyond. Over the course of the review, QDR staff consulted with and briefed congressional staff as well as representatives of allied and other governments. DoD officials also engaged with their counterparts elsewhere in the U.S. government to
benefited from further the kind of integrated security approaches long advocated by the President, Secretary of Defense, and Secretary of State. For example,
Defense leaders and staff worked closely with the Departments of State and Homeland Security, as well as the Intelligence Community, as they undertook their Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review, Quadrennial Homeland Security Review, and
Quadrennial Intelligence Community Review respectively, sharing insights regarding analysis, key missions, capabilities, and plans in overlapping issue areas.
Link Afghanistan
Withdrawal requires huge diplomatic efforts to reassure stakeholders in the region. Kissinger, 2009 [Henry, American political scientist, diplomat, and recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize, served as National Security Advisor and later concurrently as Secretary of State in the administrations of Presidents Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford, Newsweek, 10-12, More troops is a start. But to win in Afghanistan well need help from its powerful neighbors Lexis] The demand for an exit strategy is, of course, a metaphor for withdrawal, and withdrawal that is not accompanied by a willingness to sustain the outcome amounts to abandonment. In
Vietnam, Congress terminated an American role even after all our troops had, in fact, been withdrawn for two years. It remains to be seen to what extent the achievements of the surge in Iraq will be sustained there politically. The most unambiguous
form of exit strategy is victory, though as we have seen in Korea, where American troops have remained since 1953, even that may not permit troop withdrawals. A seemingly unavoidable paradox emerges. The domestic debate generates the pressure for diplomatic compromise. Yet the
fanaticism that motivates guerrillas--not to speak of suicide bombers--does not allow for compromise unless they face defeat or exhaustion. That, in turn, implies a surge testing the patience of the American public. Is that paradox soluble? The prevailing strategy in Afghanistan is based on the classic anti-insurrection doctrine: to build a central government, commit it to the improvement of the lives of its people, and then protect the population until that government's own forces are able, with our training, to take over. The request for more forces by General McChrystal states explicitly that his existing forces are inadequate for this mission, implying three options: to continue the present deployment and abandon the McChrystal strategy; to decrease the present deployment with a new strategy; or to increase the existing deployment with a strategy focused on the security of the population. A decision not to increase current force levels involves, at a minimum, abandoning the strategy proposed by General McChrystal and endorsed by Gen. David Petraeus; it would be widely interpreted as the first step toward withdrawal. The second option--offered as an alternative--would shrink the current mission by focusing on counter-terrorism rather than counterinsurgency. The argument would be that the overriding American strategic objective in Afghanistan is to prevent the country from turning once again into a base for international terrorism. Hence the defeat of Al Qaeda and radical Islamic jihad should be the dominant priority. Since the Taliban, according to this view, is a local, not a global, threat, it can be relegated to being a secondary target. A negotiation with the group might isolate Al Qaeda and lead to its defeat, in return for not challenging the Taliban in the governance of Afghanistan. After all, it was the Taliban which provided bases for Al Qaeda in the first place. This theory seems to me to be too clever by half. Al Qaeda and the Taliban are unlikely to be able to be separated so neatly geographically. It would also imply the partition of Afghanistan along functional lines, for it is highly improbable that the civic actions on which our policies are based could be carried out in areas controlled by the Taliban. Even so-called realists--like me-would gag at a tacit U.S. cooperation with the Taliban in the governance of Afghanistan. This is not to exclude the possibility of defections from the Taliban as occurred from Al Qaeda in Iraq's Anbar province. But those occurred after the surge, not as a way to avoid it. To adopt such a course is a disguised way of retreating from Afghanistan altogether. Those in the chain of command in Afghanistan, each with outstanding qualifications, have all been recently appointed by the Obama administration. Rejecting their recommendations would be a triumph of domestic politics over strategic judgment. It would draw us into a numbers game without definable criteria. President Obama, as a candidate, proclaimed Afghanistan a necessary war. As
president, he has shown considerable courage in implementing his promise to increase our forces in Afghanistan and to pursue the war more energetically. A sudden reversal of American policy would fundamentally affect domestic stability in Pakistan by freeing the Qaeda forces along the Afghan border for even deeper incursions into Pakistan, threatening domestic chaos. It would raise the most serious questions about American steadiness in India, the probable target should a collapse in Afghanistan give jihad an even greater impetus. In short, the reversal of a process introduced with sweeping visions by two administrations may lead to chaos, ultimately deeper American involvement, and loss of confidence in American reliability. The prospects of world
order will be greatly affected by whether our strategy comes to be perceived as a retreat from the region, or a more effective way to sustain it. The military strategy proposed by Generals McChrystal and Petraeus needs, however, to be given a broader context with particular emphasis on the political environment. Every guerrilla war raises the challenge of how to define military objectives. Military strategy is traditionally defined by control of the maximum amount of territory. But the strategy of the guerrilla--described by Mao--is to draw the adversary into a morass of popular resistance in which, after a while, extrication becomes his principal objective. In Vietnam, the guerrillas often ceded control of the territory during the day and returned at night to prevent political stabilization. Therefore, in guerrilla war, control of 75 percent of the territory 100 percent of the time is more important than controlling 100 percent of the territory 75 percent of the time. A key strategic issue, therefore, will be which part of Afghan territory can be effectively controlled in terms of these criteria. This is of particular relevance to Afghanistan. No outside force has, since the Mongol invasion, ever pacified the entire country. Even Alexander the Great only passed through. Afghanistan has been governed, if at all, by a coalition of local feudal or semifeudal rulers. In the past, any attempt to endow the central government with overriding authority has been resisted by some established local rulers. That is likely to be the fate of any central government in Kabul, regardless of its ideological coloration and perhaps even its efficiency. It would be ironic if, by following the received counterinsurgency playbook too literally, we produced another motive for civil war. Can a civil society be built on a national basis in a country which is neither a nation nor a state? In a partly feudal, multiethnic society, fundamental
social reform is a long process, perhaps unrelatable to the rhythm of our electoral processes. For the foreseeable future, the control from Kabul may be tenuous and its structure less than ideal. More emphasis needs to be given to regional efforts and regional militia. This would also enhance our political flexibility. A major effort is needed to encourage such an evolution.
Concurrently, a serious diplomatic effort is needed to address the major anomaly of the Afghan war. In all previous American ground-combat efforts, once the decision was taken, there was no alternative to America's leading the effort; no other country had the combination of resources or national interest required. The special aspect of Afghanistan is that it has powerful neighbors or near neighbors--Pakistan, India, China, Russia, Iran. Each is threatened in one way or another and, in many respects, more than we are by the emergence of a base for international terrorism: Pakistan by Al Qaeda; India by general jihadism and specific terror groups; China by
fundamentalist Shiite jihadists in Xinjiang; Russia by unrest in the Muslim south; even Iran by the fundamentalist Sunni Taliban. Each has substantial capacities for defending its interests. Each has chosen, so far, to stand more or less aloof.
Withdrawal requires SOFA negotiations. CNN, 2008 [Barbara Starr, Sources: Cell phone images alter course of Afghan probe, http://www.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/asiapcf/09/08/afghan.civilians/, 9-8] Afghan government concluded its investigation, ministers demanded a review of international troops within its borders. On August 25, Afghanistan's Council of Ministers called on the Defense and Foreign Affairs ministries to start negotiating a "status of forces" agreement with international forces -- which include U.S. and NATO troops. The council also asked that the ministry es demand
After the the international forces halt airstrikes on civilian targets, as well as house searches not coordinated with Afghan authorities and the illegal detention of civilians.
Policy failure will devastate US negotiating credibility. Krastev, 2003 [Nikola, GlobalSecurity.org, U.S.: Panel Urges Increased Support For Afghan Government, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2003/06/mil-030620-rfel-161133.htm]
But the independent panel's report calls for more. It says any
further security deterioration in Afghanistan will have far-reaching implications for U.S. foreign policy and will undermine the global position of Washington as a peacekeeper. Wisner drew a parallel between the current situation in Afghanistan and U.S. peace efforts in Iraq. "Our credibility as a peacekeeper, our credibility as a warrior against terror, our credibility as a force for stability, our credibility as a mobilizer of international coalitions when crises are reached and if we don't succeed and get it right in Afghanistan -- these points of credibility are all at issue.
And with them, I'll suggest as well is our ability to look forward to the kind of exit from Iraq that we as Americans would want to achieve at a certain point. If we can't get it right in Afghanistan, it's going to be a lot harder to convince others to work with us to get it right in Iraq," Wisner said.
Pulling troops out of Afghanistan will delay other priorities Afghanistan wants us to stay and will prolong negotiations Bowman 9 (Karlyn, War In Afghanistan, Forbes, 23 February, http://www.forbes.com/2009/02/21/war-afghanistan-troops-opinions-columnists_obama.html)
Obama authorized sending another 17,000 U.S. troops to Afghanistan to "stabilize a deteriorating situation." The deployment fell short of the 30,000 troops
Last week, President Barack requested by General David McKiernan, who heads the U.S. and NATO command there, but it was more than some of Obama's anti-war supporters would have liked.
The president also ordered a review of policies in Afghanistan to be completed before April's NATO summit, where he is expected to ask allies for more help. What does the
public have to say about the situation in Afghanistan? Is public opinion turning against the "good" war? Can we expect help from our European allies? And what do Afghans have to say about conditions on the ground? U.S. support for the mission remains robust. Answering a Pew Research Center question from January, 64% of respondents said the U.S. made the right decision to use military force there, while 25% said the country had made the wrong decision. In January 2006, those responses were 69%
and 20%, respectively. At the same time, however, views about how the war is going have deteriorated. In a March 2003 CBS News/New York Times poll, 76% said it was going very or somewhat well for the U.S.; by August 2008, only 28% gave that response. In a December 2008 CNN/Opinion Research Corp. survey question, 36% said the U.S. was winning in Afghanistan; 60% said it was not. In Pew's January 2009 poll, Americans were more positive about the military effort in Iraq than they were about that in Afghanistan. Questions about troop levels asked by three major U.S. pollsters in mid January show that around one-third of Americans believe the U.S. should increase the number of troops in Afghanistan. In CBS News/New York Times and ABC News/Washington Post polls, slightly fewer--28% and 29%, respectively--said the number should be decreased. In Pew's poll, nearly half of Democrats surveyed (48%) wanted to reduce U.S. military presence. In Europe, the 2007 Transatlantic Trends/German Marshall Fund survey found 64% of Europeans supported international reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan. When asked about conducting combat operations against the Taliban, just 30% of Europeans expressed support. In the same poll, 30% of Europeans agreed that "under some conditions, war is necessary to obtain justice." Comment On This Story In 2008, Transatlantic Trends found that more than 70% of respondents in the five European countries with the most troops in Afghanistan supported providing security for economic reconstruction projects and for helping to stem narcotics production. They were less enthusiastic, though, about helping train the Afghan police forces or combat troops. So when it comes to getting additional combat support from Europe, Obama's popularity on the continent is unlikely to trump its residents' pacifism. In its
ABC News, with the BBC and ARD German TV, found a sharp deterioration in views of Afghanistan's president, Hamid Karzai (83% deemed him excellent or good in 2005; 52% do now), and the U.S. government (68% called it excellent or good in 2005; 32% do now). Fifty-eight percent of Afghans said the greatest danger their country faces is the resurgence of the Taliban. (Drug traffickers were a distant second, at 13%.) Sixty-three percent support the presence of U.S. military forces in their country, a figure down from 78% in 2006. In another question, 18% of Afghans
fourth survey of opinion of Afghans, wanted to increase U.S. and NATO/ISAF troops in their country, while 44% wanted to cut the numbers. A strong plurality, in answer to another question, said coalition forces should withdraw only after security has been restored.
Links Asia
Reducing military presence prompts State Department intervention focuses diplomatic efforts on minimizing effects of the aff. Bloomfield, 2006 [Lincoln, Former US Special Envoy for Man-Portable Air Defense Systems Threat Reduction, and Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs from 2001-2005. Mr. Bloomfield previously served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs (1992-93), Deputy Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs (1991-92), and Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (1988-89) among other policy positions in the Defense Department dating to 1981. He graduated from Harvard College and received a M.A.L.D. from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Reposturing the Force: U.S. Overseas Presence in the Twenty-first Century, Chapter 3: Politics and Diplomacy of the Global Defense Posture Review, http://www.usnwc.edu/Publications/Naval-War-CollegePress/Newport-Papers/Documents/26-pdf.aspx]
An Ambitious Concept When historians look back on the Defense Departments biggest undertakings during its first six decades of existence, they will of course cite the prosecution of wars both hot and cold, the fielding of powerful and complex weapons systems, and the promulgation of defense and security strategies to prepare for and deter threats to the national interest. Rarely to be found among these major tasks will be any large-scale updating, streamlining, or
reconfiguration of an organizational empire that includes well over two million soldiers and civilians, approximately five thousand facilities spread all over the country and the world, and
an annual budget now surpassing $400 billion. The Global Defense Posture Review (GDPR) is such an undertaking. At the same time, this massive exercise in managerial housekeeping by the secretary of defense cannot be
viewed exclusively as one cabinet executives effort to make more productive use of the people, assets, and funding allotted to his department. For all the calculations of greater efficiency and utility that commend the idea of reconfiguring Americas global military footprint, this initiative is inescapably, indeed overwhelmingly, political in terms of its effect on the rest of the world. To think otherwise would be to overlook the belief, resident in allied populations in more than fifty countries by latest count, that America is committedvia the North Atlantic Treaty, the Rio Treaty, and bilateral security treaties with Japan, Korea, the Philippines, Thailand, and Australia to come to their defense in extremis. These are national commitments, solemnly made, and the sight of U.S. armed
forces standing the watch in almost every latitude and time zone has calmed regional rivalries and dissuaded armed escalations for sixty years. A global posture realignment that involves moving large numbers of those sentries
and their weapons inevitably begs the most urgent of security questions, excites foreign anxieties in many quarters, and therefore runs the risk, depending on how the matter is handled, of perturbing the very stability that Americas global military presence is meant to ensure. An Ambitious Concept The idea that U.S. military force units, their equipment, their facilities, and their support
structure should be physically positioned according to the logic of global geography is very appealing. Conceptually, an efficiently designed, globally managed force posture would optimize the flow of combat power along sea, air, and land routes from one region to the next, directly to the point of engagement, without overly taxing the system. Such a concept would best allow future presidents to position viable military options to employ anywhere in response to a sudden danger on the shortest of notice, even when the nature and location of the crisis had not been foreseen. Of all of Donald Rumsfelds actions during his headline-filled second tenure as secretary of defense, his determination to rethink, redesign, and reposition the U.S. militarys posture at home and abroad according to a rational design reflecting contemporary security conditions should stand as a positive mark in his legacy. That Mr. Rumsfeld took on this monumental management task, braving the predictable resistance of settled constituencies from one end of the globe to the other, is noteworthy; certainly none of his predecessors seriously attempted it. That he did it during wartime is extraordinary. Over the long term, a well-executed streamlining of the U.S. global defense posture could profit the nations security, if not in monetary terms certainly in the ability of a finite force structure to deliver the maximum military benefit through the greater efficiencies and capabilities of the new global posture. Big Change, Big Decision: Getting to Yes What with the profound implications of a posture change for allied countries
hosting U.S. forces and the state of Americas diplomatic relations with them, the decision to embark on a global realignment was the presidents to make, and it embodied major foreign policy equities. The Department of State, and the allied governments themselves, would inevitably make their voices heard before the Department of Defenses new scheme based on geographic convenience and logistical efficiency could supplant longstanding basing patterns in foreign localities. One could well imagine the Pentagons potential misgivings about placing this hugely ambitious venture at the mercy of other departments, never mind foreign policy
Egypt Harvard/Berkley Cross-X.com 40/148 Thursday File bureaucrats, whose reaction to any disturbance of the diplomatic status quo might be expected to be one of resistance to change, indeed opposition, even to discussing prospective force reductions with allied countries. The concern was not imaginary; there were indeed some in the State Department who wanted nothing more than for the initiative to go away and who feared damage to alliances if it went forward. On the other hand, concerns in the State Department that some Department of Defense (DoD) officials, by their manner, might aggravate rather than defuse foreign anxieties were also not entirely misplaced. In at least one country DoD doggedly sought to announce and implement a drawdown of military assets against that allys wishes and with an evident relish that required diplomatic damage control and led the president to withhold to himself the withdrawal decision. Within the U.S. policy bureaucracy as a whole,
there were varying perceptions about whether the advertised merits of particular changes under the Global Defense Posture Review would indeed redound to the long-term security benefit of the United States; such concerns were not limited to experienced regional specialists in the State Department.
Specifically true for Asian withdrawals. Lohman, 5-16-2010 [Walter, director of the Asian Studies Center at The Heritage Foundation, Taipei Times, Managing alliances in a new world, http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2010/05/16/2003473110] US allies in Asia and friends who depend on them have long wrung their hands at the prospect of US withdrawal. At no time since the administration of former US president Jimmy Carter, however, has their concern looked more plausible. Countries in the region are in the early stages of planning against that eventuality. They need reassurance. All the trips to the region and speeches in the world, however helpful to the cause, will not fill the gap alone. The region wants a resident US. It wants a strong US. It is even good for the Chinese themselves, because it precludes some of the most aggressive scenarios in their own development. The Obama administration needs to consider the full range of policy decisions and diplomacy in this light. The future of US alliances and, by extension, US long-term security, depends on it.
Link Japan
Renegotiating the SOFA will be costly internal political struggles in Japan will prevent quick passage of the plan. Al Jazeera 10 (1 February 2010, US envoy to discuss Japan bases, http://english.aljazeera.net/news/asia-pacific/2010/02/20102133033203868.html)
US assistant secretary of state for East Asia is due to arrive in Tokyo on Monday for talks on the future visit comes after thousands of people from across Japan joined protests at the weekend against plans to relocate a US base on the southern island of Okinawa. Some 47,000 US troops are stationed in Japan, with more than half on the island. Local residents have long complained about noise, pollution and crime around the bases. In 2006, the two countries signed a pact that called for the realignment of American troops in the country and for a marine base on the island to be moved to a less populated area. But the newly elected Japanese government is re-examining the deal, caught between increasing public opposition to US troops and its crucial military alliance with Washington.
The of American military bases in Japan. Kurt Campbell's 'Cornerstone' alliance Mizuho Fukushima, a cabinet minister, called for the removal of the US base [Reuters] Last month Campbell called on Japan to stick to the 2006 deal and relocate the US Futenma air base in Okinawa. In written testimony before a Senate Foreign Relations Committee subcommittee on January 21, Campbell said the alliance with Japan was a "cornerstone" of the US engagement in Asia. Campbell also reiterated Washington's desire to see that the US Marine Corps Air Station at Futenma be transferred to another area on the island by 2014. He said the US is assisting the Japanese government, led by prime
minister Yukio Hatoyama, with its review of the Futenma relocation plan. Decision postponed However, Hatoyama has repeatedly postponed his decision on the pact, with members of his own government divided on how to proceed. Last week, he pledged to resolve the issue by May, just before national elections. But the issue is a difficult one for the prime minister to juggle, with members of his coalition government calling for all US troops to leave Japan. At a
rally against the base, Mizuho Fukushima, a minister in Hatoyama's cabinet, told a crowd protesters that she wants to see the Okinawa base closed and US troops moved out of Japan entirely. Meanwhile,
opposition to the US-Japan pact is growing louder, as thousands marched through central Tokyo on Saturday. Labor unionists,
pacifists, environmentalists and students called for an end to the US troop presence. They gathered for a rally at a park, under a banner that read "Change! Japan-U.S. Relations".
Link South Korea

Plan unpopular: Public wants US troops to stay until North Korea denuclearizes
Cheon 09 [Seong-whun, Writer for the Korea Herald, Transfer of troop control: A Bush legacy, Korea Herald, 1/23/09, Acc. 6/24/10 through LexisNexis, http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/results/docview/docview.do? docLinkInd=true&risb=21_T9622716431&format=GNBFI&sort=RELEVANCE&startDocNo=1&resu ltsUrlKey=29_T9622562285&cisb=22_T9622716436&treeMax=true&treeWidth=0&csi=158208& docNo=1]
The South Korean public was perplexed at the gushing of official reports and remarks from the United States. Some even think that Washington is ready to accept the DPRK as a nuclear state as long as it is not committed to proliferation. The vast majority of South Koreans don't question the authenticity of the professional judgment of the U.S. military. Their insufficient
knowledge of the North Korean nuclear threat largely results from deliberate propaganda of the Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun administrations. They manufactured a false sense of peace and security while intentionally ignoring or making little of the
Still, South Koreans question whether it is right to implement the decision the OPCON transfer and the CFC dissolution - at this moment. Remembering that the United
nuclear threat. Korean WMD attack,
States saved their country from North Korean aggression and also is the only foreign country the ROK has ever fought for in the history of Korea, they question what the alliance is all about. Concerning the unpreparedness of the ROK military against a North
they ask, couldn't we postpone the decision until at least denuclearization of North Korea is completed? The OPCON transfer and the CFC dissolution is not a simple
military issue but a complicated matter where hard power and soft power are combined. Using soft power is the ability to attract the South Korean people to the American side. Successfully exercising soft power in the alliance means that the United States should win over South Koreans by paying careful attention to what they believe. Recently, there was an auspicious example in this regard. General Sharp sent USFK officials at Incheon Airport to receive the remains of Kim Suk-im who died when an American jet fighter crashed into her San Diego home last December. He also sent a delegation to express his condolences to the family of Kim. His decision is in full harmony with Korean culture and emotion, spreading quiet ripple effects on Korean society.
Simply because the North Korean military is most delighted to see the OPCON transfer and the CFC dissolution, the decision is worthy of delay. We
We need to exercise similar wisdom. should not send any hint of a wrong signal to Kim Jong-il. That is priority number one of the alliance at this juncture.
Link Iraq
Troop drawdown in Iraq will take years of intense negotiations. Boot, 5-9-2010 [Max, Senior fellow in national security studies at the Council on Foreign Relations and contributing editor to the opinion section of Los Angeles Times, 5-9, Theres still time to lose in Iraq; If the US doesnt address Malikis postelection moves, the billions of dollars spent and the thousands of lives lost could be for nothing Los Angeles Times, Lexis] Obama's overriding objective is to pull U.S. troops out of Iraq. The Iraqi-American security accord negotiated by the George W. Bush administration called for the departure of all our soldiers by the end of 2011. Obama added a new twist by ordering that troop strength be cut from the current 95,000 to 50,000 by September. The presumption was that the drawdown would occur after Iraq had installed a new government. American officials expected that postelection jockeying would end by June at the latest. But Iraqi politicians now expect that no government will emerge before the fall. Thus the Iraqi and American timelines are dangerously out of sync. Large troop reductions at a time of such political uncertainty will send a dangerous signal of disengagement and lessen America's ability to preserve the integrity of the elections. The delay in seating a government also endangers the possible negotiation of a fresh accord to govern Iraqi-American relations after 2011. It is vital to have a continuing American military presence to train
That should be no surprise considering that President and advise Iraqi security forces, which have grown in size and competence but still aren't capable of defending their airspace or performing other vital functions. U.S. troops also play a vital peacekeeping role, patrolling with Iraqi troops and the Kurdish peshmerga along the disputed Green Line separating Iraq proper from the Kurdish regional government. Kurdish politicians I met in Irbil warned that if Iraqi-Kurdish land disputes aren't resolved by the end of 2011 (and odds are they won't be), there is a serious danger of war breaking out once American troops leave. The possibility of miscalculation will grow once the Iraqi armed forces acquire the M-1 tanks and F-16 fighters that we have agreed to sell them. It is all the more important that an American buffer -- say 10,000 to 15,000 troops -- remain to ensure that those weapons are never used against our Kurdish allies. Yet
U.S. officers in Iraq are right now implementing plans to draw down our troops to zero by the end of 2011. They hope that some forces will be permitted to remain, but that will only be possible after what is sure to be a protracted and tortuous negotiation with the new Iraqi government. The last American-Iraqi security accord took a year to negotiate. If the new government isn't seated until the end of this year, it will be extremely difficult to conclude a treaty by the end of next year. SOFA goes til 2011 withdrawing ahead of schedule means wed have to negotiate a new one. Bryant, 2009 [Christa Case, CSM, Troop withdrawal: Obama to end Iraq war by August 2010, 2-27, http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Global-News/2009/0227/troop-withdrawal-obama-to-end-iraqwar-by-august-201]
Another challenge of the withdrawal is how to move the significant amount of equipment now in Iraq, which the Monitor recently tallied to include: 60,000 aircraft and vehicles, 120,000 trailer-sized containers, and 150,000 private contractors from nearly 50 bases and installations. One option might be to send some personnel and equipment via Turkey, where the two-lane Habur Gate crossing has been used quietly as a way to move supplies. According to the Status of Forces Agreement, a
US-Iraqi deal settled on at the end of 2008, a US military presence is allowed for up to three more years. But US units are supposed to draw back from Iraqi cities to US bases by this summer, and Obamas plan now indicates an earlier withdrawal of the bulk of the troops by August 2010. In keeping with the deal, Obama promised today that the remaining 50,000 troops a bigger number than Democrats were expecting will leave by 2011. That takes tons of diplomatic resources. AFP, 2008 [US, Iraq still negotiating troop presence deal, 10-15, http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5gXdwNmi_OvQcfCpWQ1s38VB-egqw]
Egypt Harvard/Berkley Cross-X.com 44/148 Thursday File WASHINGTON (AFP) The United States and Iraq are still negotiating the terms of an agreement on the future presence of US troops in Iraq next year, senior US officials said Wednesday. "Nothing is done until everything is done. Everything isn't done. The Iraqis are still talking among themselves. We are still talking to the Iraqis," State Department spokesman Sean McCormack told reporters. He declined to say whether the two sides were even close to a deal. Upon returning from a trip to Europe last week, US
Defense Secretary Robert Gates said he was "actually reasonably optimistic we will come to closure on this in a very near future." The accord, dubbed the Status of Forces Agreement, is to put in place a deal for the future
status of US troops in Iraq after the UN Security Council mandate for the multinational force expires on December 31. Both US and Iraqi leaders have stressed that a deal is in the works. But they have differed over some issues such as granting immunity to US soldiers for acts committed in Iraq, whether Washington has the right to detain Iraqi prisoners and on the future command of military operations on the ground. The deal was originally set to be signed in July, but has been held up by the ongoing negotiations. Withdrawal requires negotiation with Iraqi government. MSNBC, 2008 [U.S., Iraq seek troop withdrawal 'time horizon', 7-18, http://www.michaelmoore.com/words/latest-news/us-iraq-seek-troop-withdrawal-time-horizon] Bush and Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki have agreed that a security deal under negotiation should set a "time horizon" for meeting "aspirational goals" for reducing U.S. forces in Iraq, the White House said Friday. In the closest the Bush administration has come to acknowledging the
WASHINGTON - President likelihood of some kind of timetable for future U.S. troop cuts, the White House said "the goals would be based on continued improving conditions on the ground and not an arbitrary date for withdrawal." Iraqi and U.S. officials have been
working in fits and starts on a formal Status of Forces Agreement to provide a legal basis for U.S. troops to remain when an U.N. mandate expires at the end of the year. Maliki had recently suggested a
timetable be set for U.S. withdrawal, but U.S. officials have been much more cautious despite an improving security situation.
"In the area of security cooperation, the president and the prime minister agreed that improving conditions should allow for the agreements now under negotiation to include a general time horizon for meeting aspirational goals such as the resumption of Iraqi security control in their cities and provinces and the further reduction of U.S. combat forces from Iraq," the White House said. Iraq has proposed requiring U.S. forces to withdraw fully five years after the Iraqis take the lead on security nationwide, but that condition could take years to meet. And, Iraqi government opposes immediate withdrawal before stability diplomatic investments necessary in the absence of presence. Robinson, 2009 [Dan, VOA, Iraqi Politicians Urge Cautious US Military Withdrawal, 9-18, http://www.51voa.com/VOA_Standard_English/VOA_Standard_English_33702.html] Former Iraqi Prime Minister Allawi said the United States and Iraq have similar goals. The U.S. wants to leave Iraq, but not in turmoil, he said, while Iraq seeks a path of prosperity and sovereignty where individual and minority rights are respected. But, both Allawi and parliament member Saleh al-Mutlaq pointed to political, sectarian and other problems as well as external factors, such as pressures from Iran, that could cause problems during and after the elections. While Iraqis know the United States will be withdrawing its military forces, Allawi said Iraq's military remains unable to shoulder the security burden. And he said oustanding political and constitutional issues are also giving rise to severe tensions. "The implementation of [the] political reform
act as passed by Parliament in 2008 is a must. The act includes, among [other things] amending the Constitution, instituting an inclusive political process and implementing political and national reconciliation. None of these steps has been acted upon, yet these steps are very necessary for the stabilization of Iraq," he said. President Barack Obama has ordered all U.S. combat forces out of Iraq by the end of August of next year, and all U.S. forces gone by the end of 2011. Saying
the United States withdrawal should be "moral and responsible," Iraqi parliament member Saleh al-Mutlaq said the only way to ensure free and fair elections in his country is with a commitment by the U.S. and United Nations for thorough monitoring. "Without this monitoring, I
Cross-X.com Thursday File believe that the election will be the same as happened before. The intimidation is already there, the assassinations are already there. And we have been getting so many warnings that we are going to be targeted, that our people are going to be targeted," he said. Calling the elections critical, not
only for Iraq's future but for the region, the subcommittee Chairman, Democratic Representative William Delahunt, said a large international observer presence is required before and during the vote. Pointing to questions about the legitimacy of the recent election in Afghanistan, Delahunt worries not only about a deterioration in Iraq, but the impact electoral problems in Iraq could have on the American public support for U.S. policy in Afghanistan. "If the election in January is unsuccessful, support here in this country for involvement in Afghanistan will diminish because the American people will be saying, 'We tried it once; it didn't work. And look what happened.' So this isn't just simply about supporting the Iraqi people and democracy in Iraq. It's about Afghanistan and I dare say it's about the entire region," he said. The Democratic representative of the U.S. Congress to the United Nations,
Delahunt said he will use consultations in New York next week to generate support for international monitoring of the Iraqi elections. In his testimony to the subcommittee, Kenneth Katzman, a
specialist in Middle East Affairs with the Congressional Research Service, warned that sectarianism in Iraq might worsen in the run-up to the elections. "Sectarianism, and ethnic and factional infighting continue to simmer. And many Iraqis' views and positions are colored by efforts to outflank, outmaneuver and constrain rival factions," he said. Katzman said sectarian tensions could reach a peak as Iraqis decide whether to hold a referendum on the U.S. military presence. On the final day of a visit to Iraq, U.S. Vice President Joe Biden said on Thursday the United States will abide by any decisions by the Iraqi people on the U.S. withdrawal schedule, part of which was established in a Status of Forces Agreement reached during the Bush administration. In his testimony Thursday, former Iraqi Prime Minister Allawi voiced concern about what he called "reversals in security" after a fragile period of improvement, along with an upsurge in sectarian tensions. The
United States, he said, has a moral responsibility and national security interest in ensuring fraud-free elections in Iraq, which should include not only the deployment of U.S. forces, but a strong United Nations involvement.
More ev SOFAs.
Roberts, 2008 [Kristin, Reuters, Staff Writer, Gates: US won't promise to defend Iraq in accord, 2-6, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN06442345]
"The status-of-forces agreement that is being discussed will not contain a commitment to defend Iraq and neither will any strategic framework agreement," Gates told a U.S. Senate panel. "We do not want, nor will we seek, permanent
The United States and Iraq have agreed to start formal negotiations about their future relationship with the goal of finishing an accord by the end of July. The agreement will set the rules and legal protections under which U.S. forces operate in Iraq. The size of the long-term U.S. presence in Iraq also will be part of the negotiations, Lt. Gen.
bases in Iraq," he later told a U.S. House of Representatives committee. Douglas Lute, the White House deputy national security adviser, has said.
Plus, withdrawing before stability devastates negotiating credibility. Chakmakijan, 2009 [Haro, staff writer for Agence French Presse, 2-17, Iraq Sheds US Puppet in its Own Backyard, http://www.jordantimes.com/index.php?news=14364&searchFor=Iran]
"We
have political problems, tensions, over our constitutional reforms, the [long-delayed] oil law, government performance," he said. For Baghdad, "these are part of the reconciliation" process in the warthe 1979 Islamic revolution, as another example of Iraq's ability to stand on its own two feet. "We have proven that no
battered country. Zebari, an Iraqi Kurd, also pointed to Baghdad's good ties with Tehran, the arch-foe of Washington ever since
matter what the differences between the United States and a neighbouring country, we have our vested interests and can make our own decisions," he said in his office, adorned with a plush Persian carpet.
Within the Arab world, he said, Iraq had also taken a stand last month by staying away from a meeting of leaders in Qatar meant to shore up support for Hamas over the Gaza crisis, and instead attended an economic summit in Kuwait. "It
used to be that way," the foreign minister said, referring to the loss of diplomatic credibility after the US-led invasion of March 2003 that toppled Saddam Hussein, stressing that Iraq's neighbours were now taking it seriously. "The impression has completely changed, especially after this agreement with the US and the way we debated it, in parliament, in the media," in contrast to other countries where it would have been a state secret. "All this has sent the right signals... our continued engagement despite their negativism," he said, referring to the scepticism of nearby countries. Zebari pointed to the opening of several Arab
embassies in Baghdad and to the expected stream of diplomatic visits, with economic issues high on the agenda. "Syria's prime minister and foreign minister are coming over soon," he said. "We are thinking of reopening our [oil] pipeline through Syria to the Mediterranean, that's a key issue." Zebari said Baghdad's often troubled ties with Damascus had "improved a great deal"
following their opening of embassies in late 2006. "There are less infiltrators coming from the Syrian border. They haven't stopped but the Syrians have taken a number of measures, and secondly they felt that this will backfire on them." Turning to Tehran, he acknowledged Shiite Iran was influential in the new Iraq, where the Shiite majority is dominant. "They have influence, I have to be honest... But our attitude [now] is to deal with each other as two sovereign countries, through official channels," the minister said. "To say that they dictate to us, no, that is wrong," he said, citing Tehran's strong opposition to the security pact with Washington. "We told them this is a sovereign Iraqi decision," said Zebari, who has served as foreign minister since Iraq's first post-invasion administration. "They took that as a sign, I think, of Iraq asserting more independence." With Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki's visit last week - to be followed, said Zebari, by Iran's former president Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani the two sides are placing their diplomatic ties on a new footing. "We are trying to formalise relations with them through embassies, through consulates, to have a protocol of dealing with each other," he said. Zebari contrasted the approach to the individual contacts dating back to the days of opposition to Saddam's regime when many of today's leaders of Iraq were exiled in Iran. Even Kuwait, with which Iraq has had troubled ties for decades, culminating in Saddam's 1990 invasion, is sending its deputy premier and foreign minister, Sheikh Mohammad Sabah Al Salim Al Sabah, to Baghdad for the first time. Joint oil fields, demarcation of borders and the billions of dollars in war reparation claims will be among the thorny issues on the agenda. "We have come a long, long way with them," Zebari said.
Renegotiating the SOFA for a rapid withdrawal will demand large amounts of attention Allawi wants US troops to stay for legitimacy and will delay negotiations. Allawi, 10 [Ayad, leader of the Iraqiya List, which finished first in votes in Iraqs national elections in March. He served as prime minister from 2004 to 2005., Editorial: How Iraq can fortify its fragile democracy, YaLibnan, http://www.yalibnan.com/2010/06/12/editorial-how-iraqcan-fortify-its-fragile-democracy/]
we hope that the United States and the United Nations will help bring Iraqs political blocs together to achieve a government in the national interest. I sincerely hope that the United States will remain actively engaged in Iraq, to help shield our fragile democracy from foreign interference and forces that wish to undermine democracy. Washington still has unrivaled leverage in Iraq, as well as a moral responsibility to the Iraqi people whom it freed from tyranny to do all it can to deliver sustainable peace and stability. Vice President Biden recently said that the United States was going to be able to keep our commitment to reduce troop levels in Iraq to 50,000 by this summer. While I have long supported the withdrawal of U.S. troops, Iraq cannot be allowed to revert to an unstable state of sectarian strife, dominated by regional influences. Such an outcome would insult the tens of thousands of Iraqi civilians whose lives were stolen in terrorist attacks and the thousands of U.S. soldiers who sacrificed their lives; it would also put at risk every U.S. and international policy priority in the region the planned troop withdrawals,
Moreover, nuclear containment, a stable energy supply, even the chances of success in the Israeli-Palestinian issue
Renegotiating SOFAs for troop withdrawal requires considerable diplomatic capital Iraq proves. Lynch Professor Political Science 09 (Marc, associate professor of political science and international affairs at George Washington University , Bush's finest moment on Iraq: SOFA, not the surge, ForeignPolicy, 28 January 2009, http://lynch.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/01/18/sofa_not_the_surge)
Peter Beinart today bravely repeats the emerging would-be conventional wisdom. Rather than simply denounce everything Republican, he argues, Democrats should admit that the "surge" worked and -- uniquely echoing a thousand recent op-eds -was President Bush's finest moment. I have a hard time imagining anything as tedious as rehashing those tired debates from the campaign about the "surge" -- perhaps we could have another round of arguments as to whether the surge brigades arriving in the spring of 2007 caused the Sunni turn against al-Qaeda in the fall of 2006? But in the interests of post-partisanship, I am
Signing a Status of Forces Agreement requiring the full withdrawal of U.S. military forces from Iraq on a fixed three year timeline demonstrated a real flexibility on Bush's part. It demonstrated a pragmatism and willingness to put the national interest ahead of partisanship that few of us believed he possessed. It is
willing to offer an alternative as Bush's finest hour in Iraq: the Status of Forces Agreement.
largely thanks to Bush's acceptance of his own bargaining failure that Barack Obama will inherit a plausible route to successful

