German Military Intelligence in Russia 1941-45

Foreign Armies East and German Military Intelligence in Russia 1941-45 Author(s): David Thomas Source: Journal of Contemporary
History, Vol. 22, No. 2, Intelligence Services during the Second World War (Apr., 1987), pp. 261-301 Published by: Sage Publications, Ltd. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/260933 Accessed: 16/09/2010 06:58
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DavidThomas
ForeignArmiesEastand GermanMilitary Intelligence in Russia1941-45

The intelligence war in Russia 1941-45 was waged on a scale unmatchedin any other theatreof the second world war. Nevertheless, for various reasons, the conflict between the German and Soviet intelligence services has not received the attention that it deserves. In this paper, an effort is made to discuss certain facets of German intelligence operations on the Russian Front, specifically, the work of FremdeHeere Ost (FHO), 'Foreign Armies East', the department of the Oberkommando Heeres (OKH) responsible for the evaluation des of all military intelligence about the Soviet Union, including the analysis of Soviet intentions and strategy;and Amt Ausland/Abwehr, the military intelligence service under the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW), whose field headquarters in the East were responsible for clandestine collection, special operations, subversion, and counter-espionage and counter-intelligence. Abwehr operations against the Soviet Union did not fall within the strict scope of FHO activities. However, these operations are noted here, because Abwehr headquarters in Berlin furnished intelligence to FHO from the beginning, and the Abwehr field organization in the East responsible for espionage, sabotage, and counter-intelligence, Stab WALLI,was placed under the control of FHO in the spring of 1942 (departments I (espionage) and III (counter-intelligence)only). A forthcoming paper will examine Soviet intelligence operations on the Russian Front.2 For lack of space, there is no detailed treatment of the other German intelligence organizations that provided information to FHO, in particular, Fremde Luftwaffe Ost, German Air Force intelligence, and the Wehrmacht signals intelligence organization in Russia, Leitstelle fir NachrichtenaufkldrungOst. The operations of the Sicherheitsdienst (SD) of the Reichssicherheitshauptamt(RSHA), including the sabotage and subversion organization in Russia,
Journal of ContemporaryHistory (SAGE, London, Beverly Hills, Newbury Park and New Delhi), Vol. 22 (1987), 261-301.
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'Zeppelin', are omitted, for they were not an important source of intelligence for FHO.3 Fremde Heere Ost was the intelligence department in the military intelligence staff organization of the German Army High Command (OKH) responsible for military affairs in Eastern Europe, with special reference to the Soviet Union. FHO was established on 10 November 1938, as 12 Abteilung des Generalstabesdes Heeres, under IV(O. Qu. IV). From November 1938 to March Oberquartiermeister FHO was directed by Oberstleutnant Eberhard Kinzel. On 1 1942, April 1942, General Franz Halder, the Chief of the General Staff, replaced Kinzel with Oberstleutnant (later Generalmajor) Reinhard Gehler, formerly the Chief of the eastern group of the Operationsabteilung of OKH. Gehlen directed FHO until 10 April 1945, when OberstleutnantGerhard Wessel assumed command of FHO, pending its dissolution on 21 April 1945, at which time the Wehrmachtfuhrungsstab (WFST) of the OKW assumed the functions of FHO.4 FHO was responsible initially for the collection of statistical data and technical information concerning the armies of Poland, the Scandinavian countries, some Balkan countries, China and Japan, the Soviet Union, and the United States. The collection of data about the Red Army did not become the primary task of FHO until 31 July 1940, when Hitler informed the General Staff of his intention to attack the Soviet Union and ordered OKH to undertake preliminary planning. Before this date, the Soviet Union was merely one of the areas for which FHO was responsible and the organizational structure reflects this low priority assigned to Russian intelligence. Until the invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941, FHO concerned itself primarilywith the evaluation of statistical and technical intelligence about the Red Army, furnished by: (i) the Amt Ausland/Abwehr in OKW (agent reports and reports of German military attaches, primarily from Helsinki and Moscow); (ii) Oberkommando der Luftwaffe, Abteilung Fremde Luftwaffe Ost (aerial reconnaissance photographs of Red Army troop concentrations, installations, and fortifications); (iii) the Wehrwirtschafts-und Riistungsamt (Soviet armament production and military-technical data); and (iv) the Leitstelle fur Nachrichtenaufklarung Ost (signal reconnaissance relating to the Red Army). Before the commencement of 'Operation Barbarossa', FHO did not essay to draw broad conclusions regarding the Red Army from the assembled information, leaving this function to the Operationsabteilung of the General Staff.
Thomas: GermanIntelligence in Russia 1941-45
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Owing to the unsatisfactory performance of German military intelligence in general, and of FHO in particular,during the first year of the war against Soviet Russia, Halder replaced Kinzel with Gehlen, and elevated FHO from an essentially statistical organization to the de facto status of an operational department directly subordinated to the Chief of the General Staff and the Operationsabteilungof OKH. FHO under Gehlen was granted the authority to formulate its own judgments regarding large-scale operational issues, including planned German offensives, anticipated Soviet attacks, and probable Soviet military capabilities and intentions. In the spring of 1942, OKW agreed to place Stab WALLI, sections I (agent espionage) and III (counter-intelligence) under the operational direction of FHO. Thus, FHO assumed responsibility for collecting and evaluating data, and for providing an independent estimate of the enemy situation (Feindlagebeurteilung).Hereforth, the mission of FHO subsumed (i) the processing of data into statistical intelligence concerning the Red Army, based on facts drawn from all available sources of intelligence; and (ii) the evaluation of these facts, in order that a general estimate of the enemy situation, enemy capabilities, and intentions might be provided to OKH and the army commands on the eastern front. Gehlen reorganized FHO in May 1942, and the new organizational structure was retained with minor modifications until the end of the war. Briefly, the Russian section was accorded pride of place, given the best personnel, and divided into three groups. under Hauptmann Gerhard Wessel Gruppe I (Fuhrungsgruppe) became the most prestigious component of FHO. This group prepared the daily enemy situation report in close co-operation with the Operationsabteilung of OKH, as well as the daily enemy situation map, special maps (air reconnaissance results, troop concentrations etc.), and a daily statistical report (number of Soviet prisoners, captured equipment, and artillery concentrations). To ensure the effective utilization of all sources of intelligence available to FHO, in particular signals intelligence and aerial reconnaissance, Gruppe I periodically prepared and dispatched reconnaissance briefs for the East (AufklarungsfordcrungenOst). These daily reports and the (periodic) estimates of the overall enemy situation (Gesamt Beurteilungen der Feindlage) prepared by Gruppe II formed the basis of all planning by OKH. Gruppe I was sub-divided into five to six sections, including one for each German army group on the eastern front (North, Centre, South, A), another for the partisan war (Bandenlage),
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and a section for questions relating to aerial reconnaissance (Luftaufklarung). Gruppe II (Russland/MilitarischeGesamtlage)was responsible for all matters relating to the Soviet Union concerning the enemy situation, Soviet military and military-industrial potential, the strategy and operational intentions of the Soviet High Command, enemy morale, the economy, and conditions in Soviet-controlled Russia. Section IIa evaluated all intelligence relating to Soviet overall operational intentions, Soviet operational reserves, High Command structure, and war organization. IIb assessed statements of Soviet prisoners-of-war, reports of the German intercept organizations, articles in the Soviet press and captured Soviet documents and Feldpostbriefe. IIc maintained the main index of Soviet formations and (Truppenkartei) special indices on comparative force dispositions, troop organization, reserve formations, military schools, and Soviet personnel (from the rank of divisional commander upwards). conGruppe III (Dolmetschergruppeund Unterlagenbeschaffung) sisted of five sections (IIIa-IIIf) and was responsible for all translation work involving captured documents, Soviet press articles and radio broadcasts, and Soviet combat propaganda material. A special was interrogation centre (Vernehmungslager) subordinate to Gruppe III, wherein special Soviet prisoners were subjected to detailed interrogation involving the writing of reports and the completion of questionnaires on specialized subjects of interest to FHO and OKH.5 Regarding the sources of intelligence utilized by FHO before 'Barbarossa', signal reconnaissance (Nachrichtenaufklarung)and aerial reconnaissance provided much of the hard information about the current deployment, order-of-battle, and command structure of the Red Army. From 22 June 1941, FHO began to base its computation of the Soviet order-of-battle and its evaluation of Red Army capabilities and intentions on intelligence reconnaissance data obtained from six main sources: (i) troop reconnaissance; (ii) prisoner-of-war interrogation; (iii) aerial reconnaissance; (iv) signals intelligence; (v) agent reports (Abwehr I and III); (vi) captured Soviet documents. As the campaign proceeded, the evaluation section of FHO (Gruppe II) came to place especial reliance upon signals intelligence, aerial reconnaissance, and agent reports provided by WALLI I and III. For this reason, only these sources are noted here.6 For a decade preceding the invasion of Russia, the Abwehr exerted great efforts to gather intelligence on Russia - without success. The material submitted by Amt Ausland/Abwehr before June 1941
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contained in FHO files is of poor quality. The planning of 'Barbarossa' revealed that the Abwehr knew almost nothing about Soviet Russia. A German General Staff Soviet analyst described the contribution of the Abwehr thus: 'Die Masse des Nachrichtenmaterials, das wir erhielten, war Mist'.7The situation was expected to change after the start of Barbarossa, because the Abwehr would be able to enter Soviet territory and establish agent networks, conduct sabotage, reconnaissance, and subversive missions in the Soviet rear, and avail itself of captured and stolen Soviet secret documents. Therefore, closer co-ordination between the Abwehr and the Wehrmacht in the field was necessary. To this purpose, a formal arrangementfor co-operation was concluded on 9 June, under which the Abwehr was given specific operational tasks in support of the army. Abwehr I assumed responsibility for long-range enemy reconnaissance and established a forward headquarters (Befehlstab WALLI I) outside Warsaw at Sujowek. The Abwehr I detachment assigned to each German army group and army was subordinated to Stab WALLI. In early 1941, the Abwehr began the formation of the I, Frontaufkldrungsleitstellen II, and III, and the Frontaufklrungskommandos (FAKs) Frontaufkldrungstrupps (FATs) subordinate to these command posts. The command posts would serve as forward departments of the Abwehr, subordinate to Abwehr headquartersin Berlin. The FAKs and FATs were restrictedto operations in the front area of the army groups to which they were assigned for Barbarossa. The first function of FAKs I and III was the deployment of agents (V-Leuten)in the frontline area. Stab WALLI I, under the command of Major Hermann Baun, was entrusted with the extended training of agents selected from prisoner-of-war camps for long-range missions in the Soviet rear. Reconnaissance across the main battle line was restricted to a depth of 200 kilometres. The reconnaissance territory assigned Abwehr I (b) (partisan groups) included the entire rear of the Wehrmacht in occupied Russian territory.8The operational directive for Abwehr II stipulated the employment of motorized columns to a depth of 300 kilometres in the Soviet rearfor the conduct of sabotage, subversion, and reconnaissance missions;9 Abwehr III was charged with the collection of all forms of documents from Red Army headquarters, NKVD buildings, and Communist Party offices in the enemy rear, in co-operation with Gruppe Kuensberg, the special detachment of the AuswartigesAmtassigned to the task of seizing the records of all foreign diplomatic missions, and the Einsatzgruppen of the SS, whose responsibilities embraced not only mass murder, but also the seizure of documents.10
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Abwehr I activities in Russia before June 1941 were unsuccessful. After the invasion, the FAKs and FATs under WALLI I succeeded in inserting a number of agents in the rear areas of the Red Army and in penetrating temporarily several Red Army field headquarters.1 The type of agent used by WALLI I in Russia is shown by an FHO document entitled 'Abwehr I Ost Agenten', dated 14 November 1944, containing a list of 184 espionage sources evaluated according to nine different ratings.12Deducting the duplications, 159 names remain, of which almost half are described as 'still doubtful'. An analysis of the 159 sources according to category of evaluation yields the following picture of WALLI I agents in Russia: 'very valuable' (18); 'very valuable to useful' (2); 'usable' (21); 'usable to limited' (17); 'still doubtful' (74); 'limited' (15); 'limited to very limited' (4); 'very limited' (3); 'agent radio' (5). The list is evidence only that the network of Abwehr I Ost was far-flung at the end of 1944: in a few instances alone does it appear that the source actually operated in Soviet territory; the reports of some of the sources contained in the appendices to FHO estimates contain almost no information of value about the Soviet Union, especially the High Command of the Red Army, the Politbureau, and the intelligence services.13Major Baun and Colonel Gehlen imagined that the Abwehr controlled a small number of well-placed agents in Moscow and elsewhere in Russia, who provided a reliable picture of Soviet strategy until the end of the war. It is now clear that every one of these Abwehr agents either was a Soviet double-agent or functioned unwittingly as a conduit for Soviet
disinformation.14
The most important Abwehr network was controlled by the 'Max' Organization in Sofia, Bulgaria, under the auspices of Abwehr I Luft. The leader of this organization was Richard Kauder, who worked in Sofia with a former White Russian emigre, General Anton Turkul, and another Russian emigre, who claimed to have been a Cossack officer, Ilya Lang. The Max organization in Russia was said to consist of a net of wireless agents among Russian soldiers who were members of families which had been anti-Soviet. Most of these soldiers were reported to be members of Red Army signals staffs. Kauder told the Abwehr that the reports were collated in Russia at one or more centres and then transmitted via intermediaries to Istanbul and Samsun, Turkey, whence they were radioed to Sofia. The Max reports provided detailed and accurate tactical information about Red Army troop movements and the Soviet order-ofbattle, as well as reports about Soviet military strategy at critical
