LEGAL PROF MIDTERMS 6 CASES A.C. No. 3319. June 8, 2000 LESLIE UI, complainant, vs. ATTY.

IRIS BONIFACIO, respondent. Before us is an administrative complaint for disbarment against Atty. Iris Bonifacio for allegedly carrying on an immoral relationship with Carlos L. Ui, husband of complainant, Leslie Ui. The relevant facts are: On January 24, 1971 complainant Leslie Ui married Carlos L. Ui at the Our Lady of Lourdes Church in Quezon City1 and as a result of their marital union, they had four (4) children, namely, Leilani, Lianni, Lindsay and Carl Cavin, all surnamed Ui. Sometime in December 1987, however, complainant found out that her husband, Carlos Ui, was carrying on an illicit relationship with respondent Atty. Iris Bonifacio with whom he begot a daughter sometime in 1986, and that they had been living together at No. 527 San Carlos Street, Ayala Alabang Village in Muntinlupa City. Respondent who is a graduate of the College of Law of the University of the Philippines was admitted to the Philippine Bar in 1982. Carlos Ui admitted to complainant his relationship with the respondent. Complainant then visited respondent at her office in the later part of June 1988 and introduced herself as the legal wife of Carlos Ui. Whereupon, respondent admitted to her that she has a child with Carlos Ui and alleged, however, that everything was over between her and Carlos Ui. Complainant believed the representations of respondent and thought things would turn out well from then on and that the illicit relationship between her husband and respondent would come to an end. However, complainant again discovered that the illicit relationship between her husband and respondent continued, and that sometime in December 1988, respondent and her husband, Carlos Ui, had a second child. Complainant then met again with respondent sometime in March 1989 and pleaded with respondent to discontinue her illicit relationship with Carlos Ui but to no avail. The illicit relationship persisted and complainant even came to know later on that respondent had been employed by her husband in his company. A complaint for disbarment, docketed as Adm. Case No. 3319, was then filed on August 11, 1989 by the complainant against respondent Atty. Iris Bonifacio before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (hereinafter, Commission) on the ground of immorality, more particularly, for carrying on an illicit relationship with the complainant s husband, Carlos Ui. In her Answer,2 respondent averred that she met Carlos Ui sometime in 1983 and had known him all along to be a bachelor, with the knowledge, however, that Carlos Ui had children by a Chinese woman in Amoy, China, from whom he had long been estranged. She stated that during one of their trips abroad, Carlos Ui formalized his intention to marry her and they in fact got married in Hawaii, USA in 19853. Upon their return to Manila, respondent did not live with Carlos Ui. The latter continued to live with his children in their Greenhills residence because respondent and Carlos Ui wanted to let the children gradually to know and accept the fact of his second marriage before they would live together.4 In 1986, respondent left the country and stayed in Honolulu, Hawaii and she would only return occasionally to the Philippines to update her law practice and renew legal ties. During one of her trips to Manila sometime in June 1988, respondent was surprised when she was confronted by a woman who insisted that she was the lawful wife of Carlos Ui. Hurt and desolate upon her discovery of the true civil status of Carlos Ui, respondent then left for Honolulu, Hawaii sometime in July 1988 and returned only in March 1989 with her two (2) children. On March 20, 1989, a few days after she reported to work with the law firm5 she was connected with, the woman who represented herself to be the wife of Carlos Ui again came to her office, demanding to know if Carlos Ui has been communicating with her. It is respondent s contention that her relationship with Carlos Ui is not illicit because they were married abroad and that after June 1988 when respondent discovered Carlos Ui s true civil status, she cut off all her ties with him. Respondent averred that Carlos Ui never lived with her in Alabang, and that he resided at 26 Potsdam Street, Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila. It was respondent who lived in Alabang in a house which belonged to her mother, Rosalinda L. Bonifacio; and that the said house was built exclusively from her parents funds.6 By way of counterclaim, respondent sought moral damages in the amount of Ten Million Pesos (Php10,000,000.00) against complainant for having filed the present allegedly malicious and groundless disbarment case against respondent. In her Reply7 dated April 6, 1990, complainant states, among others, that respondent knew perfectly well that Carlos Ui was married to complainant and had children with her even at the start of her relationship with Carlos Ui, and that the reason respondent went abroad was to give birth to her two (2) children with Carlos Ui. During the pendency of the proceedings before the Integrated Bar, complainant also charged her husband, Carlos Ui, and respondent with the crime of Concubinage before the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal, docketed as I.S. No. 89-5247, but the same was dismissed for insufficiency of evidence to establish probable cause for the offense charged. The resolution dismissing the criminal complaint against respondent reads: Complainant s evidence had prima facie established the existence of the "illicit relationship" between the respondents allegedly discovered by the complainant in December 1987. The same evidence however show that respondent Carlos Ui was still living with complainant up to the latter part of 1988 and/or the early part of 1989.

It would therefore be logical and safe to state that the "relationship" of respondents started and was discovered by complainant sometime in 1987 when she and respondent Carlos were still living at No. 26 Potsdam Street, Northeast Greenhills, San Juan, MetroManila and they, admittedly, continued to live together at their conjugal home up to early (sic) part of 1989 or later 1988, when respondent Carlos left the same. From the above, it would not be amiss to conclude that altho (sic) the relationship, illicit as complainant puts it, had been prima facie established by complainant s evidence, this same evidence had failed to even prima facie establish the "fact of respondent s cohabitation in the concept of husband and wife at the 527 San Carlos St., Ayala Alabang house, proof of which is necessary and indispensable to at least create probable cause for the offense charged. The statement alone of complainant, worse, a statement only of a conclusion respecting the fact of cohabitation does not make the complainant s evidence thereto any better/stronger (U.S. vs. Casipong and Mongoy, 20 Phil. 178). It is worth stating that the evidence submitted by respondents in support of their respective positions on the matter support and bolster the foregoing conclusion/recommendation. WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully recommended that the instant complaint be dismissed for want of evidence to establish probable cause for the offense charged. RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.8 Complainant appealed the said Resolution of the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal to the Secretary of Justice, but the same was dismissed 9 on the ground of insufficiency of evidence to prove her allegation that respondent and Carlos Ui lived together as husband and wife at 527 San Carlos Street, Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila. In the proceedings before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, complainant filed a Motion to Cite Respondent in Contempt of the Commission 10 wherein she charged respondent with making false allegations in her Answer and for submitting a supporting document which was altered and intercalated. She alleged that in the Answer of respondent filed before the Integrated Bar, respondent averred, among others, that she was married to Carlos Ui on October 22, 1985 and attached a Certificate of Marriage to substantiate her averment. However, the Certificate of Marriage 11 duly certified by the State Registrar as a true copy of the record on file in the Hawaii State Department of Health, and duly authenticated by the Philippine Consulate General in Honolulu, Hawaii, USA revealed that the date of marriage between Carlos Ui and respondent Atty. Iris Bonifacio was October 22, 1987, and not October 22, 1985 as claimed by respondent in her Answer. According to complainant, the reason for that false allegation was because respondent wanted to impress upon the said IBP that the birth of her first child by Carlos Ui was within the wedlock.12 It is the contention of complainant that such act constitutes a violation of Articles 18313 and 18414 of the Revised Penal Code, and also contempt of the Commission; and that the act of respondent in making false allegations in her Answer and submitting an altered/intercalated document are indicative of her moral perversity and lack of integrity which make her unworthy to be a member of the Philippine Bar. In her Opposition (To Motion To Cite Respondent in Contempt),15 respondent averred that she did not have the original copy of the marriage certificate because the same was in the possession of Carlos Ui, and that she annexed such copy because she relied in good faith on what appeared on the copy of the marriage certificate in her possession. Respondent filed her Memorandum 16 on February 22, 1995 and raised the lone issue of whether or not she has conducted herself in an immoral manner for which she deserves to be barred from the practice of law. Respondent averred that the complaint should be dismissed on two (2) grounds, namely: (i) Respondent conducted herself in a manner consistent with the requirement of good moral character for the practice of the legal profession; and (ii) Complainant failed to prove her allegation that respondent conducted herself in an immoral manner.17 In her defense, respondent contends, among others, that it was she who was the victim in this case and not Leslie Ui because she did not know that Carlos Ui was already married, and that upon learning of this fact, respondent immediately cut-off all her ties with Carlos Ui. She stated that there was no reason for her to doubt at that time that the civil status of Carlos Ui was that of a bachelor because he spent so much time with her, and he was so open in his courtship.18 On the issue of the falsified marriage certificate, respondent alleged that it was highly incredible for her to have knowingly attached such marriage certificate to her Answer had she known that the same was altered. Respondent reiterated that there was no compelling reason for her to make it appear that her marriage to Carlos Ui took place either in 1985 or 1987, because the fact remains that respondent and Carlos Ui got married before complainant confronted respondent and informed the latter of her earlier marriage to Carlos Ui in June 1988. Further, respondent stated that it was Carlos Ui who testified and admitted that he was the person responsible for changing the date of the marriage certificate from 1987 to 1985, and complainant did not present evidence to rebut the testimony of Carlos Ui on this matter. Respondent posits that complainant s evidence, consisting of the pictures of respondent with a child, pictures of respondent with Carlos Ui, a picture of a garage with cars, a picture of a light colored car with Plate No. PNS 313, a picture of the same car, and portion of the house and ground, and another picture of the same car bearing Plate No. PNS 313 and a picture of the house and the garage,19 does not prove that she acted in an immoral manner. They have no

evidentiary value according to her. The pictures were taken by a photographer from a private security agency and who was not presented during the hearings. Further, the respondent presented the Resolution of the Provincial Fiscal of Pasig in I.S. Case No. 89-5427 dismissing the complaint filed by Leslie Ui against respondent for lack of evidence to establish probable cause for the offense charged 20 and the dismissal of the appeal by the Department of Justice 21 to bolster her argument that she was not guilty of any immoral or illegal act because of her relationship with Carlos Ui. In fine, respondent claims that she entered the relationship with Carlos Ui in good faith and that her conduct cannot be considered as willful, flagrant, or shameless, nor can it suggest moral indifference. She fell in love with Carlos Ui whom she believed to be single, and, that upon her discovery of his true civil status, she parted ways with him. In the Memorandum 22 filed on March 20, 1995 by complainant Leslie Ui, she prayed for the disbarment of Atty. Iris Bonifacio and reiterated that respondent committed immorality by having intimate relations with a married man which resulted in the birth of two (2) children. Complainant testified that respondent s mother, Mrs. Linda Bonifacio, personally knew complainant and her husband since the late 1970s because they were clients of the bank where Mrs. Bonifacio was the Branch Manager.23 It was thus highly improbable that respondent, who was living with her parents as of 1986, would not have been informed by her own mother that Carlos Ui was a married man. Complainant likewise averred that respondent committed disrespect towards the Commission for submitting a photocopy of a document containing an intercalated date. In her Reply to Complainant s Memorandum 24, respondent stated that complainant miserably failed to show sufficient proof to warrant her disbarment. Respondent insists that contrary to the allegations of complainant, there is no showing that respondent had knowledge of the fact of marriage of Carlos Ui to complainant. The allegation that her mother knew Carlos Ui to be a married man does not prove that such information was made known to respondent. Hearing on the case ensued, after which the Commission on Bar Discipline submitted its Report and Recommendation, finding that: In the case at bar, it is alleged that at the time respondent was courted by Carlos Ui, the latter represented himself to be single. The Commission does not find said claim too difficult to believe in the light of contemporary human experience. Almost always, when a married man courts a single woman, he represents himself to be single, separated, or without any firm commitment to another woman. The reason therefor is not hard to fathom. By their very nature, single women prefer single men. The records will show that when respondent became aware the (sic) true civil status of Carlos Ui, she left for the United States (in July of 1988). She broke off all contacts with him. When she returned to the Philippines in March of 1989, she lived with her brother, Atty. Teodoro Bonifacio, Jr. Carlos Ui and respondent only talked to each other because of the children whom he was allowed to visit. At no time did they live together. Under the foregoing circumstances, the Commission fails to find any act on the part of respondent that can be considered as unprincipled or disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a high degree. To be sure, she was more of a victim that (sic) anything else and should deserve compassion rather than condemnation. Without cavil, this sad episode destroyed her chance of having a normal and happy family life, a dream cherished by every single girl. x..........................x..........................x" Thereafter, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines issued a Notice of Resolution dated December 13, 1997, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows: RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex "A", and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, the complaint for Gross Immorality against Respondent is DISMISSED for lack of merit. Atty. Iris Bonifacio is REPRIMANDED for knowingly and willfully attaching to her Answer a falsified Certificate of Marriage with a stern warning that a repetition of the same will merit a more severe penalty." We agree with the findings aforequoted. The practice of law is a privilege. A bar candidate does not have the right to enjoy the practice of the legal profession simply by passing the bar examinations. It is a privilege that can be revoked, subject to the mandate of due process, once a lawyer violates his oath and the dictates of legal ethics. The requisites for admission to the practice of law are: a. he must be a citizen of the Philippines; b. a resident thereof; c. at least twenty-one (21) years of age; d. a person of good moral character;