SOFA negotiations looking for something entirely different than what emerged at the end. The
disengagement from Iraq. Conservatives now like to claim the SOFA as a "Bush-negotiated" success. But Bush entered the
U.S. went into the SOFA talks intent on obtaining legitimacy for a long-term military presence in Iraq once the Security Council mandate ended. When negotiations began, it was widely assumed that Bush would extract from the
Iraqis an agreement which made the removal of U.S. troops entirely contingent upon American assessments of conditions on the ground. There were widespread discussions of permanent U.S. bases and a Korea-style presence for generations, an assumption that the U.S. would retain a free hand in its operations, and an absolute rejection of an Obama-
Iraqi leaders, to most everyone's surprise, took a hard line in the negotiations. Their tough line was encouraged by Iran, no doubt, as stressed by many frustrated American commentators. But it also reflected Iraqi domestic considerations, including several rounds of upcoming
style timeline for withdrawal. But
elections and an intensely strong popular Iraqi hostility to the U.S. occupation under any name. The Iraqis were also helped by the calender. As negotiations dragged on, the December 31 deadline loomed large, threatening to leave the U.S. troops without any legal mandate to remain in the country and forcing the hand of American negotiators. Finally, the Iraqi leaders clearly kept a careful eye on the American Presidential elections and used Obama's stance to strengthen their own hand in negotiations. And here's where I will offer some sincere praise for Bush and his team. When the Iraqis insisted on an Obama-style timeline for U.S. withdrawal instead of a Bush/McCain- style conditions-based aspirational time frame for U.S. withdrawal, he could have insisted on the latter. This would have fit with his administration's often-repeated preferences. He could have continued to push for this conception closer to the December 31 deadline, playing high-stakes chicken at the expense of American military planning for the coming year and at the risk of the Iraqi political system not having adequate time to ratify the deal. But he didn't. To his credit,
Bush agreed to the Obama-style timeline for U.S. withdrawal. Granted, he hedged -- he didn't authorize Ambassador Ryan Crocker to sign off on the deal until after the Presidential election (on November 18). But at that point he bowed to the political realities in the U.S. and Iraq and agreed to a SOFA which far more closely matched Obama's avowed vision for Iraq -- withdrawal of U.S. forces in three years, no
permanent bases -- than his own. Thanks to this pragmatism, Obama can now work closely with the Iraqi government in managing the drawdown instead of spending his first months in office trying to wriggle out of an unacceptable deal. And this, I might speculate, is among the reasons why Robert Gates will continue as Secretary of Defense. And thus I offer Bush's willingness to sign the SOFA mandating U.S. withdrawal from Iraq, and not the surge, as his finest moment in Iraq.
Iraq inevitably devastates capital withdrawal cant help. Sorenson, 2008 [Ted, Former Special Counsel to Pres. Kennedy, Has the Iraq War depleted our military and diplomatic capital? 5-22, http://bigthink.com/ideas/1085]
Question:
Has
the
Iraq
War
depleted our
military and
diplomatic capital? Ted Sorensen: We havent spent it all.
We still have enormous stockpiles of strategic weapons that have never been used, and God willing will never be used. But we
have stretched thin our conventional forces in a foolish, pointless, endless invasion and occupation of Iraq. We didnt even have enough troops to secure the borders and keep the terrorists from pouring in from
other countries. We didnt even have enough troops to secure the arsenals and armories so that the terrorists just robbed all of those weapons. And theyre now being used against American troops. And what have we achieved? Saddam Hussein is gone. Yes, he was an evil man, but we dont have democracy there. Women in . . . Iraqi women probably have fewer rights today than they had women Saddam Hussein, who was secular, was in charge than they . . . than they have now when the United States put the Shiia in power. So
what have we achieved? And there are more Iraqi civilians being killed every
day. They used to be killed every day by stray American bombs; but now theyre killed today by other Iraqis, and there is no end in sight. I dont believe that with the United States having taken the lid off Pandoras box . . . Whether we stay for 50 years as John McCain may be necessary like Korea; or stay for 50 months or weeks, there will still be bloodshed, and violence, and sectarian killings, and political wrangling going on inside Iraq. We have so messed up that country that Im not sure even a democratic president can solve it. And its . . . Its the stupidest blunder in American foreign policy history.
Link TNWs
TNW withdrawal costs tons of diplomatic capital. Bell & Loehrke, 2009 [Alexandra and Benjamin, Project manager at the Ploughshares Fund and a Truman National Security Fellow AND **Research assistant at the Ploughshares Fund and a graduate student at the University of Maryland School of Public Policy, 11-23, The status of U.S. nuclear weapons in TurkeyBulletin of the Atomic Scientists http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/thestatus-of-us-nuclear-weapons-turkey] A prescription for withdrawal. Preventing Turkey (and any other country in the region) from acquiring nuclear weapons is critical to international security. Doing so requires a key factor that also is essential to paving the way toward withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons: improved alliance relations. The political and strategic compasses are pointing to the eventual withdrawal of nuclear weapons from Europe--it's a strategy that certainly fits the disarmament agenda President Barack Obama has outlined. But to get there, careful diplomacy will be required to improve U.S.-Turkish ties and to assuage Turkish security concerns. The U.S.-Turkish relationship cooled
when Turkey refused to participate in Operation Iraqi Freedom, after which Turkish support for U.S. policy declined through the end of the George W. Bush administration. Obama's election has helped to mend fences, and his visit to Turkey in April was warmly received. In fact, all of the administration's positive interactions with Turkey have been beneficial: Washington has
supported Turkey's role as a regional energy supplier and encouraged Ankara as it undertakes difficult political reforms and works to resolve regional diplomatic conflicts. For its part, Turkey recently doubled its troop contribution
to NATO's Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan--a boon to U.S. efforts there. By incorporating Ankara into its new European missile defense plans--intended to protect Turkey and other countries vulnerable to Iran's short- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles--Washington could further shore up its military relationship with Turkey. Ship-based Aegis missile systems will be the backbone of the strategy, with considerations left open for later deployments of mobile ground-based interceptors in Eastern Europe or Turkey. This cooperation could provide the bond with Washington and perception of security that Turkey seeks in the face of a potential Iranian bomb. Because Russia weighs significantly in Turkish security calculations, reductions to Russian strategic and nonstrategic nuclear arsenals also would help improve Ankara's peace of mind. The United States and Russia soon will seek ratification of a follow-on agreement to START. And treaty negotiations in pursuit of further reductions to the U.S. and Russian arsenals should involve forward-deployed nuclear weapons, including the U.S. weapons in Turkey. During any such negotiations, Turkey must be fully confident in NATO and U.S. security guarantees. Critically, any removal of the
weapons in Turkey would need to happen in concert with efforts to prevent Iran from turning its civil nuclear energy program into a military one. Otherwise, Washington would risk compromising Turkey as a NATO ally and key regional partner. If used properly, Turkey actually can play an important role in this complex process, and the United States and its allies should seriously consider Turkish offers to serve as an interlocutor between Iran and the West. First, Ankara's potential influence with Tehran should not be underestimated. As Princeton scholar Joshua Walker has
noted, given its long-established pragmatic relations and growing economic ties with Iran, Ankara is in a position to positively influence Tehran's behavior. More largely, if the United States and European Union task Turkey with
a bigger role in the diplomatic back-and-forth with Iran, it would help convince Ankara (and others) of Turkey's value to NATO and have the additional benefit of pulling Ankara into a closer relationship with Washington and Brussels. As a result, Turkey would obtain a stronger footing in alliance politics, contain its chief security concerns, and foster the necessary conditions for the removal of tactical U.S. nuclear weapons from Turkish soil. Empirically, this means intense negotiations to reassure extended deterrence commitments. Yost, 2004 [David S., Professor at the Naval Postgraduate School, Ph.D. in international relations at the University of Southern California (1979), July, The US Nuclear Posture Review and the NATO allies, International Affairs 80.4, Ebsco]
Perhaps partly because of improved relations with Russia, allied observers have expressed no noteworthy concerns about the effects of the NPR-mandated reductions in operationally deployed US strategic nuclear warheads on extended deterrence. This is consistent with a longstanding pattern in which most allies have deemed strategic nuclear
matters a US responsibility and have deferred to US judgement about the appropriate
Egypt Harvard/Berkley Cross-X.com 49/148 Thursday File structure and level of US strategic nuclear forces. Exceptions to this pattern have, however, arisen historically; and in some circumstances more such exceptions could occur. Ever since the
Soviet Union launched Sputnik in 1957 and developed the worlds first ICBMs, the alliance has been subject to periodic crises of confidencein essence, European doubts about Americas will to defend its allies, given the risk of prompt inter- continental nuclear retaliation from Russia. These doubts have been aggravated whenever Americans have
expressed anxieties about US strategic capabilities as during the bomber gap and missile gap controversies
in the late 1950s and early 1960s, and the debates about SALT II, ICBM vulnerability and grey area systems such as the Backfire bomber in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Any Europeans inclined to be worried about the credibility of
US extended deterrence in view of the constraints on US strategic nuclear forces imposed by arms control or budgetary limits would probably be influenced by interactions with US experts, policy activists and politiciansas was the case in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the
last time US policy regarding strategic nuclear forces became a significant topic in transatlantic security discussions. If a debate emerged in the United States about the adequacy of the US strategic force posture in the context of national security (without necessarily considering extended deterrence for allied security), allied experts and officials would probably ask
questions about the implications for NATO, Japan and other beneficiaries of US nuclear guarantees. In this event, the perceived political commitment of the United Statesincluding its manifest intentions, and its apparent confidence in the adequacy of its strategic nuclear posturewould probably matter more in reassuring allies than the size of the force and its specific characteristics. TNW removal will meet with massive controversy requires tons of diplomatic resources. Bell & Loehrke, 2009 [Alexandra and Benjamin, Project manager at the Ploughshares Fund and a Truman National Security Fellow AND **Research assistant at the Ploughshares Fund and a graduate student at the University of Maryland School of Public Policy, 11-23, The status of U.S. nuclear weapons in TurkeyBulletin of the Atomic Scientists http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/thestatus-of-us-nuclear-weapons-turkey] For more than 40 years, Turkey has been a quiet custodian of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons.
During the Cold War, Washington positioned intermediate-range nuclear missiles and bombers there to serve as a bulwark against the Soviet Union (i.e., to defend the region against Soviet attack and to influence Soviet strategic calculations). In the event of a Soviet assault on Europe, the weapons were to be fired as one of the first retaliatory shots. But as the Cold War waned, so, too, did the weapons' strategic value. Thus, over the last few decades, the United States has removed all of its intermediate-range missiles from Turkey and reduced its other nuclear weapons there through gradual redeployments and arms control agreements. Today, Turkey hosts an estimated 90 B61 gravity bombs at Incirlik Air Base. Fifty of these bombs are reportedly PDF assigned for delivery by U.S. pilots, and forty are assigned for delivery by the Turkish Air Force. However, no permanent nuclear-capable U.S. fighter wing is based at Incirlik, and the Turkish Air Force is reportedly PDF not certified for NATO nuclear missions, meaning nuclear-capable F-16s from other U.S. bases would need to be brought in if Turkey's bombs were ever needed. Such a relaxed posture makes clear just how little NATO relies on tactical nuclear weapons for its defense anymore. In fact, the readiness of NATO's nuclear forces now is measured in months as opposed to hours or days. Supposedly, the weapons are still deployed as a matter of deterrence, but the crux of deterrence is sustaining an aggressor's perception of guaranteed rapid reprisal--a perception the nuclear bombs deployed in Turkey cannot significantly add to because they are unable to be rapidly launched. Aggressors are more likely to be deterred by NATO's conventional power or the larger strategic forces supporting its nuclear umbrella. So in effect, U.S. tactical nuclear weapons in Turkey are without military value or purpose. That means removing them from the country should be simple, right? Unfortunately,
matters of national and international security are never that easy. Roadblocks to removal. In 2005, when NATO's top commander at the time, Gen. James L. Jones, supported the elimination of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe, he was met with fierce political resistance. (In addition to the 90
B61 bombs in Turkey, there are another 110 or so U.S. bombs located at bases in Belgium, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands.) Four years later, some U.S. and European officials still maintain that the political value of the
nuclear weapons is enough to keep them deployed across Europe. In particular, they argue that the weapons are "an essential political and military link" between NATO members and help maintain alliance cohesion. The Defense Department's 2008 report PDF on nuclear weapons management concurred: "As long as our allies value [the nuclear weapons'] political contribution, the United States is obligated to
provide and maintain the nuclear weapon capability."
Removal of TNWs strongly opposed forces negotiations after the plan. Guardian, 2-23-2010
Egypt Harvard/Berkley Cross-X.com 50/148 Thursday File [Anne Penketh. Burying Nuclear Relics of the cold war http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2010/feb/23/nato-cold-war-nuclear-relics] It's decision time for the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, which is confronted by a dilemma over the future of short-range US nuclear weapons in Europe. Until now, the alliance has chosen to ignore calls for change and has eschewed public debate. Nato clings to the outmoded notion that the 200 or so gravity bombs in five European countries are a necessary deterrent (against Russia, which has an estimated 4,000 short-range nuclear weapons). The status quo has prevailed with the US saying it is waiting for an allied request to remove the B61 bombs from Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, Italy and Turkey. But this has never happened, partly because of resistance from some former Soviet bloc states within Nato. They have been virulently opposed to the removal of the weapons which they perceive as a guarantee of a US presence in Europe against Russian aggression. More ev negotiations necessary allies oppose removal without Russian reciprocation. Guardian, 3-30-2010 [Julian Borger, Diplomatic editor, "US bombs must stay in Europe, Nato advisers say", lexis] A Nato advisory group helping to draft a new strategy for the military alliance will recommend that US nuclear bombs stay in Europe, the Guardian has learned. In a report due on 1 May, the group of experts, chaired by the former US secretary of state Madeleine Albright, will say the roughly 200 remaining American B61 bombs on European soil should not be unilaterally withdrawn. The 11 experts will suggest that the bombs
only be removed as part of a new treaty with Russia, which has an estimated 2,000 tactical nuclear weapons, mostly on its western flank. "You cannot get rid of them without reciprocity," a member of the group said. The group's
word will not be final, but it will significantly strengthen the hand of those in the alliance who are opposed to a German-led initiative to remove the bombs unilaterally. Germany won the support of
Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and Norway for its stance, and foreign ministers from the five countries delivered a letter to the Nato secretary general, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, last month calling for a debate on the future of the tactical weapons. Concern over the B61 stockpile in Europe was heightened by a security breach two months ago when protesters managed to break in to an American base in Belgium where up to 20 of the bombs are thought to be stockpiled. Italy and Turkey,
which play host to most of the B61 stockpile, have been silent on the issue in recent months, but have quietly opposed moves to withdraw them from the US bases on their soil. Eastern European and Baltic countries are also uneasy about removing what they see as a symbol of America's preparedness to protect them against attack. More ev. Thranert, 2008 [Oliver, Senior Fellow at German Institute for International and Security Affairs, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, U.S. Nuclear Forces in Europe to Zero? Yes, But Not Yet, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm? fa=view&id=22533&prog=zgp&proj=znpp] there are a number of political reasons for not entirely foregoing U.S. nuclear forces in Europe at this point in time. The function of these systems is to keep the peace and to prevent wars. In particular, U.S. nuclear forces in Europe and nuclear sharing with Alliance partners demonstrate a shared risk within NATO and binds America to the old continent. At least some NATO partners continue to value this. They remain particularly interested in a strong nuclear deterrent vis--vis Russia and Iran. Moreover, the U.S. nuclear presence gives those NATO members participating in nuclear sharing a greater say in nuclear decision making or, at least, more access to information. In order to avoid yet another split in NATO on a crucial issue, these political factors should not be neglected. In addition, three
At the same time, however, further points need to be taken into consideration.
Link Turkey
Hundreds of tactical nuclear weapons remain in NATO non-nuclear states, including Turkey, and Turkish officials have no plans to request the withdrawal. Sariibrahimolu 09 (Lale, Turkey to face pressure over US nukes on its soil. Todays Zaman. 4/4/09). http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/detaylar.do? load=detay&link=174286&bolum=100
According to the US-based Arms Control Association, under NATO nuclear-sharing arrangements, an estimated 480 tactical nuclear weapons remain deployed in five NATO non-nuclear-weapon states (Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Turkey) and in the United Kingdom, which also possesses an independent nuclear arsenal. Canada and Greece ended their participation in nuclear sharing. At this stage Turkish diplomatic sources decline to comment on what Ankara's policy will be if NATO presses and finally agrees on a unanimous
Kibarolu, an associate professor at Ankara's Bilkent University and an expert on arms control issues, told Today's Zaman that Turkish decision makers, i.e., both the political and the military leadership, are for maintaining those weapons on Turkish soil to continue their deterrence capabilities in the region, which includes the Balkans, the Middle East and the Mediterranean. Second, Turkey sees the US as the backbone of deterrence in the region and does not favor the idea of scrapping the nukes from its soil. Kibarolu, in an article he had published by the Routledge publishing house in December 2005 under the headline "Isn't it
decision to withdraw the weapons from Turkish soil, too. But Mustafa
Time to Say Farewell to Nukes in Turkey?," gives an in-depth analysis of the rationale behind the Turkish reluctance over the idea to scrap US nukes on its territory. Kibarolu states in his article that the attitude of Turkish officials toward US nuclear weapons deployed in Turkey for over four decades has been static. Officials have understandable arguments, based on their threat analysis, as to why these weapons should be retained in Turkey.
*****Internal Links*****
2NC Ext - Dip Cap Finite Egypt

Egypt has taken full focus of US diplomacy. The events trade-off with other issues. Labott 2/16 (Elise Labott, CNN Senior State Department Producer; Can Clinton remake U.S. diplomacy?; February 16, 2011; http://www.cnn.com/2011/POLITICS/02/16/clinton.sweep/index.html?iref=allsearch) CJC
"There
were a first few moments of wonderment and then she said, 'We have to dive in,'" is perhaps her toughest test yet as the nation's top diplomat. For two years, she has traveled the globe, talking about the need for countries to become more democratic, more open to technology, more open to the demands of the young. Now it is becoming reality, and the Obama administration is struggling over how to respond. The timing could not be worse. Clinton had hoped to start the year reviving peace talks between Israelis and Palestinians, which were in free fall after a push for an Israeli settlement freeze reached a dead end. Mubarak's support in the effort was critical, and his ouster could paralyze, if not kill, the administration's ambitious goal of achieving Palestinian statehood by the end of the year. Events elsewhere in the world aren't looking any more promising. World powers just concluded a fresh round of nuclear talks with Iran that produced no meaningful movement. North and South Korea have been on a razor's edge for months. The two countries exchanged artillery fire in November after North Korea shelled a South Korean island, killing four people. Although tensions had cooled somewhat in recent months, Clinton was impatient to stop careering from crisis to crisis on the peninsula and engage Pyongyang in a meaningful way that both calmed the situation with South Korea and moved North Korea toward abandoning its nuclear ambitions.
recalled Cheryl Mills, Clinton's counselor and chief of staff. Bad timing for a tough test It
Diplomatic focus is shifting to deal with the Egyptian crisis. There is a tradeoff resources are limited. Associated Press 2/2 (Staff, Clinton: Critical time for American leadership, Feb 2, 2011,
http://hosted.ap.org/dynamic/stories/U/US_HILLARY_CLINTON_GLOBAL_CHANGES? SITE=NYMID&SECTION=HOME&TEMPLATE=DEFAULT) CJC
Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton stressed the need for stronger U.S. diplomacy in global hot spots, saying Wednesday the recent developments in Egypt and the Middle East demonstrate the critical need for America's global leadership. Speaking to an audience of nearly every American ambassador, Clinton referred to the unrest gripping the Arab world in emphasizing the importance of U.S. "civilian power." She said U.S. diplomacy needed to be more nimble, innovative and accountable than ever before. "What's going on today - recent events in Egypt and certainly in that broader region - remind us all how crucial it is to have top-notch leadership on the ground and how quickly the ground can shift under our feet," Clinton told the gathering of diplomats at the State Department. Clinton said officials would have to accept that positions and resources would need to be shifted to where they are needed most, from the fragile states of Afghanistan and Iraq to Pakistan, where she said the volume of false claims about the United States makes
WASHINGTON (AP) -responding difficult.
2NC Ext Dip Cap Finite Middle East

Diplomatic efforts must be focused on hot spots to deal with those crises. Focus on other issues trades-off with our ability to focus on the unrest in the Middle East. Associated Press 2/2 /11 (Staff; Clinton: Critical time for American leadership; Feb 2, 2011; http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5jQd9Kvg9Uv2cvUt1Qs9k94zAgEuA? docId=185e3876cccf45b782bfa9245e30be45) CJC Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton stressed the need for stronger U.S. diplomacy in global hot spots, saying Wednesday the recent developments in Egypt and the Middle East demonstrate the critical need for America's global leadership. Speaking to an audience of nearly every American ambassador, Clinton referred to the unrest gripping the Arab world in emphasizing the importance of U.S. "civilian power." She said U.S. diplomacy needed to be more nimble, innovative and accountable than ever before. "What's going on today recent events in Egypt and certainly in that broader region remind us all how crucial it is to have top-notch leadership on the ground and how quickly the ground can shift under our feet," Clinton told the gathering of diplomats at the State Department. Clinton said officials would have to accept that positions and resources would need to be shifted to where they are needed most, from the fragile states of
WASHINGTON (AP) Afghanistan and Iraq to Pakistan, where she said the volume of false claims about the United States makes responding difficult. Referring to the release of confidential U.S. diplomatic cables by the WikiLeaks website,
Clinton said ambassadors needed to adapt to a "fast-changing world" that includes theft, protests and technological developments that have the capacity to change the lives of millions of people. "We are all in unchartered territory," Clinton said. She urged ambassadors to embrace the potential of
Facebook, Twitter and other forums to better project the
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Diplomatic capital is finite each new issue trades off with existing issues Anderson & Grewell 01 (Terry L. Anderson is executive director of Political Economy Research Center ("PERC")The Center for Free Market Environmentalism, Bozeman, Montana, and senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University. J. Bishop Grewell is a research associate with PERC. Fall, 2001 2 Chi. J. Int'l L. 427) CJC Foreign policy is a bag of goods that includes issues from free trade to arms trading to human rights. Each new issue in the bag weighs it down, lessening the focus on other issues and even creating conflicts between issues. Increased environmental regulations could cause countries to lessen their focus on international threats of violence, such as the sale of ballistic missiles or border conflicts between nations. As countries must watch over more and more issues arising in the international policy arena, they will stretch the resources necessary to deal with traditional international issues. As Schaefer writes, "Because diplomatic currency is finite . . . it is critically important that the United States focus its diplomatic efforts on issues of paramount importance to the nation. Traditionally, these priorities have been opposing hostile domination of key geographic regions, supporting our allies, securing vital resources, and ensuring access to foreign economies." Diplomatic capital is finite issues trade off. Schaeffer, 2000 [Brett, Fellow in the Center for International Trade at Heritage Foundation, The Greening of U.S. Foreign Policy, page 46] Diplomacy is the first option in addressing potential threats to U.S. national interests and expressing U.S. concerns and priorities to foreign nations. The daily conduct of diplomacy through U.S. missions and representatives is essential in articulating U.S. interests and eliciting cooperation and support for those interests abroad. Because diplomatic currency is finiteclearly, foreign countries and officials cannot be expected to endlessly support and promote U.S. concernsit is critically important that the United States focus its diplomatic efforts on issues of paramount importance to the nation. Traditionally, these priorities had been opposing
hostile domination of key geographic regions, supporting our allies, securing vital resources, and ensuring access to foreign economies (Holmes and Moore 1996, xi-xvii).
Diplomatic capital is finite plan prevents focus on more important issues. Anderson & Grewell, 2001 [Terry and Bishop, The Greening of Foreign Policy, http://www.perc.org/pdf/ps20.pdf]
Greater international environmental regulation can increase international tension. Foreign
policy is a bag of goods that includes issues from free trade to arms trading to human rights. Each new issue in the bag weighs it down, lessening the focus on other issues and even creating conflicts between issues. Increased
environmental regulations could cause countries to lessen their focus on international threats of violence such as the sale of ballistic missiles or border conflicts between nations. As countries must watch over more and more issues
arising in the international policy arena, they will stretch the resources necessary to deal with traditional international issues. As Schaefer (2000, 46) writes, Because diplomatic currency is finite . . . it is critically important that the United States focus its diplomatic efforts on issues of paramount importance to the nation. Diplomatic capital is finite each new issue trades off with another one.
Cross-X.com Thursday File Anderson and Grewell 2000 (Terry L., Executive Director of the Property and Environment Research Center, J. Bishop, former research associate for PERC. He is a graduate of Stanford University, the Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Studies, and Northwestern Law School, The Greening of Foreign Policy, PERC Policy Series: PS-20, December 2000, http://www.perc.org/pdf/ps20.pdf)
Greater international environmental regulation can increase international tension. Foreign
policy is a bag of goods that includes issues from free trade to arms trading to human rights. Each new issue in the bag weighs it down, lessening the focus on other issues and even creating conflicts between issues. Increased environmental regulations could cause countries to lessen
their focus on international threats of violence such as the sale of ballistic missiles or border conflicts between
nations.
As countries must watch over more and more issues arising in the international policy arena, they will stretch the resources necessary to deal with traditional international issues. As Schaefer (2000, 46) writes, Because diplomatic currency is finite . . . it is critically important that the United States focus its diplomatic efforts on issues of paramount importance to the nation. Traditionally, these priorities have been opposing hostile domination of key
geographic regions, supporting our allies, securing vital resources, and ensuring access to foreign economies.
2NC Ext Diplomatic Capital Key Plan Cost

The plan would have to be spun to control perceptions this requires extensive diplomatic focus. The Quadrennial Defense Review in 2010 (QDR Report prepared for Congress, February 1, 2010)
As part of the U.S. government's integrated civilian-military efforts to interact effectively with a variety of audiences and stakeholders, DoD will continue to improve key capabilities that support strategic communication. Effective strategic
communication requires close collaboration across interagency lines at all stages, and DoD works particularly closely with the Department of State to support States core role in communicating with foreign governments and international publics. Effective strategic communication also requires the orchestration of multiple lines of operation. Chief among these are policy implementation, force employment, information operations, public affairs, civil affairs, and public diplomacy and engagement. Together, the effects of these activities support national objectives. Strategic communication is essential in COIN, CT, and stability operations, where population and stakeholder beliefs and perceptions are crucial to our success, and where adversaries often enjoy the advantage of greater local
knowledge and calibrate their activities to achieve sophisticated information objectives.
Military K2 Secular Transition

US must support the military to ensure there is time for political parties to get organized to prevent a rise of the Muslim Brotherhood. Investors Business Daily 2/11 (Editorial Staff; Editorial: Obama Botched Egypt Here's How To Fix It; 02/11/2011; http://www.investors.com/NewsAndAnalysis/Article/562996/201102111907/Egypts-Flight.htm) CJC "For Islamists, democracy is a tool for acquiring power, not a culture of governance." And he exposes the preposterous State Department delusion that because alQaida operatives "figure the Brothers are soft, they obviously must be moderates so we can work with these guys!" Majority rule without liberty amounts to the tyranny of the majority a chilling prospect in the Mideast. But it's the only "democracy" the Brotherhood will back. The U.S. should now make the best of a bad situation, quietly helping Egypt's military stay in power for as long as it takes to ensure that Mubarak's successor isn't an Islamist enabler.
McCarthy warns that
Effective diplomacy is critical to deal with the Egyptian crisis. US diplomacy is stretched to the brink and need full focus to deal with a situation that can change quickly. Dougherty 2/2 (Jill Dougherty, CNN Foreign Affairs Correspondent, Clinton warns of 'uncharted territory' in wake of Egypt
unrest, February 2, 2011, http://www.cnn.com/2011/POLITICS/02/02/us.diplomatic.challenges/index.html? eref=rss_politics&utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+rss%2Fcnn_allpolitics+%28RSS %3A+Politics%29) CJC
In the midst of mass uprisings and historic change in the Middle East, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton told a gathering of U.S. diplomats Wednesday that "we are all in uncharted territory." Pointing to a range of challenges, from congressional pressure to cut the State Department budget and foreign aid, to WikiLeaks disclosures of diplomatic cables, Clinton said "we have a tough road ahead." "As we see, with what's going on today, recent events in Egypt and certainly in that broader region, (they) remind us all of how crucial it is to have top-notch leadership on the ground. And how quickly that ground can shift under our feet," she said. "From the theft of confidential cables to 21st century protest movements, to development breakthroughs that have the potential to change millions of lives, we are all in uncharted territory." Clinton called for the unprecedented "Global Chiefs of Mission" meeting several months ago, bringing together U.S. ambassadors from around the world. The meeting was scheduled for early February, she joked, because "we
Washington (CNN) -figured it would be quiet." Even as news reports Wednesday showed protesters clashing on the streets of Cairo, Egypt, Clinton noted that the U.S. ambassador to Egypt, Margaret Scobey, was not able to attend the State Department meeting. Turning serious at the end of her remarks, Clinton added: "There are too many forces at work, some of which we
are only beginning to understand. Too many cross currents and complexities." US must ensure a peaceful transition now to prevent the unrest from rising creating a scenario for radicalization that would trigger war between Israel and Iran. CNN 2/2 (Elise Labott and Josh Levs, CNN Staff, The Sweep: The risk of democracy in the Middle East, February 2, 2011,
http://www.cnn.com/2011/POLITICS/02/02/sweep.us.egypt/index.html? eref=rss_politics&utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+rss%2Fcnn_allpolitics+%28RSS %3A+Politics%29) CJC
The future of U.S. policy and interests in the region will largely depend on who ends up in power, not just in Egypt but in the host of other countries on the verge of transformation. In a doomsday scenario, extremist Islamic factions in Egypt, Tunisia and even Jordan could come to power, killing critical diplomatic and military relationships, forcing the closing of the Suez Canal and allowing Iran fill the vacuum. That could even trigger a most dangerous war between Israel and Iran. Nobody expects that worst-case nightmare to come through, however. Regardless of the outcome, the
Egypt Harvard/Berkley Cross-X.com 58/148 Thursday File Obama administration has concluded that it must try to be on the right side of history, which is seems to be the catchphrase of the week for Middle East analysts. Supporting the status quo could embolden leaders to hold on, possibly becoming even more oppressive. That could give way to a permanent resistance that creates even more pressure for chance, further radicalizes the Arab street and creates even more anger at the United States.
A2: Military Not Relinquish Power