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junctures. Gehlen and FHO considered the Max reports very good and incorporated their information into a number of major FHO estimates of the enemy situation. Lang was in contact with Russian emigres and other sources in the Middle East and purveyed reports to the Abwehr under the codename 'Moritz'. After the war, Allied intelligence identified Turkul and Lang as Soviet agents, and there is probative evidence that Kauder, too, was probably a Soviet agent.'5 Nonetheless, at the tactical and operational level, FHO obtained useful intelligence from the agent sources controlled by WALLI I. It was the German experience in Russia that a good percentage of success was achieved when twenty per cent of the agents' reports could be used, even if the remaining eighty per cent had to be discarded. Reconnaissance through agents was found to be valuable in providing starting-points from which to trace the train of thought of the Red Army High Command.16However, it is clear that FHO could not and did not rely upon WALLI I for timely intelligence about Soviet operational intentions, except in the case of the Max reports. Signals reconnaissance (Nachrichtenaufklarung) was the most important source of intelligence available to FHO concerning the Red Army order-of-battle, the grouping of Soviet forces, the interrelationship and the functioning of the Soviet military chain of command, and Soviet operational intentions. Radio reconnaissance, or Funkaufkldrung,was the most effective and important type of signal reconnaissance on the Eastern Front. Drahtaufkldrung(telephone reconnaissance), including the tapping of Soviet telephone wires and field cables, was restricted for the most part to the tactical level. The interception of Soviet diplomatic radio traffic (Diplomatenfunk) was totally unsuccessful. Signals intelligence obtained from radio reconnaissance was passed to FHO by the Leitstelle fur die NachrichtenaufklarungOst in OKH, through a liaison officer from the Leitstelle, Oberstleutnant Ritter Bitterl von Tessenburg.'7 The Leitstelle fur Nachrichtenaufklarung Ost published the results of signal reconnaissance activity in a daily, consolidated report, the Nachrichtenaufkclarungslage, or 'signal reconnaissance situation'. The liaison officer participated in discussions in FHO concerning the determination of the enemy situation. In cases of doubt, the decision about the evaluation of the intelligence collected by signal reconnaissance to be published in the pertinent FHO report or estimate was made by Gehlen, based on a conference with the liaison officer from the Leitstelle, and, if
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necessary, on a telephone conversation with the Ic officer of the front sector in question. Before Barbarossa,the Kommandeur, Horchtruppen Ost, was responsible for signal reconnaissance, which was conducted from three fixed stations, Warsaw, Konigsberg, and Breslau, by four Horch companies. In July 1940, Army Group B was transferred to the east and given intercept units. After the invasion, the Leitstelle was organized, and signal reconnaissance regiments were attached to every army group. Each army group organized the regiment assigned to it in accordance with the needs of the immediate situation and the size of the front to be covered. The standard arrangementconsisted of two battalions to each regiment, each battalion with one long-range reconnaissance company (Fernaufkldrungskompanie) one or two and reconnaissance companies (Nahaufkldrungskompanien). short-range One company normally was attached to each army, and the platoons of this company were deployed one platoon for each corps sector. German signal reconnaissance achieved its best results at the tactical and operational level, by unbuttoning Red Army two, three, and four-digit ciphers, and by establishing the tactical order-of-battle and the command structures and groupments of Soviet forces by means of radio direction-finding (Funkpeilung); traffic analysis (Verkehrauswertung),and content evaluation (Inhaltsauswertung). The Germans also broke certain NKVD ciphers, as well as the ciphers used by the Soviet railroad organization, inland shipping vessels, collective farms, and certain defence factories. The Luftwaffe signal reconnaissance organization broke some high-level Soviet Air Force ciphers, including ciphers for transmitting meteorological data. However, as with the army, Luftwaffe signal reconnaissance, too, obtained most of its intelligence about the strength and deployment of Red Air Force units through the interception of ground radio traffic, and by aerial direction finding and analysis of pilot and air controller communications.18 Notwithstanding these successes, Soviet signals security improved from the summer of 1942, depriving German long-range radio reconnaissance units of intelligence about Soviet troop deployments, groupings, and command structures at the operational level. Moreover, the Red Army imposed radio silence before every Soviet offensive, thereby preventing an accurate determination of the enemy situation and timely evaluation of Soviet operational intentions. Furthermore, German signal reconnaissance never broke any highlevel Soviet army, intelligence, or diplomatic cipher. The impenetrability of all Soviet strategic cryptosystems therefore deprived FHO
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of any veracious intelligence about Soviet military strategy and intelligence operations based on high-level encoded traffic between the STAVKA and Red Army field headquarters at army and front level, and between the Moscow headquarters of the GRU, NKGB, NKVD, and SMERSH and major field offices in Soviet territory, singleton agents and agent groups in the German rear, and legal and illegal Rezidenturain foreign countries.19 Nevertheless, signals intelligence was the basic source for most FHO estimates of the enemy situation. Unfortunately, when the results of signal reconnaissance consisted of tactical indicators that contradicted the strategic indicators of enemy intentions upon which FHO had already based its assumptions, FHO refused in some instances to modify its existing evaluation to accommodate the results of signal reconnaissance. Stalingrad is the locus classicus. On 11 October, the Leitstelle fur Nachrichtenaufklarung reported a comprehensive regroupment of Soviet forces between the Don and Volga, including the establishment of a new Soviet field headquarters, 'Don Front'. FHO evaluated the insertion of this headquarters, the regrouping of Soviet units in the zone of the Soviet Sixty-ThirdArmy, and the enemy movements in front of Fourth Panzer Army as 'defensive enemy behaviour'. Another signal reconnaissance report submitted to FHO in November confirmed the existence of a large grouping of Soviet forces behind the bridgehead of Serafimovich and provided clear evidence that the Red Army had recognized the weaknesses of, and the boundary between, the Rumanian and Italian armies to the north of Stalingrad.20 However, this evaluation contradicted the forecast of Soviet intentions and fighting strength submitted by Gehlen in late August, 'Gedanken zur Weiterentwicklung der Feindlage im Herbst und Winter'; specifically, the fundamental assumption that the Red Army would be unable to mount more than one winter offensive, because of insufficient manpower reserves after the summer campaign season.21 After signals intelligence, air reconnaissance was the most reliable source of strategic intelligence available to FHO regardingRed Army troop deployments and movements and rear facilities and fortifications. Gehlen analysed the experience of FHO in evaluating air reconnaissance data in a comprehensive study based on a large number of examples of past operations, Erfahrungin der Auswertung derLuftaufklarungim Osten.22 This document acknowledged that air reconnaissance could reveal only a section of the enemy's conduct, at one moment in time, but that the advantage of air reconnaissance for
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purposes of evaluating enemy intentions consisted in its ability to furnish quickly a deep insight into the different activities of the enemy. In the judgment of Gehlen, air reconnaissance could not provide an exact picture of any facet of enemy activity, either troop movements or groupments: however, air reconnaissance furnished a starting-point for the evaluation of intelligence data from other sources, and therefore, it was an indispensable supplementary means of confirming perceptions of enemy intentions distilled from other intelligence sources. Indeed, the outstanding aptitude of the Red Army and the Red Air Force for camouflage and concealment at the tactical, operational, and strategic level, the characteristics of the Russian terrain, weather conditions, Soviet air defences, and the shortage of German reconnaissance aircraft all combined to restrict the effectiveness of air reconnaissance, especially after June 1941. Fremde Luftwaffe Ost never achieved the level of efficiency and sophistication in the collection, processing, and evaluation of air reconnaissance data, attained by the air intelligence organizations of the British and the Americans. The Luftwaffe did conduct at one time or another photo reconnaissance and aerial mapping missions over all major cities, military-industrial sites, and military bases in European Russia. However, the Luftwaffe possessed neither the aircraft nor the intelligence personnel and organization necessary for continuous, comprehensive coverage of strategic military areas and the evaluation of the data obtained thereby. As the strength of the Luftwaffe in Russia diminished and the Red Air Force achieved air superiority, the number of strategic and tactical air reconnaissance missions rapidly dwindled, depriving FHO of photo reconnaissance data at critical
moments.23
and Railroad reconnaissance (Eisenbahnaufkldrung) the reconnaissance of principal roads (Strassenaufkldrung)constituted the most valuable forms of strategic air reconnaissance utilized by FHO in the evaluation of Soviet intentions. To insure accurate interpretations of air reconnaissance, the Luftwaffe practice was to fly photo reconnaissance missions of the strategically important stretches of road and of key railroad stations and trans-shipment installations three times per day. By this method, Luftwaffe intelligence was able to estimate, with a reasonable degree of accuracy, the number of trains and thus the number of troops and vehicles such as tanks that were being transported over a specific stretch of track or road. Having computed the capacity of Soviet railroad cars and motor trucks and
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the daily number of trains needed to supply a Red Army rifle division or armoured division, FHO could use air reconnaissance data to tabulate the probable number of Soviet formations behind a given sector of the front, based on the volume of railroad activity (number of lines in use, number and size of trains per day, per section of the front, and so on). The evaluation of aerial photographs was complemented and confirmed by agent reports. As noted by Gehlen in his study, experience tended to show that the evaluation of the volume of Soviet railroad movements could be certain only when it was restricted to specific sectors of the front and rear areas, and when it was based on intelligence collected over a long period (ten to twelve days). Owing to the excellent camouflage discipline of the Red Army, aerial road reconnaissance never provided data sufficient to estimate accurately the strength of the troops in movement.24 The Gehlen study confirms that within the scope of strategic and tactical aerial reconnaissance, the daily aerial reconnaissance of the Soviet battle area, emphasizing tank assembly areas, artillery positions, and forward airfields was of especial importance in the estimation of enemy operational intentions. The results of this form of reconnaissance often provided FHO with valuable intelligence upon which to base evaluations of where the Soviet main effort would be made, the degree of Red Army preparedness for launching an attack, and Soviet operational intentions regarding an entire section of the front. Counter-intelligence assumed a position of special importance in German intelligence operations on the Eastern Front. When the Wehrmacht invaded Russia, neither the Abwehr, nor FHO (nor the RSHA) possessed any realistic conception of the complexity, the intensity, and the scale of the war that they would be compelled to wage against the Soviet intelligence and security services. OKH and the Abwehr grossly underestimated the Soviet intelligence threat to the Wehrmacht and never succeeded thereafter in confuting the activities of the Soviet services. Russia won the 'intelligence war' on the Eastern Front, not through signals intelligence and aerial reconnaissance, as did Britain and America on the Western Front, but by means of espionage conducted by Soviet agents at every level of operations, from parachute agents in the tactical zone of the Wehrmacht in Russia, to networks and penetration agents with access to the German High Command and German intelligence
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organizations. The forward unit of Abwehr III-F assigned to Russia, WALLI III, and its control organization, Leitstelle III Ost fur Frontaufklarung, under Oberst Schmalschlager, performed creditably and achieved considerable success against Soviet intelligence. However, in the end, German counter-intelligence in Russia was overwhelmed, and it failed to protect the Wehrmacht, and, indeed, FHO, against Soviet espionage and deception.25 The counter-intelligence organization attached to Stab WALLI was constituted in the spring of 1941 from the Abwehr III units that had participated in the campaigns against Yugoslavia and Greece. Four Frontaufklarungskommandos (FAKs) and twelve Frontaufklarungstrupps (FATs) were formed and assigned to Leitstelle III Ost. This chain of command was as follows: Leitstelle III Ost was under Abwehr Abteilung III, the 'Kommandos' were subordinate to the Leitstelle, and the 'Trupps' came under the Kommandos. For administrative and disciplinary purposes, FHO assumed responsibility for the Leitstelle, the Kommandos were assigned to the army groups (North, Centre, South) and the Trupps were placed under the armies. The mission of WALLI III was to direct and supervise the Kommandos and Trupps in their tactical assignments and their general intelligence activities. These units in turn were charged with the seizure and collection of all captured records and material of operational and intelligence value. During the initial advance into Russia, German counter-intelligence units combed out the border zone to a depth of 200-300 kilometres. Following the armoured units closely, the FATs concentrated on larger cities, headquarters, and Soviet governmental offices as their targets. The FAKs were concentrated to await the occupation of Leningrad, Moscow, Kiev, and Odessa. When it was discovered that there were numerous NKVD intelligence units in the area between the border zones and the line Leningrad-Moscow-Kiev-Odessa, the FATs were removed from the FAKs and assigned to the armies. In 1941, the FAKs and FATs captured so much Soviet documentary material that its evaluation could not be completed until shortly before the end of the war. WALLI III registered- some 3,000 documents, including the complete files of the NKVD Rezidenturaat Brest Litovsk and of the Soviet Nineteenth Army. However, the most important success of WALLI III in 1941 was the acquisition of a relatively complete picture of the Soviet intelligence and security services based on captured documents and the interrogation of captured Soviet agents and intelligence officers.26
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During the first weeks of the war, no Russian agent in Germanoccupied territory was identified by Abwehr III or the SD, possibly because the GRU and the NKVD were unable to carry out such assignments. After the initial phase of the war, the NKVD infiltrated hundreds of agents into the rear of the German army, and numerous Soviet agents penetrated the German civil and military administrations in the guise of collaborators and anti-communists. The partisan movement had been organized, in embryo, by the Fourth Department of the GUGB in the NKVD SSSR before the war. The First Section of the Fourth Department had prepared the operations of partisan groups in the rearof any possible enemy, and specifically, Germany.27 Although WALLI III soon tumbled to the importance of the partisans to Soviet intelligence and their value for the Red Army, OKH and several senior field commanders initially underestimated the threat posed by the partisans and therefore refused to divert sufficient troops to the rear to combat the partisans in co-operation with the FATs. The consequences of this insouciance for the German army are well-known. When the German advance came to a standstill in late 1941, the changed military situation created severe difficulties for WALLI III. The flow of captured Soviet records reduced to a trickle, depriving the FAKs and FATs of their best source of operational intelligence. Moreover, the Soviets began a comprehensive intelligence offensive marked by the mass deployment of agents and the expansion of sabotage and diversionary operations by the partisans. The Wehrmacht possessed no means of defending itself against this Soviet activity because there were no mobile military counter-intelligence units available for protection. Therefore, OKW changed the missions of Leitstelle III Ost to include the following tasks: (1) collection of information about the employment of Soviet agents; (2) formulation of a complete picture of the Soviet intelligence situation; (3) strategic deception of the Soviet intelligence services by means of G. V. Spiele (double-agent operations) and G. V. Funkspiele (radio play-backs); (4) identification of Soviet operational intentions from Soviet intelligence activities; (5) evaluation of all non-intelligence information and documents obtained during interrogations; (6) tacticaldeception by means of G.V. Spiele and G.V. Funkspiele.
