Espinosa, Maria Ana E./ Persons/ Prof.

Pangalangan/ A2015
The People of the Philippine Islands, plaintiff and appellee vs. Ursula Sensano and Marcelo Ramos, defendants and appellants March 7, 1933/ Appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte/ De la Pena, J. Facts: 1. Ursula Sensano and Mariano Ventura were married on April 29, 1919. 2. Shortly after the birth of their child, Ventura left Sensano without giving any support for her and their child. 3. Poor and illiterate, she struggled to survive with her child until she met Marcelo Ramos who took her and the child. 4. Ventura returned in 1924 and filed a charge against Sensano and Ramos for adultery. Both were sentenced of 4 months and 1 day of arresto mayor. 5. After Sensano completed her sentence, she left Ramos and begged Ventura for his pardon and promised to be a faithful wife if he would take her back. 6. Ventura refused to pardon her or to live with her and said she could go where she wished, that he would have nothing more to do with her, and she could do as she pleased. 7. Sensano and her child went back to Ramos and lived together ever since. 8. Ventura knew that Sensano and Ramos resumed living together but he did not do anything to assert his rights as husband. 9. Ventura left for Hawaii and went back after 7 years. He filed the second charge of adultery here involved with the sole purpose, as he declared, of being able to obtain a divorce under the provisions of Act No. 2710. Issue: Can the husband file a charge of adultery against his wife despite not doing anything after his knowledge of his wifes crime? Held: The judgment below is reversed. Ratio: Article 344 RPC, par 2 Prosecution of the crimes of adultery, concubinage , seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness- The offended party cannot institute criminal prosecution without including both the guilty parties, if they are both alive. The conduct of the husband and the evidence in this case warrant the inference that he consented to the adulterous relations existing between the accused and therefore he is not authorized by law to institute this criminal proceeding. Jose de Ocampo, petitioner vs. Serafina Florenciano, respondent February 23, 1960/ Petition for review by certiorari of a decisin of the CA/ Bengzon, J. Facts: 1. April 5, 1938, Ocampo and Florenciano were married. 2. March 1951, Ocampo caught Florenciano having illicit relations with Jose Arcalas. 3. June 1951, Ocampo sent Florenciano to Manila to study beauty culture. Florenciano stayed there for 1 year where she was having affairs with other men. 4. June 1952, Florenciano left Ocampo and they lived separately since then. 5. June 18, 1955, Ocampo caught Florenciano having illicit relations with Nelson Orzama. 6. Ocampo signified his intention to file for a petition for legal separation. She manifested conformity provided she is not charged with adultery in a criminal action. 7. July 5, 1955, petition for legal separation was filed. Issue: was there a confession of judgment that prevents the petition for legal separation to be decreed? Held: Finding no obstacles to the aggrieved husbands petition we hereby reverse the appealed decision and decree a legal separation between these spouses, with all the consequent effects. Ratio: The petition for legal separation on account of Florencianos adultery with Jose Arcalas has prescribed, because his action was not filed within one year from March 1951 when Ocampo discovered her infidelity. As of the adultery against Nelson Orzame, CA interpreted Florencianos conformity to the legal separation and her admission of her crime as a confession of judgment, thus a petition for legal separation could not be decreed provided by Art 101 CC. As the court understands, the article merely prohibits a separation

