Endencia and Jugo v. Saturnino as CIR. G.R L-6355-56, Aug 31. 1953 SEPARATION OF POWERS P: Montemayor, J. F: 1.

According to the SG on behalf of CIR, the decision in the case of Perfecto v Meer was not received favourably bu Congress, bec. Immediately after its promulgation, Congress enacted RA no. 590. (House Bill No.1127)
Article VII of Consti: SEC. 9. The members of the Supreme Court and all judges of inferior courts shall hold office during good behavior, until they reach the age of seventy years, or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office. They shall receive such compensation as may be fixed by law, which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office. Until the Congress shall provide otherwise, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall receive an annual compensation of sixteen thousand pesos, and each Associate Justice, fifteen thousand pesos.

2. The Court held in the Perfecto case that judicial officers are exempt from the payment of income tax on their salaries, because if govt will collect it will result to a decrease or diminution of their salaries, and it is prohibited by the Consti.
RA 590 SEC 13. No salary wherever received by any public officer of the Republic of the Philippines shall be considered as exempt from the income tax, payment of which is hereby declared not to be dimunition of his compensation fixed by the Constitution or by law

3. Judge Macadaeg, found and held that under the doctrine laid down by Perfecto v Meer, the collection of income taxes from salaries of Justices Jugo and Justice Endencia was a diminution of their compensation and was in violation of the Consti of the Phil., and so refund taxes. 4. The SC held that the judicial officers are exempt from payment of income tax on their salaries, bec the collection was a diminution of such salaries, specifically prohibited in the Consti. RA 590 no salary wherever received by any public officer of the Rep. (naturally including judicial officer) shall be considered exempt from income tax I: 1. WON the Legislature can validly enact RA 590? 2. WON legislature can lawfully declare the collection of income tax on the salary of public official, specially judicial officer? H: The decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with no pronouncement as to costs
R: 1. Legislative Dept is assigned to make and enact laws, executive to execute the said laws, and Judicial power exclusively is for interpretation and application of laws. And this authority of judicial is extends to the Consti. Before the courts can determine whether a law is constitutional or not, it will have to interpret and ascertain the meaning not only of said law, but also of the pertinent portion of the Constitution in order to decide whether there is a conflict between the two, because if there is, then the law will have to give way and has to be declared invalid and unconstitutional. 2. It is the duty of the courts to declare the act unconsti. Bec. They cannot shrink from it w/o violating their oaths of office. This duty of the courts to maintain the Consti as the funadamental law of the state is imperative and unceasing; Chief Justice Marshall whenever a statute is in violation of the fundamental law, the courts must so adjudge and thereby give eefect to the Consti. 3. Congress argument: that taxing the salary of Jud.ofcr is not a decrease of compensation. This is clear example of interpretation or ascertainment of the meaning of the phrase w/c shall not be diminished during their continuance in ofc Found in Sec9, Art VII Costi, referring to salaries of J.O. 4. That legislature cannot cannot pass any declatory act, or act declatory of what the law was before its passage, so as to give it any binding weight with the courts. 5. Legislature is to eneact not to interpret. If the L. May declare what law means, especially after the court has ascertain its meaning by interpretation, this would surely cause confusion and instability in judicial process and court decisions. -------------- 6. That the collection of income tax on a salary is an actual evident diminution. However the lower house said that RA 590; as it would seem that of the main reasons behind the enactment of the law was the feeling among ceratin legislators that members of the SC should not enjoy any exemption and that as citizens, out of patriotism and love for their country, they should pay income tax in their salaries. 7. However, the court said the exemption was not intended to benefit judicial officers, but was grounded on public policy. Justice Van Devanter SC in the case of Evans v Gore: The primary purpose of the prohibition against diminution was not to benefit the judges but to attract good and competent men to the bench and to promote that independence of action and judgment w/c is essential to the maintenance of the guaranties..Such being its purpose, it is construed not as a private grant, but as limitation imposed in the public interest. 8. Evans v Gore that they (fathers of Consti) regarded the independence of the judges as far as greater importance thatn any revenue that could come from taxing their salries.