Diplomats are working with the military now. They dont want to rule indefinitely. Miller 2/14 (Judith Miller, political journalist; Egyptian Army Calls Up Military Reservists to Help Keep Peace; February 14, 2011; http://www.foxnews.com/world/2011/02/14/egyptianarmy-calls-military-reservists-help-peace/) CJC The Egyptian Army today called up thousands of military reservists as soldiers cleared Tahrir Square, the epicenter of the extraordinary revolution that has transformed Egypt and the political map of the Middle East. The call-up appeared to be related to the armys continuing need to maintain stability in the absence of the civilian police. Most of Egypts civilian police officers fled their posts on January 28
CAIRO, Egypt -in the face of overwhelming numbers of protesters throughout Cairo and other Egyptian cities. Since then, military police in their traditional camouflage uniforms and red berets have been guarding the U.S. Embassy, government ministries, the state-run television center, and other strategic facilities throughout the country. The call-up also reflects continuing political
tensions in the country following the forced resignation of President Hosni Mubarak, Egypts
autocratic ruler for almost 30 years. A western diplomat said that it was believed that former president Mubarak was still in his residence at the Egyptian seaside resort of Sharm el-Sheikh. In Washington, Egypts ambassador said this morning in a television interview that Mubaraks health was deteriorating, but western diplomats in Cairo said they had no independent information about the state of his current condition. Mubarak has flown twice in as many years to Germany for treatment of an undisclosed medical condition, which Egyptian sources have identified as stomach cancer. Although former President Mubarak
ceded power to the army, it remains unclear exactly what part the army will play in its role as the transitional government that Egyptians have demanded should lead to elections by September. There have been labor strikes across the country, including by the police, who demonstrated on Monday demanding higher wages and better working conditions. Myriad youthful opposition groups have been holding almost round-the-clock meetings to craft and present a unified statement of their demands for reform to the military. A western diplomat said that senior army officers, including Secretary of Defense Field Marshall Mohammed Tantawi, had repeatedly indicated that the army has been acting in good faith and has assured foreign governments that it does not seek a longterm role in governing the country. Diplomats, however, added that the military had still not disclosed when the three-decade-old emergency law granting the government the right to arrest and hold people without formal charges or judicial oversight would be lifted. On Saturday,
the military government announced that it would abide by all treaties, apparently including its long-standing peace accord with Israel. On Sunday, it issued yet another communiqu announcing that it had suspended the constitution that has been structured to give Egypts president almost unlimited terms in office and authority and inhibits political opposition. It also dissolved Egypts parliament, whose elections last fall have been widely denounced by domestic and international critics as fraudulent. In a
recent meeting with western diplomats, the Egyptian military officials leading the country through an unchartered period of political transition are stressing that they do not want to govern Egypt indefinitely or, one diplomat suggested, be responsible for Egypts crushing problems. The officers, the diplomat said, have been stressing that they are going to do what the people want, the
diplomat said.
Dip. K2 Transition Military

Diplomacy with Egyptian military is critical to ensuring a stable transition. Quandt 2/2 (William B. Quandt is a politics professor at the University of Virginia. He served on the National Security Council
dealing with Middle East affairs in the Nixon and Carter administrations. He actively participated in the Camp David peace negotiations in 1978, Time for Obama to press Mubarak, February 2, 2011, http://dyn.politico.com/printstory.cfm?uuid=1690BD3B49D6-43ED-ADDD-DE8AD70C9948) CJC
So, it is time for President Barack Obama to take the next step to cash in on the close military-tomilitary relationship that has been forged between the United States and Egypt over the years. Since 1979, when I was serving in the Carter administration, the United States has completely reequipped and trained a
new, U.S-style military. And we have paid for it about $1 billion per year. Now that military is the key to Egypts near-term future. Not that the new president of Egypt should, or will, emerge from its ranks. But rather that it can be the guarantor
of a peaceful transition to a new, democratic order. This is not an unfamiliar role for militaries in moments of transition. Turkeys military, with a few bumpy moments, has played such a role; similarly in the
Philippines and Indonesia, a discredited dictator was eased out (with American urging) and the military stayed on to provide stability for the new democracies. In Chile, the hated dictator Gen. Augusto Pinochet was ousted, but the military was actually given guarantees by the new Chilean democrats that its corporate interests - and even Pinochets person would be respected as long as they did not block the transition to democracy and limited their role to upholding security. In Tunisia as well, we seem to be witnessing an encouraging example of the military helping with the transition to a new order. So Egypt need not
turn out like Iran where the shahs military split and went down with him, leaving a vacuum that allowed for a great deal of post-revolutionary violence and radicalization. In the past, the U.S. has looked to the Egyptian military as a partner primarily on regional security and anti-terrorism issues. Now we need to think of it as a partner in helping to consolidate Egypts democratic transition. The key now is not a lot of public statements from the president. Obama has said enough and is just about on target. But a few calls from Defense Secretary Robert Gates, Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Mike Mullen, perhaps CIA Director Leon Panetta to their counterparts might help. And the experienced former ambassador to Egypt, Frank
Wisner, could weigh in as well with the simple message that the prolonged transition envisaged by Mubarak does not seem viable. The crisis needs to be brought to an end soon. And that can only happen if Mubarak
steps down. The military is the only institution in Egypt that can convince him to do so and assure him the dignified retirement from power that he apparently craves. U.S. efforts to apply gentle pressure must now be followed by a more forceful message to those who can get Mubaraks attention in a way that we have not. If the Egyptian military acts soon and in accord with the sentiment of the Egyptian people they will emerge as a strong, respected force in the new Egypt.
Diplomacy with the military is key to avoiding extremist from taking over the government. Babbin 2/2 (Jed Babbin served as a Deputy Undersecretary of Defense under George H.W. Bush. He is the author of several bestselling books including "Inside the Asylum," and "In the Words of Our Enemies.", Egypt's Future Will Be Decided by the Military, February 2, 2011, http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2011/02/02/egypts_future_will_be_decided_by_the_milit ary.html) CJC
It is not clear that Mubarak's regime will survive the week. Whether it falls this week or in coming months, Egypt's
immediate future will be decided by the Egyptian military. If, as is most likely, the military remains on the sidelines and allows a radical regime to take power, Egypt - like Turkey before it - may pass into the radical Islamic sphere. And there is nothing America can do to prevent that. With one exception. Many of our most senior generals have longstanding relationships with their Egyptian comrades, the kind of bond that can only be achieved by serving side by side in training and military exercises. These officers, if the president permits them, should be on the phone with their Egyptian comrades to offer assurances of aid and support if they choose to stand against a radical Islamic regime. That, and only that, would be an effective American influence on Egypt's immediate future.
Diplomacy with Egyptian military is critical to a stable transition government. Wall Street Journal 2/3 (JONATHAN WEISMAN And ADAM ENTOUS, Staff Writers, White House Charts a New Plan,
FEBRUARY 3, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703960804576120064121963244.html? mod=rss_Politics_And_Policy) CJC
Dunne, an Egypt expert at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and an informal White House adviser, said the White House needs to convince the Egyptian army to step in, restore order and set up the new government. The military, however, is watching what happens with the demonstrations, and the demonstrators are waiting for Washington to push Mr. Mubarak aside. The U.S. is in a difficult spot with the protestors, many of whom have critiqued the Obama
Michele administration's stutter-step embrace of regime change in Egypt. "Nobody wants to be the first to make the hard decisions," Ms. Dunne said. Israel, likewise, sees the Egyptian military as likely the only institution that can guide
a smooth and inclusive transition, experts said.
U.S. officials believe for now the military it will stay on the sidelines, leaving it to the police and security forces to quell violence between anti-government protesters and Mubarak supporters. Since last week, the U.S. has been exerting pressure on the Egyptian military not to
take sides, and not to crackdown on the protesters. Some U.S. officials believe the violence would worsen if the military intervened, even if only to quell the fighting.
Only the Egyptian military can ensure that the new government is not radical. Babbin 2/2 (Jed Babbin served as a Deputy Undersecretary of Defense under George H.W. Bush. He is the author of several bestselling books including "Inside the Asylum," and "In the Words of Our Enemies.", Egypt's Future Will Be Decided by the Military, February 2, 2011, http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2011/02/02/egypts_future_will_be_decided_by_the_milit ary.html) CJC The only stabilizing force is the Egyptian military which has the power, and perhaps the motivation, to prevent Egypt from being subordinated by its Islamic neighbors. The Mubarak regime
is a lineal descendant of Gamel Abdel Nasser's, who seized power in 1952. Nasser was a pan-Arabist, fervently attempting to ally Arabs in a unified front against Israel, leading to the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. Pan-Arabism has since disappeared except from the mind of Libya's Muammar Qaddafi, and the parallel Iranian goal of establishing a Muslim caliphate hasn't taken hold in Egypt yet because of the three men who have ruled it for nearly sixty years. When Nasser died in 1970, one of his protgs, Anwar alSadat, took over. It was Sadat who braved the Arab currents to sign the Camp David Accords, the first real peace agreement between Israel and a formerly-hostile neighbor. Sadat was assassinated by Muslim radicals in 1981 because of his willingness to make peace with Israel in the Camp David agreement. Mubarak swept into power at Sadat's death. Two factors will
control the result of the crisis that now envelops the Mubarak regime. The first is the Egyptian military. The second is the efforts of Iran and Syria - independently and in combination with Egyptian Islamists - to turn Egypt into another Syria or a satellite of Iran.
Sustained Diplomacy Checks Extremist Rise

Continued diplomacy will be critical to ensure democratic elections and prevent extremist take over. CNN 2/3 (CNN Wire Staff, Official: U.S., Egypt talk ways to 'move' political transition forward, February 3, 2011, http://www.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/africa/02/03/egypt.obama.reaction/index.html? eref=rss_politics&utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+rss %2Fcnn_allpolitics+%28RSS%3A+Politics%29) CJC The real difficulty, Rubin said, will come in the months ahead as U.S. policymakers try to prevent Egypt from following the path Iran took after 1979, when the fall of Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi led to the rise of the fundamentalist regime still in power today. The U.S. needs to make clear the Egyptian elections happen "come hell or high water," Rubin said, but at the same pushing to ensure armed extremist militias aren't allowed to claim the mantle of democratic legitimacy.
Dip Cap Checks Spillover

Diplomatic capital is not limited to Egypt in the crisis. Continued pressure on other allies for reform is critical to checking back spillover. Reuters 2/3 (Steve Holland and Susan Cornwell Staff, U.S. in talks over possible Mubarak departure, Feb 3 2011, http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/02/04/us-egypt-usaidUSTRE71175920110204? feedType=RSS&feedName=politicsNews&utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_ca mpaign=Feed%3A+Reuters%2FPoliticsNews+%28News+%2F+US+%2F+Politics+News%29) CJC Amid concerns that a wave of protests that erupted in Tunisia and then Egypt could spread to other Middle Eastern capitals, Obama phoned Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh to follow up his pledges of reform with concrete actions. The White House said Obama also told Saleh it is imperative that Yemen take forceful action against al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. Clinton spoke to Jordan's King Abdullah -- another close U.S. ally -- on Thursday to discuss Egypt and to express support for his own recent reforms, part of a wave of change by authoritarian governments across the Middle East seeking to head off Egypt-style unrest.
A2: No Influence
U.S. State Department is busy brokering a peaceful transition to democracy in Egypt now. The have the influence necessary to support the transition. Reuters 2/1 (U.S. envoy in Egypt spoke with ElBaradei: statement Feb 1, 2011, http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/02/01/us-egypt-usa-elbaradei-idUSTRE7107ZJ20110201? feedType=RSS&feedName=politicsNews&utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_ca mpaign=Feed%3A+Reuters%2FPoliticsNews+%28News+%2F+US+%2F+Politics+News%29) CJC The U.S. ambassador to Cairo made contact with prominent Egyptian political activist Mohamed ElBaradei on Tuesday to discuss a political transition in Egypt, the U.S. Department of State said. Mohamed ElBaradei, the retired head of the U.N. nuclear watchdog, has demanded President Hosni Mubarak quit office and said he was ready to play a role in any shift to a democratic system in Egypt. "Our embassy in Cairo maintains an active outreach to a wide range of political and civil society representatives in Cairo, and the mission has been especially busy in the last several days to help convey our strong support for an orderly transition," the U.S. State Department said in a statement. "One such contact was between the ambassador and Mohamed ElBaradei today," it
CAIRO (Reuters) added in the statement sent to Reuters in Cairo, referring to U.S. Ambassador Margaret Scobey.
A. extend the Hilliker evidence, closing the Suez Canal would cause oil price shocks and these Rising oil prices destroy the economy Whipple 7/14/2010 (Tom, one of the most highly respected analysts of peak oil issues in the United States. Retired 30-year CIA analyst who has been following
the peak oil story since 1999, Editor of the daily Peak Oil News and the weekly Peak Oil Review, The Peak Oil Crisis: A Mid-Year Review, FNCP.com, http://www.fcnp.com/commentary/national/6896-the-peak-oil-crisis-a-mid-year-review.html)
six in ten surveyed by Pew believe that the economic situation will be better soon and that the recession is only temporary. This alone vividly illustrates how poorly the true state of the global economic situation is understood and the size of the shock that most of us are in for. Nearly everyone will admit that continuing oil shortages and that high (above $100 a barrel) oil prices would be devastating to the prospects for economic recovery and that persisting very high (say above $200 a barrel) oil prices would send the U.S. and many other economies into a deep, long-lasting depression. The problem is that few are willing to consider seriously the accumulating evidence that
Interestingly, increasing oil prices and eventually oil shortages within the next few years are as inevitable as the sunrise. Most of us have no thoughts about the issue other than the current price of a gallon of gas. Among those who appreciate that the world's petroleum resources are finite, few understand the proximity of the crisis.
C. Extinction Broward 9 ((Member of Triond) http://newsflavor.com/opinions/will-an-economic-collapse-kill-you/ AD: 7-7-09 )ET
Now its time to look at the consequences of a failing world economy. With five offical nations having nuclear weapons, and four more likely to have them there could be major consequences of another world war. The first thing that will happen after an economic collapse will be war over resources. The United States currency will become useless and will have no way of securing reserves. The United States has little to no capacity to produce oil, it is totatlly dependent on foreign oil. If the United States stopped getting foreign oil, the government would go to no ends to secure more, if there were a war with any other major power over oil, like Russia or China, these wars would most likely involve nuclear weapons. Once one nation launches a nuclear weapon, there would of course be retaliation, and with five or more countries with nuclear weapons
*****Impact Scenarios***** ***Suez Canal Shell***
Egypt Harvard/Berkley Cross-X.com 65/148 Thursday File there would most likely be a world nuclear war. The risk is so high that acting to save the economy is the most important issue facing us in the 21st century.
Close Suez Canal = Price Shocks

Egypt crisis is raising oil prices for fear of closing the Suez Canal. If the canal were closed it would create price shocks and market disruption. Reuters 1/31 (Steve Holland and Andrew Quinn, Staff, U.S. urges Egypt's Mubarak do more; envoy in Cairo, Jan 31, 2011, http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/02/01/us-egypt-usaidUSTRE70R6A920110201?pageNumber=1) CJC The crisis is taking its toll on oil markets. Brent crude oil futures surged to $101 a barrel, a 28month high, as anxieties rose that protests in Egypt could spark instability across the Middle East and disrupt oil shipments through the Suez Canal. U.S. stocks rose as investors focused on the
expanding U.S. economy and rising earnings, satisfied the situation in Egypt would not escalate into widespread violence or turmoil. The broad Standard & Poor's 500 Index closed up 0.77 percent, at 1,286.12. Senator Jeff Bingaman, chairman of the U.S. Senate's energy panel, warned on Monday that the escalating protests in Egypt could affect U.S. access to affordable energy supplies. Egypt's Suez Canal allows the transport of crude oil and liquefied natural gas bound for
the U.S. and other countries. National security aides at the White House were monitoring the effect the unrest and uncertainty in Egypt may have on oil and financial markets. Gibbs said no disruptions had been reported in the Suez Canal.
Egypt K2 Oil Markets

Egypt key to global Oil flows. Harder 2/1 (Amy Harder reports on energy and the environment for National Journal and moderates an expert blog on the topic as well, Egyptian Unrest Leaves U.S. Over an Imported Barrel, February 1, 2011, http://www.nationaljournal.com/member/daily/egyptian-unrest-leavesu-s-over-an-imported-barrel-20110131) CJC Egypt is in a unique position in the oil supply chain even though it produces only 700,000 barrels a day. The Suez Canal and Sumed pipeline serve as vital transportation arteries for global oil shipments. For now, no evidence suggests that either of those avenues will be blocked, but Pumphrey said the risk could compel individual shippers to slow down shipments there or choose alternate, longer routes.
Egypt Military K2 Suez Canal

Egyptian military can prevent the closing of the Suez Canal with US influence. Washington Post 2/2 (Karen DeYoung Washington Post Staff Writer, As crisis deepens in Egypt, U.S. 'can't dictate events', February 2, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2011/02/02/AR2011020206619.html?hpid=topnews) CJC Concern was also growing about possible interference in traffic along the Suez Canal, through which much of the West's imported oil travels. Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, had his second conversation this week with Lt. Gen. Sami Enan, the Egyptian military's chief of staff, and Mullen spokesman Capt. John Kirby said the chairman "expressed confidence in the Egyptian military's ability to provide for their country's security, both internally and throughout the Suez Canal area."
Impact Magnifier: Saudi Arabia

Continued instability in Egypt risks revolt and uprising in Saudi Arabia causing megaoil shocks causing the global economy to nose dive. Luft 2/3 (Gal Luft is executive director of the Institute for the Analysis of Global Security, What if Saudi Arabia erupts?, February 3, 2011, http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0211/48698.html#ixzz1Cz60q1YQ) CJC The demonstrations in Egypt and elsewhere in the Arab world could well be the harbinger of an excruciating oil crisis. Not because Egypt is a major oil exporter. It isnt. Egypt produces less than 1 percent of the worlds oil. And not even because it controls the Suez Canal, through which 1.8 million barrels, about 5 percent of the overall global tanker trade, travels daily. Egypt is relevant to the oil market because it may be a bellwether for the disgruntled masses in Saudi Arabia. And instability in that oil kingdom is how mega-oil shocks are made. For decades, experts have warned about the fragility of the House of Saud. To curtail their opposition, Saudi monarchs have placated their subjects with cradle-to-grave, petrodollar-funded entitlement programs, while taming the Wahhabi
establishment through charitable contributions to religious institutions worldwide. Inspired by the events elsewhere in the Sunni Muslim world, this social contract could face a challenge at the worst possible time when the
House of Sauds top echelon is ill and geriatric. If the Saudis should decide to emulate their Egyptian brethren, a new oil crisis might be upon us. Saudi Arabia not only is the worlds largest exporter, it also holds 70 percent of the worlds spare production capacity. In other words, Saudi Arabia is the oil markets only firefighter, capable of supplying the market when others falter. But if the fire station is on fire, there will be no one to save the neighborhood. A new oil shock would cause our economy to nose-dive back into a recession. Since World War II, studies show, every recession except one was preceded by a sharp rise in oil prices. In todays economy, this could be as devastating as a second heart attack is for a fragile patient just recovering from a first one.
***Leadership Shell***
A. Egypt will be a test case for US soft-power. US must remain flexible and constantly engaged to influence the military to ensure a transition to democracy. Failure would undermine US soft-power moving forward. Sun-Sentinel 2/15 (Sun Sentinel Editorial Board; Egypt 'revolution' opens opportunity for U.S. soft power; February 15, 2011; http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/2011-02-15/news/fl-egyptsoft-power-obama-editorial-a20110215_1_soft-power-egyptian-people-egyptian-revolution) CJC
The euphoric moment is passing, and Egypt's revolt will recede from the front pages. That means the
next phase in Egypt will have begun the transition to a democracy and that will be an opportunity for the United States to employ and test "soft power." Remember that term? Remember the soft power vs. hard
power debate of recent years? The soft power phrase became vogue in the aftermath of serious divisions over the war in Iraq. The euphemism denotes the use of non-military tools diplomacy, aid, etc. rather than overt force to achieve U.S. objectives. The ouster of Hosni Mubarak from power last week opens an opportunity to position the Egyptian
"revolution" as a soft power showcase. And certainly as an alternative to the Iraq model employed by the George
W. Bush administration. At the outset of this discussion, however, it's critical to acknowledge that Egypt is not Iraq. Far from it. As disliked as Mubarak became, he rates nowhere near the likes of a brutal despot like Saddam Hussein. As such, what
would have worked or was needed in one country would not automatically apply to another. Such is the case with international relations and diplomacy cookie-cutter, textbook models don't exist. And, in fact, one could argue that soft power's limits were sadly on display during the protests in Iran last year. Nonetheless, it's the Egypt case that stands front-and-center now. And Egypt offers an opportunity for soft power thanks to the courage and resilience of Egyptians who rallied peacefully for almost a
month to prompt Mubarak's departure. It is the Egyptian people who are the true heroes of this peaceful uprising. Many claim a sense of pride that they achieved their aims non-violently, and they are more than justified to feel vindicated. It is their achievement that opened the window to international soft power. It is an opportunity that can't be missed, and can't be allowed to be lost. In the aftermath of Mubarak's resignation, the Egyptian military has suspended parliament and
the country's constitution. Military leaders say they will run the country until elections are held in six months. The United States has much influence with Egypt's military leaders, owing to aid and training the past few decades. That leverage must now be used skillfully to assist and ensure a fair election that places a legitimate government in place. If so, Egypt could be the watershed for an Obama doctrine of soft power.
B. US hegemony solves all problems Thayer 06 Associate Professor in the Department of Defense and Strategic Studies at Missouri
State University [Bradley, In Defense of Primacy, The National Interest, December (lexis)]
A grand strategy based on American primacy means ensuring the United States stays the world's number one power--the diplomatic, economic and military leader. Those arguing against primacy claim that the United States should retrench, either because the United States lacks the power to maintain its primacy and should withdraw from its global commitments, or because the maintenance of primacy will lead the United States into the trap of "imperial overstretch." In the previous issue of The National Interest, Christopher Layne warned of these dangers of primacy and called for retrenchment.1 Those arguing for a grand strategy of retrenchment are a diverse lot. They include isolationists, who want no foreign military commitments; selective engagers, who want U.S. military commitments to centers of economic might; and offshore balancers, who want a modified form of selective engagement that would have the United States abandon its landpower presence abroad in favor of relying on airpower and
retrenchment, in any of its guises, must be avoided. If the United States adopted such a strategy, it would be a profound strategic mistake that would lead to far greater instability and war in the world, imperil American security and deny the United States and its allies the benefits of primacy. There are two
seapower to defend its interests. But critical issues in any discussion of America's grand strategy: Can America remain the dominant state? Should it strive to do this? America can remain dominant due to its prodigious military, economic and soft power capabilities. The totality of that equation of power answers the first issue.
The United States has overwhelming military capabilities and wealth in comparison to other states or likely potential alliances. Barring some disaster or tremendous folly, that will remain the case for the foreseeable future. With few exceptions, even those who advocate retrenchment acknowledge this. So the debate revolves around the desirability of maintaining American primacy. Proponents of retrenchment focus a great deal on the costs of U.S. action--but they fail to realize what is good about American primacy. The price and risks of primacy are reported in newspapers every day; the benefits that stem from it are not. A GRAND strategy of ensuring
Egypt Harvard/Berkley Cross-X.com 71/148 Thursday File American primacy takes as its starting point the protection of the U.S. homeland and American global interests. These interests include ensuring that critical resources like oil flow around the world, that the global trade and monetary regimes flourish and that Washington's worldwide network of allies is reassured and protected. Allies are a great asset to the United States, in part because they shoulder some of its burdens. Thus, it is no surprise to see NATO in Afghanistan or the Australians in East Timor. In contrast, a strategy based on retrenchment will not be able to achieve these fundamental objectives of the United States. Indeed, retrenchment will make the United States less secure than the present grand strategy of primacy. This is because threats will exist no matter what role America chooses to play in international politics. Washington cannot call a "time out", and it cannot hide from threats. Whether they are terrorists, rogue states or rising powers, history shows that threats must be confronted. Simply by declaring that the United States is "going home", thus abandoning its commitments or making unconvincing half-pledges to defend its interests and allies, does not mean that others will respect American wishes to retreat. To make such a declaration implies weakness and emboldens aggression. In the anarchic world of the animal kingdom, predators prefer to eat the weak rather than confront the strong. The same is true of the anarchic world of international politics. If there is no diplomatic solution to the threats that confront the United States, then the conventional and strategic military power of the United States is what protects the country from such threats. And when enemies must be confronted, a strategy based on primacy focuses on engaging enemies overseas, away from American soil. Indeed, a key tenet of the Bush Doctrine is to attack terrorists far from America's shores and not to wait while they use bases in other countries to plan and train for attacks against the United States itself. This requires a physical, on-the-ground presence that cannot be achieved by offshore balancing. Indeed, as Barry Posen has noted, U.S. primacy is secured because America, at
present, commands the "global commons"--the oceans, the world's airspace and outer space--allowing the United States to project its power far from its borders, while denying those common avenues to its enemies. As a consequence, the costs of power projection for the United States and its allies are reduced, and the robustness of the United States' conventional and strategic deterrent capabilities is increased.2 This is not an advantage that should be relinquished lightly. A remarkable fact about international politics today--in
a world where American primacy is clearly and unambiguously on display--is that countries want to align themselves with the United States. Of course, this is not out of any sense of altruism, in most cases, but because doing
so allows them to use the power of the United States for their own purposes--their own protection, or to gain greater influence. Of 192 countries, 84 are allied with America--their security is tied to the United States through treaties and other informal arrangements--and they include almost all of the major economic and military powers. That is a ratio of almost 17 to one (85 to five), and a big change from the Cold War when the ratio was about 1.8 to one of states aligned with the United States versus the Soviet Union. Never before in its history has this country, or any country, had
us extensive influence in international politics, allowing the United States to shape the behavior of states and international institutions. Such influence comes in many forms, one of which is America's ability to create coalitions of like-minded states to free Kosovo, stabilize Afghanistan, invade Iraq or to stop proliferation through the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI ). Doing so allows the United States to operate with allies outside of the UN, where it can be stymied by opponents. American-led wars in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq stand in contrast to the UN's inability to save the people of Darfur or even to conduct any military campaign to realize the goals of its charter. The quiet effectiveness of the PSI in dismantling Libya's WMD programs and unraveling the A. Q. Khan proliferation network are in sharp relief to the typically toothless attempts by the UN to halt proliferation. You can count with one hand countries opposed to the United States. They
so many allies. U.S. primacy--and the bandwagoning effect--has also given are the "Gang of Five": China, Cuba, Iran, North Korea and Venezuela. Of course, countries like India, for example, do not agree with all policy choices made by the United States, such as toward Iran, but New Delhi is friendly to Washington. Only the "Gang of Five" may be expected to consistently resist the agenda and actions of the United States. China is clearly the most important of these states because it is a rising great power. But
even Beijing is intimidated by the United States and refrains from openly challenging U.S. power. China proclaims that it will, if necessary, resort to other mechanisms of challenging the United States, including asymmetric strategies such as targeting communication and intelligence satellites upon which the United States depends. But China may not be confident those strategies would work, and so it is likely to refrain from testing the United States directly for the foreseeable future because China's power benefits, as we shall see, from the international order U.S. primacy creates. The
other states are far weaker than China. For three of the "Gang of Five" cases--Venezuela, Iran, Cuba--it is an anti-U.S. regime that is the source of

relations.
the problem; the country itself is not intrinsically anti-American. Indeed, a change of regime in Caracas, Tehran or Havana could very well reorient
THROUGHOUT HISTORY, peace and stability have been great benefits of an era where there was a dominant power--Rome, Britain or the United States today. Scholars and statesmen have long recognized the irenic effect of power on the anarchic world of international politics. Everything we think of when we consider the current international order--free trade, a robust monetary regime, increasing respect for human rights, growing democratization--is directly linked to U.S. power. Retrenchment proponents seem to think that the current system can be maintained without the current amount of U.S. power behind it. In that they are dead wrong and need to be reminded of one of history's most significant lessons: Appalling things happen when international orders collapse. The Dark Ages followed Rome's collapse. Hitler succeeded the order established at Versailles. Without U.S. power, the liberal order created by the United States will end just as assuredly. As country and western great Ral Donner sang: "You don't know what you've got (until you lose it)." Consequently, it is important to note what those good things are. In addition to ensuring the security of the United States and its allies, American primacy within the international system causes many positive outcomes for Washington and the world. The first has been a more peaceful world. During the Cold War, U.S. leadership reduced friction among many states that were historical antagonists, most notably France and West Germany. Today, American primacy helps keep a number of complicated relationships aligned--between Greece and Turkey, Israel and Egypt, South Korea and Japan, India and Pakistan, Indonesia and Australia. This is not to say it fulfills Woodrow Wilson's vision of ending all war. Wars still occur where Washington's interests are not seriously threatened, such as in Darfur, but a Pax Americana does reduce war's likelihood, particularly war's worst form: great power wars. Second, American power gives the United States the ability to spread democracy and other elements of its ideology of liberalism. Doing so is a source of much good for the
countries concerned as well as the United States because, as John Owen noted on these pages in the Spring 2006 issue, liberal democracies are more likely to align with the United States and be sympathetic to the American worldview.3 So, spreading democracy helps maintain U.S. primacy.
once states are governed democratically, the likelihood of any type of conflict is significantly reduced. This is not because democracies do not have clashing interests. Indeed they do. Rather, it is because they are more open, more transparent and more likely to want to resolve things amicably in concurrence with U.S. leadership. And so, in general, democratic states are good for their citizens as well as for advancing the interests of the United
In addition, States. Critics have faulted the Bush Administration for attempting to spread democracy in the Middle East, labeling such an effort a modern form
It is the obligation of Bush's critics to explain why democracy is good enough for Western states but not for the rest, and, one gathers from the argument, should not even be attempted. Of course, whether democracy in the Middle East will have a peaceful or
of tilting at windmills. in Iraq in January 2005.
stabilizing influence on America's interests in the short run is open to question. Perhaps democratic Arab states would be more opposed to Israel, but nonetheless, their people would be better off. The United States has brought democracy to Afghanistan, where 8.5 million Afghans, 40 percent of them women, voted in a critical October 2004 election, even though remnant Taliban forces threatened them. The first free elections were held
It was the military power of the United States that put Iraq on the path to democracy. Washington fostered democratic governments in Europe, Latin America, Asia and the Caucasus. Now even the Middle East is increasingly democratic. They may not yet look like Western-style democracies, but democratic progress has been made in Algeria, Morocco, Lebanon,
Iraq, Kuwait, the Palestinian Authority and Egypt. By all accounts, the march of democracy has been impressive. Third, along with the growth in the
the United States has labored to create an economically liberal worldwide network characterized by free trade and commerce, respect for international property rights, and mobility of capital and labor markets. The economic stability and prosperity that stems from this economic order is a global public good from which all states benefit, particularly the poorest states in the Third World. The United States created this network not out of altruism but for the benefit and the economic well-being of America. This economic order forces American industries to be competitive, maximizes efficiencies and growth, and benefits defense as well because the size of the economy makes the defense burden manageable. Economic spin-offs foster the development of military technology, helping to ensure military prowess. Perhaps the greatest testament to the benefits of the economic network comes from Deepak Lal, a former Indian foreign service
number of democratic states around the world has been the growth of the global economy. With its allies, diplomat and researcher at the World Bank, who started his career confident in the socialist ideology of post-independence India. Abandoning the positions of his youth, Lal now recognizes that the only way to bring relief to desperately poor countries of the Third World is through the adoption of free market economic policies and globalization, which are facilitated through American primacy.4 As a witness to the failed alternative