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upon a confession of judgment. Confession of judgment usually happens when the defendant appears in court and confesses the right of plaintiff to judgment of files a pleading expressly agreeing to the plaintiffs demand. This did not happen in this case. There is evidence independently of such statement, the decree may and should be granted, since it would not be based on her confession, but upon evidence presented by the plaintiff. What the law prohibits is a judgment based exclusively or mainly on defendants confession. If a confession defeats the action ipso facto, any defendant who opposes the separation will immediately confess judgment, purposely to prevent it. Neither is there collusion. Collusion happens if the parties had arranged to make it appear that a matrimonial offense had been committed although it was not, or if the parties had connived to bring about a legal separation even in the absence of grounds therefor. Here, the offense of adultery really happened according to the evidence. The court do not think Ocampos failure actively to search for Florenciano and take her home constituted condonation or consent to her adulterous relations. She left him and it was not his duty to search for her to bring her home, it was her obligation to return. Sargent v. Sargent December 20, 1920 Facts: 1. Mr. Sargent filed charges against defendant, Mrs. Sargent, with having committed adultery with Charles Simmons, their negro chauffeur. 2. Petitioner showed that Mrs. Sargent committed 3 specific acts: at Jeffersonville, N.Y., Kensington Ave. Home and at the Kensington Ave. Home the raid. 3. Witnesses presented against the defendant were 4 negroes, working for the petitioner (who also have ill feelings towards the defendant) and detectives the petitioner employed after he was informed of his wifes relations with Simmons. 4. Testimonies from the witnesses stated that Mrs. Sargent was attracted to Simmons and Simmons was seen a number of times alone with Mrs. Sargent in her room. 5. For the first actit would be contrary to human experience that the defendant would confide to another her intention to commit adultery. Also, because of gonorrhea, she couldnt have been in the condition to indulge in a night of sexual intercourse. 6. The second act depends wholly on Charlottes story. 7. The third act is the so called raid. It happened when Mr. Sargent was not at home. Issue: If the first and second acts of adultery alleged have not been proved and the petitioner relies on the 3rd act, did his conduct as to the alleged act amount to consent? Held: Yes, thus the wife was not guilty of adultery. Ratio: The first act and second act of adultery have not been proved. On the third act, the petitioner was already informed by charlotte of the supposedly relations between simmons and his wife. Instead of sending Simmons away or protecting his wife, he staged a situation where his wife could commit adultery. Mr. Sargent absented himself from home, kept simmons in his home where simmons and his wife would have a lot of opportunities to be together. He threw no protection around his wife, instead left her in danger. He did not even warn her against intimacy with Simmons, but he left her in danger, and did nothing whatever to withdraw her from Simmons evil influence. For 2 months he was in possession of Charlottes information he maintained friendly intercourse with her as though nothing had occurred to shake his faith in her, treating her as though conditions were not unusual, even taking a 2-day automobile trip with her a week before the raid. Would an outraged husband, who had learned that a negro was his wifes lover, want to be in the presence of a wife who had so dishonored him, without an ulterior motive on his part? It seemed like Mr. Sargent wanted his wife to commit adultery. William H. Brown, plaintiff and appellant vs. Juanita Yambao, defendant and appellee October 18, 1957/ Appeal from a Judgment of the CFI of Manila/ Tan, J. Facts: 1. While Brown was interned from 1942 to 1945 at UST, Yambao committed adultery with Carlos Field of whom she had a baby girl.

Espinosa, Maria Ana E./ Persons/ Prof. Pangalangan/ A2015

2. Brown learned of this upon his release from internment in 1945, since then they lived separately. They later executed a document liquidating their conjugal partnership and assigning properties as share of Yambao. 3. Brown lived with another woman and had begotten children. 4. The CFI denied legal separation due to Browns incurring of misconduct of similar nature that barred his right of action. Issue: 1. Did the assistant fiscal erred in it acted as counsel for the defaulting wife? 2. Was the husband barred from his right of action, of legal separation, due to incurring of misconduct of similar nature and prescription? Ratio: 1. It was legitimate for the fiscal to bring to light any circumstances that could give rise to the inference that the wifes default was calculated, or agreed upon, to enable appellant to obtain the decree of legal separation that he sought without regard to the legal merits of his case. One such circumstance is obviously the fact that Browns cohabitation with a woman other than his wife, since it bars him from claiming legal separation by Art 100 CC. Art 100 CC - Where both spouses are offenders, a legal separation cannot be claimed by either of them. Collusion between the parties to obtain legal separation shall cause the dismissal of the petition. The calling for intervention of the state attorneys in case of uncontested proceedings for legal separation is to emphasize that marriage is more than a mere contract; that it is a social institution in which the state is vitally interested, so that its continuation or interruption can not be made to depend upon the parties themselves.