9. When a JO assumed office, he does not exactly ask exemption from tax, however, it is already attached to his office, provided and secured by the fundamental law, not primarily for his benefit, but based on public interest, to secure and preserve his independence of judicial thought and action. 9. When a JO assumed office, he does not exactly ask exemption from tax, however, it is already attached to his office, provided and secured by the fundamental law, not primarily for his benefit, but based on public interest, to secure and preserve his independence of judicial thought and action.

OPLE v TORRES, AGUIRRE, VILLANUEVA, HABITO, BARBERS, REODICA, SARINO, SEPARATION OF POWERS VALENCIA, AFRICA, HEAD OF THE NATIONAL COMPUTER CENTER and CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT P: PUNO F: 1.) The P. Is to prevent the shrinking of the right to privacy, which is the most comprehensive of rights of men. Ople would like to invalidate AO 308 Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference System on grounds of (a) it is a usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate and (b) it impermissibly intrudes on our citizinerys protected zone. 2.) AO 308 was circulated Jan 24, 1997 the petition was filed Jan 24,1997. On april 8, 1997 a temporary restraining order was issued enjoining its implementation. ARGUMENT: PETITIONER- A. The establishment of a National Computerized Identification Reference System Requires A Legislative Act. The Issuance of AO 308 by the President of the RP is, Therefore, an Unconstitutional usurpation of the legislative powers of the Congress of the R.P. B. The appropriation of Public Funds by the Pres for the implementation of AO308 is an unconsti usurpation of the exclusive right of congress to appropriate public funds for expenditure. C. Implementation of AO308 insidiously lays the groundwork for a system w/c will violate Bill of Rights RESPONDETS-A. The petition is not a justiciable case as would warrant a judicial review. B. AO 308, was issued w/in the Executive and Administrative power of the pres.w/o encroaching on the Legislative P. C. Funds necessary for the implementation of the identification ref. Sys. May be sourced from the budgets of the concerned agencies. D. AO 308 protects individuals interest in Privacy. I: WON there is a usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate? H: The petition is granted and AO 308 declared null and void for being unconstitutional. R: 1. Legal standing- Ople is distinguished member of the senate, he has a standing bec. The petion deals with usurpation of legislative power. A taxpayer and a member of GSIS. The ripeness of the petition is not affected by the fact that the implementing rules of AO308 has yet promulgated; because as early as Jan 97, SSS caused publication of notice to bid for the manuf of the national ID card, Ex. Sec. Torres has publicly announced the representatives from the GSIS and the SSS have completed the guidelines for NID system. That resp. Has the swerving will to implement Ao308 2. Executive should trespass on the law making domain of congress. The blurring demarcation line between the power of the legislature to make laws and the power of the executive to execute laws will disturb their delicate balance of power and cannot be allowed. 3. Legislative power is the authority under consti to make laws and to alter and repeal them. The people vested to them. 4. Legislative power embraces all subjects and extends to matters of general concern and or common interest. 5. The Pres. Execute the laws, it is defined as the power to enforce and administer the laws. It is the power of carrying the laws into practical operation and enforcing their due observance. He has the duty of supervising the enforcement of laws for the maintenance of general peace and public order. He is granted administrative power to bureaus and ofcs to enable him to discharge his duties effectively. Administrative power is concerned with the work of applying policies ad

