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Procedural Guideline: Guideline


Protection Guidelines CEPG8002

Before you begin l CHECK that this printed document is the most recent version before you use it. The online version of this document is the current version. DO NOT unlawfully disclose any restricted information in this document. To see how the law applies to you: Employee: Read your contract of employment with Country Energy. Contractor: Read your contract of engagement with Country Energy. Sub-contractor: Read your contract with the contractor engaged by us. Accredited Service Providers: comply with Country Energy policies, state acts and regulations.

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CONTENTS PAGE
1 2 3 4 5 PURPOSE ................................................................................................................................. 4 KEY TERMS AND DEFINITIONS............................................................................................... 4 ACTIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES .......................................................................................... 7
3.1 Role of Protection .................................................................................................................................7

CEPG8002

PROTECTION DESIGN.............................................................................................................. 8
4.1 Design ...................................................................................................................................................8

SUBSTATION BATTERIES......................................................................................................... 9
5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 5.6 5.7 5.8 Protection Sensitivity............................................................................................................................9 Protection against Abnormal Operating Conditions............................................................................9 Protection Selectivity......................................................................................................................... 10 Fault Clearance Times....................................................................................................................... 10 Coordination of Protection Settings.................................................................................................. 10 Protection Flagging and Indication ................................................................................................... 10 Trip Supply Supervision Requirements ............................................................................................ 10 Trip Circuit Supervision ..................................................................................................................... 10

PROTECTION SCHEMES ........................................................................................................11


6.1 6.2 6.3 6.4 6.5 6.6 6.7 6.8 6.9 6.10 Protection Scheme Selection............................................................................................................ 11 Fault Clearance Times....................................................................................................................... 13 Selection Requirements - General.................................................................................................... 13 Transmission Plant............................................................................................................................ 13 Subtransmission and Distribution Protection and Substation Plant .............................................. 14 Main Protection ................................................................................................................................. 14 Backup Protection ............................................................................................................................. 14 Distribution Transformers ................................................................................................................. 15 Capacitor Banks ................................................................................................................................ 15 Circuit Breaker Fail ............................................................................................................................ 16

SETTING PHILOSOPHY ZONE SUBSTATION SCHEMES ....................................................16


7.1 7.2 7.3 7.4 7.5 7.6 7.7 Distance Schemes............................................................................................................................. 16 Directional Overcurrent and Earth Fault .......................................................................................... 20 Busbar Protection.............................................................................................................................. 20 Transformer Protection ..................................................................................................................... 21 DISTRIBUTION BUSBAR PROTECTION .............................................................................................. 26 Subtransmission Undervoltage and Underfrequency Protection.................................................... 28 Sub Transmission Automatic reclose ............................................................................................... 28

SETTING PHILOSOPHY DISTRIBUTION SCHEMES ............................................................29


8.1 8.2 8.3 8.4 Distribution Feeder Protection within Zone Substations................................................................. 29 Shunt Capacitor Protection............................................................................................................... 33 Frequency Injection System Protection............................................................................................ 35 Distribution Automatic Reclose ........................................................................................................ 37

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8.5 8.6 Automatic Field Reclosers................................................................................................................. 39 Line Fuses.......................................................................................................................................... 43

CEPG8002

9 10 11 12

PROTECTION COORDINATION...............................................................................................45 RECORDS ...............................................................................................................................45 HIGH VOLTAGE CUSTOMERS ................................................................................................45 GENERATORS ........................................................................................................................46
12.1 General .............................................................................................................................................. 46

ATTACHMENT A TOTAL FAULT CLEARING TIME CALCULATIONS, METHODS AND TERMS .........47 13 14 REFERENCES.........................................................................................................................48 REVISIONS .............................................................................................................................48

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CE-IN-CONFIDENCE 1 PURPOSE

CEPG8002

This Procedural Guideline sets out the general requirements for protection systems installed on Country Energys high voltage transmission, subtransmission and distribution systems. Distribution automatic reclose equipment is also included in this code of practice. The guidelines in this document cover Country Energys Transmission (above 66kV), Subtransmission (66kV, 33kV, 22kV), and Distribution high voltage systems (6.35kV, 6.6kV, 11kV, 22kV, 33kV, 12.7kV SWER, 19.1kV SWER). This document does not preclude the installation or maintenance of protection that exceeds the requirements of this Procedural Guideline; or protection that does not completely meet the requirements of this Procedural Guideline where special considerations exist.

KEY TERMS AND DEFINITIONS


ACR: Automatic Circuit Recloser. A distribution level switch, which includes control mechanisms to detect and clear faults and to make a number of reclose attempts. The term includes Oil Circuit Reclosers (OCRs), which are ACRs, using oil for both the interrupt and timing medium. Assigned Protection Zone: That protection zone for which the relay has been designed to protect as its primary role. Also called protected zone or primary zone. Backup Protection: A protection scheme designed to backup a Main Protection and provide backup if the Main Protection or Circuit breaker fails to operate correctly. A Backup Protection scheme shall be completely independent of the Main Protection and operate a separate circuit breaker/s. CB: Circuit Breaker. CT: Current Transformer. C.C.T: Critical Clearing Time as defined in the National Electricity Rules for local and remote end faults at voltages of 100kV and above. CE-IN-CONFIDENCE: this is a general sensitivity label to be applied to information assets that are not to be released outside of the organisation, but are freely available to all employees and other personnel working directly for Country Energy. An example of the use of this sensitivity label would be its application to the corporate policies, forms, procedures, standards, manuals and guidelines to be applied across the organisation. For more information refer to Information Security Sensitivity Labelling and Handling CEPG1096 and CEM7063. Co-Generation: The production of electrical power by converting another form of energy in a generating unit as a by-product of an associated primary function. Refer CEK8012 Co-Generation Guidelines. Dead: In this document, where the context permits, not electrically energised. Dead Time: The time between the tripping and automatic reclosing of a circuit breaker or recloser during which no current flows. It is the interval between arc extinction and contact making on reclosing. Distribution: Distribution voltage equipment outside a substation boundary, including the lines from that boundary. Distribution Voltage: In this document, 6.35kV, 6.6kV, 11kV, 22kV, 33kV, 12.7kV SWER, or 19.1kV SWER.

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CEPG8002

Embedded Generation: A generating unit connected within a distribution network and not having direct access to the transmission or subtransmission network. Fault Clearance Time: The time interval between inception of fault current and arc extinction. This is the sum of the relay operating time, switch opening time, and arc duration. Generation: The production of electrical power by converting another form of energy in a generating unit. Live: In this document, where the context permits, electrically energised. Lockout: A feature of an auto-reclose scheme which, after the predetermined operating sequence of the circuit breaker, prevents further automatic reclosing. Main Protection: A protection scheme designed to be the primary protective scheme covering an item or a group of items of power supply plant. Maximum Fault Level: The maximum fault level on three phase systems is taken as the three phase or phase to earth short circuit with all available high voltage plant in service and a prefault voltage factor as per clause 5.2(b) of AS3851-1999 is applied. Minimum Fault Level: The minimum fault level on three phase systems is taken as the phase to phase or phase to earth short circuit level with the minimum high voltage plant required to maintain supply in service. The minimum fault level on SWER systems is the phase to ground level. Minimum Trip Level: The minimum trip level is the current required to cause a device to issue a trip signal. NER: National Electricity Rules. OCR: See ACR. Operating Factor: (also known as Safety Factor) is the multiplier factor of the lowest fault current seen by a protective device, divided by the minimum trip setting of that protective device. The system conditions upon which this current is calculated shall be as per the Minimum Fault Level as defined in this document, unless otherwise specified (eg for distribution feeder protection). Operating Sequence: The full set of tripping and closing operations provided by a combination of protective and control equipment applied to a circuit breaker or recloser in clearing or attempting to clear a fault. Primary Switch (of equipment): The isolating switch operated initially by the protection scheme having the equipment within its primary protection zone. Primary Protection Zone: That protection zone within the relays assigned protection zone in which the relay operates as the main device. Zone 1 of an impedance (distance) relay is the primary protection zone of that relay. In some circumstances it may be necessary to incorporate a delay in the primary zone. Primary System: Equipment connected directly to the high voltage system. Protection Setting Advice: (PSA) is the document used for detailing protection device settings and operating sequence to be applied to specified equipment. Reclaim Time: The time following a successful closing operation, measured from the instant the auto-reclose cycle is initiated, which must elapse before the auto-reclose relay will initiate a new reclosing sequence in the event of a further fault incident. Refer also Sequence Reset Time. Recloser: See also ACR (synonym). A form of circuit breaker, usually suitable for pole mounting, designed for a multi-shot operating sequence and with built in devices for fault sensing and reclosing.

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CEPG8002

Reclosing Time: The interval between the trip initiation and the contacting of the arcing contacts on the reclosing stroke of a circuit breaker or recloser. In many cases this interval is virtually identical to the Dead Time and is normally taken as the setting of the timer that controls the reclosing operation. Relay: In this document, where the context permits, any device that controls a CB or other switching device in a manner analogous to electromagnetic relays. Relay includes the control mechanisms of an ACR and may include the characteristic curve of fuses. Reset Time: The time taken for equipment to return to its quiescent state after the energising quantities have been removed. Secondary System: Equipment associated with the Primary System usually connected by means of instrument transformers. Sectionaliser: Switch that operates after a fault to isolate a section of line. The switch will only operate while the primary system is dead, when it itself is isolated by an upstream ACR etc. Sequence Reset Time: The interval between the trip initiation and the contacting of the arcing contacts on the reclosing stroke of a circuit breaker or recloser. In many cases this interval is virtually identical to the Dead Time and is normally taken as the setting of the timer that controls the reclosing operation. Refer also Reclaim Time. Switch Clearing Time: The time interval between the receipt of the trip signal and arc extinction. This is the sum of the switch opening time and arc duration. Subtransmission: Interconnected Power lines energised at 22kV, 33kV and 66kV and radial feeders energised at 132kV and associated substation equipment, and the distribution voltage circuit breakers and equipment within a substation boundary fence. Total Clearing Time: The time for a permanent fault to be cleared from the system. This value includes the protection operating time and the CB arc extinguishing time. Transmission: Interconnected Power lines energised at above 66kV and associated substation equipment, including the lower voltage circuit breakers of power transformers (or lower voltage terminals if no such breakers are installed). The term may include high voltage equipment above 1000V associated with generation where the context permits. Upstream, Downstream: (respectively). VT: Voltage Transformer. Protection 1: A Main Protection scheme (either the Main Protection or one of a pair of similar capability Main Protection schemes). Protection 2: Usually the second of two Main Protection schemes. Also referred to as duplicate protection. Same primary source inputs and CB(s) different CT cores and protection relays. Note: In this document, the word shall means mandatory, and should means advisory. In this document, closer to or further from the power supply source

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3.1

CEPG8002

ACTIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES


Role of Protection
While it is not possible to eliminate risk to personnel and livestock from power lines and equipment energised at the voltages covered by this document, an important role of protection equipment is to reduce the level of such risk to an acceptable minimum. Protection equipment should be designed to detect and clear all faults on the high voltage system rapidly while maintaining supply to the largest possible proportion of the electricity supply system in a manner that avoids (wherever possible) danger to personnel or livestock or damage to equipment. Whenever possible all faults should be seen by a backup protection device as detailed within this document. Protection schemes applied to Country Energys high voltage system are not normally set to protect against overload conditions unless specifically required. To achieve this, the protection scheme must be designed to: detect all possible faults that can occur within the protected zone clear the fault as quickly as practical discriminate (isolate the minimum proportion of the system consistent with clearing the fault) be reliable (operate when it is required to) be secure (not operate when it is not required)

It is not always possible to achieve all these goals. In particular, the goals of reliability and security can conflict. HV Equipment must never be left energised without adequate protection. If in any instance the normal equipment protection is out of service, the equipment must either: be de-energised; or be energised from a source that can provide adequate protection; or be provided with a backup or alternative protection.