2. Browns action was already barred because he did not file for petition for legal separation
proceeding until 10 years after he learned of his wifes adultery. Browns inaction for 10 years also evidences condonation or connivance on his part. Art 102 CC- An action for legal separation cannot be filed except within one year from and after the date on which the plaintiff became cognizant of the cause and within 5 years from and after the date when such cause occurred. Willan v. Willan 1960/ CA of Great Britain Facts: 1. June 2, 1925, the parties were married. They cohabit until Sept. 29, 1958. 2. Throughout the marriage, she frequently and persistently assaulted him and showed violence to him. She was immensely jealous of his relations to other women. She habitually used offensive and obscene language, calling him horrible names. 3. She frequently demanded sexual intercourse with him at times when he did not wish to have it, obliging him to conform to her wishes by indulging in various types of violence. 4. August 13, 1958, the solicitor wrote in behalf of the husband to the wife complaining of her cruel conduct and informing her that the husband would be obliged to leave her. 5. After that, life went on very much as before where the couple cohabit. 6. Sept 28/29, the night before the husband left for the last time, an act of sexual intercourse took place between the parties. Issue: Was the act of sexual intercourse that happened before the husband left the home constituted condonation? Held: His act is conclusive of condonation. Ratio: The husband claims that the last act of intercourse that occurred between the parties on the night of Sept 28/29 could not have constituted condonation by reason of the fact that it constituted an important element of the cruelty complained of, and/or by reason of the fact that it took place when the petitioner was under duress and/or was not a free agent.

Espinosa, Maria Ana E./ Persons/ Prof. Pangalangan/ A2015

The act of intercourse was induced by duress on the part of the wife, and that the husband was not to be regarded as a free agent. It is well established that, whatever may be the position of a wife, in the case of husband the fact of having intercourse with the wife, with full knowledge of the matrimonial offense of which complaint is made, is conclusive evidence of condonation by the husband of the wife. It is conclusive evidence because it is the best possible way of showing that the wife has been reinstated as a wife. Only one exception to that rule was accepted by the House of Lords and that is the case where the act of intercourse is induced by fraud on the part of the wife. Subject to that, intercourse by a husband with his wife after knowledge of the matters complained of is conclusive evidence of condonation. Benjamin Bugayong, plaintiff and appellant vs. Leonila Ginez, defendant and appellee December 28, 1956/ Appeal from an order of the CFI of Pangasinan/ Leano, J. Facts: 1. August 27, 1949, Bugayong and Ginez were married. The couple lived with the sisters of the husband. When Bugayong had to return to his duty, the couple agreed that Ginez would stay with his sisters in Sampaloc, Manila. 2. July 1951, Ginez left the house of her sister-in-law to reside with her mother in Asingan, Pangasinan. She later moved to Dagupan to study in a local college. 3. July 1951, Bugayong began receiving letter from Valeriana Polangco, Bugayongs sister-in-law, and some anonymous letters informing him of alleged acts of infidelity of his wife. His wife also admitted to him by her letter that an Elliong kissed her. Bugayong claims that the letter was destroyed. 4. August 1952, Bugayong went to Asingan, Pangasinan and sought for his wife. 5. Ginez came along with Bugayong where they stayed and lived as husband and wife in Pedro Bugayongs house, Bugayongs cousin. 6. On the 2nd day, Bugayong tried to verify from his wife the truth of her adultery, she did not answer but packed up and left. 7. Bugayong tried to find Ginez but failed. He went to Ilocos Norte to soothe his wounded feelings. 8. November 18, 1952, Bugayong filed complaint for legal separation. The CFI dismissed the complaint. Issue: Was the act charged have been condoned by the plaintiff-husband? Held: The order appealed is affirmed. Ratio: The Court agree with the trial judge that the conduct of Bugayong narrated despite his belief that his wife was unfaithful, deprives him, as alleged the offended spouse, of any action for legal separation against the offending wife, because his said conduct comes within the restriction of Art 100 CC. The only general rule in American jurisprudence is that any cohabitation with the guilty party, after the commission of the offense, and with the knowledge or belief on the part of the injured party of its commission, will amount to conclusive evidence of condonation; but this presumption may be rebutted by evidence. If there had been cohabitation, to what extent must it be to constitute condonation? Single voluntary act of marital intercourse between the parties ordinarily is sufficient to constitute condonation, and where the parties live in the same house, it is presumed that they live on terms of matrimonial cohabitation. Socorro Matubis, plaintiff and appellant vs. Zoilo Praxedes, defendant and appellee October 25, 1960/ Appeal from a judgment of the CFI of Camarines Sur/ Surtida, J. Facts: 1. January 10, 1943, Matubis and Praxedes were married. 2. May 30, 1944, the couple agreed to live separately, which status remained unchanged until the present 3. April 3, 1948, the couple entered into an agreement a. Both relinquish their right over the other as legal husband and wife b. Both are free to get any mate and live with as husband and wife without any interference by any of them, nor either of them can prosecute the other for adultery or concubinage or any other crime or suit arising from their separation.

