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The "Is-Ought" Gap: Deduction or Justification? Author(s): Ken Witkowski Source: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 36, No. 2 (Dec., 1975), pp. 233-245 Published by: International Phenomenological Society Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2107056 . Accessed: 28/07/2011 11:51
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THE "IS-OUGHT" GAP: DEDUCTIONOR JUSTIFICATION? In recent years the debate over the 'is-ought' gap has centered largely around John Searle's argument that it is logically possible to deduce propositions which involve or which-contain, the English modal auxilary 'ought' from other propositions which involve only
the English copula 'is..' R. M. Hare, in his article "The Promising

Game," rejects Searle's argument, insisting that the "deduction is a fraud."2Likewise Professor A. C. Genova has mounted an original attack upon Searle's deduction by introducing the notion of 'brute values.'3 In this paper I am going to argue that the issue between Searle
et al.4 on the one hand and Hare, Genova et al.5 on the other be re-

cast in a fundamentally different way than has been done in the past. It is a matter of historical record that the issue of the 'is-ought gap' (or the 'fact-value gap') has been construed, at one and the same time, both as a problem concerning a logical deduction (or entailment) and as a problem of justification without much concern that they are logically different. Hume's brief-but justly famous passage in the last paragraph of Book III, part i, section i of the Treatise, I think, contains the possibility of reading the,problem either way, And
1 Searle's position was originally set forth in a now famous article, "How To Derive an 'Ought' from an 'Is'," Philosophical Review (73), January, 1964, pp. 43-58. He restated his position without any drastic change in his book Speech Acts (Camnbridge, 1969), chapter 8.
2 R. M. Hare, "The Promising Game," in The Is-Ought Question (ed. W. D. Hudson, Macmillan, 1969), p. 155. 3 A. C. Genova, "Institutional Facts and Brute Values," Ethics (81) October, 1970, pp. 36-54. 4 Among those who have attempted to deduce an 'ought' from an 'is' besides Searle are: D. Rynin, "The Autonomy of Morals," Mind, 1957, pp. 308-317; A. N. Prior, "The Autonomy of Ethics," Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 1960, pp. 197-206; G. W. Roberts, "Factual and i Evaluative Statements," Journal of Value Inquiry I., No. 2, Fall, 1967, pp. 149-150. This list is only partial. 5 Those who have argued against deducing an 'ought' from an 'is' other than Hare and Genova include: Warren Samuels, "You Cannot Derive 'Ought' from 'Is,' " Ethics (83), January 1972, pp. 159-162; J. R. Cameron, "Ought and Institutional Obligation," Philosophy (46), October, 1971, pp. 309-323; James and Judith Thompson, "How Not to Derive 'Ought' from 'Is,' " in The Is-Ought Question, pp. 163-167. This list is only partial.

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certainly Nowell-Smith's formulation in his Ethics trades upon this

distinction.' I am going to argue that most of those who have dealt with this

issue since Hume have not been alive to the importance of keeping clear and distinct the difference between what I am going to call the "Entailment Gap" and the "Justification Gap"7(or as I prefer to call this latter distinction, for reasons which will become obvious below, the "Resolution Gap"). The failure to separate these two issues in the literature has created much confusion about what is at issue in the "is-ought"question. For'example, I will suggest that while Searle and others have in fact bridged the "Entailment Gap" (or the Deduction Gap"), they have not decided the crucial and primary. issue of the "Justification. Gap" (or the "Resolution Gap") at all. Furthermore, I will argue that we should abandon all talk of "deducing" an
"ought" from an "is" not because it cannot be done (for, in my view,