The Group Manager Technical Service and Protection Coordination Manager shall be responsible for the implementation and maintenance of this Code of Practice as well as application of the operational aspects of this philosophy on the transmission and sub transmission system. The Regional General Managers and Managers Planning and Customer Connection shall be responsible for the application of the operational aspects of this philosophy on the distribution system. Modifications to protection systems or settings are to be undertaken by authorised protection personnel only. Disciplinary action will be taken against any employees found to be interfering with the protection systems without the appropriate authority.

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4.1

CEPG8002

PROTECTION DESIGN
Design
All protection design shall comply with the following standards: IEC61000 Electromagnetic Compatibility IEC 60255 Electrical Relays Appropriate Australian Standards, including AS/NZS 3000 (SAA Wiring Rules) The National Electricity Rules CEPG8002 Protection Guidelines

These standards shall be accepted as the minimum requirements. Where practical, protection systems shall be designed to achieve the following objectives: To detect all short circuit faults between phases and phase(s) and earth and to detect abnormal operating conditions which may lead to failure of the network or an unsafe condition arising. To allow the primary system being protected to operate within its rated voltage range and carry its rated normal and emergency load currents, without the protection system operating, failing or being damaged. To disconnect the faulted part of the network from the rest of the system in the minimum practical time in order to: minimise damage to the equipment and remainder of the network prevent loss of stability of the network minimise the probability of injury to personnel and livestock exposed to the faulty equipment or to the faulted part of the network minimise the probability or extent of damage to Country Energys property or to other persons property as a result of the fault minimise the extent and duration of interruption to supply as a result of the fault.

To operate in a selective manner so that the minimum amount of the network is taken out of service after a protection operation. To be as reliable as possible, within cost-justifiable limits. To this end, duplicate or back-up protection systems will be required in many situations. To ensure that allowance is made for future growth in the network and changes in customer load requirements.

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CE-IN-CONFIDENCE 5 SUBSTATION BATTERIES

CEPG8002

Substation batteries are identified as a critical single point of failure and as such should be duplicated and supply the following protection equipment: Transformer protection (which also protects the lower voltage plant). Subtransmission feeders operating at 33kV and above.

The duplicate battery requirement need not be complied with where: 33kV circuits where remote backup protection is afforded supplied by a separate battery Equipment protected by fuses.

Existing substations which are augmented should meet this requirement. Where this is not feasible and only a single trip battery is installed, remote backup protection shall be provided.

5.1

Protection Sensitivity
All protection schemes shall have sufficient sensitivity to detect and correctly clear all primary plant faults within their intended normal operating zones, under both normal and minimum operating conditions. However, it is recognised that some faults cannot be detected by the protection schemes, i.e., a broken conductor on the load side of the break. Settings need to be chosen such that protection is as sensitive as possible without incurring spurious trips or limiting operation of the network under credible system operating conditions. In all cases minimum operating factors should be achieved.

5.2

Protection against Abnormal Operating Conditions


Protection specifically designed to detect overloads of transmission/subtransmission line circuits or distribution circuits should generally not be fitted. Oil insulated transformers, regulators and reactors larger than 1.5 MVA shall be protected against loss of insulating oil. Under abnormal primary plant conditions, any fault shall be detected and cleared by at least one protection scheme somewhere in the system. Protection schemes affording remote backup may be used for this purpose. Under a single main protection scheme failure, any fault shall be detected and cleared by at least one protection scheme somewhere in the system. Protection schemes affording remote backup may be used for this purpose. Where a protection scheme provides a backup function it shall have sufficient sensitivity to detect and clear all primary plant faults within its intended backup operating zone under both normal and minimum system conditions.

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5.3 Protection Selectivity

CEPG8002

Protection shall selectively trip the appropriate circuit breakers or fuses for the fault, with minimum disturbance to the rest of the network. Protection shall also be set to be selective for all faults, where all protection and circuit breakers (or other fault clearing devices) on the system function as designed. It is also desirable that selectivity be maintained where a single item of protection or a circuit breaker has failed to operate correctly. Selectivity shall be ensured for the system configuration (lines, interconnecting transformers and supply transformers) that exist for the majority of the time. Selectivity shall also be ensured for credible operating conditions (corresponding to maximum and minimum fault level conditions).

5.4

Fault Clearance Times


For a particular protection scheme, relay settings shall be such as to reduce fault-clearance times to the minimum, without sacrificing selectivity of or with main protection. Refer to section 5.2 for fault clearing times. Consideration needs to be given to Earth Potential Rise and Voltage Contours in relation to personnel safety and communications equipment and equipment ratings when selecting clearance times.

5.5

Coordination of Protection Settings


Appropriate grading margins shall be applied to ensure protection coordination is achieved in order to meet the requirements of selectivity. New protection settings need to be coordinated with existing protection settings. Existing protection settings should be reviewed and modified where necessary to allow for any system configuration changes resulting from transmission, subtransmission, distribution or generation projects. Setting records shall be kept in non-volatile media. Setting change control procedures shall be applied.

5.6

Protection Flagging and Indication


All protective devices other than fuses shall be equipped with non volatile operation indicators (flags) or shall be connected to an event recorder. Such indicating, flagging and event recording shall be sufficient to enable the determination after the fact of which devices caused a particular trip.

5.7

Trip Supply Supervision Requirements


All protection scheme secondary circuits, where loss of supply would be a significant risk to plant and personnel and would result in protection performance being substantially reduced shall have trip supply supervision.

5.8

Trip Circuit Supervision


All new protection secondary circuits of 11kV and above that include a circuit breaker trip coil shall have trip circuit supervision.

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CE-IN-CONFIDENCE 6 PROTECTION SCHEMES

CEPG8002

Country Energy shall apply the following minimum protection schemes as shown in Table 1. Application detail is provided below. Where duplicate protection schemes are installed these shall be of different hardware and firmware configurations to ensure adequate redundancy.

6.1

Protection Scheme Selection


Table 1: Protective Devices Plant Protective Devices

Duplicate Main Protection schemes shall be installed. These shall consist of Distance and/or Line Differential Transmission Feeders schemes. Local CB fail shall be installed. Duplicate trip batteries shall be installed. Duplicate Main Protection scheme shall be installed. These shall consist of Distance and/or Line Differential and/or 3-phase Directional/overcurrent and Directional/earth fault schemes. Subtransmission feeders (22kV, Local CB fail should be fitted where practical, remote 33kV and 66kV) backup shall be applied if no local backup is available. Duplicate trip batteries shall be installed. Reclosers will be considered where remote backup can be achieved and directional functions are not required. Duplicate Main Protection schemes shall be installed. These shall consist of High Speed Biased Differential schemes, No.1 oil temp and winding temp, No.2 main Transmission Plant tank buchholz, tap changer buchholz and overpressure. Local CB fail shall be installed. Duplicate trip batteries shall be installed. Duplicate Main Protection schemes shall be installed. These shall consist of No.1 High Speed Biased Differential scheme, oil temp and winding temp. No.2 High speed biased differential, main tank Subtransmission Plant > 8MVA buchholz, tap changer buchholz and overpressure. Both relays should include backup OC and EF functions. Local CB fail should be fitted where practical, remote backup shall be applied if no local backup is available. Duplicate trip batteries shall be installed. Main Protection scheme consisting HV and MV Overcurrent and Earth fault protection shall be installed (relays, reclosers or fuses). Subtransmission Plant =< 8MVA Local CB fail should be fitted where practical, remote backup shall be applied if no local backup is available or duplicate batteries are not installed.

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Plant Protective Devices

CEPG8002

Transmission Busbars

Subtransmission Busbars > 22kV

Distribution Busbars < 33kV

Distribution Feeders (Substation)

Distribution Feeders (Field)

Duplicate Main Protection schemes shall be installed. These shall consist of High Impedance Differential schemes. Local CB fail shall be installed between zones. Remote backup shall be applied to cover busbar. Duplicate trip batteries shall be installed. Duplicate Protection scheme consisting High Impedance Differential scheme should be installed. Local CB fail should be installed between zones. Remote backup shall be applied to cover busbar. Where this busbar is normally radially connected, remote backup protection can be provided for all connected circuits. Where remote backup cannot be provided, a fault thrower is to be installed. Main Protection scheme consisting High Impedance Differential scheme should be installed. Where the above cannot be achieved, protection shall be provided by a combination of transformer Overcurrent and 2nd high voltage Earth fault and Feeder initiated Blocking schemes. Remote backup shall be applied to cover busbar. Main Protection scheme consisting three phase HV Overcurrent, Earth fault and Sensitive Earth fault protection shall be installed (Relays or Reclosers) On new or augmented installations duplicate main protection schemes shall be installed. These should consist of a main and backup protection scheme. CB fail protection shall be installed, designed to trip the BBP or Transformer and Bus Section CBs. Backup protection in the form of transformer lower voltage overcurrent and earth fault should be applied where BBP and duplicate main protection does not apply. Automatic reclosers, sectionalisers and Line fuses should be installed in line with the following guidelines. Remote backup protection should be applied by source side device.

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6.2 Fault Clearance Times

CEPG8002

Fault clearance time should be as short as possible, and must whenever possible be short enough to prevent avoidable damage to personnel or plant. The total clearing time - the time for a permanent fault to be cleared from the system - will vary depending on fault levels and number of automatic reclosers used on the system. See Attachment A for the method of calculating total clearing time. Where Critical Clearing Times are outside the National Electricity Rules requirements, an application for exemption must be submitted supported by a stability study and report. Table 2 shows the maximum clearing times for zero impedance faults under normal conditions on the Country Energy system. Table 2: Fault Clearing Times Protection operating times from fault inception to circuit breaker arc extinction shall not be greater than: Fault Clearance Times (ms) Nominal Voltage 100kV> 66kV 33kV 22kV 11kV and below SEF Source End Fault Location As per NER Schedule 5 200 1000 1000 1000 10,150 Remote End Fault Location As per NER Schedule 5 1000 2000 _ _ 10,150 Backup As per NER Schedule 5 4500 4500 _ _ _

6.3

Selection Requirements - General


Where possible without otherwise compromising the protection scheme (eg, by compromising selectivity), non-unit protection elements shall back up downstream protection and downstream switching devices. Protection schemes should be designed so that failure of one component should not compromise the operation of other protection schemes. Test facilities shall be provided for all relevant Protection schemes to enable the protection trips to be isolated to all CBs individually and to enable secondary injection of volts and current to be applied to any protection without affecting the complimentary protection or taking the HV equipment out of service.