Espinosa, Maria Ana E./ Persons/ Prof. Pangalangan/ A2015 c. The wife is no longer entitled for any support from the husband or any benefits he may
receive thereafter, no is the husband entitled for anything from the wife d. Neither of them can claim anything from the other from the time they verbally separated, May 30, 1944 to the present when they made their verbal separation into writing. 4. January 1955, Praxedes began cohabiting with Asuncion Rebulado. 5. Matubis filed complaint on April 24, 1956. 6. CFI dismissed complaint due to condonation. Issue: Was the agreement of both parties constituted condonation which bar the wife from right of action? Held: The CFI decision is affirmed. Ratio: Counsel in his brief submits that the agreement is divided into 2 parts. The 1st part having to do with the act of living separately which he claims to be legal, and the 2nd partthat which becomes a license to commit the ground for legal separation, which is admittedly illegal. The court does not share the appellants view. Condonation and consent here are not only implied but expressed. Art 100 CC provides that legal separation may be claimed only by the innocent spouse, provided there has been no condonation of or consent to the adultery or concubinage. Having condoned and or consented in writing, the plaintiff is now undeserving of the courts sympathy.

Elena Contreras, plaintiff-appellant, vs. Cesar Macaraig, defendant-appellee May 29, 1970/ Appeal from a decision of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila/ Juliano-Agrava, J. Facts: 1. March 16, 1952, Contreras and Macaraid were married with 3 children. 2. 1958, couple acquired rights, as lessee and purcharser under a conditional sale agreement, to own a house and lot which they transferred in favor of their 3 children. Installments were paid by Contreras father and the couple own no other conjugal property. 3. Macaraig met Lily Ann Alcala in his work. Macaraig left his work and started working as a special agent in Malacanang. He began to be away often and come home very late. 4. September 1962, Avelino Lubos, Contreras driver, told Contreras that her husband was living with another woman. 5. Whenever the husband will go home, she desist from discussing the matter because she did not wish to precipitate a quarrel and drive him away. 6. Mrs. Felicisima Antioquia, her fathers employee, was sent to investigate. She got hold of a copy of the baptismal certificate of Macaraigs child with Lily Ann Alcala. She gave it to the plaintiff in October 1963. 7. Contreras asked the help of her father-in-law and sister-in-law to convince Macaraig to leave Alcala but it was unsuccessful. 8. December 1963, Contreras and her 2 children talked to Macaraig to give up his concubine and return to their conjugal home, assuring him that she was willing to forgive him. Macaraig said he could no longer leave Lily Ann and refused to returen to his legitimate family. 9. December 14, 1963, Contreras instituted the action for legal separation. Issue: has the action of the wife prescribed due to filing an action more than a year after the knowledge of husbands crime? Held: The decision appealed from is set aside and another is hereby rendered holding that appellant is entitled to legal separation as prayed for in the complaint. Ratio: Art 102 provides that an action for legal separation cannot be instituted except within one year after plaintiff became cognizant of the cause. In the absence of the clear-cut decision of the SC as to the exact import of the term cognizant, the practical application of said rules might be different in case of adultery, which is an act and for concubinage, which may be a situation or relationship. At the time a wife acquired information, which can be reasonably relied upon as true, that her husband is living in concubinage with another woman, the 1 year period should be deemed to have started even if the wife shall not then be in possession of proof sufficient to establish the concubinage before a court of law. It