Searle has done so). but rather the "deductive" question is not, and should have never been regarded as, the crucial issue in this debate. Since Hume's perspicuous remark, the real problem has been whether anyone could ever justify any set of value statements on the basis of any given set of factual ones, not whether or not we could deduce one-set from the other. Of course I think there is a reason why writers tended to conflate the two issues which I will indicate toward the end of my paper. It has been particularly unfortunate that those who have tried to defend the "gap" between "values",and "facts" have used the language of deduction in their counterattacks upon, e.g., Searle. I think Hare and Genova have been alive to the real problem, despite their language. My general claim that there is a distinction to be made
6 Nowell-Smith writes: "Freely translated into modern terminology, what Hume means is this. In all systems of morality we start with certain statements of fact that are not judgments of value or commands; they contain no moral words. They are usually statements about God or human nature, that is to say, about what men are and in fact do. We are then told that because these things are so we ought to act in such and such a way; the answers to practical questions are deduced or in some other way derived from statements about what is the case. This must be illegitimate reasoning, since the conclusion of an argument can contain nothing which is not in the premises, and there are no 'oughts' in the premises." P. H. Nowell-Smith, Ethics (Penguin Edition), p. 37. 7 I have taken the phrases 'the Entailment -Gap,' and 'the Justification Gap,' from an article by Professor Tom L. Beauchamp, "No 'Fact-Value' Gap for Hume? Reply to Konrad," Journal of Vatlue Inquiry, (VII), #1, Spring, 1973, pp. 40-48. Professor Beauchamp discussed another issue in connection with his interpretation of a passage from Hume which he calls the "Explanation Gap." I make use only of the first two of his distinctions but I apply them well beyond their original context.

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between the "Entailment Gap" and the "Justification Gap," and the latter is the primary and crucial issue, really supports Hare's position, although I am not so sure Hare would agree. To support my general claim I will argue that the notion of a logical deduction and of an ethical justification are logically different in such a way that (i) it is obvious that what we have always been interested in arguing is the issue of justification, and (ii) it is-impossible ever to bridge all "Justification Gaps" (or "Resolution Gaps"). In section I of this article I will set the stage for my claim that the two issues have been conflated and ought to be kept separate -by examining both Searle's logical deduction and Genova's attack upon it. In Section II, I will argue my case. Of course there is an important presupposition in my argument at this point, namely that I accept the notion of 'the moral point of view.' Now this notion means different things to different writers. In my case, the acceptance of 'the moral point of view' means that (i) one has accepted the legitimacy of moral words or categories, e.g., 'right,' 'wrong,' 'ought,' etc.; and (ii) one has also accepted that disputes within such a framework can never be conclusively resolved or one position-justified at the expense of the other. I will not argue for this position in this essay. My main task here is to drive a conceptual wedge between the notion of deduction and the notion of justification in the context of ethical arguments. Section I: Searle and Genova on Deriving an "Ought"from an "Is." In his article as well as in his book, Speech Acts, Searle offers the following series of statements which, when combined with other additional statements (none of the latter involving any evaluative or moral statements), stand in a relationship of entailment, i.e., 1 entails
2, 2 entails 3, etc.:

1. Jones uttered the words "I hereby promise to pay you, Smith, five dollars." 2. Jones promised to pay Smith five dollars. 3. Jones placed himself under an obligation to pay Smith five dollars. 4. Jones is under an obligation to pay Smith five dollars. 5. Jones ought to pay Smith five dollars.8 In his book Searle argues that to get from 1 to 2 we need the following additional premises: "la. Under certain conditions C, anyone who utters the words (sentence), "I hereby promise to pay you, Smith,
8 John Searle, Speech Acts, p. 177; also his "How to Derive . . . ," op cit., p. 44.