6.4

Transmission Plant
Protection installed to protect Country Energy transmission plant and equipment shall be designed to comply with the protection requirements of Table 1, and must be coordinated with protection on transmission authority equipment. Where necessary to meet fault clearance times referred to in Table 2, schemes should incorporate distance acceleration, direct intertrip, or other high speed fault clearing techniques as required.

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6.5 Subtransmission and Distribution Protection and Substation Plant

CEPG8002

Protection installed to protect Country Energy subtransmission plant and equipment shall be designed to comply with the protection requirements of Table 1, and must be coordinated with protection on source and load side equipment. Fault clearance times referred to in Table 2 should be achieved and in all cases be as fast as practical to maximise quality of supply. While all Main Protection schemes remain in service there should be complete discrimination for all faults. There may be a loss of discrimination under backup protection, but this should be kept to a minimum. Protection schemes applied should minimise voltage fluctuations experienced by other customers. The use of instantaneous settings can assist with this aim. Where Integrated relay schemes are installed these shall be fitted with self monitoring features and a fail safe Protection Faulty alarm, and this alarm shall be monitored at the appropriate remote control centre.

6.6

Main Protection
The Main Protection scheme (or each of 1 and 2 Protection) shall be stand alone protection designed for high reliability, security and discrimination. The role of this protection is to clear any fault in the fastest possible time. Main Protection should not, as far as is practical, share DC supplies, CT cores, VT cores, CB trip coils or test facilities with the complimentary protection. Duplicate Main protection schemes shall in general be from different manufacturers. Fault location shall be provided in new installations for transmission and subtransmission powerlines more than 20km in length or where the line crosses difficult terrain, either built into a protection relay or as a separate relay. Fault location functionality should be added to existing power lines where practical.

6.7

Backup Protection
Backup Protection shall be separate from the Main Protection, and shall be designed for high reliability and security. The role of Backup Protection is to be available if the Main Protection is unavailable (due to repair or maintenance etc) or fails to operate. It shall then clear any fault in the protected zone in as short a time as is necessary.

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6.8 Distribution Transformers
This term includes SWER isolation transformers and reactors.

CEPG8002

The majority of Distribution Transformers and SWER Isolators shall be protected with fuses as specified in the Country Energy Policy Distribution Transformer Fusing CEPG5099. Most distribution reactors are installed without specific protection, except for surge suppression devices. It is accepted practice to connect SWER reactors to existing rural substations (preferably non residential due to noise) using the same substation EDO fuse. This allows for easy detection of faulty reactors or fuses blown by lightning. Which might otherwise remain undetected as no customer call would be received for a reactor site. On new SWER systems, backup can be achieved due to the larger conductor sizes, on older established systems, backup can be very difficult and expensive to achieve. Under these circumstances HV EDO fuses should be considered, as backup is not required for fuses.

6.9

Capacitor Banks
Capacitor bank protection shall consist of a combination of out of balance, overcurrent and earth fault Voltage protections should be considered where there is a high risk of large over voltages. Other protection as recommended by the manufacturer shall be installed. Reclose inhibit circuitry will normally be installed to prevent the energisation of reverse charged capacitor banks. None of these protections are alone sufficient to protect against all faults that may occur. The concept of Main and Backup Protection does not apply in this case. Trip isolation links and current and voltage test points shall be provided for each protection.

6.9.1

Unbalance Protection Where capacitor banks are installed as parallel banks with a common ungrounded neutral, a sensitive overcurrent relay will be fitted to measure the current flowing between the banks in the neutral conductor. This will detect bank unbalance caused by capacitor can fuse operation in one of the banks.

6.9.2

Overcurrent Protection Overcurrent relays covering phase and earth faults shall be fitted to detect faults external to the capacitor cans. These shall have redundancy such that if one section is out of service (for maintenance or repair, or from an equipment failure) the protection will continue to adequately clear any fault in the assigned protection zone. The overcurrent relays shall meet the same requirements as laid down in the Distribution Feeder section of 7.1.1 (not including the SEF relay). An integrated relay including out of balance protection is acceptable as one of the integrated overcurrent relays.

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6.9.3 Over and Under Voltage Protection

CEPG8002

An over voltage relay should be provided to protect the bank from continuous high system voltages. An undervoltage relay shall be provided to trip the bank on loss of supply or excessively low system voltage conditions. These functions may be provided by a single integrated relay. 6.9.4 Reclose Inhibit Unless the manufacturer indicates that it is unnecessary, a relay should be fitted to prevent closure of the main capacitor bank CB until sufficient time has elapsed since the last trip, for the capacitor cans to discharge to a safe voltage. This function may be integrated in a relay providing other protective functions.

6.10

Circuit Breaker Fail


The purpose of a CB Fail scheme is to isolate a fault that has been detected by other protection but not cleared. The fault may be not cleared because: the CB failed to open in response to the trip signal; or the CB operated but was not situated so as to clear the fault (a blind spot fault). (This is uncommon or non-existent on the Country Energy subtransmission and distribution systems).

CB Fail shall consist of a timer and an overcurrent check relay. The timer will be initiated by the primary protection trip command. The time setting for <100kV should be 300ms and 100kV> to comply with NER schedule 5, the timer shall cause a trip to all other circuit breakers necessary to clear the fault if and only if the overcurrent check relay detects fault current still flowing. CB Fail may be integrated with Backup Protection relays, as it is called upon to operate on a CB failure, and the combination of a CB failure and Backup Protection failure is regarded as sufficiently unlikely to be discounted.

SETTING PHILOSOPHY ZONE SUBSTATION SCHEMES


The following section describes the requirements for the setting of the following protection schemes within Zone Substations.

7.1

Distance Schemes
Where distance schemes are employed, the following setting criteria shall be applied.

7.1.1

Number of Zones A minimum of three (3) forward (towards feeder) zones shall be used. In unusual circumstances, a fourth forward reaching zone may be used if it can provide faster operating times whilst still providing suitable grading with downstream protective devices. Reverse reaching zones are typically not to be used unless unusual circumstances require such an element to be used. In such cases, the following shall apply: a b A justification for the use of such an element is recorded in the file notes for that circuit breaker, and no other more conventional alternatives exist. A note is made in the caution notes of the PSA regarding the use of the reverse element.

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c d e 7.1.2 The reverse element is graded with all downstream protection. The reverse element is only to be used as backup protection.

CEPG8002

The IED is programmed with a display which clearly indicates the fact that the reverse element operated.

Quadrilateral Ground Protection Where available, quadrilateral ground protection zones are to be used, as they provide additional resistive coverage. Such resistive reaches should be set as large as possible, however care is to be exercised to ensure that the resistive element is not set to an excessive level, without due regard to any potential overreach. In general: Quad resistive reach shall not exceed: a b Manufacturers recommendation, or Shall be designed to cater for any possible overreach due to CT/VT errors and system nonhomogeneity.

Note: Quadrilateral elements may not be suitable when load MHO elements are used. In these cases MHO elements only should be used for zones 2 and 3. 7.1.3 Zone 1 Protection Zone 1 is used to provide instantaneous protection to the protected feeder. As much of the feeder as possible should be covered by Zone 1, whilst taking into account the following:
1 2

Zone 1 must not see into any part of the system which is covered by downstream protection, in order to ensure grading. This will limit the maximum reach of Zone 1. An allowance must be made for the possibility that the relay can over-reach due to relay CT/VT errors; hence the relay must be set short of the impedance to the remote relays as determined by the previous point. A setting value of 80% of the line impedance to the remote relay is typical; however this may need to be shortened. The residual compensation factor 0 should be calculated on the impedance of the section of line determined in the above first point, as Zone 1 typically requires the most accuracy to ensure that it does not reach into the area covered by remote downstream relays.

Timing Zone 1 should be set instantaneous in all normal circumstances. 7.1.4 Zone 2 Protection Zone 2 is used to provide fast protection of the remainder of the feeder that cannot be covered by Zone 1 as it overlaps with the downstream protection, it needs to have a time delay to ensure grading. Zone 2 reach shall be set as follows:
1 2 3

To cover the entire length of the protected feeder. This will require the calculation of the maximum impedance between the relay point and any part of the line to be protected. An allowance is made for relay under-reach. Setting values chosen should not be less than 120% of the maximum line impedance determined from the previous point. As arcing faults /infeed are highly likely, an allowance for arc resistance should be made. Refer to section 6.1.6 for details of determination of arc resistance.

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CEPG8002

This allowance will often require the increase of Zone 2 impedance setting past the value required by the previous point, although this may not be required where Quad elements are used. Where studies indicate that zone 2 cannot be set large enough to cover all arcing faults, the zone 2 reach shall be set as large as practical and zone 3 should be used to cover such faults. Zone 2 timing shall be set as such:
1

Zone 2 must grade with any downstream protection within its potential reach. a Zone 2 does not need to grade with transformer high voltage overcurrent and earth fault (HVOC and EF) provided that the transformer is also covered by instantaneous differential protection AND Zone 2 does not extend into the transformer low voltage bus. Zone 2 does not need to grade with downstream feeder HVOC and EF, provided that the same downstream feeder is provided with a distance relay or pilot wire relay, AND Zone 2 does not extend past the instantaneous reaches of these downstream high speed relays.

Note that under the following circumstances, grading need not be provided:

Timing for Zone 2 should not exceed the criteria as specified in Table 2 Fault clearing times in section 5.2.

7.1.5

Zone 3 Protection Zone 3 is typically used to provide remote backup of downstream equipment. It is important to note that Zone3 need only provide backup for a single contingency event, that is the failure of one protective device only per event. Zone 3 reach shall be set as follows:
1

Primary feeder arcing fault coverage.

Where it is not practical to cover for arcing faults within zone 2, zone 3 should be set to cover such faults in the primary protection zone.
2

Downstream Feeder Backup

Zone 3 shall protect any feeder supplied by a downstream substation. Note that the effect of infeed from other feeders should also be taken into account. See Note below. The required reach of the relay should be calculated for system normal conditions only, provided zone 3 is used for backup protection.
3

Downstream Substation Transformer protection

Zone 3 shall protect any bus fed by transformers of a downstream substation. The effect of infeed should be catered for, as should three phase, two phase and phase to earth faults. The required reach of the relay to the bus shall be calculated using system normal conditions only, provided zone 3 is used for backup protection.
4

The setting selected for Zone 3 should ensure stability for inrush during memory operation. The reach selected should also ensure stability during high load periods.

Note: This note requirement is not essential for downstream substations equipped with duplicate batteries, feeder protections and trip coils, although it is still good practice to do so. In the event that this requirement is unable to be met, alternative solutions to backup should be sought, these include:
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a b c d

CEPG8002

Installation of duplicate protection in downstream substations, especially if it is part of a critical ring. Further investigation to determine if the fault will be cleared by sequential operation of protective devices, provided safe clearing times for the faulted feeder can be observed. Determine if second protection (where provided eg DOC) will see the fault. Use of DTOC, DTEF or NPS elements may see the fault.

Zone 3 timing shall be set as such:


1

Zone 3 must grade with any downstream protection within its potential reach.