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WALLI III was expanded along the lines of functional necessity to execute these newly assigned missions.28 Leitstelle III Ost was prepared for the Soviet intelligence offensive that began in early 1942, in the sense that German counterintelligence understood the working methods, training, operational patterns, and primary targets of the Soviet services. However, from the summer of 1942, German intelligence records testify that the FAKs and FATs were overwhelmed by numbers. Approximately 1,000 members of Frontaufklarung III faced the combined strength and experience of the NKVD, NKGB, GRU, and SMERSH. Almost 3,000 Soviet intelligence officers were identified by German counterintelligence. Per annum, the Soviet services committed roughly 40,000 well-trained agents and perhaps twice as many poorly prepared mass agents. Of the estimated 130,000 trained Soviet agents dispatched behind German lines, the FAKs and FATs identified 50,000 and neutralized another 20,000. German counter-intelligence succeeded in preventing numerous sabotage actions, and succeeded at times in deceiving the Red Army and Soviet intelligence. German counter-intelligence successfully infiltrated and disrupted a number of partisan units. In addition, Leitstelle III Ost forwarded valuable intelligence to FHO regarding Soviet operational intentions and the Soviet intelligence services. Given German resourcesand the scope of Soviet intelligence and partisan activity, it is hard to see how Leitstelle III Ost could have accomplished any more than it did.29 The planning and preparation of Barbarossa were influenced strongly by the traditional Russland-Bildof the Generalstab.According to this picture, the Soviet Union, like Czarist Russia, was a 'colossus of clay', which would break asunder under a swift, strong blow from the outside. In the view of several leading German generals, the Red Army in 1940-41 was clumsy, incapable of operational initiative at all command levels, habituated to mechanical militaryplanning and operational conduct, and in generalunprepared to wage modern warfare. The poor performance of Soviet forces in Poland and Finland was adjudged prima facie evidence that the Red Army neither had recovered from the decimation of its officer corps in the purges, nor had assimilated the new military technologies that it was known, or suspected, to be developing. The swiftness and ease of the victory in 1940 over France (the strongest military power in Europe, according to the conventional wisdom) confirmed OKH in the belief that German military-technical superiority and leadership would ensure a swift, effective result against the Soviet Union. The
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planning documents for Barbarossa and the official statements and diary entries of ranking German generals regarding the feasibility of the undertaking combine to suggest that OKH, the WFST, and the Generalstab viewed the problem of an attack on the Soviet Union as essentially a matter of the correct operational preparation.30 In general, the evaluation of the Red Army by FHO before 22 June 1941 furnished no corrective to the erroneous Russland-Bildthat informed German military thinking. On the contrary, the FHO assessment of Soviet military capabilities re-affirmed the traditional German picture and served up additional justification for the optimism prevailing in OKH. FHO did not begin systematically to observe the Red Army until the Polish Campaign in the fall of 1939. Initially, FHO was compelled to base its assessments of the strength of the Red Army in 1939 and 1940 on five main sources of intelligence, each of which was inadequate: (i) long-range and short-range radio reconnaissance; (ii) reports of Abwehr agents and immigrants from the Baltic States; (iii) German military attache reports; (iv) information from allied intelligence services; (v) Soviet Army deserters. The overall assessment of the Red Army by FHO between July 1940 and June 1941 must be described as incomplete and inaccurate. After aerial reconnaissance, radio reconnaissance furnished the most reliable information about the strength and deployment of the Red Army and the Red Air Force, but only for the portion of the Soviet Union accessible to German radio reconnaissance. However, radio reconnaissance provided almost no hard intelligence about Soviet reserve formations in the interior, Soviet active-duty units not stationed in European Russia, and the operation of the Red Army conscription system.3' The information about the Soviet Union collected by FHO during 1940 was convolved into a memorandum entitled 'Die Kriegswehrmacht der Union der Sozialistischen Sowjetrepubliken, Stand 1.1 1941', two thousand copies of which were issued on 15 January 1941. The description of the basic administrative structureof the Red Army in 'Die Kriegswehrmacht'shows that FHO had established the existence of sixteen military districts and two military commissariats under the Peoples' Commissariat for Defence. However, FHO was quite unclear regarding the most important questions, namely, the organization and strength of the Red Army. Through radio reconnaissance (primarily direction-finding) and aerial reconnaissance, FHO established that at least eleven Soviet armies had been constituted in European Russia. It was assumed that the higher staffs
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of the army groups (fronts), armies, and operational groups would be drawn from the high commands of the military districts and armies. FHO calculated that eleven to twelve million men were available for mobilization for the field army. However, it doubted that this many men could be mobilized, due to existing labour shortages and the lack of officers and materiel.32 The total strength of the Red Army was established as follows: 20 armies (at minimum) 20 rifle corps 150 rifle divisions 9 cavalry corps 32/36 cavalry divisions 6 mechanized corps 36 motorized-mechanized brigades The number of rifle divisions in European Russia at the end of 1940 was estimated as at least 121. FHO possessed no definitive intelligence as of 15 January regarding the disposition of these forces in Russia. The number of tank and motorized regiments and the number of special formations of artillery were not known. Moreover, FHO evaluated the known Soviet tanks and armed vehicles as obsolete, or as copies or modified versions of foreign models. As of 15 January 1941, the existence of the T-34 main battle tank was unknown to FHO and the Wehrwirtschaftsamt, notwithstanding the use of the T-34 in the Khalkin Gol campaign in 1939.33Taking as the basis of computation approximately 200 rifle divisions and other units, FHO assumed the following strength figures: 4 million men Field Army ca. 0.6 million Rear Services 1.6 million Internal troops 6.2 million men34 Total As regards Soviet military strategy and operational intentions in the event of a German attack, FHO handed up two influential assessments in 'Die Kriegswehrmacht': (i) that the bulk of Soviet forces would deploy either north or south of the Pripyat Marshes, in order to seal off a breakthrough by means of a counter-attack against the flanks of a German advance, although it was doubtful that the Red Army would be capable of such a flanking operation, given the present level of military leadership and training, and the organization and state of Soviet railroads and roads; (ii) that the strength of the Red Army derived from numbers of men and weapons and the stoicism, hardness, and courage of the individual soldier, for which
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reason the Red Army would be particularly effective on the defence. Whereas the Soviet soldier in the Finnish Campaign had fought without enthusiasm, in the event of a German invasion of Russia he would be motivated to fight, within certain limits, by the idea of the defence of the proletarian Fatherland. 'Die Kriegswehrmacht' (and subsequent FHO evaluations of the Red Army) betray no comprehension of the political, social, and psychological change that had occurred in the Soviet Union since the Revolution of 1917, specifically, the effect of twenty-four years of Communist Party indoctrination and education upon the Russian population and the individual Red Army soldier and officer. According to 'Die Kriegswehrmacht', 'the Soviet Union today preserves only the outward form, not, however, the substance of true Marxist teaching': 'the state is directed by a bureaucratic approach blindly devoted to Stalin, the economy is run by engineers and managers, who are indebted to the new state for everything and are truly devoted to him. The Army is to be constituted on a new foundation, especially with reference to the experiences of the Finnish War.' FHO summed up the Red Army thus: 'The clumsiness, schematism, avoidance of decisions and responsibility has not changed ... The weaknesses of the Red Army reside in the clumsiness of officers of all ranks, the clinging to formulae, the insufficient trainingaccording to modern standards, the aversion to responsibility and the marked insufficiency of organization in all aspects.'35 Notwithstanding the defective intelligence about the fighting power and military potential of the Soviet Union provided by FHO, OKH imagined that it possessed a satisfactory grasp of the most important elements of the Soviet armed forces. Having weighed up the strengths and weaknesses of the Soviet army, it still appeared to FHO and OKH that the same problems preponderated (with no near-term solution to hand): namely, the lack of a competent, highlevel, military leadership cadre capable of replacing the body of generals and senior officers executed by Stalin in the purges; the backwardness of the Red Army in troop-training and the insufficient stockpiling of sufficient quantities of modern war materiel for all Soviet formations. Nevertheless, FHO concluded that the Red Army was evolving into a completely modern fighting force, at the end of which process the Soviet armed forces would be capable of attacking Germany and Europe. The Feindbeurteilung the Red Army issued by FHO on 20 May on 1941 re-affirmed that the bulk of Soviet ground forces were deployed
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in European Russia as follows: 130 rifle divisions; 21 cavalry divisions; 5 armour divisions; 36 motorized-mechanized brigades. This estimate stated that 'a substantial reinforcement from Asia is improbable on political grounds'. Consequently, FHO noted that it made no allowance for Red Army formations known or believed to be stationed in the Soviet Far East. Summing up the presumed, overall intentions of the Soviets, FHO concluded that, in the event of an attack from the West, a withdrawal of the bulk of Soviet forces into the interior of Russia, after the example of 1812, would be impossible. FHO predicted (i) that the defensive would be conducted to a depth of thirty kilometres, using the field fortification system in the border region; (ii) that the fortified areas would serve as the base for offensive thrusts with limited objectives, for the purpose of thwarting German attack-operations and the transfer of the fighting to enemy territory.36 Given the exiguous intelligence available to FHO in 1941 concerning Soviet war strategy and the capabilities of the Red Army, the FHO evaluation of the most likely form of the Soviet military response to a German attack was neither unreasonable nor illogical. FHO convinced itself that the Red Army High Command did not yet possess the ability rapidly to plan and execute large-scale, armoured attacks on the operational or strategic level, in response to German mobile warfare. This erroneous presumption figured in every FHO evaluation of the Red Army in 1940 and 1941, to the detriment of an objective understanding of the actual capability of the Soviet military leadership and Red Army strategy and tactics. German underestimation of Soviet military capabilities and ignorance of Soviet strategy proved costly to the Wehrmacht in Russia.37 The invasion of Russia and the subsequent course of the German campaign from June to December 1941 exposed serious weaknesses in the FHO evaluation of the Red Army and Soviet military strategy. (The campaign also revealed the general inadequacy of Abwehr I clandestine collection operations against the Soviet target.) Within days, every Wehrmacht army group headquartersdiscovered that the intelligence furnished by FHO about the deployment, resistance, and strength of opposing Soviet forces was inaccurate and otherwise inadequate for operational planning in the field. A typical example is provided by an after-action report prepared by the operations section of XLI Panzer Corps:
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The documents to hand provided indeed only a superficial picture of the enemy resistance to be expected. Despite all endeavours including those of the Abwehr station in Konigsberg, no clear picture about the strength, groupment, and organization of the enemy forces opposing the corps was attained.38
The FHO underestimation of the Red Army in 1941 was acknowledged by OKH, although, paradoxically, it was not deemed to be a serious problem at the time, given the magnitude of the initial German successes, and German confidence in final victory. In the event, for the rest of 1941, no lessons were drawn from the various failures of FHO in respect of analysis and estimates. Only the near catastrophe suffered by the Wehrmacht during the winter of 1941-42 compelled OKH to reconsider the effect on German strategy of the poor performance of FHO, in particular, the repeated judgment in FHO intelligence estimates that the Red Army was near collapse and incapable of taking the offensive against German forces. Between July and December 1941, FHO issued a number of inaccurateintelligence estimates, which nourished the overconfidence of OKH and the Fiihrer, and resulted in errors of German strategy and operational conduct at decisive moments in the campaign. For instance, in August, on the basis primarily of prisoner-of-war interrogation reports and wishful thinking, FHO described the will to fight and the battle worthiness of the Red Army as 'diminishing':'Die Gesamtkraft reicht nunmehr weder fur einen Angriff grosseren Stils noch zur Bilding einer durchgehendenAbwehrfront'. FHO concluded that: (i) 'The number of new formations had reached its maximum strength, and virtually no additional new formations need be counted;' (ii) 'The available Soviet forces suffice only to retard the German advance against the bases essential for the survival of the army and the state, in the hope of prolonging the campaign to the period of bad weather, in order to gain a breathing spell in which to refurbish and enlarge the armed forces using British and American material assistance. Owing to the unbroken duration of the battles and the intercession of new, heavier casualties, the furtherdiminution of the fighting morale of the Red Army is to be counted upon.' Incidentally, General Halder was not convinced by this estimate. On 11 August, he went on record with a clear accounting, to the effect that the Russian colossus had been underratedand still could dispose of manpower reserves for new formations to redress all large losses. Posterity has ratified this assessment.39