enforcing orders as determined by proper governmental organs. To fix uniform standards of administrative efficiency and check the official conduct of his agents. 6. AO is an ordinance issued by the pres., it must be in harmony with the law and should be for the sole purpose of implementing the law and carrying out the legislative policy of administrative code of 1987. 7. It cannot be argued that AO308 supplements Administrative Code. It establishes for the first time a National Computerized ID ref. Sys...No citizen will refuse to get ID card for no one can avoid dealing with the govt. Thus, its clear that w/o ID, a citizen will have difficulty exercising his rights.That the contention that AO308 gives no right and imposes no duty cannot stand. 8. Assuming, arguendo, that AO308 need not be the subject of a law, still it cannot pass the constitutional muster as an administrative legislation bec. Facially it violates the right to privacy. The essence of privacy is the right to be let alone. 8. Assuming, arguendo, that AO308 need not be the subject of a law, still it cannot pass the constitutional muster as an administrative legislation bec. Facially it violates the right to privacy. The essence of privacy is the right to be let alone Kapunan Dissenting Opinion- 1. The new ID sys would improve the public service in our country. 2.Admin code has unequivocally vested the pres with quasi-legislative powers in the form of EO, AO etc. An AO, like the new ID sys is emobodied, has its peculiar meaning under 1987 admi code Sec 3- acts of the pres which relate to particular aspects of govtal operations in pursuance of his duties as admin head shall be promulgated in AO. **vote Dismmissed Mendoza Separate Opinion-Ople has no legal stand, although it violates the right of privacy, he claims no personal injuru suffered as a result of the order in question. Instead he is bringing this action as a taxpayer, senator, memb of GSIS.**vote Dismiss **Administative Order Code of 1987 Book1- Sovereignity and General Administration; Book 2 Distribution of Powers of the Three Branches of Govt; Book3- Office of the President, Book4Executive Branch; Book5-Constitutional Commission; Book6-National Govt Budgeting; Book7Administrative Procedure.

KILUSANG MAYO UNO v DIRECTOR- GENERAL, NATIONAL ECONOMIC SEPARATION OF POWERS DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, 487 SRA 62, GR No. 167798 (2006) P: Carpio F: 1. Pres Macapagal issued EO 420 REQUIRING ALL GOVERNMENT AGENCIES AND GOVERNMENT-OWNED AND CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS TO STREAMLINE AND HARMONIZE THEIR IDENTIFICATION (ID) SYSTEMS, AND AUTHORIZING FOR SUCH PURPOSE THE DIRECTORGENERAL, NATIONAL ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY TO IMPLEMENT THE SAME, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES -Petitioners Argument- GR 167798 1. EO 420 is unconstitutional because it constitutes usurpation of legislative functions by the executive branch of the government. 2. That EO 420 infringes on the citizens right to privacy. GR 167930 1. EO 420 is void because: it is contrary to law that it completely disregard the decision in Ople v Torres and violates RA 8282 Social security act; the executive usurped the legislative power of Congress bec. She has no power to issue EO 420; EO 420 will use public funds not appropriated by Congress; It violates Constitutional rights of privacy; EO 420 is issued w/o public hearing; and EO 420 violates equal protection and results in discriminatory treatment I: WON Eo 420 is unconstitutional bec it constitutes usurpation of legislative functions? WON it infringes citizens right to privacy? H: Petition is dismissed. EO 420 is Valid R:1. Petitioners legal standing- Even assuming that petitioners are bereft f legal standing the Court considers the issues raised under the circumstances of paramount public concern. 2. EO 420 coverage is only all government and government owned agencies issuing cards to their members ex. LTO,SSS 3. The purpose of uniform ID data collection and ID format is to reduce costs, achieve efficiency and reliability, insure compatibility,and provide convenience to the people served by govt entities. 4. Sec 3 limits the data collected namely NAME, HOME ADDRESS, SEX,PICTURE,SIGNATURE, DATE OF BIRTH, PLACE OF BIRTH, MARITAL STATUS, NAME OF PARENTS, HEIGHT,WEIGHT, TWO INDEX FINGERS AND TWO THUMBMARKS, ANY PROMINENT DISTINGUISHING FEATURES LIKE MOLES, TIN 5.This specific data are the usual data required for personal identification by govt entities and even by private sector. 6. Some govt entities like LTO require more data while EO 420 is reduced to 14 info. 7. The unified ID system can be achieved: 1. The heads of these existing govt entities can enter into a MOA making their systems uniform. If the govt entities can individually adopt a format for their own pursuant to their regular functions under existing laws, they can also adopt by mutual agreement uniform ID format and this will result to substantial