In general, Zone 3 need not be graded with Zone 3 protection of other downstream distance relays, unless it is determined that if it is possible that such a malgrade is likely to cause an unnecessary loss of customers for a single contingency failure.
2

Zone 3 should not be set to greater than four (4) seconds (preferably three (3) seconds). In the instance where this is not possible, the reach should be reviewed.

7.1.6

Arcing Resistance / Infeed It is recognized that arc resistance and infeed can significantly affect the apparent impedance seen by a distance relay. In order to allow for this effect, the following considerations should be taken:
1

Arcing Resistance

In order to calculate arc resistance for phase faults, use a OR b Method recommended by relay manufacturer

R ARC =

28710 L I 1.4

where L = Average phase to phase or phase to earth distance in metres where I = Fault level at line end (with zero resistance)
2

Apparent impedance due to phase to phase faults

Use data from fault study program using arc resistance as per 1 above to determine apparent impedance.
3

Apparent impedance due to phase to earth faults

Add arc resistance as per 1 above to tower/pole footing resistance to achieve overall fault resistance. Use calculated fault resistance to determine apparent impedance. 7.1.7 Loss of Potential Loss of VT supply to a distance relay may either render it inoperable or cause it to trip. Where the relay permits, an emergency overcurrent and earth fault element should be used which is activated by the loss of VT supply.
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7.2 Directional Overcurrent and Earth Fault

CEPG8002

Directional Overcurrent (DOC) and Earth Fault (DEF) protections are sometimes used on meshed subtransmission feeders as the duplicate protection to the main scheme and on the lower voltage side of parallel transformers. They can generally be set more sensitive and with a faster operating time than normal OC protection as grading is not required with all other OC devices. The Voltage Transformers (VT) used for these schemes must be of the 5 limb type or 3 single phase units to obtain the correct residual voltage from an Open Delta connection. Modern relays simulate the Open Delta residual voltage within the relay. The same grading principal applies as detailed in section 7.1.1 for other devices in the current direction. The DOC devices should be set above load even if the device is setup to detect faults in the direction opposite load. The most common connection used in Country Energy older systems for DOC is the 90 deg connection with a 45 deg relay angle (quadrature connection) The A phase relay is supplied with Ia and Vbc which results in the current applied to the relay leading the volts applied to the relay by 45 deg. This connection gives a correct directional tripping zone over the range of currents 45 deg 135 deg lagging. Other connections are available but the above suits the majority of Country Energy situations. DEF relays are of a similar construction to the DOC older relays and are fully integrated in the newer IED relays. These are polarised by the residual voltage, in this application the applied current lags the applied voltage, so the relay angle chosen should be -45 deg for distribution systems and -60 deg for subtransmission systems. The newer IED relays have varying methods of calculating DOC and DEF operating parameters and should be investigated and set in accordance with the manufacturers recommendation.

7.3

Busbar Protection
Busbar protection is used on Substation busbars of 33kV and above.

7.3.1

Location of Busbar CTs Busbar protection CTs must be located on the circuit side of each circuit breaker, otherwise a blindspot could occur which is neither cleared by Busbar protection or other unit protection schemes, and may have to be cleared by remote protection.

7.3.2

High Impedance Busbar protection High impedance Busbar protection is the only Busbar protection scheme that is currently approved for use within Country Energy. The following requirements apply with the use of Busbar protection:
1

CT Requirements Class PX CTs are to be used for all new Busbar protection schemes as the knee point voltage and secondary resistance are well known. The kneepoint voltage of the CT shall be a minimum of two (2) times the proposed relay setting voltage. The CTs used in the scheme must all be set on the same ratio. Interposing CTs are not to be used with high impedance Busbar protection.

a b c d

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2

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Relay Voltage Limitation

To prevent damage to equipment or secondary wiring the voltage across the element of a high impedance Busbar protection relay shall be limited by a suitably rated voltage limiting device such as a Metrosil.
3

Relay Voltage Stabilisation

The relay setting voltage shall not be set lower than the following:

V RELAY = I FAULT (RCT + RLEADS )

Where:

VRELAY is the setting voltage of the relay I FAULT

is the secondary current that would flow for a worst case primary fault

RCT is the highest winding resistance of any CT used in the scheme RLEADS is the resistance of leads from the CT to the relay
Note: V RELAY must be less than half (1/2) the kneepoint voltage of the worst CT used in the scheme.

7.4

Transformer Protection
Where used, transformer protection should be set in accordance with the following guidelines:

7.4.1

Transformer Differential Protection


1

Biased Differential element setting a Maximum through fault conditions, regardless of tap setting. This requires that the bias slope be set to compensate for CT errors and a variable tapchanger setting. Bias slopes should be set as per relay manufacturers recommendations. Restrained for inrush.

The biased differential element must be set to be stable under the following conditions:

Where configurable, the following harmonic restraint or harmonic blocking elements should be set: Second harmonic Fourth harmonic DC

Care needs to be exercised when setting or applying a biased differential relay which protects two or more transformers, as prolonged inrush imbalances can occur when a second transformer is energised. In such cases, additional precautions need to be taken, such as custom blocking logic. c
2

Must be sensitive enough to positively operate for faults inside the protected zone.

Unrestrained Differential element setting

These elements are provided to very quickly detect high differential currents which clearly indicate the presence of an internal fault. The guidelines for the setting of these elements are as follows:
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a

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Elements are often not provided with any form of harmonic restraint or blocking and hence can operate for transformer inrush. Hence care must be taken to ensure the setting is not too low to operate under energisation. If possible, the unrestrained element should be set to cover High Voltage terminal faults, although this may not always be achievable, depending upon the fault level. CT Selection

b
3

Biased differential relays a Ratio chosen CT ratio should be chosen so that rated secondary current does not flow at primary currents LESS than 140% of the maximum rated current for the relevant transformer winding.

It is recognised that this requirement may not be economically achievable for existing schemes, hence a lower ratio is acceptable, provided the CT and relay can continuously withstand such current OR it can be shown that there is no reasonable possibility of the transformer being subject to greater than 150% of its secondary rating. b CT Kneepoint voltage

In general the minimum CT kneepoint voltage for use in transformer differential circuits shall be determined by:

X Vk = I f sec 1 + (RCT + RBURDEN ) R


Where - Vk is the knee point voltage of the CT to be used.

I f sec
RBURDEN

is the maximum CT secondary current flowing due to a through fault. is the secondary resistance of the CT. is the combined resistance of the CTs burden (leads, relays, interposing CTs etc). is the Inductive Reactance/Resistance ratio of the fault.

(R CT
X R

This knee point voltage requirement should be carefully adhered to for the following reasons: 7.4.2 Saturation may cause spurious tripping due to through faults. CT saturation under internal fault conditions may produce current harmonics which may cause the relays harmonic blocking system to delay the relays operating time.

Transformer Restricted Earth Fault Protection Restricted Earth Fault (REF) is a form of unit protection employed on star transformer or generator windings. Its main advantage over differential protection is that it is highly sensitive to earth faults in the star winding which occur in approximately the half of the winding which is closest to the star point. Such faults do not usually cause a large amount of phase current to flow, but do result in a high neutral current flow.

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There are two types of REF protection relays in common use within Country Energy:
1

CEPG8002

High Impedance REF:

This protection works on the same principle as the high impedance BBP relay. The requirements for the setting and selection of these schemes are as follows: a b c
2

CT requirements - as per section 6.3.2 (1) Relay Voltage Limitation as per section 6.3.2 (2) Relay Voltage Stabilisation as per section 6.3.2 (3) Low Impedance REF (typically numerical or electronic relays);

Stability Setting

The low impedance REF must be set to be stable under maximum through fault conditions (especially for earth faults). The likelihood of CT saturation should be taken into account. Ideally, the relay should be restrained (or blocked) if the neutral CT current does not exceed a threshold value as an absence of neutral CT current indicates that there is no fault within the relays zone. A three phase out of zone fault can produce significant false residual current. b CT selection - Phase CTs

As the phase CTs shall usually be the same as those used in the biased differential relay, they shall be selected in accordance with 6.4.1 (3) (a). c CT selection - Neutral CTs

For relays which do not have internal CT tap compensation, the REF CTs must be selected to be the same ratio and class as the phase CTs. For relays which do have internal CT tap compensation, a ratio lower than the phase CTs may be selected provided all of the following is applied: 7.4.3 The knee point voltage produced on that ratio is not less than the value required by 6.4.1 (3) (b). The relay chosen can compensate for the ratio mismatch proposed. It is preferred that the ratio of the neutral CT is not less than half of the ratio of the phase CTs.

Transformer Thermal Protection Transformer thermal protection is provided to ensure that the winding insulation is not subjected to excessive temperature rises for long durations. Insulation temperature rises above the design temperature can reduce the lifespan of the insulation. There are cases however, where it is necessary to subject the transformer windings to temperatures marginally in excess of the design temperature for short durations. Whilst this does have a minor detrimental effect on the insulation life of the transformer, it allows supply to customers to be maintained.

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CEPG8002

There are two variations in design criteria applied, pre 1998 and post 1998. For simplicity, these have been combined to provide a standard for Country Energy. The Winding Temperature indicator is a summation of the oil temperature and the difference between the average winding temperature and the average oil temperature multiplied by 1.1 to account for the hottest spot, the latter provided through a CT and heater/shunt combination to simulate the winding temperature at varying loads. Where fitted, thermal protection should be set as follows:
1

To the manufacturers recommended settings (provided they are relevant to the transformers present configuration).

OR
2

To the following settings, if the manufacturers settings cannot be obtained or are considered no longer applicable to the transformer in its present configuration (eg a transformer may have been upgraded from ONAN to ONAF).

Hot Oil Alarm setting = 90degC Hot Oil Trip setting = 105degC Hot Winding Alarm setting = 110degC Hot Winding Trip setting = 125degC Fan and Pump Control - based on winding temp sensor reading Pumps On = 60degC Pumps Off = 50degC (where sensor differential permits). Fans On = 65degC Fans Off = 55degC (where sensor differential permits). Fan and Pump Control - based on Oil temp sensor reading Pumps On = 55degC Pumps Off = 45degC (where sensor differential permits). Fans On = 60degC Fans Off = 50degC (where sensor differential permits). Winding Temperature Indicator Setting The Temperature gradient (G) Where = T - k

T = average winding temperature rise for steady conditions k = constant ratio of average temperature rise to top oil temperature rise = 0.8 for natural oil cooled transformers prior 1959 = 0.97 for forced oil cooled transformers prior 1959

OR Where test figures are available k = 1 temperature difference between inlet and outlet / 2 X temperature rise of the top oil. = top oil temperature rise for steady conditions at test load Determination of Injection temperature rise T = 1.1 X G T = 1.1 (T-k)

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Determination of Injection current IT = VAmax (OFAF) X CT ratio / 3 X V IH = IT X RS/RH + RS Where IH = Heater current RH = Heater resistance + leads RS = Shunt resistance

CEPG8002

Determination of Heater/Shunt current

7.4.4

Transformer Mechanical Protection


1

Main Tank Buchholz shall be fitted to all transformers above 5MVA. These devices will have an alarm for gas collection and a trip for oil surge. A low oil trip shall be set up for transformers above 15MVA in zone substations with a full N-1 capacity. An Auto changeover scheme is also to be implemented in conjunction with the low oil trip where one of the transformers is normally on standby. Tap Changer Buchholz or oil surge device shall be fitted to all transformers above 5MVA fitted with on load tap changers. These devices shall be set to trip. Overpressure devices should be fitted to larger transformers. Where fitted these devices should be set to trip.