e. he must show that no charges against him involving moral turpitude, are filed or pending in court; f. possess the required educational qualifications; and g. pass the bar examinations.25 (Italics supplied) Clear from the foregoing is that one of the conditions prior to admission to the bar is that an applicant must possess good moral character. More importantly, possession of good moral character must be continuous as a requirement to the enjoyment of the privilege of law practice, otherwise, the loss thereof is a ground for the revocation of such privilege. It has been held If good moral character is a sine qua non for admission to the bar, then the continued possession of good moral character is also a requisite for retaining membership in the legal profession. Membership in the bar may be terminated when a lawyer ceases to have good moral character. (Royong vs. Oblena, 117 Phil. 865). A lawyer may be disbarred for "grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude". A member of the bar should have moral integrity in addition to professional probity. It is difficult to state with precision and to fix an inflexible standard as to what is "grossly immoral conduct" or to specify the moral delinquency and obliquity which render a lawyer unworthy of continuing as a member of the bar. The rule implies that what appears to be unconventional behavior to the straight-laced may not be the immoral conduct that warrants disbarment. Immoral conduct has been defined as "that conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the community." (7 C.J.S. 959).26 In the case at bar, it is the claim of respondent Atty. Bonifacio that when she met Carlos Ui, she knew and believed him to be single. Respondent fell in love with him and they got married and as a result of such marriage, she gave birth to two (2) children. Upon her knowledge of the true civil status of Carlos Ui, she left him. Simple as the facts of the case may sound, the effects of the actuations of respondent are not only far from simple, they will have a rippling effect on how the standard norms of our legal practitioners should be defined. Perhaps morality in our liberal society today is a far cry from what it used to be before. This permissiveness notwithstanding, lawyers, as keepers of public faith, are burdened with a higher degree of social responsibility and thus must handle their personal affairs with greater caution. The facts of this case lead us to believe that perhaps respondent would not have found herself in such a compromising situation had she exercised prudence and been more vigilant in finding out more about Carlos Ui s personal background prior to her intimate involvement with him. Surely, circumstances existed which should have at least aroused respondent s suspicion that something was amiss in her relationship with Carlos Ui, and moved her to ask probing questions. For instance, respondent admitted that she knew that Carlos Ui had children with a woman from Amoy, China, yet it appeared that she never exerted the slightest effort to find out if Carlos Ui and this woman were indeed unmarried. Also, despite their marriage in 1987, Carlos Ui never lived with respondent and their first child, a circumstance that is simply incomprehensible considering respondent s allegation that Carlos Ui was very open in courting her. All these taken together leads to the inescapable conclusion that respondent was imprudent in managing her personal affairs. However, the fact remains that her relationship with Carlos Ui, clothed as it was with what respondent believed was a valid marriage, cannot be considered immoral. For immorality connotes conduct that shows indifference to the moral norms of society and the opinion of good and respectable members of the community.27 Moreover, for such conduct to warrant disciplinary action, the same must be "grossly immoral," that is, it must be so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree.28 We have held that "a member of the Bar and officer of the court is not only required to refrain from adulterous relationships x x x but must also so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he is flouting those moral standards."29 Respondent s act of immediately distancing herself from Carlos Ui upon discovering his true civil status belies just that alleged moral indifference and proves that she had no intention of flaunting the law and the high moral standard of the legal profession. Complainant s bare assertions to the contrary deserve no credit. After all, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant, and the Court will exercise its disciplinary powers only if she establishes her case by clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence.30 This, herein complainant miserably failed to do. On the matter of the falsified Certificate of Marriage attached by respondent to her Answer, we find improbable to believe the averment of respondent that she merely relied on the photocopy of the Marriage Certificate which was provided her by Carlos Ui. For an event as significant as a marriage ceremony, any normal bride would verily recall the date and year of her marriage. It is difficult to fathom how a bride, especially a lawyer as in the case at bar, can forget the year when she got married. Simply stated, it is contrary to human experience and highly improbable. Furthermore, any prudent lawyer would verify the information contained in an attachment to her pleading, especially so when she has personal knowledge of the facts and circumstances contained therein. In attaching such Marriage Certificate with an intercalated date, the defense of good faith of respondent on that point cannot stand.

It is the bounden duty of lawyers to adhere unwaveringly to the highest standards of morality. The legal profession exacts from its members nothing less. Lawyers are called upon to safeguard the integrity of the Bar, free from misdeeds and acts constitutive of malpractice. Their exalted positions as officers of the court demand no less than the highest degree of morality. WHEREFORE, the complaint for disbarment against respondent Atty. Iris L. Bonifacio, for alleged immorality, is hereby DISMISSED. However, respondent is hereby REPRIMANDED for attaching to her Answer a photocopy of her Marriage Certificate, with an altered or intercalated date thereof, with a STERN WARNING that a more severe sanction will be imposed on her for any repetition of the same or similar offense in the future. SO ORDERED. A.C. No. 7136 August 1, 2007

JOSELANO GUEVARRA, complainant, vs. ATTY. JOSE EMMANUEL EALA, respondent. DECISION PER CURIAM: Joselano Guevarra (complainant) filed on March 4, 2002 a Complaint for Disbarment1 before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Committee on Bar Discipline (CBD) against Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala a.k.a. Noli Eala (respondent) for "grossly immoral conduct and unmitigated violation of the lawyer's oath." In his complaint, Guevarra gave the following account: He first met respondent in January 2000 when his (complainant's) then-fiancee Irene Moje (Irene) introduced respondent to him as her friend who was married to Marianne (sometimes spelled "Mary Ann") Tantoco with whom he had three children. After his marriage to Irene on October 7, 2000, complainant noticed that from January to March 2001, Irene had been receiving from respondent cellphone calls, as well as messages some of which read "I love you," "I miss you," or "Meet you at Megamall." Complainant also noticed that Irene habitually went home very late at night or early in the morning of the following day, and sometimes did not go home from work. When he asked about her whereabouts, she replied that she slept at her parents' house in Binangonan, Rizal or she was busy with her work. In February or March 2001, complainant saw Irene and respondent together on two occasions. On the second occasion, he confronted them following which Irene abandoned the conjugal house. On April 22, 2001, complainant went uninvited to Irene's birthday celebration at which he saw her and respondent celebrating with her family and friends. Out of embarrassment, anger and humiliation, he left the venue immediately. Following that incident, Irene went to the conjugal house and hauled off all her personal belongings, pieces of furniture, and her share of the household appliances. Complainant later found, in the master's bedroom, a folded social card bearing the words "I Love You" on its face, which card when unfolded contained a handwritten letter dated October 7, 2000, the day of his wedding to Irene, reading: My everdearest Irene, By the time you open this, you'll be moments away from walking down the aisle. I will say a prayer for you that you may find meaning in what you're about to do. Sometimes I wonder why we ever met. Is it only for me to find fleeting happiness but experience eternal pain? Is it only for us to find a true love but then lose it again? Or is it because there's a bigger plan for the two of us? I hope that you have experienced true happiness with me. I have done everything humanly possible to love you. And today, as you make your vows . . . I make my own vow to YOU! I will love you for the rest of my life. I loved you from the first time I laid eyes on you, to the time we spent together, up to the final moments of your single life. But more importantly, I will love you until the life in me is gone and until we are together again. Do not worry about me! I will be happy for you. I have enough memories of us to last me a lifetime. Always remember though that in my heart, in my mind and in my soul, YOU WILL ALWAYS

. . . AND THE WONDERFUL THINGS YOU DO! BE MINE . . . . AND MINE ALONE, and I WILL ALWAYS BE YOURS AND YOURS ALONE! I LOVE YOU FOREVER, I LOVE YOU FOR ALWAYS. AS LONG AS I'M LIVING MY TWEETIE YOU'LL BE!"2 Eternally yours, NOLI Complainant soon saw respondent's car and that of Irene constantly parked at No. 71-B 11th Street, New Manila where, as he was to later learn sometime in April 2001, Irene was already residing. He also learned still later that when his friends saw Irene on or about January 18, 2002 together with respondent during a concert, she was pregnant. In his ANSWER,3 respondent admitted having sent the I LOVE YOU card on which the above-quoted letter was handwritten. On paragraph 14 of the COMPLAINT reading: 14. Respondent and Irene were even FLAUNTING THEIR ADULTEROUS RELATIONSHIP as they attended social functions together. For instance, in or about the third week of September 2001, the couple attended the launch of the "Wine All You Can" promotion of French wines, held at the Mega Strip of SM Megamall B at Mandaluyong City. Their attendance was reported in Section B of the Manila Standard issue of 24 September 2001, on page 21. Respondent and Irene were photographed together; their picture was captioned: "Irene with Sportscaster Noli Eala." A photocopy of the report is attached as Annex C.4 (Italics and emphasis in the original; CAPITALIZATION of the phrase "flaunting their adulterous relationship" supplied), respondent, in his ANSWER, stated: 4. Respondent specifically denies having ever flaunted an adulterous relationship with Irene as alleged in paragraph 14 of the Complaint, the truth of the matter being that their relationship was low profile and known only to the immediate members of their respective families, and that Respondent, as far as the general public was concerned, was still known to be legally married to Mary Anne Tantoco.5 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) On paragraph 15 of the COMPLAINT reading: 15. Respondent's adulterous conduct with the complainant's wife and his apparent abandoning or neglecting of his own family, demonstrate his gross moral depravity, making him morally unfit to keep his membership in the bar. He flaunted his aversion to the institution of marriage, calling it a "piece of paper." Morally reprehensible was his writing the love letter to complainant's bride on the very day of her wedding, vowing to continue his love for her "until we are together again," as now they are.6 (Underscoring supplied), respondent stated in his ANSWER as follows: 5. Respondent specifically denies the allegations in paragraph 15 of the Complaint regarding his adulterous relationship and that his acts demonstrate gross moral depravity thereby making him unfit to keep his membership in the bar, the reason being that Respondent's relationship with Irene was not under scandalous circumstances and that as far as his relationship with his own family: 5.1 Respondent has maintained a civil, cordial and peaceful relationship with [his wife] Mary Anne as in fact they still occasionally meet in public, even if Mary Anne is aware of Respondent's special friendship with Irene. xxxx 5.5 Respondent also denies that he has flaunted his aversion to the institution of marriage by calling the institution of marriage a mere piece of paper because his reference [in his above-quoted handwritten letter to Irene] to the marriage between Complainant and Irene as a piece of paper was merely with respect to the formality of the marriage contract.7 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) Respondent admitted8 paragraph 18 of the COMPLAINT reading: 18. The Rules of Court requires lawyers to support the Constitution and obey the laws. The Constitution regards marriage as an inviolable social institution and is the foundation of the family (Article XV, Sec. 2).9 And on paragraph 19 of the COMPLAINT reading:

19. Respondent's grossly immoral conduct runs afoul of the Constitution and the laws he, as a lawyer, has been sworn to uphold. In pursuing obsessively his illicit love for the complainant's wife, he mocked the institution of marriage, betrayed his own family, broke up the complainant's marriage, commits adultery with his wife, and degrades the legal profession.10 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied), respondent, in his ANSWER, stated: 7. Respondent specifically denies the allegations in paragraph 19 of the Complaint, the reason being that under the circumstances the acts of Respondent with respect to his purely personal and low profile special relationship with Irene is neither under scandalous circumstances nor tantamount to grossly immoral conduct as would be a ground for disbarment pursuant to Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court.11 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) To respondent's ANSWER, complainant filed a REPLY,12 alleging that Irene gave birth to a girl and Irene named respondent in the Certificate of Live Birth as the girl's father. Complainant attached to the Reply, as Annex "A," a copy of a Certificate of Live Birth13 bearing Irene's signature and naming respondent as the father of her daughter Samantha Irene Louise Moje who was born on February 14, 2002 at St. Luke's Hospital. Complainant's REPLY merited a REJOINDER WITH MOTION TO DISMISS14 dated January 10, 2003 from respondent in which he denied having "personal knowledge of the Certificate of Live Birth attached to the complainant's Reply."15 Respondent moved to dismiss the complaint due to the pendency of a civil case filed by complainant for the annulment of his marriage to Irene, and a criminal complaint for adultery against respondent and Irene which was pending before the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office. During the investigation before the IBP-CBD, complainant's Complaint-Affidavit and Reply to Answer were adopted as his testimony on direct examination.16 Respondent's counsel did not cross-examine complainant.17 After investigation, IBP-CBD Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan, in a 12-page REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION18 dated October 26, 2004, found the charge against respondent sufficiently proven. The Commissioner thus recommended19 that respondent be disbarred for violating Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility reading: Rule 1.01: A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct (Underscoring supplied), and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the same Code reading: Rule 7.03: A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession. (Underscoring supplied) The IBP Board of Governors, however, annulled and set aside the Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner and accordingly dismissed the case for lack of merit, by Resolution dated January 28, 2006 briefly reading: RESOLUTION NO. XVII-2006-06 CBD Case No. 02-936 Joselano C. Guevarra vs. Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala a.k.a. Noli Eala RESOLVED to ANNUL and SET ASIDE, as it is hereby ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE, the Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, and to APPROVE the DISMISSAL of the above-entitled case for lack of merit.20 (Italics and emphasis in the original) Hence, the present petition21 of complainant before this Court, filed pursuant to Section 12 (c), Rule 13922 of the Rules of Court. The petition is impressed with merit. Oddly enough, the IBP Board of Governors, in setting aside the Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner and dismissing the case for lack of merit, gave no reason therefor as its above-quoted 33-word Resolution shows. Respondent contends, in his Comment23 on the present petition of complainant, that there is no evidence against him.24 The contention fails. As the IBP-CBD Investigating Commissioner observed:

While it may be true that the love letter dated October 7, 2000 (Exh. "C") and the news item published in the Manila Standard (Exh. "D"), even taken together do not sufficiently prove that respondent is carrying on an adulterous relationship with complainant's wife, there are other pieces of evidence on record which support the accusation of complainant against respondent. It should be noted that in his Answer dated 17 October 2002, respondent through counsel made the following statements to wit: "Respondent specifically denies having [ever] flaunted an adulterous relationship with Irene as alleged in paragraph [14] of the Complaint, the truth of the matter being [that] their relationship was low profile and known only to immediate members of their respective families . . . , and Respondent specifically denies the allegations in paragraph 19 of the complaint, the reason being that under the circumstances the acts of the respondents with respect to his purely personal and low profile relationship with Irene is neither under scandalous circumstances nor tantamount to grossly immoral conduct . . ." These statements of respondent in his Answer are an admission that there is indeed a "special" relationship between him and complainant's wife, Irene, [which] taken together with the Certificate of Live Birth of Samantha Louise Irene Moje (Annex "H-1") sufficiently prove that there was indeed an illicit relationship between respondent and Irene which resulted in the birth of the child "Samantha". In the Certificate of Live Birth of Samantha it should be noted that complainant's wife Irene supplied the information that respondent was the father of the child. Given the fact that the respondent admitted his special relationship with Irene there is no reason to believe that Irene would lie or make any misrepresentation regarding the paternity of the child. It should be underscored that respondent has not categorically denied that he is the father of Samantha Louise Irene Moje.25 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) Indeed, from respondent's Answer, he does not deny carrying on an adulterous relationship with Irene, "adultery" being defined under Art. 333 of the Revised Penal Code as that "committed by any married woman who shall have sexual intercourse with a man not her husband and by the man who has carnal knowledge of her, knowing her to be married, even if the marriage be subsequently declared void."26 (Italics supplied) What respondent denies is having flaunted such relationship, he maintaining that it was "low profile and known only to the immediate members of their respective families." In other words, respondent's denial is a negative pregnant, a denial pregnant with the admission of the substantial facts in the pleading responded to which are not squarely denied. It was in effect an admission of the averments it was directed at. Stated otherwise, a negative pregnant is a form of negative expression which carries with it in affirmation or at least an implication of some kind favorable to the adverse party. It is a denial pregnant with an admission of the substantial facts alleged in the pleading. Where a fact is alleged with qualifying or modifying language and the words of the allegation as so qualified or modified are literally denied, it has been held that the qualifying circumstances alone are denied while the fact itself is admitted.27 (Citations omitted; emphasis and underscoring supplied) A negative pregnant too is respondent's denial of having "personal knowledge" of Irene's daughter Samantha Louise Irene Moje's Certificate of Live Birth. In said certificate, Irene named respondent a "lawyer," 38 years old as the child's father. And the phrase "NOT MARRIED" is entered on the desired information on "DATE AND PLACE OF MARRIAGE." A comparison of the signature attributed to Irene in the certificate28 with her signature on the Marriage Certificate29 shows that they were affixed by one and the same person. Notatu dignum is that, as the Investigating Commissioner noted, respondent never denied being the father of the child. Franklin A. Ricafort, the records custodian of St. Luke's Medical Center, in his January 29, 2003 Affidavit30 which he identified at the witness stand, declared that Irene gave the information in the Certificate of Live Birth that the child's father is "Jose Emmanuel Masacaet Eala," who was 38 years old and a lawyer.31 Without doubt, the adulterous relationship between respondent and Irene has been sufficiently proven by more than clearly preponderant evidence that evidence adduced by one party which is more conclusive and credible than that of the other party and, therefore, has greater weight than the other32 which is the quantum of evidence needed in an administrative case against a lawyer. Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own. They are distinct from and they may proceed independently of civil and criminal cases. . . . of proof for these types of cases differ. In a criminal case, proof beyond reasonable doubt is necessary; in an administrative case for disbarment or suspension, "clearly preponderant evidence" is all that is required.33 (Emphasis supplied) Respondent insists, however, that disbarment does not lie because his relationship with Irene was not, under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, reading: SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving

moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. The disbarment or suspension of a member of the Philippine Bar by a competent court or other disciplinatory agency in a foreign jurisdiction where he has also been admitted as an attorney is a ground for his disbarment or suspension if the basis of such action includes any of the acts hereinabove enumerated. The judgment, resolution or order of the foreign court or disciplinary agency shall be prima facie evidence of the ground for disbarment or suspension (Emphasis and underscoring supplied), under scandalous circumstances.34 The immediately-quoted Rule which provides the grounds for disbarment or suspension uses the phrase "grossly immoral conduct," not "under scandalous circumstances." Sexual intercourse under scandalous circumstances is, following Article 334 of the Revised Penal Code reading: ART. 334. Concubinage. - Any husband who shall keep a mistress in the conjugal dwelling, or, shall have sexual intercourse, under scandalous circumstances, with a woman who is not his wife, or shall cohabit with her in any other place, shall be punished by prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods. x x x x, an element of the crime of concubinage when a married man has sexual intercourse with a woman elsewhere. "Whether a lawyer's sexual congress with a woman not his wife or without the benefit of marriage should be characterized as 'grossly immoral conduct' depends on the surrounding circumstances."35 The case at bar involves a relationship between a married lawyer and a married woman who is not his wife. It is immaterial whether the affair was carried out discreetly. Apropos is the following pronouncement of this Court in Vitug v. Rongcal:36 On the charge of immorality, respondent does not deny that he had an extra-marital affair with complainant, albeit brief and discreet, and which act is not "so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree" in order to merit disciplinary sanction. We disagree. xxxx While it has been held in disbarment cases that the mere fact of sexual relations between two unmarried adults is not sufficient to warrant administrative sanction for such illicit behavior, it is not so with respect to betrayals of the marital vow of fidelity. Even if not all forms of extra-marital relations are punishable under penal law, sexual relations outside marriage is considered disgraceful and immoral as it manifests deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the marital vows protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our laws.37 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) And so is the pronouncement in Tucay v. Atty. Tucay:38 The Court need not delve into the question of whether or not the respondent did contract a bigamous marriage . . . It is enough that the records of this administrative case substantiate the findings of the Investigating Commissioner, as well as the IBP Board of Governors, i.e., that indeed respondent has been carrying on an illicit affair with a married woman, a grossly immoral conduct and indicative of an extremely low regard for the fundamental ethics of his profession. This detestable behavior renders him regrettably unfit and undeserving of the treasured honor and privileges which his license confers upon him.39 (Underscoring supplied) Respondent in fact also violated the lawyer's oath he took before admission to practice law which goes: I _________, having been permitted to continue in the practice of law in the Philippines, do solemnly swear that I recognize the supreme authority of the Republic of the Philippines; I will support its Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same; I will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well as to the courts as to my clients; and I impose upon myself this voluntary obligation without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God. (Underscoring supplied) Respondent admittedly is aware of Section 2 of Article XV (The Family) of the Constitution reading: Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State.

In this connection, the Family Code (Executive Order No. 209), which echoes this constitutional provision, obligates the husband and the wife "to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support."40 Furthermore, respondent violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in "unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct," and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the same Code which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in any "conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law." Clutching at straws, respondent, during the pendency of the investigation of the case before the IBP Commissioner, filed a Manifestation41 on March 22, 2005 informing the IBP-CBD that complainant's petition for nullity of his (complainant's) marriage to Irene had been granted by Branch 106 of the Quezon City Regional Trial Court, and that the criminal complaint for adultery complainant filed against respondent and Irene "based on the same set of facts alleged in the instant case," which was pending review before the Department of Justice (DOJ), on petition of complainant, had been, on motion of complainant, withdrawn. The Secretary of Justice's Resolution of January 16, 2004 granting complainant's Motion to Withdraw Petition for Review reads: Considering that the instant motion was filed before the final resolution of the petition for review, we are inclined to grant the same pursuant to Section 10 of Department Circular No. 70 dated July 3, 2000, which provides that "notwithstanding the perfection of the appeal, the petitioner may withdraw the same at any time before it is finally resolved, in which case the appealed resolution shall stand as though no appeal has been taken."42 (Emphasis supplied by complainant) That the marriage between complainant and Irene was subsequently declared void ab initio is immaterial. The acts complained of took place before the marriage was declared null and void.43 As a lawyer, respondent should be aware that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife are presumed, unless proven otherwise, to have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.44 In carrying on an extra-marital affair with Irene prior to the judicial declaration that her marriage with complainant was null and void, and despite respondent himself being married, he showed disrespect for an institution held sacred by the law. And he betrayed his unfitness to be a lawyer. As for complainant's withdrawal of his petition for review before the DOJ, respondent glaringly omitted to state that before complainant filed his December 23, 2003 Motion to Withdraw his Petition for Review, the DOJ had already promulgated a Resolution on September 22, 2003 reversing the dismissal by the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office of complainant's complaint for adultery. In reversing the City Prosecutor's Resolution, DOJ Secretary Simeon Datumanong held: Parenthetically the totality of evidence adduced by complainant would, in the fair estimation of the Department, sufficiently establish all the elements of the offense of adultery on the part of both respondents. Indeed, early on, respondent Moje conceded to complainant that she was going out on dates with respondent Eala, and this she did when complainant confronted her about Eala's frequent phone calls and text messages to her. Complainant also personally witnessed Moje and Eala having a rendezvous on two occasions. Respondent Eala never denied the fact that he knew Moje to be married to complainant[.] In fact, he (Eala) himself was married to another woman. Moreover, Moje's eventual abandonment of their conjugal home, after complainant had once more confronted her about Eala, only served to confirm the illicit relationship involving both respondents. This becomes all the more apparent by Moje's subsequent relocation in No. 71-B, 11th Street, New Manila, Quezon City, which was a few blocks away from the church where she had exchange marital vows with complainant. It was in this place that the two lovers apparently cohabited. Especially since Eala's vehicle and that of Moje's were always seen there. Moje herself admits that she came to live in the said address whereas Eala asserts that that was where he held office. The happenstance that it was in that said address that Eala and Moje had decided to hold office for the firm that both had formed smacks too much of a coincidence. For one, the said address appears to be a residential house, for that was where Moje stayed all throughout after her separation from complainant. It was both respondent's love nest, to put short; their illicit affair that was carried out there bore fruit a few months later when Moje gave birth to a girl at the nearby hospital of St. Luke's Medical Center. What finally militates against the respondents is the indubitable fact that in the certificate of birth of the girl, Moje furnished the information that Eala was the father. This speaks all too eloquently of the unlawful and damning nature of the adulterous acts of the respondents. Complainant's supposed illegal procurement of the birth certificate is most certainly beside the point for both respondents Eala and Moje have not denied, in any categorical manner, that Eala is the father of the child Samantha Irene Louise Moje.45 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) It bears emphasis that adultery is a private offense which cannot be prosecuted de oficio and thus leaves the DOJ no choice but to grant complainant's motion to withdraw his petition for review. But even if respondent and Irene were to be acquitted of adultery after trial, if the Information for adultery were filed in court, the same would not have been a bar to the present administrative complaint. Citing the ruling in Pangan v. Ramos,46 viz:

x x x The acquittal of respondent Ramos [of] the criminal charge is not a bar to these [administrative] proceedings. The standards of legal profession are not satisfied by conduct which merely enables one to escape the penalties of x x x criminal law. Moreover, this Court, in disbarment proceedings is acting in an entirely different capacity from that which courts assume in trying criminal case47 (Italics in the original), this Court in Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pools, Inc. v. Atty. Naldoza,48 held: Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own. They are distinct from and they may proceed independently of civil and criminal cases. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Resolution No. XVII-2006-06 passed on January 28, 2006 by the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Respondent, Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala, is DISBARRED for grossly immoral conduct, violation of his oath of office, and violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Let a copy of this Decision, which is immediately executory, be made part of the records of respondent in the Office of the Bar Confidant, Supreme Court of the Philippines. And let copies of the Decision be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and circulated to all courts. This Decision takes effect immediately. SO ORDERED. A.C. No. 6313 September 7, 2006

CATHERINE JOIE P. VITUG, complainant, vs. ATTY. DIOSDADO M. RONGCAL, respondent. DECISION TINGA, J.: The allegations raised in this complaint for disbarment are more sordid, if not tawdry, from the usual. As such, close scrutiny of these claims is called for. Disbarment and suspension of a lawyer, being the most severe forms of disciplinary sanction, should be imposed with great caution and only in those cases where the misconduct of the lawyer as an officer of the court and a member of the bar is established by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof.1 Under consideration is the administrative complaint for disbarment filed by Catherine Joie P. Vitug (complainant) against Atty. Diosdado M. Rongcal (respondent). A classic case of "he said, she said," the parties' conflicting versions of the facts as culled from the records are hereinafter presented. Complainant narrates that she and respondent met sometime in December 2000 when she was looking for a lawyer to assist her in suing Arnulfo Aquino ("Aquino"), the biological father of her minor daughter, for support. Her former classmate who was then a Barangay Secretary referred her to respondent. After several meetings with complainant, respondent sent a demand letter2 in her behalf to Aquino wherein he asked for the continuance of the monthly child support Aquino used to give, plus no less than P300,000.00 for the surgical operation their daughter would need for her congenital heart ailment. At around this point, by complainant's own admission, she and respondent started having a sexual relationship. She narrates that this twist in the events began after respondent started calling on her shortly after he had sent the demand letter in her behalf. Respondent allegedly started courting her, giving her financial aid. Soon he had progressed to making sexual advances towards complainant, to the accompaniment of sweet inducements such as the promise of a job, financial security for her daughter, and his services as counsel for the prospective claim for support against Aquino. Complainant acknowledges that she succumbed to these advances, assured by respondent's claim that the lawyer was free to marry her, as his own marriage had already been annulled. On 9 February 2001, respondent allegedly convinced complainant to sign an Affidavit of Disclaimer3 ("Affidavit") categorically stating that even as Aquino was denoted as the father in the birth certificate4 of her daughter, he was, in truth, not the real father. She was not allowed to read the contents of the Affidavit, she claims. Respondent supposedly assured her that the document meant nothing, necessary as it was the only way that Aquino would agree to give her daughter medical and educational support. Respondent purportedly assured complainant that despite the Affidavit, she could still pursue a case against Aquino in the future because the Affidavit is not a public document. Because she completely trusted him at this point, she signed the document "without even taking a glance at it."5 On 14 February 2001, respondent allegedly advised complainant that Aquino gave him P150,000.00 cash and P58,000.00 in two (2) postdated checks to answer for the medical expenses of her daughter. Instead of turning them over to her,