savings, efficiency, and compatibility. Hence, this is purely administrative and no need to exercise legislative power. 2. The president may be executive or administrative order direct the govt entities under executive dept to adopt a uniform ID data and collection format. 8. Of course, the Presidents power of control is limited to the Executive branch of government and does not extend to the Judiciary or to the independent constitutional commissions. Thus, EO 420 does not apply to the Judiciary, or to the COMELEC which under existing laws is also authorized to issue voters ID cards. This only shows that EO 420 does not establish a national ID system because legislation is needed to establish a single ID system that is compulsory for all branches of government. 9. In issuing AO420 the pres. Did not make alter or repeal any law but merely implemented and executed existing laws. 10. What require legislation are three aspects of govt maintained ID card system. 1. When implementation of an ID card system requires a special appropriation because there is no existing appropriation. 2. When the ID card is compulsory to on all branches of govt 3. When ID card requires the collection and recording of personal data beyond what is routinely or usually required. 11. Eo 420 does not require any special appropriation because the existing ID card systems of govt entities covered by EO420 have the proper appropriation or funding. 12. GSIS, SSS, LTO has been issuing ID cards in the performance of their govt functions, there have been no complainys of abuse by these govt agencies. 13. Eo 420 the personal data collected are treated strictly confidential and personal matters, and personal matters are exempt or outside the coverage of the peoples right toinformation of public concern. 14. OPle v Torres is not authority to hold that EO 420 violates the right to privacy bec this issue is only annulled on grounds that it need legislation. And EO 420 does not establish a national ID system.
UNITED STATES v NIXON, 418 US 683 (1974) SEPARATION OF POWERS

F:1. On June 17, before Nixon won the election, 5 burglars broke into Democratic headquarters located in the Watergate bldg complex in Washington DC. 2. Nixon appointed Archibald Cox to the position of special prosecutor, charge with investigation of the break in, but then fired Cox in the Saturday Nigght Massacre. However, public outrage forced Nixon to appoint a new SP, Leon Jaworski, who was charged with conducting the Watergate investigation. 3. On March 1, 1974 a grand jury of US District Court of Columbia returned an indictment charging seven individuals with various offences including conspiracy to defraud US and to obstruct justice. 3. The grand jury named the Pres as an unindicted co-conspirator. 4. On April 1974,Jaworski obtained a subpoena duces tecum was issued to the Pres by the US District Court and made returnable on May 1974. This tape is believed to contain damaging evidence involving the indicted men and perhaps the Pres. Himself. 5. On April 30 the Pres. Publicly released edited transcripts of 43 conservations; portions of 20 conversations subject to subpoena. 6. James D. St. Clair, Nixons attorney then requested Judge Sirica to quash the subpoena. The president wants me to argue that he is as powerful a monarch as Louis XIV, only four years at a time,and is not subject to the processes of any court in the land except the court of impeachment. Sirica Denied the motion and ordered the president to turn the tapes over by may 31 7. St.Clairs and Jaworski appealed directly to the SC w/c had arguments on July8. 8. St. Clair argued the matter should not be subject to judicial resolution since the matter was a dispute itself. SP Jaworski has not been proven the requested mats. Were absolutely necessary for the trial of the 7men. And he claimed that Nixon had an absolute executive privilege to protect comminucations between high Govt Officials and those wh advise and assist them in carrying out their duties I: WON the subpoena duce tecum is binding upon the President of the US based on the principles of executive privilege and separation of powers? H: Yes it is binding. AFFIRMED R: 1. When the ground for asserting privilege as to subpoena materials sought for use in criminal trial is based only on the generalized interest in confidentiality, it cannot prevail over the fundamental demands