finally,
economic systems, Lal is one of the strongest academic proponents of American primacy due to the economic prosperity it provides. Fourth and
the United States, in seeking primacy, has been willing to use its power not only to advance its interests but to promote the welfare of people all over the globe. The United States is the earth's leading source of positive externalities for the world. The U.S. military has participated in over fifty operations since the end of the Cold War--and most of those missions have been humanitarian in nature. Indeed, the U.S. military is the earth's "911 force"--it serves, de facto, as the world's police, the global paramedic and the planet's fire department. Whenever there is a natural disaster, earthquake, flood, drought, volcanic eruption, typhoon or tsunami, the United States assists the countries in need. On the day after Christmas in 2004, a tremendous earthquake and tsunami occurred in the Indian Ocean near Sumatra, killing some 300,000 people. The United States was the first to respond with aid. Washington followed up
with a large contribution of aid and deployed the U.S. military to South and Southeast Asia for many months to help with the aftermath of the disaster. About 20,000
U.S. soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines responded by providing water, food, medical aid, disease treatment and prevention as well as forensic assistance to help identify the bodies of those killed. Only the U.S. military could have accomplished this Herculean effort. No other force possesses the communications capabilities or global logistical reach of the U.S. military. In fact, UN peacekeeping operations depend on the United States to supply UN forces. American generosity has done more to help the United States fight the War on Terror than almost any other measure. Before the
tsunami, 80 percent of Indonesian public opinion was opposed to the United States; after it, 80 percent had a favorable opinion of America. Two years after the disaster, and in poll after poll, Indonesians still have overwhelmingly positive views of the United States. In October 2005, an enormous earthquake struck Kashmir, killing about 74,000 people and leaving three million homeless. The U.S. military responded immediately, diverting helicopters fighting the War on Terror in nearby Afghanistan to bring relief as soon as possible. To help those in need, the United States also provided financial aid to Pakistan; and, as one might expect from those witnessing the munificence of the United States, it left a lasting impression about America. For the first time since 9/11, polls of Pakistani opinion have found that more people are favorable toward the United States than unfavorable, while support for Al-Qaeda dropped to its lowest level. Whether in Indonesia or Kashmir, the money was well-spent
When people in the Muslim world witness the U.S. military conducting a humanitarian mission, there is a clearly positive impact on Muslim opinion of the United States. As the War on Terror is a war of ideas and opinion as much as military action, for the United States humanitarian missions are the equivalent of a blitzkrieg.
because it helped people in the wake of disasters, but it also had a real impact on the War on Terror.
Ext - Leadership
US effective response to Egypt is critical to maintaining regional ties in the Middle East critical to its leadership. Yacoubian 2/1 (Mona Yacoubian is senior adviser to the Center for Conflict Management at the U.S. Institute of Peace, Winning the future in a new Mideast, February 1, 2011, http://dyn.politico.com/printstory.cfm?uuid=EC73B7BB-6C56-41A0-8F05-AD2986A02AE3) CJC President Hosni Mubaraks speech Tuesday is unlikely to assuage the hundreds of thousands of Egyptians gathered in Cairos Tahrir Square, demanding an end to his regime. Instead, Washington is facing a new reality in the Arab world. The unprecedented popular demonstrations
Egyptian that already expelled one Arab leader in Tunisia and may well be on the verge of unseating another regime in Egypt mark a watershed in the region from which there is no return. The dynamics now spawning protests in Algeria,
Jordan, and Yemen reflect tectonic regional shifts that U.S. policymakers must grasp if the United States is to exert influence and remain relevant in this new Middle East. These protests
are remarkable, not least because of the impassioned calls for dignity and respect by people whose governments have long treated them with contempt. Their demands are not the bread and butter issues that typify Arab world street protests. Rather, these are pleas for greater freedoms, an end to torture and repression and for legitimate governments that can represent their aspirations. These rolling popular protests are the most dramatic examples of the regions changing tides. A regional re-
alignment is shifting the contours of power and influence from the Levant to the Gulf. In particular, Turkeys role as a key arbiter among Middle East players, a bridge to Europe, and an important model of Islamist democracy to the Arab world, signals a new era in regional relations. Turkey has also exerted its influence to promote regional trade and investment. It is spearheading a free trade
zone encompassing Turkey, Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan that could help spur badly-needed economic growth and job creation. The small Arab sheikhdom of Qatar is also exerting disproportionate influence. It owns Al Jazeera, the Arabic language satellite network that has broadcast from Egypt for the past eight days. Once reviled by many in the West as a supporter of Al Qaeda, the network is now being celebrated for insuring that the world can watch Egyptians make history. Qatar has also played a key mediating role helping to bring together Lebanons fractious factions in May 2008 when the country appeared on the verge of another civil war, and possibly positioned to reprise this role as Lebanon once again contends with mounting tensions. Other trends are not as positive from an U.S. vantage point namely the ascendance of the militant Shiite group Hezbollah in Lebanon accompanied by Syrias resurgence there from the nadir of its influence in 2005. Yet,
the United States must recognize this shifting regional alignment if it is to leverage any of these changes to its advantage. Indeed, President Barack Obamas call to the win the future in his State of the Union address resonates deeply regarding Americas role in the Middle East. The stakes are nothing less than the future of American leadership in the region. This seminal moment in the Middle East demands that the United States be bold and innovative rather than relying on a reflexive response to the changesboth dramatic and subtlethat are now re-shaping that
region.
A. Continuing partnership with Egypt is critical to counterterrorism operations globally. They provide critical intelligence for our success to prevent attacks. Muslim Brotherhood takeover would close that Intel window. Washington Post 2/13 (Mary Beth Sheridan and Joby Warrick, Washington Post Staff Writers; Mubarak resignation throws into question U.S.-Egyptian counterterrorism work; February 13, 2011; http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2011/02/12/AR2011021203581.html?hpid=topnews) CJC Egypt's government has been a critical partner for U.S. intelligence agencies, sharing information on extremist groups such as al-Qaeda and working hand in glove on counterterrorism operations. Now the future of that cooperation is in question. With the ouster of President Hosni Mubarak, a staunch American ally, the contours of the U.S.-Egyptian relationship may well be redrawn. Analysts say a more democratic Egyptian government will have to be responsive to a public that may oppose such special and close ties with Washington. Moreover, the Muslim Brotherhood is likely to gain influence if free
For decades,
***Terrorism Shell***
Cross-X.com Thursday File and fair elections are held, analysts say. The Islamist group has renounced violence but is openly hostile to Israel and may call for more independence from U.S. policies. "How will cooperation with the United States on counterterrorism develop in the view of these new constraints? I would argue the space will contract," said Aaron David Miller, a former State Department Middle East expert who is now at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.
B. The impact is extinction. Alexander 03

(Yonah-, Prof. & Director @ Inter-University for Terrorism Studies, August 28, Washington Times, Terrorism Myths and Realities, Lexis; Jacob)
the international community failed, thus far at least, to understand the magnitude and implications of the terrorist threats to the very survival of civilization itself. Even the United States and Israel have for decades tended to regard
Last week's brutal suicide bombings in Baghdad and Jerusalem have once again illustrated dramatically that terrorism as a mere tactical nuisance or irritant rather than a critical strategic challenge to their national security concerns. It is not surprising, therefore, that on September 11, 2001, Americans were stunned by the unprecedented tragedy of 19 al Qaeda terrorists striking a devastating blow at the center of the nation's commercial and military powers. Likewise, Israel and its citizens, despite the collapse of the Oslo Agreements of 1993 and numerous acts of terrorism triggered by the second intifada that began almost three years ago, are still "shocked" by each suicide attack at a time of intensive diplomatic efforts to revive the moribund peace process through the now revoked cease-fire arrangements [hudna]. Why are the United States and Israel, as well as scores of other countries affected by the universal nightmare of modern terrorism surprised by new terrorist "surprises"? There are many reasons, including misunderstanding of the manifold specific factors that contribute to terrorism's expansion, such as lack of a universal definition of terrorism, the religionization of politics, double standards of morality, weak punishment of terrorists, and the exploitation of the media by terrorist propaganda and psychological warfare. Unlike their historical counterparts,
contemporary terrorists have introduced a new scale of violence in terms of conventional and unconventional threats and impact. The internationalization and brutalization of current and future terrorism make it clear we have entered an Age of Super Terrorism [e.g. biological, chemical, radiological, nuclear and cyber] with its serious implications concerning national, regional and global security concerns. Two myths in particular must be debunked immediately if an effective counterterrorism "best practices" strategy can be developed [e.g., strengthening international cooperation]. The first illusion is that terrorism can be
greatly reduced, if not eliminated completely, provided the root causes of conflicts - political, social and economic - are addressed. The conventional illusion is that terrorism must be justified by oppressed people seeking to achieve their goals and consequently the argument advanced by "freedom fighters" anywhere, "give me liberty and I will give you death," should be tolerated if not glorified. This traditional rationalization of "sacred" violence often conceals that the real purpose of terrorist groups is to gain political power through the barrel of the gun, in violation of fundamental human rights of the noncombatant segment of societies. For instance, Palestinians religious movements [e.g., Hamas, Islamic Jihad] and secular entities [such as Fatah's Tanzim and Aqsa Martyr Brigades]] wish not only to resolve national grievances [such as Jewish settlements, right of return, Jerusalem] but primarily to destroy the Jewish state. Similarly, Osama bin Laden's international network not only opposes the presence of American military in the Arabian Peninsula and Iraq, but its stated objective is to "unite all Muslims and establish a
The second myth is that strong action against terrorist infrastructure [leaders, recruitment, funding, propaganda, training, weapons, operational command and control] will only increase terrorism. The argument here is that law-enforcement efforts and military retaliation inevitably will fuel more brutal acts of violent revenge.
government that follows the rule of the Caliphs." Clearly, if this perception continues to prevail, particularly in democratic societies, there is the danger it will paralyze governments and thereby
The prudent application of force has been demonstrated to be an effective tool for short- and long-term deterrence of terrorism. For example, Israel's targeted killing of Mohammed Sider, the Hebron commander of the Islamic Jihad, defused a "ticking bomb." The assassination of Ismail Abu Shanab - a top Hamas leader in the Gaza Strip who was directly responsible for several suicide bombings including the latest bus attack in Jerusalem disrupted potential terrorist operations. Similarly, the U.S. military operation in Iraq eliminated Saddam Hussein's regime as a state sponsor of terror. Thus, it behooves those countries victimized by terrorism to understand a cardinal message communicated by Winston Churchill to the House of Commons on May 13, 1940: "Victory at all costs, victory in spite of terror, victory however long and hard the road may be: For without victory, there is no survival."
encourage further terrorist attacks. In sum, past experience provides useful lessons for a realistic future strategy.
Egypt Intel = Best

There is no other country that can replace Egypts intelligence system, they are the best. Radical takeover means the US is fighting blind. Washington Post 2/13 (Mary Beth Sheridan and Joby Warrick, Washington Post Staff Writers; Mubarak resignation throws into question U.S.-Egyptian counterterrorism work; February 13, 2011; http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2011/02/12/AR2011021203581.html?hpid=topnews) CJC Egypt's intelligence cooperation is extensive. Its security services have numerous sources in places where the U.S. government does not, such as Gaza and Sudan, according to analysts. And the Egyptians have built up a trove of information on al-Qaeda and other radical Islamist groups in the Middle East. The Egyptian General Intelligence Service "has the reputation of being one of the best-informed intelligence agencies on Islamist fundamentalism and its international dimensions," according to Jane's intelligence information service. Bruce Hoffman, a terrorism expert at Georgetown University, noted that during the Cold War, the United States had a window into the Soviet Union through Iran, then a strong U.S. ally. "We have the same kind of window into Iran and other countries via the Egyptians," he said. "Whatever happens next, this will never be the same." In addition to passing on intelligence, Egypt's security services have worked closely on operations with their U.S. counterparts, particularly since the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks. The cooperation became
public after revelations surfaced that U.S. officials secretly "rendered" terrorism suspects to countries such as Egypt for interrogation. Human rights groups have denounced the practice because of the notorious torture record of those nations' security services. Hoffman said the use of rendition has been on the decline, however, since the United States and many governments no longer wanted to be associated with it. In the region, Mubarak's government played an important role in containing the Palestinian group Hamas, by blocking the smuggling of arms and militants into Gaza and supporting Israel's blockade of the strip. And Egypt served as a counterweight to Iran. "A different government in Cairo may not
see Iran as quite the same kind of threat. Or they might just look for ways to use Iran as a foreign-policy lever" in their relationship with the West, Hoffman said.
Egypt Counterterrorism
Radicalization in Egypt would undermine US counterterrorism efforts. A peaceful solution undermines Al Qaedas narrative. NY Times 2/2 (HELENE COOPER, MARK LANDLER and MARK MAZZETTI, Sudden Split Recasts U.S. Foreign Policy, February 2, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/03/world/middleeast/03diplomacy.html?_r=1&hp) CJC the unfolding crisis is about much more than just a rift with an ally. With the popular revolts in Egypt and Yemen and a government already deposed in Tunisia American counterterrorism officials are concerned that radical factions in those countries could find a new foothold amid the chaos. The United States is heavily reliant on foreign partners, and officials and outside experts said that losing Mr. Mubarak or President Ali Abdullah Saleh of Yemen would deal a short-term blow to its counterterrorism campaign. Or perhaps not. Theres part of this thats dangerous to Al Qaeda, said Juan Zarate of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, who was a top counterterrorism official during George W. Bushs administration. If the street protests lead to a peaceful, pluralistic transition, that does huge damage to the Al Qaeda narrative, he said. That narrative holds that authoritarian proAmerican governments should be deposed by violent jihad.
For the United States,
Effective diplomacy in Egypt is critical to a peaceful resolution of the crisis that renews our diplomatic credibility which is critical to fighting terrorism. Stone 1/31 (Andrea Stone, Political Analyst for Politics Daily, Egyptian Crisis Biggest Foreign Test Yet for Obama Administration, 1/31/2011, http://www.politicsdaily.com/2011/01/31/egyptian-crisis-biggest-foreign-test-yet-for-obamaadministratio/) CJC
Officials were "a little bit flustered at first" by the protests -- Vice President Joe Biden told the PBS News Hour that Mubarak is not a dictator -- but Boston University international relations professor Richard Augustus Norton said
overall, the administration has done a good job of reacting. Republican leaders backed up that assessment, as Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell refused to criticize how the administration was handling the crisis. The best the White House can do -- and appears to be doing behind the
scenes -- is communicate "the hopelessness of the situation to President Mubarak," said Nathan Brown, an expert on Arab politics at George Washington University. The dual nature of diplomacy -- especially as practiced in the Middle
East -- has complicated the administration's response to the popular uprising in Egypt. Just as WikiLeaks has been credited with setting off the revolution in Tunisia, leaked cables about Egypt illustrate a complex relationship of subtle shifts between coddling and arm-twisting. "We have closed our eyes to Mubarak because he has been useful to us in other ways," said Marina Ottaway, director of the Middle East program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. The same realpolitik has been in play in the relation with Yemen, Algeria and other dictatorial regimes in the region that the United States has taken it easy on in order to secure help for fighting terrorism.
Yemen Spillover
Spillover is happening in Yemen, a critical US ally. Reuters 2/15 (Matt Spetalnick and Patricia Zengerle, Staff Writers; Obama slams Iran government and praises Egypt army; Feb 15, 2011; http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/02/15/us-egypt-iran-obama-idUSTRE71E4IG20110215? feedType=RSS&feedName=politicsNews&utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_ca mpaign=Feed%3A+Reuters%2FPoliticsNews+%28News+%2F+US+%2F+Politics+News%29) CJC Anti-government demonstrations also simmered Tuesday in Yemen and Bahrain, two key U.S. allies with longtime autocratic rulers, as the pro-democracy fervor that toppled Mubarak rippled across the Middle East. "Obviously, we're concerned about stability throughout the region," Obama said. "If you're governing
these countries, you've got to get out ahead of change, you can't be behind the curve." But seizing the chance to put Iran, a longtime U.S. foe, on the spot, he urged all governments in the region to deal peacefully with protests, as the Egyptian military had done.
"We have sent a strong message to our allies in the region saying, 'Let's look at Egypt's example, as opposed to Iran's example'," Obama said.
Spillover -> Yemen = Terrorism

Preventing spillover from Egypt is critical to keeping terrorist hotspots from collapsing like Yemen. Stone 1/31 (Andrea Stone, Political Analyst for Politics Daily, Egyptian Crisis Biggest Foreign Test Yet for Obama Administration, 1/31/2011, http://www.politicsdaily.com/2011/01/31/egyptian-crisis-biggest-foreign-test-yet-for-obamaadministratio/) CJC the most serious foreign policy crisis of the Obama administration unfolded at breakneck speed in the streets of Cairo and other Egyptian cities, the White House and diplomats at the State Department have struggled to keep up with developments. At the same time, they have kept an eye out for trouble in nearby countries, especially Yemen. Already a basket case before recent street protests, the al-Qaeda sanctuary is ground zero in the U.S. fight against terrorism. National security officials huddled with Egypt experts in the White House while the president spoke by phone to leaders in the region. Those in Saudi Arabia, Yemen and Jordan, among others, fear the revolution that began in Tunisia could target them next.
As arguably
A. Continued Egyptian protests are sparking a wave of uprising across the Middle East diplomacy will be critical to keep stability. CBS News 2/14 (Genevieve Kermani, Staff Writer CBS News; Will Egypt's Revolution Spark Domino Effect?; February 14, 2011; http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503544_162-20031888503544.html) CJC Hamid of the Brookings Doha Center said on "Washington Unplugged" Monday that the revolutions in Egypt and Tunisia could spark similar outcomes throughout the Middle East. "We're seeing protests all throughout the region, people are drawing inspirations from the Egyptian model,
Shadi and what I think people are saying is if it first happened in Tunisia, and now that it's happened in Egypt, why can't it happen elsewhere?" Hamid told CBS News senior White House correspondent Bill Plante. Protests have been seen in recent
days in Algeria, Yemen, Jordan, Bahrain and Iran. As Plante noted, though Hosni Mubarak is no longer the president of Egypt, protesters remain on the streets in that country in an effort to remind the military "who's in charge of Egypt's revolution." Hamid pointed to the "end of this so-called
stability-paradigm," stating that countries throughout the Middle East are suddenly taking new approaches to respond to their citizens' needs. "Some [countries] are trying essentially to bribe their citizens, as we've seen in Kuwait," he said. Hamid added that the United States should try to adapt its foreign policy accordingly. "We're seeing protests
emerge everywhere," he said. "Yemen could be next. Jordan could be next. It's really hard to tell." B. Middle East is powder keg, any conflict will spillover The Age 9/24/2007 Tempers must remain cool as the Middle East heats up, http://www.theage.com.au/news/editorial/tempers-must-remain-cool-as-the-middle-east-heatsup/2007/09/23/1190486129857.html THE torturous road to peace in the Middle East becomes more excruciating every day and the cumulative effect of events in the region over the past week offer little hope for any reduction in what appear to be increasingly flammable tensions. If anything, the talk now is of war. The
match that lights the flame may well be last Thursday's assassination of Lebanese MP Antoine Ghanem, a violent murder that pitched his divided nation further into turmoil. His death was the latest in a string of attacks against prominent critics of Lebanon's neighbour and former powerbroker Syria, the most notable being the 2005 killing of former prime minister Rafiq Hariri. Mr Ghanem's death introduces an unwelcome element of instability ahead of tomorrow's crucial presidential elections, especially if an anti-Syrian candidate is elected. More importantly, any instability could fan the flames of civil war in a country that has been a pivotal test-run for democracy in the region since September 11, 2001. The killing has been widely condemned by the international community and the finger pointed, once again, at Syria, and by implication its ally, Iran. Syria
***Instability Shell***
has, somewhat ingenuously, denied any involvement, as it has with the other high-profile assassinations of anti-Syrian leaders in Lebanon. Calls have been made for UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon to launch an international probe into the bombing, and this should be carried out with haste. Talk of war further intensified after the deputy commander of Iran's air force, General Mohammad Alavi, announced that Iran had already prepared a plan to attack Israel if it bombed his country. This war of words was further escalated when a senior commander of Iran's Revolutionary Guard chose to outline the capability of his country's ballistic missiles, which he threatened to use on American targets in the Middle East. These threats coincide with growing international pressure on Iran to abandon what is regarded by the West, and particularly by the US, as its clandestine nuclear arms program. The French also added fuel to the fire when Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner warned the world to "prepare for the worst and the worst is war". The head of the UN's International Atomic Energy Agency, Mohamed ElBaradei, quickly entered the fray and warned against the use of force against Iran, a move UN officials described as an "out of control" drift to war. This pointed admonition coincides with a string of reports emanating from Washington that the Bush Administration is running out of patience with diplomacy and is intensifying its plans for air strikes against Iran. The events in Lebanon and the debate over Iran run parallel with Israel's declaration of the Gaza Strip as "hostile territory" and Israeli opposition leader Benjamin Netanyahu's confirmation that two weeks ago Israel carried out an air attack deep inside Syria, Iran's only Arab ally, on a site that it believed was being equipped for nuclear development by North Korea. Another suggestion is that the target was Iranian weapons destined for Lebanon's Hezbollah. There has also been speculation that the raid served as a "dry run" for a possible Israeli or US attack on Iran. Meanwhile, US efforts to ensure the success of a Middle East peace conference, planned for November, remain mired in political haggling over what is to be brought to the negotiating table. In the Middle East, every event,
every tension, is connected to another, more so since the Iraq war, and it is this very mutuality that can make one act, such as the murder of a Lebanese MP, have dangerous consequences for the region as a whole. The Middle East is now overheated and potentially explosive, and Australia must impress upon its allies that, in a part of the world where every action can easily be met with a disproportionate reaction, there is more mileage in diplomacy than in any military solution.
C. Regional Conflicts Draw in the US and go Nuclear Jonathan Dean (Advisor on International Security Issues) 5/4/95 Union of Concerned Scientists We do not want this kind of world. We cannot afford it. Democracies and free markets are spreading. Their expansion is the best general guarantee for peace. But democracies and free markets cannot flourish in an increasingly interknit world unless there is some modicum of order. Beyond the loss of life and productive capability in armed conflict, the United States and other industrial countries pay for these conflicts by losing their investments and their trade in goods and services. They pay most of the costs for humanitarian relief and rehabilitation, and they pay in increased domestic frictions for
the waves of migrants and refugees loosed by conflict. Look at what excessive rates of migration, including hundreds of thousands of refugees from the Balkans, have done in Germany, with its arson murders by extremists. Beyond this,
unrestrained regional conflicts can become conflicts which can draw in the United States and other major powers. In the long run, protracted regional violence creates conditions and motivation for developing nuclear weapons which can directly threaten our security.
Ext Instability
Egypt instability threatens Middle East instability. The Australian 2/4 (High stakes in the square, February 04, 2011, http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/opinion/high-stakes-in-the-square/story-e6frg71x1225999765488) CJC EGYPT'S transition will determine stability in the region. The extraordinary battle being played out in the centre of Cairo will decide the future not just of Egypt, but of the Middle East. The stability of the 80-million-strong nation and of the region is in play as protesters clash with progovernment supporters in Tahrir Square. The stakes are high, yet a week after the uprising began, it remains far from certain whether either Hosni Mubarak or Barack Obama will be able to deliver a sustainable outcome. The Egyptian President is insisting that while he will step down in September, and meanwhile he intends to oversee the transition to a new leader; the US President is signalling he must leave before that, with a caretaker government working towards change. In the middle are the protesters in the square who, against the odds and despite the violence, are refusing to leave until Mr Mubarak surrenders office. The cry is for democracy: the risk is to the stability that has defined Egypt for decades. That need for stability has driven the West's approach to Mr Mubarak's 30 years in
power. He has been the strongman of the Middle East, whose ability to balance domestic demands and regional imperatives has made his nation a secular bulwark against fundamentalist Islam and the West's strongest Arab ally. But the past few days have shown that acceptance by Egyptians of the trade-off between rights and stability can no longer be assumed. A combination of economic woes and mass unemployment, along with dissatisfaction with a long-term autocratic leader, have spilled into the street. It is an uprising that appears to have taken by surprise everyone from the White House to the man being touted as the most likely transitional leader, Nobel Peace Prize winner Mohamed ElBaradei. The lack of an organised political opposition in Egypt has become apparent in recent days, but however ad hoc these protests, and however weak the civil society, the mood for change cannot be ignored.
ME Diplomacy Bahrain & Yemen

Uprisings in Bahrain and Yemen have US diplomats on their toes to balance strategic interests. Wall Street Journal 2/16 (Joe Parkinson, Adam Entous, and Julian Barnes, Reporters for the Wall Street Journal; Wave of Unrest Rolls Into Gulf; FEBRUARY 16, 2011; http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704409004576145711833269124.html? mod=ITP_pageone_0#) CJC BahrainThe Middle East's wave of popular revolts helped spur the largest street rebellion in years in a Persian Gulf monarchy, and the first to pit a Shiite Muslim majority against Sunni rulersheightening the dilemma for the U.S. as it struggles to pursue its interests in the region. The funeral of a demonstrator here Tuesday swelled into growing clashes with security forces amid the gleaming new skyscrapers of this financial capital, which hosts the headquarters for the U.S. Navy's Fifth Fleet patrolling the Gulf. The developments came as security forces in Yemen, an important ally in U.S. antiterrorism efforts, fought back protesters for a fifth day. In Iran, the government threatened leaders of Monday's protests there with execution and made a fresh wave of arrests. The parallel protests against key allies and enemies of the U.S. sharpened the difficulty for the Obama administration, as fast-moving uprisings have unseated regimes in Tunisia and Egypt and triggered opposition rallies in Algeria, Jordan and elsewhere. The White House is trying to balance its desire to encourage what President Barack Obama called Tuesday "certain universal values" with U.S. strategic interests. The president and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton both offered encouragement to
MANAMA, Iranian protesters and aimed tough words at Tehran on Tuesday, in marked contrast to their relative silence on Iran during the last wave of protests in Iran in 2009. Mr. Obama praised the courage of protesters and said the Iranian regime was "pretending" to celebrate Egypt's revolt while "gunning down and beating people who were trying to express themselves peacefully" at home. Neither leader spoke Tuesday about the movements in Bahrain and Yemen, though the president was questioned about both during a news conference. Later, State Department spokesman Philip Crowley put out a statement
saying the U.S. is "very concerned" about the violence and is urging the regime to investigate protester deaths as quickly as possible. "We also call on all parties to...refrain from violence," he added.
Yemen Counter Terrorism

Obama is pushing to double support for counter-terrorism efforts in Yemen to fight al Qaeda. This is separate from his budget. Yemen is under threat of collapsing. The money would assist counter-terrorism efforts against AQAP which is the biggest threat of terrorist attacks, and critical economic assistance to stabilize the country. Reuters 2/14 (Phil Stewart, Staff Reporter; U.S. to spend $75 million on new Yemen military training; Feb 14, 2011; http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/02/14/us-usa-yemenidUSTRE71D7AQ20110214? feedType=RSS&feedName=politicsNews&utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_ca mpaign=Feed%3A+Reuters%2FPoliticsNews+%28News+%2F+US+%2F+Politics+News%29) CJC The United States aims to spend $75 million to double the size of a special Yemeni counterterrorism unit, a U.S. official said on Monday. The funding, which has yet to be approved by Congress, is part of a broader effort to increase pressure on al Qaeda's Yemen-based affiliate, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, or AQAP, the official told Reuters, speaking on condition of anonymity. Michael Leiter, head of the National Counterterrorism Center, told Congress last week he saw AQAP as the biggest current threat to the U.S. homeland. The group has claimed responsibility for a failed Christmas Day attack in 2009 aboard a
U.S. airliner and a more recent attempt last year to blow up two U.S.-bound cargo planes with toner cartridges packed with explosives. The U.S. official said the funds would be invested in a special Yemeni counter-
terrorism unit that is operated under Yemen's interior ministry and now totals around 300 people. The funds are unrelated to another $120 million earmarked for Yemen in President Barack Obama's 2012 budget request unveiled on Monday. The request includes $35 million in additional military assistance for Yemen and $69 million in economic assistance. Yemen's President Ali Abdullah Saleh, in power for 30 years, has faced growing protests in recent weeks from thousands of Yemenis, inspired by uprisings that toppled Egypt's President Hosni Mubarak and Tunisia's President Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali. He is also under pressure to quash the resurgent al Qaeda wing in the impoverished Arabian Peninsula state, at the same time as he struggles to control southern secessionists and to cement a fragile truce with rebels in the north. U.S. Director of National Intelligence James Clapper told Congress last week that Yemen's "myriad political, security, and development challenges" pose the greatest threat to that poor Arab nation since its 1994 civil war. Stable Yemen government, would gut US counter-terrorism efforts globally and allow the fast spread of al Qaeda. Wall Street Journal 2/16 (Joe Parkinson, Adam Entous, and Julian Barnes, Reporters for the Wall Street Journal; Wave of Unrest Rolls Into Gulf; FEBRUARY 16, 2011; http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704409004576145711833269124.html? mod=ITP_pageone_0#) CJC Some U.S. officials believe if the current government fell in Yemen, U.S. operations in the country could be hamstrung. Those operations include training commandos and conducting counter-terrorism strikes. Yemen is the home to al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, and officials say a collapse of the weak government could give the group free rein.
A. Diplomats are working for a solution to ensure that Bahrain allows political reforms and to quell the uprising. Wall Street Journal 2/16 (Joe Parkinson, Adam Entous, and Julian Barnes, Reporters for the Wall Street Journal; Wave of Unrest Rolls Into Gulf; FEBRUARY 16, 2011;
***Bahrain Shell***
Egypt Harvard/Berkley Cross-X.com 84/148 Thursday File http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704409004576145711833269124.html? mod=ITP_pageone_0#) CJC

