REPUBLIC SERVICE

The Spratlys Conundrum

By Ricardo Saludo Second of Three Parts In dealing with China over territorial squabbles in the South China Sea, going one on one is the sure way to get nowhere. Like sending an expert to explain the Philippine position to Beijing after two mainland vessels intimidated an oil exploration team within our exclusive economic zone (EEZ). President Benigno Aquino 3rds emissary has about as much chance of scoring diplomatic points with the Chinese as a five-foot UAAP rookie has to dunk the ball on Yao Ming. Dwarfing militarily and economically every rival claimant in the Paracels and Spratlys island groups, China has consistently opposed internationalizing its disputes and much prefers dealing with them bilaterally. And the one-on-one strategy works even better when, like the Philippines, the other side would even go to Beijing to talk, as if we were a tenant asking our landlord why his security guards told our guest not to park in front of our home. Besides being smaller and weaker, the Philippines has an even greater handicap in dealing with China: 227 Filipinos in mainland jails on drug trafficking charges. Last months visit by no less than Vice-President Jejomar Binay to plead for the lives of three narco-convicts on death row vividly demonstrated how much leverage imprisoned compatriots can exert on our leaders. While supporting the assertion of territorial interests in the new Spratlys spat, Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago spelled out the governments dilemma: We cannot predict how much of a factor the incident will be in the fate of the Filipinos sentenced to death there. But definitely it will have a negative impact. Plainly, if the executions deferred after Binays visit are carried out in response to our tough stance on the Spratlys, not even President Aquinos lofty approval rating could escape damage. This despite Foreign Secretary Alberto del Rosarios public insistence that there is no link between Filipinos on death row in China and disputed islands in the middle of the South China Sea. One can add to the lives-for-territory stakes a livelihood angle too, as the Taipei trips of two other PNoy emissaries, Mar Roxas and former president Fidel Ramos, underscore. Both bigwigs were sent to mollify the islands leaders incensed over the Aquino Administrations deportation of 14 Taiwan citizens to China. Taipei has slowed down processing employment papers for overseas Filipino workers, and muttered threats of a ban on hiring them. Beijing cannot be see an even bigger squeezeball in the much larger OFW contingent in Hong Kong. The Special Administrative Region would not need much

urging from its sovereign parent to take action against the Philippines after last Augusts Rizal Park hostage drama, for which no top official has yet been sanctioned. So it may not be the brightest idea to take China on one on one by dispatching lawyer Henry Bensurto, Secretary General of the Commission on Maritime and Ocean Affairs, to explain in Beijing that the seismic survey team confronted by two Chinese patrol boats last month were well within our 200-mile EEZ. That might just play into the hands of Beijings mandarins. Rather, we have to seek safety in numbers. The Philippines must join with our siblings in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, maybe with some supportive cheers from Uncle Sam on the sidelines, in getting the Chinese to behave on the high seas and comply with the informal code of conduct they agreed with ASEAN back in 2002 to avoid escalating tensions and precipitating conflict in the South China Sea. Under the non-binding Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, signed by ASEAN and China in Phnom Penh in 2002, signatories undertake to exercise self-restraint in the conduct of activities that would complicate or escalate disputes and affect peace and stability including, among others, refraining from action of inhabiting on the presently uninhabited islands, reefs, shoals, cays, and other features and to handle their differences in a constructive manner. Beijing has, in fact, openly expressed some willingness to work toward a formal pact to upgrade the informal accord. After meeting the groups leaders in Hanoi last October, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao declared on the Foreign Ministry website: As before, China will work with other nations to earnestly implement the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, increase mutual confidence and friendly cooperation. Reportedly, Chinese officials were to join those of ASEAN in a meeting last December to begin work on a formal code of conduct. Still, keeping the peace in the South China Sea is one thing; settling the rival claims is another. In his website statement, Premier Wen reiterated Beijings preference to go one-on-one in discussing differences: We will jointly work toward the maintenance of peace and stability in the South China Sea and work to bilaterally resolve the dispute in an appropriate manner. If China seems more forthcoming over the past year to forge a binding agreement on the South China Sea, its probably due to Americas renewed interest in matters Asian, including the Spratlys conundrum. At the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) last July, three months before the October Summit where Premier Wen went, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton declared that her country had a national interest in freedom of navigation, open access to Asia's maritime commons, and respect for international law in the South China Sea. That doesnt seem too provocative unless you happen to claim most of the South China Sea as your sovereign pond subject to your laws and policies, period. Beijing went ballistic over the Clinton missive, which raised a controversy that the Chinese have sought to keep off the ARF agenda since the security meetings began in Bangkok in July 1994.

In an angry online summary of the Forum, Chinas Foreign Ministry fumed: "As expected, the U.S. side chose to ignore China's advice and played up the issue at the meeting. . . . The seemingly impartial [Clinton] remarks were in effect an attack on China and were designed to give the international community a wrong impression that the situation in the South China Sea is a cause for grave concern. Shi Yinghong, a professor in international security at Beijings Renmin University, one of Chinas leading institutions of learning, minced no words in commenting on the ARF event. China is angry, he told Reuters. This is the first public U.S. interference over the South China Sea, which the Foreign Ministry sees as an issue between China and Southeast Asian countries. This is quite serious because it dramatically expands the space for disputes between China and the U.S." Well, the Americans certainly seem ready for some tension with Beijing. Just over a week after Sec. Clintons ARF remarks, Capt. Rudy Lupton, commander of the Seventh Fleet flagship based in Japan, said: "We expect them [the Chinese] to be responsible on what they do as we are. And I believe if we act in that way, there should be no issues. Thus, Washingtons intervention may have also presented Beijing with a tough choice: play ball with ASEAN in drafting a formal code of conduct for the South China Sea, or pretty much drive the regional grouping toward the U.S. as the only credible guarantor of peace and security in the crucial waters where the bulk of East Asias fuel, minerals and trade sail. Last months patrol boat episode would certainly tend to have the latter effect among Spratlys claimant countries. Especially for the Philippines, whose military openly admits its inability to counter Chinas power. After the 52nd annual Philippines-U.S. Mutual Defense Board meeting in Manila, then-Armed Forces Chief Gen. Ricardo David expressed doubts that war would break out over the Spratlys. And if there is one, he admitted, wala naman tayong ipuputok. Gen. David then called for a minimal asset to guard our territory. The way forward then for the Philippines in asserting our interests in the Spratlys may be a three-fold path: join hands with ASEAN in pressing China to conclude a legally binding agreement on avoiding confrontation and peacefully resolving disputes in the South China Sea, strengthen our security alliances especially with the United States, and build up a minimum military capability to defend our territorial interests. In the final part of this column on Friday, we assess the tough balancing act that those three imperatives entail and meet factions in the Aquino Administration that may get in the way of that national security agenda. (The article ends on Friday.)
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Ricardo Saludo heads the Center for Strategy, Enterprise & Intelligence (ric.saludo@censeisolutions.com). He holds a M.S. in Public Policy and Management from School of Oriental and African Studies, London.