of due process law in fair administration of justice. The generalized assertion of privilege must yield to the demonstrated, specific need for evidence in a pending criminal trial. 2. That a 3rd party who has been issued a subpoena to produce documents would basically have only 2 options. 1. To comply with such order 2. To resist to the order with possibility of being held in contempt if the third partys claims are rejected on appeal. In this case, the traditional contempt avenue to immediate appeal is peculiarly due to the unique setting of the case. These considerations lead us to conclude that the order of the District Court was an appealable order. 3. The mere assertion of a claim of an "intra-branch dispute," without more, has never operated to defeat federal jurisdiction; justiciability does not depend on such a surface inquiry. The issue is the production or nonproduction of specified evidence deemed by the Special Prosecutor to be relevant and admissible in a pending criminal case. It is sought by one official of the Executive Branch within the scope of his express authority; it is resisted by the Chief Executive on the ground of his duty to preserve the confidentiality of the communications of the President. Whatever the correct answer on the merits, these issues are "of a type which are traditionally justiciable." In light of the uniqueness of the setting in which the conflict arises, the fact that both parties are officers of the Executive Branch cannot be viewed as a barrier to justiciability. 4. A subpoena for documents may be quashed if their production would be "unreasonable or oppressive," but not otherwise. This case recognized certain fundamental characteristics of the subpoena duces tecum in criminal cases: (1) it was not intended to provide a means of discovery for criminal cases of subpoenaed materials. Under this test, in order to require production prior to trial, the moving party must show: (1) that the documents are evidentiary and relevant; (2) that they are not otherwise procurable reasonably in advance of trial by exercise of due diligence; (3) that the party cannot properly prepare for trial without such production and inspection in advance of trial and that the failure to obtain such inspection may tend unreasonably to delay the trial; and (4) that the application is made in good faith and is not intended as a general "fishing expedition 5. Our conclusion is based on the record before us, much of which is under seal. Of course, the contents of the subpoenaed tapes could not at that stage be described fully by the Special Prosecutor, but there was a sufficient likelihood that each of the tapes contains conversations relevant to the offenses charged in the indictment. We also conclude there was a sufficient preliminary showing that each of the subpoenaed tapes contains evidence admissible with respect to the offenses charged in the indictment. ***6. Powell v. McCormack, supra, at 549. And in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S., at 211 , the Court stated: "Deciding whether a matter has in any measure been committed by the Constitution to another branch of government, or whether the action of that branch exceeds whatever authority has been committed, is itself a delicate exercise in constitutional interpretation, and is a responsibility of this Court as ultimate interpreter of the Constitution." We therefore reaffirm that it is the province and duty of this Court "to say what the law is" with respect to the claim of privilege presented in this case. 7. Neither the doctrine of separation of powers, nor the need for confidentiality of high-level communications, without more, can sustain an absolute, unqualified Presidential privilege of immunity from judicial process under all circumstances. When the privilege depends solely on the broad, undifferentiated claim of public interest in the confidentiality of such conversations, a confrontation with other values arises. Absent a claim of need to protect military, diplomatic, or sensitive national security secrets, we find it difficult to accept the argument that even the very important interest in confidentiality of Presidential communications is significantly diminished by production of such material for in camera inspection with all the protection that a district court will be obliged to provide. 8. In this case we must weigh the importance of the general privilege of confidentiality of Presidential communications in performance of the President's responsibilities against the inroads of such a privilege on the fair administration of criminal justice. The President's broad interest in confidentiality of communications will not be vitiated by disclosure of a limited number of conversations preliminarily shown to have some bearing on the pending criminal cases. We conclude that when the ground for asserting privilege as to subpoenaed materials sought for use in a criminal trial is based only on the generalized interest in confidentiality. It cannot prevail over the fundamental demands of due process of law in the fair administration of criminal justice. 9. It is therefore necessary in the public interest to afford Presidential confidentiality the greatest protection consistent with the fair administration of justice. The need for confidentiality even as to idle conversations with associates in which casual reference might be made concerning political leaders within the country or foreign statesmen is too obvious to call for furthertreatment.