"The
goal is to press to reform these governments, not remove them, where our national security is at stake," Christopher Boucek, a Middle East analyst at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington. The split U.S. imperatives also were on display in the Egyptian revolt, when the
administration initially tried to encourage peaceful protests while urging the government of Hosni Mubaraka longstanding U.S. allyto survive by meeting some demands. Bahrain's Sunni Muslim rulers have long faced a restive Shiite
population that alleges economic and political discrimination. Shiite leaders have pushed, sometimes
violently, for more political rights over the years, though they have stopped short of trying to remove the ruling family from power. In response, the kingdom has liberalized more than most of its Gulf neighbors. While the ruling family still holds nearabsolute power, a viable Shiite opposition has gained a growing voice in the country's parliament, with 18 of 40 seats. But parliamentarians from the Shiite bloc, called Al-Wafaq, on Tuesday suspended their participation in
the body, in solidarity with the protesters. The move robs Bahrain's government of a legitimate political party with which to negotiate a settlement. B. Bahrain collapse would result in US losing basing for the Navys 5th Fleet, critical to countering Iran and protect the Persian Gulf. The spillover to Gulf States would result in massive oil price spikes. Wall Street Journal 2/16 (Joe Parkinson, Adam Entous, and Julian Barnes, Reporters for the Wall Street Journal; Wave of Unrest Rolls Into Gulf; FEBRUARY 16, 2011; http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704409004576145711833269124.html? mod=ITP_pageone_0#) CJC the Obama administration fears unrest in Bahrain could undercut U.S. interests in a region where a significant chunk of the world's oil is produced and transported each day. Although it lacks oil, Bahrain's housing of the U.S. Navy's Fifth Fleet make it a critical port for the Navy vessels deployed to counter Iran and protect the Persian Gulf. If Bahrain's Sunni-led government were to be forced from powersomething protesters haven't yet made a focus of their demands some fear a new government might seek closer ties to Iran and force the U.S. Navy to relocate . Another concern is that an uprising in Bahrain could spill into next-door Saudi Arabia or Kuwait, where even minor unrest might roil world-wide oil markets.
Likewise,
C. 5th Fleet is critical to deterring Iranian aggression in the Middle East. Gour and Grant 9 (Dr. Gour is a vice president with the Lexington Institute, a nonprofit public-policy research organization headquartered in Arlington, Virginia. He is involved in a wide range of issues as part of the institutes national security program. Dr. Rebecca Grant is a senior fellow of the Lexington Institute. Her research focuses on airpower, joint operations, cyberspace, and other issues within the institutes national security program; U.S. NAVAL OPTIONS FOR INFLUENCING IRAN; Naval War College Review, Autumn 2009, Vol. 62, No. 4; http://www.nwc.navy.mil/getattachment/c866a012-4a28-4627-86f8-38d0b627e710/U-S--NavalOptions-for-Influencing-Iran---Daniel-G) CJC A central focus of U.S.military deployments in the Persian Gulf is to deter Iran from taking actions deemed inimical to American interests. The presence of U.S. naval forces in the Gulf, and since 1991 in Kuwait, is a visible demonstration of the interest of the United States in the region and of commitment to secure its national interests and defend allies. Irans actions of principal concern to the United States include its nuclear program, support for extremist groups in the region, assistance to anti-U.S. forces in Iraq, and efforts to undermine U.S. allies. In addition, Irans
efforts to develop asymmetric capabilities designed to hold U.S. forces and allies in the region at risk or to contest movement in the Gulf must also be considered as potentially destabilizing. American planners must consider the possibility that Iran may threaten to resort to military force should the pressures on Tehran to change its behaviors become intolerable. Deterrence
must include a clear message to Iran that it cannot alter the strategic situation in the region
Egypt Harvard/Berkley Cross-X.com 85/148 Thursday File through the use of force, however much it may try. In recent years, Iran has engaged in a series of information
operations intended to create the impression that it is capable of exerting its military power in the Persian Gulf. Iranian sources claim that the Islamic Republics navy can close the Gulf. To accomplish this, Iran is relying on a strategy of asymmetric warfare in essence, guerrilla warfare at sea.25 The United States, together with its allies, needs to conduct its own information campaign. This campaign should be accompanied by clear demonstrations through exercises, fleet deployments, and cooperative activities with alliesthat the United States can rapidly defeat Irans asymmetric warfare strategy. The heart of
deterrence and dissuasion is the promise of unacceptable consequences. The recipient of the
deterrent/dissuasion message must consider either his fate too painful or his gain too small to justify his current behavior. In other words, he must be confronted by the likelihood that the opponent will impose unacceptable costs or negate the effects of his actions. Deterrence theory suggests a number of potential options: preemption/first strike,
retaliation, and defenses, either alone or in combination. It may be possible to threaten preemption or
retaliation with conventional forces even against a nuclear-armed adversary, although the persuasiveness of a nonnuclear response to a nuclear threat is uncertain.
D. Iranian aggression causes World War 3. Bosco, 2006
[David, 7/23/2006. Senior Editor at Foreign Policy Magazine. Could This Be the Start of World War III? http://usc.glo.org/forums/0016/viewtopic.php? p=403&sid=95896c43b66ffa28f9932774a408bb4b] ARMAGEDDON Could This Be the Start of World War III? As the Middle East erupts, there are plenty of scenarios for global conflagration. By David Bosco, David Bosco is a senior editor at Foreign Policy magazine. July 23, 2006 IT WAS LATE JUNE in Sarajevo when Gavrilo Princip shot Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife. After emptying his revolver, the young Serb nationalist jumped into the shallow river that runs through the city and was quickly seized. But the events he set in motion could not be so easily restrained. Two months later, Europe was at war. The understanding that small but violent acts can spark global conflagration is etched into the world's consciousness. The reverberations from Princip's shots in the summer
of 1914 ultimately took the lives of more than 10 million people, shattered four empires and dragged more than two dozen countries into war. This hot summer, as the world watches the violence in the Middle East, the
awareness of peace's fragility is particularly acute. The bloodshed in Lebanon appears to be part of a broader upsurge in unrest. Iraq is suffering through one of its bloodiest months since the U.S.-led
invasion in 2003. Taliban militants are burning schools and attacking villages in southern Afghanistan as the United States and NATO struggle to defend that country's fragile government. Nuclear-armed India is still cleaning up the
wreckage from a large terrorist attack in which it suspects militants from rival Pakistan. The world is awash in weapons, North Korea and Iran are developing nuclear capabilities, and long-range missile technology is spreading like a virus. Some see the start of a global conflict. "We're in the early stages of what I would describe as the Third World War," former House Speaker Newt Gingrich said last week.
Certain religious websites are abuzz with talk of Armageddon. There may be as much hyperbole as prophecy in the forecasts for world war. But it's not hard to conjure ways that today's hot spots could ignite. Consider the following scenarios: Targeting Iran: As Israeli troops seek out and destroy Hezbollah forces in southern Lebanon, intelligence officials spot a shipment of longer-range Iranian missiles heading for Lebanon. The Israeli government decides to strike the convoy and Iranian nuclear facilities simultaneously. After Iran has recovered from the shock, Revolutionary Guards
surging across the border into Iraq, bent on striking Israel's American allies. Governments in Syria, Jordan, Egypt and Saudi Arabia face violent street protests demanding retribution against Israel and they eventually yield, triggering a major regional war. E. Global nuclear war. Steinback, 2002 [John Steinbach, Center for Research on Globalization, March 3, 2002 (http://www.globalresearch.ca/articles/STE203A.html)]
The Israeli nuclear arsenal has profound implications for the future of peace in the Middle East, and indeed, for the entire planet. It is clear from Israel Shahak that Israel has no interest in peace except that which is dictated on its own terms, and has absolutely no intention of negotiating in good faith to curtail its nuclear program or discuss seriously a nuclear-free MiddleEast,"Israel's insistence on the independent use of its nuclear weapons can be seen as the foundation on which Israeli grand strategy rests."(34) According to Seymour Hersh, "the size and sophistication of Israel's nuclear arsenal allows men such as Ariel Sharon to dream of redrawing the map of the Middle East aided by the implicit threat of nuclear force."(35) General Amnon Shahak-Lipkin, former Israeli Chief of Staff is quoted "It is never possible to talk to Iraq about no matter what; It is never possible to talk to Iran about no matter what. Certainly about writing in Haaretz said, "Whoever believes that Israel will ever sign the UN Convention prohibiting the proliferation of nuclear weapons... is day dreaming,"(37) and Munya Mardoch, Director of the
Israeli Institute for the Development of Weaponry, said in 1994, "The moral and political meaning of nuclear weapons is that states which renounce their use are acquiescing to the status of Vassal states. All those states which feel satisfied with possessing conventional weapons alone are fated to become vassal states."(38) As Israeli society becomes more and more polarized, the influence of the radical right becomes stronger. According to Shahak, "The prospect of Gush Emunim, or some secular right-wing Israeli fanatics, or some some of the delerious Israeli Army generals, seizing control of Israeli nuclear weapons...cannot be precluded. ...while israeli jewish society undergoes a steady polarization, the Israeli security system increasingly relies on the recruitment of cohorts from the ranks of the extreme right."(39) The Arab states, long aware of Israel's nuclear program, bitterly resent its coercive intent, and perceive its existence as the paramount threat to peace in the region, requiring their own weapons of mass destruction. During a future Middle Eastern war (a distinct possibility given the ascension of Ariel Sharon, an unindicted war criminal with a bloody record stretching from the massacre of Palestinian civilians at Quibya in 1953, to the massacre of Palestinian civilians at Sabra and Shatila in 1982 and beyond) the possible Israeli use of nuclear weapons should not be discounted. According to Shahak, "In Israeli terminology, the launching of missiles on to Israeli territory is regarded as 'nonconventional' regardless of whether they are equipped with explosives or poison gas."(40) (Which requires a "nonconventional" response, a perhaps unique exception being the Iraqi SCUD attacks during the Gulf War.) Meanwhile, the existence of an arsenal of mass destruction in such an unstable region in turn has serious implications for future arms control and disarmament negotiations, and even the threat of nuclear war. Seymour Hersh warns, "Should war break out in
the Middle East again,...or should any Arab nation fire missiles against Israel, as the Iraqis did, a nuclear escalation, once unthinkable except as a last resort, would now be a strong probability."41) and Ezar Weissman, Israel's current President said "The nuclear issue is gaining momentum(and the) next war will not be conventional."(42) Russia and before it the Soviet Union has long been a major(if not the major) target of Israeli nukes. It is
widely reported that the principal purpose of Jonathan Pollard's spying for Israel was to furnish satellite images of Soviet targets and other super sensitive data relating to U.S. nuclear targeting strategy. (43) (Since launching its own satellite in 1988, Israel no longer needs U.S. spy secrets.) Israeli nukes aimed at the Russian heartland seriously complicate disarmament and arms control negotiations and, at the very least, the unilateral possession of nuclear weapons by Israel is enormously destabilizing, and dramatically lowers the threshold for their actual use, if not for all out nuclear war. In the words of Mark Gaffney, "... if the familar pattern(Israel refining its weapons of mass destruction with U.S. complicity) is not reversed soon- for whatever reason- the
deepening Middle East conflict could trigger a world conflagration."
Bahrain is critical to US defense strategy in the Middle East. The 5th Fleet ensure oil flow through the Strait of Hormuz, and deters Iran. CBS News 2/16 (Staff; Navy's 5th Fleet in Bahrain Eyes Unrest Warily; February 16, 2011; http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2011/02/16/501364/main20032183.shtml) CJC Unrest surging through the Arab world has so far taken no toll on the American military. But that could change if revolt washes over the tiny Persian Gulf kingdom of Bahrain longtime home to the U.S. Navy's mighty 5th Fleet and arguably the Middle East anchor of U.S. defense strategy. The discontent that has spilled into the streets of Bahrain's capital, Manama, this week features no anti-American sentiment, but the U.S. has a lot at stake in preserving its dominant naval presence in the Gulf. In announcing that it is "very concerned" about violence linked to the
WASHINGTON protests, the State Department on Tuesday underscored Bahrain's strategic importance as a U.S. partner. "The United States welcomes the government of Bahrain's statements that it will investigate these deaths, and that it will take legal action against any unjustified use of force by Bahraini security forces," said department spokesman P.J. Crowley. "We urge that it follow through on these statements as quickly as possible." The 5th Fleet operates at least one aircraft carrier in the Gulf
Bahrain 5th Fleet
at all times, along with an "amphibious ready group" of ships with Marines aboard. Their presence is central to a longstanding U.S. commitment to ensuring the free flow of oil through the Gulf, while keeping an eye on a hostile Iran and seeking to deter piracy in the region. Anthony Cordesman, a Mideast defense specialist at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, said Bahrain has security services capable of handling protesters and potentially backed by neighboring Saudi Arabia. Thousands of banner-waving protesters took over a main square in Manama
Tuesday in a bold attempt to copy Egypt's uprising. The demonstrations capped two days of clashes that left at least two people dead, and the king made a rare address on national television to offer condolences for the bloodshed. "It is a serious problem, but whether it's going to flare up any more seriously this time than all the other times is hard to say," Cordesman said. "The question is whether they can shake the security structure of the state." The implications for U.S. foreign policy and national security from the pro-democracy movements that have arisen in the Arab world - highlighted by Egypt's stunning revolution - is likely to be a topic Wednesday when Defense Secretary Robert Gates testifies before the House Armed Services Committee. Bahrain became a more prominent partner for the Pentagon after the 1991 Gulf War with Iraq; since then
it has granted U.S. forces increased access, plus permission to store wartime supplies for future crises.
Bahrain Spillover -> Gulf Oil States

Bahrain uprising spillover would be sectarian spilling over into critical Gulf Oil states. Wall Street Journal 2/16 (Joe Parkinson, Adam Entous, and Julian Barnes, Reporters for the Wall Street Journal; Wave of Unrest Rolls Into Gulf; FEBRUARY 16, 2011; http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704409004576145711833269124.html? mod=ITP_pageone_0#) CJC Bahrain is a tiny, island kingdom in the oil-rich Gulf best known for its banking prowess, along with bars that cater to
nationals from alcohol-free Saudi Arabia next door. It pumps little crude itself, but the protests here have brought home to neighboring oil-rich capitalsDubai, Abu Dhabi, Doha and Riyadha taste of the turmoil that had largely been limited to much poorer corners of the Arab world. It's also the first country experiencing the recent unrest in which the
often-explosive sectarian divide between Sunni and Shiite Muslims has emerged in a meaningful way. Shiites make up small minorities in other recent hot spots, including Egypt, Jordan and Yemen, but religious tensions haven't been a driving factor in unrest in those places. A sustained Shiite uprising in Bahrain would alarm Sunni rulers in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates, all Gulf countries with sizable Shiite minorities. They worry about the unrest spilling across their borders, and the possibility Iran would have more opportunities to meddle in the region. Gulf rulers are often quick to blame Iran for instigating trouble among Shiite populations, though real Iranian influence in those communities has been limited.
Egypt -> Bahrain

Egypt has spilled over into Bahrain, threatening to out the Navys 5th Fleet and spillover throughout the Gulf region. NYT 2/16 (Nicholas D. Kristof, Columnist; Tunisia. Egypt. Bahrain?; February 16, 2011; http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/17/opinion/17kristof.html) CJC
The gleaming banking center of Bahrain, one of those family-run autocratic Arab states that count as American allies, has become the latest reminder that authoritarian regimes are slow learners. Bahrain
is another Middle East domino wobbled by an angry youth and it has struck back with volleys of tear gas, rubber bullets and even buckshot at completely peaceful protesters. In the early-morning hours on Thursday here in the Bahrain capital, it used deadly force to clear the throngs of pro-democracy protesters who had turned Pearl Square in the
center of the city into a local version of Tahrir Square in Cairo. This was the last spasm of brutality from a regime that has handled protests with an exceptionally heavy hand and like the previous crackdowns,
this will further undermine the legitimacy of the government. Egypt has infected Bahrain, a young businessman, Husain, explained
to me as he trudged with a protest march snaking through Manama. Husain (Im omitting some last names to protect those involved) said that Tunisia and Egypt awakened a sense of possibility inside him and that his resolve only grew when Bahrains riot police first attacked completely peaceful protesters. When protesters held a funeral march for the first man killed by police, the authorities here then opened fire on the mourners, killing another person. I was scared to participate, Husain admitted. But he was so enraged that he decided that he couldnt stay home any longer. So he became one of the countless thousands of prodemocracy protesters demanding far-reaching change. At first the protesters just wanted the release of political prisoners, an end to torture and less concentration of power in the al-Khalifa family that controls the country. But, now,
after the violence against peaceful protesters, the crowds increasingly are calling for the overthrow of the Khalifa family. Many would accept a British-style constitutional monarchy in which King Hamad, one of the Khalifas,
would reign without power. But an increasing number are calling for the ouster of the king himself. King Hamad gave a speech regretting the deaths of demonstrators, and he temporarily called off the police. By dispatching the riot police early Thursday morning, King Hamad underscored his vulnerability and his moral bankruptcy.
All of this puts the United States in a bind. Bahrain is a critical United States ally because it is home to the American Navys Fifth Fleet, and Washington has close relations with the Khalifa family. Whats more, in some ways Bahrain was a model for the
region. It gives women and minorities a far greater role than Saudi Arabia next door, it has achieved near universal literacy for women as well as men, and it has introduced some genuine democratic reforms. Of the 40 members of the (not powerful) Lower House of Parliament, 18 belong to an opposition party. Somewhat cruelly, on Wednesday I asked the foreign minister, Sheik Khalid Ahmed al-Khalifa, if he doesnt owe his position to his family. He acknowledged the point but noted that Bahrain is changing and added that some day the country will have a foreign minister who is not a Khalifa. Its an evolving process, he insisted, and he emphasized that Bahrain should be seen through the prism of its regional peer group. Bahrain is in the Arabian gulf, he noted. Its not in Lake Erie. The problem is that Bahrain has educated its people and created a middle class that isnt content to settle for crumbs beneath a paternalistic Arab potentate and this
country is inherently unstable as a predominately Shiite country ruled by a Sunni royal family. Thats one reason Bahrains upheavals are sending a tremor through other gulf autocracies that oppress Shiites, not least Saudi Arabia. A. US-Israel relations are on the brink of collapsing. Failure by the US to appear engaged on the Egyptian crisis to prevent a takeover of the government by radicals, would be perceived by Israel as US abandonment. US must ensure continued diplomacy on the crisis to assure Israel and prevent an extremist takeover. Fabian 2/15 (Jordan Fabian, Staff Writer at The Hill; Israelis fretting over U.S. policy; 02/15/11; http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/144065-israelis-fret-over-us-policy-afterprotests) CJC Israelis are worried about two more years of President Obama, and the crisis in Egypt is adding to their concerns. Israelis already have a cool relationship with Obama, who in
TEL AVIV, Israel his first year as president called for an Israeli settlement freeze as a precondition to peace talks with the Palestinians. Obamas 2009 speech in Cairo, which called for a new beginning between the West and the Muslim world, was also viewed with skepticism in Israel.
Now there are questions surrounding the leadership of Egypt, Israels traditional ally in the Arab world, as well as U.S. policy toward the Middle East. While Israelis uniformly recognize that the U.S.-Israel relationship is strong on the whole, many believe that the unrest in the Arab world could lead Obama to revert to familiar themes they view as hostile to their countrys interests. Former Israeli ambassador to the United States Zalman ***Israel Relations Shell***
Egypt Harvard/Berkley Cross-X.com 90/148 Thursday File Shoval said in an interview that a continued Obama effort to reach out to the Muslim world will be read in Israel as an effort to push Israeli interests to the side. Obamas approach to the Middle East, [beginning with] his Cairo speech, could be viewed as even more harmful to Israel, Shoval said. The pressures of the campaign trail, when candidates often make pledges or take positions they are later pressured to act
upon, have already begun to reopen a split between Obama and his potential Republican rivals on the Middle East. Some believe these campaign arguments could eventually become policy differences that would be detrimental to Israel. Three potential 2012 GOP candidates visited the Jewish state during the first five weeks of 2011. None of the Republicans publicly criticized Obama, but their comments offered a preview of the coming GOP attacks. Mississippi Gov. Haley Barbour, for example, argued that a point of view has emerged in Washington that Israel is a problem. People who hold this view feel themselves correct to demand from Israel an endless series of dangerous strategic concessions, even though they should have learned by now, when Israel makes such concessions, in return it is rewarded with nothing but more rocket attacks, Barbour said in an address to the Herzliya Conference. The unrest in Egypt has prompted divergent responses from President Obama
and the Israeli government, and policymakers in both countries have said that the outcome could strain the American-Israeli relationship. While Obama called for a credible transition to democracy in Egypt after President Hosni Mubarak formally stepped down on Friday, he placed his public focus on the Egyptian peoples struggle for democracy. I am confident that the people of
Egypt can find the answers, and do so peacefully, constructively and in the spirit of unity that has defined these last few weeks, he said. Several potential Republican presidential candidates have called his response misguided. Israel has expressed
support for Egyptian democracy, but it has voiced severe worry about the possibility of the country slipping into the hands of Islamic extremists who could undo its 1979 peace treaty with Israel. B. US-Israel relations key to Middle East stability Kramer 06 fellow at The Washington Institute and senior fellow at the Olin Institute, Harvard (Dr. Martin, The American Interest, Fall 2006, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC06.php?CID=980)
My answer, to anticipate my conclusion, is this: United States support for Israel is not primarily the result of Holocaust guilt or shared democratic values; nor is it produced by the machinations of the Israel Lobby. American support for Israel -indeed, the illusion of its unconditionality underpins
the pax Americana in the eastern Mediterranean. It has compelled Israels key Arab neighbors to reach peace with Israel and to enter the American orbit. The fact that there has not been a general Arab-Israeli war since 1973 is proof that this pax Americana, based on the United States-Israel alliance, has been a success. From a realist point of view, supporting Israel has been a low-cost way of keeping order in part of the Middle East, managed by the United States from offshore and without the commitment of any force. It is, simply, the ideal realist alliance. In contrast, the problems the United States faces in the Persian Gulf stem from the fact that it does not have an Israel equivalent there, and so it must massively deploy its own force at tremendous cost. Since no one in the Gulf is sure that the United States has the staying power to maintain such a presence over time, the Gulf keeps producing defiers of America, from Khomeini to Saddam to Bin Laden to Ahmadinejad. The United States has to
counter them, not in the interests of Israel, but to keep the worlds great reserves of oil out of the grip of the Wests sworn enemies.
C. Extinction Moore 9BA in pol sci from Wayne State (Carol, Six Escalation Scenarios to Nuclear World War III, 16 February,http://pakalert.wordpress.com/2009/02/16/six-escalation-scenarios-to-nuclearworld-war-iii/) Israel is especially dangerous because its leaders and supporters have made clear for years that if Israel was ever devastated by any kind of war or attack it would retaliate in indiscriminate Samson Option attacks against not just on Muslim cities, but against European and even Russian targets. (See Israeli Nuclear Threats and Blackmail .) Russia, of course, would retaliate with thousands of nuclear bombs against the United States. Given suspected U.S. nuclear primacy plans, Russia could feel compelled to attack the United States for acts like a U.S. nuclear attack on Iran,
Egypt Harvard/Berkley Cross-X.com 91/148 Thursday File which is just a few hundred miles from its border. On January 25, 1995 Boris Yeltsin, then President of Russia, came within three minutes of initiating a full nuclear strike on the United States because of one Norwegian scientific rocket Russians could not identify. (Details ) And U.S. leaders also could be spooked by a nuclear incident, as the 2002 movie Sum of All Fears illustrates. Once there is any use of nuclear weapons, it will be like giving permission for anyone to use them. Compare it to a room full of people embarrassed to cough, but once one does, everyone else feels free to do so. Any use of nuclear weapons probably will lead to a rapid escalation, out of control spiral, to nuclear war among most or all nuclear nationsworld nuclear war. The U.N. cannot stop it. U.S. imperialism and pre-emptive strikes cannot stop it. Only a worldwide
disarmament movement can stop it.
Israel Brink
Israel is on edge already. Wall Street Journal 2/11 (Staff; AT A GLANCE: Egypt's Mubarak Steps Down; Military Takes Over; FEBRUARY 11, 2011; http://online.wsj.com/article/BT-CO-20110211-713327.html) CJC Mubarak's departure marks the beginning of a new chapter in the Middle Eastern country, one that he thinks will be difficult but more democratic. "Egyptians have made it clear that nothing
President Barack Obama said the less than genuine democracy will carry the day," he said, while acknowledging there will be tough days ahead. United Nations chief Ban Ki-moon said the army must allow free and fair elections to get back to civilian rule. European leaders, too, were united in calling for a swift transition to democracy. Arab League chief Amr Mussa hailed the Egyptian people and army for their "historic achievement" and called for national consensus. Saudi Arabia and Israel, in particular, were put on
the defensive as events rattled regional allies and foes alike, threatening a decades long balance of power in the Mideast.
A2: Brotherhood Not A Threat

Your evidence is citing Director of National Intelligence Clapper, who has clarified his statements about the Muslim Brotherhood, indicating that they are NOT a secular organization. Benson 2/16 (Pam Benson, CNN Reporter; Intel chief says his Muslim Brotherhood remark misunderstood; February 16, 2011; http://www.cnn.com/2011/POLITICS/02/16/clapper.comment/index.html? eref=rss_politics&utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+rss %2Fcnn_allpolitics+%28RSS%3A+Politics%29) CJC The nation's top intelligence officer sought to clarify Wednesday a comment that was roundly criticized when he said that the Muslim Brotherhood was a "secular" group. Director of National Intelligence James Clapper, speaking to the Senate Intelligence Committee, said his comment last week was misunderstood and he only meant that the group is trying to work within secular political systems. The group itself is not secular, Clapper said in an opening statement
Washington (CNN) -to Congress. Sen. Diane Feinstein, D-California, the chair of the committee, expressed concern about whether the U.S. intelligence committee knew enough about the Brotherhood's positions. In a series of questions to Clapper, Feinstein wanted to know the stated positions of the group with regards to the Middle East peace process, ties to Iran and the smuggling of weapons into Gaza. Clapper responded each time it was hard to say or he didn't know -- but he weapons into Gaza.
added he would assess they are not in favor of a peace treaty, that it remains to be seen on Iran and he surmised they supported bringing
***Muslim Brotherhood***
Muslim Brotherhood Pushing For Control

Muslim Brotherhood is pushing to take control of the government through elections. Dorell 2/14 (Oren Dorell, Reporter at USA TODAY; Ideology shadows fight to rule the new Egypt; 2/14/2011; http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2011-02-14-1Aegypt14_CV_N.htm) CJC Fattah, spokesman for the long-banned Muslim Brotherhood, sat at a laminate table in plans for Egypt under democratic rule. In the scramble for power among groups of various political identity after last week's ouster of President Hosni Mubarak, the Brotherhood an Islamist group that has held as many as 20% of the seats in Egypt's parliament in recent years is vowing to increase its influence on daily life in Egypt. The Brotherhood would seek "the preservation of
AIRO Ali Abdel his office in South Cairo, answering phone calls, chattering in Arabic at aides in dark suits and discussing honor" by stoning adulterers, punishing gays, requiring Muslim women to cover their heads and shoulders in public and killing Muslims who leave their faith, said Abdel Fattah, whose forehead bore the calluses of those who prostrate themselves five times a day in prayer. As he spoke late Saturday, the "thump thump" of a cleaver could be heard just outside the unadorned office. A man was hacking up a calf on a wood stump, arranging the meat on a plastic sheet on the patio floor. A bright puddle of blood ran into the street as the animal was slaughtered for a feast celebrating the Brotherhood's hopes for the future. "We
basically want a government that will take on the demands of the people that were clear in the revolution of Tahrir Square," Abdel Fattah said. "Sharia law does not differ from the demands of the people."
A2: Muslim Brotherhood Not Win Enough Seats

Muslim Brotherhood would not have to win the majority. They would get 30% if elections were held now, which would be enough to control the government. Dorell 2/14 (Oren Dorell, Reporter at USA TODAY; Ideology shadows fight to rule the new Egypt; 2/14/2011; http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2011-02-14-1Aegypt14_CV_N.htm) CJC
How strong is the Brotherhood? Estimates vary on the political support the Brotherhood has in Egypt. The movement gained 20% of seats in the parliament in 2005 when Mubarak, under pressure from the Bush administration on human rights issues, allowed direct elections for the first time. Wael Nawara of Al Ghad says the Brotherhood would gain 15% of the seats in an election today. Mohamed Zarea, a lawyer and human rights worker who deals with members of the Brotherhood, says they would get 50%. Some conservative Muslims consider themselves more moderate and would not go along with an extremist program. Mohamed Hossam Eldin Abdel Wahid, 56, who keeps a large red tinted beard and a floor-length ochre robe, considers himself a conservative Muslim. He says he memorized the Quran during a 20-year detention under Mubarak's emergency laws. Selling scented oils to men outside a mosque in Giza, he said "attacks based on religion are wrong." "A Muslim who does not practice regulations of Islam, who's an extremist, is a sinful Muslim," he said. Makram-Ebeid estimates the
Brotherhood would gain "only" 30% of parliament seats in elections involving 22 opposition parties she counts as vying for power. However, a party could do a lot with such a percentage of the parliament's seats. Hezbollah, a U.S.-designated terrorist group and enemy of Israel, last month toppled the government of the majority pro-Western parties in Lebanon and installed its own candidate as prime minister. Hezbollah did this despite having just 57 of the 128 seats in Lebanon's parliament.
Egypt Influence K2 Avoid Islam Rise

American support is critical to ensure a transition that does not give power to the radical Muslim Brotherhood. Wawro 1/31 (Dr. Geoffrey Wawro is the General Olinto Mark Barsanti Professor of Military History and Director of the Military History Center at the University of North Texas. He is the author of Quicksand: Americas Pursuit of Power in the Middle East, 1/31/2011, http://www.thedailybeast.com/blogs-and-stories/2011-01-31/egyptian-protests-mirror-1979revolution-in-iran/?cid=bs:archive7) CJC So far the Obama administration seems to be getting it right on Egypt. The president has called for an orderly transition, and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has warned there must not be a takeover that would lead to oppression, a clear reference to Egypts Muslim Brotherhood. More than just the right words will be needed. The Obama team should be looking closely at
Washingtons awful mismanagement of the Iranian revolution of 1978-79 to make sure they do not repeat the errors of the Carter administration. The revolutions in Cairo and Tehran have much in common. Both simmered under the rule of corrupt strongmen who had held power for three decades. Both were triggered by new mediaaudiocassettes in Iran, Twitter and Facebook in Egyptand both exploded in major regional states, with big populations, strong internal security services and powerful, U.S.-supplied militaries. Both dynasts, Hosni Mubarak and Shah Muhammed Reza Pahlavi, were regarded in Washington as family friends, to borrow Hillary Clintons phrase. Both had complex societies, with big swollen cities like Cairo and Tehran containing both the most and least educated people in the country: a relatively narrow educated elite and a broad mass of slum-dwellers. The strategic threat of thatthen and nowwas outlined by the U.S. ambassador in Tehran in 1970, when he predicted, with astonishing accuracy, just how Iranian demographics would shape the coming upheaval. Since most Iranians were poorly educated and highly ignorant, any truly democratic movement would be in a reactionary obscurantist direction under the clergy. The Carter administration was as startled by the revolution in Tehran as Obama was by the wave of revolutions from Tunis to Cairo. Just before the regime began to totter in 1978, Carters CIA had predicted that nothing much would change in Iran through 1985: Iran is not in a revolutionary or even pre-revolutionary situation. As Carter reacted to events in Iran, rifts in the U.S. government confused and demoralized him, and prevented Washington from acting swiftly and decisively to steer the Iranian revolution in a moderate direction. Iranian generals met with the U.S. ambassador in Tehran, William Sullivan, and expressed their willingness to launch a coup to keep the shah in power, or even topple the shah, purge the fundamentalist opposition, and set up a moderate caretaker government. Such a plan, which held the most promise in late 1978, was undone by fights between Cyrus Vances State Department and Zbigniew Brzezinskis National Security Council. State thought the shah was doomed and that Washington needed to reach some accommodation with the Khomeini camp; Brzezinski (joined by Defense Secretary Harold Brown and Energy Secretary James Schlesinger) thought the shah might relinquish some domestic authority, but must hold on to police powers and military and foreign affairs. Just as we today worry that
fundamentalists might hijack the Tunisian, Egyptian, Jordanian, and Lebanese emergencies, Brzezinski spoke of an arc of crisis in the Middle Easta wave of unrest in Islamic countries, beginning with Iranthat the Soviets might hijack. Administration hardliners wanted the shah to get tough, to re-arrest political prisoners, to shut down the press, and to flood the streets with troops and tanks. But decades of repression and fake elections had crushed Irans secular parties; there was no credible moderate opposition to undergird a generals coup. Only the Shiite clergylike the Muslim Brotherhood in Egyptremained intact and powerful as a political force. In December 1978, Carter appointed 68-yearold George Ball to sift through conflicting reports to determine just what the U.S. ought to do about Iran. Ball worked hard for two weeks, read classified and unclassified reports from all sources, and then met with Carter to render his verdict. The shah was finished, vomited out in a national regurgitation by the Iranian people. Americas wisest course now would be to work out the transfer of power to responsible hands before Khomeini comes back and messes everything up. Ball urged Carter to tell the shah to leave Iran, turn affairs over to a reliable government, and serve as a distant regent until things cooled down. Carter expressed astonishing diffidence. I cant tell another head of state what to do, Carter protested. You can tell a friend what you think, Ball persisted. One of the obligations of friendship is to give advice, particularly to a man who is cut off from the normal sources, who is surrounded by sycophants. Carter refused to have that conversation with the shah. Fortunately, Obama
is speaking bluntly with Mubarak about the need for change. Noting Carters hesitation, Brzezinski
reopened his attack. The president must prop up the shah, to reassure allies and deter the Soviets. Geopolitics is not a kindergarten class, he reminded the president. Balls moderates were used-up hacks who wouldnt stand a chance against Khomeinis mobs. No, the U.S. would have to vest its hopes in the Iranian military, which was still loyal to the shah. Brzezinski drafted a letter for Carter to send to the shah that baldly enjoined him to use force against the demonstrators. Vance was horrified, and warned Carter that Brzezinski was recommending a course that would end in 1,000 deaths, others thought tens of thousands. The letter was never sent. Another wave of riots swept through Tehran in January 1979. Carter sent General Robert Huyser to speak with the senior Iranian generals and gauge their attitude. What Huyser discovered was interesting. The generals feared the Islamists, but also moderates, who they assumed would open corruption investigations that would lead back to the military. The seven Iranian generals Huyser met with expressed their readiness to kill 100,000 Iranians if necessary, to restore the shah or an authoritarian regime. What they neededall seven declaredwas unflinching U.S. backing. Today in Cairo,
President Obama is facing similar hard choices. The error in Tehran in 1979 was one of omission. Frozen by opposing views, Washington did nothing. When the shah left Iran in January 1979 to
have his cancer treated, pro-Khomeini demonstrations broke out in every Iranian city. Although Brzezinski and Brown in
Washington and General Alexander Haig at NATO headquarters in Belgium were still for unleashing the Iranian military against the ayatollahsgive the officers a go-ahead, Brown urged BrzezinskiCarter refused to roll the dice. Carter decided that Iran was Khomeinis. It wasnt. The president still effectively controlled the Iranian generals and might have fashioned a moderate reform coalition under their aegis. Instead, Carter selected a negative program: merely cultivating contacts with moderate Islamic clergy, officers, and politicians in the vain hope that they would counter Khomeinis radicalism and step in if the ayatollahs movement unraveled. Just as Egyptian fighter jets are orbiting Cairo in a show of strength, the Iranian air force did the same in early February 1979. The imperial militarys hour had seemingly arrived. Khomeinis komitehs Islamic militias and revolutionary courtswere rounding up the shahs courtiers. The generals made a last appeal to Ambassador Sullivan for support; he relayed the request to Washington, but Carter remained inert, refusing even to dispatch a carrier to the Persian Gulf. The Iranian generals threw in the towel. Sullivan cabled Washington on February 27, warning that anti-American sentiment was boiling over in the streets and the press, and that the U.S. Embassy could no longer be protected. He and his subordinates recommended the embassy staff be reduced to six officers and a vicious dog. (When the embassy was actually seized eight months later, Carter must have wished he had heeded the warning.) With Washington in retreat, the generals declared neutrality; most were arrested, exiled, or shot. The army stood down and let the demonstrations disarm it. In Iran, all our investment in an individual, rather than in a country, came to naught, an American colonel named Colin Powell observed from the Pentagon. When the shah fell, our Iran policy fell with him. President Obama is now holding our Egypt
policy in his hands. He must move fast and deal bluntly with President Mubarak. The Egyptian army must be restrained; credible opposition moderates like Mohamed ElBaradei must be empowered to move the country forward without a breakdown in security or an Islamist coup. Mubarak should turn power over to a respected politician bolstered by Omar Suleimans reformed security services, who will loosen their grip but not permit the Muslim Brotherhood to knock over a national unity government as easily as Khomeini crushed Irans first, mixed provisional revolutionary government. None of this will be easily accomplished, and America has only an auxiliary role. But the hand we played in 1979 was self-nullifying, and helped usher in the Islamic Republic of Iran, which has vexed and weakened American policy for more than 30 years.
Brotherhood = Price Spikes

Muslim Brotherhood control risks cutting off Oil from the Middle East devastating our econ recover and causing Oil Spikes. POLITICO 2/1 (Glenn Thrush covers Capitol Hill for Politico and Mike Allen is the chief political correspondent for Politico and
Laura Rozen is a reporter at POLITICO, Egypt: Worst scenarios for W.H., February 1, 2011, http://dyn.politico.com/printstory.cfm? uuid=DE7516BA-D472-D8ED-D73BCE853D37CED6) CJC
Egypt produces no oil and is hardly an economic powerhouse with global reach, but it controls the Suez Canal, pinch point of the Mideast oil supply. If a new Egyptian government, perhaps one dominated by the anti-U.S. Muslim Brotherhood, decides to block the canal, tankers would be forced to undertake the six-to-eight-week trek around the Horn of Africa, driving per-barrel prices to $120 or more and gas prices at the pump well beyond $4 a gallon, experts say. That could have a disastrous impact on an economy that has just begun picking up steam, especially if any such blockade includes Egypts critical Sumed pipeline. The question is whether that supply gets cut off at some point, former Obama car czar Steve Rattner, speaking on MSNBCs Morning Joe said Monday. Right now, the market doesnt think its all that likely, but thats a risk. Oil traders have begun factoring in that risk: Since Friday, when the first huge demonstrations rocked Cairo, prices have soared about 7 percent, up to more than $92 per barrel.
Brotherhood = Econ Collapse