2 3

7.4.5

Transformer High Voltage Overcurrent and Earth Fault Protection High Voltage Overcurrent and Earth fault protection shall be set as follows:
1 2 3

CT Ratio chosen CT ratio should be chosen so that rated secondary current does not flow at primary current LESS than 140% of the maximum rated current of the transformer. Overcurrent pickup The primary overcurrent pickup should be set to 140%> of the maximum rated current of the transformer. Overcurrent grading The relay timing shall be designed to grade: a b Above all downstream devices for three phase, phase to phase and phase to earth faults. Below upstream devices. Note that this requirement does not apply for upstream distance relay Zone 2 reach when in accordance with Section 6.1.4

Instantaneous Overcurrent grading High Voltage Instantaneous Overcurrent elements should be set in accordance with the following: a b Low Voltage faults will not operate Instantaneous Overcurrent under maximum fault conditions. Instantaneous Overcurrent pickup level should be greater than eight (8) times the ONAN rating of the transformer, with the preferred value to be ten (10) times.

Earth fault pickup The Earth fault pickup shall be set as low as practical whilst ensuring the following is observed: a b Current grading with downstream devices, for transformers that are able to allow zero sequence currents to flow through them. In any case, not less than 10 Amps. Above all downstream devices, if the transformer is able to allow zero sequence currents to flow through them.

Earth fault grading The relay timing shall be designed to grade a

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b
7

CEPG8002

Below upstream devices (see note for part (c).

Instantaneous Earth fault Instantaneous EF should be set to the same criteria as the IOC above. His element will provide some benefits for phase-phase-earth faults.

7.5
7.5.1

DISTRIBUTION BUSBAR PROTECTION


Transformer Low Voltage Overcurrent and Earth Fault protection Transformer Low Voltage Overcurrent and Earth Fault (LV OC and EF) shall be set as follows:
1 2

CT ratio chosen (140% as per HV) OC grading. Relay shall grade: a b c Above all feeder downstream devices Pickup should be 140%> than the maximum rated current of the transformer. Below transformer OC protection for three phase and two phase faults.

Instantaneous Overcurrent (IOC) - LV IOC elements are usually not used as they cannot grade with feeder OC protection. These elements can be used as part of a blocking scheme (refer Section 6.5.4 (1) (b). Earth Fault (EF) pickup EF pickup to be set to grade above downstream relays. Pickup should be kept to the minimum value needed to maintain current grading. Instantaneous Earth Fault (IEF) as per IOC Section 6.5.4 (1) (c).

4 5

7.5.2

Transformer Low Voltage Neutral Earth Fault protection Where used, Transformer Neutral Earth Fault (NEF) shall be set as follows:
1 2 3

CT ratio chosen Where a NEF relay is fed from a dedicated CT, the NEF CT ratio chosen shall be at least 1/20th of the maximum respective fault current that can flow through the CT. NEF grading as per EF pickup Section 6.5.1 Part (4) above. IEF instantaneous NEF elements should not be used.

Where transformers are only fitted with high voltage protection, NEF protection should be installed tripping the HV circuit breaker. 7.5.3 Lower Voltage busbar protection scheme These should be used as the preferred scheme for the lower voltage busbars. Refer requirements for section 6.3. 7.5.4 Blocking Schemes for Distribution Busbar Speed Enhancement Where Blocking schemes are used, in lieu of busbar protection, to improve the clearing times of distribution busbar faults. They consist of fast definite time overcurrent and earth fault elements used in the transformer circuit breakers and the bus ties. These fast elements will operate for high fault currents, unless a downstream relay also sees the fault and sends a blocking signal to the relay with the fast definite time element, to prevent it from operating. The components of a blocking scheme shall be set as follows:
1

Transformer Low Voltage Overcurrent and earth Fault a The Overcurrent and Earth Fault element shall be set normally as per section 6.4.5.

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b

CEPG8002

An instantaneous Overcurrent element shall be set to operate at 60% of the phase to phase fault current that would be seen by that device under system normal conditions. The delay required for the instantaneous Overcurrent shall be as per (d) below. An instantaneous Earth fault element shall be set to operate at 40% of the phase to earth fault current that would be seen by that device under system normal conditions.

Note: For earth fault limited systems this requirement is not valid and the following shall apply: Setting must be less than normal earth fault current through device. Setting must be at least twice the value of the highest downstream earth fault element pickup which blocks it. d
2

Timing The instantaneous Overcurrent and instantaneous Earth fault elements shall have the following delay applied: Downstream Electronic relays 200ms Downstream Nulec Reclosers 250ms

Bus Circuit Breaker a b c The bus circuit breaker shall have Inverse Definite Minimum Time, Overcurrent and Earth fault set to grade between the transformer circuit breaker and the feeders. An instantaneous Overcurrent and Instantaneous Earth fault element set as per (1) (b) and (1) (c) above. Timing The Instantaneous Overcurrent and Instantaneous Earth fault shall have the following delay applied:

Downstream Electronic relays 80ms Downstream Nulec Reclosers 200m

Two sets of Directional Overcurrent and Earth fault elements shall be used to produce a blocking signal for the circuit breakers in the reverse direction.

The other of these elements shall face the reverse direction and be used to produce a blocking signal for the circuit breakers in the opposite direction. The pickups of these directional elements shall be as follows:

Overcurrent Must be set greater than load but less than the pickup value determined in (b) above. An initial value of 120% of Overcurrent pickup (as per (a) above) is suggested. Earth fault - Must be set greater than the highest downstream earth fault element but less than the pickup value determined in (b) above. An initial value of twice the highest downstream Earth fault element is recommended.

There shall be no delay on these blocking elements.


3

Feeder Circuit Breakers involved in protection blocking a b Feeder circuit breakers shall be set as per Section 7.1.1 for distribution feeders, 7.2.1 for Capacitor circuit breakers and Section 7.3.1 for Frequency Injection plant. In all cases the following shall apply:

Overcurrent or Earth fault pickup instantaneously closes a protection blocking send signal.

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7.6
7.6.1

CEPG8002

Subtransmission Undervoltage and Underfrequency Protection


Undervoltage Protection Where required, undervoltage settings shall be determined by the Transmission System Network Service provider as per S5.1.10.2 of the National Electricity Rules.

7.6.2

Underfrequency Protection Where required, underfrequency settings shall be determined by NER, as per S5.1.10.2 of the National Electricity Rules.

7.7
7.7.1

Sub Transmission Automatic reclose


Automatic Reclose Justification Because a large proportion of faults are of a transitory nature, it is normally an advantage to attempt to reconnect a sub-system that has been isolated by protection operation after a fault, if this is likely to restore supply to the sub-system without undue risk to personnel, livestock, or plant.

7.7.2

Subtransmission Feeders Automatic reclose shall be used on all Country Energy Subtransmission feeders and be initiated by No1 and No2 feeder protections, with the exception of the following case: Zone 3 of distance protection usually acts as a backup for other downstream protection. If it is possible to treat zone 3 trips separately, zone 3 trips should not initiate an automatic reclose, unless used for primary protection.

7.7.3

Subtransmission Transformers Automatic reclose should not be used on transformers in Country Energys Transmission, Subtransmission and Zone Substations.

7.7.4

Subtransmission Busbars Automatic reclose should not be used in conjunction with busbar protection in Country Energys Transmission, Subtransmission and Zone Substations. Exceptions will be granted in substations where previous experience indicates that environmental conditions are such that faults of a transient nature are a common cause of busbar faults. In such cases, automatic reclose may be used to successfully restore supply without undue risk to personnel, livestock, or plant.

7.7.5

Automatic Reclose Timing Reclose dead time settings shall include allowance for: likely risk to personnel on or arriving at the scene switch operating mechanism reset and stabilise time, including contact cooling times after passing fault current relay reset time likely effects on customer equipment of a restoration of supply after a short outage effects on equipment, including risk of damage from the mechanical and electrical effects of repeated fault current and trapped charges.

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Subtransmission Feeders

CEPG8002

A reclose dead time of 5 - 10 seconds should be used on Country Energys Subtransmission feeder network. The longer time has been proven on Transmission and Subtransmission networks to provide the best chance of restoring a transient faulted feeder to service. Subtransmission Busbars When allowed, a reclose dead time of 5 seconds should be used on Country Energys Subtransmission busbar network. 7.7.6 Automatic Reclose attempts The majority of transient faults will be cleared by a single tripping operation. Automatic reclose shall be disabled prior to: live line work. any manual close of a CB, including re-energising plant following maintenance and energising plant while sectionalising to locate a fault.

Automatic reclose shall not be used for customer owned lines or for lines dedicated to one customer unless authorised by the customer. One reclose attempt should be used on Country Energys Subtransmission feeder network. Refer to Attachment A for Total Fault Clearing Time calculations, methods and Terms

8
8.1

SETTING PHILOSOPHY DISTRIBUTION SCHEMES


Distribution Feeder Protection within Zone Substations
Distribution feeder protection within Zone Substations should be set in accordance with the following guidelines:

8.1.1

Feeder Overcurrent and Earth Fault Protection


1

CT Ratio chosen CT ratio should be chosen so that rated secondary current does not flow at primary current LESS than 120% of the maximum continuous load current of the feeder.

New installations should have primary and backup three phase overcurrent and earth fault installed. This should also be considered on existing substantially UG cable systems. The primary and backup systems shall be of different manufacturers and types, set substantially the same, be supplied from separate batteries and operated into separate trip coils. Where practical a second CT core should be used, but a common CT core is acceptable. All associated ancillary functions eg SCADA and auto-reclose shall reside in the primary protection. Where full primary and backup lower voltage protection is installed, there will be no requirement to provide backup protection from the transformer systems.