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In November, the Red Army launched its first series of counterattacks with a wider, fixed operational objective, against First Panzer Army at Rostov-on-Don, Sixteenth Army near Tichvin, and against Fourth Army on the flank of Army Group Centre. FHO did not foresee these counter-offensives. Moreover, during late November and early December, FHO also did not anticipate the formation of new Soviet reserves, and it failed to discover the deployment of the fresh formations disposed behind the Moscow front for a full-scale counter-offensive designed to destroy Army Group Centre. Indeed, on 4 December, FHO informed OKH that the Soviet forces in front of Army Group Centre presently would be incapable of a large-scale offensive. In actual fact, the Soviets used the respite in early December to bring up precisely the reserves and the equipment that FHO reported the Red Army did not possess, or could not procure in the immediate future. Thus, FHO failed to predict the counter-attack against Army Group Centre in December. The alarming contents of the numerous items of intelligence pointing to a Soviet counter-offensive against Army Group Centre, forwarded by Luftwaffe Intelligence East and the Ic section of Army Group Centre itself, were not evaluated in timely fashion by FHO. FHO continued to believe that the Red Army was incapable of training a significant number of new divisions. The various intelligence reports concerning Soviet troop movements and new concentrations, therefore, were interpreted by FHO as relating to existing Red Army formations being transferred from peaceful sections of the front for the support of counter-attacks.40 When Gehlen assumed command of FHO in April 1942, he undertook to improve FHO analysis and estimates by instituting standardized procedures for the continuous, systematic collection and evaluation of intelligence about the Soviet order-of-battle; troop movements and deployments; Red Army organization, unit strength, casualties, equipment losses, and military-industrial production. Under Kinzel, FHO did not issue written estimates of the enemy situation, because the Soviet command in the operational sphere showed itself to be completely dependent on German initiatives. Consequently, apart from verbal briefing reports, FHO limited itself to the publication of a daily 'Situation Report', or Lagebericht.Thus, lack of comprehensive estimates of the overall enemy situation, including probable Soviet intentions, impaired OKH operational planning. When the Red Army regained the initiative on particular sections of the front in the winter of 1941-42, FHO responded by issuing assessments entitled 'Most Important Characteristics of the
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Enemy Situation (Wichtigste Merkmale der Feindlage), in which an evaluation of enemy intentions appertaining to the enemy situation was set forth. In the course of the wider development of the war in Russia, it became necessary in the context of the daily situation briefings before the Chief of the General Staff to put in writing existing thoughts concerning the evaluation of the enemy (Feindbeurteilung). Accordingly, from 11 April 1942, FHO distributed a daily 'Brief Estimate of the Enemy Situation' (Kurze Beurteilungder Feindlage) to the interested commands (Chief, General Staff; Chief, Operations Department; Ic Sections of the army groups; Luftwaffe Fuhrungsstab). On the assumption that the continuation of the war made it necessary to provide OKH and the army group commanders with prognosticative documentation about expected enemy behaviour, FHO now began to issue at intervals of four to eight weeks a 'Comprehensive Estimate of the Enemy Situation' (Zusammenfassende Beurteilungder Feindlage).4' In 1945, FHO prepared on Gehlen's orders a collection of FHO 'Estimates of the Overall Enemy Situation before the German Front in the East' for the period April 1942 to December 1944. In his introduction, Gehlen registered the modest judgment that the actual course of Soviet operations from July 1943 to December 1944 demonstrated that FHO succeeded in recognizing the enemy's intention in prescient fashion ('in some cases, months in advance'), and that, 'through a systematic evaluation of all available sources of intelligence it was possible to furnish the leadership in a timely manner with an essentially correct picture of the enemy's intentions and troop strength, and thereby provide a usable basis for German decision-making'. The documentary record of FHO prognostications does not corroborate Gehlen's statement. FHO made a number of serious mistakes in analysis and estimation, which contributed directly to the defeat of the Wehrmacht in Russia.42 The first case relates to the Soviet offensive against Kharkov, 12 May 1942. On 1 May 1942, Gehlen issued a major intelligence estimate, 'Evaluation of the Total Enemy Situation and its Possibilities of Development'. This assessment concluded that the 'indications of a large-scale operation with far-rangingobjectives still cannot be perceived'. According to FHO, the Red Army retained only the appearance of the initiative, owing to the arrival of additional German forces. FHO predicted that the Red Army could not achieve in any given position such an outstanding success as to compel the removal of significant German forces from the deployment
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for the forthcoming offensive in the Ukraine. With regardto possible developments, FHO assessed the overall Soviet intention as defensive: 'Forces sufficient for a large-scale offensive are lacking'. The estimate betrays no awareness either of the actual scale of Soviet deployments for the counter-offensive against Kharkov that opened on 12 May, or of the Soviet intention to execute this attack - which forced the Wehrmacht into a comprehensive regroupment and delayed the start of the summer offensive until 28 June. The FHO evaluation did register the direction of attack actually selected by the Red Army: however, FHO expected a localized Soviet operation, not a fullyfledged offensive.43 The next example of faulty estimation concerns Soviet strategy in the Ukraine in 1942. In the summer of 1942, FHO failed to interpret Soviet strategy in response to the German offensive in the Ukraine. Prima facie, FHO relied on an agent report for the prediction that the Soviets would execute a massive, planned withdrawal movement to the Volga in the face of the advance of Army Group South. In reality, the withdrawals that the Red Army was forced to carry out in the summer and autumn of 1942 were part of a deliberate Soviet strategy of mobile defence, the purpose of which was to prevent entrapments similar to those of 1941. During the autumn of 1942, as the front approached the Volga at Stalingrad, Soviet military historians affirm that there was no thought of a precipitate withdrawal, which would have allowed the German forces to spend the winter on the Volga. To judge from a Gehlen briefing at the War Academy in September, in which he stated that the course of operations justified the expectation that the area around Stalingrad and the oil-producing region in the Caucasus would be firmly in German hands before the onset of winter, Gehlen and FHO were quite ignorant of actual Soviet plans.44 A third example of FHO mis-estimation relates to the Soviet attack against Stalingrad,'OperationUranus'. As earlyas August 1942, FHO foresaw the possibility of a Soviet counter-offensive against Army Group B at Stalingrad. Gehlen in his assessment 'Thoughts regarding the Further Development of the Enemy Situation in the Autumn and Winter', registered the following operational possibilities:45 (1) recapture of Stalingrad; (2) assault against the deep flank of Sixth Army with the objective of Rostov, to cut off the Caucasus; (3) attacks against the especially weak positions on the front of the allied armies, specifically, the bridgeheads at Serafimovitch and Korotoyak.
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However, in the autumn, FHO secured information from captured documents, prisoners-of-war, radio reconnaissance, and Abwehr agents, which nourished in Gehlen's mind the id6efixe that the main Soviet winter offensive would be directed against Army Group Centre.46 In November, German short-range radio reconnaissance secured definite evidence of new, large Soviet troop concentrations behind the Don Front. On 12 November, FHO interpreted this intelligence as evidence of a possible attack in the near future against Third Rumanian Army, with the aim of interdicting the railroad to Stalingrad in order to endanger German forces stationed further east and compel a withdrawal of the German divisions in and around Stalingrad. However, FHO concluded that the available Soviet forces would be too weak for 'far-reaching operations'. True, FHO acknowledged the possibility that a weaker offensive might be launched against Army Group B after the end of the mud season.47 However, on 6 November, Gehlen issued a major 'Estimate of the Enemy Situation in Front of Army Group Centre', wherein he concluded that the main effort of the coming Russian offensive would be in the area of Army Group Centre. According to this estimate, it was still unclear whether the Russians intended to launch a larger offensive across the Don, or had limited their objective in the south, in the belief that it would be impossible to seek a decision simultaneously on two sections of the front. Nevertheless, Gehlen avouched that it was evidentthat Soviet preparation for the attack in the south had not proceeded so far that it was necessary to expect that a large operation would be conducted in the near future simultaneously with the expected offensive against Army Group Centre.48 Gehlen's obduracy in the face of the evidence is astonishing. As late as 10 December, he refused to acknowledge, unequivocally, that the main Soviet winter offensive would not be directed against Army Group Centre. The appendix to the 'Kurze Beurteilung der Feindlage' of 10 December, 'Possible Indications for a Beginning Russian Shift of Main Effort from the Middle Front Section of the Don Front', stated that Soviet troop deployments from the beginning of November permitted one to assume that the intention was a decisive operation in the middle section of the front in the direction of Smolensk (i.e. against Army Group Centre) and a modest, careful operation on the Don Front. According to this assessment, the Russian High Command still disposed of weighty reserves in the central sector, and it was not certain that the main Soviet effort would
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be made on the Don Front. Operation Uranus opened on 19 November and achieved complete tactical and operational surprise. Within four days, Soviet forces encircled Sixth Army. FHO passed over this intelligence failure in silence. Not until 9 December did Gehlen modify his stated conviction that the main Soviet offensive would be directed at Army Group Centre, and admit the possibility that the Russians could have shifted the main effort of their forces from Army Group Centre more toward the southern section of the front. Furthermore, according to FHO, it still could not be discerned whether a large-scale offensive should be expected across the Don against the Italian Eighth Army and the Second Hungarian Army with the objective of Rostov, echeloned after the operation against the Third Rumanian Army; or, whether the Russians also would conduct offensive operations against the Italian and Hungarian armies. Two days later, the Red Army attacked the Italian sector of the front and sealed the doom of Paulus' Sixth Army. This attack surprised FHO, because it was still under the spell of the notion that the Red Army was fully preoccupied defending against the German counter-attack to break the encirclement of Sixth Army.49 By the end of October, FHO had to hand sufficient tactical and operational intelligence from which to distill a timely and correct assessment of Soviet intentions vis-a-vis the Don-Volga front. And thisjudgment is not based upon hindsight. Army Group B intelligence assembled an accurate picture of Soviet strategy based on the same intelligence as was available to FHO. Thus, FHO must bear the final responsibility for the intelligence failure at Stalingrad in November 1942. True, Soviet radio silence and bad flying weather in October and November severely curtailed the effectiveness of German signals intelligence and aerial reconnaissance respectively. Moreover, Soviet operational and strategic maskirovkaseriously disoriented OKH and FHO as regards Soviet capabilities and intentions for the winter offensive of 1942. However, in the final analysis, it was Gehlen's unshakeable belief that the main Soviet offensive would be directed against Army Group Centre which distorted FHO analysis of Soviet operational intentions, including the intelligence that pointed to a Soviet attack at Stalingrad.50 In January and February 1943, the successive victories of the Red Army prompted FHO to issue a number of pessimistic assessments, which compounded the earlier, unfounded optimism of FHO estimates by underestimatingGerman capacity for effective resistance and exaggerating the ability of the Red Army to sustain its offensive
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in the Ukraine. During this period, German military intelligence was poorly informed about Soviet plans. A major FHO estimate dated 22 February 1943 could offer only the jejune conclusion that recent decisions of the Red Army leadership about the future course of operations had been influenced by the situation in the Ukraine.51 The brilliant success in February and March of General von Manstein's counter-offensive restored a certain degree of confidence to FHO, which was reflected henceforth in FHO estimates issued between March and May. Thus, in another FHO 'Beurteilung der Feindabsichten vor der deutschen Ostfront im grossen', dating to 23 March, Gehlen tendered these judgments: 'the Red Army had decided to revert to the defensive on the southern front in the face of German counter-attacks; on the basis of the high Russian losses during the winter, it must appear doubtful whether the enemy was in the position at all to conduct a "war-deciding summer offensive".' FHO acknowledged that Soviet intentions after the mud season were still unclear.52 From May 1943, FHO provided OKH with timely and correct analysis of the difficulties that the Wehrmacht would face in executing 'Unternehmen Zitadelle' and of the consequences of this operation, including the Soviet counter-attacks against the northern and southern flanks of the participating German forces. Indeed, the estimation of Soviet intentions vis-a-vis Zitadelle and the Soviet summer offensive of 1943 represents the high point of FHO analysis. Thus, the FHO 'Comprehensive Estimate of Overall Enemy Intentions before the German East Front' of 21 May 1943 predicted correctly that the Red Army intended to conduct a large-scale summeroffensive, having taken into consideration identified German offensive preparations for an attack designed to sever the Russian north-south connection. Specifically, this estimate predicted a Soviet counter-attack against the right wing of Army Group Centre to eliminate the salient at Orel as a threat to Soviet operations against the north wing of Army Group South.53 When Gehlen briefed the commanders of the army groups and armies on 23 June, he reiterated this assessment: the point of main effort of the expected Soviet summer offensive was to be expected opposite Army Group South in the direction of the Dnepr. This operation would be initiated through enveloping attacks against the Sixth Army and the right wing of First Panzer Army and against the projecting bulges in the German front in the area Kharkov-Belgorod. Simultaneously, the Red Army would attack the right flank of Army Group Centre to eliminate the German
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threat on the flank from the bulge in the front at Orel. The Soviet troop concentration around Orel permitted the assumption that the Russians intended to attack the Orel salient on both sides and penetrate as far as Bryansk in order to tie down Second Panzer Army and seize the area around Orel. What FHO did not foresee was the full dimension of the Soviet summer offensive against Army Group South and Army Group Centre in August. Eight Sovietfronts, were involved, and the Red Army maintained the initiative on attack until October 1943. The Red Army did not achieve tactical surprisein most sectors because German aerial reconnaissance successfully detected the preparations for the attack. Nevertheless, the scope of these attacks and the Red Army formations involved were not foreseen by FHO.54 The most serious failure of FHO analysis attaches to the collapse of Army Group Centre in June 1944. 'Operation Bagration', the Soviet offensive against Army Group Centre which began on 22 June 1944, involved four complete Russian field armies, one tank army, and an enormous logistical effort requiring 75,000 railroad carloads of troops, equipment, and supplies.55 The Soviet deception plan for Bagration was the most sophisticated and thoroughly organized of the Great Patriotic War. Operation Bagration achieved operational and strategic surprise and issued in the destruction of Army Group Centre. FHO was completely deceived and disoriented regarding Soviet intentions for the summer offensive and failed to predict Bagration. The magnitude of this intelligence failure makes a mockery of Gehlen's assertion that FHO anticipated all major Soviet offensives. In the first instance, the inability of FHO to detect Soviet preparations for Bagration was a function of Soviet tactical, operational, and strategic maskirovka. As General Shtemenko, Deputy Chief of the Red Army General Staff, put it: 'This system of operational deceptive measures proved its worth. History has shown that the enemy was profoundly misled concerning our real intentions.' However, in the last resort, FHO failed to anticipate Bagration because of the consistent tendency to underestimate the leadership ability of the Red Army High Command and Soviet operational art, on the one hand, and the inability to discard initial preconceptions and presumptions about Soviet intentions and capabilities in the light of countervailing intelligence and new events, on the other. The ramifications of this tendency can be seen in the most important FHO estimates relating to Army Group Centre and the 1944 Soviet summer offensive.56