respondent handed her his personal check6 in the amount of P150,000.00 and promised to give her the balance of P58,000.00 soon thereafter. However, sometime in April or May 2001, respondent informed her that he could not give her the said amount because he used it for his political campaign as he was then running for the position of Provincial Board Member of the 2nd District of Pampanga. Complainant maintains that inspite of their sexual relationship and the fact that respondent kept part of the money intended for her daughter, he still failed in his promise to give her a job. Furthermore, he did not file the case against Aquino and referred her instead to Atty. Federico S. Tolentino, Jr. ("Atty. Tolentino"). Sometime in 2002, assisted by Atty. Tolentino, complainant filed a criminal case for child abuse as well as a civil case against Aquino. While the criminal case was dismissed, the civil case was decided on 30 August 2004 by virtue of a compromise agreement.7 It was only when said cases were filed that she finally understood the import of the Affidavit. Complainant avers that respondent failed to protect her interest when he personally prepared the Affidavit and caused her to sign the same, which obviously worked to her disadvantage. In making false promises that all her problems would be solved, aggravated by his assurance that his marriage had already been annulled, respondent allegedly deceived her into yielding to his sexual desires. Taking advantage of the trust and confidence she had in him as her counsel and paramour, her weak emotional state, and dire financial need at that time, respondent was able to appropriate for himself money that rightfully belonged to her daughter. She argues that respondent's aforementioned acts constitute a violation of his oath as a lawyer as well as the Code of Professional Responsibility ("Code"), particularly Rule 1.01, Rule 1.02, Rule 16.01, Rule 16.02, and Canon 7.8 Hence, she filed the instant complaint9 dated 2 February 2004. Expectedly, respondent presents a different version. According to him, complainant needed a lawyer who would file the aforementioned action for support. Complainant's former high school classmate Reinilda Bansil Morales, who was also his fellow barangay official, referred her to him. He admits sending a demand letter to her former lover, Aquino, to ask support for the child.10 Subsequently, he and Aquino communicated through an emissary. He learned that because of Aquino's infidelity, his relationship with his wife was strained so that in order to settle things the spouses were willing to give complainant a lump sum provided she would execute an affidavit to the effect that Aquino is not the father of her daughter. Respondent relayed this proposal to complainant who asked for his advice. He then advised her to study the proposal thoroughly and with a practical mindset. He also explained to her the pros and cons of pursuing the case. After several days, she requested that he negotiate for an out-of-court settlement of no less than P500,000.00. When Aquino rejected the amount, negotiations ensued until the amount was lowered to P200,000.00. Aquino allegedly offered to issue four postdated checks in equal amounts within four months. Complainant disagreed. Aquino then proposed to rediscount the checks at an interest of 4% a month or a total of P12,000.00. The resulting amount was P188,000.00. Complainant finally agreed to this arrangement and voluntarily signed the Affidavit that respondent prepared, the same Affidavit adverted to by complainant. He denies forcing her to sign the document and strongly refutes her allegation that she did not know what the Affidavit was for and that she signed it without even reading it, as he gave her the draft before the actual payment was made. He notes that complainant is a college graduate and a former bank employee who speaks and understands English. He likewise vehemently denies pocketing P58,000.00 of the settlement proceeds. When complainant allegedly signed the Affidavit, the emissary handed to her the sum of P150,000.00 in cash and she allegedly told respondent that he could keep the remaining P38,000.00, not P58,000.00 as alleged in the complaint. Although she did not say why, he assumed that it was for his attorney's fees. As regards their illicit relationship, respondent admits of his sexual liaison with complainant. He, however, denies luring her with sweet words and empty promises. According to him, it was more of a "chemistry of (sic) two consensual (sic) adults,"11 complainant then being in her thirties. He denies that he tricked her into believing that his marriage was already annulled. Strangely, respondent devotes considerable effort to demonstrate that complainant very well knew he was married when they commenced what was to him, an extra-marital liaison. He points out that, first, they had met through his colleague, Ms. Morales, a friend and former high school classmate of hers. Second, they had allegedly first met at his residence where she was actually introduced to his wife. Subsequently, complainant called his residence several times and actually spoke to his wife, a circumstance so disturbing to respondent that he had to beg complainant not to call him there. Third, he was the Punong Barangay from 1994 to 2002, and was elected President of the Association of Barangay Council ("ABC") and as such was an ex-officio member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Guagua, Pampanga. He ran for the position of Provincial Board Member in 2001. Thus, he was known in his locality and it was impossible for complainant not to have known of his marital status especially that she lived no more than three (3) kilometers away from his house and even actively helped him in his campaign. Respondent further alleges that while the demand for support from Aquino was being worked out, complainant moved to a rented house in Olongapo City because a suitor had promised her a job in the Subic Naval Base. But months passed and the promised job never came so that she had to return to Lubao, Pampanga. As the money she received from Aquino was about to be exhausted, she allegedly started to pester respondent for financial assistance and urged him to file the Petition for Support against Aquino. While respondent acceded to her pleas, he also advised her "to look for the right man"12 and to stop depending on him for financial assistance. He also informed her that he could not assist her in filing the case, as he was the one who prepared and notarized the Affidavit. He, however, referred her to Atty. Tolentino. In August 2002, respondent finally ended his relationship with complainant, but still he agreed to give her monthly financial assistance of P6,000.00 for six (6) months. Since then, they have ceased to meet and have communicated only

through an emissary or by cellphone. In 2003, complainant begged him to continue the assistance until June when her alleged fianc from the United States would have arrived. Respondent agreed. In July 2003, she again asked for financial assistance for the last time, which he turned down. Since then he had stopped communicating to her. Sometime in January 2004, complainant allegedly went to see a friend of respondent. She told him that she was in need of P5,000.00 for a sari-sari store she was putting up and she wanted him to relay the message to respondent. According to this friend, complainant showed him a prepared complaint against respondent that she would file with the Supreme Court should the latter not accede to her request. Sensing that he was being blackmailed, respondent ignored her demand. True enough, he alleges, she filed the instant complaint. On 21 July 2004, the case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines ("IBP") for investigation, report and recommendation.13 After the parties submitted their respective position papers and supporting documents, the Investigating Commissioner rendered his Report and Recommendation14 dated 2 September 2005. After presenting the parties' conflicting factual versions, the Investigating Commissioner gave credence to that of complainant and concluded that respondent clearly violated the Code, reporting in this wise, to wit: Respondent, through the above mentioned acts, clearly showed that he is wanting in good moral character, putting in doubt his professional reputation as a member of the BAR and renders him unfit and unworthy of the privileges which the law confers to him. From a lawyer, are (sic) expected those qualities of truth-speaking, high sense of honor, full candor, intellectual honesty and the strictest observance of fiduciary responsibility all of which throughout the passage of time have been compendiously described as MORAL CHARACTER. Respondent, unfortunately took advantage and (sic) every opportunity to entice complainant to his lascivious hungerness (sic). On several occasions[,] respondent kept on calling complainant and dropped by her house and gave P2,000.00 as aid while waiting allegedly for the reply of (sic) their demand letter for support. It signals the numerous visits and regular calls all because of [l]ewd design. He took advantage of her seeming financial woes and emotional dependency. xxxx Without doubt, a violation of the high moral standards of the legal profession justifies the impositions (sic) of the appropriate penalty, including suspension and disbarment. x x x15 It was then recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months and that he be ordered to return to complainant the amount of P58,000.00 within two months. The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the said Report and Recommendation in a Resolution16 dated 17 December 2005, finding the same to be fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and "considering Respondent's obviously taking advantage of the lawyer-client relationship and the financial and emotional problem of his client and attempting to mislead the Commission,"17 respondent was meted out the penalty of suspension for one (1) year with a stern warning that a repetition of similar acts will merit severe sanctions. He was likewise ordered to return P58,000.00 to complainant. Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Set Case for Clarificatory Questioning18 ("Motion") dated 9 March 2006 with the IBP and a Motion to Reopen/Remand Case for Clarificatory Questioning dated 22 March 2006 with the Supreme Court. He reiterates his own version of the facts, giving a more detailed account of the events that transpired between him and complainant. Altogether, he portrays complainant as a shrewd and manipulative woman who depends on men for financial support and who would stop at nothing to get what she wants. Arguing that the IBP based its Resolution solely on complainant's bare allegations that she failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence, he posits the case should be re-opened for clarificatory questioning in order to determine who between them is telling the truth. In a Resolution19 dated 27 April 2006, the IBP denied the Motion on the ground that it has no more jurisdiction over the case as the matter had already been endorsed to the Supreme Court. While we find respondent liable, we adjudicate the matter differently from what the IBP has recommended. On the charge of immorality, respondent does not deny that he had an extra-marital affair with complainant, albeit brief and discreet, and which act is not "so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree"20 in order to merit disciplinary sanction. We disagree. One of the conditions prior to admission to the bar is that an applicant must possess good moral character. Said requirement persists as a continuing condition for the enjoyment of the privilege of law practice, otherwise, the loss thereof is a ground for the revocation of such privilege.21 As officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character but must also be seen to be of good moral character and leading lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of the community.22 The Court has held that to justify suspension or disbarment the act complained of must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral.23 A grossly immoral act is one that is so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled or disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a high degree.24 It is a willful, flagrant, or shameless act that shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the community.25 While it is has been held in disbarment cases that the mere fact of sexual relations between two unmarried adults is not sufficient to warrant administrative sanction for such illicit behavior,26 it is not so with respect to betrayals of the marital

vow of fidelity.27 Even if not all forms of extra-marital relations are punishable under penal law, sexual relations outside marriage is considered disgraceful and immoral as it manifests deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the marital vows protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our laws.28 By his own admission, respondent is obviously guilty of immorality in violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code which states that a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. The next question to consider is whether this act is aggravated by his alleged deceitful conduct in luring complainant who was then in low spirits and in dire financial need in order to satisfy his carnal desires. While the IBP concluded the question in the affirmative, we find otherwise. Complainant's allegations that she succumbed to respondent's sexual advances due to his promises of financial security and because of her need for legal assistance in filing a case against her former lover, are insufficient to conclude that complainant deceived her into having sexual relations with her. Surely, an educated woman like herself who was of sufficient age and discretion, being at that time in her thirties, would not be easily fooled into sexual congress by promises of a job and of free legal assistance, especially when there is no showing that she is suffering from any mental or physical disability as to justify such recklessness and/or helplessness on her part.29 Respondent's numerous visits and regular calls to complainant do not necessarily prove that he took advantage of her. At best, it proves that he courted her despite being a married man, precisely the fact on which the finding of immorality is rooted. Moreover, the circumstance that he gave her P2,000.00 as aid does not induce belief that he fueled her financial dependence as she never denied pleading with, if not badgering, him for financial support. Neither does complainant's allegation that respondent lied to her about his marital status inspire belief. We find credence in respondent's assertion that it was impossible for her not to have known of his subsisting marriage. She herself admitted that they were introduced by her friend and former classmate, Ms. Morales who was a fellow barangay official of respondent. She admitted that she knew his residence phone number and that she had called him there. She also knew that respondent is an active barangay official who even ran as Provincial Board Member in 2001. Curiously, she never refuted respondent's allegations that she had met and talked to his wife on several occasions, that she lived near his residence, that she helped him in his campaign, or that she knew a lot of his friends, so as not to have known of his marital status. Considering that she previously had an affair with Aquino, who was also a married man, it would be unnatural for her to have just plunged into a sexual relationship with respondent whom she had known for only a short time without verifying his background, if it were true that she preferred "to change [her] life for the better,"30 as alleged in her complaint. We believe that her aforementioned allegations of deceit were not established by clear preponderant evidence required in disbarment cases.31 We are left with the most logical conclusion that she freely and wittingly entered into an illicit and immoral relationship with respondent sans any misrepresentation or deceit on his part. Next, complainant charged respondent of taking advantage of his legal skills and moral control over her to force her to sign the clearly disadvantageous Affidavit without letting her read it and without explaining to her its repercussions. While acting as her counsel, she alleged that he likewise acted as counsel for Aquino. We find complainant's assertions dubious. She was clearly in need of financial support from Aquino especially that her daughter was suffering from a heart ailment. We cannot fathom how she could abandon all cares to respondent who she had met for only a couple of months and thereby risk the welfare of her child by signing without even reading a document she knew was related to the support case she intended to file. The Affidavit consists of four short sentences contained in a single page. It is unlikely she was not able to read it before she signed it. Likewise obscure is her assertion that respondent did not fully explain to her the contents of the Affidavit and the consequences of signing it. She alleged that respondent even urged her "to use her head as Arnulfo Aquino will not give the money for Alexandra's medical and educational support if she will not sign the said Affidavit of Disclaimer."32 If her own allegation is to be believed, it shows that she was aware of the on-going negotiation with Aquino for the settlement of her claim for which the latter demanded the execution of the Affidavit. It also goes to show that she was pondering on whether to sign the same. Furthermore, she does not deny being a college graduate or that she knows and understands English. The Affidavit is written in short and simple sentences that are understandable even to a layman. The inevitable conclusion is that she signed the Affidavit voluntarily and without any coercion whatsoever on the part of respondent. The question remains as to whether his act of preparing and notarizing the Affidavit, a document disadvantageous to his client, is a violation of the Code. We rule in the negative. It was not unlawful for respondent to assist his client in entering into a settlement with Aquino after explaining all available options to her. The law encourages the amicable settlement not only of pending cases but also of disputes which might otherwise be filed in court.33 Moreover, there is no showing that he knew for sure that Aquino is the father of complainant's daughter as paternity remains to be proven. As complainant voluntarily and intelligently agreed to a settlement with Aquino, she cannot later blame her counsel when she experiences a change of heart. Besides, the record is bereft of evidence as to whether respondent also acted as Aquino's counsel in the settlement of the case. Again, we only have complainant's bare allegations that cannot be considered evidence.34 Suspicion, no matter how strong, is not enough. In the absence of contrary evidence, what will prevail is the presumption that the respondent has regularly performed his duty in accordance with his oath.35 Complainant further charged respondent of misappropriating part of the money given by Aquino to her daughter. Instead of turning over the whole amount, he allegedly issued to her his personal check in the amount of P150,000.00 and pocketed the remaining P58,000.00 in violation of his fiduciary obligation to her as her counsel.