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2

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Overcurrent pickup The primary overcurrent pickup should be set as follows: a b To be greater than the five year forecast maximum load X 120% and To be greater than maximum predicted cold load. This predicted value can be obtained in one or more of the following ways:

By past experience of cold load problems on the feeder. By prediction based on the maximum recorded feeder load experienced in a one year period. In this case, a margin of 10%* should be added to ensure security. By prediction based on the maximum expected feeder load from a load flow study. In this case, a margin of 10%* should be added to ensure security. *Note: this margin may be increased for feeders where the backup requirements are met at higher settings. By the use of the Cold Load multiplier function available within some recloser controllers. c The overcurrent pickup should be set so as to ensure the following Operating Factors are observed:

Primary Protection Operating Factor - The overcurrent setting should provide a primary Operating Factor of 2.0 for phase-phase faults. *Note: In the event that the above operating factor cannot be achieved without excessive and/or uneconomic system redesign, then both of the following shall apply: An Operating Factor of 1.5 should be achieved using the normal calculations. AND The effect of minimum feeder load current should be used in the software calculation of the minimum current seen by the relay for phase-phase faults. The ratio of this calculated minimum current (including load) to primary relay current pickup should exceed 1.75. Backup Protection Operating Factor - The overcurrent setting should provide a backup Operating Factor of 1.5 for phase-phase faults. *Note: In the event that the above operating factor cannot be achieved without excessive and/or uneconomic system redesign, then both of the following shall apply: An Operating Factor of 1.35 should be achieved using the normal calculations. AND The effect of minimum feeder load current should be used in the software calculation of the minimum current seen by the relay for phase-phase faults. The ratio of this calculated minimum current (including load) to primary relay current pickup should exceed 1.5. The feeder overcurrent relay pickup should be set higher than the downstream device(s) overcurrent pickup. This requirement need not apply in instances where it can be justified that time grading is still likely to exist between these devices for all practical fault situations. *Note: Typically the ratio of maximum three phase fault current seen by the device to overcurrent primary pickup should not be greater than 20X.
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Overcurrent timing The relay overcurrent timing shall be set as such:

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Above all downstream devices for three phase, phase to phase and earth faults up to the maximum fault levels present at the downstream device location. Below upstream devices, up to the maximum fault level that the feeder and upstream device shall simultaneously see for a feeder fault. To protect any conductor within its Primary and Backup zone against thermal damage for fault levels that may be experienced by it. The following time grading margin between the feeder and upstream devices should be used: If the upstream relay is electronic - 300ms minimum, 400ms preferred. If the upstream relay is an induction disk type - 400ms minimum.

The following time grading margin between the feeder and downstream devices should be used: If the feeder relay is electronic - 300ms minimum, 400ms preferred. If the feeder relay is an induction disk type - 400ms minimum.

Overcurrent IDMT curves - Where possible, IEC 60255 SI or VI curves are preferred. Other curves may be used where the downstream protection does not suit the use of the preferred curves. High Set Overcurrent Elements - Where available, high set overcurrent elements may be used, provided that the element is not capable of reaching to any downstream recloser under maximum fault conditions or operating due to feeder energisation inrush. In order to prevent malgrading with distribution transformer fuses, a 300ms definite time delay setting is preferred over an instantaneous setting. Earth Fault pickup The primary Earth Fault pickup should be set as follows: To be significantly less than the feeder Overcurrent pickup, a setting of 60% of the overcurrent is typical.

The feeder Earth Fault relay pickup should be set higher than the downstream device(s) Earth Fault pickup. This requirement need not apply in instances where it can be justified that time grading is still likely to exist between these devices for all practical fault situations or to grade above larger fuses. The Earth Fault pickup should be set so as to ensure the following Operating Factors are observed: Primary Protection Operating Factor - The Primary Earth Fault Operating Factors should apply: For feeders without SEF protection - 1.75 (based on 20 ohm fault resistance) For feeders with SEF protection - 1.75 (based on 0 Ohm fault resistance)

Backup Protection Operating Factor - The Backup Earth Fault Operating Factors should apply: For feeders without SEF protection - 1.5 (based on 20 ohm resistance as per Minimum Fault Level definition in section 2) For feeders with SEF protection - No specific Operating Factor is required, provided an SEF relay operating factor of 2.0 is maintained.

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*Note: Typically the ratio of maximum earth fault current seen by the device to earth fault primary pickup should not be greater than 20X. Earth Fault Timing The Earth Fault relay timing should be set as follows: Above all downstream devices for earth faults up to the maximum fault levels present at the downstream device location. Note that time grading should be achieved over distribution transformer fuses; however time grading does not need to be achieved over larger fuses. Below upstream devices, up to the maximum fault level that the feeder and upstream device shall simultaneously see for a feeder earth fault. To protect any conductor in within its Primary and Backup zone (where required) against thermal damage for fault levels that may be experienced by the conductor. The following time grading margin between the feeder and upstream devices should be used: If the upstream relay is electronic - 300ms minimum, 400ms preferred. If the upstream relay is an induction disk type - 400ms minimum. The following time grading margin between the feeder and downstream devices should be used: If the feeder relay is electronic - 300ms minimum, 400ms preferred. If the feeder relay is an induction disk type - 400ms minimum.

Earth Fault IDMT curves - Where possible, IEC 60255 SI or VI curves are preferred. Other curves may be used where the downstream protection does not suit the use of the preferred curves. High Set Earth Fault Elements - Where available, high set Earth Fault elements may be used, provided that the element is not capable of reaching to any downstream recloser under maximum fault conditions or operating due to feeder energisation inrush. In order to prevent malgrading with distribution transformer fuses, a 300ms definite time delay setting is preferred over an instantaneous setting. 8.1.2 Feeder Sensitive Earth Fault (SEF) Protection Feeder SEF protection should be set as follows: SEF pickup: The SEF pickup shall be set between 5A and 10A primary. SEF time delay: The SEF time delay shall have a maximum of 10 seconds delay and a minimum of 5seconds. This delay shall ensure a time grading margin of at least 0.5 seconds over downstream SEF relays.

*Note: Sensitive Earth Fault Protection shall not be applied to a feeder to which an un-isolated single wire earth return (SWER) line is connected. Sensitive Earth Fault Protection shall not be applied to any underground distribution systems.

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8.2
8.2.1

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Shunt Capacitor Protection


Capacitor Components and Types A capacitor bank can be broken down into the following components: Each bank is comprised of one or more stages. A stage is basically a portion of the capacitor bank which can be energised separately to the rest of the bank via a contactor. Each stage consists of a number of individual capacitor cans or units. A can or unit is the smallest physical capacitor component in the bank. Each can typically consists of parallel and/or series combinations of smaller, lower voltage capacitors; however these are sealed within the can. A can may be rated to the system voltage for lower voltages (22kV or less) or it may be placed in series with other capacitors to be used on higher voltages.

Shunt capacitors can be broadly put into two main types: Fused capacitors - These banks usually consist of series and/or parallel combinations of individual capacitor cans per phase. Each unit is protected by its own fuse. Operation of a single fuse does not necessarily render the entire bank inoperative; however multiple failures can cause excess voltages to be impressed on the remaining cans. Unfused or Fuseless banks - These banks consist of one or more series strings of cans per phase. Should the dielectric in a can fail, it is designed to weld the electrodes together, such that it can safely carry the string current. This also will impress higher voltages on the remaining cans.

The shunt capacitor configurations common within Country Energy are: Grounded Star - Each can (or combination of cans) is connected to a phase and to earth. CTs are sometimes places on the earth connections. Ungrounded Double Star - Each stage is divided into two star connected half-stages. The neutrals of these half-stages are connected together, but are not earthed. CTs are usually placed between the neutrals.

8.2.2

Capacitor Protection Whilst the actual protection implemented on a particular bank may vary depending upon capacitor type or configuration, the basic protection principles remain the same. These principles are: Protection of a bank against short circuit - This is often taken care of by the fuses in fused bank. Paper dielectric capacitors are known to produce gas under short circuit conditions, which can lead to tank rupture and damage to healthy capacitors. Some capacitor manufacturers provide Tank Rupture Time Current Curves which are used to ensure the fuse selected will prevent rupture. Grounded capacitors are most susceptible to tank rupture as the prospective fault currents are higher. Protection of the bank against overload (overheating) - This can occur when the bank is subjected to prolonged excessive currents which have the effect of increasing can temperature and reducing dielectric life. These currents are typically due to harmonics or a high system voltage. Protection of individual cans against overvoltage - Capacitors are sensitive to overvoltages. Although quoted values vary, it is generally stated that capacitors should not be subjected to greater than 110% of rated* volts continuously, otherwise dielectric life will suffer. As substation bus voltages can normally be expected to be in this vicinity, the failure of one or more cans may place an excessive voltage on the remaining cans.

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*The rated volts may vary between manufacturers. Some use the highest operating voltage (Um as per AS1824.1 eg 24kV); others use the nominal system voltage (eg 22kV). Unless otherwise known, the nominal system voltage should be used. 8.2.3 Capacitor Overcurrent and Earth Fault Protection CT Ratio chosen CT ratio should be chosen so that rated secondary current does not flow at primary current LESS than 150% of the rated current of the capacitor bank. Overcurrent pickup The primary overcurrent pickup should be set as follows: To the manufacturers recommended setting In the absence of recommended settings then the pickup should be set as near as practical to 140% of capacitor rated current. This is due to the fact that capacitor banks are generally rated for 130% of nameplate current. Overcurrent timing The relay overcurrent timing shall be set as such: Above any individual can or bank fuses (where installed). A time grading margin of 200ms min, 300ms preferred should be used. Below upstream devices, up to the maximum fault level that the capacitor overcurrent relay and upstream device shall simultaneously see for a fault.

The following time grading margin between the capacitor overcurrent relay and upstream devices should be used: If the upstream relay is electronic - 300ms minimum, 400ms preferred. If the upstream relay is an induction disk type - 400ms minimum

To ensure that the overcurrent relay will not operate during capacitor energisation. For a numerical relay, a minimum tripping time of greater than 2 cycles is sufficient to provide security against spurious tripping. Hence a TMS of 0.1 is usually sufficient. High Set Overcurrent - If used, high set overcurrent elements in Numerical relays must have at least a two cycle delay. It is recommended that high set elements not be used unless recommended by the capacitor bank manufacturer. Earth Fault pickup The primary Earth Fault pickup should be set as follows: To the manufacturers recommended setting In the absence of recommended settings then the pickup should be set to 20% of the capacitor bank current. Particular care should be taken when setting the Earth Fault pickup for a grounded bank, as grounded capacitors will act as a path for return fault current for nearby earth faults - refer to earth fault timing. Earth Fault timing The relay Earth Fault timing shall be set as such: Above any individual can fuses (where installed) - note that grading over entire bank fuses is not required due to the high settings that would be needed. A time grading margin of 200ms min, 300ms preferred should be used.

Below upstream devices, up to the maximum fault level that the capacitor Earth Fault relay and upstream device shall simultaneously see for a fault. The following time grading margin between the capacitor Earth Fault relay and upstream devices should be used:
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If the upstream relay is electronic - 300ms minimum, 400ms preferred. If the upstream relay is an induction disk type - 400ms minimum

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To ensure that the Earth Fault relay will not operate during capacitor energisation. For a numerical relay, a minimum tripping time of greater than 2 cycles is sufficient to provide security against spurious tripping. Hence a TMS of 0.1 is usually sufficient. Grounded capacitors can act as a return path for earth fault currents. The capacitor earth fault relay shall be set to time grade over any circuit Earth Fault protection for an earth fault on that circuit. Due to the relatively low fault currents flowing in the capacitor compared to the feeder, time grading shall not be usually difficult to achieve.

8.2.4

Capacitor Unbalance Protection Unbalance Protection - Unbalance protection is provided to detect an unbalance condition. This is in order to protect cans from excessive voltage and also to prevent unbalanced voltages from occurring on the busbar. Unbalance protection shall be set as follows: As per manufacturers recommendations.