SILVERIO v REPUBLIC, GR No. 174689, 537 SCRA 373 (2007) SEPARATION OF POWERS P: Corona F:1. P. Alleged that he was born in the City of Manila to the spouses Melecio Silverio and Anita Dantes on April 4, 1962. His name was registered as ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO. His sex was registered as male. 2. That he is a transsexual and he always identified himself with girls since childhood. He underwent psychological examination, hormone treatment and breast augmentation. And on Jan 2001 he underwent sex reassignment surgery in Bangkok. He was examined by Dr Reysio-Cruz, who issued a med certificatethat he had in fact undergone the procedure. 3. The P. Lived as female and in fact engaged to be married. 4. He then want his name changed to Mely and sex to female. 5. An order setting of the case initial hearing was published in the Peoples Journal Tonight for 3 consecutive weeks. On the hearing no opposition was made. 6. On July 4, 2003 the trial court rendered a decision in favour of the petitioner. 7. The OSG filed a petition for certiorari in CA, that there is no law allowing the change of entries in the birth certificate by reason of sex alteration. CA decision is in favour of the Rep..Petitioner moved for recon but was denied. 8. The P. Claims that the change of his name and sex in his birth certificate is allowed under Article 407-413 of CC, Rules 103 and 108 of Rules of Court and RA 9048..The petition lack merit. I: WON the remedy in this case should be solely addressed by the legislature? H:Petition is DENIED R:1. A change of name is a privilege, not a right. In article 376-No person can change his name or surname w/o judicial authority.amended- RA 9048 governs the change of first name. It vests the power and authority to entertain petitions for change of first name to the city or municipal civil registrar or consul general. Jurisdiction over change of first names is now lodged to administrative officers and not judicial. 2. Grounds for change of first name. 1. The first or nickname to ridiculous, tainted with dishonour, difficult to write and pronounce. 2. The nickname has been habitually and continuously used by P. 3. The change will avoid confusion. 3. Thus the P. Basis for change of first name is sex reassignment. Further, a change of name does not alter ones legal capacity or civil status. RA 9048 does not sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex reassignment. This may only create grave complications in the civil registry and public interest. 4. P. Was not w/in that courts primary jurisdiction as the P. Should have been filed w/ the local registrar concerned.

5. Art 376 of CC amended RA 9048 in so far as clerical or typographical errors are involved, the corrections or change of such matters can now be made through administrative proceedings. 6. RA 9048 sec 2, ...no correction must involve the change of nationality, age, status, or sex of the P. Change of sex is not a mere typo error. 7. Under the law, a birth certificate is a historical record, thus the sex of a person is determined at birth visually don by the birth attendant by examining the genitals of the infant. 8. The change of sex will have serious legal and public policy consequences 1. That the change of sex is his first step towards marriage, marriage is a sacred social institutions between man and woman.2. there are various laws a/c only applies to women. 9. In our system of govt it is the legislature, should it choose to do so, to determine what guidelines should given the recognition of the effects of reassignment. The remedies P. Seeks involve questions of public policy to be addressed solely by legislature not courts 10. Art 9 of CC no judge or court shall decline render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of law. The duty of the court is to apply or interpret the law not to make or amend it. 11. The supreme court cant enact a law where no law exists.