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On 30 March 1944, Gehlen handed up a comprehensive estimate of the enemy situation, wherein he set down a number of assumptions about future Soviet intentions, which informed all subsequent FHO evaluations relating to the expected Soviet summer offensive. Firstly, it was presumed, a priori, that the summer offensive would be directedagainst army groups A and South: 'The available operational possibilities in the area between the Black Sea and the Pripyat region will influence the future enemy combat leadership'. According to Gehlen, Soviet successes on the southern wing of the Ostfront threatened to open the way for the Red Army into the Balkans and the General Gouvernment by sundering the German front between the lower Dnestr and the Pripyat Marshes. Since the Soviet leadership realized these operational possibilities, therefore, there could be no doubt that the Red Army would attempt by every means to drive strong forces deep into the General Gouvernment between the CarpathianMountains and the Pripyatregion before the construction and fortification of a continuous German defensive front.57 The final FHO evaluation of Soviet plans before Bagration, the 'Comprehensive Estimate of the Overall Enemy Situation before the German East Front and Presumed Enemy Intentions', issued on 13 June, predicted that the summer offensive would be launched between 15 and 20 June, and stated that all available intelligence confirmed the previous FHO evaluation that the main blow would be delivered against Army Group North Ukraine.58 of Subsequent FHO estimates placed the Schwerpunkt the expected Soviet summer offensive between Kovel' and the Carpathian Mountains. The 'Comprehensive Estimate of the Enemy Situation' issued by FHO on 3 May had discerned two possible Soviet offensives: (1) one starting from the sector Kovel'-Lutskon the southwestern edge of the Pripyat Marshes, designed to strike behind Army Group Centre north-west to Warsaw, thence to the Baltic coast; (ii) an attack through the Carpathian Mountains into Rumania. This estimate asserted that (i) would require such a level of tactical proficiency that the STAVKA would not select this course: therefore, the Soviet main effort probably would be directed at the Balkans. The presumed Soviet operational intentions with reference to army groups South Ukraine, North Ukraine, and North remained unchanged, and as delineated in the comprehensive estimate issued on 3 May. In the judgment of FHO, it appeared questionable whether the Red Army possessed sufficient forces to conduct a wide-ranging offensive in the general direction of Minsk after the capture of the
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area Mogilev-Orsha-Vitebsk. In sum, FHO remained convinced that the main Soviet offensive would be launched against Army Group North Ukraine. From 10 June, Army Group Centre began to receive intelligence that indicated, but did not confirm, Soviet troop deployments in preparation for an offensive against Army Group Centre. An Aktennotiz of FHO, dated 17 June 1944, registered the new information, but reaffirmed that the Schwerpunkt of the anticipated Soviet attack operations remained unchanged and directed at Army Group North Ukraine. The attack preparations in front of Army Group Centre were acknowledged, but were assessed as of secondary importance, and related to the main offensive against Army Group North Ukraine. Between 16 and 21 June, Ic Army Group Centre and the intelligence sections of its subordinate armiesdiscernedadditional Soviet preparation for an offensive, which were registered in intelligence estimates. Nevertheless, FHO declined to change its basic assessment that the main Soviet attack would be launched against Army Group North Ukraine. However, despite many accurate reconnaissance results and pieces of intelligence, neither FHO nor OKH could locate the position of the Soviet strategic reserves, for which reason it was not recognized in time that the first powerful wave of the Soviet summer offensive of 1944 would break over Army Group Centre. Until the end, the Soviet grouping of forces in the south, especially the armour formations, was the most important reason that FHO (and OKH) expected the main attack against Army Group North Ukraine. Indeed, even after the first successes of Bagration, FHO clung to this erroneous estimate of Soviet intentions. Not until the end of July did FHO acknowledge that the Soviet High Command viewed the offensive in progress as decisive for the outcome of the war.59 To conclude, the poor performance of FHO in evaluating the capabilities and the strength of the Red Army in connection with the planning of Barbarossa is beyond dispute. Nor can there be any doubt about the unsatisfactory record of FHO between June 1941 and April 1942 in assessing Soviet operational intentions and fighting power. Under Gehlen, FHO systematically compiled and analysed an enormous quantity of intelligence concerning almost every aspect of the Red Army and Soviet military industrial organization, not to mention the partisan movement, Soviet internal conditions, and the Soviet intelligence and security services.60As a result, FHO steadily improved its evaluations of the Soviet order-of-battle and strategic
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manpower reserves.Nevertheless, more knowledge about capabilities did not vouchsafe better understanding of intentions. Bearing in mind the fact that Gehlen's attempt to furnish long-range intelligence estimates of Soviet intentions was an innovation for German military intelligence (for which reason, allowance must be made for the inconsistent format and Delphic language of the estimates), it is nonetheless true that FHO did not provide the German High Command with an 'essentially correct picture of the enemy's intentions and troop strength', as Gehlen claimed. On the contrary, FHO failed on a number of decisive occasions either to apprehend Soviet intentions or to predict major Red Army offensives at army and front level. In the first instance, the inability of FHO accurately to estimate Soviet intentions was a function of insufficient intelligence and Soviet maskirovka. German signals intelligence never succeeded in unbuttoning the highest cryptosystems of the Red Army and the Soviet intelligence and security services. For this reason, FHO was never privy to the type of strategic intelligence collected by the British and American signals intelligence organizations.61True, Stab WALLI I did succeed in placing agents in Soviet military headquarters at the divisional and army level, and elsewhere in the rear area of the Red Army, while WALLI III successfully utilized a number of apprehended Soviet intelligence personnel in double-agent operations and Funkspiele, which produced valuable intelligence about Soviet intentions.62However, neither WALLI I, nor indeed, any component of Abwehr I, succeeded in penetrating any Red Army headquarters above army level, or any high-level department of the Soviet government. WALLI III 'doubled' many Soviet agents and captured several NKVD, GRU, and SMERSH officers, who provided useful information about the methods, organization, personnel and targets of their respective service. But WALLI III never succeeded in penetrating the headquarters and main field offices of the NKVD, GRU, NKGB, and SMERSH. The information about Soviet strategy collected by agents of WALLI I on behalf of FHO became a positively dangerous source of intelligence. For it can be proved that nearly every report concerning high-level Soviet military and political plans transmitted by agents of Abwehr I contained Soviet disinformation. Over time, these reports seriously disoriented Gehlen, the FHO evaluation group, OKH, and the Wehrmacht field commands about Soviet intentions.63
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The Abwehr possessed three important agents upon whose reports about Soviet strategy and intentions Gehlen personally placed great reliance: Max (Sofia); 'Stex' (Stockholm); and Ivar Lissner (Harbin). Max was under Soviet control, ab initio, and functioned as a conduit of strategic disinformation; Stex was a Soviet-controlled source, who transmitted disinformation. With the clairvoyance of hindsight, it can be seen that the dossier of Lissner reports consisted of a cunning admixture of strategic disinformation, leavened with a modicum of accurate tactical information about Red Army deployment, troop movements, morale and promotions.64 Disinformation comprised only one element of the operational and strategic maskirovka employed against FHO by Soviet intelligence. The full Soviet armoury included camouflage and concealment, imitation, simulation, demonstration manoeuvres, and radio deception. Recent Soviet official accounts of maskirovka operations against the Wehrmacht and the German intelligence and security services document the role and the success of Soviet deception in connection with several major offensives and every phase of Abwehr activity in Russia.65 Various FHO documents and Gehlen's own statements at his interrogation testify that FHO was formally cognizant of the fact, and the basic purpose, of Soviet deception.66 However, the same records affirm that neither FHO nor Gehlen comprehendedthe working principlesand the interlockingtechniques of maskirovka, as described in official Soviet accounts of actual deception operations against German intelligence. FHO was vulnerable to Soviet deception, especially at the strategic level, not only because of the lack of hard, high-level intelligence about Soviet plans, but also owing to certain German militaryhabits of mind. Specifically, these were a sense of superiority that persistently ensnared FHO in optimistic predictions about German plans, and simultaneously conduced to underestimation of Soviet military capabilities; a preoccupation with Soviet military deficiencies that repeatedly induced FHO to underrate the degree of Soviet operational skill; a tendency toward what is called today 'mirror-imaging',namely, the presumption that the (German) estimate of Soviet intentions was in fact the one that offered the best chance of success in a given set of circumstances; the centralization of the FHO estimation process in the hands of Gehlen himself and a small group of evaluators. Gehlen was possessed of an exaggerated self-confidence and an unfounded belief in his own infallibility. He formulated certain beliefs about the enemy situation of which he subsequently could not be disabused by
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any countervailing evidence. Thus, Gehlen is proof that the greatest deception senior intelligence officers suffer is from their own opinions.
Abbreviations
Soviet Military Intelligence Main Administration for State Security KGB Committee for State Security NKGB People's Commissariat for State Security NKVD People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs SMERSH Smert Shpionam. Glavnoye Upravleniye Main Administration for Kontrrazvedki Counter-intelligence [Soviet Military Counterintelligence] STAVKA Stavka VerkhovnogoGlavnokomandovaniyeGeneral Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. GlavnoyeRazvedylvatel'noyeUpravleniye Glavnoye UpravleniyeGosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti Narodny Komissariat Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti Del Narodny Komissariat Vnutrennikh GRU GUGB
Notes
The author wishes to thank Dr John Dziak and Mr Raymond Rocca for their encouragement and assistance in preparing this article. Special gratitude is due to Mr John Taylor and Mr Will Mahoney and Mr William Lewis, National Archives, Modern Military Records Branch, for their unflagging help in locating documents. Citations from captured documents in the National Archives, Washington, DC, (NA) and the Washington National Records Centre, Suitland, Maryland (WNRC) are according to repository, microfilm publication number (e.g. T-78), microfilm roll number, and frame or frames:e.g. NA T-78/483/1-5. Other records from the National Archives are cited according to repository, record group number (RG), entry and box where appropriate: e.g. RG 319, entry 179. Documents obtained by the author under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) are recorded by agency of origin as FOIA. 1. David Kahn, Hitler's Spies. GermanMilitary Intelligence in World WarII (New York 1978) is an outstanding exception, as is the magisterial trilogy of John Erickson: TheSoviet High Command.A Military-PoliticalHistory 1918-1941 (London 1962);The Road to Stalingrad (London 1975); and The Road to Berlin (Boulder 1985). Soviet military historians complain justly of the failure of'bourgeois' historians in the West to appreciate the decisive importance of the Eastern Front and the magnitude of the Soviet victory over the Wehrmacht. The claim has merit:however, to acknowledge this
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is not to endorse the fiction that the Soviet Union won the second world war more or less single-handed. See V. Larionov, N. Yeronin, B. Solovyov, V. Timokhovich, World War II Decisive Battles of the Soviet Army (Moscow 1984), 5-17. 2. For the important Soviet sources on the intelligence war, see Soviet Intelligence and Security Services, 1964-1970. A Selected Bibliography of Soviet Publications (Washington, D.C. 1972);Soviet Intelligenceand Security Services. VolumeII-covering 1971 and 1972. A Selected Bibliography of Soviet Publications with some Additional Titles from Other Sources (Washington, D.C. 1975). Add now Raymond Rocca and John Dziak, Bibliography on Soviet Intelligence and Security Services (Boulder, Colorado 1985). See also Robert Stephan, 'SMERSH. Soviet Counter-intelligence in World War Two', Journalof Contemporary History, 22,4 (October 1987),forthcoming. 3. See in general 'The Organization of the Ic Service of the German Air Force', der Oberkommando Luftwaffe/740, LuftwaffeFiihrungsstab 1942, NA T-321/86/7 I1Ic, 94; Generalleutnant D. Walter Schwabedissen, The Russian Air Force in the Eyes of German Commanders, US Air Force Historical Studies 175 (New York 1960); Williamson Murray, Strategyfor Defeat. TheLuftwaffe 1933-1945 (Washington, D.C. 1982), 69-159. For the Luftwaffe radio intercept service, see Generalleutnant Kurt Schubert, Luftwaffe CommandEast. Signals. 1942-1945, NA manuscript no. D-193. For the Luftwaffe intelligence evaluation of the Red Air Force before June 1941, see now Horst Boog, 'Die Beurteilung der Sowjetischen Luftstreitkrafte 1939-1941', in Der Angriff auf die Sowjetunion,Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg,4, ed. Horst Boog, Jiirgen F6rster, Joachim Hoffmann, Ernst Klink, Rolf-Dieter Miillerand Gerd R. Uberschar (Stuttgart 1983), 121-43. On German signals intelligence in Russia, see Kahn, Hitler's Spies, 189-202, with General Albert Praun, Signal Communications in the East. German Experiences in Russia, US Army European Command, Foreign Military Studies, MS no. P- 132 (Heidelberg 1952). See now for a detailed discussion of tactical radio reconnaissance, Volker Detlef Heydorn, Nachrichtennahaufkldrung (Ost) und sowjetrussischesHeeresfunkwesenbis 1945 (Rombach 1985), 66-157, with bis Horch-Verfahren citation of documents; Fritz Trenkle, Die DeutschenFunkpeil-und 1945 (AEG Telefunken 1982). On the SD and the RSHA, Walter Schellenberg, Aufzeichnungen(Wiesbaden and Munich 1979), 239-47; 'SD in the East', Intelligence Report(henceforth IR) no. 20, 18July 1945, US Third Army, NA RG 238; 'The SD and the RSHA', IR no. 15,9 July 1945, US Third Army, WNRC RG 332, box 69; 'Amt VI of RSHA', IR no. 16, 13July 1945, Military Intelligence Service Interrogation Centre, WNRC RG 332, box 69; 'Amt VI RSHA: Central and Eastern Europe', Consolidated Interrogation Report (CIR) no. 3, no date, US Twelfth Army Group, NA RG 238; 'Notes on Mil. Amt C and other Departments of RSHA', Combined Services Detailed Interrogation Centre (CSDIC) no. 1725, 3 May 1945, WNRC RG 165, entry 179, box 665. On ZEPPELIN, see Counter-intelligence Special Report (CI-SR) no. 61,6 March 1948, 7707 European Command Intelligence Centre, US Army, NA RG 319, file no. XE 003374; CSDIC no. 31, 20 February 1946, 'Final Report on Dr Gerhard Willy Teich', appendix B, 'Unternehmen Zeppelin'. 4. On the organization of FHO, see 'Arbeitseinteilungder Abteilung Fremde Heere Ost ab 1.11.39', T-78/458/6435615-616; 'Arbeitsabteilung der Abteilung Fremde Heere Ost ab 15.3.41', T-78/458/6435904-909. For FHO organization in 1943, 'Diensteinteilung der Abteilung Fremde Heere Ost. Stand vom 20.6.1943', T78/458/6435890-894. Gehlen's reorganization is discussed in Hermann Zolling and Heinz H6hne, Pullach Intern. General Gehlen und die Geschichte des Bundesnachrichtendienstes(Hamburg1971),57-74; Heinz Hohne, DerKriegim Dunkeln.Machtund