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five dollars," promises to pay Smith five dollars" and "lb. Conditions C obtain."9From 1, la, and lb we can derive 2. Searle's main point, I believe, emerges when he demonstrates the logical relation that holds between two and three. For Searle the act of promising is "by definiThis definitional tion, an act of placing oneself under an obligation."10 connection, or conceptual connection, between the act of promising and the acceptance or recognition of the burdens by the person who makes the promise (i.e., the obligation to fulfil the promise) is an important move for Searle. Once he secures this point the rest of the deduction goes smoothly and he is able to conclude, "We have thus derived (in as strict a sense of "derive" as natural language will admit of) an 'ought' from an 'is.' ' Searle's justification that there is a conceptual connection between the act of promising and the acceptance of an obligation is in terms of institutions and rules. To speak a language is to participate in an institution of rule-governed, intentional behavior. The rules which govern speech acts are:"constitutive" rather than "regulative." Regulative rules are rules which govern existing practices. Constitutive rules are those which set up what is to count as part of a practice. Making a promise is possible because there exists the prior institution of promising which defines the act of promising as an act of placing oneself under an obligation to fulfil the promise."2 use To the word "promise" is to commit oneself to the logical properties of which in this case is to undertake an obligation. the word,13 However, both in his original article and in his book, Searle makes a distinction which has become, in the eyes of his opponents (e.g., Genova), crucial in the undermining of his entire "derivation." He admits that there is a cogent distinction to be made between "what is external and what is internal to the institution of promising."14 allows for the possibility of a nihilistic anarchist to argue He that one 'ought never to keep promises' without logical contradiction. But how? Searle explains:
It is internal to the concept of promising that in promising one undertakes an obligation to do something. But whether the entire institution of promising is 9 John Searle, Speech Acts, p. 178. 10 Ibid., p. 178. 11 Ibid., p. 181. Searle continues, "It must be pointed out also that even with 5 as interpreted as 5' the "ought" is in Kant's sense a "categorical" not a "hypothetical" ought. 5' does not say that Jones ought to pay up if he wants such and such. It says he ought, as regards his obligation, to pay up." 12 Ibid., p. 60. 13 Ibid., p. 194. 14 Ibid., p. 189.

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good or evil, and whether the obligation undertaken in promising is good or evil, and whether the obligations undertaken in promising are overridden by other outside considerations are questions external to the institution itself. The nihilist argument considered above is simply an attack external to the institution of promising. In effect, it says that the obligation to keep a promise is always overidden because of the alleged evil character of the institution. But it does not deny the point that promises obligate, it only insists that the obligations ought not be fulfilled because of the external consideration of "selffulfillment. 15

Searle's critics charge that in light of such distinctions the deduction achieved has little significance from the moral point of view. I would now like to briefly examine Professor Genova's critique, keeping in mind that I am concerned to follow this debate in terms of the claims that 'ought' statements are (or are not) logically deducible from a set of 'is' statements. The main thrust of Professor Genova's attack is to challenge the significance of the deduction Searle has produced. Genova grants that Searle has sucessfully deduced, among other things, what he terms an institutional value from an institutional fact. But Searle, he goes on, thinks he has refuted the "naturalistic-fallacyfallacy" thesis (for example the one committed by Nowell-Smith or Hare), namely, the claim that it is impossible to deduce value from facts. However Searle fails to realize that his counterexample (or his deduction) is not really directed against the thesis of Hare or Nowell-Smith. To secure this point Genova introduces the notion of a "brute-value"and argues that it is upon this concept that the whole impossibility of deducing an "ought" from an "is" rests:
We recognize that there is a sense of "ought" (and certain other value terms) which, although it may well be determined by constitutive rules of English
15 Ibid., p. 189. For the moment let us accept Searle's characterization of the anarchist as correct. (Actually this too has its problems. What possible sense can be made of the claim that the anarchist "does not deny the point that promises obligate [but] only insists that the obligations ought not be fulfilled" ever? Surely this cannot mean that a prima facie obligation is always overridden by an absolute obligation, for this renders the notion of a prima facie obligation incoherent. For an exposition of this point concerning the anarchists position see an article by Tom Beauchamp and Ken Witkowski, "A Critique of Pure Anarchism," The Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Summer, 1973, esp. p. 535.) Searle's point seems to be that from an "internal" point of view the obligation to keep a promise (for the anarchist) is not a moral issue. In fact, there is some support for this suggestion when Searle says, "I think, incidentally, that the obligation to keep a promise probably has no necessary connection with morality." Speech Acts, p. 188. This creates more problems for Searle, which I indicate below. We can at least observe that the "categorical" character of the obligation to keep a promise (see note 11) is after all really not quite like Kant's since, if it were, then it would have a "necessary" connection with morality. Searle seems to be inconsistent here.