The IBP did not make any categorical finding on this matter but simply ordered respondent to return the amount of P58,000.00 to complainant. We feel a discussion is in order. We note that there is no clear evidence as to how much Aquino actually gave in settlement of complainant's claim for support. The parties are in agreement that complainant received the amount of P150,000.00. However, complainant insists that she should have received more as there were two postdated checks amounting to P58,000.00 that respondent never turned over to her. Respondent essentially agrees that the amount is in fact more than P150,000.00 but only P38,000.00 more and complainant said he could have it and he assumed it was for his attorney's fees. We scrutinized the records and found not a single evidence to prove that there existed two postdated checks issued by Aquino in the amount of P58,000.00. On the other hand, respondent admits that there is actually an amount of P38,000.00 but presented no evidence of an agreement for attorney's fees to justify his presumption that he can keep the same. Curiously, there is on record a photocopy of a check issued by respondent in favor of complainant for P150,000.00. It was only in his Motion for Reconsideration where respondent belatedly proffers an explanation. He avers that he cannot recall what the check was for but he supposes that complainant requested for it as she did not want to travel all the way to Olongapo City with a huge sum of money. We find the circumstances rather suspicious but evidence is wanting to sustain a finding in favor of either party in this respect. We cannot and should not rule on mere conjectures. The IBP relied only on the written assertions of the parties, apparently finding no need to subject the veracity of the assertions through the question and answer modality. With the inconclusive state of the evidence, a more in-depth investigation is called for to ascertain in whose favor the substantial evidence level tilts. Hence, we are constrained to remand the case to the IBP for further reception of evidence solely on this aspect. We also are unable to grant complainant's prayer for respondent to be made liable for the cost of her child's DNA test absent proof that he misappropriated funds exclusively earmarked for the purpose. Neither shall we entertain complainant's claim for moral damages and attorney's fees. Suffice it to state that an administrative case against a lawyer is sui generis, one that is distinct from a civil or a criminal action.36 It is an investigation by the Court into the fitness of a lawyer to remain in the legal profession and be allowed the privileges as such. Its primary objective is to protect the Court and the public from the misconduct of its officers with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by requiring that those who exercise this important function shall be competent, honorable and reliable men and women in whom courts and clients may repose confidence.37 As such, it involves no private interest and affords no redress for private grievance.38 The complainant or the person who called the attention of the court to the lawyer's alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may have in the proper administration of justice.39 Respondent's misconduct is of considerable gravity. There is a string of cases where the Court meted out the extreme penalty of disbarment on the ground of gross immorality where the respondent contracted a bigamous marriage,40 abandoned his family to cohabit with his paramour,41 cohabited with a married woman,42 lured an innocent woman into marriage,43 or was found to be a womanizer.44 The instant case can be easily differentiated from the foregoing cases. We, therefore, heed the stern injunction on decreeing disbarment where any lesser penalty, such as temporary suspension, would accomplish the end desired.45 In Zaguirre v. Castillo,46 respondent was found to have sired a child with another woman who knew he was married. He therein sought understanding from the Court pointing out the polygamous nature of men and that the illicit relationship was a product of mutual lust and desire. Appalled at his reprehensible and amoral attitude, the Court suspended him indefinitely. However, in Fr. Sinnott v. Judge Barte,47 where respondent judge consorted with a woman not his wife, but there was no conclusive evidence that he sired a child with her, he was fined P10,000.00 for his conduct unbecoming a magistrate despite his retirement during the pendency of the case. We note that from the very beginning of this case, herein respondent had expressed remorse over his indiscretion and had in fact ended the brief illicit relationship years ago. We take these as signs that his is not a character of such severe depravity and thus should be taken as mitigating circumstances in his favor.48 Considering further that this is his first offense, we believe that a fine of P15,000.00 would suffice. This, of course, is without prejudice to the outcome of the aspect of this case involving the alleged misappropriation of funds of the client. WHEREFORE, premises considered, we find Atty. Diosdado M. Rongcal GUILTY of immorality and impose on him a FINE of P15,000.00 with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely. The charge of misappropriation of funds of the client is REMANDED to the IBP for further investigation, report and recommendation within ninety (90) days from receipt of this Decision. Let a copy of this decision be entered in the personal record of respondent as an attorney and as a member of the Bar, and furnished the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country. SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 6792

January 25, 2006

ROBERTO SORIANO, Complainant, vs. Atty. MANUEL DIZON, Respondent. DECISION PER CURIAM: Before us is a Complaint-Affidavit1 for the disbarment of Atty. Manuel Dizon, filed by Roberto Soriano with the Commission on Bar Discipine (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). Complainant alleges that the conviction of respondent for a crime involving moral turpitude, together with the circumstances surrounding the conviction, violates Canon 1 of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility;2 and constitutes sufficient ground for his disbarment under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.3 Because of the failure of Atty. Dizon to submit his Answer to the Complaint, the CBD issued a Notice dated May 20, 2004, informing him that he was in default, and that an ex-parte hearing had been scheduled for June 11, 2004.4 After that hearing, complainant manifested that he was submitting the case on the basis of the Complaint and its attachments.5 Accordingly, the CBD directed him to file his Position Paper, which he did on July 27, 2004.6 Afterwards, the case was deemed submitted for resolution. On December 6, 2004, Commissioner Teresita J. Herbosa rendered her Report and Recommendation, which was later adopted and approved by the IBP Board of Governors in its Resolution No. XVI-2005-84 dated March 12, 2005. In his Complaint-Affidavit, Soriano alleged that respondent had violated Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility; and that the conviction of the latter for frustrated homicide,7 which involved moral turpitude, should result in his disbarment. The facts leading to respondent s conviction were summarized by Branch 60 of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City in this wise: "x x x. The accused was driving his brown Toyota Corolla and was on his way home after gassing up in preparation for his trip to Concepcion, Tarlac with his wife. Along Abanao Street, a taxi driver overtook the car driven by the accused not knowing that the driver of the car he had overtaken is not just someone, but a lawyer and a prominent member of the Baguio community who was under the influence of liquor. Incensed, the accused tailed the taxi driver until the latter stopped to make a turn at [the] Chugum and Carino Streets. The accused also stopped his car, berated the taxi driver and held him by his shirt. To stop the aggression, the taxi driver forced open his door causing the accused to fall to the ground. The taxi driver knew that the accused had been drinking because he smelled of liquor. Taking pity on the accused who looked elderly, the taxi driver got out of his car to help him get up. But the accused, by now enraged, stood up immediately and was about to deal the taxi driver a fist blow when the latter boxed him on the chest instead. The accused fell down a second time, got up again and was about to box the taxi driver but the latter caught his fist and turned his arm around. The taxi driver held on to the accused until he could be pacified and then released him. The accused went back to his car and got his revolver making sure that the handle was wrapped in a handkerchief. The taxi driver was on his way back to his vehicle when he noticed the eyeglasses of the accused on the ground. He picked them up intending to return them to the accused. But as he was handing the same to the accused, he was met by the barrel of the gun held by the accused who fired and shot him hitting him on the neck. He fell on the thigh of the accused so the latter pushed him out and sped off. The incident was witnessed by Antonio Billanes whose testimony corroborated that of the taxi driver, the complainant in this case, Roberto Soriano."8 It was the prosecution witness, Antonio Billanes, who came to the aid of Soriano and brought the latter to the hospital. Because the bullet had lacerated the carotid artery on the left side of his neck,9 complainant would have surely died of hemorrhage if he had not received timely medical assistance, according to the attending surgeon, Dr. Francisco Hernandez, Jr. Soriano sustained a spinal cord injury, which caused paralysis on the left part of his body and disabled him for his job as a taxi driver. The trial court promulgated its Decision dated November 29, 2001. On January 18, 2002, respondent filed an application for probation, which was granted by the court on several conditions. These included satisfaction of "the civil liabilities imposed by [the] court in favor of the offended party, Roberto Soriano."10 According to the unrefuted statements of complainant, Atty. Dizon, who has yet to comply with this particular undertaking, even appealed the civil liability to the Court of Appeals.11 In her Report and Recommendation, Commissioner Herbosa recommended that respondent be disbarred from the practice of law for having been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. The commissioner found that respondent had not only been convicted of such crime, but that the latter also exhibited an obvious lack of good moral character, based on the following facts:

"1. He was under the influence of liquor while driving his car; "2. He reacted violently and attempted to assault Complainant only because the latter, driving a taxi, had overtaken him; "3. Complainant having been able to ward off his attempted assault, Respondent went back to his car, got a gun, wrapped the same with a handkerchief and shot Complainant[,] who was unarmed; "4. When Complainant fell on him, Respondent simply pushed him out and fled; "5. Despite positive identification and overwhelming evidence, Respondent denied that he had shot Complainant; "6. Apart from [his] denial, Respondent also lied when he claimed that he was the one mauled by Complainant and two unidentified persons; and, "7. Although he has been placed on probation, Respondent has[,] to date[,] not yet satisfied his civil liabilities to Complainant."12 On July 8, 2005, the Supreme Court received for its final action the IBP Resolution adopting the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner. We agree with the findings and recommendations of Commissioner Herbosa, as approved and adopted by the IBP Board of Governors. Under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude is a ground for disbarment or suspension. By such conviction, a lawyer is deemed to have become unfit to uphold the administration of justice and to be no longer possessed of good moral character.13 In the instant case, respondent has been found guilty; and he stands convicted, by final judgment, of frustrated homicide. Since his conviction has already been established and is no longer open to question, the only issues that remain to be determined are as follows: 1) whether his crime of frustrated homicide involves moral turpitude, and 2) whether his guilt warrants disbarment. Moral turpitude has been defined as "everything which is done contrary to justice, modesty, or good morals; an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general, contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals."14 The question of whether the crime of homicide involves moral turpitude has been discussed in International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) v. NLRC,15 a labor case concerning an employee who was dismissed on the basis of his conviction for homicide. Considering the particular circumstances surrounding the commission of the crime, this Court rejected the employer s contention and held that homicide in that case did not involve moral turpitude. (If it did, the crime would have been violative of the IRRI s Employment Policy Regulations and indeed a ground for dismissal.) The Court explained that, having disregarded the attendant circumstances, the employer made a pronouncement that was precipitate. Furthermore, it was not for the latter to determine conclusively whether a crime involved moral turpitude. That discretion belonged to the courts, as explained thus: "x x x. Homicide may or may not involve moral turpitude depending on the degree of the crime. Moral turpitude is not involved in every criminal act and is not shown by every known and intentional violation of statute, but whether any particular conviction involves moral turpitude may be a question of fact and frequently depends on all the surrounding circumstances. x x x."16 (Emphasis supplied) In the IRRI case, in which the crime of homicide did not involve moral turpitude, the Court appreciated the presence of incomplete self-defense and total absence of aggravating circumstances. For a better understanding of that Decision, the circumstances of the crime are quoted as follows: "x x x. The facts on record show that Micosa [the IRRI employee] was then urinating and had his back turned when the victim drove his fist unto Micosa's face; that the victim then forcibly rubbed Micosa's face into the filthy urinal; that Micosa pleaded to the victim to stop the attack but was ignored and that it was while Micosa was in that position that he drew a fan knife from the left pocket of his shirt and desperately swung it at the victim who released his hold on Micosa only after the latter had stabbed him several times. These facts show that Micosa's intention was not to slay the victim but only to defend his person. The appreciation in his favor of the mitigating circumstances of self-defense and voluntary surrender, plus the total absence of any aggravating circumstance demonstrate that Micosa's character and intentions were not inherently vile, immoral or unjust."17 The present case is totally different. As the IBP correctly found, the circumstances clearly evince the moral turpitude of respondent and his unworthiness to practice law. Atty. Dizon was definitely the aggressor, as he pursued and shot complainant when the latter least expected it. The act of aggression shown by respondent will not be mitigated by the fact that he was hit once and his arm twisted by complainant. Under the circumstances, those were reasonable actions clearly intended to fend off the lawyer s assault.

We also consider the trial court s finding of treachery as a further indication of the skewed morals of respondent. He shot the victim when the latter was not in a position to defend himself. In fact, under the impression that the assault was already over, the unarmed complainant was merely returning the eyeglasses of Atty. Dizon when the latter unexpectedly shot him. To make matters worse, respondent wrapped the handle of his gun with a handkerchief so as not to leave fingerprints. In so doing, he betrayed his sly intention to escape punishment for his crime. The totality of the facts unmistakably bears the earmarks of moral turpitude. By his conduct, respondent revealed his extreme arrogance and feeling of self-importance. As it were, he acted like a god on the road, who deserved to be venerated and never to be slighted. Clearly, his inordinate reaction to a simple traffic incident reflected poorly on his fitness to be a member of the legal profession. His overreaction also evinced vindictiveness, which was definitely an undesirable trait in any individual, more so in a lawyer. In the tenacity with which he pursued complainant, we see not the persistence of a person who has been grievously wronged, but the obstinacy of one trying to assert a false sense of superiority and to exact revenge. It is also glaringly clear that respondent seriously transgressed Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility through his illegal possession of an unlicensed firearm18 and his unjust refusal to satisfy his civil liabilities.19 He has thus brazenly violated the law and disobeyed the lawful orders of the courts. We remind him that, both in his attorney s oath20 and in the Code of Professional Responsibility, he bound himself to "obey the laws of the land." All told, Atty. Dizon has shown through this incident that he is wanting in even a basic sense of justice. He obtained the benevolence of the trial court when it suspended his sentence and granted him probation. And yet, it has been four years21 since he was ordered to settle his civil liabilities to complainant. To date, respondent remains adamant in refusing to fulfill that obligation. By his extreme impetuosity and intolerance, as shown by his violent reaction to a simple traffic altercation, he has taken away the earning capacity, good health, and youthful vigor of his victim. Still, Atty. Dizon begrudges complainant the measly amount that could never even fully restore what the latter has lost. Conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude may relate, not to the exercise of the profession of lawyers, but certainly to their good moral character.22 Where their misconduct outside of their professional dealings is so gross as to show them morally unfit for their office and unworthy of the privileges conferred upon them by their license and the law, the court may be justified in suspending or removing them from that office.23 We also adopt the IBP s finding that respondent displayed an utter lack of good moral character, which is an essential qualification for the privilege to enter into the practice of law. Good moral character includes at least common honesty.24 In the case at bar, respondent consistently displayed dishonest and duplicitous behavior. As found by the trial court, he had sought, with the aid of Vice-Mayor Daniel Farias, an out-of-court settlement with complainant s family.25 But when this effort failed, respondent concocted a complete lie by making it appear that it was complainant s family that had sought a conference with him to obtain his referral to a neurosurgeon.26 The lies of Atty Dizon did not end there. He went on to fabricate an entirely implausible story of having been mauled by complainant and two other persons.27 The trial court had this to say: "The physical evidence as testified to by no less than three (3) doctors who examined [Atty. Dizon] does not support his allegation that three people including the complainant helped each other in kicking and boxing him. The injuries he sustained were so minor that it is improbable[,] if not downright unbelievable[,] that three people who he said were bent on beating him to death could do so little damage. On the contrary, his injuries sustain the complainant s version of the incident particularly when he said that he boxed the accused on the chest. x x x."28 Lawyers must be ministers of truth. No moral qualification for bar membership is more important than truthfulness.29 The rigorous ethics of the profession places a premium on honesty and condemns duplicitous behavior.30 Hence, lawyers must not mislead the court or allow it to be misled by any artifice. In all their dealings, they are expected to act in good faith. The actions of respondent erode rather than enhance public perception of the legal profession. They constitute moral turpitude for which he should be disbarred. "Law is a noble profession, and the privilege to practice it is bestowed only upon individuals who are competent intellectually, academically and, equally important, morally. Because they are vanguards of the law and the legal system, lawyers must at all times conduct themselves, especially in their dealings with their clients and the public at large, with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach."31 The foregoing abhorrent acts of respondent are not merely dishonorable; they reveal a basic moral flaw. Considering the depravity of the offense he committed, we find the penalty recommended by the IBP proper and commensurate. The purpose of a proceeding for disbarment is to protect the administration of justice by requiring that those who exercise this important function be competent, honorable and reliable -- lawyers in whom courts and clients may repose confidence.32 Thus, whenever a clear case of degenerate and vile behavior disturbs that vital yet fragile confidence, we shall not hesitate to rid our profession of odious members. We remain aware that the power to disbar must be exercised with great caution, and that disbarment should never be decreed when any lesser penalty would accomplish the end desired. In the instant case, however, the Court cannot extend that munificence to respondent. His actions so despicably and wantonly disregarded his duties to society and his

