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LOCAL GOVERNMENT REVIEWER (for finals!

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Preliminary notes The exam would be 100 points + 10pt bonus. He asks essay questions just for 5 points! Nevertheless, answer as comprehensively as you can to get the full points. He also said that he wont ask you to memorize, BUT you should know general concepts and issues. TOPICS most likely to be included: *national-local powers *qualifications for elections *disciplinary actions *CDMASAB (creation, division, merger, abolition and substantial alteration of boundaries) *corporate vs. governmental functions *General supervision powers who exercises supervision over who? *general welfare clause (police powers) questions *federalism: test limits of local governance *autonomy, decentralization and devolution *recall elections as effective check *term-limits CONSTI PROVS on LG: ARTICLE X Section 1: Territorial and Political Subdivisions (PCMBA): 1. provinces 2. cities 3. municipalities 4. barangays 5. autonomous regions *Pimentel: list exclusive! LGU Defined Basco v. PAGCOR: Local Government has been described as a political subdivision of a nation or state which is constituted by law and has substantial control of local affairs. In a unitary system of government, such as the government under the Philippine Constitution, local governments can only be an intra sovereign subdivision of one sovereign nation, it cannot be an imperium in imperio. Local government in such a system can only mean a measure of decentralization of the function of government. Section 2: territorial and political subdivisions enjoy LOCAL AUTONOMY Limbona v. Mangelin: decentralization of administration - when the central government delegates administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government power and in the process to make local governments "more responsive and accountable Page 1 of 1

decentralization of power - involves an abdication of political power in the favor of local governments units declare to be autonomous . The autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention from central authorities. *Under LGC, only decentralization of administration! Decentralization vs Federalism Decentralization: decision by the central government authorizing its subordinates, whether geographically or functionally defined, to exercise authority in certain areas. It involves decision-making by sub-national units. It is typically delegated power, wherein a larger government chooses to delegate certain authority to more local governments Federalism: implies some measure of decentralization, but unitary systems may also decentralize. The sub-units that have been authorized to act do not possess any claim of rights against the central government. Section 3: Congress ENACT LGC! (then outline more or less ng LGC) Section 4: GENERAL SUPERVISION CLAUSE President exercise general supervision over local governments Provinces: component cities and municipalities Cities and municipalities: component barangays *ensure acts of their component units are w/n the scope of their prescribed powers and functions GENERAL SUPERVISION: ensure that local affairs are administered according to law. No control over acts in the sense that he can substitute their judgments with his own. Power of supervision means overseeing or authority of an officer to see that the subordinate officers perform their duties. -includes power of the president to discipline elective officials. Also includes power to investigate. (Joson v. Executive Secretary) *see Section 25, LGC Section 5: ECON POWERS Each LGU shall have power to: 1. create own sources of revenues 2. levy TFC subject to such guidelines and limitations as the Congress may provide (power of taxation delegated by Congress to LGUs) consistent with local autonomy TFC accrue exclusively to LGUs *see Section 18, LGC Section 6: IRA provision -just share in the national taxes -automatically released to them Cha Mendoza

DR. ANTONIO G.M. LA VIA

LOCAL GOVERNMENT REVIEWER (for finals!)