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usage as with any other words, does not presuppose the institutionalized facts (like promise-making, debt-paying, truth-telling . . . ) to which the word is applied. There is a brute sense of "ought" which simply indicates whether we value, commend, recommend, endorse (or whatever) the evaluated institutional facts without presupposing that they are themselves good, bad or indifferent . . . Searle, although he apparently does not realize its significance, recognizes the distinction between what I call brute values and institutional values when he says that committing oneself to accept the institution of promising can mean either (a) undertaking to use the word "promise" in accordance with the literal meaning as it is determined by the internal constitutive rules of the institution, or (b) endorsing or valuing the institution itself as a good or accepting the institution from an external vantage point. (p. 195, Speech Acts.) . . . In short, if one judges that the institution of promising ought to exist, then this use of "ought" (although no doubt determined by English usage) is not logically determined by the use of "ought" which logically derives from the particular institution of promising - the use we find in "One ought to keep one's promises" where the latter is viewed as a tautology. I say that interpretation (b) corresponds to what classical moralists meant by values as opposed to
facts brute values . . .16

It is important to notice the role the notion of "brute value" plays in Genova's argument against Searle. If the notion is in some sense viable, and if the traditional claim of the impossibility of deducing values from facts is to be construed in terms of brute values, then Searle's deduction is irrelevant to the traditional claim. Let us grant that Genova is correct that the traditional thesis is to be construed in terms of "brute values." The claim he is forced to make good on is whether or not the notion of a brute value is a viable one. If it is, then any person who undertakes to evaluate an entire institutional practice in moral terms does so from an external point of view; and "the values he endorses are not logically deducible from statements describing the institution of promise-making, statements asserting the constitutive rules for the usage of "promise," or definitional tautologies logically generated from within the institution."17 Genova tries to offer both a 'weak' and a 'strong' defense of the claim that the notion of a 'brute value' is a viable one. It is beside the scope of this essay to explore in detail his defense. For the sake of argument I am going to grant that his weak defense of the notion is successful. This defense is an extension of Anscombe's famous "On Brute Facts." Genova suggests that what in one context may be considered an institutional value in another context may be considered a "brute value." (Genova wants to assign no metaphysical status to this "brute value"). And one does not have to adopt a noninstitution16 A. C. Genova, "Institutional Facts and Brute Values," Ethics (81), pp. 43-45. 17 Ibid., p. 50.

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al perspective to hold a brute value. -To defend the notion of a brute

value all that is required is the adoption of a different or extrainstitutional point of view. To reject the institution of promise-making may indeed be to adopt the institutional practice -of promise-breaking, but the latter may embody your brute value relative to the institution and value of promise keeping. These values are endorsed from an external point of view and hence "would still maintain their logical independence of the values from within the institution."' Thus one cannot deduce any "brute values" from any set of institutional facts since the former.are prior and external to the latter. But is it not odd to talk in this way? At. this point has not the issue ceased to be one of deduction or entailment at all-at least in the strict sense of "derive" as natural language will admit? Are we and should we be talking about fallacies and logic at this point in the argument? I submit that we should not since the.issue here discussed is one of justification and not deduction. Section II: The Notion of Deduction and Justification. I maintain that there is a logical distinction between the "Entailment Gap" and the "Justification Gap" and that the classical thesis about the independence of "values" from "facts" concerns the issue of justification and not deduction. I propose to argue my case in the following way: I will give a brief, obvious account of the logical differences between an "entailment" (in any argument) on the one hand, and a "justification in ethics" on the other. Specifically I will drive a wedge between these two notions in a significant way- b-y contrasting the necessary and sufficient conditions for any entailment to obtain (in or outside. of the context of an ethical argument) with the necessary and sufficient conditions for (i) a justification in ethics and (ii) a successful, i.e., conclusive justification (resolution) in ethical arguments. I will suggest that while an argument can be advanced that an entailment and a justification in ethics have some logically necessary conditions in common, they surely do not.share any significant sufficient conditions and hence are logically distinct. In fact the ,sufficient conditions for a justification in ethics, not to mention a conclusive justification, are so very different from the sufficient conditions for a successful deduction that I conclude a proof of 'logical entailment' could never settle the different (and primary) issue of justification. My final point will be that since no sufficient conditions could ever
18 Ibid., p. 50.,