profession. We are convinced that meting out a lesser penalty would be irreconcilable with our lofty aspiration for the legal profession -- that every lawyer be a shining exemplar of truth and justice. We stress that membership in the legal profession is a privilege demanding a high degree of good moral character, not only as a condition precedent to admission, but also as a continuing requirement for the practice of law. Sadly, herein respondent has fallen short of the exacting standards expected of him as a vanguard of the legal profession. In sum, when lawyers are convicted of frustrated homicide, the attending circumstances not the mere fact of their conviction would demonstrate their fitness to remain in the legal profession. In the present case, the appalling vindictiveness, treachery, and brazen dishonesty of respondent clearly show his unworthiness to continue as a member of the bar. WHEREFORE, RESPONDENT MANUEL DIZON is hereby DISBARRED, and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision be entered in his record as a member of the Bar; and let notice of the same be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and on the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country. SO ORDERED. [A.C. No. 5864. April 15, 2005] ARTURO L. SICAT, complainant, vs. ATTY. GREGORIO E. ARIOLA, JR., respondent. RESOLUTION PER CURIAM: In an affidavit-complaint,[1] complainant Arturo L. Sicat, a Board Member of the Sangguniang Panglalawigan of Rizal, charged respondent Atty. Gregorio E. Ariola, the Municipal Administrator of Cainta, Rizal, with violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility by committing fraud, deceit and falsehood in his dealings, particularly the notarization of a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) purportedly executed by a one Juanito C. Benitez. According to complainant, respondent made it appear that Benitez executed the said document on January 4, 2001 when in fact the latter had already died on October 25, 2000. He alleged that prior to the notarization, the Municipality of Cainta had entered into a contract with J.C. Benitez Architect and Technical Management, represented by Benitez, for the construction of low-cost houses. The cost of the architectural and engineering designs amounted to P11,000,000 and two consultants were engaged to supervise the project. For the services of the consultants, the Municipality of Cainta issued a check dated January 10, 2001 in the amount of P3,700,000, payable to J.C. Benitez Architects and Technical Management and/or Cesar Goco. The check was received and encashed by the latter by virtue of the authority of the SPA notarized by respondent Ariola. Complainant further charged respondent with the crime of falsification penalized under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code by making it appear that certain persons participated in an act or proceeding when in fact they did not. In his Comment,[2] respondent explained that, as early as May 12, 2000, Benitez had already signed the SPA. He claimed that due to inadvertence, it was only on January 4, 2001 that he was able to notarize it. Nevertheless, the SPA notarized by him on January 4, 2001 was not at all necessary because Benitez had signed a similar SPA in favor of Goco sometime before his death, on May 12, 2000. Because it was no longer necessary, the SPA was cancelled the same day he notarized it, hence, legally, there was no public document that existed. Respondent prayed that the complaint be dismissed on the ground of forum-shopping since similar charges had been filed with the Civil Service Commission and the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon. According to him, the complaints were later dismissed based on findings that the assailed act referred to violations of the implementing rules and regulations of PD 1594,[3] PD 1445,[4] RA 7160[5] and other pertinent rules of the Commission on Audit (COA). He stressed that no criminal and administrative charges were recommended for filing against him. In a Resolution dated March 12, 2003,[6] the Court referred the complaint to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. On August 26, 2003, the IBP submitted its investigation report: x x x it is evident that respondent notarized the Special Power of Attorney dated 4 January 2001 purportedly executed by Juanito C. Benitez long after Mr. Benitez was dead. It is also evident that respondent cannot feign innocence and claim that he did not know Mr. Benitez was already dead at the time because respondent, as member of the Prequalification and Awards Committee of the Municipality of Cainta, personally knew Mr. Benitez because the latter appeared before the Committee a number of times. It is evident that the Special Power of Attorney dated 4 January 2001 was part of a scheme of individuals to defraud the Municipality of Cainta of money which was allegedly due them, and that respondent by notarizing said Special Power of Attorney helped said parties succeed in their plans. The IBP recommended to the Court that respondent's notarial commission be revoked and that he be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one year.

After a careful review of the records, we find that respondent never disputed complainant's accusation that he notarized the SPA purportedly executed by Benitez on January 4, 2001. He likewise never took issue with the fact that on said date, Benitez was already dead. His act was a serious breach of the sacred obligation imposed upon him by the Code of Professional Responsibility, specifically Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, which prohibited him from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. As a lawyer and as an officer of the court, it was his duty to serve the ends of justice,[9] not to corrupt it. Oath-bound, he was expected to act at all times in accordance with law and ethics, and if he did not, he would not only injure himself and the public but also bring reproach upon an honorable profession. In the recent case of Zaballero v. Atty. Mario J. Montalvan,[11] where the respondent notarized certain documents and made it appear that the deceased father of complainant executed them, the Court declared the respondent there guilty of violating Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.[12] The Court was emphatic that lawyers commissioned as notaries public should not authenticate documents unless the persons who signed them are the very same persons who executed them and personally appeared before them to attest to the contents and truth of what are stated therein. The Court added that notaries public must observe utmost fidelity, the basic requirement in the performance of their duties, otherwise the confidence of the public in the integrity of notarized deeds and documents will be undermined. In the case at bar, the records show that Benitez died on October 25, 2000. However, respondent notarized the SPA, purportedly bearing the signature of Benitez, on January 4, 2001 or more than two months after the latter's death. The notarial acknowledgement of respondent declared that Benitez 'appeared before him and acknowledged that the instrument was his free and voluntary act. Clearly, respondent lied and intentionally perpetuated an untruthful statement. Notarization is not an empty, meaningless and routinary act.[13] It converts a private document into a public instrument, making it admissible in evidence without the necessity of preliminary proof of its authenticity and due execution. Neither will respondent's defense that the SPA in question was superfluous and unnecessary, and prejudiced no one, exonerate him of accountability. 'His assertion of falsehood in a public document contravened one of the most cherished tenets of the legal profession and potentially cast suspicion on the truthfulness of every notarial act. As the Municipal Administrator of Cainta, he should have been aware of his great responsibility not only as a notary public but as a public officer as well. A public office is a public trust. Respondent should not have caused disservice to his constituents by consciously performing an act that would deceive them and the Municipality of Cainta. Without the fraudulent SPA, the erring parties in the construction project could not have encashed the check amounting to P3,700,000 and could not have foisted on the public a spurious contract all to the extreme prejudice of the very Municipality of which he was the Administrator. According to the COA Special Task Force: Almost all acts of falsification of public documents as enumerated in Article 171 in relation to Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code were evident in the transactions of the Municipality of Cainta with J.C. Benitez & Architects Technical Management for the consultancy services in the conduct of Detailed Feasibility Study and Detailed Engineering Design of the Proposed Construction of Cainta Municipal Medium Rise Low Cost Housing, in the contract amount of P11,000,000. The agent resorted to misrepresentation, manufacture or fabrication of fictitious document, untruthful narration of facts, misrepresentation, and counterfeiting or imitating signature for the purpose of creating a fraudulent contract. All these were tainted with deceit perpetrated against the government resulting to undue injury. The first and partial payment, in the amount of P3,700,000.00 was made in the absence of the required outputs. x x x We need not say more except that we are constrained to change the penalty recommended by the IBP which we find too light. WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Gregorio E. Ariola, Jr., is found guilty of gross misconduct and is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law. Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant and entered in the records of respondent, and brought to the immediate attention of the Ombudsman. SO ORDERED. B.M. No. 1222 February 4, 2004

Re: 2003 BAR EXAMINATIONS RESOLUTION PER CURIAM: On 22 September 2003, the day following the bar examination in Mercantile Law, Justice Jose C. Vitug, Chairman of the 2003 Bar Examinations Committee, was apprised of a rumored leakage in the examination on the subject. After making his own inquiries, Justice Vitug reported the matter to Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., and to the other members of the Court, recommending that the bar examination on the subject be nullified and that an investigation be conducted forthwith. On 23 September 2003, the Court adopted the recommendation of Justice Vitug, and resolved to nullify the examination in Mercantile Law and to hold another examination on 04 October 2003 at eight o clock in the evening (being the earliest available time and date) at the De La Salle University, Taft Avenue, Manila. The resolution was issued without prejudice to any action that the Court would further take on the matter.

Following the issuance of the resolution, the Court received numerous petitions and motions from the Philippine Association of Law Schools and various other groups and persons, expressing agreement to the nullification of the bar examinations in Mercantile Law but voicing strong reservations against the holding of another examination on the subject. Several reasons were advanced by petitioners or movants, among these reasons being the physical, emotional and financial difficulties that would be encountered by the examinees, if another examination on the subject were to be held anew. Alternative proposals submitted to the Court included the spreading out of the weight of Mercantile Law among the remaining seven bar subjects, i.e., to determine and gauge the results of the examinations on the basis only of the performance of the examinees in the seven bar subjects. In a resolution, dated 29 September 2003, the Court, finding merit in the submissions, resolved to cancel the scheduled examination in Mercantile Law on 04 October 2003 and to allocate the fifteen percentage points among the seven bar examination subjects. In the same resolution, the Court further resolved to create a Committee composed of three retired members of the Court that would conduct a thorough investigation of the incident subject of the 23 September 2003 resolution. In a resolution, dated 07 October 2003, the Court adopted the computation in the allocation of the fifteen percentage points for Mercantile Law among the remaining seven bar examination subjects, to wit: Original Adjusted Adjusted Relative Percentage Percentage Relative Weight Weight Weight Weight 15% 10% 15% 10% 10% 20% 17.647% 11.765% 17.647% 11.765% 11.765% 23.529% 5.882% 100% 3 2 3 2 2 4 1 3.53% 2.35% 3.53% 2.35% 2.35% 4.71% 1.18% 20%

Subject Political and International Law Labor and Social Legislation Civil law Taxation Criminal law Remedial Law

Legal Ethics and Practical Exercises 5%

In another resolution, dated 14 October 2003, the Court designated the following retired Associate Justices of the Supreme Court to compose the Investigating Committee: Chairman: Justice Carolina C. Grio-Aquino Members: Justice Jose A.R. Melo Justice Vicente V. Mendoza

The Investigating Committee was tasked to determine and identify the source of leakage, the parties responsible therefor or who might have benefited therefrom, recommend sanctions against all those found to have been responsible for, or who would have benefited from, the incident in question and to recommend measures to the Court to safeguard the integrity of the bar examinations. On 15 January 2004, the Investigating Committee submitted its report and recommendation to the Court, herein reproduced in full; thus "In the morning of September 21, 2003, the third Sunday of the 2003 bar examinations, the examination in commercial law was held in De la Salle University on Taft Avenue, Manila, the venue of the bar examinations since 1995. The next day, the newspapers carried news of an alleged leakage in the said examination.1 "Upon hearing the news and making preliminary inquiries of his own, Justice Jose C. Vitug, chairman of the 2003 Bar Examinations Committee, reported the matter to the Chief Justice and recommended that the examination in mercantile law be cancelled and that a formal investigation of the leakage be undertaken. "Acting on the report and recommendation of Justice Vitug, the Court, in a resolution dated September 23, 2003, nullified the examination in mercantile law and resolved to hold another examination in that subject on Saturday, October 4, 2003 at eight o clock in the evening (being the earliest available time and date) at the same venue. However, because numerous petitions, protests, and motions for reconsideration were filed against the retaking of the examination in mercantile law, the Court cancelled the holding of such examination. On the recommendation of the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Court instead decided to allocate the fifteen (15) percentage points for mercantile law among the seven (7) other bar examination subjects (Resolution dated October 7, 2003).