In the absence of manufacturers setting, the following should apply: Where the capacitor is configured such that the removal of one or more cans may place additional voltage stress on the remaining capacitors, the TRIP level should be set to the unbalance current value (for the protected stage) which corresponds to a 10% increase in voltage across any remaining can (compared to a fully balanced system). The TRIP should be delayed between 0.5 and 2.0 seconds in order to prevent spurious tripping. The ALARM value should be set to 50% of the TRIP value and be delayed by 10 seconds. Where the capacitor is configured such that the removal of one or more cans will NOT place additional voltage stress on the remaining capacitors, the TRIP level should be set for a current equivalent to 15% of the rating of the protected stage. The TRIP should be delayed between 0.5 and 2.0 seconds in order to prevent spurious tripping. The ALARM value should be set to 50% of the TRIP value and be delayed by 10 seconds.

Unbalance CTs - The class of Unbalance CTs shall be selected as follows: 8.2.5 To be accurate for the low levels at which the relays are anticipated to operate. For this reason measurement class CTs may be used in this application. The CT shall be capable of withstanding the primary prospective fault level that it may be subjected to. This is especially the case for wound primary CTs.

Capacitor Overvoltage Protection Overvoltage protection - Where used, capacitor overvoltage protection should be set to operate at 120% of the capacitor rated volts and with a delay of 10 seconds.

8.3

Frequency Injection System Protection


Frequency injection (FI) is typically injected on the distribution or subtransmission busbar via an isolating transformer.

8.3.1

FI Set Overcurrent and Earth Fault Protection CT Ratio chosen CT ratio should be chosen so that rated CT secondary current does not flow when a primary current of LESS than 150% of the rated primary current of the FI plant flows through the CT primary. Overcurrent pickup The primary overcurrent pickup should be set as follows:

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To the manufacturers recommended setting

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In the absence of recommended settings the overcurrent relay should be set to 120% of the rated current of the FI plant (as most numerical relays use 50Hz band pass filtering, the relay do not typically respond to currents at the FI frequency). The overcurrent relay pickup setting should be capable of seeing any terminal fault on the lower voltage side of the injection transformer, with an Operating Factor of 2.0.

Overcurrent timing The relay overcurrent timing shall be set as such: To the manufacturers recommended setting In the absence of recommended settings the overcurrent relay timing should be set to operate for faults on the lower voltage terminals of the injection transformer in not more than 1.0 sec. Below upstream devices, up to the maximum fault level that the FI set overcurrent relay and upstream device shall simultaneously see for a fault. The following time grading margin between the FI Set overcurrent relay and upstream devices should be used: If the upstream relay is electronic - 300ms minimum, 400ms preferred. If the upstream relay is an induction disk type - 400ms minimum Above downstream protective devices (if fitted), up to the maximum fault level that the FI set overcurrent relay and downstream device shall simultaneously see for a fault. The following time grading margin between the FI Set overcurrent relay and upstream devices should be used: If the FI set relay is electronic - 300ms minimum, 400ms preferred. If the FI set relay is an induction disk type - 400ms minimum The overcurrent relay shall not operate for injection transformer energising current.

Earth Fault pickup The primary Earth Fault pickup should be set as follows: To the manufacturers recommended setting. In the absence of recommended settings the overcurrent relay should be set to 20% of the rated current of the FI plant or 10A, whichever is the greater.

Earth Fault timing The relay Earth Fault timing shall be set as such: Below upstream devices, up to the maximum fault level that the FI set Earth Fault relay and upstream device shall simultaneously see for a fault. The following time grading margin between the capacitor Earth Fault relay and upstream devices should be used: If the upstream relay is electronic - 300ms minimum, 400ms preferred. If the upstream relay is an induction disk type - 400ms minimum. To ensure that the relay does not operate during isolating Transformer energisation. An IEC 60255 curve time multiplier of 0.1 or more should be adequate.

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8.4
8.4.1

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Distribution Automatic Reclose


Automatic Reclose Justification Because a large proportion of faults are of a transitory nature, it is normally an advantage to attempt to reconnect a sub-system that has been isolated by protection operation after a fault, if this is likely to restore supply to the sub-system without undue risk to personnel, livestock, or plant. Sensitive Earth Fault protection The type of fault covered by this type of protection is rarely, if ever transient in nature and often may be a danger to the general public. Sensitive earth fault protection shall not be used to initiate an automatic reclose operation. Distribution feeders For the purpose of automatic reclose, distribution feeders can be categorised into overhead or underground types of feeders. Overhead distribution feeders An overhead distribution feeder is a feeder that is predominantly overhead in construction; it may have some small sections of underground construction. Overhead distribution feeders can be further categorised into the following groups: Urban overhead distribution feeders Rural overhead distribution feeders Industrial overhead distribution feeders Any overhead feeder that supplies predominantly urban areas, i.e. towns, villages etc. Any overhead feeder that supplies predominantly rural areas, i.e. farms, hamlets etc. Any overhead feeder that supplies predominantly industrial areas, i.e. industrial parks etc. Automatic reclose should not be implemented. Where a feeder traverses a large section of rural area which may be subject to transient faults, automatic reclose may be considered. Underground distribution feeders An underground distribution feeder is a feeder that is predominantly underground in construction; it may have some small sections of overhead construction. Faults on underground feeders are usually not transient in nature; therefore automatic reclose shall not be implemented on underground distribution feeders.

8.4.2

Automatic Reclose attempts The majority of transient faults will be cleared by a single tripping operation. Automatic reclose shall be disabled prior to: live line work. any manual close of a CB, including re-energising plant following maintenance and energising plant while sectionalising to locate a fault.

Automatic reclose shall not be used for customer owned lines or for lines dedicated to one customer unless authorised by the customer.
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General statistics indicate a 70% successful reclose when slow reclosing is used, a further 5% on a second attempt and 1% on the third attempt. The possible success of reclosing against potential permanent damage to equipment needs to be considered when applying reclose. Only two reclose attempts only are recommended unless used in conjunction with sectionalisers. Reclose dead time settings shall include allowance for: likely risk to personnel on or arriving at the scene switch operating mechanism reset and stabilise time, including contact cooling times after passing fault current relay reset time likely effects on customer equipment of a restoration of supply after a short outage effects on equipment, including risk of damage from the mechanical and electrical effects of repeated fault current and trapped charges.

Urban overhead distribution feeders Due to safety concerns involving automobile accidents with fallen conductors a maximum of one reclose attempt should be used on urban overhead distribution feeders, set at 10s. Rural overhead distribution feeders There should be two reclose attempts allowed on rural overhead distribution feeders, except where sectionalisers requiring additional reclosers are installed. These should be set to 10s. The accumulated trip and reclose times should not be greater than 25s due to possible safety implications. Field reclosers The same principle detailed above should generally be applied to field reclosers. 8.4.3 Reclaim time Reclaim time must in all cases be longer than the operating time of any protection that may initiate an auto-reclose operation. 1 Reclaim time settings must consider the mechanical limitations of the CB and protection relays, which include but are not limited to: switch operating mechanism reset and stabilise time, such as spring charge time required to set up CB for a normal trip-close-trip sequence thermal limits requiring cooling time between successive fault current incidents in equipment time for electromechanical relays to reset

Refer to Attachment A for Total Fault Clearing Time calculations, methods and Terms.

This can be quite long for an Extremely Inverse IDMT overcurrent relay operating at about 120% of its nominal setting.

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8.5 Automatic Field Reclosers

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An automatic recloser is a self-contained device with the necessary circuit intelligence to sense overcurrents, to time and interrupt the overcurrents, and to reclose automatically to re-energize the line. If the fault should be permanent the recloser will lock open after the preset number of operations (usually one to four) and thus isolate the faulted section from the main part of the system. Modern automatic reclosers enjoy the feature that they can employ different curves for each reclose attempt. If there are line section fuses downstream of the recloser it is beneficial to have at least one fast shot to provide some protection for the fuses for a transient fault. Reclosers Classifications Automatic circuit reclosers are classified on the basis of single or three phases, Hydraulic; Electronic or Microprocessor controls, Oil or vacuum interrupters. 8.5.1 O/C, E/F and SEF Protection on line Reclosers When selecting reclosers for field application, consideration should be given to ensure the unit is suitably rated for the interrupting capacity at the location being installed. Overcurrent Protection covering phase and earth faults shall be set to detect faults on the line in the reclosers zone. The line recloser shall meet the same requirements as laid down in the distribution part of the guideline on Overcurrent and Earth Fault for grading and backup (including the setting of SEF protection) Inrush Restraint Used to temporarily prevent the recloser tripping on the initial close due to inrush currents. The recommended settings for this function are 4 x full load current with a time setting of 0.15 second. Cold Load Pickup Used to temporarily prevent higher than normal load currents causing a trip due to loss of diversity when switching in on to a system after an extended outage. The recommended settings for this function are 1.5 - 2 x full load current and a time setting of 120 minutes. Various reclosers apply this principle using different methods of application. The figures used apply to a CAPM4> NULEC recloser and should be used as a guideline only for other models. Example: Small load application Full load = 30Amp 2 x 30A = 60Amp setting. More substantial load application Full load = 200Amp 1.5 x 200A = 300Amp setting

Note: Consideration should be given to possible malgrading with upstream devices depending on the methods of application. 8.5.2 Co-Ordination between Reclosers and recloser in Series Recloser to recloser coordination is achieved by time-current grading primarily by the selection of different series trip-coil rating in hydraulic reclosers, or different minimum-trip current values in electronic reclosers and determination of the recloser time-current characteristics.

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Grading margins starting from the source: Electronic to hydraulic 300ms Electronic to Electronic 300ms Hydraulic to hydraulic 400ms Hydraulic to electronic 400ms

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Dead times should take into account slow reset times of hydraulic reclosers and margins between hydraulic devices should be increased with the number of reclose attempts. 8.5.3 Co-ordination between Recloser and Sectionaliser in Series Installation of a sectionaliser does not affect the operating factor required at the recloser. 8.5.4 Co-ordination between Reclosers and Fuses in Series: Co-Ordination will depend on the number of shots set on the recloser for the down stream fuses. In rural areas where transient faults may be a problem, reclosers are normally set to give at least one instantaneous trip, so if the fault is of a transient nature, it can be cleared with out blowing the fuse and interrupting supply. For optimum co-ordination between a recloser and fuse their characteristics should be such that whilst all transient faults would be cleared by one or more instantaneous recloser operations without the fuse blowing, permanent faults would blow the fuse before the recloser reached the lockout condition. This ideal is not always attainable for all faults values, yet a reasonable compromise can often be achieved by examination of recloser and fuse characteristic where ideally the fuse characteristic should fit between the instantaneous and the delay tripping for the recloser. Where fast curves are employed on reclosers to protect fuses during transient faults, a 1.5 times operating factor should be used for fault detection. With electronic reclosers when using instantaneous trips then a minimum time (usually 0.1 sec) can be considered to prevent unnecessary spurious trips and provide protection stability eg from indirect lightning surges etc. Backup protection is not required for high voltage fuses. Consideration should be given to fuse element heating when coordinating with fuses, the grading margin will decrease for source side fuses with subsequent reclosers, an increased grading margin and/or reclose times should be considered to ensure grading, the grading margin for load side fuses will be increased by successive reclosers.