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be met for a successful justification in ethics a "gap" remains. However I will comment on the character of this "gap," and how, probably, in my reading of it, the 'classical' account of what constitutes the 'naturalist fallacy' is significantly modified. (In this respect I am sympathetic to Searle's account for it illustrates the difficulty of talking Just about a "fact-value"gap.) Deduction is a familiar and perspicuous notion; it is a logical relation between "premises" and a "conclusion." The premises provide absolutely conclusive "evidence" (support) for the validity of the conclusion in a valid deductive argument. Any statement 'p' entails another statement 'q' only if there is a rule of inference (usually found in the textbooks) which allows us to pass from one statement to another. In an older terminology we can say that 'q' is entailed by 'p' -or is deduced from 'p' - if 'q' is "contained in" 'p.' Among the necessary conditions for the relationship of entailment to obtain would be the following: (i) that there be rules of inference and (ii) that there be some agreement on the meaning of the terms in statements 'p' and 'q' (or that some "definitional" connections exist.). It is a sufficient condition for any entailment to obtain that the rules of inference be correctly applied, or that the argument be formally valid. Justification in a philosophical context -in or outside of ethical arguments - is also a familiar notion, but perhaps not quite so perspicuous. It has usually been understood as a process of advancing (good) reasons in support of the claims we make. Here is a similarity between justification and deduction: both advance statements in support of other statements. Perhaps it has been just his similarity which has led us to confuse "deduction" with "justification." But they are different. While some writers have been tempted to say that a -justification in ethics had little if anything to do with deductive inference at all,19I would like to defend a more modest position, namely that they are logically different.
19See William Frankena's article "Ought and Is Once More," Man and World, 1969 where he writes: ". (a) that always, when a piece of practical reasoning seems reasonable and justified, there is present both a factual premise and something that may be called an attitude, interest, or point of view and involves, not just believing a proposition, but being for or against something (it may be an ordinary desire, selfin the case of moral judgment and reasoning it is "the moral point of love) view," however that may be defined; (b) that if one has an interest or takes a point of view and then finds or believes that certain relevant facts obtain (that is, facts bearing on the interest or point of view), then one may rationally and justifiably, at least in principle, proceed to a normative conclusion, even if the inference is not

THE'IS-OUGHT' DEDUCTION GAP: OR JUSTIFICATION? 241 I think it is plausible to argue that it is a necessary condition of any successful argument in ethics which purports to be a justification that it be according to "logical Hoyle." But of course this is an easy condition to satisfy since it is a purely formal requirement. It is, however, not a sufficient condition for a justification in ethics that the argument be formally valid. Let us take Searle's own example to illustrate this. To argue that "Jones uttered the words 'I hereby promise to pay you, Smith, five dollars' " does entail "Jones ought to pay Smith five dollars" one must establish some definitional or conceptual connection between the two statements. This Searle at. tempts to do by appealing to the notion of an internal "constitutive" rule which establishes what it is to promise (or, more specifically in Searle's case, how one uses the English word "promise" in connect tion with the English modal auxiliary "ought.") However this says nothing about the endorsement of the institution which, as Searle himself points out so clearly in the example of his nihilistic anarchist, requires we take an "external" - or what I propose we call "moral" point of view. In other words the issue of the "internal" deduction of an "ought" from an "is" surely is never a sufficient condition of a moral endorsement or justification of the institution, the latter always being an "external" question to the framework accepted or rejected. For a person to justify the acceptance of the entire institution of "promise-keeping"he must endorse the institution by appealing to some additional, "external,"moral (and not merely constitutive) rule. The "ought" in Searle's deduction does not have, to borrow an Austinian term, the "force" of an "ought" when intended as a moral prescription. This is even more evident in Searle's own account of the nihilist anarchist. Certainly one could argue that it is a necessary condition of the anarchist's rejection of the institution of "promise-keep. ing" that he know what was logically entailed in the concept of promising, e.g., he be aware of the constitutive rules which specify what promises are, and that they ought to be kept. But this is not
strictly according to logical Hoyle (whether it is justified in practice will depend on what the facts appealed to are, whether other interests or point of view are affected, etc.). In fact, while I am less sure of (a) than (b), I submit that the use of a statement involving some term like 'ought' or 'good' in a first hand normative way is appropriate precisely in such a context and only in such a context." p. 525. It is therefore not a necessary condition for Frankena that a practical argument be a deductively valid one. See also p. 526,