Muslim Brotherhood coming into power would collapse Western economies. CNN Money 1/31 (Cyrus Sanati, contributor, Biggest corporate stakes in Egypt's power shift, January 31, 2011, http://money.cnn.com/2011/01/31/news/international/egypt_economic_interests.fortune/index.ht m) CJC The recent demonstrations in Egypt have rocked world markets and sent investors scrambling for the exits. It's not without reason. A possible revolution in the most populous and influential nation in the Arab world shouldn't be taken lightly given the possibility of an anti-Western government coming to power in Cairo. It's not yet clear what kind of government would emerge if the current autocratic regime led by President Hosni Mubarak were to fall. What is clear is that US economic interests in the entire region would be at risk if Egypt falls under the veil of Islamic fundamentalism. It could lead to the expulsion of US and Western companies from Egypt and threaten the stability of more secular Arab states, ranging from US foes like Syria to staunch US
FORTUNE -allies like Jordan and Saudi Arabia. The scenes from the protests in Egypt look eerily similar to ones that swept Iran 32 years ago, which led to the establishment of an anti-western Islamic Republic. The protests in 1978 and 1979, like in Egypt, seemed to catch the world, and the US State Department, totally off guard. They seemed to have sprung out of nowhere but offered some hope that the dictator ruling the country would fall to a more democratic regime. There are of course very large differences between Arab Egypt today and Persian Iran 32 years ago, but the economic backdrop is similar. The revolution that swept Iran and seems to be festering in Egypt, did not come about overnight. A confluence of economic changes in both countries helped widen the divide between the rich and the poor, bringing about the angst that we see today. Disparate Egyptian opposition
groups, from liberals to Islamic fundamentalists, have banded together to oust Mubarak. Mohamed El Baradei, who won a Nobel Peacce Prize for his leadership of the IAEA, is now leading the opposition groups' newly formed steering committee. El Baradei, who is critical of President Obama's reluctance to call for Mubarak's resignation, is pushing for a peaceful transition to democracy, which has alleviated some fears on Wall Street and Washington. Western business in an Islamic theocracy But a revolution can quickly turn. The most powerful group with the largest following usually comes out on top.
In Iran, the Islamic fundamentalists had the poor firmly in their grasp and used their mass to overwhelm the other groups. They eventually turned on their former coalition partners and wiped them out. Such a scenario could occur in Egypt.
The largest and most organized of the opposition groups is the Muslim Brotherhood, a banned Islamic resistance movement that is not on the friendliest of terms with the West, especially the United States. It has said it wants to establish Sharia (Islamic) law in the country and ban all women and Christians from government (Christians make up 10% of the population of Egypt). It has no formal connection with Washington but it does have strong ties to Tehran, which funds their activities. So if Egypt falls to an Islamic theocracy, it will probably spell bad news for the western companies operating in the country. The United States is a major exporter to the country, making up around 10% of Egypt's total imports. The US supplies wheat, corn and soybeans to Egypt averaging around $2 billion a year. That could hurt the sales of companies like ConAgra (CAG, Fortune 500), ADM (ADM, Fortune 500) and Cargill. The US also delivers $1.3 billion in military aid to Egypt, much of which is recycled back to US defense contractors like Boeing (BA, Fortune 500), Lockheed Martin (LMT, Fortune 500), Northrup Grumman (NOC, Fortune 500), General Dynamics (GD, Fortune 500) and Raytheon (RTN, Fortune 500). They provide support for older US-made military equipment, like the F-4 and F-16 attack fighters, and also sell Egypt new weapons. Egypt also has a small, but noteworthy energy sector, and has several western energy companies working in the country. European oil companies like the UK's BP (BP) and Italy's ENI (E) have had a major
presence in the country for decades drilling for oil and gas. But no company has more exposure to the energy sector in Egypt like Apache Corporation (APA, Fortune 500). It is by far the largest US investor in Egypt, with a total investment of more than $7 billion over the past 17 years. Egypt now accounts for a quarter of the company's earnings. Apache's large investment in Egypt has not gone unnoticed by the markets. Wall Street has wiped $5 billion off Apache's market value since
the riots began amid fears that a new government could expropriate their land concessions.
That is equivalent to about 50% of the estimated value of Apache's Egyptian assets.
Brotherhood = ME Instability
Allowing the Muslim Brotherhood in the door would open all of the Middle East to extremism undermining American leadership globally and completely destabilizing the Middle East. Morris 2/2 (Dick Morris, a former political adviser to Sen. Trent Lott (R-Miss.) and President Bill Clinton, Obama Following a
Very Risky Strategy With Egypt, February 2, 2011, http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2011/02/02/will_obama_lose_egypt_108751.html) CJC
Obama better hope that the crowds clamoring for an overthrow of the Hosni Mubarak regime really do achieve a functioning liberal democracy rather than an Iranian-style theocracy. His re-election hopes may be doomed if Iran takes over. Just as Richard Nixon helped to discredit Harry Truman
President and defeat Democratic presidential nominee Adlai Stevenson in 1952 by trumpeting the question, "Who lost China?" Obama may well have to explain how and why he lost Egypt. If he permits Egypt to slip through our fingers and go over to the Iranian sphere of influence, he will pay for it politically in 2012. Imagine if this president, whose domestic policy initiatives are coming apart at the seams, loses office over a foreign policy blunder. The Muslim Brotherhood is allied closely with Hamas.
To the extent that it masquerades as a peaceful body, it is a wolf in sheep's clothing. Any coalition with the Brotherhood is as likely to remain secular as Adolf Hitler's early coalition with Paul von Hindenburg in Germany was likely to stay non-Nazi. The Muslim Brotherhood will take over if it gets its foot in the door. By failing to back Mubarak, Obama is committing the same sin that Dwight
Eisenhower did in Cuba and Jimmy Carter did in Iran. He needs to understand that the radical Islamists mean us ill and that any effort to appease them is bound to fail. If Egypt falls, Obama will have permanently damaged America's
vital interests. Look at what Carter's abandonment of the Shah has cost the world and is likely to cost it in the future. We
now face the possibility that a radicalized Egypt could be Obama's gift to the globe. Until now, Americans have regarded Obama's flirtation with the Arab street with a mild concern that he may be too naive in his understanding of that part of the world. But his policy of appeasement toward radical Islam has yet to have any bad consequence. We have had some terror attacks, to be sure, but none have risen to the level of a cataclysm. But losing Egypt to the grip of Islamic
fundamentalism would be a huge blow to the United States, to Israel and to the entire Western world. It would literally open the door to a theocratic Iranian-style empire stretching from Morocco to Iran. Inspired by an Islamic takeover in Egypt, he may find himself confronted with a Middle Eastern version of the old domino theory, where one nation after another falls to Islamism, with each new theocratic conquest destabilizing its neighbor.
Remember that Iran has a population of 79 million and Egypt has 75 million. Together, their 154 million almost equal the combined population of all the other nations in North Africa and the Middle East. If Egypt and Iran were to work
in
tandem, they could control the region.
Muslim Brother Hood Pushing For Power

Muslim Brotherhood is rising to take power. Warren 2/3 (David Warren, Political Reporter, Face in the Crowd, February 3, 2011, http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2011/02/03/face_in_the_crowd_108750.html) CJC
Four days ago I wrote that, "No one can predict what will come of" the Egyptian demonstrations, "until fresh factors come into play." Let me update that. Mohamed ElBaradei -- the man who ran interference for the Iranian regime, against Bush, when he
is now well placed for the succession to Hosni Mubarak, with the support of the Muslim Brotherhood. The latter have reached for power fairly cleverly. At first they presented themselves as entirely neutral, between the Mubarak regime and the "spoilt children of Egypt's middle classes" -- inspired by the riots in Tunisia to try their luck in Tahrir Square. Then, at Friday prayers, many imams apparently told their flocks to go swell the demonstrators' ranks. But this support remained cautious. Only now that Mubarak's position is untenable -- because the Egyptian army is distancing itself from him -- are the valves fully opening, and is the Muslim Brotherhood appropriating the revolution.
was chief UN atomic weapons inspector --
Brotherhood = No MEPP
Radical takeover will undermine Egypt-Israel Peace Accords and gut any possibility of a successful MEPP. POLITICO 2/1 (Glenn Thrush covers Capitol Hill for Politico and Mike Allen is the chief political correspondent for Politico and Laura Rozen is a reporter at POLITICO, Egypt: Worst scenarios for W.H., February 1, 2011, http://dyn.politico.com/printstory.cfm?uuid=DE7516BA-D472-D8EDD73BCE853D37CED6) CJC The most obvious danger, according to administration officials, is that any new Egyptian regime will almost certainly adopt a more militant stance toward its partner in peace for more than three decades, Israel. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has been meeting around the clock with advisers, gaming out the various scenarios ranging from chillier relations to
A new Egypt-Israel conflict Nasser-type saber rattling in Cairo. In fact, one of the reasons the Egyptian army remains so popular among its people was its near success against Israel during the bloody Yom Kippur war in 1973. Were not talking about another war, Munayyer added. But the illusion of a real peace with Israel is over. Even if Egypt and Israel dont come to blows, a more
militant Cairo could wipe out whatever remaining hope lingered for an Israeli-Palestinian peace deal. And that could, perversely, push Obama a president who vowed to improve relations with the Arab world back into a much closer alliance with Israel after two years of tense relations with the traditional U.S. ally in the region.
Transition K2 Check Muslim Brotherhood

Timing is everything. The US must ensure that there is a transition government. Immediate elections would result in a takeover by the Muslim Brotherhood. The military will be a critical partner in the transition government and checking back extremist rise. The Australian 2/4 (High stakes in the square, February 04, 2011, http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/opinion/high-stakes-in-the-square/story-e6frg71x1225999765488) CJC The immediate question is how to move forward, especially given the divergence of views between Washington and Cairo about the timetable for change and the role that should be played by Mr Mubarak. The Americans, anxious that immediate elections would open wide the door to the Muslim Brotherhood (outlawed but experienced in running independent candidates at earlier elections) in the absence of other strong opposition parties, appear to be looking for an interim government that would minimise Mr Mubarak's role and give everyone a chance to regroup. Time is needed anyway for changes to be made in the constitution to allow for more democracy. The 82-year-old leader is the
sticking point. The respected Middle East commentator and former US ambassador to Israel, Martin Indyk, argued on ABC TV Lateline on Wednesday night that Egyptians will not accept a process overseen by Mr Mubarak because
they "simply do not trust him to ensure there will be a free and fair election". In the short term, it is the military -- which continues to position itself on the side of the people, if not the protesters -- that will be most crucial in determining what happens next. The army did not intervene in the chaotic events in Tahrir Square yesterday as pro-Mubarak riders on horses and camels clashed with the anti-government protesters. But with the clashes continuing overnight, how long before anarchy forces the hand of the military? Some have wanted to present Tahrir Square as the "Berlin Wall" of the
Middle East, but popular protests do not always bear fruit -- witness the failures of the 2009 Green Movement in Iran and the Cedar Revolution in Lebanon in 2005. While Egypt is still in flux, it appears likely, as commentator Daniel Pipes wrote in this newspaper on Wednesday, that "the militaries will remain the ultimate powerbrokers" in the Middle
East. Those impatient for change should remember that revolutions, even when successful, are unpredictable -- witness the deposition of the shah in 1979 that ushered in the Islamic republic in Iran. A post-Mubarak Egypt is inevitable, whatever the timing. The challenge for Egypt's powerbrokers is to increase popular participation in the life of the nation, but ensure that in the process extremist Islam does not secure a foothold.
A2: Muslim Brotherhood Not Threat

Claims of Muslim Brotherhood moderation have no warrants. They are based on ignorance of reality. Kelly 2/13 (Jack Kelly, a former Marine and Green Beret, was a deputy assistant secretary of the Air Force in the Reagan administration; Beware the Muslim Brotherhood; February 13, 2011; http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2011/02/13/beware_the_muslim_brotherhood_108878.ht ml) CJC When journalists tout the brotherhood's "moderation" because it has publicly eschewed violence, they fail to mention that its goals are similar to al-Qaida's; that it grew to prominence because of its alliance with Adolf Hitler and that -- according to Kuwait's education minister -- it is the father of all current terror groups in the Middle East. Confusion about the Muslim Brotherhood is not limited to journalists. In testimony to the House Intelligence Committee Thursday, James Clapper, the Director of National Intelligence, described the brotherhood as "largely secular." "This is one of the most reckless and irresponsible statements ever made publicly by an American official at a critical and delicate moment," said John Podhoretz of Commentary magazine. Obama administration cluelessness about the brotherhood is dangerously reminiscent of Carter administration policy toward Iran in 1979. President Jimmy Carter's U.N. ambassador, Andrew Young, once described the Ayatollah Khomeini as "some kind of saint." The Muslim brothers are bad guys. But they seem to have been as surprised by the protests -- which have been dominated by young
people who seem genuinely interested in freedom and democracy -- as the Obama administration was.
***Foreign Aid***
Congress Cut Aid

Congress would cut aid if it felt Egyptian Military was going the wrong direction. Bloomberg 2/13 (Viola Gienger, reporter for Bloomberg News; Public Praise, Private Calls Keep Pentagon Connected to Egypt's Military; Feb 13, 2011; http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-02-13/public-praise-private-calls-keep-pentagonconnected-to-egypt-s-military.html) CJC Congress could cut back the aid if Egypt moves in a direction contrary to U.S. policy, including peace with Israel. The Egyptian people are demanding a meaningful and irreversible transition to democracy, said Arizona Senator John McCain, the top Republican on the Senate Armed Services Committee. I urge the Egyptian military to faithfully support and secure the coming process of political change in Egypt. Congress will cut aid if military fails to ensure transition. Wall Street Journal 2/11 (Staff; AT A GLANCE: Egypt's Mubarak Steps Down; Military Takes Over; FEBRUARY 11, 2011; http://online.wsj.com/article/BT-CO-20110211-713327.html) CJC Sen. Patrick Leahy (D., Vt.), who heads the committee responsible for yearly spending on diplomacy and international aid, warned annual U.S. aid to Egypt could be "at risk" if Cairo's military thwarts a transition to democratic rule.
Later Friday,
Failure for Obama to get results means that Congress will take action and cut off aid to Egypt. Reuters 2/1 (Caren Bohan and Andrew Quinn, Staff, Obama says change in Egypt "must begin now", Feb 1, 2011, http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/02/02/us-egypt-usa-obamaidUSTRE7109F720110202? feedType=RSS&feedName=politicsNews&utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_ca mpaign=Feed%3A+Reuters%2FPoliticsNews+%28News+%2F+US+%2F+Politics+News%29) CJC U.S. lawmakers also reacted with skepticism to Mubarak's announcement. The U.S. senator who oversees foreign aid said Mubarak had no credibility to oversee Egypt's transition, and he renewed a threat to withhold aid from Egypt if it necessary to push for democracy there. "President Mubarak's decision to stand down from future leadership of the government is welcome, but his continued role in Egypt's transition is unrealistic," said Senator Patrick Leahy, who chairs the Senate appropriations subcommittee that approves U.S. foreign aid. "We (the United States) should do what we can to support a transition to democracy including, if it becomes necessary, withholding aid to the government," Leahy, a Democrat, said.
Some
Aid: Peaceful Transition K2 Prevent Cut

US wont cut aid now, but if the issue is not resolved they are willing to gut it. Cornwell 2/2 (Susan Cornwell, Staff, Lawmakers' views vary on aid cutoff to Egypt, Feb 2, 2011,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/02/02/us-egypt-usa-aid-congress-idUSTRE71194420110202? feedType=RSS&feedName=politicsNews&utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+Reuters %2FPoliticsNews+%28News+%2F+US+%2F+Politics+News%29) CJC
U.S. lawmakers are unlikely to slash American aid to Egypt quickly, but they are watching to see where unrest there leads, congressional aides and analysts said on Wednesday. Views of the Egyptian turmoil vary on Capitol Hill. For now, the Republican-run House of Representatives seems more cautious than the Democratic-run Senate about cutting U.S. aid to Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak's government, which has been running at $1.5 billion a year. That could lead to a battle over withholding aid to Egypt later this month, when lawmakers will get an opportunity to make changes. Much depends on events between now and then.
WASHINGTON (Reuters) -
Aid K2 Leverage
Aid to Egypt gives the US direct influence over the military. That is why they did not fight protestors. Ambinder 2/1 (Marc Ambinder is the White House Correspondent for National Journal Group, A White House Policy on Egypt Evolves, February 1, 2011, http://www.nationaljournal.com/whitehouse/a-white-house-policy-on-egypt-evolves-20110201) CJC
The Brotherhood had done a poor job of recruiting young Egyptians; its membership ranks were fewer than polls showed. The strong secular undercurrent in most major Egyptian cities kept the Brotherhood in check as much as the heavy-handed security forces did. On Friday morning, Obama turned his intelligence briefing into a seminar about Egypt, peppering his foreign policy team with questions about the relationship between Egyptian police and the military. During his mid-day press briefing Friday, press secretary Robert Gibbs seemed to imply that further U.S. aid to Egypt would be contingent
upon the countrys reactions to the protests, which had reached gale-force size. Obamas advisers believed that the informal checks and balances that had kept Egypt firmly in Americas corner would continue with or without Mubarak. The military was the key: most of the more then $1 billion in annual aid, a legacy of the SadatBegin peace accord, flows directly to them. Publicly insinuating that future money would be conditioned on how Egyptian leaders handled the protesters demand was less of a direct threat than simply the application of direct leverage: Mubarak would have to tread lightly when ordering his military to backstop his police; for the military, siding with the police would be tantamount to abandoning the U.S. US has the necessary influence to shape the outcome in Egypt because of its Aid package. Washington Post 1/31 (Editorial Staff, Misconceptions about the Egyptian crisis, January 31, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2011/01/31/AR2011013104517.html) CJC The most misguided assertion in Washington holds that the United States lacks the capacity to influence the outcome of the Egyptian crisis. In fact, both sides in Egypt have been aggressively appealing for support from the Obama administration, and for good reason - the United States supplies $1.5 billion in annual aid to Egypt, including well more than $1 billion for the Egyptian military. The White House has rightly hinted that that aid is now at stake, and on Sunday Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton finally announced U.S. support for a "transition" to "real democracy." Both in public and in every other communications channel, the administration should be making explicit the connection between future funding for the Egyptian military and that democratic transition. Aid is critical to the US continuing to have relations. The military connection is the only way that US-Egypt relations will remain and aid is the lynch-pin. LA Times 2/3 (Staff, Egypt after Mubarak, February 3, 2011, http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/editorials/la-ed-egypt-20110203,0,6393912.story) CJC A policy of the Mubarak regime that is likely but not guaranteed to survive the transition is Egypt's intimate relationship with the United States. The army, which is a much respected and highly influential institution, values the relationship with the U.S. (and the military aid that accompanies it), and there are strong cultural, educational and economic ties between the two countries built over many years. Anti-Americanism has been a minor theme in the protests, and it mostly reflected outrage over the slowness of the United States to dissociate itself from Mubarak.
Aid K2 Arms Sales

Cutting aid to Egypt puts the brakes on billions of dollars in regional arms sales. Cornwell 2/2 (Susan Cornwell, Staff, Lawmakers' views vary on aid cutoff to Egypt, Feb 2, 2011,
Most U.S. aid to Egypt is military and has gone for things like M1A1 Abrams battle tanks and F-16 fighter aircraft. The unrest in Egypt and other Middle Eastern countries could put the brakes on billions of dollars of arms sales to the entire region, analysts say.
Aid Cut Quickly

Obama can cut off aid in the pipeline immediately if there is not a peaceful resolution. Cornwell 2/2 (Susan Cornwell, Staff, Lawmakers' views vary on aid cutoff to Egypt, Feb 2, 2011,
Leahy added the Obama administration could stop spending money already appropriated by Congress for this year. "There is money in the pipeline, the administration can stop that money at any time," he said. State Department spokesman P.J. Crowley said last week the United States would continue to monitor how Egypt's military responds to the crisis -suggesting that a major army intervention to put down protests might trigger a change. "There are stipulations in terms of the behavior of recipients of our assistance. And obviously, if aid is used in a way that is contrary to our laws, our policies, and our values, we'll make adjustments as we need to," he said. Congress will cut aid to speed up the transition. House and Strohm 2/2 (Billy House is a Congress writer for National Journal,
Chris Strohm covers homeland security and intelligence for National Journal Group, Post-Mubarak, Questions of Aid Get Complicated, February 2, 2011, http://www.nationaljournal.com/member/daily/post-mubarak-questions-of-aid-get-complicated-20110201) CJC
In his own statement, Leahy said, The welcome restraint and professionalism shown by the Egyptian Army so far is a testament to the long relationship between our two countries. But we should do what we can to support a transition to democracy including, if it becomes necessary, withholding aid to the government, he said. Senate is willing to gut aid quickly. Cornwell 2/2 (Susan Cornwell, Staff, Lawmakers' views vary on aid cutoff to Egypt, Feb 2, 2011,
Democratic Senator Patrick Leahy chairs the Senate subcommittee in charge of foreign aid and has taken a harder line on continuing aid to the Mubarak government, which he says has "no credibility" to oversee the transition to democracy. Leahy suggested on Wednesday that Washington should think about economic aid for a new government in Cairo, saying he hoped for a transition to a government that would address joblessness and hunger and "the suffering of the people." "Those would be very appropriate areas to spend American aid," Leahy told Reuters Insider Television. "But it's certainly not going to be spent on a government that must leave and is dragging its feet on leaving," he added, referring to the Mubarak government.
Egypt A2: No Aid Cut Budget

Aid can be cut in the coming budget, Senate will wait to act until after house which means they can reconcile the difference. Cornwell 2/2 (Susan Cornwell, Staff, Lawmakers' views vary on aid cutoff to Egypt, Feb 2, 2011,
The House Republican who chairs the committee on foreign aid, Representative Kay Granger, urged caution this week in deciding what the U.S. response to events in Egypt will be. "It is
critical that we are deliberate about the actions we take. Egypt has been a moderate influence in the Middle East and has a peace agreement with Israel. I am continuing to monitor the events on the ground very closely," Granger said. The
Democratic-run Senate will act on the funding bill after the House, and might take a different approach. The chambers would then have to work out their differences.
Egypt Aid On Table

US is putting the question of Aid to Egypt on the table. Reuters 2/2 (Arshad Mohammed and Andrew Quinn, U.S. urges restraint in Egypt, struggles for policy, Feb 2, 2011,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/02/02/us-egypt-usa-idUSTRE71175920110202? feedType=RSS&feedName=politicsNews&utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+Reuters %2FPoliticsNews+%28News+%2F+US+%2F+Politics+News%29) CJC
The White House said last week U.S. military aid to Egypt, which runs about $1.3 billion per year, would be reviewed as events unfold but U.S. officials have indicated it would not be quickly cut off. "Our
assistance to Egypt is longstanding. It is based on the work that we've done together. Our relationship has been a stabilizing one," State's Crowley said on Monday.
***Iran***
Diplomacy = Iran Transition

Continued focus for our diplomacy efforts is critical in the Middle East. It ensures stable transitions between regimes. US must stay focused on a country by country basis. The uprising in Iran can be successful with continued effective US diplomacy. Phillip 2/15 (Abby Phillip is a staff writer; W.H. takes Egypt wisdom to Iran; 2/15/11; http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0211/49513.html) CJC A second test of President Barack Obamas Middle East foreign policy is brewing in the streets of Tehran this week. Following the popular uprising in Egypt that toppled the 30-year authoritarian regime of President Hosni Mubarak, some of the same activists who led Irans failed Green Revolution in 2009 are taking to the streets again and facing the same, near-certain threat of government-backed, violent repression. The administrations response to protests in Tehran on Monday largely mirrored its public statements three weeks ago after demonstrators filled the streets of Cairo.
Let me very clearly and directly support the aspirations of the people who are in the streets in Iran today, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton told reporters Monday. We wish the opposition and the brave people in the streets across cities in Iran the same opportunity that they saw the Egyptians seize. At the same time, the diplomatic scenarios in Iran are
dramatically different. Unlike Mubarak, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is a U.S. adversary and the subject of United Nations sanctions, which lessens the extent to which the State Department and the White House have to conduct diplomatic back flips in their public statements. But the absence of a diplomatic relationship, coupled with near-complete suppression of the media, make the situation in Iran more unstable, unpredictable and, potentially, more dangerous. Basic problem that you face here is that you have to deal with this country by country, said Anthony Cordesman, a national security policy chairman at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Theres no real way to predict which of the pressures for change [in the Mideast] are going to become serious and reach a crisis point. Administration officials are monitoring events in Iran closely
and attempting to gauge whether the latest street demonstrations will gain momentum. Unlike Egypts scenario, which the White House openly admitted came as a surprise, unrest in Iran has festered for more than a year which analysts believe has prepared the Ahmadinejad regime to respond swiftly to threats of opposition. Iran has been in a period of turmoil now for a full 18 months, said Suzanne Maloney, who served as an Iranian affairs adviser in the Bush-era State Department. What I think was so powerful, and what set the Egyptian government so off-kilter, was simply that this came out of nowhere. By contrast, Maloney said, the Iranian regime has learned from last years protests and the outcome in Egypt lessons that could prompt the government to launch a more systematic and unbridled crackdown on dissent. Theyre watching for this, day in and day out, Maloney said. The Obama administration also learned from the Egyptian revolution. The White
House and the State Department, which drew flak for sending mixed messages during the crisis, has been careful to speak with a unified voice including efforts to spread democracy to Iran.
***** Affirmative Answers*****
***2AC F/L***
1. Non-Unique: Muslim Brotherhood has already been included in the current negotiations and elections are coming fast. Sun News 2/14 (LEE KEATH and HAMZA HENDAWI - Associated Press reporters; Egypt: Muslim Brotherhood plans political party; Feb. 14, 2011; http://www.thesunnews.com/2011/02/14/1981307/egypts-us-envoy-says-mubarakmay.html#storylink=mirelated) CJC Egypt's long banned Muslim Brotherhood said Tuesday it intends to form a political party once democracy is established, as the country's new military rulers launched a panel of experts to amend the country's constitution enough to allow democratic elections later this year. The panel is to draw up changes at a breakneck pace - within 10 days - to end the monopoly that ousted President Hosni Mubarak's ruling party once held,
CAIRO -which it ensured through widespread election rigging. The initial changes may not be enough for many in Egypt calling for the current constitution, now suspended by the military, to be thrown out completely and rewritten to ensure no one can once again establish autocratic rule. Two members on the panel said the next elected government could further change the document if it choses. The military's choices for the panel's makeup were a sign of the new political legitimacy
of the Muslim Brotherhood, the fundamentalist group that was the most bitter rival of Mubarak's regime. Among the panel's members is Sobhi Saleh, a former lawmaker from the Brotherhood seen as part of its reformist wing. The eight-member committee, which met with Defense Minister Hussein Tantawi on Tuesday, also includes a Christian supreme court judge, along with other judges and legal experts, one of its
members Mohammed Hassanein Abdel-Al, a legal scholar told The Associated Press. The panel is headed by Tareq el-Bishri, a widely respected former judge and scholar who was once a secular leftist but later became one of the most foremost thinkers of what Egyptians refer to as the "moderate Islamic" political trend and is seen as a bridge between the movements. The
panel's convening indicated the military was trying to push ahead quickly with a transition after
Mubarak resigned Friday in the face of 18 days of unprecedented popular protests that massed hundreds of thousands. The military is now also urging an end to labor strikes that spread wildly across the country Sunday and Monday, unleashed by the turmoil.
2. Diplomatic capital doesnt trade off the state department can collaborate and hire more people to avoid any tradeoff. GAO 2003 (Government Accountability Office, U.S. Public Diplomacy: State Department Expands Efforts but Faces Significant Challenges: GAO-03-951., 4 September 2003, GAO-03-951, EBSCO)
To improve the planning, coordination, execution, and assessment of U.S. public diplomacy efforts, we recommend that the Secretary of State develop and widely disseminate throughout the department a strategy that considers the
techniques of private sector public relations firms in integrating all of States public diplomacy efforts and directing them toward achieving common and measurable objectives; consider ways to collaborate with the private sector to employ best practices for measuring efforts to inform and influence target audiences, including expanded use of opinion research and better
designate more administrative positions to overseas public affairs sections to reduce the administrative burden; strengthen efforts to train Foreign Service officers in foreign languages; and program adequate time for public diplomacy training into States assignment process.
use of existing research;
3. US does not have influence over Egyptian military. Bloomberg 2/13 (Viola Gienger, reporter for Bloomberg News; Public Praise, Private Calls Keep Pentagon Connected to Egypt's Military; Feb 13, 2011; http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-02-13/public-praise-private-calls-keep-pentagonconnected-to-egypt-s-military.html) CJC The Egyptian military can afford to exercise its independence from foreign interference, even after more than 30 years and billions of dollars of U.S. assistance, because of its relative professionalism and its view of U.S. assistance as part of a two-way bargain, officials and analysts say. The fact that we have a good relationship means that theyre going to listen to you, not that theyre going to follow you, said Graeme Bannerman, a former U.S. lobbyist for Egypt whos now a scholar for the Middle East Institute in Washington. In the end, theyll make the decision based on what is
best in the Egyptians national interest. The Egyptian military may also have acquired some of its professional standards and
ethics while studying at U.S. military educational institutions such as the service war colleges and the National Defense University. More than 500 a year come to the U.S. for advanced training, in addition to the contacts they have in Egypt with U.S. personnel, who help them adapt to the American weapons and equipment they receive.
4. The US does not have influence on the events in Egypt. Diplomatic Capital is irrelevant in a post Mubarak world. Dreazen 2/1 ( Yochi Dreazen is a senior correspondent for National Journal Group covering military affairs and national security, Mubarak's Departure Raises Tough Questions for U.S., Israel, Feb. 1, 2011, http://www.nationaljournal.com/mubarak-s-departure-raises-toughquestions-for-u-s-israel-20110201) CJC Policymakers in Washington and Jerusalem have assumed for days that Mubarak would soon step down, and have already begun thinking through what may come next. But the Obama administration and its allies have only limited influence on the future course of events on the ground in Egypt. In the end, the answers to the many questions set off by Mubaraks departure will have to come from the Egyptians themselves. 5. US diplomacy is ineffective countries will say no and conflicts are escalating now. Miller, 2-3-2010 [2/3/2010, Aaron David, public-policy scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Foreign Policy, The End of Diplomacy?, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/02/03/the_end_of_diplomacy?page=full] MGM Back in the day, there was a time when American diplomacy did big and important things. No more, it seems. The world's gotten complicated, America is a good deal weaker, and the U.S. administration is handicapping itself with a dysfunctional bureaucratic setup that makes it harder to focus and
find its footing. Effective American diplomacy may well be going the way of the dodo, and the sad fact is there may be little Barack Obama can do about it. Lamenting the absence of great men years before his own shining moment, Winston Churchill wrote that in England, once upon a time, "there were wonderful giants of old." There's always a danger in idealizing what once was or seemed to be in order to make a point about the present. Still, looking back over the last 60 years, you really do have to wonder whether America's best diplomacy and foreign policy are behind it. America never ran the world (an illusion the left, right, and much of the third and fourth worlds believe; but there were moments (1945-1950, the early 1970s, 19881991) when the United States marshaled its military, political, and economic power toward
impressive ends. There were, or course, disasters and plenty of dysfunction during these years, including the Vietnam War
and out-of-control CIA operations. But there were also brilliant achievements: the Marshall Plan, NATO, effective Arab-Israeli diplomacy, dtente with the Russians, opening to China, a competent American role in the acceleration and management of the end of the Cold War, and the first Gulf War. For most of the last 16 years, however -- under Bill Clinton and George
Bush -- America has been in a diplomatic dry patch. In the face of terrorism, nuclear proliferation, wars of choice, and nasty regional conflicts, conventional diplomacy has either not been tried or not been very successful. The image of the shuttling secretary of state preempting crises or exploiting them to broker agreements, doggedly pursuing Middle East peace, achieving dramatic breakthroughs with spectacular secret diplomacy seems a world away. The Obama administration wants to do this kind of stuff. And it has done pretty well in managing the big relationships with Russia and Europe, though it has had its share of problems with China. But frankly, these are the easy ones. It's not from the big that the president's problems come; it's from the small. In garden spots like Iraq, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Yemen, and Somalia, the problems are four parts military, five parts nationbuilding, and maybe one part diplomacy. And America is unlikely to prevail in any meaningful sense of the word where corrupt, extractive regimes are unable to control their own territory and cut deals with anti-American elements and place their security and political concerns first. Even in areas where diplomacy might seem to work on paper -- Kashmir, Arab-Israeli peacemaking -- the United States is hampered by conflicts driven by deep ethnic and religious hostility and by internal politics in which its own allies (Israel, Pakistan, and India) can't be of much help. And in one of the cruelest ironies of all, the U.S. president who has gone further to engage Iran than any of his predecessors is watching any hope for diplomacy being ground up by a regime under siege in Tehran. What's more, the
W.
Egypt Harvard/Berkley Cross-X.com 116/148 Thursday File power of the small is being matched by the weakening of the big. You don't have to be a declinist (I'm not) to see how far the image of American power has fallen. Forget the economic meltdown, which has much of the world wondering about what kind of great power the United States really is. America's currently fighting two wars where the standard for victory is not whether it can win but when it can leave. Whether it's an inability to get tough sanctions from the international community against Iran, bring Tehran to heel, make North Korea play ball, get the Arabs and the Israelis to cooperate, or push the Pakistanis to hit the Taliban and al Qaeda in a sustained way, the world has gotten used to saying no to America without cost or consequence. And that's very bad for a great power. Finally, there's the issue of how the
country organizes itself. A new bureaucratic flowchart won't replace skill and luck, better marshal American power, or create genuine opportunities for success abroad. But if you don't have the right structure, it makes success all that much harder. And the United States has departed from the one model that has proven successful: the strong
foreign-policy president empowering the strong secretary of state who rides herd over subcabinet-level envoys in real time and in close coordination with the president on strategy. Instead, the Obama administration has created an empire of envoys with power concentrated in the White House but without real purpose or strategy. The nation's top diplomat (the secretary of state) seems to be everywhere and nowhere in terms of owning issues
and finding a way to take on some of the nastiest challenges, which is what secretaries of state are supposed to do. It's still early, and maybe the Obama administration will get lucky. Perhaps the Iranian regime will collapse or the Arabs and Israelis will do something good by themselves. But the next several years are more likely to be tough ones for
American diplomacy. And the image that comes to mind isn't a terribly kind one: America as a kind of modern-day Gulliver tied up by tiny tribes abroad and hobbled by its inability to organize its own house at home. 6. There will not be a transition to democracy in Egypt. The Brotherhood and Military will prevent it either way. Warren 2/17 (David Warren, Staff; Democracy and the Mob; February 17, 2011; http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2011/02/17/our_incoherent_response_to_middle_east_ch aos_108923.html) CJC You cannot argue with a mob -- the choice is between feigned obedience and defiance -- and the Egyptian army chose
to dispense with Hosni Mubarak last week. It is trying to play the forces loosed on Cairo streets and elsewhere as a bull; with a cape of promises, revised daily to keep up with the demands. Reforms, yes; a new constitution, yes; multi-party elections, yes; ... and now, more money for everyone! You cannot write a constitution in 10 days, or rather, you can, but it won't last. Most old-world constitutions were written in blood (Canada's was unusual); the alternative is to write them in water. That the existing Egyptian constitution is a defunct, humourless joke -- dictated by a dictator -- may be conceded. And yet there was one thing to be said for it. It corresponded approximately to the reality, and made limitations upon democracy fairly plain. It wasn't a
Democracy is itself the loudest false promise being casually offered in the Middle East. It will not be available within days or weeks, in Egypt, or Iran for that matter. It exists only
tissue of false promises. party elections,"
arguably, and then very tenuously, in Iraq -- after nearly a decade of bloodshed. And there, only because Bush and company dwelt upon the "civil society" aspects, consciously resisting "one man, one vote, one time." Even reduced to "free and fair multi-
democracy remains unavailable for the foreseeable future, because in Egypt, Jordan, Yemen, Algeria, and elsewhere, only two "parties" are seriously organized, and neither is parliamentary by disposition. One would be the civilian military order behind each existing autocracy; the other the Muslim Brotherhood, or Islamist equivalents (Hamas, Hezbollah, and so on). These latter have already created their parallel welfare and regulatory agencies, their protection rackets, even a kind of judicial and legislative apparatus, operating through the mosques. The more sophisticated commentators in the West have been drawing contrasts between the older and younger
manifestations of Islamism. In the case of Egypt, we are asked to compare, for instance, the social-media-savvy Moaz Abdel Karim, age 29, with the rhetorically bludgeoning Mohamed Badi -- age 66, and the actual "supreme guide" of the Muslim Brotherhood (with the infrastructure of the movement entirely behind him). The former speaks sensitively but vacuously about pluralism in religion and politics; about the aspirations of women. The latter prefers to raise the banner of Jihad, while belabouring three topics: Zionism, Israel, and Jews. Whom should we trust? We have read much about those twittering "social media," which the younger generation of Islamists have mastered, along with everyone else. The demonstrations were certainly organized through them. They became possible because social media gave people the sense of strength in numbers -- well before they actually had the numbers on the street. And al Jazeera leaped in quickly to spread the word and excitement from there. The Internet, in combination with partisan and sensationalized mass media, have rewritten many of the rules. The
mob is now electronically summoned and enhanced, but, to return to where I started, this does not make it any easier to argue with, nor contribute to the possibilities for mature and intelligent
Egypt Harvard/Berkley Cross-X.com 117/148 Thursday File deliberation over the path ahead. It instead creates a new and much broader field for anarchy. From anarchy to totalitarianism is one Persian step.
***Uniqueness Ans.***
Aff Egypt N/U: Dip Cap Low

