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QualTech 2001
QC Story (Engine PU)
M D Damle Executive Engineer Mahindra and Mahindra, Mumbai The improvement project was decided on the basis of RPN (Risk Priority Number) of various components going into the Engine Assembly. The FMEA study for working out this RPN numbers was done as per methodology recommended by Lucas, UK. The graph showing RPN nos. for first 13 failure modes is as below:

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The RPN number for this problem was calculated in August 2000 as follows: i. ii. iii. iv. Severity: 7 ( Due to excessive oil loss and certain possibility of consequential Engine failure) Detection: 10 (Due to no possibility of detection during Engine Assembly and possibility of detection only during Engine Testing and customer line ie, Road Test.) Occurrence: 5 ( Due to four leakage cases observed in July 00) The RPN number works out as 350.

Based on these, the failure mode with highest RPN number ie, the Camshaft bore Expansion Plug not expanded properly (causing oil leakage) was selected as a problem. Expansion Plug is a dummy plug used for sealing the core hole provided in the crankcase. In the month of July 2000, four cases of heavy leakage were observed at the Engine Testing and Road Test put together, amounting to 472 PPM. No Precise data regarding rejection due to this precise defect is available before this month. Project Eliminating the possibility of camshaft bore Expansion Plug not getting Expanded Properly.

Team No 1 2 3 4 5 Team Member D V Khobrekar M D Damle D Kumar S U More S L Borate Department Module Manager - Engine Assembly Cell Manager - Engine Assembly MQS - Engine PU Quality Assurance - Engine Assembly Manufacturing Engineering - Engine PU
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Function in Team Leader Member Member Member Member

Project Start date: 1 September 2000 Diagnostic Journey 1. Analysis of Symptoms The problem manifests itself in the form of leakage of engine oil through camshaft bore expansion plug during engine testing and road test. The leakage is observed between crankcase rear side and flywheel

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The analysis of four defective cases observed in July 2000 showed the following: - NC patch (not cleaned up patch) on expansion plug two cases.

a)

NC Patch is difficult to detect visually. Process Operation sequence of this manual process was as follows:

A)

Brainstorming 10 Probable causes evolved during brain storming The Why, Why analysis of two most probable causes. Most Probable cause NC Patch on the Expansion plug. Why? Defective supply by the vendor Why? Vendors Manufacturing process is not controlled

Improper seating of tool

Not hammered properly Improper tooling

Operator error Pressing profile not OK

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Cause and Effect Diagram

A)

Testing of the theories 1. NC Patch on Expansion Plug As observed during Analysis of the Symptoms, two out of four Expansion Plugs involved in Engines Leaking between Crankcase rear side and Flywheel had NC patch. Hence this theory is Valid. 2. Improper seating due to not hammered properly and improper tooling. It was decided to test these two theories by designing and experimenting new tool as shown in the diagram and providing guide (Location) for hammering this tool, as shown in the diagram.

Old Method

New Method (Experiment with New Tool and Location provided)

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This tool and guiding for tooling was made on 15 November 2000 and tried out for 15 days. It was observed that there was no problem in operation due to these changes and not a single defect was observed during the period. Hence these theories are valid. Hence the Root Causes identified were as follows: NC Patch on Expansion Plug Improper seating of tool.

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Implementation of the Remedies The expansion plugs are supplied by the supplier M/s Bezhard and since the occurrence possibility of NC patch was very very low, the possibility of detection at Vendors end as well as our end at the receipt stage was very low. But since the criticality of the defect was very high, preventing the problem to go to the next stage ie, Engine Testing was very essential. Hence it was decided to introduce Vacuum testing at Engine Assembly immediately after fitting of Expansion Plugs. This vacuum testing has been started st from 1 December 2000. The new tool and tooling as described above is in use from 15 November 2000. Results 1. 2. Not a single case of leakage was observed from 1 December 2000 at engine testing or road test. However during this period two expansion plugs with NC patch were found at the vacuum testing, thereby giving us confidence that no engine with expansion plug with NC patch fitted will now go to the next engine testing stage. The graph showing engine testing rejection from July 2000 onwards can be seen as follows:
st th

3.

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d. i. ii. iii.

The new RPN number for the defect is as follows: Severity seven (same as earlier) Detection three (Instead of 10 earlier, since the vacuum test introduced detects any defect in Expansion plug on pressing) Occurrence one (Instead of five earlier, since detection at vacuum test stage totally eliminates possibility of occurrence at engine testing or road test)

Hence RPN number works out as 21. Standardization a. New process now looks as follows:

b. The Standard Operation Procedure (SOP) and Control Plan (QCPC) for the assembly stage was modified to include the new pressing tool from 14th December 2000. Also SOP for Vacuum Test was made and is operative from the same date.

This project was presented at QualTech 2001. Qimpro Consultants 2002

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