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CO-ORDINATION BETWEEN RECLOSERS AND FUSES
1000.00

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15A SLOW

20A SLOW

100.00 20A FAST

15A FAST

10.00 Time in Seconds

DELAYED CURVE
1.00

INSTANTANEOUS

0.10

0.01 1 10 100 1,000 10,000

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8.5.5 Coordination between fuses and downstream reclosers

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It is common on isolated SWER systems and rural zone substations for fuses being the primary SWER isolation or zone substation transformer protection, with downstream reclosers used to clear faults on the SWER or 3-phase distribution network respectively. The source side fuses will normally be rated to provide protection to the transformer, and will basically determine what the combination of recloser curves used, so that the fuse does not interrupt the circuit for any fault current on the recloser. The reclosers modified delayed curve must be faster than the fuses minimum melt curve. For the maximum available recloser fault current, the fuse minimum melting time must be greater than the average clearing time of the recloser delayed curve, multiplied by a specific factor K. A comparison of the time-current curves of the fuse and recloser will require that either the fuse or the recloser curves to be shifted horizontally on the current axis (adjusted for the same voltage level). Since the fuse size is generally determined by the transformer rating, it is usually easier to shift the fuse curve and compare to the different recloser curves. Typical K factors for source-side fuses and load-side reclosers, used to multiply the time values of the delayed curve (B, C, D for Cooper reclosers). Reclosing time (ms) 400 500 830 1,500 2,000 4,000 10,000 Two-fast, Two slow sequence (2A 2B) 2.7 2.6 2.1 1.85 1.7 1.4 1.35 One-fast, three-slow sequence (1A3B) 3.2 3.1 2.5 2.1 1.8 1.4 1.35 Four-delayed sequence (4B) 3.7 3.5 2.7 2.2 1.9 1.45 1.35

The intersection of the K-factor adjusted delayed curve with the fuse minimum-melting time curve determines the maximum coordinating current. 8.5.6 Basic co-ordination principles to be observed The load-side device must clear permanent or temporary faults before the source-side device interrupts the circuit (fuse link) or operates to lockout (recloser). Outages caused by permanent faults must be restricted to the smallest section of the distribution system.

These principles primarily influence the selection operation of curves and the sequences of both source-side and load-side devices, the general location of these devices on the distribution system. The placements of a number of devices to restrict outages to the smallest section of the system are determined by individual cases and the protection guidelines. 8.5.7 Basic Guidelines for the Location of reclosers: Principal Fault Causes The principal fault causes in Country Energy are lightning, birds, branches and bark in roughly that order.

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Remote controlled electronic reclosers allow protection to be customised to these fault types to reduce fire risk and outage time.

Advantage of remote controlled electronic reclosers Remote controlled electronic reclosers have the following advantages: 8.5.8 Curves can be shaped to give fast clearing of high currents - minimizes fire risk. Curves can be shaped to allow cold start inrush to pass - allows lower pickups and faster operation. Can be loaded to 75% of Trip Current - allows higher loads on long feeders. Can customize dead times to fault types - minimizes momentary outages. Can read trip current remotely - gives distance to fault and speeds restoration. Trip sequence advance feature - minimizes fire risk with stuck recloser down line. Cold start inrush feature - allows restoration of heavily loaded feeders without sectioning. Can shape curves to any recloser or fuse - allows better coordination up line and down line. Sensitive ground fault protection - can be graded to minimize outage areas.

Application Rules for Reclosers Reclosers should be located to segment the system to minimise customer exposure to faults. Reclosers should be located to ensure fault coverage and to meet backup requirements. Remote controlled reclosers should be considered in troublesome locations. Excessive use of series recloser can cause grading problems, sectionaliser should be considered. It is recommended to not use more than three reclosers in series on any one line section. Reclosers should be the minimum requirement for new single customer spurs above 1MVA as the connection point device.

8.6

Line Fuses
Fuses are the most basic protection devices available for overcurrent protection on a distribution system. Their primary function is to serve as inexpensive weak links in the circuit-links that open to clear (interrupt) overcurrent and protect equipment against overload and short circuit. They can also be used as line sectionalising.

8.6.1

Fuse to fuse co-ordination Discrimination: Fuse to fuse 100ms Backup protection is not required for high voltage fuses. All fuses operate in the same way. A conductor of limited cross-section is heated by current passing through it till it melts. This takes time, represented in time/current characteristic for the fuse. On melting, a break is caused in the element, at which an electrical arc is established, which burns in the fuse until the current returns to zero. Thus there are two stages in fuse operation: The pre-arcing time (time/current characteristics) The arcing time.

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The arcing behaviour is different for small, large and intermediate overcurrents. Where possible an operating factor of 3.0 should be used when selecting fuses. 8.6.2 Principles of operation of fuses Low overcurrents

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At low overcurrents, the fuse breaks initially at just one point the M effect spot. This single arc needs to lengthen before the voltage develops across the fuse is large enough to allow extinction. It lengthens by burning away elements materials. The longer the time taken to do this, the more probable is the catastrophic failure. High overcurrents The fuse element vaporizes at all its constrictions. This produces a voltage drop sufficient to rapidly reduce the current to zero. Current-time curves for both pre-arcing time and total operating time are published for higher overcurrents, but there is a large tolerance band for both, which gets wider (as a proportion of the total operation time) as the current increase. This is because both pre-arcing and arcing times depend heavily on the degree of DC offset current in the fault, which itself is determined by the pointonwave of the voltage where the fault occurs (an unpredictable variable). For this reason virtual time curves are used at high currents, when operating times are less than about 0.1 sec. The virtual time curves are not intended, therefore, to indicate actual operating times, but serve as a guide to grading fuses. The virtual total operating time of the minor fuse lie below the virtual prearcing time of the major fuse. Intermediate overcurrents The worse case energy dissipation in fuses may occur at intermediate currents. The inductive energy dissipated by the arc, 0.5LI, does not continuously increase with increasing prospective current, but peaks and then decreases. The maximum Ldi/dt voltage developed across a fuse during operation is a function of the element length and design (number of construction) rather than circuit inductance. This voltage is limited by design to prevent fuse and is fairly constant for any given fuse in a circuit up to its voltage rating. Above this voltage, the peak voltage may raise as the wider parts of the element disintegrate (due to persistent arcing course by the higher circuit voltage) and from globules. The moral of this is: do not use a fuse in a circuit that exceeds its voltage rating! 8.6.3 Grading of fuse to fuse of the same voltage The method of ensuring co-ordination is to inspect current-time curves, which generally include minimum pre-arcing time and maximum clearing time. Such curves are only available on distribution circuits. Time-curve permit fuses of different manufactures and designs to be successfully coordinate. We simply need to ensure that the minimum pre-arcing time of the major fuse is greater than the maximum clearing time of the minor fuse, up to the maximum fault current that can be seen by both. This maximum current condition is a fault just down stream of the minor fuse. An acceptable rule for coordinating fuse links is that the maximum clearing time of the protecting link should not exceed 75% of the minimum melting time for the protected fuse. This assures that the protecting fuse will interrupt and clear the fault before the protected fuse is damage in any way.

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8.6.4 Types of distribution fuses

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Expulsion type fuses is the most commonly used fuse in the distribution systems, the main duty of the fuse is to protect equipment against overcurrent and over load of the system, secondary to indicate the fuse has been blown by dropping out of its in-service position. Powder filled fuses Vacuum fuses

Reference should be made to the Distribution Fusing Policy CEPG5099 for the correct sized fuses.

PROTECTION COORDINATION
In normal cases, a minimum 400ms shall be allowed for coordination between the operating times of protection and upstream backup protection of the electro-mechanical type (Main/Backup). In cases, where the upstream scheme utilises electronic devices, this time may be reduce to 300ms. In special cases, the Protection Branch will consider the characteristics of the protection relays and the switching devices to allow a variation in coordination times.

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RECORDS
The Country Energy employees associated with protection shall be responsible for the recording, storage and maintenance of all protection records. Details of all the current and historic settings, tripping schemes, Instrument transformer ratios, reclose times, configurations, software files, firmware and software versions, calculations and analysis details etc of all transmission, subtransmission and distribution protection equipment and devices, should be stored. All Country Energy employees associated with planning, protection, control and maintenance should have read access to current device data. Our organizations records are our protection system memory, providing evidence of actions and decisions and representing a vital asset to support our daily functions and operations.

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HIGH VOLTAGE CUSTOMERS


The customer is to provide a protective system approved by Country Energy to disconnect their equipment from the supply in the event of a fault on their equipment. All protection settings shall provide suitable discrimination with Country Energys system protection. All protective equipment must be maintained to an industry recognised standard. Fuse can be used as the connection point for customers <1MVA. Customers => than 1MVA, a recloser is to be used as the minimum connection point device to ensure that other Country Energy customers are not affected by faults in the HV customers network.

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All Generation proposed for installation on Country Energys Network shall be assessed on an individual case basis considering the type of Generator proposed and the proposed location on the network. Reference should be made to the Co-Generation guidelines CEK8012 when checking/applying protection for these systems.

12.1

General
The Generator is to provide a protective scheme approved by Country Energy to disconnect their equipment from the supply system in the event of a fault on their system or Country Energys system. The Generator must have operating procedures in place to prevent closure of generation equipment onto an out-of-service or faulted section of Country Energy network. All protection settings shall provide discrimination as indicated in this policy with Country Energys system protection. All protective equipment must be maintained to an industry recognised standard. Consideration must be given to any change in fault level due to the generation source and the impact on the existing system. Generator Earthing must be considered. A star winding is generally preferred on Country Energys side of the transformer.

For detailed guidelines regarding protection schemes for generators connected to Country Energys network refer to CEK8012 Cogeneration Protection Guidelines.

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ATTACHMENT A TOTAL FAULT CLEARING TIME CALCULATIONS, METHODS AND TERMS

Figure 1 and Figure 2 show the method of calculation of Total Clearing Time and clarify some of the terms used.

Figure 1: Permanent Fault Trip Sequence with One Reclose


F a u lt D e te c te d T rip O n O ff F a u lt C le a ra n c e T im e D ead T im e F a u lt C le a ra n c e T im e R e c lo s e T rip to L o c k o u t

T o ta l C le a rin g T im e

Figure 2 Permanent Fault Sequence with Three Recloses


F a u lt D e te c te d R e c lo s e O n O ff T rip T rip R e c lo s e T rip T rip to L o c k o u t R e c lo s e

F C T

D T

F C T

D T

F C T

D T

F C T

T o ta l C le a rin g T im e F C T = F a u lt C le a ra n c e T im e D T = D e a d T im e

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REFERENCES
CEPG1096 - Information Security Sensitivity Labelling and Handling CEM7063 - Information Security Sensitivity Labelling and Handling Code of Minimum Electrical Protection, C (b) 5 - 1968, Electricity Supply Association of Australia ENA C(b)1-2006 : Guidelines for design and maintenance of overhead distribution and transmission lines. Guide to the Application of Autoreclosing to Radial Overhead Lines Supplying Urban and Rural Areas, D (b) 12 - 1991, Electricity Supply Association of Australia

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REVISIONS
Section All Sections All Sections Details of Changes in this Revision Throughout entire document Updated to current Country Energy template

Issue Number 2

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