R 192229Z OCT 09 FM AMEMBASSY MEXICO TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8666 UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 MEXICO 003018 SUBJECT: MATAMOROS OFFICIALS: INTEL,

COORDINATION, AND CONVICTIONS ELUSIVE IN DRUG FIGHT 1. (U) Participants: U.S. The Ambassador DCM John Feeley Consul General Michael Barkin (Matamoros) RSO Michael Flynn (Matamoros) Mexico Matamoros Mayor Erick Silva Santos Tamaulipas State Attorney General Jaime Rodriguez Inurrigarro SEMAR Vice Admiral Daniel Bozada Sanchez SEDENA General Brig. D.E.M. J.A. Sanchez

City Council Secretary Raul Cesar Gonzalez Garcia Public Safety Director Ruben Hiram Gonzalez 2. (SBU) SUMMARY: Matamoros Mayor Erick Silva, local security commanders, and Tamaulipas Attorney General Jaime Rodriguez Inurrigarro described a strained security environment and weakened economy in a 24 September luncheon with the Ambassador. Conversation focused on deficits in intelligence generation, coordination among agencies and between levels of government, and drug offense prosecutions, as well as the limited role of civil/police forces. The Mayor and Attorney General called for government reform and consistent delivery of resources. Apart from SEDENA and SEMAR, whose temporary deployment they praised, civilian officials portrayed a low-bandwidth relationship with the federal government. Based on visits to Tijuana and Juarez, the lack of cooperation between police and military in Matamoros may reflect the worst of the worst. END SUMMARY. ----------------------------FIGHTING BLIND AND DISJOINTED ----------------------------3. (SBU) The Ambassador asked first about intelligence production and dissemination. General Sanchez listed his primary intelligence gathering activities: overflights searching for trafficker

routes, street patrols, intel analysts, and a citizen hotline. His regimental command is located in Reynosa, along with most of the analytical operation (apart a small Matamoros-based cell). He allowed he did not believe he was receiving sufficient, actionable leads to drive operations. The General qualified the situation in Matamoros as "not a front of war." The enemy is organized gangsters who at least in Matamoros look to lay low out of reach of the state. But they are well armed, he granted. SEDENA's Matamoros street strength is 100 men; reinforcements from neighboring garrisons of 300 can respond within an hour. Air assets are based in Reynosa; the General wished he had that capacity locally. The local Seguridad Publica force is 615 people, but its mission is maintaining order rather than combating drug traffickers. When asked whether the varied government forces conducted joint patrols, the General said that while SEDENA, SEMAR, and PFP were all present in Matamoros, each operated independently. They request cross-service assistance in emergencies, but there is little dayto-day coordination. 4. (SBU) The Ambassador turned to a muchpublicized September 4 gunfight. The General said the action began when an army patrol encountered suspect vehicles (a convoy of SUVs with tinted windows). The engagement was not a raid and not intel-driven. Spotted on the street, the suspects tried to flee. The General said they were transporting a senior drug trafficking organization (DTO) leader; they fought ferociously, knowing their chain of command would kill them were the chief in their care apprehended. Local police did

not respond to the firefight. Stray bullets landed on the U.S. side of the border, compelling the University of Texas-Brownsville to close early. --------------------------------------------------ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE AND TRANSITION TO CIVILIAN LEAD --------------------------------------------------5. (SBU) The Ambassador noted the security forces rarely assembled a crime scene and that the overwhelming majority of those detained in operations do not go to court. The army is limited in what it can do at a crime scene. Local and state police do not enter the crime scene because drug offenses are jurisdictionally outside their scope. Either a narco dies in a firefight, he confesses under military interrogation, or in time he goes free. Without criminal convictions and jail time, the fight is ultimately not sustainable. 6. (SBU) The Ambassador emphasized that the Mexican military needed an exit strategy. Mexico must build up its civil police and prosecutorial forces to fill much of the space currently occupied by the military. The DCM asked how the Merida Initiative could best push aid to the state and local level. The Mayor said Mexico needed trustworthy people in security jobs ("gente que sea confiable"), more arms and equipment to mount more patrols, more investment in the army and navy, and better salaries. He underlined the need for follow-through. Who would fund initiatives after USG funding runs its course? It's great to stand up a new unit, but how would he pay for its fuel

and maintenance? ----------------------REFORM AND COORDINATION ----------------------7. (SBU) The Mayor, formerly a representative in the federal Chamber of Deputies, listed three reforms he considered necessary to win: *Wholesale reform by the state to clarify the roles of the various federal forces. For example, the local Seguridad Publica force has more elements than SEDENA in Matamoros, but does not have the statutory authority to hunt drug traffickers. *Social reform to provide the jobs, education, and opportunity necessary to prevent young Mexicans from joining the cartels. *A new approach to public communications that reins in irresponsible journalism, better conveys the government's message and shapes a less hostile operating environment. The Attorney General concurred that constitutional reform was needed, driven by President Calderon. He added that SEDENA, PGR, and SSP are all short resources. Salaries are too low. The major mechanism in the area for interagency coordination is a state-level committee that meets in Ciudad Victoria, the state capital, every 15 days. Its readouts go to CISEN but are not in real time and do not drive operational activity. Noting the value the state government placed on cooperation

with the USG, he mentioned Tamaulipas officials had met with ICE Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary Pena on 20 September and were optimistic of concluding an information sharing agreement. 8. (SBU) The Ambassador asked how local and state level government communicated with the federal level. The Mayor said that at the local level, he lived with and reacted to the drug-driven troubles daily. The federal government, at a strategic remove, acts via programs and plans. Local-federal channels of communication are poor. In Ciudad Victoria, the Governor of Tamaulipas has more clout and a more direct link to Mexico City. ----------------------------------RECESSION, VIOLENCE, AND INVESTMENT ----------------------------------9. (SBU) Stepping back from security, the Mayor detailed five chief concerns: crossing time at the border, illegal crossings, the effect of the U.S. economic downturn on Matamoros, distribution of wealth and social problems, and security. The weakened local economy was of particular worry. Declines in tourism, remittances, and oil receipts and the H1N1 influenza have combined to push up unemployment (a potential boon to DTO recruiting efforts). The economy will improve, but fear in the business community of the DTOs and kidnappings may still drag on investment. An indicator to watch is the number of Tamaulipans living in McAllen and San Antonio. Perceptions are worse than reality, but the Mayor admitted he faced

a challenge convincing residents, tourists, businesspeople to return to Matamoros.

and

10. (SBU) COMMENT: While violence is not at the level seen in border cities to the west, security forces in Matamoros are underperforming. They are not generating actionable intelligence, coordinating among security agencies, patrolling jointly or effectively, or getting prosecutions. Measures to protect the population and disaggregate citizens and drug traffickers are underdeveloped. Local citizens seem to support the military deployment but steer clear of patrols for fear of cross-fire. Government hotlines receive few tips, a sign would-be informants doubt the government can protect them from retribution. In the search for better results, Matamoros may benefit by applying lessons learned in positive trending areas of operation such as Tijuana. PASCUAL (Edited and reading.) reformatted by Andres for ease of