"In a Resolution dated September 29, 2003, the Supreme Court created an Investigating Committee composed of three (3) retired Members of the Court to conduct an investigation of the leakage and to submit its findings and recommendations on or before December 15, 2003. "The Court designated the following retired Associate Justices of the Supreme Court to compose the Committee: Chairman: Justice CAROLINA GRIO-AQUINO Members: Justice JOSE A. R. MELO Justice VICENTE V. MENDOZA

"The Investigating Committee was directed to determine and identify the source of the leakage, the parties responsible therefor and those who benefited therefrom, and to recommend measures to safeguard the integrity of the bar examinations. "The investigation commenced on October 21, 2003 and continued up to November 7, 2003. The following witnesses appeared and testified at the investigation: 1. Associate Justice Jose C. Vitug, chairman of the 2003 Bar Examinations Committee; 2. Atty. Marlo Magdoza-Malagar, law clerk in the office of Justice Vitug 3. Atty. Marcial O. T. Balgos, examiner in mercantile law; 4. Cheryl Palma, private secretary of Atty. Balgos; 5. Atty. Danilo De Guzman, assistant lawyer in the firm of Balgos & Perez; 6. Atty. Enrico G. Velasco, managing partner of Balgos & Perez; 7. Eduardo J. F. Abella, reviewer in commercial law at the Lex Review Center; 8. Silvestre T. Atienza, office manager of Balgos & Perez; 9. Reynita Villasis, private secretary of Atty. De Guzman; 10. Ronan Garvida, fraternity brother of Atty. De Guzman; 11. Ronald F. Collado, most illustrious brother of the Beta Sigma Lambda Fraternity; 12. Jovito M. Salonga, Asst. Division Chief of Systems Development for Judicial Application, MlSO; The Committee held nine (9) meetings - six times to conduct the investigation and three times to deliberate on its report. "ASSOCIATE JUSTICE JOSE C. VITUG, chairman of the Bar Examinations Committee, testified that on Monday morning, September 22, 2003, the day after the Bar examination in mercantile or commercial law, upon arriving in his office in the Supreme Court, his secretary,2 Rose Kawada, informed him that one of the law clerks, Atty. Marlo Magdoza-Malagar, told her that a friend of hers named Ma. Cecilia Delgado-Carbajosa, a bar examinee from Xavier University in Cagayan de Oro City, who was staying at the Garden Plaza Hotel in Paco, confided to her that something was wrong with the examination in mercantile law, because previous to the examination, i.e., on Saturday afternoon, the eve of the examination, she received a copy of the test questions in that subject. She did not pay attention to the test questions because no answers were provided, and she was hard-pressed to finish her review of that subject, using other available bar review materials, of which there were plenty coming from various bar review centers. "However, upon perusing the questions after the examinations, Cecilia noticed that many of them were the same questions that were asked in the just-concluded-examination. "Justice Vitug requested Marlo to invite her friend to his office in the Supreme Court, but Carbajosa declined the invitation. So, Justice Vitug suggested that Marlo and Rose invite Carbajosa to meet them at Robinson s Place, Ermita. She agreed to do that. "Cecilia Carbajosa arrived at Robinson s Place at the appointed time and showed the test questions to Rose and Marlo. Rose obtained a xerox copy of the leaked questions and compared them with the bar questions in mercantile law. On the back of the pages, she wrote, in her own hand, the differences she noted between the leaked questions and the bar examination questions.

"Rose and Marlo delivered the copy of the leaked questions to Justice Vitug who compared them with the bar examination questions in mercantile law. He found the leaked questions to be the exact same questions which the examiner in mercantile law, Attorney Marcial O. T. Balgos, had prepared and submitted to him as chairman of the Bar Examinations Committee. However, not all of those questions were asked in the bar examination. According to Justice Vitug, only 75% of the final bar questions were questions prepared by Atty. Balgos; 25% prepared by Justice Vitug himself, were included in the final bar examination. The questions prepared by Justice Vitug were not among the leaked test questions. "Apart from the published news stories about the leakage, Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. and Justice Vitug received, by telephone and mail, reports of the leakage from Dean Mariano F. Magsalin, Jr. of the Arellano Law Foundation (Exh. H) and a certain Dale Philip R. De los Reyes (Exh. B -B-3), attaching copies of the leaked questions and the fax transmittal sheet showing that the source of the questions was Danny De Guzman who faxed them to Ronan Garvida on September 17, 2003, four days before the examination in mercantile law on September 21, 2003 (Exh. B-1). "ATTORNEY MARLO MAGDOZA-MALAGAR was subpoenaed by the Committee. She identified the copy of the leaked questions that came from Cecilia Carbajosa (Exh. A). She testified that, according to Carbajosa, the latter received the test questions from one of her co-bar reviewees staying, like her, at the Garden Plaza Hotel in Paco, and also enrolled in the review classes at the Lex Review Center at the corner of P. Faura Street and Roxas Boulevard, Ermita. She did not pay for the hand-out because the Lex Review Center gives them away for free to its bar reviewees. "ATTORNEY MARCIAL O. T. BALGOS, 71 years of age, senior partner in the law firm of BALGOS AND PEREZ with offices in Rm. 1009 West Tektite Tower, Exchange Road, Ortigas Center, Pasig City, testified that in November 2002, Justice Jose C. Vitug, as chair of the Committee on the 2003 Bar Examinations, invited him to be the examiner in commercial law. He accepted the assignment and almost immediately began the preparation of test questions on the subject. Using his personal computer in the law office, he prepared for three consecutive days, three (3) sets of test questions which covered the entire subject of Mercantile Law (pp. 3-5, tsn, Oct. 24, 2003). As he did not know how to prepare the questionnaire in final form, he asked his private secretary, Cheryl Palma, to format the questions (p. 13, tsn, Oct. 24, 2003). And, as he did not know how to print the questionnaire, he likewise asked Cheryl Palma to make a print-out (Id., pp. 14-15). All of this was done inside his office with only him and his secretary there. His secretary printed only one copy (Id., p. 15). He then placed the printed copy of the test questions, consisting of three sets, in an envelope which he sealed, and called up Justice Vitug to inform him that he was bringing the questions to the latter s office that afternoon. However, as Justice Vitug was leaving his office shortly, he advised Atty. Balgos to give the sealed envelope to his confidential assistant who had been instructed to keep it. When Atty. Balgos arrived in the office of Justice Vitug, he was met by Justice Vitug s confidential assistant to whom he entrusted the sealed envelope containing the test questions (pp. 19-26, tsn, Oct. 24, 2003). "Atty. Balgos admitted that he does not know how to operate a computer except to type on it. He does not know how to open and close his own computer which has a password for that purpose. In fact, he did not know, as he still does, the password. It is his secretary, Cheryl Palma, who opened and closed his computer for him (p. 45, tsn, Oct. 24, 2003). "Atty. Balgos testified that he did not devise the password himself. It was Cheryl Palma who devised it (Id., p. 71). "His computer is exclusively for his own use. It is located inside his room which is locked when he is not in the office. He comes to the office every other day only. "He thought that his computer was safely insulated from third parties, and that he alone had access to it. He was surprised to discover, when reports of the bar leakage broke out, that his computer was in fact interconnected with the computers of his nine (9) assistant attorneys (tsn, pp. 30,45). As a matter of fact, the employees - Jovito M. Salonga and Benjamin R. Katly - of the Court s Management Information Systems Office (MISO) who, upon the request of Atty. Balgos, were directed by the Investigating Committee to inspect the computer system in his office, reported that there were 16, not 9, computers connected to each other via Local Area Network (LAN) and one (1) stand-alone computer connected to the internet (Exh. M). Atty. Balgos law partner, former Justice Secretary Hernando Perez, also had a computer, but Perez took it away when he became the Secretary of Justice. "The nine (9) assistant attorneys with computers, connected to Attorney Balgos computer, are: 1. Zorayda Zosobrado (she resigned in July 2003) 2. Claravel Javier 3. Rolynne Torio 4. Mark Warner Rosal 5. Charlynne Subia 6. Danilo De Guzman (resigned on October 22, 2003 [Exh. D]) 7. Enrico G. Velasco, managing partner

8. Concepcion De los Santos 9. Pamela June Jalandoni "Upon learning from Justice Vitug of the leakage of the bar questions prepared by him in mercantile law, Atty. Balgos immediately called together and questioned his office staff. He interrogated all of them except Atty. Danilo De Guzman who was absent then. All of them professed to know nothing about the bar leakage. "He questioned Silvestre Atienza, the office manager, Atienza is only a second year law student at MLQU. But he is an expert in installing and operating computers. It was he and/or his brother Gregorio who interconnected the computers in the law office, including Attorney Balgos computer, without the latter s knowledge and permission. "Atienza admitted to Attorney Balgos that he participated in the bar operations or bar ops of the Beta Sigma Lambda law fraternity of which he is a member, but he clarified that his participation consisted only of bringing food to the MLQU bar examinees (Tsn, pp. 46-47, Oct. 24, 2003). "The next day, Attorney Balgos questioned Attorney Danilo De Guzman, also a member of the Beta Sigma Lambda fraternity, FEU chapter. De Guzman admitted to him that he downloaded the test questions from Attorney Balgos computer and faxed a copy to a fraternity brother. Attorney Balgos was convinced that De Guzman was the source of the leakage of his test questions in mercantile law (Tsn, p. 52, Oct. 24, 2003). "Attorney Balgos prepared a COMPARISON (Exh. E) of the juxtaposed final bar questions and his proposed test questions, with marginal markings made by Justice Vicente V. Mendoza (Ret.), indicating whether the questions are similar: (S); or different: (D), together with the percentage points corresponding to each question. On the basis of this comparative table and Atty. Balgos indications as to which questions were the same or different from those given in the final questionnaire, Justice Mendoza computed the credit points contained in the proposed leaked questions. The proposed questions constituted 82% of the final bar questions. Attached to this Report as Annex A is the comparative table and the computation of credit points marked as Exh. E-1. "CHERYL PALMA, 34 years old, private secretary of Attorney Balgos for the past six years, testified that she did not type the test questions. She admitted, however, that it was she who formatted the questions and printed one copy as directed by her employer. She confirmed Atty. Balgos testimony regarding her participation in the operation of his personal computer. She disclosed that what appears in Atty. Balgos computer can be seen in the neighborhood network if the other computers are open and not in use; that Silvestre Atienza of the accounting section, can access Atty. Balgos computer when the latter is open and not in use. "ATTORNEY ENRICO VELASCO, managing partner of the firm, testified that on October 16, 2003, he sent De Guzman a memo (Exh. C) giving him 72 hours to explain in writing why you should not be terminated for causing the Firm an undeserved condemnation and dishonor because of the leakage aforesaid. "On October 22, 2003, De Guzman handed in his resignation effective immediately. He explained that: Causing the firm, its partners and members to suffer from undeserved condemnation and humiliation is not only farthest from, but totally out of, my mind. It is just unfortunate that the incident subject matter of your memorandum occurred. Rest assured, though, that I have never been part of any deliberate scheme to malign the good reputation and integrity of the firm, its partners and members. (Exh. D) "DANILO DE GUZMAN testified that he joined Balgos & Perez in April 2000. He obtained his LLB degree from FEU in 1998. As a student, he was an awardee for academic excellence. He passed the 1998 bar examinations with a grade of 86.4%. In FEU, he joined the Beta Sigma Lambda law fraternity which has chapters in MLQU, UE and MSU (Mindanao State University). As a member of the fraternity, he was active during bar examinations and participated in the fraternity s bar ops. "He testified that sometime in May 2003, when he was exploring Atty. Balgos computer, (which he often did without the owner s knowledge or permission), to download materials which he thought might be useful to save for future use, he found and downloaded the test questions in mercantile law consisting of 12 pages. He allegedly thought they were quizzers for a book that Atty. Balgos might be preparing. He saved them in his hard disk. "He thought of faxing the test questions to one of his fraternity brods, a certain Ronan Garvida who, De Guzman thought, was taking the 2003 bar examinations. Garvida is also a law graduate from FEU. He had taken the 2002 bar examinations, but did not pass. "On September 17, 2003, four days before the mercantile law bar examination, De Guzman faxed a copy of the 12-pagetest questions (Exhs. I, I-1, I-2, I-3) to Garvida because earlier he was informed by Garvida that he was retaking the bar examinations. He advised Garvida to share the questions with other Betan examinees. He allegedly did not charge anything for the test questions. Later, after the examination was over, Garvida texted (sent a text message on his cell phone) him (De Guzman), that he did not take the bar examination.

"Besides Garvida, De Guzman faxed the mercantile law bar questions to another fraternity brother named Arlan (surname unknown), through Reynita (Nanette) Villasis, his secretary (Tsn, pp. 20-28, Oct. 29, 2003). But he himself faxed the questions to still another brod named Erwin Tan who had helped him during the bar ops in 1998 when he (De Guzman) took the bar examinations (Id., p. 28). He obtained the cell phone numbers of Arlan and Erwin Tan from Gabby Tanpiengco whom he informed by text message, that they were guide questions, not tips, in the mercantile law examination. "When he was confronted by Attorney Velasco on Wednesday after the examination, (news of the leakage was already in all the newspapers), De Guzman admitted to Attorney Velasco that he faxed the questions to his fraternity brothers, but he did not reveal where he got the test questions. "De Guzman received a text message from Erwin Tan acknowledging that he received the test questions. However, Erwin informed him that the questions were kalat na kalat (all over the place) even if he did not share them with others (Tsn, pp. 54-55, Oct. 29, 2003). "De Guzman also contacted Garvida who informed him that he gave copies of the test questions to Betans Randy Iigo and James Bugain. "Arlan also texted De Guzman that almost all the questions were asked in the examination. Erwin Tan commented that many of the leaked questions were asked in the examination, pero hindi exacto; mi binago (they were not exactly the same; there were some changes). "De Guzman tried to text Garvida, but he received no response. "De Guzman disclosed that he learned how to operate a computer from Silvestre Atienza, the office manager, and through self-study, by asking those who are knowledgeable on computers. He has been using computers since 1997, and he bought his own computer in 2001, a Pentium 3, which he uses at home. "REYNITA VILLASIS, the 36-year-old legal secretary of Attorney De Guzman, submitted her affidavit (Exh. F) and orally affirmed her participation in the reproduction and transmittal by fax of the leaked test questions in mercantile law to Ronan Garvida and Arlan, as testified by De Guzman. "RONAN GARVIDA, appeared before the Investigating Committee in compliance with the subpoena that was issued to him. Garvida graduated from FEU College of Law in 2000. He is about 32 years of age. While still a student in 1998, he was afflicted with multiple sclerosis or MS, a disease of the nervous system that attacks the nerve sheaths of the brain and spinal cord. It is a chronic disabling disease although it may have periods of remission. It causes its victim to walk with erratic, stiff and staggering gait; the hands and fingers may tremble in performing simple actions; the eyesight can be impaired, and speech may be slow and slurred (p. 737, Vol. 2, Reader s Digest Medical Encyclopedia, 1971 Ed., compiled by Benjamin F. Miller, M.D.). All these symptoms were present when Garvida testified before the Committee on November 6, 2003 to answer its questions regarding his involvement in the leakage of the examiner s test questions in mercantile law. "Garvida testified that when he was a freshman at FEU, he became a member of the Beta Sigma Lambda fraternity where he met and was befriended by Attorney De Guzman who was his senior by one and a half years. Although they had been out of touch since he went home to the province on account of the recurrence of his illness, De Guzman was able [to] get this cell phone number from his compadre, Atty. Joseph Pajara. De Guzman told Garvida that he was faxing him possible questions in the bar examination in mercantile law. Because the test questions had no answers, De Guzman stressed that they were not tips but only possible test questions. "Garvida had intended to take the 2003 bar examinations. He enrolled in the Consortium Review Center in FEU, paying P10,000.00 as enrollment fee. However, on his way to the Supreme Court to file his application to take the bar examination, he suffered pains in his wrist - symptoms that his MS had recurred. His physician advised him to go to the National Orthopedic Hospital in Quezon City for treatment. This he did. "He gave up his plan to take the 2003 bar examinations. Nevertheless, he continued to attend the review classes at the Consortium Review Center because he did not want to waste completely the P10,000-enrollment fee that he paid for the review course ( Nahihinayang ako ). That was presumably why De Guzman thought that Garvida was taking the bar exams and sent him a copy of the test questions in mercantile law. "Upon receipt of the test questions, Garvida faxed a copy to his brod Randy Iigo who was reviewing at the Consortium Review Center. Randy photocopied them for distribution to other fraternity brods. Some of the brods doubted the usefulness of the test questions, but Randy who has a high regard for De Guzman, believed that the questions were tips. Garvida did not fax the questions to any other person than Randy Iigo. He allegedly did not sell the questions to Randy. I could not do that to a brod, he explained. "In view of the fact that one of the copies of the leaked test questions (Exh. H) bore on the left margin a rubber stamp composed of the Greek initials BEA-MLQU, indicating that the source of that copy was the Beta Sigma Lambda chapter at MLQU, the Committee subpoenaed Ronald Collado, the Most Illustrious Brother of the Beta Sigma Lambda fraternity of MLQU.