*see Discussion on Section 18 of LGC Section 7: SHARE in Wealth of Nation -equitable share in the proceeds of the utilization and development of the national wealth w/n their respective areas -includes sharing the same with the inhabitants by way of direct benefits Section 8: TERM OF LOCAL OFFICIALS GR (Local officials): 3 years, no more than 3 consecutive terms X: barangay officials, as determined by law VOLUNTARY RESIGNATION: not considered an interruption in the continuity of service considered full term *see Section 43, LGC Section 9: Sectoral reps in Sanggunians Section 10: Creation of LGUs -CDMASAB in accordance w/ LGC + approval of the majority of votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units DIRECTLY AFFECTED *See section 10, LGC Section 11: CREATION OF SPECIAL METROPOLITAN POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS -by law -subject to plebiscite similar to Sec10 -component cities and municipalities retain basic autonomy + entitled to own executive and legislative assemblies -jurisdiction limited to basic services requiring coordination MMDA v. Bel-Air Village Association: MMDA has no police power, no legislative power, just coordinating powers and laying down policies for the efficient and expeditious delivery of basic services Section 12: CLASSIFICATION OF CITIES HUC determined by law ICC prohibit their voters from voting for provincial elective officials Component cities could vote for provincial elective officials ABELLA v. COMELEC: Section 12, Article X of the Constitution is explicit in that aside from highly urbanized cities, component cities whose charters prohibit their voters from voting for province elective officials are independent of their province. (a registered voter of an independent component city who is prohibited from voting provincial officials cannot run as officials of the province!) *see Section 451-453, LGC Section 13: LGUs may group themselves Page 2 of 2

DR. ANTONIO G.M. LA VIA


For purposes of 1. consolidation and coordination of efforts, services and resources 2. common benefit Section 14: REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT COUNCILS -composition: a. LG offices b. reps from NGOs -purpose: administrative decentralization, strengthen autonomy of units, accelerate the economic and social growth and development of units in the region Section 15 to 21: AUTONOMOUS REGIONS Sec15: creation of Autonomous regions of Muslim Mindanao and Cordilleras Sec16: President exercise General supervision: ensure laws are faithfully executed Sec17: Powers, functions, responsibilities should be granted by law/consti or else, NG Sec18: Organic Act for each Autonomous region Sec19: first Congress enact organic acts Sec20: Legislative Powers of Autonomous regions Sec21: Preservation of peace and order w/n region local police agencies Defense and security National Government YeY! Locgov proper THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE: PRINCIPLES, POWERS AND RELATIONS Section 1: LGC title Definition of LGU: Basco vs. Pagcor: Local Government has been described as a political subdivision of a nation or state which is constituted by law and has substantial control of local affairs. In a unitary system of government, such as the government under the Philippine Constitution, local governments can only be an intra sovereign subdivision of one sovereign nation, it cannot be an imperium in imperio. Local government in such a system can only mean a measure of decentralization of the function of government. Section 2: Declaration of Policy (a) genuine and meaningful local autonomy (b) accountability of LGUs through recall, initiative, and referendum Cha Mendoza

LOCAL GOVERNMENT REVIEWER (for finals!)


(c) periodic consultations w/ LGUs, NGOs and other sectors of community Genuine and meaningful local autonomy -purpose of establishing local autonomy in the system of governance is to enable LGUs to become self-reliant communities and to make them more effective partners in the attainment of national goals Accountable local officials -people empowerment through checks on local officials *see sections 69-75 and 120-127 Consultations -see Sec26-27 Section 3: Operative Principles of Decentralization (a) effective allocation among LGUs of respective powers, functions, responsibilities, and resources (b) organizational structure and operating mechanisms to meet priority needs and services (c) local officials, employees, subject to CS laws (merit and fitness), paid maily from local funds (d) responsibility and accountability accompanied by provision for reasonably adequate resources (ArtX. Sec5,6,7) (e) general supervision (ArtX. Sec4) (f) LGUs may group themselves (ArtX, Sec13) (g) Enhance LGUs capabilities to enable them to participate actively in implementation of national programs and projects (h) continuing mechanism to enhance local autonomy (i) LGUs and NG share in responsibility in the management and maintenance of ecological balance (Sec26) (j) Effective mechanism for insuring accountability of LGUs (Secs 2(b), 69-75, 120-127) (k) Improved coordination of NG policies and programs, extension of adequate technical and material assistance (Sec 25) (l) Participation of private sector in local governance encouraged (ArtX, Sec9) (m) NG ensure that decentralization contributes to continuing development and performance of LGUs GANZON v. CA: Local autonomy is not instantly self-executing. Although the broad principles on local autonomy are set out in the Constitution, they are not self-executing but subject to, among other things, the passage of a local government code, a local tax law, income distribution legislation, and a national representation law, and measures designed to realize autonomy at Page 3 of 3