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a sufficient condition for his rejection of that institution (nor, one might observe, is it a sufficient reason for his endorsement of another 'institution,' viz., that of "promise-breaking,") Searle has said that "the nihilist argument considered above is simply an external attack on the institution of promising . . . it does not deny the point that promises obligate, it only insists that the obligations ought not be fulfilled because of the external consideration of 'self-fulfillment.' "20 Searle has also said that "I think, incidentally, that the obligation to keep a promise probably has no necessary connection with morality."21 These admissions make my distinctions between "entailment" and "justification"' all the more appealing for his argument seems to run along the following lines: the 'internal' obligation - the obligation incurred by the act of promising - is not*necessarily connected with morality (at all, I might add). The rejection of the institution - or the justification of the rejection - requires that we appeal to "external," specifically moral, rules. And it is here that a moral ought is generated. The significant issue is the relationship that obtains between the "external" rules (or 'values') and the institution itself. The anarchist's position may, with some difficulty, be considered from another perspective. Let us imagine him endorsing the institution of "promise-breaking." (but what would the constitutive rules of this institution be like?). To endorse this institution he would have to make an appeal to the "external" consideration of self-fulfillment, which, in my opinion, is roughly characterizable as appeal to some principle consistent with 'ethical egoism,' e.g., 'always break promises for it is in one's own self-interest, given the kind of structured society that exists.', etc. This could be considered by an anarchist as a sufficient justification, or a good reason, for his rejection of the institution of 'promise-keeping,' and his moral endorsement of the institution of 'promise-breaking.' I agree that the "ought" in the deduction has no necessary connection with morality; in fact it has no connection sans phrase since it is an "internal" conceptual or definitional issue. The "ought" which is significant appears, as it were, after the endorsement is made from the moral or "external" point of view, that is, when a justification, by recourse to specifically moral rules, is attempted. From an "internal" perspective the 'is-ought' gap is indeed easily bridged since it is a logical, deductive issue. However the significant issue, and the one intended by the
20 21 Ibid.,

J. Searle, Speech Acts, p. 189. p. 188.

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classical defenders of the 'is-ought' gap, has been the one which concerns the issue of justification, which is always an "external" question and a difficult, if not impossible one, to resolve. I have argued that a sufficient condition of any justification in an ethical argument is that an appeal be made to some independent, "external," moral principle or rule. This picture of "internal" and "external," while certainly not an entirely happy one, highlights the latter process of justification as logically different from the "internal" task of deduction. The issue of justification is simply not one of entailment. Of course all "justifications" rest on what Hare would call a decision of principle and, one can always challenge any such decisions. A further point must be made. I have talked of the necessary and sufficient conditions for any justification of any ethical argument or practical inference. However, does it make sense to talk this way when faced with the following puzzle: what are the necessary and sufficient conditions for a "successful," i.e., conclusive, justification in any ethical dispute? One might be tempted to answer that the justification be "correct," or even "true." But what would that take? When is any reason, or any appeal to a moral rule supported by a reason, satisfactory and satisfying? I know the first is a logical issue and the second a psychological one. And I am aware that one should not confuse the two. But I maintain, without any argument in this essay, that the two issues are intimately related in the conext of an ethical argument. (Of course this view presupposes an entire ethical theory.) And even if one wished to answer the logical question, when is any rule or reason satisfactory, what would the answer here be like? I do not think we can give the necessary and sufficient conditions for a successful justification in ethics for that would require that we produce a moral rule justifying our practice as true. But this seems either incoherent or impossible, given the arguments open to a philosophical skeptic. I propose that we abandon the practice of talking about the "isought gap" in terms of an "Entailment Gap" (or a "Deductive Gap"), pace Hume, Nowell-Smith and Hare; (2) we should grant to Searle that a deduction has been successfully carried out, that it is not a