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATION v. REYES 621 SCRA 511 (2010) SEPARATION OF POWERS P: Per curiam F: 1. Mr. Rene De Guzman, the docket clerk, was in charge of the preparation and transmission of the records on appeal. 2. Judge Sta. Romana would often remind him about his duties, however de guzman would just dismiss the subject in ridicule and with the empty assurance of a good task. 3. After a number of weeks, the attitude of De guzman seemingly bordering in the irrational if not to say that a sense of responsibility is utterly lacking may have given cue for Judge Sta. Romana to have de guzman undergo a drug test. 4. Judge requested the Nueve ecija Privincial crime lab for the drug testing- the result yielded positive of marijuana and shabu. 5. In a resolution, the court required de guzman to submit his comment on the charge of misconduct relative to allged use of prohibited drugs w/in 10days from notice. De guzman failed to comment. 6. Then de guzman was redirected to show cause why he should not be held in contempt for failure to comply with the resolution and to submit w/in 10days from notice a comment. 7. De guzman complied on Mach 2008. He said in his letter, that he failed to comply bec. He lost his copy of the resolution 8. The letter was recommended to OCA: (R) did not challenge the authenticity of the chemistry report, his reason for not replying a comment is that he lost the resolution and forget about it is not valid nor an excuse for the delay in complying with order this is thoroughly and substantially is gross misconduct and may even be considered disrespect to court. Therefore OCAs recomm is the case be Re-Docketed and De guzman us found guilty of gross misconduct and accordingly dismisses from service effective immediately with the forfeiture of all benefits except accrued leave credits, 9. the court required de guzman to manifest w/in 10days from receipt whether he is willing to submit the case for resolution however he simply ignored the directive. I: WON H:Rene De Guzman is hereby DISMISSED from service with forfeiture of all retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including govt owned or controlled corporations. R: 1. De Guzman had shown his propensity to defy directives of this court.

2. Office of Court Administrator v Clerk Of Court Fe Ganzan- A resolution of the SC should not be construed as a mere request, and should be complied w/ promptly and completely. Such failure to comply betrays, not only a recalcitrant streak in char., but also disrespect for lawful order and directive of the court. And she is an employee of the Judiciary and should know more than ordinary citizen, should be aware of her duty to obey the orders and processes of SC w/o delay. 3. As dispensers of justice, all memb. And employees of the Judiciary are expected to adhere strictly to the laws of the land, one w/c is RA 9165 w/c prohibits the use of D.D. >>The court agree w/ OCA that by his repeated misconduct of disrespecting to the courts directives, de guzman is guilty of gross misconduct and has already forfeited his privilege of being employee of Court. It is by weeding out likes of de guzman from the ranks that would be able to preserve the integrity of their institution. 4. 2 Justices disagree w/ the maj. Opinion. They state that the Courts real strength is not in its righteousness but in the willingness to understand that men are not perfect and that there is a time to punish and a time to give a chance for contrition and change. However, the legislative policy as embodied in RA9165 in deterring D.D use by resort to sustainable programs of rehabilitation and Tx must be considered in light of the Courts constitutional power of administrative supervision over court and personnel. 5. The legislative power imposing policies through laws is not unlimited and is subject to substantive and constitutional limitations that set parameters both in the exercise of power itself and the allowable subjects of legislation. As such, it cannot limit the courts power to impose disciplinary actions against erring justices, judges and court personnel. Neither should such policy be used to restrict Courts power to preserve and maintain the Judiciarys honor, dignity, and integrity and public confidence that can be achieved by imposing strict and rigid standards.

6. Dismissal of De Guzman is not bec of he is a drug user but on his countimacious and repeated acts of not heeding the directives of the court.

SENATE OF PHIL. v ERMITA

SEPARATION OF POWER

F: 1. In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of the Philippines, through its various Senate Committees, conducts inquiries or investigations in aid of legislation which call for, inter alia, the attendance of officials and employees of the executive department, bureaus, and offices including those employed in Government Owned and Controlled Corporations, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), and the Philippine National Police (PNP). 2. On September 23, 2005, the committee of the senate as a whole issued invitations to various officials of the executive department and Military officials for them to appear as resource speakers in a public hearing on the North Rail Project, and on the issues of Gloriagate, Wire-tapping of the President, Electoral fraud, as was shown in the respective privileged speeches of the Senators. 3. On September 27 & 28 2005, after being invited most of those resource persons were not able to make it due to prior commitments (i.e. military officials), while on 27 September then Senate President Drilon, received a letter from Executive Secretary Ermita requesting a postponement of the hearing (re: Northrail). 4.On September 28, 2005 the president issued E.O 464, and Ermita sent a letter to the Senate President, informing him of the E.O. and that the resource persons from the executive dept would not be able to attend w/o the consent of the president. With regard to the hearing on the wire-tapping of the President, Col. Balutan and Gen. Gudani were relieved from their military posts and faced court martial proceedings for testifying w/o the presidents approval.