US diplomatic capital is at an all-time low. We dont have the influence to do anything in the region. CNN 2/2 (Elise Labott and Josh Levs, CNN Staff, The Sweep: The risk of democracy in the Middle East, February 2, 2011,
the U.S. has less leverage in the region than ever before. At talks last month in Istanbul, Turkey, Iran showed the U.S. and its allies that it will remain defiant on its nuclear program in the face of tough sanctions. Lebanon is in the throes of a dangerous game of brinksmanship that threatens to send the country back into civil war after Hezbollah, supported by Syria and Iran, brought down the U.S.-backed government of Prime Minister Saad Hariri and installed billionaire businessman Najib Mikati as its choice for the job. In Yemen, a strongman president has been ejected, but he was also key to U.S. anti-terror efforts in the country that harbors an active and threatening subset of al Qaeda.
Today,
***Link Level***
Iraq Aff Link Turn

Withdrawing from Iraq saves diplomatic capital shifts focus elsewhere while Iraq takes the lead. Scowcroft, 5-13-2010 [Brett, former US National Security Advisor, 2010 GLOBAL SECURITY FORUM, http://csis.org/files/attachments/100513_middleeast_panel_transcript.pdf]
Q: Chet Crocker, Georgetown University. A couple of 20,000-foot questions for a retired Air Force general and a screenplay writer. (Laughter.) Brent, you mentioned the phrase, a nurturing presence, and I wonder what kind of post-Iraq war, postAfghan war military footprint you see in that part of the world, and what role for our diplomacy? Are we going to be the lead actor on all the issues that weve been touching on Israel-Palestine, India-Pakistan, and of course, Gulf security architecture, which David mentioned? So are we going to be the lead diplomatic presence and the lead
military presence in this region? And should this region continue to occupy 80 percent of our political and diplomatic capital around the world? Thank you. LT. GEN. SCOWCROFT: Chet, I think youre the best one to answer that question. I would hope that we would back down a little bit from leadership in the region to, if you will, nurturing and cooperation and encouragement for the region to get itself together and to move in unison. Its fundamentally a rich region. Iraq, for example, has huge natural resources. The right kind of encouragement could do a lot to turn Iraqi-Iranian relationship to one, at least, of toleration. I think Jordan is another problem, which is, in part, a regional problem. Aside from the issues of the East Bank, and so on, there are close to a million Iraqi refugees in Jordan. This is a terrible burden for a state without the natural resources that some of the others have. I think we can use our ability to organize and guide in a way which encourages the best instincts of the region without saying, weve dealt with these military problems; now were going to set the region
straight, because I dont think were able to do that.
Afghanistan Aff Link Turn

Afghanistan presence devastates dip cap. South China Morning Post, 2009 [Greg Torode, 12-3, "Will Obama's Afghan strategy play into China's hands?", Lexis] Obama's Afghan strategy - 100,000 troops and a withdrawal beginning in July 2011 - will demand costly intangibles and some are wondering whether it is here, in East Asia, that Washington will end up paying that bill. Quagmire in Afghanistan could further play into the hands of an emerging China that is fast
US President Barack challenging the strategic assumptions that have governed East Asia for decades. Even if the dramatic escalation of 30,000 extra troops goes smoothly, the military, political and diplomatic capital expended will be considerable. And it is
being spent by a fresh, young hopeful, but an exhausted warrior trying to restore his reserves of blood and treasure after two conflicts, and the worst economic crisis in a generation. Will Afghanistan divert Washington's attention from the more subtle but vital task of dealing with the rise of China and balancing ties across East Asia, where, for decades, it has been the primary military power? Will it divert the energies of US institutions just as they are supposed to be engaging China on an ever-broadening range of issues, from the
not environment and water management to freedom of navigation? Then there are the worst case scenarios. Would Afghanistan commitments mean the US could not respond fully to a military crisis in the region, say a conflict over Taiwan or the Korean peninsula? Afghanistan, after all, is now Obama's war. These are the questions being asked across
the region just weeks after Obama staged his first visit to set the tone for what he hopes will be eight years of complex engagement - deepening ties with China while boosting existing alliances and reaching
to out to new friends. No one is pretending China would create that crisis but some believe Beijing would quietly seek to exploit any perceived vacuum. Dr Ian Storey, a scholar at Singapore's Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, said a sense that the US risked bogging itself down in Afghanistan could embolden Beijing. "On a strategic level, it might reinforce China's perceptions that the US is a declining power," he said. "And I think that, in turn, could make Beijing more assertive in the region. We might see China being more confident about pushing the theme of a new multipolar world like they tried in the 1990s, a world where the US is more of a 'normal' power." Already, US military officials describe more frequent encounters with Chinese warships across the region, a presence expected to grow. On the diplomatic front, US diplomats and their regional allies find their Beijing counterparts increasingly assertive. While Afghanistan might force Washington to draw away from the Pacific theatre - its biggest presence - its important naval engagement with the region was unlikely to diminish, Storey said. "We can see the US is exhausted," one veteran Japanese envoy said privately. "Taking on fresh burdens in Afghanistan leaves us wondering about the response in a crisis. With the best will, it would be a great challenge ... they are already stretched." Professor Shi Yinghong, director of the Centre for American Studies at Renmin University, said China would now pay closer attention to developments in Afghanistan. Although China would avoid publicly commenting on Obama's Afghan decision, Shi said Beijing would be concerned no matter whether America won or lost the war. "It will be a very distant concern. Beijing will be more immediately concerned if the US loses the war, in this case, its ally Pakistan will be affected, and security in the region will be undermined," he said. "If the war is won, then Beijing will be uncomfortable to have so many US soldiers near its border." In practical terms, Beijing has appeared content to stand on the sidelines through the war to date. Repeated US requests to exploit bases on the Chinese side of the border for refuelling missions have been refused. More recently, US officials have requested an opening of the small but strategic Sino-Afghan border to allow troops and supplies to be ferried down the mountainous Wakhan Corridor. The issue was raised during Obama's recent mission to Beijing but has yet to be approved. No offers of hard military support is expected any time soon. Most analysts believe China is unlikely to want to be involved in a war led by US-dominated Nato forces rather than the UN. But some in the region believe Obama will not be easily diverted. Professor Thitinan Pongsudhirak, a political scientist at Bangkok's Chulalongkorn University, said Obama had made considerable gains in Southeast Asia compared with his predecessor. He has entrenched ties with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and has taken the risk of engaging Myanmar's junta. "Despite all the challenges he will face in Afghanistan, I think the track in this part of the world is set ... his administration has done more in a year than Bush did in eight years," he said. "We fully expect that will continue."
Investment in Afghan war is wasting Obamas diplomatic capital aff frees it up. Carpenter, 6-27-2010 [Dan, Writer and columnist for the IndyStar, No credit for taking charge, http://www.indystar.com/article/20100627/OPINION05/6270333/1039/OPINION05/No-credit-fortaking-charge]
Like Lincoln, President Barack
Obama
has found it necessary to change generals in the middle of a war. Unlike Lincoln, this
president seems unlikely to defeat the South. With Afghanistan, his chances of victory are roughly equal to Lincoln's, assuming that victory means a secure, friendly populace under the firm control of a government established under the auspices of the U.S. military. Even a gunboat diplomacy buff like George Will sees no hope or necessity for the Afghanistan expedition. Liberals are left pretty much in a quagmire, suffering through another political oil
splash on their man without reason to believe his handling of this affront has any bearing on the alleged business at hand. "Success" in Afghanistan is as remote to the vast majority of
Egypt Harvard/Berkley Cross-X.com 121/148 Thursday File Americans (those without loved ones there) as Afghanistan itself. To the extent they discuss the
commander in chief as they stand in line for their iPhones, they talk in terms of his domestic war, the bone-deep conflict between a Northern urbanite and a devout resistance dominated by the South and Southwest. Recognizing the potency of right-wing sentiment, and the inconstancy of the so-called Blue Dog Democrats, Obama long ago adopted a strategy of cooptation. Assure the other side you share their narrowly defined basic values of patriotism and morality and middle-class preeminence, and hope they'll drop their guard against your more imaginative agenda. Because nobody dares run for president as an
antiwar candidate, Obama chose to label Iraq as the wrong war, leaving Afghanistan as the right war and obligating himself to prosecute that waste of lives, money and diplomatic capital. He played into the mass fantasy that global upheaval can be reduced to the mischief of a few terrorist bands. He threw in the bonus of a sort-of deadline for bringing the troops home. None of it has pleased North or South on this side of the proverbial water's edge. It
couldn't even spare him a bizarre cross-cultural kneecapping by his top general in, of all places, Rolling Stone magazine. Hardly a match for Lincoln's dark nights of the soul, I guess; but our much-maligned 16th president surely died with confidence that historians would vindicate him. He waged a terrible war that ended insurrection, ended slavery -- and ended. No American
war has taken longer to reach its end than the current one that Barack Obama purported to welcome. Its end is not in sight, and the absence of evil that it would bring about is something our visionary leader is unable to picture for us. Lincoln's eloquence about bereaved military families who "have
laid so costly a sacrifice upon the altar of freedom" can hardly be appropriated for a disjointed and deadly security operation for a corrupt and ineffectual foreign regime. The battle, then, is to save face on the home front. To show who is in command. It has to be an ill-fitting role for a man who sought to dial down his predecessor's emphasis on the military and offer an open hand to the non-Western world. Playing it is the price he has had to pay to be president. He can go ahead and break a leg, as they say in show business; but he'll hear little applause from South, North, or, when it comes to his chosen war, posterity.
Iraq Aff Link Turn

Withdrawing from Iraq saves diplomatic capital shifts focus elsewhere while Iraq takes the lead. Scowcroft, 5-13-2010 [Brett, former US National Security Advisor, 2010 GLOBAL SECURITY FORUM, http://csis.org/files/attachments/100513_middleeast_panel_transcript.pdf]
Q: Chet Crocker, Georgetown University. A couple of 20,000-foot questions for a retired Air Force general and a screenplay writer. (Laughter.) Brent, you mentioned the phrase, a nurturing presence, and I wonder what kind of post-Iraq war, postAfghan war military footprint you see in that part of the world, and what role for our diplomacy? Are we going to be the lead actor on all the issues that weve been touching on Israel-Palestine, India-Pakistan, and of course, Gulf security architecture, which David mentioned? So are we going to be the lead diplomatic presence and the lead
military presence in this region? And should this region continue to occupy 80 percent of our political and diplomatic capital around the world? Thank you. LT. GEN. SCOWCROFT: Chet, I think youre the best one to answer that question. I would hope that we would back down a little bit from leadership in the region to, if you will, nurturing and cooperation and encouragement for the region to get itself together and to move in unison. Its fundamentally a rich region. Iraq, for example, has huge natural resources. The right kind of encouragement could do a lot to turn Iraqi-Iranian relationship to one, at least, of toleration. I think Jordan is another problem, which is, in part, a regional problem. Aside from the issues of the East Bank, and so on, there are close to a million Iraqi refugees in Jordan. This is a terrible burden for a state without the natural resources that some of the others have. I think we can use our ability to organize and guide in a way which encourages the best instincts of the region without saying, weve dealt with these military problems; now were going to set the region
straight, because I dont think were able to do that.
Japan Aff Link Turn

Withdrawing from Okinawa ends criticism of the US, allowing us to pursue diplomatic endeavor Gher, 2002 [Jaime, JD graduate at University of San Francisco School of Law, Status of Forces Agreements: Tools to Further Effective Foreign Policy and Lessons To Be Learned from the United States-Japan Agreement, Fall, 37 U.S.F. L. Rev. 227, University of San Francisco Law Review, Lexis] MGM
a local assembly on Okinawa, the site of America's largest military base in Japan, demanded the "withdrawal of all U.S. Marines on the island and the resignation of their commander." n18 As the global community becomes more aware of Japanese dissatisfaction, the more likely it is that United States diplomatic endeavors will be thwarted and its international reputation tarnished. The United States has a long history of "sending ... [troops] abroad to further [its] national security and foreign policy objectives[, which] has profound implications under United States and international law and raises ... issues of ... status, rights, privileges, and immunities." n19 This Comment focuses on an instrument essential to America's military placement
On February 16, 2001, scheme: the Status of Forces Agreement ("SOFA").
Link Link Turn South Korea K Aff

Link Turn: US focus should shift from military power and towards gender policy. Such a change would significantly increase diplomatic capital. Culpepper 2010 (Brenton, Lawyer and writer in the Vanderbilt Law School Journal of Transnational Law**, Congresss Attempted Response to the Worlds Demand for the Violence Against Women Act, The Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, LexisNexis, May 2010, http://web.lexis-nexis.com/scholastic/document?_m =235f2b6f28fe5116dc52324e38ebfe4c&_docnum=1&wchp=dGLzVlzzSkVk&_md5=bcef5cca117ffa071d3621 bd40b67ba6) Congressional activism on gender policy provides an avenue for shifting the image of the U.S. from one of military hard power to a moral and diplomatic leader. 113 This shift increases U.S. diplomatic capital, which can - in much the same way a President spends political capital to achieve policy objectives on Capitol Hill - translate into success for U.S. foreign policy goals. 114 Credibility in one human [*749] rights arena (e.g. gender equality) often serves to enhance credibility in an unrelated human rights arena (e.g. child labor). 115 Professor Joseph Nye describes the above phenomenon as "soft power": "Soft power is the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments." 116 Nye argues that "when American policies lose their legitimacy and credibility in the eyes of others, attitudes of distrust tend to fester and further reduce our leverage." 117 "Problems arise for our soft power when we do not live up to our own standards," including
international standards to which the United States committed. 118 Areas of legal and moral contradiction, such as those present in gender policy, create the loss of the legitimacy and credibility necessary to build soft power. 119 Readers should be cautious not to overestimate the value of U.S. credibility on gender equality issues. Certainly, this Note does not mean to suggest that if Congress passes legislation that addresses gender problems in America, all of the damage currently spanning the U.S. moral ethos would dissipate. However, "soft power grows out of our culture, out of our domestic values and policies," and reclaiming legitimacy by addressing domestic gender-motivated violence as a human rights issue can communicate this cultural value. 120 In particular, Congressional legislation serves the dual purpose of restoring the U.S. image as a champion of gender equality as well as signaling that Congress takes its responsibility for fulfilling international human rights obligations seriously. In this way, gender legislation advances U.S soft power interests.
***Internal Answers***
Aff Egypt: No Influence

US does not have influence over Egyptian military. Bloomberg 2/13 (Viola Gienger, reporter for Bloomberg News; Public Praise, Private Calls Keep Pentagon Connected to Egypt's Military; Feb 13, 2011; http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-02-13/public-praise-private-calls-keep-pentagonconnected-to-egypt-s-military.html) CJC The standards taught include a role for civilian influence over decision-making, said Robert Springborg, a professor of political economy of the Middle East at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. Springborg said he doesnt think the U.S. has had much influence over the decisions of the Egyptian military during the turmoil in Cairo and other major cities. I think the military has looked after its own interests as the high command sees them, he said. The Egyptian military isnt likely to get too involved in details of constitutional changes or get so comfortable that they would want to hang on to power, Bannerman and others said. They are just not the types to want to do that, said Paul Sullivan, a professor of economics at the National Defense University in Washington. Also the people of Egypt would likely not accept it.
Aff Egypt: Aid =/= Influence

Aid does not influence Egyptian military; they see it as compensation for the Peace Accords with Israel. Bloomberg 2/13 (Viola Gienger, reporter for Bloomberg News; Public Praise, Private Calls Keep Pentagon Connected to Egypt's Military; Feb 13, 2011; http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-02-13/public-praise-private-calls-keep-pentagonconnected-to-egypt-s-military.html) CJC The Egyptian military sees the aid it receives every year from the U.S. as recompense for its 1979 peace agreement with Israel and for basing and access that the U.S. receives, analysts said. They see the aid as a partnership, Bannerman said. As a result, Gates and Mullen arent likely to press too hard, he said. Theyre smart enough to know thats not how to get them to do it.
Aff Egypt No Influence

U.S. has zero influence over what happens on the ground in Egypt. Stone 1/31 (Andrea Stone, Political Analyst for Politics Daily, Egyptian Crisis Biggest Foreign Test Yet for Obama Administration, 1/31/2011, http://www.politicsdaily.com/2011/01/31/egyptian-crisis-biggest-foreign-test-yet-for-obamaadministratio/) CJC U.S. is a 'spectator' Despite its financial sway, "It's important to keep in mind that the United States is not going to change the course of events in Egypt or anywhere else," Ottaway said. "The United States is really a spectator to a phenomenon that has taken on a life of its own." US is reactionary, they know the outcome is out of their control. Wall Street Journal 2/3 (JONATHAN WEISMAN And ADAM ENTOUS, Staff Writers, White House Charts a New Plan,
FEBRUARY 3, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703960804576120064121963244.html? mod=rss_Politics_And_Policy) CJC
How the administration overcomes Mr. Mubarak and moves to an interim government is not clear. White House Chief of Staff William Daley, meeting with journalists Wednesday, said, "A lot of this is totally out of our control." Much of the White House response has been "reacting to the circumstances on the street and the knowledge we obtain," he said. US has zero influence over the outcome in Egypt. Babbin 2/2 (Jed Babbin served as a Deputy Undersecretary of Defense under George H.W. Bush. He is the author of several bestselling books including "Inside the Asylum," and "In the Words of Our Enemies.", Egypt's Future Will Be Decided by the Military, February 2, 2011, http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2011/02/02/egypts_future_will_be_decided_by_the_milit ary.html) CJC Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak's Tuesday promise to not run for reelection does not mean his government will survive through the scheduled September contest. Whether his regime falls now or leaves of its own accord later will not be decided in Washington, DC or the New York Times' editorial boardroom. Neither will the choice of his successor, who - unless the Egyptian armed forces choose to intervene may tilt Egypt into the radical Islamist sphere now dominated by Iran. In his brief Tuesday evening remarks, President Obama did a good job of pretending that we have significant influence on the events in Egypt which will determine who rules in Mubarak's place. But he did say one thing that will influence events there: that transition in Egypt "must be meaningful, it must be peaceful, and it must begin now. By that remark, he threw our lot with the demonstrators who seek Mubarak's immediate removal and made Mubarak's time to organize any transition even more limited than they were before. In fact, America has lost the ability to influence the shape of post-Mubarak Egypt and it faces growing crises in another moderate Arab state, Jordan, which has been solidly pro-American since the advent of King Abdullah's reign. This loss of influence is apparently misunderstood or, to borrow a malapropism from a former president, misunderestimated by the Obama administration and its media surrogates. US does not have influence over the Middle East. CNN 2/2 (Elise Labott and Josh Levs, CNN Staff, The Sweep: The risk of democracy in the Middle East, February 2, 2011,
http://www.cnn.com/2011/POLITICS/02/02/sweep.us.egypt/index.html? eref=rss_politics&utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+rss%2Fcnn_allpolitics+%28RSS %3A+Politics%29) CJC Although it came into office hoping to seduce the region rather than fight it, the Obama
administration has not delivered on the tantalizing promises it made since taking over, not only to show progress on solving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict but to encourage democratic reform. Change in the region comes not from his encouragement but from the disaffected taking matters into their own hands. These dashed expectations Obama has created in the region are not just disappointing;
Egypt Harvard/Berkley Cross-X.com 128/148 Thursday File they have hurt U.S. credibility in the region and have had diplomats and Middle East experts scratching their heads about just what Obama's vision for the region is. This troubled region has always looked to the U.S. to help in times of crisis. Now, countries like Turkey and Qatar, whose interests don't always align with Washington's, are taking the lead.
Aff Egypt No Influence: Military

US does not have influence over the military. They can be baought by radical forces. Babbin 2/2 (Jed Babbin served as a Deputy Undersecretary of Defense under George H.W. Bush. He is the author of several bestselling books including "Inside the Asylum," and "In the Words of Our Enemies.", Egypt's Future Will Be Decided by the Military, February 2, 2011, http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2011/02/02/egypts_future_will_be_decided_by_the_milit ary.html) CJC
As one very senior retired Israeli officer told me, the Egyptian army didn't become communist when it was heavily equipped (rather more than it needed) by the Soviet Union. In 1973 they even expelled the Soviets from Egypt. We cannot expect
that the Egyptian army will have become a democratic force as a result of our deep connections with it. That source emphasized that the Egyptian army's deep rooted culture and mentality will prevail. A senior American military source who trained with Egyptian forces for years echoed those thoughts and added this: the Egyptian army's officer corps is loyal to Mubarak, at least up to a point. But they will resist a radical regime. Though they aren't well-trained by US standards because
they have little funding to train, the officers and men have some prestige in Egyptian society which they wish to maintain. Though the enlisted men in Egyptian forces are very poorly paid - again reflecting Egypt's weak economy and consistent failure to spend enough to create and train effective forces - they are loyal to their officers. On Monday, the Egyptian military proclaimed it would not use violence against the Cairo demonstrators. But that does not mean it will remain on the sidelines indefinitely. But what if, when Mubarak falls, a more radical government rises in its place? Another senior American military source opined that the Egyptian military would not permit a radical Islamic regime like the Tehran Ayatollahs from taking control. But given Egypt's culture and its military's low-paid status, it's entirely possible that a new
Islamist regime could purchase the military's loyalty. That is the most likely scenario if radical Islamic influence - from inside Egypt and emanating from Iran and Syria - manage to tip the balance their way.
***A2: Counterterrorism*** ***Impact Ans.***
A2: Counterterrorism Impacts

No risk of collapsing counterterrorism operations. 3 warrants: A. Egypt will continue its cooperation even with Muslim Brotherhood in power. B. Turkey could fill the intelligence void. C. Turn: Egypt democracy regardless of the outcomes undercut Al-Qaeda. Washington Post 2/13 (Mary Beth Sheridan and Joby Warrick, Washington Post Staff Writers; Mubarak resignation throws into question U.S.-Egyptian counterterrorism work; February 13, 2011; http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2011/02/12/AR2011021203581.html?hpid=topnews) CJC officials, however, argue that Egypt is likely to continue much of its cooperation. They note the country has every interest in combating terrorism, having suffered years of assassinations and other attacks by extremist Muslim groups. Only last month, 21 people died in a carbomb attack on a Coptic Christian church in Alexandria. Grenier predicted the relationship would continue even if the Muslim Brotherhood controlled the next government. If anything, the Brotherhood "understands the extremists better than anyone else. They know that, in revolutionary situations, the moderates are the first to go," said the former CIA official, now chairman of ERG Partners, a consulting firm. Michele Dunne, another former State Department Middle East expert, agreed that the new Egyptian government will be much more sensitive to public opinion than Mubarak's regime. "But the U.S. has good counterterrorism cooperation with governments of countries like Turkey," a democratic Muslim nation, said Dunne, now at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. "The idea we can't do business with countries responsive to their citizens is a false one." Indeed, she said, if
Some former the future Egyptian government is less repressive, "maybe Egypt won't be producing terrorists" like Ayman al-Zawahiri, an Egyptian who is the No. 2 figure in al-Qaeda. Many counterterrorism officials and Middle East experts are
skeptical that al-Qaeda will benefit from Egypt's political upheaval, at least in the short run. Al-Qaeda and the Muslim Brotherhood have been foes for decades, and polls show that Egyptians overwhelmingly reject the group's brutal methods and rigid ideology. Al-Qaeda opposes the kind of democracy that millions of Egyptians called for in the 18 days of mass demonstrations that led to Mubarak's toppling. "The developments in Egypt are actually devastating to al-Qaeda," said J. Scott Carpenter, a Middle East expert with the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.
***A2: Spillover/Instability***
Aff No Egypt Spillover

Egypt uprisings will not spillover into instability in the Middle East. Hirsh 1/31 ( Michael Hirsh is chief correspondent for National Journal. Hirsh previously served as the senior editor and national economics correspondent for Newsweek, Containing Egypt: If Mubarak Goes, Does the Revolution Stop There?, January 31, 2011, http://www.nationaljournal.com/nationalsecurity/some-u-s-experts-argue-yes--20110131) CJC
Thats the only certainty now as well -- no one really knows. It is quite possible that the rapid toppling of two long-entrenched Arab dictators -- first, Tunisias Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, then possibly Mubarak -- could spread quickly to other regimes, especially since economic discontent seems a central motivation. In Jordan, where the unemployment rate is 13.4 percent compared to Egypts 9.7 percent (according to CIA estimates), King Abdullah is also running a police state that brooks no dissent. In Yemen, Ali Abdullah Saleh is presiding over terrible poverty and an unemployment rate that the CIA says runs as high as 35 percent. Saudi Arabia is ostensibly rich and under rigid control, but unemployment is higher (10.8 percent) there than in Egypt. Still, the
betting among some of the more sober-minded analysts of Arab and Middle East politics inside and outside the U.S. government is that the turmoil in Egypt is likely containable politically -- that it sends reverberations throughout the region but without a wave of revolution to follow. I dont see it as a brush fire spreading across the Middle East, but it is going to have an impact across the Middle East, said Barbara Bodine, the former ambassador to Yemen and a longtime specialist in Near East affairs. It has been a game-changer in how people see their governments and their ability to change them. But that still is a long way from revolution.
After all, the last one to occur in the region had been the Iranian revolution -- and that remained a one-off event for three decades, until Tunisia. Overturning a government requires that a whole array of unusual
circumstances align at once, not least of which is a leader who turns and flees, as Ben Ali did to the surprise of many
experts. King Abdullah of Jordan and the Gulf Arab leaders have the ability to adapt. And Abdullah has, more than Mubarak, pushed for reforms, said a U.S. official involved in analyzing the Arab world. Remember in 2003 to 2005, when people were predicting another Arab spring. The Iraqis were holding elections. So were the Palestinians. There were a lot of predictions that got way ahead of where the facts were. The spillover or domino effect tends to be less than people fear
it will. Beyond that, while Egypt was once seen as the aristocracy of the Arab world -- the country that others looked to -- its time of influence has passed. Egypt has not been center of gravity in the Middle East for a very long time, in terms of education, in terms of money, the arts, the media," Bodine said. The aristocracy is often the last to know their time is over. Indeed, Egypts government is uniquely despised for precisely the reason that it has been so stagnant in its policies. What you had was this
gerontocracy sitting on top of an ossified bureaucracy," Bodine added. "I think what youre watching is this utter frustration, not that things were going badly, but they werent going at all.
There is no risk of spreading instability. Leaders throughout the Middle East are pushing reforms quickly to prevent uprisings. Politico 2/1 (Ben Smith and Laura Rozen, Political Reporters for Poiltico, Egypt unrest threatens to spread, February 1, 2011, http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0211/48649.html) CJC Jordans King Abdullah II named a new prime minister, Marouf al-Bakhit, late Tuesday and ordered him to undertake quick and tangible steps for real political reforms, which reflect our vision for
comprehensive modernization and development in Jordan, according to a statement. The king described economic reform as a necessity to provide a better life for our people, but we wont be able to attain that without real political reforms, which must increase popular participation in the decision making. Abdullahs statement also called for an immediate revision of the laws governing politics and public freedom. The Jordanian monarchy is still widely viewed as stable in spite of a large and restive population of Palestinian refugees and observers who said it is unclear whether the shake-up unlike Mubaraks new government in Egypt represents a move toward real change. What we see is the king realizing that this is a serious public movement, both on its own right and when viewed in the regional context, and so he gave the protesters what they were asking for, namely, a change of government, and by doing so, he hopes to ensure that they do not demand anything more, said Ghaith al-Omari, who is of Jordanian descent and serves as advocacy director for the American Task Force on Palestine. Former
Jordanian Foreign Minister Marwan Muasher said, however, that the move could trigger real change. Its a serious wake-up call that reform cant wait any longer, said Muasher, who is now vice
president for studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, though he added that Jordan is different from Tunisia and Egypt; theres no fear of the system collapsing in any way. Muasher developed a political reform plan five years ago, but as soon as the Jordanian political establishment raised alarms, the king backed away from it, said Martin Indyk, former U.S. ambassador to Israel and current director of foreign policy at the Brookings Institution. So, the king has a template the
Muasher plan. The question is whether he will now have the basis to go to the East Bank establishment and say, Gentlemen, sink or swim? If we do not implement this political reform program now, we will all go down together. What is clear is that
the turmoil in Tunisia and Egypt has roiled the region with an intensity not seen since the 1970s. And the evident American and European willingness to watch Mubarak fall may have prompted autocrats to re-evalute their own relationships. Theyre dumbfounded by the notion that the U.S. governments rhetoric about human rights and democracy might actually mean something, as opposed to representing a set of meaningless talking points they can ignore, said Human Rights Watch Washington Director Tom Malinowski. Across the region, governments have visibly responded to the fear of spreading turmoil: In Yemen, where protesters have clashed with police, President Ali Abdullah who last week raised the salaries of government employees and soldiers announced expanded payments to thousands of poor families and eliminated tuition for students at state universities. In the Palestinian city Ramallah, the Western-backed authority said it would move swiftly to hold local elections. President Mahmoud Abbas canceled the elections in 2009 for fear that his Fatah party would lose seats. In Iran, the government which is publicly cheering Egyptian protesters is also flexing its muscle, reportedly executing a record number of prisoners in January, including one Dutch national who participated in European protests. Even seemingly stable regimes notably American allies like Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, whose small populations and immense wealth have typically allowed the regimes to defuse political protest responded visibly. One day after the protests broke out in Egypt, Kuwaits government announced payments of more than $3,500 to its subjects to subsidize the cost of food. There will be no spill over from Egypt creating instability, because there will be no backlash from other governments. Miller 2/2 (David E. Miller, Reporter, Times are changing use of force in Arab world, February 2, 2011,
http://www.allheadlinenews.com/articles/7022549122) CJC
The use of crushing military force to put down popular uprisings has lost its punch in the Arab Middle East. Today, leaders appear to be altering their tactics, quickly giving in to the demands of change from their people. Less than 24 hours after Egyptian president Husni Mubarak announced he would neither run again for office nor nominate his son Gamal, and after King Abdullah of Jordan sacked Prime Minister Samir Rifai and his cabinet, the Yemeni president on Wednesday announced he would not stand for another term, abandoning plans to change the constitution enabling him to rule for life. "I will not extend my mandate and I am against hereditary rule," Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh told his countrys parliament, ahead of a "Day of Rage" scheduled for Thursday by civil society groups. Saleh's 32-year presidency will expire in 2013. "The era of tanks and security control is over," Aish Ali Awwas, head of strategic studies at the Sheba Center for Strategic Studies (SCSS), a Yemeni think-tank, told The Media Line. "What happened in Tunisia and Egypt has an impact on other Arab states. The new era will be one of peaceful activities." Awwas said that
President Saleh's announcement was more likely an attempt to quell opposition rage than a sincere declaration he would step down. The opposition did not demand Saleh's resignation either, he added, but only reforms in the election system and a tougher government approach to corruption. "Everyone now is focused on the day after Saleh," Awwas said. "The important thing is he will not be able to bequeath the Presidency to his son, after what happened in Tunisia and Egypt." During the 1970s and 1980s Arab rulers used massive force without hesitation to quell local opposition. In September 1970, King Hussein of Jordan sent tanks into Palestinian refugee camps to quash an armed insurrection. In 1982 iron-fisted Syrian forces leveled the city of Hama as President Hafez Al-Assad ruthlessly crushed a Sunni Islamic revolt. In both events, thousands of civilians lost their lives. Dr.
Maddy-Weitzman, a senior Middle East researcher at the Moshe Dayan Center at Tel-Aviv University, said that Arab leaders were now opting for a proactive approach, trying to avert the mistakes made by their Egyptian and Tunisian counterparts. "Theyre trying to defuse the atmosphere and recalibrate, taking both concrete and symbolic steps," Maddy-Weitzman told The Media Line. He said that new media made it more difficult for regimes to use hard force, depriving Arab
Bruce countries of their traditional monopoly over the flow of information. However, more violence is sometimes used, such as by the Iranian regime of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad that crushed the popular opposition riots following the elections last year.
***A2: Iran Reform***
Aff No Iran Reform