"RONALD COLLADO is a senior law student at the MLQU. He admitted that his fraternity conducted Bar Ops for the 2003 bar exams. Bar Ops are the biggest activity of the fraternity every year. They start as soon as new officers of the fraternity are elected in June, and they continue until the bar examinations are over. The bar operations consist of soliciting funds from alumni brods and friends to be spent in reproducing bar review materials for the use of their barristers (bar candidates) in the various review centers, providing meals for their brod -barristers on examination days; and to rent a bar site or place near De la Salle University where the examinees and the frat members can convene and take their meals during the break time. The Betans bar site for the 2003 bar examinations was located on Leon Guinto Street, Malate. On September 19 and 21, before [the] start of the examination, Collado s fraternity distributed bar review materials for the mercantile law examination to the examinees who came to the bar site. The test questions (Exh. H) were received by Collado from a brod, Alan Guiapal, who had received them from Randy Iigo. "Collado caused 30 copies of the test questions to be printed with the logo and initials of the fraternity (BEA-MLQU) for distribution to the 30 MLQU examinees taking the bar exams. Because of time constraints, frat members were unable to answer the test questions despite the clamor for answers, so, they were given out as is - without answers. "DEAN EDUARDO J. F. ABELLA of the Jose Rizal University law school in Mandaluyong City, was the reviewer in Mercantile Law and Practical Exercises at the Lex Review Center which is operated by the Lex Review & Seminars Inc., of which Dean Abella is one of the incorporators. He learned about the leakage of test questions in mercantile law when he was delivering the pre-week lecture on Legal Forms at the Arellano University. The leaked questions were shown to him by his secretary, Jenylyn Domingo, after the mercantile law exam. He missed the Saturday lecture in mercantile law because he was suffering from a touch of flu. He gave his last lecture on the subject on Wednesday or Thursday before the exam. He denied having bought or obtained and distributed the leaked test questions in Mercantile Law to the bar reviewees in the Lex Review Center. "F I N D I N G S "The Committee finds that the leaked test questions in Mercantile Law were the questions which the examiner, Attorney Marcial O. T. Balgos, had prepared and submitted to Justice Jose C. Vitug, as chairman of the 2003 Bar Examinations Committee. The questions constituted 82% of the questions asked in the examination in Mercantile Law in the morning of September 21, 2003, Sunday, in some cases with slight changes which were not substantial and in other cases exactly as proposed by Atty. Balgos. Hence, any bar examinee who was able to get hold of the leaked questions before the mercantile law examination and answered them correctly, would have been assured of passing the examination with at least a grade of 82%! "The circumstance that the leaked test questions consisted entirely of test questions prepared by Atty. Balgos, proves conclusively that the leakage originated from his office, not from the Office of Justice Vitug, the Bar Examinations Chairman. "Atty. Balgos claimed that the leaked test questions were prepared by him on his computer. Without any doubt, the source of the leaked test questions was Atty. Balgos computer. The culprit who stole or downloaded them from Atty. Balgos computer without the latter s knowledge and consent, and who faxed them to other persons, was Atty. Balgos legal assistant, Attorney Danilo De Guzman, who voluntarily confessed the deed to the Investigating Committee. De Guzman revealed that he faxed the test questions, with the help of his secretary Reynita Villasis, to his fraternity brods, namely, Ronan Garvida, Arlan (whose surname he could not recall), and Erwin Tan. "In turn, Ronan Garvida faxed the test questions to Betans Randy Iigo and James Bugain. "Randy Iigo passed a copy or copies of the same questions to another Betan, Alan Guiapal, who gave a copy to the MLQU-Beta Sigma [Lambda s] Most Illustrious Brother, Ronald F. Collado, who ordered the printing and distribution of 30 copies to the MLQU s 30 bar candidates. "Attorney Danilo De Guzman s act of downloading Attorney Balgos test questions in mercantile law from the latter s computer, without his knowledge and permission, was a criminal act of larceny. It was theft of intellectual property; the test questions were intellectual property of Attorney Balgos, being the product of his intellect and legal knowledge. "Besides theft, De Guzman also committed an unlawful infraction of Attorney Balgos right to privacy of communication, and to security of his papers and effects against unauthorized search and seizure - rights zealously protected by the Bill of Rights of our Constitution (Sections 2 and 3, Article III, 1987 Constitution). "He transgressed the very first canon of the lawyers Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that [a] lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land, and promote respect for law and legal processes. "By transmitting and distributing the stolen test questions to some members of the Beta Sigma Lambda Fraternity, possibly for pecuniary profit and to given them undue advantage over the other examiners in the mercantile law examination, De Guzman abetted cheating or dishonesty by his fraternity brothers in the examination, which is violative of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, as well as Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for members of the Bar, which provide: Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct

Canon 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR. "De Guzman was guilty of grave misconduct unbecoming a member of the Bar. He violated the law instead of promoting respect for it and degraded the noble profession of law instead of upholding its dignity and integrity. His actuations impaired public respect for the Court, and damaged the integrity of the bar examinations as the final measure of a law graduate s academic preparedness to embark upon the practice of law. However, the Investigating Committee does not believe that De Guzman was solely responsible for the leakage of Atty. Balgos proposed test questions in the mercantile law examination. The Committee does not believe that he acted alone, or did not have the assistance and cooperation of other persons, such as: "Cheryl Palma, Atty. Balgos private secretary, who, according to Atty. Balgos himself, was the only person who knew the password, who could open and close his computer; and who had the key to his office where his computer was kept. Since a computer may not be accessed or downloaded unless it is opened, someone must have opened Atty. Balgos computer in order for De Guzman to retrieve the test questions stored therein. "Silvestre Atienza, also a fraternity brod of De Guzman, who was responsible for interconnecting Atty. Balgos computer with the other computers outside Atty. Balgos room or office, and who was the only other person, besides Cheryl Palma, who knew the password of Atty. Balgos computer. "The following persons who received from De Guzman, and distributed copies of the leaked test questions, appear to have conspired with him to steal and profit from the sale of the test questions. They could not have been motivated solely by a desire to help the fraternity, for the leakage was widespread ( kalat na kalat ) according to Erwin Tan. The possible co-conspirators were: Ronan Garvida, Arlan, Erwin Tan, Randy Iigo, Ronald Collado, and Allan Guiapal "The Committee does not believe that De Guzman recklessly broke the law and risked his job and future as a lawyer, out of love for the Beta Sigma Lambda fraternity. There must have been an ulterior material consideration for his breaking the law and tearing the shroud of secrecy that, he very well knows, covers the bar examinations. "On the other hand, the Committee finds that the theft of the test questions from Atty. Balgos computer could have been avoided if Atty. Balgos had exercised due diligence in safeguarding the secrecy of the test questions which he prepared. As the computer is a powerful modern machine which he admittedly is not fairly familiar with, he should not have trusted it to deep secret the test questions that he stored in its hard disk. He admittedly did not know the password of his computer. He relied on his secretary to use the password to open and close his computer. He kept his computer in a room to which other persons had access. Unfamiliar with the use of the machine whose potential for mischief he could not have been totally unaware of, he should have avoided its use for so sensitive an undertaking as typing the questions in the bar examination. After all he knew how to use the typewriter in the use of which he is quite proficient. Atty. Balgos should therefore have prepared the test questions in his trusty typewriter, in the privacy of his home, (instead of his law office), where they would have been safe from the prying eyes of secretaries and assistant attorneys. Atty. Balgos negligence in the preparation and safekeeping of his proposed test questions for the bar examination in mercantile law, was not the proximate cause of the bar leakage; it was, in fact, the root cause. For, if he had taken those simple precautions to protect the secrecy of his papers, nobody could have stolen them and copied and circulated them. The integrity of the bar examinations would not have been sullied by the scandal. He admitted that Mali siguro ako, but that was what happened (43 tsn, Oct. 24, 2003). "R E C O M M E N D A T I O N "This Honorable court in the case of Burbe v. Magulta, A.C. No. 5713, June 10, 2002, 383 SCRA 276, pronounced the following reminder for lawyers: Members of the bar must do nothing that may tend to lessen in any degree the confidence of the public in the fidelity, the honesty and integrity of the profession. In another case, it likewise intoned: We cannot overstress the duty of a lawyer to at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession. He can do this by faithfully performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts, and to his clients. (Reyes v. Javier, A.C. No. 5574, February 2, 2002, 375 SCRA 538). It goes without saying that a lawyer who violates this precept of the profession by committing a gross misconduct which dishonors and diminishes the public s respect for the legal profession, should be disciplined.

"After careful deliberation, the Investigating Committee recommends that: "1. Attorney Danilo De Guzman be DISBARRED for he had shown that he is morally unfit to continue as a member of the legal profession, for grave dishonesty, lack of integrity, and criminal behavior. In addition, he should make a written PUBLIC APOLOGY and pay DAMAGES to the Supreme Court for involving it in another bar scandal, causing the cancellation of the mercantile law examination, and wreaking havoc upon the image of this institution. "2. Attorney Marcial O. T. Balgos should be REPRIMANDED by the Court and likewise be required to make a written APOLOGY to the Court for the public scandal he brought upon it as a result of his negligence and lack of due care in preparing and safeguarding his proposed test questions in mercantile law. As the Court had to cancel the Mercantile Law examination on account of the leakage of Attorney Balgos test questions, which comprised 82% of the bar questions in that examination, Atty. Balgos is not entitled to receive any honorarium as examiner for that subject. "3. FURTHER INVESTIGATION of Danilo De Guzman, Cheryl Palma, Silvestre Atienza, Ronan Garvida, Arlan, Erwin Tan, Randy Iigo, James Bugain, Ronald Collado and Allan Guiapal by the National Bureau of Investigation and the Philippine National Police, with a view to their criminal prosecution as probable co-conspirators in the theft and leakage of the test questions in mercantile law. "With regard to recommending measures to safeguard the integrity of the bar examinations and prevent a repetition of future leakage in the said examinations, inasmuch as this matter is at present under study by the Court s Committee on Legal Education and Bar Matters, as an aspect of proposals for bar reforms, the Investigating Committee believes it would be well-advised to refrain from including in this report what may turn out to be duplicative, if not contrary, recommendations on the matter."3 The Court adopts the report, including with some modifications the recommendation, of the Investigating Committee. The Court, certainly will not countenance any act or conduct that can impair not only the integrity of the Bar Examinations but the trust reposed on the Court. The Court also takes note that Mr. Jovito M. Salonga and Mr. Benjamin R. Katly, two of its employees assigned to the Management Information Systems Office (MISO), who were tasked by the Investigating Committee to inspect the computer system in the office of Atty. Balgos, found that the Court s Computer-Assisted Legal Research (CALR) database4 was installed in the computer used by Atty. Balgos. Mr. Salonga and Mr. Katly reported that the system, which was developed by the MISO, was intended for the exclusive use of the Court. The installation thereof to any external computer would be unauthorized without the permission of the Court. Atty. Velasco informed the two Court employees that the CALR database was installed by Atty. De Guzman on the computer being used by Atty. Balgos. The matter would also need further investigation to determine how Atty. De Guzman was able to obtain a copy of the Court s CALR database. WHEREFORE, the Court, acting on the recommendations of the Investigating Committee, hereby resolves to (1) DISBAR Atty. DANILO DE GUZMAN from the practice of law effective upon his receipt of this RESOLUTION; (2) REPRIMAND Atty. MARCIAL O.T. BALGOS and DISENTITLE him from receiving any honorarium as an Examiner in Mercantile Law; (3) Direct the National Bureau of Investigation (a) to undertake further investigation of Danilo De Guzman, Cheryl Palma, Silvestre Atienza, Ronan Garvida, Erwin Tan, Randy Iigo, James Bugain, Ronald Collado and Allan Guiapal with a view to determining their participation and respective accountabilities in the bar examination leakage and to conduct an investigation on how Danilo De Guzman was able to secure a copy of the Supreme Court s CALR database. Let a copy of this Resolution be made part of the records of Danilo De Guzman in the Office of the Bar Confidant, Supreme Court of the Philippines, and copies to be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and circulated by the Office of the Court Administrator to all courts. SO ORDERED.