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(3) fraud, and that this issue at least has not been begged;22 while we should grant that Searle's deduction is a relatively interesting one, pace Genova,especially since the classical defenders of the "gap" did put it in terms of a deductive one, nevertheless, we should also insist that the deduction is irrelevant from the moral point of view; (and in light of Searle's comment that the "obligation to keep a promise probably has no necessary connection with morality," I would think he would have no trouble with this recommendation); (4) finally, that we urge that the primary sense of Hume's famous passage lies in the area of "justification" and that it is here that the work re,
mains to try to close the gap, if indeed this makes any sense.
22 In her own way Philippa Foot has anticipated some basic points of the present argument in her brief remarks on this issue in her "Introduction" to Theories of Ethics: Oxford Readings In Philosophy (Ed. Philippa Foot, Oxford University Press, 1967), pp. 9-13, esp. pp. 11-12. She writes, "In any case I agree with Hare in finding Searle's argument faulty, though my grounds are quite different from his. For it seems to me that while there is in principle no objection to the project of deriving an 'ought' from an 'is' Searle has tried to work from the wrong kind of premises, at least for a 'moral' ought. For he has tried to deduce an 'ought' statement from premises that are 'internal' to a particular institution, and this is not how 'ought' statements are used. To see this we have only to suppose that we have a thoroughly bad institution - say one connected with dueling .- by the rules of which one has an obligation to shoot another man once certain things have been said and done. We could then construct an argument parallel to.Searle's which should lead to the conclusion that one ought to shoot at X. But in fact this is not what anyone who disapproved of the institution on moral grounds would say. He would deny that he had any obligation to shoot at his man, because of the evil social consequences of the institution, the point being not that he was not prepared to obey the rule (which might or might not be the case) but rather that he denied the obligation on account of his view of the institution, Thus one might say that while Searle was not wrong in principle in saying that an 'ought' could be derived from an 'is,' he was inaccurate in thinking that it could be derived from these particular premises. For while some other words that might naturally be called 'evaluative' (e.g., 'owes') do seem to belong within an institution, 'ought' could only be deduced from a set of premises which referred to such things as injury, freedom and happiness, i.e. to things that count in the scale of human good and harm. Thus one could indeed not deny that one owed a certain sum of money given certain institutions and certain institutional, matters of fact of the kind that Searle is thinking of, but if one thought the whole institution harmful, and conceived it as a socially useful task to destroy it, one would say 'It is not true that one ought to pay what one owes.' 'One ought to keep one's promises' is thus not a tautological statement, and the most one can say is that promising presupposes the acceptance of an obligation on the part of a number of people. As to the deduction of 'ought' from 'is', we shall have to try the right kind of premises, and see how things turn out.. Hare has not shown that there is in principle an objection to the project, but Searle has not shown that it can be done. Everything will depend on how the meaning of 'ought' in a moral judgment is related to such notions as

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The admission of (4) above, and my reading of it, seriously undermines the so-called "naturalistic fallacy" thesis as stated by defenders of a "fact-value" gap. For example, in Nowell-Smith's formulation the issue is in terms of a logical gap between "values" and "facts." My argument suggests not only that we abandon the entailment formulation of the problem - and this would change our view of the issue as involving a "fallacy"23but that the "Justification Gap" (or "Resolution Gap") is not one just between "values" and "facts" but, given Searle's framework, between "values" (institutional) and "values" (moral) as well. KEN WITKOWSKI.
THE GEORGEWASHINGTON UNIVERSITY.

those of injury and welfare, and this has yet to be worked out." pp. 11-12. Professor Foot's remarks did not come to my attention until after this paper was completed. However, she still is wedded to the notion of a "deduction" and simply wants to get the right "premises." I am suggesting that this is the wrong way to look at the issue.
23 On this point see the well-known article by Frankena, "The Naturalistic Fallacy," Mind (48), 1939, pp. 467-77, esp. p. 477.