DR. ANTONIO G.M. LA VIA


the local level. In spite of autonomy, the Constitution places the local government under the general supervision of the Executive. Section 4: Scope of Application Section 5: Rules of Interpretation a. power of LGU: liberal interpretation in favor of LGU in case of doubt: in favor of devolution of powers, in favor of LGU b. tax ordinance: strictly against LGU, liberally in favor of taxpayer Tax exemption: strictly against person claiming it c. general welfare clause: interpret liberally to give more powers to LGUs in accelerating economic devt and upgrading quality of life for the people in the community d. rights and obligations existing before LGC and contracts involving LGUs: original terms e. when no legal provision/jurisprudence available: may resort to customs and traditions in the place where controversy takes place * Where the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no room for interpretation. There is only room for application. (SUCALDITO V. MONTEJO) YAO KEE V. SY-GONZALES: cusoms: a rule of conduct formed by repetition of acts, uniformly observed or practiced as a social rule, legally binding and obligatory. A custom must be proved as a fact, according to the rules of evidence. A local custom as a source of right cannot be considered by a court of justice unless such custom is properly established by competent evidence like any other fact. BADUA V. CORDILLERA BODONG ADMINISTRATION: For decisions of tribal councils to be applicable, they should be w/n the scope of LGC (therefore, in this case, should be under an autonomous region) Chapter 2 General Powers and Attributes of LGUs *refer to Section 10, CONSTI Section 6: Authority to CDMASAB -by law: by Congress: province, city, municipality, or any other political subdivision -by ordinance: by Sangguniang Panlalawigan/Panlungsod: barangay LATASA v. COMELEC: the creation or conversion of a local government unit is done mainly to help assure its economic viability. CORDILLERA BROAD COALITION V. COA: Administrative Regions are not territorial and political subdivisions but are primarily created to coordinate the planning and implementation of programs and services in the covered area.. CAR is not a public corporation or a territorial and political subdivision. Cha Mendoza

LOCAL GOVERNMENT REVIEWER (for finals!)


It does not have a separate juridical personality unlike provinces, cities and municipalities. Neither is it vested with the power to sue and be sued, the power to own and dispose of property, the power to create its own sources of revenues, etc. PELAEZ v. AUDITOR GENERAL: President has no power to create municipalities. The authority to create municipal corporations is essentially legislative in nature. The statutory denial of the presidential authority to create a new barrio implies a negation of the bigger power to create municipalities, each of which consists of several barrios. Section 7. Creation and Conversion GR: based on verifiable indicators of viability and projected capacity to provide services (a) INCOME: sufficient for all essential government functions and services, commensurate with population size (b) POPULATION: total # of inhabitants w/n territorial jurisdiction (c) LAND AREA: contiguous X: comprises of 2+ islands separated by a LGU independent of others *properly identified by metes and bounds *sufficient to provide for basic services and facilities to meet requirements of populace HOW Income Plus Populatio Land Area (certified by CREAT n LMB)* ED (certified Not Territory as used by NSO) before, inspired by Tan v. COMELEC Province Only by At least Eithe At least Contiguous Territory At 2 an Act 20M for r 250k least 2k km of the last inhabitan -creation shall not reduce Congre 2y ts the land area, population ss immedia or income of the original (therefo tely prior unit/s at the time of said re LAW) to its creation to less than the creation minimum requirements and a. territorial jurisdiction based shall be properly upon identified by metes and 1991 bounds constant X: composed of 1+ prices as islands certified b. need not be by DOF contiguous if composed of 2+ islands Page 4 of 4 City Only by an Act of Congre ss (therefo re LAW) At least P100M for the last 2 consecut ive years based on 2000 constant prices as certified by DOF (amende d by RA 9009) Annual income: At least P2.5M for the last 2 consecut ive years based on 1991 constant prices