Thomas: German Intelligence in Russia 1941-45
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Einfluss der deutschen und russischen Geheimdienste(Munich 1985), 446-56 passim; and Reinhard Gehlen, Der Dienst. Erinnerungen1942-1971 (Mainz and Wiesbaden 1971), 20-61. The best discussion of FHO activity and organization from 1941 is The German G-2 Service in the Russian Campaign (Ic-Dienst Ost), US Forces European Theatre, First Special Intelligence Interrogation Report, 22 July 1945, NA RG 165, Entry 79, box 1218a. 5. Gehlen, op. cit., 45-61. 6. Zolling and Hohne, op. cit., 63-70. 7. The author of the quotation was Major Heinz Hiemenz, Gruppenleiter FHO II, in 1941. See Heinz Hohne, Canaris, translated by J. Maxwell Brownjohn (New York 1979), 441. But some German generals were happy with FHO reports. General Jodl in his interrogation by Soviet intelligence stated that: 'In general, I was satisfied with the activity of our intelligence service. Its finest result was the exact identification of the grouping of Russian forces in the early part of 1941 in western Belorussia and the Ukraine'. Cited in Gert Buchheit, Der Deutsche Geheimdienst. Geschichte der militarischenAbwehr(Munich 1966), 255. See Hohne, Der Krieg imDunkein,432-3, for an evaluation of Abwehr espionage in Russia before June 1941. Documentary evidence about Abwehr I activity in Russia 1940-41 is generally lacking. With the exception of the valuable account of Abwehr operational activity by Oscar Reile, Geheime Ostfront. Die Deutschen im Osten (Munich 1965), the secondary accounts of Abwehr activity cannot be verified by documentary evidence:e.g. Paul Leverkuihn, Der geheime Nachrichtendienstder deutschen Wehrmachtim Kriege (Frankfurt am Main 1957), 129-40; Buchheit, op. cit., 253-7; E.H. Cookridge, Gehlen. Spy of the Century (New York 1971). Note the limited nature of Abwehr operations against Soviet forces in Poland from 1939 in 'Amt Ausl./Abw. Befehl btr.: "Organisation zur Behandlung von Zwischenfallen an der deutsch-sowjetischen Grenze" ', 18 June 1940, T-77/908/ 5662771-798; 5662799-809. See Counter-Intelligence Final Interrogation Report (CIFIR) no. 53, 11 December 1945, Military Intelligence Service Centre, NA RG 165, entry 179, box 704, for Abwehr I activities in the Baltic States in 1940. For Abwehr reports on Russia, see 'Amt. Ausl./Abw. Geheim Akten-Russland', T-77/1027/ 651065ff. 8. See 'Amt. Ausl./Abw. Einsatzbefehl fur die Abwehrkommandos und Abwehrtrupps', 11 June 1941, T-78/458/6435482; 'Amt. Ausl./Abw. Denkschrift btr. Auskunfterteilung', 14 June 1941, T-78/458/6435434ff. For the establishment of Stab WALLI, T-78/458/6435243ff.; Hermann Baun, Interrogation Report, US Army Intelligence and Security Command, file no. XE 003134, NA RG 319; Gehlen, op. cit., 54-5. 9. For Abwehr II, 'Abschnittsstab Ostpreussen, Ic/VO. Abw. II, nr. 448141, Tatigkeit der Abw. II auf russ. Gebiet. Vortrag Leiters Abw. II, 20.4.1941', Tdie 78/482/6466565ff.; 'Chef. Amt. Ausl./Abw. Abw. II, Aktennotiz uiber Besprechung mit Reichsleiter Rosenberg am 30 Mai 1941', (signed by Canaris), T-77/1443/884. On Abwehr II operations in 1941 and thereafter, Helmut Spater, Die Brandenburger zbV 800. Eine Deutsche Kommandotruppe (Munich 1978), 140-266, and David Thomas, 'The Importance of Commando Operations in Modern Warfare 1939-1982', Journalof ContemporaryHistory, 18, 4 (October 1983), 692-4, with documentary sources. 10. For Abwehr III, see Oberst Heinrich Schmalschlager, Interrogation Report, US Army Intelligence and Security Command, file no. XE 013988, NA RG 319; 'Asts in the Balkans, in Poland, and in Wien', Military Intelligence Service Centre, CI-CIR no. 13, 31 January 1946, WNRC RG 165, entry 179, box 739; 'German Methods of
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Combatting the Soviet Intelligence Services', CI-CIR no. 16,3 January 1946, Military Intelligence Service Centre, NA RG 238; 'Frontaufklarungskommandos', IR no. 40,9 September 1945, US Third Army Interrogation Centre, NA RG 238. 11. See Zolling and Hohne, op. cit., 64-7, for an overview. The war diaries of Abwehr detachments in Russia 1941-43, provide a glimpse of Abwehr I activity. See 'Amt. Ausl./Abw. 22.6.1941-8.11.1941, "Abwehrtrupp I, KTB nr. I" ', T-77/ 1445/216-295; 'Abwehrgruppe Sid, 21.2.1942-31.7.1943, Kriegstagebuch Abwehrgruppe Sid', T-77/1443/1-323; 'Abwehrgruppe Sld, Abwehrkommando I', T77/1443/324-404. For Abwehr reports in the summer of 1941, see T-78/503/lff. 12. See 'Abt. Fremde Heere Ost (IIa), 14.11.1944, "Decknamenverzeichnis der Agenten der Abwehr I" ', T-78/673/825ff. 13. See for example the dossier of WALLI I reports, 'Zusammenstellung wichtiger militirischer Nachrichten', 4.10.1941, T-78/503/ no frame numbers; 'Heeresgruppe Slid Ic, Ic/AO Dienststelle Baun, Meldungen und Karten, 6-7.1942', T-311/298/1100. The Abwehr I network, 'Orion', responsible for some of these reports was under the control of Soviet counter-intelligence in the summer of 1942. See G. Akselrod, 'Die Verschworung der Verblendeten', in Schild und Flamme.Erzihlungen undBerichteaus der Arbeit der Tscheka (East Berlin 1973), 372-73. See 'FHO. Anlagenband zur Zusammenstellung der in der Zeit vom April 1942-Dezember 1944 in der Abteilung Fremde Heere Ost abgefassten Beurteilungen der Feindlage vor deutscher Ostfront im grossen', for a collection of 'Wichtige Abwehrmeldungen', including Abwehr agent reports. T-78/498/6485725-855. For another informative collection, see 'Wichtiger Abwehrmeldungen und Gefangenaussagen der Letzten Zeit uber sowjetrussische Operationsabsichten.Stand 3 Mai 1943',T-78/587/486-494. For specimens containing prima facie disinformation, see T-78/574/674-759, reports of V-Mdnnerin Russia reporting on US and British lend lease and allied troop movements. 14. Contra Cookridge, Gehlen, 72-89, and H6hne, Der Krieg im Dunkeln, 434-48 passim. For Max, see David Thomas, 'The Legend of Agent Max', ForeignIntelligence andLiterary Scene, 5, 1 (January 1986), 1,2,5, with US Army Intelligence and Security Command, Richard Kauder, interrogation file, no. XE 0111758, FOIA; ibid. Ivar Lissner, interrogation file, no number, FOIA: file includes 'Counter-intelligenceCorps Met. Unit no. 81, memorandum, 5 February 1946, Lissner, Ivar', with translation of Japanese intelligence interrogation report of Lissner, with references to Soviet consulate contacts in Harbin 1942-1943. For Stex, see his report of 3 April 1943 at T-78/556/435ff. 15. On the Max organization, Lang and Turkul, see CSDIC Special Interrogation Report (SIR) no. 1716,9 August 1945, 'Notes on Gruppe I Luft, Amt Ausland Abwehr and on the Activities of its Outlying Centres', paragraphs 116-129; CSDIC SIR no. 1727, 16 September 1945, 'Notes on Abwehr I Luft', appendix I, paragraph 15, both reports WNRC RG 165, Entry 179, box 665; CIA, no date, 'The German Intelligence Service and the War', paragraphs 11-13, FOIA. Turkul was interrogated first by the 430 CIC detachment, Salzburg, Austria, in 1945, and then by British counterintelligence. Turkul bent but never broke. See also US Army Intelligence and Security Command, Oberst Werner Ohletz, interrogation file, no. XE 003702, FOIA, for additional information on Turkul. Lang (real name Longin) almost certainly was a Soviet intelligence officer: the interrogation reports of Lang and Turkul reveal that Lang probably was Turkul's control and that Lang definitely provided Kauder with the intelligence that he transmitted to the Abwehr (using the 'Max' organization as the cut-out). See David Thomas, 'Max' and'Moritz': Germanand Soviet Intelligence in the
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Balkans and the Near East during World War Two, forthcoming. 16. For examples of such reports, see 'Abw. I, Frontaufklarung Kommandos 103 und 203,1944', T-311/233/914ff. See also Amt. Ausl./Abw., 'Der V-Mann: Ratschlage zu seiner Ausbildung im Rahmen eines Einsatzlagers. 1. Heft: Der Osten.', a 55-page instruction manual, at T-77/1453/917-987. 17. See note 3 for sources; also 'German Operational Intelligence. A Study of German Operational Intelligence', GMDS, April 1946, 8-27, NA RG 165. For examples, see 'AOK 17, Kommandeur fur Nachrichten, 2.4.1943, Feindfunklage am 1.4.43', T-312/727/8366057-59; 'AOK 17, Kommandeur der Nachrichtenaufklarung, 1.4.1943, Zusammenfassende Feindfunklagemeldung', T-77/727/8366281-3. 18. See note 3 for sources. 19. See note 17 above, and Heydorn, Nachrichtennahaufkldrung (Ost) und sowjetrussischesHeeresfunkwesenbis 1945, 124-36, for examples of German successes; Kahn, Hitler's Spies, 203-07; ibid., Kahn on Codes (New York 1983), 94-5. On the effect of Soviet radio silence, see for example 'FHO. Vortragsnotiz, 30.4.1944, Uber Lage der Funkaufklarung vor deutscher Ostfront', T-78/483/6468318. 20. See Heydorn, Nachrichtennahaufkliirung, 125-7; Manfred Kehrig, Stalingrad. Analyse und Dokumentation einer Schlacht (Stuttgart 1974), 89, note 248, citing a 'Besondere Feindfunklage-Meldung vom 11.10.1942', cited as 'Kdr. d. Nachr. Aufkl. 1, nr. 1011/42 geh. kdos. Besondere Feindfunklagemeldung XI/1, 11.11.42', in US Army, Foreign Military Studies, MS no. P-096, 1-15, and in Kehrig, Stalingrad,553-8. 21. The estimate is reproduced in Kehrig, op. cit., 550-2. 22. 'FHO. 'Erfahrungen in der Auswertung der Luftauklarungsergebnissefur die Beurteilung der Feindlage', December 1943, T-78/458/6435920ff. 23. For examples of Luftwaffe aerial photographs, see 'AOK 17 Koluft 4. 1941, Stabsmeldung nr. 1, 20.4.1941' (photographs of Soviet border fortifications) T312/683/8318725ff.; T-312/683/8318773ff.; 'Pz AOK 4, Anlagenband 5, 12. 41-4.42, 'Meldungen Koluft' (air reconnaissance reports), T-313/349/8633040ff.; Pz AOK 3, Ic/AO, Anlagenband I-II z. KTB nr. 7, 10.42-3.43, 'Luftaufklarungsergebnisse', T-313/266/8537134-192. See 'German Operational Intelligence', 28-49 passim, for interpretation, use, and types of air reconnaissance data. For an eyewitness account of German air reconnaissance over Russia, Georg Pemler, Flug zum Don. Aus den (Leoni am StarnburgerSee 1981), geheimen Kriegstagebucheines Aufkldrungsfliegers 187-92; 247. Heinz Nowarra, Fernaufkldrer 1914-1945. Entstehung, Entwicklung, Einsatz (Stuttgart 1982) is useful on aircraft and organization. For Soviet airfield camouflage, 'OKL. Lw. Fu. St. Ic, 12 September 1944, Einzelschriften des Ic-Dienstes Ost der Luftwaffe', no. 20, 'Aufbau von Flugplatzen', T-321/96/221-244; 'OKL. Lw. Fu. St. Ic, 5 April 1945, Einzelschriften des Ic-Dienstes Ost der Luftwaffe', nr. 168, 'Schutz der Flugplatze der SU-Fliegertruppe',T-321/240/no frame numbers;Generalleutnant D. Klaus Ube, RussianReactions to GermanAirpowerin WorldWarII, US Air Force Historical Studies 176 (Washington, DC 1964), 34-66; Colonel Ye. Simakov, 'Operativnaia maskirovka VVS v nastupatel' nykh operatsiiakh', ['VVS (Air Force) Zhurnal, Surprise and Deception during Offensive Operations'], Voyenno-istoricheskii 12 (December 1977), 19-26. 24. See 'The German G-2 Service in the Russian Campaign (Ic-Dienst Ost)', 7-8; 38-40. 25. See in general 'German Counter-intelligence Activities in Occupied Russia (1941-1944)', Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, MS no. P-122, NA, Modern Military Records Branch, file copy; CIA, 'Study of Intelligence
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and Counter-intelligence Activities on the Eastern Front and in Adjacent Areas during WW II', NA RG 263; CI-CIR no. 16. 'Operations and Experiencesof Frontaufklarung (FA) III Ost during the Eastern Campaign', CI-SR no. 32, 27 January 1947, 7707 Military Intelligence Service Centre, NA, RG 165, is based on the testimony of Schmalschlaiger and is an invaluable treatment of German counter-intelligence in Russia, which is followed closely here. There is important eyewitness information in Reile, Geheime Ostfront, 120ff (Reile served in Abwehr III-f and later in the Bundesnachrichtendienst). 26. CI-SR no. 32, 12-20. See for example, 'Die Ausbildung der Abwehr Funktionare des NKWD. Angaben des NKWD-Funktionares Shigunow', T-120/240/175713ff. 27. CI-SR no. 32, 20-23. On Soviet intelligence and the partisan movement, Soviet Partisans in World War II, ed. John A. Armstrong (Madison 1964), 338-60; Edgar Howell, The Soviet Partisan Movement 1941-1944 (Washington, DC 1956), 42-60; Abt. Frd Heere Ost (B/P), nr. 2460, 3.5.1943, 'Nachrichtenuiber Bandenkrieg', Nr. I, 3-4, T-78/479/6462622ff. 28. CI-SR no. 32, 30-39. 29. CI-SR no. 32, 51-52. See also 'Espionage-Sabotage-Conspiracy. German and Russian Operations 1940 to 1945', Office of Naval Intelligence, April 1947, 57-67, author's personal files. 30. Andreas Hillgruber, 'Das Russland-Bild der Fuhrenden Deutschen Militars vor Beginn des Angriffs auf die Sowjetunion', Festschrift fur Frite T. Epstein zum 80. Geburtstag(Wiesbaden 1978), 296-310. See in general for sources and documentation, Der Angriff auf die Sowjetunion, 112-15 (military-industrial resources); 194-202 (Red Army strength); 272-6 (assessment of Red Army before the invasion). Key FHO evaluations between 1939 and June 1941 include 'Heeres Gruppe Suid,Ic Vortragnotiz Russland, 28.11.39-19.1.40', T-311/256/615-848 (Red Army capabilities based on observations during the Soviet occupation of Poland, Finland, and the Baltic states); 'Erfahrungen aus dem Finnischen-Russischen Krieg', T-311/26/535-852; T-78/567/ 918ff.; 'Bewaffnung und Ausriistung der Roten Armee, 3.1940-11.1940', T-78/488/ 647415 l1ff.; 'Werturteil uber die Rote Armee nach den Berichten iiber den Einmarsch in Polen, im Baltikum und in Finnland', 19 December 1939, T-311/256/826ff. For the shortcomings in the FHO evaluation of the Red Army, see Seaton, The Russo-German War 1941-1945, 43-9; Barry Leach, German Strategy against Russia 1939-1941 (Oxford 1973), 91-5. 31. See Heydorn, Nachrichtennahaufkldrung, Ia/Ic, 76-82; see '41 Pz Ar. Kps. Abt. I. 26 November, Armee Feindnachrichtenbeschaffung Vorbereitungender Operationen Studie Barbarossa 21.4-21.6.41 ', T-314/981 /725ff., for FHO acknowledgement of the lack of intelligence about Red Army strength and reserves. 32. 'Die Kriegswehrmacht der Union der Sozialistischen Sowjetrepubliken, Stand: 1.1.1941, Teil I: Text'. T-78/550/729-802. See also 'Die Landesbefestigungen der Union der Sozialistischen Sowjetrepubliken UdSSR Stand: 15.3.1941, Teil II-III', T-78/501/6489522-645. The assessment of the Red Army expounded in 'Die Kriegswehrmacht' was influenced strongly by the reports of General Kostring, the German military attache in Moscow, who was a most astute and experienced observer of Soviet Russia. As Kostring acknowledged, it was essentially impossible in Russia to collect any worthwhile information about the Red Army except at the annual October Day parade: one had to draw conclusions about developments in the Red Army on the basis of general impressions, past experience, and intuition. Thus, notwithstanding Kostring's deep experience of Russia and the Soviet military leadership, there were