There will be no Iranian overthrow of government sparked from the Egyptian protests, there is not enough support against Iranian leadership. Majd 1/31 (Hooman Majd, an Iranian-American writer, is the author of The Ayatollahs Democracy: An Iranian Challenge, Iran won't take cues from Egypt, January 31, 2011, http://dyn.politico.com/printstory.cfm?uuid=D87B8D53-EA90-B6B4-DB70DE791553C0EC) CJC There has been a temptation in the West to tie the convulsions in Tunisia, Egypt and elsewhere in the Arab world to Irans 2009 green movement protests. Those large demonstrations are being cited as the sparks that ignited the imagination of all who live under repressive regimes in the Middle East. In Tehran, meanwhile, the government has not shied away from gleefully reporting the Arab uprisings. But analogies are made not with the fetneh, or sedition, as the 2009 post-election crisis is
described. Rather, they are made with the Islamic Revolution of 1979, which swept the shah off the Peacock Throne and into ignominious exile. Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, much like Egypts President Hosni Mubarak, was a lifetime dictator closely allied with Washington. This Iranian narrative, however, is far closer to the truth. If there is any secret desire among
U.S. officials that Irans opposition green movement will now be motivated by what it inspired and rise up again to overthrow the Islamic system, those hopes will most likely be dashed. Facile comparisons aside, Persians are not Arabs and have little in common with them culturally, politically or even religiously. Unlike Arabs, Iranians have a long history, more than a century, of democratic movements. Their struggle since the fall of the shah for representative government has not depended on the removal of one man or one family. The Wests view that Iran has an overwhelmingly unpopular dictatorship and that the green movement sought to overthrow the political system is fundamentally wrong. Both before and after the contested 2009 election, Iran has been more politically analogous to the red state, blue state dynamic in the United States than to the one-man rule of many Arab states.The media, indeed, had focused on protesters and demonstrators in 2009 and on the governments heavy crackdown. It largely ignored, however, the extent of support that President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad did have which even green movement leaders estimated to be in the millions. Support for the supreme leader and the Islamic system was, and is, far greater. In the almost two years since, Iranian exiles and many Western analysts have declared the country an unredeemable dictatorship. But within Iran, citizens see politics as usual: continuing disputes, challenges and debate among the three branches of government with Ahmadinejad not always coming out on top. That is not to say that there is no discontent or that the green movement more a civil
rights movement than the revolution that many in the West had hoped for is completely irrelevant. But, until now, Arab protesters could have only dreamed about what Iran has achieved politically in the past 30-plus years. Arab countries have also had dictators who were supported, coddled and encouraged by Washington and who acted against the wishes of their citizens. But Iran has been free of foreign influence even if its citizens havent always agreed with the governments policies. Iran has been subjected to U.S. sanctions, which affect ordinary citizens quality of life, while Arab countries are key strategic allies and their governments receive billions of dollars in U.S. support little of which trickles down to their citizens. It may be a stretch for the Iranian government to proclaim that Arab protesters are revolting against U.S. hegemony as much as they are against dictatorship. But it is indisputable that the popular opinion of Arab states runs contrary to what we ordinarily call U.S. interests. It is not so different in Iran except that popular opinion on U.S. interests, at least among the majority of Iranians, is in line with the governments. Thats not to say that the anti-Americanism displayed by Iranians is anything but anti-imperialism, and Irans youth are, famously, the most pro-American but not pro-U.S. foreign policy in the region. One reason the green
movement lost steam in Iran, however, and is unlikely to reappear anytime soon, apart from the severity of the governments crackdown, is that the government has been successful in portraying itself at least to moderate supporters as being aligned with Western interests. I was in Tehran when
the Tunisian president fled his country and after the Hezbollah-engineered collapse of the Lebanese government. The Iranian media covered both extensively. But there was little indication that Irans youth were readying themselves for another challenge to authority. In the West, Iranian supporters of the green movement were quick to disseminate catchy slogans: Tunes tunest, Iran natunest, meaning Tunisia could, Iran couldnt or, better yet, Tunis envy. Certainly there may be Iranians who are envious of the ease with which the Arabs dispatched their leader. But Irans green movement had more in common with the Lebanese Cedar Revolution of 2005 than with the 2011 uprising in North Africa. As with the Lebanese protests, the green
movements large number of demonstrators gave the impression that the entire country was unified behind one goal. But again, much like the Cedar Revolution, that turned out to be an illusion. Many of the green movements demands still resonate with Iranians some even, evidently, with Ahmadinejad and his government. But major change in Iran is unlikely to come
Egypt Harvard/Berkley Cross-X.com 134/148 Thursday File about through street protests which is why no one calls for them anymore. Not while the whole country, unlike in the Arab states, isnt united in hatred of its leaders.
***A2: Muslim Brotherhood Bad***
Aff Egypt No I/L: Muslim Brotherhood

Muslim Brotherhood will not rise to control the government, they dont want power and the military would NEVER allow it. Bloomberg 2/13 (Viola Gienger, reporter for Bloomberg News; Public Praise, Private Calls Keep Pentagon Connected to Egypt's Military; Feb 13, 2011; http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-02-13/public-praise-private-calls-keep-pentagonconnected-to-egypt-s-military.html) CJC Other U.S. lawmakers have raised concerns that the Muslim Brotherhood, an opposition group accused of terrorist ties, might seize control of the country. I dont think the military are going to let the Muslim Brotherhood take over and the Muslim Brotherhood know that and theyre keeping their heads down, and saying basically they dont want to take over, Martin Indyk, a former ambassador to Israel who is vice president for foreign policy at the nonprofit Brookings Institution in Washington, D.C., said on NBCs Meet the Press yesterday.
Aff Egypt Brotherhood Wont Run

No Internal link Muslim Brotherhood will not run for election. This guts their extremist internal which are critical to their impact story. Sun News 2/14 (LEE KEATH and HAMZA HENDAWI - Associated Press reporters; Egypt: Muslim Brotherhood plans political party; Feb. 14, 2011; http://www.thesunnews.com/2011/02/14/1981307/egypts-us-envoy-says-mubarakmay.html#storylink=mirelated) CJC The Brotherhood announced Tuesday that it would form a party once promised freer laws are in place. "The
Muslim Brotherhood group believes in the freedom of the formation of political parties. They are eager to have a political party," spokesman Mohammed Mursi said in a statement on the Brotherhood website. Essam el-Arian, a prominent
Brotherhood figures, said the movement would not run any candidate for upcoming presidential elections, acknowledging that such a move would be too controversial. "We are not going to have a candidate for the upcoming presidential elections. Its time for solidarity, its time for unity, in my opinion we need a national consensus," he said. But he said the Brotherhood's top leadership had decided on
the creation of a party.
Aff Egypt A2: Muslim Brotherhood Bad

Muslim Brotherhood does not represent a threat to transition to radical Islam in Egypt. CNN 2/2 (Elise Labott and Josh Levs, CNN Staff, The Sweep: The risk of democracy in the Middle East, February 2, 2011,
Rosefsky Wickham, an associate professor of political science at Emory University and notes that the Brotherhood is an umbrella organization that encompasses different views and trends. Though technically illegal, the group does have a presence among the masses, but it is no longer the defiant anti-system movement it was in the past. The key question is whether the Brotherhood will continue to exercise self-restraint when the Mubarak regime falls. Rosefsky believes it will, arguing that the Brotherhood is less interested in seizing power and calling the shots than it is in spreading its message and influencing policy. Other experts believe the Brotherhood will grab power if given the chance.
Carrie author of "Mobilizing Islam: Religion, Activism and Political Change in Egypt,"
The Muslim Brotherhood is not a threat to US interests. Their turns are overblown rhetoric without specific facts about the Muslim Brotherhood. Beehner 2/1 (Lionel Beehner is a fellow with the Truman National Security Project and Ph.D. candidate in political science at Yale University. He is also a member of USA TODAY's Board of Contributors, In Egypt, 'Islamist' fears overblown, 2/1/2011, http://www.usatoday.com/news/opinion/forum/2011-02-01-column01_ST2_N.htm) CJC
The United States has played a role of wait-and-see as protests have raged across Tunisia and Egypt. There
is concern that a party inhospitable to American interests namely the Muslim Brotherhood could fill a power vacuum were President Hosni Mubarak to be tossed from office like Tunisia's Zine El Abidine
Ben Ali. As a result, some foreign policy observers are urging caution in calling for regime change or immediate elections. These fears are overblown. The threat posed by Islamists seizing power is more often than not a
crutch used by autocrats to safeguard their positions, secure foreign aid and snap up White House invitations. We have seen this in spades since 9/11, when presidents from Pakistan's Pervez Musharraf to Egypt's Mubarak played up the threat of radical Islamists at home to secure more goodies from Washington namely billions of dollars worth of aid and military hardware and retain power. Their relationship vis--vis the U.S. can best be summed up: Hey, we may not be perfect, but trust me, the alternative is worse. Islamic role is essential But let's face it, for a democratic coalition to come to power in Egypt it has to make political room for religious groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood. That isn't a bad thing. Mohamed ElBaradei, an opposition candidate for president, has won the Brotherhood's support. And some Muslim Brothers have participated in the recent protests, though their role and
influence remain unclear. The political scientist Barrington Moore once famously posited: "No bourgeoisie, no democracy." What we are seeing is the Arab world corollary: No Islamist representation, no democracy. Indeed, as the country's largest
opposition movement, any grassroots reform coalition in Egypt must win the Brotherhood's support. It is more popular than Egypt's liberal opposition. And the bulk of its membership comprises moderates committed to peaceful relations with Egypt's neighbors, including Israel, and nonMuslims. The Atlantic's Robert Kaplan describes the group as a "community self-help organization." Even though its members support sharia law, their primary aim is not to roll back women's rights or install an Islamic caliphate (much less a Taliban-style haven for terrorists), but to reform Egyptian politics by cleaning up corruption and releasing political prisoners. True, when the group was founded in a smoky coffeehouse in 1920s Cairo, its orientation was hardly pro-democratic. But after being banned in 1954, the movement drifted from the fiery rhetoric of past enlistees such as al-Qaeda deputy Ayman al-Zawahri or even the anti-American theologian Sayyid Qutb to make room for liberal values. The Brotherhood also suffers from an image problem, given its offshoots with ties to terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda and its alleged role in the assassination of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat in 1981. But Washington cannot wish away their widespread support among Egypt's religious classes, as they have with
Hamas in Palestine or Hezbollah in Lebanon. Nor is it clear they'd install an Iran-style theocracy. Indeed, U.S. policy still feels
hamstrung from the memories of Iran in 1979. Post-9/11 paranoia about radical Islam has made too many Americans allergic to the "I" word in political movements an untenable position in the Middle East as the U.S. itself has acknowledged in practice. Let us not forget that America's two most recent nation-building efforts have resulted in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and an Iraqi constitution that defines the country as an Islamic Democratic Republic. Moderate Islam is an essential part
of democracy in the Middle East Washington needs to start reading its own memos. This isn't Iran Also, Egypt is not post-Shah Iran. There are no colorful or anti-American religious clerics like Ayatollah Khomeini waiting in the wings. Just as the Taliban will be included in whatever future government of
Afghanistan finally sticks, so too will the Muslim Brotherhood be part of a future and, yes, democratic Egypt. We cannot avoid free elections because of the threat of Islamist parties. "This cycle of suspicion and discord must end," President Obama pledged in his June 2009 speech in Cairo. Indeed, just as we tend to oversentimentalize the secular opposition candidates as saints, so too do we demonize parties with a religious bent. "Whether the Brotherhood would in fact try to impose such a (theocratic) regime is unknown," Max Boot of the Council on Foreign Relations wrote recently. "Unfortunately, the only way to find out would be to let them take over." Maybe, but if the Brothers were hell-bent on installing an Iranian-
style theocracy, they would not have thrown their support behind ElBaradei, a secular technocrat. The question is not whether the Muslim Brotherhood will seek to join ElBaradei's coalition, but whether he will accept them. And he must. The United States, meanwhile, should back elections there, whether now or later this year. If the Brotherhood wins in a landslide, that could be preferable to propping up an unpopular dictator.
Aff Egypt A2: Muslim Brotherhood Takeover

Muslim Brotherhood does not have the ability to take control. Their evidence is not supported by facts on the ground in Egypt and the military will check back and ensure a peaceful transition. Atran 2/2 (Scott Atran, an anthropologist at Frances National Center for Scientific Research, the University of Michigan and John Jay College, is the author of Talking to the Enemy: Faith, Brotherhood and the (Un)making of Terrorists., Egypts Bumbling Brotherhood, February 2, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/03/opinion/03atran.html?partner=rssnyt&emc=rss) CJC
AS Egyptians clash over the future of their government, Americans and Europeans have repeatedly expressed fears of the Muslim Brotherhood. You dont just have a government and a movement for democracy, Tony Blair, the former British prime minister, said of Egypt on Monday. You also have others, notably the Muslim Brotherhood, who would take this in a different direction. The previous day, the House speaker, John Boehner, expressed hope that Hosni Mubarak would stay on as president of Egypt while instituting reforms to prevent the Muslim Brotherhood and other extremists from grabbing power. But heres the
real deal, at least as many Egyptians see it. Ever since its founding in 1928 as a rival to Western-inspired nationalist movements that had failed to free Egypt from foreign powers, the Muslim Brotherhood has tried to revive Islamic power. Yet in 83 years it has botched every opportunity. In Egypt today, the Brotherhood counts perhaps some 100,000 adherents out of a population of over 80 million. And its failure to support the initial uprising in Cairo on Jan. 25 has made it marginal to the spirit of revolt now spreading through the Arab world. This error was compounded when the Brotherhood threw in its lot with Mohamed ElBaradei, the former diplomat and Nobel Prize winner. A Brotherhood spokesman, Dr. Essam el-Erian, told Al Jazeera, Political groups support ElBaradei to negotiate with the regime. But when Mr. ElBaradei strode into Tahrir Square, many ignored him and few rallied to his side despite the enormous publicity he was receiving in the Western press. The Brotherhood realized that in addition to being late, it might be backing the wrong horse. On Tuesday, Dr. Erian told me, Its too early to even discuss whether ElBaradei should lead a transitional government or whether we will join him. This kind of flip-flopping makes many Egyptians scoff. When the army allowed hundreds of Mubarak supporters and plainclothes policemen through
barricades on Wednesday to muscle out protesters, the Muslim Brotherhood may have gained an opportunity. It might be able to recover lost leverage by showing its organizational tenacity in resisting the attempts to repress the demonstrators. Nonetheless, the Brotherhood did not arrive at this historical moment with the advantage of wide public favor. Such support as it does
have among Egyptians an often cited figure is 20 percent to 30 percent is less a matter of true attachment than an accident of circumstance: the many decades of suppression of secular opposition groups that might have countered it. The British, King Farouk, Gamal Abdel Nasser and Anwar elSadat all faced the same problem that Hisham Kaseem, a newspaper editor and human rights activist, described playing out under Mr. Mubarak. If people met in a cafe and talked about things the regime didnt like, he would just shut down the cafe and arrest us, Mr. Kaseem said. But you cant close mosques, so the Brotherhood survived. If Egyptians are given
political breathing space, Mr. Kaseem told me, the Brotherhoods importance will rapidly fade. In this
uprising the Brotherhood is almost invisible, Mr. Kaseem said, but not in America and Europe, which fear them as the bogeyman. Many people outside Egypt believe that the Brotherhood gains political influence by providing health clinics and charity for the poor. But the very poor in Egypt are not very politically active. And according to Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh, a former member of the Brotherhoods Guidance Council, the group has only six clinics in Cairo, a city of 18 million. Many of the other clinics are Islamic in orientation simply because most Egyptians are Islamic. The wealthier businessmen who often sponsor them tend to shun the Brotherhood, if only to protect their businesses from government disapproval. Although originally the Brotherhood was organized into paramilitary cells, today it forswears violence in political struggle. This has made it a target of Al Qaedas venom. In January 2006, Ayman al-Zawahri, the former leader of Egypts Islamic Jihad and Al Qaedas leading strategist, blasted the Brotherhoods willingness to participate in parliamentary elections and reject nuclear arms. You falsely affiliated with Islam, he said in vilifying the group. You forget about the rule of Shariah, welcome the Crusaders bases in your countries and acknowledge the existence of the Jews who are fully armed with nuclear weapons, from which you are banned to possess. People in the West frequently conflate the Brotherhood and Al Qaeda. And although their means are very different, even many Egyptians suspect that they share a common end that is alien to democracy. When I asked Dr. Erian about this, he retorted that the United States and Mr. Mubarak had conspired after Sept. 11 to brainwash people into thinking of all Muslim activists as terrorists, adding that the street knew the truth. The street, however, manifests little support for the
Brotherhood. Only a small minority of the protesters in Tahrir Square joined its members in prayers there (estimates range from 5 percent to 10 percent), and few Islamic slogans or chants were heard. Obviously the Brotherhood wants power and its positions, notably its stance against Israel, are problematic for American interests. Israel
must know that it is not welcome by the people in this region, Dr. Erian said. Moreover, the Brotherhood will probably have representatives in any freely elected government. But it is because democracies tolerate disparate political
groups that they generally dont have civil wars, or wars with other democracies. And because the Brotherhood itself is not monolithic it has many factions it could well
Egypt Harvard/Berkley Cross-X.com 140/148 Thursday File succumb to internal division if there really were a political opening for other groups in Egypt.
What we are seeing in Egypt is a revolt led by digitally informed young people and joined by families from all rungs of society. Though in one sense it happened overnight, many of its young proponents have long been working behind the scenes, independent of the Brotherhood or any old guard opposition. Egyptians are a pretty savvy lot. Hardly anyone I talked to believes that democracy can be established overnight. The Brotherhood leadership talks of a year or two of transition, although that may reflect a vain hope of using that time to broaden its popular support enough to reach a controlling plurality. The more
common assessment even among democracy advocates is that the military will retain control Omar Suleiman, the intelligence chief and new vice president, will be acceptable to Egyptians if the army gets rid of Mr. Mubarak now and over the next decade real democratic reforms will be instituted.
Egypt is missing instruments essential to any functioning democracy and these must be established in the transition period an independent judiciary, a representative Parliament, an open press, Mr. Kaseem said. If you try to push democracy tomorrow well end up like Mauritania or Sudan, both of which in recent decades have had coups on the heels of democratic elections. A
military in control behind the scenes for a while is probably the best hope for a peaceful transition. Let the U.S.A. stay away, urged Mr. Kaseem, who insisted that he is pro-American and abhors the Brotherhood.
They are only bungling things with calls for immediate reforms and against the Brotherhood. We are handling this beautifully. Even a military leader with an I.Q. of 30 wouldnt go down the same path as Mubarak because he would understand that the people of Egypt who are out in the streets are no longer apathetic, their interests are mostly secular, they are connected and they will get power in the end. If Americas already teetering standing among Egyptians and across the Arab and Muslim world is not to topple altogether, the United States must now publicly hold Mr. Mubarak responsible for the violence and privately inform the Egyptian Army that it cannot support any institution that is complicit. But there is little reason for the
United States to fear a takeover by the Muslim Brotherhood. If Egypt is allowed to find its own way, as it so
promisingly began to do over the past week, the problems of violent extremism and waves of emigration that America and Europe most fear from this unhappy region could well fade as its disaffected youth at last find hope at home.
***A2: Suez Canal***
Aff Egypt US Will Keep Suez Canal Open

US is prepared to intervene to keep the Suez Canal open. Reuters 2/1 (Staff, U.S. sees Suez Canal closure as inconceivable, Feb 1, 2011, http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/02/01/us-egypt-usa-mattis-idUSTRE71086W20110201? feedType=RSS&feedName=politicsNews&utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_ca mpaign=Feed%3A+Reuters%2FPoliticsNews+%28News+%2F+US+%2F+Politics+News%29)CJC The United States would respond "diplomatically, economically, militarily" to any closure of the Suez Canal although such an event seems inconceivable, the head of U.S. Central Command said on Tuesday. "When you look at the fiscal impact of that (closing the canal) on whoever is in a position of authority in Egypt, I just can't imagine the motive to shut that down," Gen. James Mattis said. He had been asked if the United States would be prepared to act if there were any disruptions to the key shipping channel because of instability in Egypt. "Were it to happen obviously we would have to deal with it
(Reuters) diplomatically, economically, militarily, whatever, but that to me is hypothetical and I would defer to the political leaders," he said, speaking at a London event hosted by the Policy Exchange think tank. Mattis said the United States had no
plans to re-order its military forces in the region because of instability in North Africa. "The short
answer is no. These issues do not call for a military solution right now," he said. "There's no reason right now for any shift in military forces or anything like that. I've not received any orders. I've not requested or directed anything like that," he said.
Aff Egypt A2: Oil Cut-Off

No Impact and No Risk that Oil gets cut off regardless who is in control in Egypt. POLITICO 2/1 (Glenn Thrush covers Capitol Hill for Politico and Mike Allen is the chief political correspondent for Politico and Laura Rozen is a reporter at POLITICO, Egypt: Worst scenarios for W.H., February 1, 2011, http://dyn.politico.com/printstory.cfm?uuid=DE7516BA-D472-D8EDD73BCE853D37CED6) CJC There are, however, some mitigating factors. The canal and pipeline together control only about 3 percent of the worlds crude oil supply. And Egypt especially the army, which guards the canal badly needs the revenue it generates. Theres no leverage in cutting off a key earner, said former State Department and Defense Department official Anthony Cordesman, a Middle East expert with the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a Washington think tank. Whoever is governing is going to need money, and they are going to need it in a hurry. They dont need a big spike in gas prices to go along with a 20 percent hike in food prices.
A2: Suez Canal Shut Down = No Impact

There is no impact to shutting down the Suez Canal, it is only if there is a spill over in the Middle East. Restuccia 1/31 (Andrew Restuccia, Energy and Environmental Reporter for The Hill, Egypt's unrest revives debate about U.S. oil dependency, 01/31/11, http://thehill.com/blogs/e2-wire/677e2-wire/141329-protests-in-egypt-spur-talk-of-oil-prices-drilling) CJC A leading energy analyst said Monday that a short-term shutdown of the Suez Canal would likely not result in major problems. But the analyst warned that widespread protests across the Middle East that shut down key oil supply routes could pose a threat. Kevin Book, an analyst at ClearView Energy Partners, said the biggest concern is how unrest in Egypt might affect the transport of oil. If the Suez Canal, which carries about 600,000 barrels of oil per day from Egypt to other parts of the world, were to be shut down for a short time, reserves from International Energy Agency countries could cover any losses. If the Suez Canal closure lasted too long, oil would have to be rerouted around the Cape of Good Hope at the tip of Africa, turning a 15-hour trip into a 600-hour trip, Book said. Despite the length in transit, Book said the result would be nontrivial, but manageable. The real problems, however, would come if protests in Yemen affected oil transport through the nearby Strait of Bab el-Mandab, which carries 3.2 million barrels of oil per day to other countries, Book said. In the event of a shutdown, oil flowing northbound could be diverted to Saudi Arabias East-West crude oil pipeline, which currently runs at reduced capacity. However, southbound flows would still be blocked, Book said. The other issue of
concern, Book said, is whether countries like Iran and Venezuela seize upon tight global oil system capacity to air grievances or issue proclamations.
***A2: Aid Cuts***
Aff Egypt No Aid Cuts

Aid will not get cut anytime soon. Cornwell 2/2 (Susan Cornwell, Staff, Lawmakers' views vary on aid cutoff to Egypt, Feb 2, 2011,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/02/02/us-egypt-usa-aid-congress-idUSTRE71194420110202? feedType=RSS&feedName=politicsNews&utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+Reuters %2FPoliticsNews+%28News+%2F+US+%2F+Politics+News%29) CJC "I
have a hard time seeing the politics come together in order to have a bipartisan and bicameral agreement on cutting aid to Egypt soon," said Jon Alterman, director of the Middle East program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. "I don't think Americans have a clear view yet (of events in Egypt) and therefore it's hard for Congress to have a clear view," Alterman said. There will be no cuts, not enough time to cut it from the budget. Cornwell 2/2 (Susan Cornwell, Staff, Lawmakers' views vary on aid cutoff to Egypt, Feb 2, 2011,
Republican aides doubt there will be any major cuts in military aid to Egypt in the House version of an upcoming bill to fund the government from March through September 30. The bill should be on the House floor by the week of February 14, leaving scant time for big policy changes, a House aide said.
House
Aff Egypt Policy -> Israel Inev. Change

Egyptian policy toward Israel will change inevitably. Dorell 2/14 (Oren Dorell, Reporter at USA TODAY; Ideology shadows fight to rule the new Egypt; 2/14/2011; http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2011-02-14-1Aegypt14_CV_N.htm) CJC Egypt's policy toward Israel will change no matter who gains power. For years, Mubarak The Brotherhood wants to put Egypt's peace treaty with Israel up to a referendum, Abdel Fattah said. And if the government decides to open border crossings between Egypt and the Gaza Strip, "we will support Hamas like others will," he said, referring to the U.S.-designated terror group that rules Gaza. Even liberals say they will pay more attention to the Palestinians than Mubarak did.
Most agree that clamped down on arms to Hamas and opposed Hezbollah.
***A2: Israel*** ***Offense***
Aff Egypt Turn: Peace Process

The failure of the Egypt-Israel Peace Accords would spark Israel-Palestinian deal. POLITICO 2/1 (Glenn Thrush covers Capitol Hill for Politico and Mike Allen is the chief political correspondent for Politico and Laura Rozen is a reporter at POLITICO, Egypt: Worst scenarios for W.H., February 1, 2011, http://dyn.politico.com/printstory.cfm?uuid=DE7516BA-D472-D8EDD73BCE853D37CED6) CJC the looming shift away from the Camp David Accords could be a spur to peace negotiators. This makes it clear that Israel and Palestine have to come to a significant peace agreement sooner rather than later because there is going to be tremendous instability in Egypt for the foreseeable future, he said.
Gregg, for one, thinks
Aff Withdraw = More Democratic Reforms

Large military foot print in the middle-east drives repression and will spark continued violent backlash against oppressive regimes. The United States support of repressive regimes because they are willing to support US policy means more oppression of people to keep them quiet. The plan moves away from a large military footprint in the middle east allowing for more democratic reforms. This includes places like Iran. Telhami 1/31 ( Shibley Telhami is Anwar Sadat professor for peace and development at the University of Maryland and a nonresident senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, Upheaval in Egypt: Not about the U.S., January 31, 2011, http://dyn.politico.com/printstory.cfm? uuid=D88A5DBE-DB47-2BCB-9B6BD331D950FDD0) CJC
Ever since Egypts public demonstrations calling for regime change began, Washington has been debating what the White House should or should not say, as if American words in the middle of an upheaval that is not our doing can affect the outcome in Egypt and turn the tide of Arab public opinion in favor of the United States. But if there is any lesson to be learned from Tunisia, and from the U.S. policy in the region in the past few years, it is that these historic and indigenous events in Egypt must not become about the United States. One reason the Tunisian revolution succeeded in toppling the president without major ramifications for the U.S. is that the revolt was not viewed as directly related to the West. When the Bush administration used the
Iraq War as a vehicle to spread democratic change in the Middle East, anger with the United States on foreign policy issues particularly Iraq and the Arab-Israeli conflict and deep suspicion of U.S. intentions put the genuine democracy advocates in the region on the defensive. The outcome has been that, every year since the Iraq War began, polls of Arabs revealed their sense that the Middle East is even less democratic than before. As we witness the remarkable and inspiring events in both Tunisia and Egypt, one has to wonder whether these events could have taken place even earlier had there not been the diversion of the Iraq War and whether these upheavals might have swept away Saddam Husseins dictatorship without shots being fired from the outside. Even in Iran, where there is obvious public opposition to the clerical regime, as indicated by the contestation over the 2009 presidential election, one wonders whether the Iranian people might succeed if the regime were robbed of its ability to point fingers at the West. The United States, for its own sake, must side with people standing for self-determination and
freedom, who are prepared to risk their lives for them. But lets have no illusion about the effect of what we say on the outcome in Egypt or throughout the Arab world. Events in Egypt are mostly out of our control. Its not up to the United States to determine who the next president of Egypt will be. In any case, Americas inability to engineer political
outcomes in the region or even predict them has been demonstrated in events ranging from the outcome of the Iraq War itself to contests for power in Lebanon and the Palestinian territories. Whether President Barack Obama publicly calls for President Hosni Mubarak to resign will very likely have little effect on Arab and Egyptian public opinion. To be sure, many democracy advocates want to see a more forceful U.S. voice on behalf of regime change in Cairo. But others, including those in places supporting an Egyptian revolution, like the Al Jazeera network, are already asking whether the Egyptian upheaval was instigated by Washington with some evidence presented. If and when the U.S. does take a forceful position, we must have no illusion about how it will be spun by many Arabs. Washington is likely to be seen as attempting to control events moving to pre-empt the public will and engineering an outcome to its liking. It will quite likely be mocked by Hassan Nasrallah of Hezbollah just as he mocked France for how quickly it abandoned its client after Zine al-Abidine Ben Alis departure from Tunisia. There is a sense in U.S. national discourse that the anger with the United States is only about its support for authoritarian governments in the region. It is partly about that. But its deeper and more complex as we have seen in the attitudes of the Iraqi people, many of whom were happy to get Washingtons support to throw off their dictator but were still unhappy with U.S. foreign policy. Resolving Washingtons dilemma in its relationship with authoritarian rulers in the region will not be addressed by White House speeches or even the elimination of U.S. foreign aid. As long as the United States has a heavy military footprint in the region, is fighting wars in the Middle East and is invested in the outcome of the ArabIsraeli conflict, it will continue to prefer cooperative regimes over a public will that goes against it. The Iraq War was most telling. Even as the United States was waging a war partly in the name of democracy, the vast majority of the Arab public passionately opposed it, and even many
Egypt Harvard/Berkley Cross-X.com 148/148 Thursday File governments counseled against it largely for fear of public opposition. But we insisted and we rewarded and we threatened and got our way with most. The net result was that those governments that went against the will of the overwhelming majority, which made them even more insecure, reacted in the way they knew best: They became even more repressive. Today, our closest institutional relationships in the Arab world, driven by strategic U.S. priorities, are military to military, intelligence to intelligence, security service to security service. These agencies are the anchors of repression in the region, regardless of who rules at the top. Given that repression now appears to be failing, this is a moment for a bigger assessment of U.S. policy in the region beyond what happens in Egypt.

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Egypt Harvard/Berkley 1/148

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UQ Ext A2: Dip Cap Low

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UQ Ext A2: Military Control = N/U

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UQ Ext Focused Diplomacy

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Diplomacy Focus Key

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UQ Ext Military Diplomacy

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UQ Ext US Has Influence Over Military

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UQ Ext Timeframe Next Few Months Key

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UQ Ext Dip. K2 Election Timing

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A2: Link Turns: Timing (A Must Read)

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2NC Link Magnifier - Focus

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2NC Link Magnifier Perception

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2NC Aid Link Magnifier

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Ext Aid Link: A2 Aid Cuts Now

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Ext Aid Link: Econ Spark Instability

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2NC Links Plan Kills Coercive Diplomacy

Chiu & Dworken, 1991

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Link Military Change

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***Impact Scenarios* *Suez Canal Shell***