DR. ANTONIO G.M. LA VIA


Eithe r At least 150k inhabitan ts Contiguous Territory At 2 least 100 km -creation shall not reduce the land area, population or income of the original unit/s at the time of said creation to less than the minimum requirements a. territorial jurisdiction shall be properly identified by metes and bounds X: composed of 1+ islands b. need not be contiguous if composed of 2+ islands Contiguous Territory At 2 least 50 km -creation shall not reduce the land area, population or income of the original municipality or municipalities at the time of said creation to less than the minimum requirements a. territorial jurisdiction shall be properly identified by metes and bounds X: composed of 1+ islands b. need not be contiguous if composed of 2+ islands NONE a. land must be contiguous b. land shall be properly identified by metes and bounds Cha Mendoza

Municipalit y

Only by law

And (all 3)

At least 25k inhabitan ts

Barangay

*by law *by ordinan ce

None Financial viability of the created baranga y become

Cant add anyt hing!

GR: At least 2k inhabitan ts Except: w/n M.M. area other

LOCAL GOVERNMENT REVIEWER (for finals!)


s the obligatio n of the LGU creating it metropoli tan political subdivisi ons w/c may be created by law HUCs dapat P5k inhabitan ts

DR. ANTONIO G.M. LA VIA


Arguments that DIRECTLY AFFECTED means only those that would be included in the new LGU: PAREDES v. EXEC SEC: In creating new municipalities from former barangays of other municipalities, should only include those which would be included under the new LGU because the residents of the parent municipalities would still be under the same LGU (Province) w/o diminution of any rights. (so consider same status, pero under pa rin supervision ng same entitysame benefits) LOPEZ v. COMELEC: Creation of MMC w/o plebiscite held as constitutional but now requires plebiscite: SEC11, ARTX, Consti requires plebiscite! ABBAS v. COMELEC: Administrative regions ARE NOT TERRITORIAL AND POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS like provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays so TO MERGE LGUs into an administrative region, NO PLEBISCITE REQUIRED. Section 11: Selection and Transfer of LG Sites, Offices and Facilities Section 12: Government Centers Section 13. Naming of LGUs and Public Places, Streets and Structures *basically: WHO HAS POWER TO CHANGE NAMES: (a) Sangguniang Panlalawigan (b) Sanggunian of HUCs and ICCs (c) Sanggunian of Component Cities and Municipalities What can they change (in general): - in consultation with Philippine Historical Commission + 1. component units under them w/ recommendation of Sanggunian concerned + ratification in plebiscite 2. roads, avenues, blvds, thoroughfares, and bridges 3. schools Local School Boards 4. hospital, health facilities Local Health Boards 5. any other public place/bldg owned by the LGU concerned *cant use names of living persons, unless for justifiable reasons, not oftener than once every 10 years *cant change name with historical/cultural/ethnic significance unless overturned by UNANIMOUS VOTE OF SANGUNIAN CONCERNED + CONSULTATION WITH PHC *should notify: President, rep of legislative district concerned, Bureau of Posts Section 14: Beginning of Corporate Existence GR: upon election and qualification of its chief executive and majority of the members of its sanggunian X: other time fixed by law/ordinance Cha Mendoza

Tan v. COMELEC: Territory reflected only territory with reference to mass of land area and excluded the waters over which the political unit exercised control. Section 8. Division and Merger. -same requirements as Creation and Conversion (INCOME, POPULATION, LAND AREA - IPL) -no reduction of IPL of LGUs concerned to less than min standards, and w/re: INCOME, not below what was standard before Section 9: ABOLITION of LGUs -there should be a law/ordinance -IPL irreversibly reduced to less than the minimum -the law/ordinance should include where the LGU would be incorporated/merged PIMENTEL: Congress retained power to create brgys in Metropolitan Manila so they can abolish it too. SECTION 10: Plebiscite Requirement -mandatory -approval of majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose in the political unit/units DIRECTLY AFFECTED -conducted by COMELEC w/n 120d from effectivity of law/ordinance (unless law/ordinance fix date) Tan v. COMELEC: in the creation of a new LGU, those to be included in such plebiscite would be the people living in the area of the proposed new province and those living in the parent province. Page 5 of 5

LOCAL GOVERNMENT REVIEWER (for finals!)