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strict limits to his knowledge of unfolding developments in the Red Army. A review of the attache reports submitted from Moscow 1939-41 reveals a steady constriction of hard factual data about almost every facet of the Red Army, with an increasing uncertainty and equivocation in the wording of Kostring's assessment of Soviet military affairs. In the available dossier of reports, thereare no comprehensive analyses of the Red Army for the period December 1939-June 1941. See 'OKH. GenstdH. O.Qu.IV, Abt. Fremde Heere Ost (II) 14 January 1941, Anlage' (report of visit to a Soviet tank brigade), T-311/256/634ff. See also for a selection of Kostring reports, Hermann Teske (ed.), General Ernst K6string, Der militarische Mittler zwischendem DeutschenReich undden Sowjetunion1921-1941 (Frankfurt am Main 1966), 189-202. Kostring's reports therefore were not a solid foundation for the FHO analytical edifice erected upon them. 33. FHO grossly miscalculated the number and quality of Soviet tanks. See General Halder, Kriegstagebuch(KTB), 3, 267, with General Heinz Guderian, Erinnerungen eines Soldaten (Heidelberg 1951), 172:Halder informed Hitler on 3 February 1941that the Red Army disposed of 10,000 tanks of preponderantly inferior quality; in reality, on 22 June the Red Army possessed roughly 20,000 tanks, including the T-34. 34. For actual Soviet strength totals in 1941, see Der Angriffaufdie Sowjetunion, 71-6; 199-200, with Leach, GermanStrategy, appendix 4, and Brian Fugate, Operation Barbarossa. Strategy and Tactics on the Eastern Front, 1941 (Novato 1984), 14-59. In the spring of 1941, the Red Army possessed some 300 divisions, including roughly 170 in the military districts in European Russia. For Soviet troop deployments before the invasion, see now Colonel S. Alferov, 'Strategic Deployment of Soviet Troops in the Western Theatre of Military Operations in 1941', (in Russian) Voyenno-istoricheskii Zhurnal (henceforth VIZ), 6 (June 1981), 26-33, translated in Joint Publications Research Service, no. 79083 (1981), 30-9. 35. See for example the Abwehr assessments of Red Army morale at 'Amt Ausl./Abw., Nachrichten aus den westukrainischen Gebieten der Sowejetunion. Stand August 1940', T-77/1027/6500209-6500221; Amt Ausl./Abw. nr. 1297/40, 21 September 1940, Uberlaufer Bericht, 'Zersetzungserscheinungenin der Roten Armee', T-77/1027/6500222-225. See Hillgruber, 'Russland-Bild', 299-300, for the quotations from 'Die Kriegswehrmacht'. 36. See 'FHO. Feindbeurteilung. Stand 20.5.41', T-78/479/6465470ff. 37. See John Erickson, Soviet High Command,565-87, for analysis. 38. See '41 Pz. Ar. Kps. Abt. Ia/Ic, 26 November 1941, Vorbereitungen der Operation Studie Barbarossa', T-314/981/725. 39. See Boog, et al., Der Angriff auf die Sowjetunion, 498-503 for sources. For Halder's assessment, KTB 3, 170 (11 August 1941). 40. See Klaus Reinhardt, Die Wende vor Moskau (Stuttgart 1972), 202-4, for references to FHO evaluations and reports; with Boog, et al., Der Angriff auf die Sowjetunion, 600-1. See 'FHO Lagebericht Ost, nr. 159, 21 November 1941', T-78/482/6466640ff. 41. See Gehlen, Der Dienst, 59-61. 42. FHO. 'Zusammenstellung der in der Zeit vom April 1942-Dezember 1944in der Abteilung Fremde Heere Ost abgefassten Beurteilungen der Feindlage vor deutscher Ostfront im grossen. Teil A', T-78/466/6445876-6446237; 'Anlagenband zur Zusammenstellung der in der Zeit vom April 1942-Dezember 1944 in der Abteilung Fremde Heere Ost abgefassten Beurteilungen der Feindlage vor deutscher Ostfront im grossen', T-78/498/6485726-855. See 'Zusammenstellung. Teil A', 3, for Gehlen's
298
introductory remarks. See Hans-Heinrich Wilhelm, 'Die Prognosen der Abteilung Fremde Heere Ost 1942-1945' in ZweiLegendenaus demDrittenReich (Stuttgart 1974), 7-72, for a critical assessment of the full dossier of FHO estimates. 43. FHO. 'Beurteilung der Gesamtfeindlage und ihrer Entwicklungsm6glichkeiten am 1.5.42', T-78/466/64470-78. 44. 'Zusammenstellung. Teil A', 15, 'Kurze Beurteilungen iiber die Feindlage', 15 July 1942, with Gehlen, Der Dienst, 41. 45. See 'Fremde Heere Ost (I), H. Qu. 29.8.42, Gedanken zur Weiterentwicklung der Feindlage im Herbst und Winter', reproduced in Kehrig, Stalingrad, 550-2. 46. See FHO 'Kurze Beurteilungen der Feindlage vom 15.10.1942', in 'Zusammenstellung. Teil A', 18: 'The enemy is ostensibly engaged in the preparation of a large operation against Army Group Centre, against which he should be ready for operations about the beginning of November'; Kurze Beurteilung der Feindlage vom 28.10.1942', in 'Zusammenstellung. Teil A', 20. See 'Anlagenband zur Zusammenstellung', 'Anlage zu Fremde Heere Ost (I) vom 6.11.42', 9 (Max report, dated 4 November, on a supposed 'war council' in Moscow at which the forthcoming offensives were decided). See Kehrig, Stalingrad, 86-119 for the picture of the enemy situation adopted by OKH in October and November 1942. Prima facie, the agent reports were part of the Soviet strategic deception plan for 'Operation Uranus'. See Erickson, TheRoad to Stalingrad, 388-90 and 423-5 for Soviet planning for 'Operation Uranus'. See V. Matsulenko, 'Operativnaya maskirovka voisk v kontranastuplenii pod Stalingradom', ['Operational Maskirovka of Forces during Counter-offensive at Stalingrad'] VIZ, 1 (January 1974), 10-12 and 23-25, translated in Joint Publications Research Service, no. 61347 (1975), 7-13. For discussion of the maskirovka at Stalingrad, Earl Ziemke, 'Stalingrad and Belorussia. Soviet Deception in World War II', in Donald Daniel and Kathrine Herbig (eds), Strategic Military Deception (New York 1982), 247-54. 47. FHO 'Kurze Beurteilung der Feindlage vom 12.11.1942', 'Zusammenstellung. Teil A', 32. On the intelligence, see note 20. 48. FHO 'Beurteilung der Feindlage vor Heeresgruppe Mitte', 'Zusammenstellung. Teil A', 22. 49. Anlage 1 zu Fremde Heere Ost (I) vom 10.12.1942,'M6gliche Anzeichen fir eine beginnende russische Schwerpunktverlagerungvom mittleren Frontabschnitt an die Donfront', 'Zusammenstellung. Teil A', 39. 50. See Kehrig, Stalingrad,92-3, on the intelligence estimate of Army Group B, with sources. 51. See Fremde Heere Ost (I) 19.1.1943, 'Kraftebild und weitere russische Operationsmoglichkeiten im Siidbereich der Ostfront', 'Zusammenstellung. Teil A', 47-50. The FHO estimate of 22 February, Fremde Heere Ost (I), 'Beurteilung der Feindabsichten vor der deutschen Ostfront im grossen. Auf Grund der neuesten Abwehrmeldungen', 'Zusammenstellung. Teil A', 59-62, concluded that: under the influence of the failure of the attacks with large forces against Army Group Centre and the success of the offensive in the Ukraine, 'the idea of causing the collapse of the entire German front through the shattering of both wings of the German Army now played an authoritative role in the enemy's decision-making process'. Prima facie, Gehlen imbibed this notion from a Max report dated 20 February, referring to a high-level command conference in Moscow. See 'Anlagen Band zur Zusammenstellung', 'Zusammenstellung der wichtigsten Abwehrmeldungen uber russ. Operationsabsichten. Stand 21.2.43', 16.
299
52. Fremde Heere Ost (IIa), nr. 574/43 gkdos., 23.3.1943, 'Beurteilung der Feindabsichten vor der deutschen Ostfront im grossen', 'Zusammenstellung. Teil A', 74-9. 53. Abt. Fremde Heere Ost (IIa) nr. 1226/43 gkdos. 21 Mai 1943, 'Zusammenfassende Beurteilung der Feindabsichten vor der deutschen Ostfront im grossen', T-78/556/393-398. 54. Abt. Fremde Heere Ost (Chef) 21.6.1943, 'Uberblick uber die Feindlage, Vortrag vor dem Chefs der Generalstabe der Heeresgruppen und Armeen am 23. Juni 1943', T-78/556/798-801. For Zitadelle, see Abt. Fremde Heere Ost (I), nr. 1616/44 gkdos. 3.7.1943,'Beurteilung des Feindverhaltenbei Durchfuhrungdes Unternehmens "Zitadelle" ', 'Zusammenstellung. Teil A', 106-9. For Zitadelle and the Soviet counter-offensives that followed the battle, see now Erickson, The Road to Berlin, 87-135, the most authoritative account incorporating the newest Soviet sources. 55. For accounts of Operation Bagration, see now Gerd Niepold, Mittlere Ostfront Juni '44 (Herford and Bonn 1985), 24-30; Rolf Hinze, Der Zusammenbruchder HeeresgruppeMitte im Osten 1944 (Stuttgart 1980), 28-48; General S.M. Shtemenko, The Soviet General Staff at War (Moscow 1970), 222-56; Marshall G.Z. Zhukov, Reminiscences'and Reflections, 2 (Moscow 1985), 264-96. Erickson, ibid., 191-229, contains the first account to integrate the full range of Soviet military sources. 56. On the Soviet strategic maskirovkafor Operation Bagration, see V. Chernyayev, 'Operativnaya maskirovka voisk v Belorusskoi operatsii' ['Operational Maskirovkaof Forces in the Belorussian Operation'], VIZ, 8 (1974), 12-14; A. Shimanskiy, 'O Dostizheniy strategicheskiy Vnezapnosti pri Podgotovke Letne-Osenney Kampaniy 1944 Goda' ['Concerning the Achievement of Strategic Surprise in the Preparationfor the Summer-Fall Campaign of 1944'], VIZ, 6 (June 1968), 17-28, translated in Joint Publications Research Service, no. 46237 (1968), 1-14. For discussion, Ziemke, 'Stalingrad and Belorussia: Soviet Deception in World War II', 257-68. 57. Abt. Fremde Heere Ost (I), nr. 112/44 gkdos. 30.3.1944, 'Zusammenfassende Beurteilung der Feindlage vor deutscher Ostfront und vermutete Feindabsichten im grossen. Stand 30.3.44', 'Zusammenstellung. Teil A', 244-55; also T-78/466/6446124155. 58. Fremde Heere Ost (I), nr. 1931/44 gkdos. 13.6.1944, 'Zusammenfassende Beurteilung der Feindlage vor deutscher Ostfront und vermutete Feindabsichten im grossen. Stand 13.6.44', T-78/466/6446158-167. This estimate incorporated a Max message, dated 27 April 1944, wherein it was reported that the basic plan for the Soviet summer offensive had been approved at a conference in Moscow: according to Max, the plan adopted entailed an offensive by the Soviet First, Second and Third Ukrainian fronts against the Balkans launched from the Soviet left flank south of Army Group North Ukraine. Gehlen in the 13 June estimate forecast that the main Soviet offensive would be concentrated between Kovell (opposite Army Group North Ukraine). See Anlage 4 zu Fremde Heere Ost (I) nr. 1428/44 gkdos. vom 3.5.44, 'Wichtige Abwehrmeldungen und Gefangenenaussagen der letzten Zeit uiber sowjetrussische Operationsabsichten. Stand 3.5.44', 103-04, for the Max message of 27 April. 59. For the documents, see Niepold, Mittlere OstfrontJuni'44,16-23. Pz. AOK 3 on 21 June reported that Soviet preparations were complete and that an attack was expected momentarily, encompassing a large-scale offensive in the direction north of Orsha. Suffice to state, Gehlen does not discuss the collapse of Army Group Centre in Der Dienst. 60. Space precludesa comprehensivetreatment of FHO reporting. See Heeresgruppe Mitte Ic/AO Ausw. 6 November 1944, Die Rote Armee.Materialund Quellensammlung
300
fur den Ic Dienst, T-78/492/6478926-2943, a published handbook of FHO intelligence studies. For Soviet military-industrial organization, see for example 'Flugzeugbau in der UdSSR. Stand: Mitte 1944', T-78/575/479-643; 'Panzerfertigung in der SU', T-78/578/536-712. On the partisan war, see the FHO report series, Nachrichteniiber Bandenkrieg, T-78/677/738-760, and T-78/576/1-243. See 'Innere Verhaltnisse in SU', T-78/481/6464956-6465469, for FHO reports on internal conditions. On the Soviet services, see for example 'Truppenverbande und Truppenahnliche Organisationen des roten Volkskommissariats des Innern (NKWD)', T-78/590/291ff.; FHO Ic Unterlagen Ost. 'Die Uberwachungsorgane im sowjetischen Staat', Merkblatt Geheim 11/5, 1 December 1944, NA RG 242, H3/753; Fremde Heere Ost (I) 1943, 'Die Sowjetische Agentenabwehr und Gegenspionage im Operationsgebiet der Ostfront', T-78/562/1-52. 61. On Soviet signals security, see the captured Russian order, 'Befehl an die Truppen der 5. Garde-Pz. Armee: Uber Wahrung der Geheimhaltung bei Gesprachen mit Hilfe technischer Nachrichtenmittel'. T-78/204/6149034ff. OKH H. Qu., 29.12,1944. Betr.: 'Russischen Fuhrungsfunkverkehr Heer, Luftwaffe und NKWD', author's personal files. See also OKH 'Gen. St d H/Chef. Heeresnachrichten, nr. 1072/42. g. Kdos. 5 Oktober 1942'; 'Die Organisation der deutschen Nachr. Aufklarung ist dem Feinde im wesentlichen bekannt. Er hat daher seine Nachr. Aufklarungs-Ergebnissen durch erheblich verbesserte Disziplin, Anderung seiner Decknamen, Rufzeichen und Wellenauswendung und Einfuhrung zahlreicherschwierigerer Schlusselverfahren gegen eine Weitere Aufklarung in weitgehenden Masse geschiitzt.' 62. On Funkspiele, see for example FHO (IIb) 'Chefsache Irrefiihrung Allgem. Schriftverkehr', T-78/488/6473211-6473330, a folder of documents on the organizational history of German Funkspiele 1944-1945; FHO 'Chefsache Funkspiele Bd. I.', T-78/488/6473331-6473467; Fiihrungsgruppe GenstH. Oper. Abt. (Fest), Denkschrift btr.: 'Funkspiel zur Feindtauschung', T-78/497/6485615. Soviet operational intentions vis-a-vis specific sectors of the front sometimes were revealed by the concentration of Soviet agents in the German rear, as plotted by WALLI III on maps. See FHO (I), 'Schwerpunkte des sowjetische Agenteneinsatzes im Sept. 1944. Ansatz sowj. Kundschaftergruppen. Agenten Einsatz im Operationsgebiet Ost', T-78/582/ 313ff. A documented instance of Abwehr espionage involving penetration of Red Army field headquarters concerns the agent, Piotr Ivanovich Tavrin. See 'Sovetskiy Organy Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti v Gody Velikoy Otechestvennoy Voyny' ['Soviet Organs of State Security in the Years of the Great Patriotic War'], Voprosy Istoriy, 5 (May 1965), 35-39. For interrogations, see for example AOK 16 Ic Abwehrtrupp 112 25.7.1942, 'Aussage des russ. Agenten Arbussow, Alexander'. T312/1594/1081-83; 48 Pz. Kps. Geheime Feldpolizei 14.4.1942, 'Zusatzbericht zur Vernehmung der Agentin Klavidia Simonenko', T-314/1161/151-156; 'Gesamtergebnis der Vernehmungen des Spions Semjon Nikolajewitsch Kaputsin' (NKVD), 22 July 1943, NA RG 242, box 27, 'Auswartiges Amt POW Interrogations at Schloss Loetzen'. 63. For examples of reports containing prima facie disinformation, see FHO 'Anlage zur kiirzen Feindbeurteilungen. Wichtige Abwehrmeldungen',T-78/559/322, 24 June 1944, report of V-Mann 420, stating that the Soviet summer offensive was due to begin in July!; 'Amt. Ausl./Abw. Walli I, 8.2.1944, Agentbericht', T-77/1424/563, report of V-Mannat US air base in Ukraine. Recent accounts of Soviet counterintelligence in the second world war document the almost total deception and
301
manipulation of Abwehr agent networks in Russia. See for example Georgi Tsinev, 'Na strazhe interesov vooruzhennykh sil SSR' ['Guarding the Interests of the Armed Sil, 24 (December 1974), 26-31, translated in Forces'], Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Joint Publications Research Service, no. 73037 (1979), 1-8; General V. Pirozhkov [deputy chairman, USSR KGB], 'The Invisible Front', (in Russian) Agitator, 23 (December 1984), 31-34, translated in Joint Publications Research Service, no. UPS85-023 (1985), 27-33. Three basic Soviet works on counter-intelligence operations against the Abwehr are: Sergei Zakharovich Ostryakov, VoyennyeChekisty [Military Chekists] (Moscow 1979);A.A. Bogdanov et al., Poyedinkes Abverom.Dokumentalnyy ocherk o ChekistakhLeningradskogofronta 1941-1945 [Duelling with the Abwehr. A Documentary Essay about Chekists of the Leningrad Front 1941-1945] (Moscow 1968); A.A. Bogdanov and I.Y. Leonov (eds), Armeiskie Chekisty [Army Chekists] (Leningrad 1985). 64. See notes 14 and 15 above, for sources. On Turkul, Lang, and Kauder, add 'Russian Emigre Organizations', United States Political Advisor for Germany, 10 May 1949, NA RG 59 861.20262/5-1049. 65. See Colonel David Glantz, 'The Red Mask: the Nature and Legacy of Soviet Military Deception in World War II', Center for Land Warfare United States Army War College (Carlisle, Pennsylvania 1985), for an outstanding documented study of maskirovka operations on the Eastern Front. Recent accounts include General V. Matsulenko, 'Operativnayamaskirovkasovetskikh voisk v pervom i vtorom periodakh voyny' ['Operational maskirovka of Soviet Forces in the first and second Periods of War'], VIZ, 1 (January 1972), 11-20, translated in Joint Publications Research Service, no. 55246 (1972), 6-18; V. Matsulenko, 'Operativnayamaskirovka sovetskikh voisk v Vislo-Oderskoi operatsii' ['Operational maskirovka in the Vistula-Oder Operation'], VIZ, 1 (January 1975), 10-21. See John Dziak, 'The Operational Tradition of Soviet Deception: 'A Historical Sampling', conference paper, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California (1985), for a resume of cases. 66. See FHO 'Die Rote Armee und die Eigentumlichkeit ihrer Gliederung, Fuhrungsgrundsatzeund Kampfweise',January 1944,T-78/530/279-321; Luftwaffenverbindungskommando beim Obkdo. H.Gr.Mitte nr. 1771/44 geh. 6.9.1944, 'Anzeichen fur sowjetrussischen Durchbruchsangriffe', T-78/496/6483611ff; FHO 'Einzelschriften des Ic-Dienstes Ost nr. 4 Stand 20.11,42', T-78/556/565ff., noting Soviet Tiuschung and Tarnung; AOK 3 Ic Abt. nr. 01036/44 geh. 3.9.1944, 'Tarnung Pz der Bewegungen der Roten Armee', T-313/311/8588525-6. For Gehlen's understanding, 'Notes on the Red Army - Intelligence and Security', Seventh Army Interrogation Centre, SAIC/R/2, 24 June 1945, NA RG 165.
DavidThomas
is a Research Associate at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies and Research Scholar in Residence at the National Intelligence Study Centre, Washington DC. His article is based on research for a forthcoming study, Maskirovka. Soviet Military Deception.