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is consonant to the philosophy that marriage is an inviolable social institution so that the law provides strict requirements before it will allow a disruption of its status. In the eyes of the law, the only time when Contreras became cognizant of the infidelity of her husband was in the early part of December 1963 when she begged him to come home but Macaraig refused. It was only on the occasion when Macaraig admitted of his guilt and chose not to come home that the period of one year must be deemed to have commenced. Lucy Somosa-Ramos, petitioner vs. Cipriano Vamenta, Jr. Presiding Judge of CFI of Negros Occidental and Clemente G. Ramos, respondents July 29, 1972/ Original Petition in SC. Certiorari./ Fernando, J. Facts: 1. June 18, 1971, Somosa-Ramos filed for legal separation, due to concubinage and attempt on her life. She sought for the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction for the return to her of what she claimed to be her paraphernal and exclusive property, then under the administration and management of Ramos. 2. July 3, 1971, Ramos opposed the hearing of such motion based on Art. 103 CC. An action for legal separation shall in no case be tried before 6 months shall have elapsed since the filing of the petition. 3. September 3, 1971, Somosa-Ramos got an order dated August 4, 1971 of respondent Judge granting the motion of Ramos to suspend hearing of the petition for a writ of mandatory preliminary injunction. Issue: Does Art 103 CC prohibiting the hearing of an action for legal separation before the lapse of 6 months from the filing of the petition, would likewise preclude the court from acting on a motion for preliminary mandatory injunction applied for as an ancillary remedy to as suit? Held: The pleas of the petitioner is granted and the suspension of hearing on the petition for a writ of mandatory preliminary injunction is set aside. Ratio: Art 103 CC is not an absolute bar to the hearing of a motion for preliminary injunction prior to the expiration of the 6-month period. The hope that the parties may settle their differences is not altogether abandoned. Hopefully the guilty parties may mend his or her ways, and the offended party may in turn exhibit magnanimity. Hence, the interposition of a 6-month period before an action for legal separation is to be tried. Art 104 CC- After the filing of the petition for legal separation, the spouse shall be entitled to live separately from each other and manage their respective property. The husband shall continue to manage the conjugal partnership property but if the court deems it proper, it may appoint another to manage said property, in which case the administrator shall have the same rights and duties as a guardian and shall not be allowed to dispose of the income or the capital except in accordance with the orders of the court. There is justification for Somosa-Ramos insistence that her motion for preliminary injunction should not be ignored by the lower court. There is all the more reason for this response considering that the husband she accused of concubinage and an attempt against her life would in the meanwhile continue in the management of what she claimed to be her paraphernal property, an assertion that was not specifically denied by him. Diego de la Vina, petitioner vs. Antonio Villareal, auxiliary judge of CFI and Narcisa Geopano, respondents July 31, 1920/ Original Action in SC. Certiorari./ Johnson, J. Facts: 1. September 17, 1917, Geopano, a resident of Iloilo, filed a complaint against De la Vina, a resident of Negros Oriental 2. During their marriage, the couple acquired property, real and personal, all of which is under the administration of De La Vina. 3. Since 1918, de la Vina had been committing adultery with Ana Calog 4. De la Vina ejected Geopano from their conjugal home that obliged her to live in Iloilo where she established her habitual residence. Geopano lived only through the support of her daughter. 5. Geopano presented a motion alleging that since the filing of her complaint she had had personal knowledge that the defendant was trying to alienate or encumber the property which belonged to

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the conjugal partnership between the couple, to the prejudice of de la vina, and prayed that a preliminary injunction be issued against de la Vina restraining and prohibiting him in the premises. 6. CFI granted the preliminary injunction prayed for by Geopano. Issue: 1. May a married woman ever acquire a residence or domicile separate from that of her husband during the existence of the marriage? 2. In an action for divorce, brought by the wife against her husband, in which the partition of the conjugal property is also prayed for, may the wife obtain a preliminary injunction against the husband restraining and prohibiting him from alienating or encumbering any part of the conjugal property during the pendency of the action? Held: The petition should be and is hereby denied. Ratio:

1. As a general principle of law, the domicile of the wife follows that of her husband. This rule is
founded upon the theoretic identity of person and of interest between the husband and wife, and the presumption that, from the nature of the relation, the home of the one is that of the other. It is intended to promote, strengthen and secure their interests in this relation, as it ordinarily exists, where union and harmony prevail. But this is not an absolute rule. The wife may acquire another and separate domicile from that of her husband where the theoretical unity of husband and wife is dissolved, as it is by the institution of divorce proceedings or where the husband has given cause for divorce.; or where there is separation of the parties by agreement, or a permanent separation due to desertion of the wife by the husband or attributable to cruel treatment on the part of the husband; or where there has been forfeiture by the wife of the benefit of the husbands domicile. The law will recognize a wife having a separated existence, and separate interests, and separate rights in those cases where the express object of all proceedings is to show that the relation itself ought to be dissolved, or so modified as to establish separate interests, and specially a separate domicile and home, bed and board being put, apart for the whole, as expressive of the idea of home. As alleged in the present case, de la Vina ejected Geopano from the conjugal home in order that he may freely indulge in his illicit relations with another woman. Under no other circumstances could a wife be more justifies in establishing a separate residence from that of her husband. For her to continue living with him, even if he had permitted it, would have been a condonation of his flagrant breach of fidelity and marital duty. 2. The law making the husband the sole administrator of the property of the conjugal partnership is founded upon necessity and convenience as well as upon the presumption that, from the very nature of the relation between husband and wife, the former will promote and not injure the interests of the latter. But when that relation ceases and, in a proper action, the wife seeks to dissolve the marriage and to partition the conjugal property, it is but just and proper, in order to protect the interests of the wife, that the husbands power of administration be curtailed, during the pendency of the action, insofar as alienating or encumbering the conjugal property is concerned. Sec 164, Act No. 19 provides: A preliminary injunction may be granted when it is established, in the manner hereinafter provided, to the satisfaction of the judge granting it. 1. That the plaintiff is entitled to the relief demanded and such relief, or any part thereof, consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the acts complained of either for a limited period or perpetually; 2. That the commission or continuance of some act complained of during the litigation would probably work injustice to the plaintiff; 3. That the defendant is doing, or threatens, or is about to do, or is procuring or suffering to be don, some act probably in violation of the plaintiffs rights, respecting the subject of the action, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual. It cannot be doubted that if de la Vina should dispose of all or any part of the conjugal property during the pendency of the action for divorce, and squander or fraudulently conceal the proceeds, that act would probably work injustice to the plaintiff, or that it would probably be in violation of the plaintiffs rights,

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respecting the subject of the action, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual. In this case Geopanos rights sought to be protected by said paragraph 3 is not the right to administer conjugal property, as counsel for the petitioner believes but the right to share in the conjugal property upon the dissolution of the conjugal property. The power to grant preliminary injunctions, both preventive and mandatory, is a logical and necessary incident of the general powers conferred upon CFI, as courts of record of genereal and unlimited original jurisdiction, both legal and equitable. Manuel J.C. Reyes, petitioner vs. Leonor Ines-Luciano, Judge of Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court, QC, CA and Celia Ilustre-Reyes, respondents February 28, 1979/ Petition for Certiorari to review the decision of the Workmens Compensation Commission/ Fernandez, J. Facts: 1. June 3, 1976, Ilustre-Reyes filed a complain against Reyes for legal separation on the ground that Reyes attempted to kill the Ilustre-Reyes. 2. There were two instances when Reyes hurt and almost killed Ilustre-Reyes, on March 10, 1976 and May 26, 1976. Ilustre-Reyes is unemployed and without funds. She is only being supported by her father with whom she resides. All the conjugal properties are in the possession of Reyes. 3. Ilustre-Reyes asked for support pendente lite for her and her 3 children. Reyes opposed on the ground that his wife committed adultery with her physician. 4. March 15, 1977, CA granted monthly alimony pendente lite of 5000pesos from June 1976. Issue: 1. Is the wife entitled for support from her husband despite the fact that a case for adultery had been filed against her? 2. In determining the amount of support pendente lite, is it enough that the court ascertain the kind and amount of evidence even by affidavits only or other documentary evidence appearing in the records? Held: The petition for certiorari is hereby denied and the decision of CA is affirmed with the modification that the support pendente lite at the rate of 4000pesos a month should commence from March 1, 1979. Ratio:

1. It is true that adultery of the wife is a defense in an action for support. However, the alleged
adultery of the wife must be established by competent evidence.The mere allegation that the wife has committed adultery will not bar her from the right to receive support pendent lite. Adultery is a good defense and if properly proved and sustained will defeat the action. 2. In determining the amount to be awarded as support pendente lite, is is not necessary to go fully into the merits of the case, it being sufficient that the court ascertain the kind and amount of evidence which it may deem sufficient to enable it to justly resolve the application, one way or the other, in view of the merely provisional character of the resolution to be entered. Mere affidavits may satisfy the court to pass upon the application for support pendente lite. It is enough for the facts to be established by affidavits or other documentary evidence appearing in the record.