I: 1. Whether E.O. 464 contravenes the power of inquiry vested in Congress; 2. Whether E.O. 464 violates the right of the people to information on matters of public concern; and 3. Whether respondents have committed grave abuse of discretion when they implemented E.O. 464 prior to its publication in a newspaper of general circulation H: WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTLY GRANTED. Sections 2(b) and 3 of Executive Order No. 464 (series of 2005) are declared VOID. Sections 1 and 2(a) are, however, VALID.

R: The power of inquiry vs. the executive privilege The power of inquiry [inquiry in aid of legislation] of Congress is expressly recognized in Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution. An exemption to such Congressional power falls under the rubric of executive privelage, which is also a constitutional concept. Executive privilege, however, is recognized only in relation to certain types of information of a sensitive character. The validity of a claim thereof depends on the ground invoked to justify it and the context in which it is made. Executive officials are NOT exempt from the duty to disclose information by the mere fact of being executive officials. Validity Section 1 (with limitation) Section 1 of E.O. 464 specifically applies to department heads. The required prior consent under Section 1 is based on Article VI, Section 22 of the Constitution on what has been referred to as the question hour. The requirement then to secure presidential consent under Section 1, limited as it is only to appearances in the question hour, is valid on its face. For under Section 22, Article VI of the Constitution, the appearance of department heads in the question hour is discretionary on their part.

Section 1 cannot, however, be applied to appearances of department heads in inquiries in aid of legislation. Congress is not bound in such instances to respect the refusal of the department head to appear in such inquiry, unless a valid claim of privilege is subsequently made, either by the President herself or by the Executive Secretary. Unconstitutionality of Sections 2 (b) and 3 Section 3 of E.O. 464 requires all the public officials enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress. Whenever an official invokes E.O. 464 to justify his failure to be present, such invocation must be construed as a declaration to Congress that the President, or a head of office authorized by the President, has determined that the requested information is privileged, and that the President has not reversed such determination. There is an implied claim of privilege, which implied claim is not accompanied by any specific allegation of the basis thereof.

Certainly, Congress has the right to know why the executive considers the requested information privileged. It does not suffice to merely declare that the President, or an authorized head of office, has determined that it is so, and that the President has not overturned that determination. Such declaration leaves Congress in the dark on how the requested information could be classified as privileged. That the message is couched in terms that, on first impression, do not seem like a claim of privilege only makes it more pernicious. It threatens to make Congress doubly blind to the question of why the executive branch is not providing it with the information that it has requested. The claim of privilege under Section 3 of E.O. 464 in relation to Section 2(b) is thus invalid per se. It is not asserted. It is merely implied. It does not provide for precise and certain reasons for the claim, which deprives the Congress to determine whether the withholding of information is justified under the circumstances of each case. Validity of Section 2(a) Section 2(a) merely provides guidelines, binding only on the heads of office mentioned in Section 2(b), on what is covered by executive privilege. It does not purport to be conclusive on the other branches of government. It may thus be construed as a mere expression of opinion by the President regarding the nature and scope of executive privilege. Right to Information

Petitioners are not amiss in claiming that what is involved in the present controversy is not merely the legislative power of inquiry, but the right of the people to information. There are, it bears noting, clear distinctions between the right of Congress to information which underlies the power of inquiry and the right of the people to information on matters of public concern. Thus, while Congress is composed of representatives elected by the people, it does not follow, except in a highly qualified sense, that in every exercise of its power of inquiry, the people are exercising their right to information.