German Military Intelligence in Russia 1941-45

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Foreign Armies East and German Military Intelligence in Russia 1941-45 Author(s): David Thomas Source: Journal of Contemporary

ForeignArmiesEastand GermanMilitary Intelligence in Russia1941-45

Journal of Contemporary History

Thomas: GermanIntelligence in Russia 1941-45

Thomas: GermanIntelligence in Russia 1941-45

Journal of Contemporary History

Thomas: GermanIntelligence in Russia 1941-45

Thomas: GermanIntelligence in Russia 1941-45

Journal of Contemporary History

Thomas: GermanIntelligence in Russia 1941-45

Journal of Contemporary History

Thomas: GermanIntelligence in Russia 1941-45

Journal of Contemporary History

Thomas: GermanIntelligence in Russia 1941-45

Journal of Contemporary History

Thomas: GermanIntelligence in Russia 1941-45

Journal of Contemporary History

Thomas: GermanIntelligence in Russia 1941-45

Thomas: GermanIntelligence in Russia 1941-45

Journal of Contemporary History

Thomas: GermanIntelligence in Russia 1941-45

Journal of Contemporary History

Thomas: GermanIntelligence in Russia 1941-45

Thomas: GermanIntelligence in Russia 1941-45

Thomas: GermanIntelligence in Russia 1941-45

Journal of Contemporary History

Thomas: GermanIntelligence in Russia 1941-45

Journal of Contemporary History

Thomas: German Intelligence in Russia 1941-45

Thomas: German Intelligence in Russia 1941-45

Thomas: German Intelligence in Russia 1941-45

Thomas: German Intelligence in Russia 1941-45

Thomas: GermanIntelligence in Russia 1941-45

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