Section 15: Political and Corporate Nature of LGU (DUAL PERSONALITY) LGUs: -body politic and corporate endowed with powers to be exercised by it in conformity w/law -shall exercise powers as a 1. political subdivision of the national govt 2. corporate entity representing inhabitants of its territory CITY of MANILA v. IAC: re transfer of bones when lease contract w/ public cemetery not yet over so sued for damages (so refer to this later w/re suability) -Its powers are twofold in character-public, governmental or political on the one hand, and corporate, private and proprietary on the other. *Governmental powers: exercised in administering the powers of the state and promoting the public welfare and they include the legislative, judicial, public and political *Municipal powers: exercised for the special benefit and advantage of the community and include those which are ministerial, private and corporate CITY OF NAGA V. CA: When transferring titles to property, needs RESOLUTION OF PROVINCIAL BOARD + APPROVAL OF PRESIDENT Section 16: GENERAL WELFARE CLAUSE Powers exercised by LGUs: (1) expressly granted (2) necessarily implied from powers expressly granted (3) necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective governance (4) those essential to the promotion of the general welfare (catch all) *Without the General Welfare clause, can LGUs still exercise police powers? NO. it is delegated by Legislative: should be granted expressly PRESIDENT, based on residual powers, could also exercise Police Power * H in the ff answers WON there was valid exercise of Police power *RURAL BANK OF MAKATI v. MAKATI: -2 branches of general welfare clause: (1) general legislative power: authorizes the municipal council to enact ordinances and make regulations not repugnant to law, as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred upon the municipal council by law. (2) police power proper: authorizes the municipality to enact ordinances as may be necessary and proper for the health and safety, prosperity, morals, Page 6 of 6

DR. ANTONIO G.M. LA VIA


peace, good order, comfort and convenience of the municipality and its inhabitants and for the protection of their property. ACEBEDO OPTICAL COMPANY V CA The State, through the legislature, has delegated the exercise of police power to LGUs, as agencies of the State, in order to effectively accomplish and carry out the declared objects of their creation. This delegation of police power is embodied in the general welfare clause of the code. So exercise should be in accordance with law. *BINAY v. DOMINGO -Police powers vested in LGUs broad and not limited: AS LONG AS GREATEST WELFARE TO ALL. Care for poor is public purpose. -duty to provide for the real needs of the people in their health, safety, comfort and convenience and consistently as may be with private rights. PPL V FAJARDO -Should comply with standards of DUE PROCESS *LUCENA GRAND CENTRAL TERMINAL V. JAC LINER -can regulate right to enjoy property, PROVIDED: (1) for a lawful subject (2) reasonable reasonable in a sense that it is not too overbroad! (there might be other ways to achieve the lawful subject) PARAYNO V. MUNICIPALITY OF CALASIO - A local government is considered to have properly exercised its police powers only when the following requisites are met: (1) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the interference of the State and (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive. The first requirement refers to the equal protection clause and the second, to the due process clause of the Constitution. *TATEL V MUNICIPALITY OF VIRAC -For it to be valid however it (1) must not only be within the corporate powers of the municipality to enact but must also be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law, and must be in consonance with certain well established and basic principles of a substantive nature (2) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute Cha Mendoza

LOCAL GOVERNMENT REVIEWER (for finals!)


(3) must not be unfair or oppressive (4) must not be partial or discriminatory (5) must not prohibit but may regulate trade (6) must be general and consistent with public policy, and (7) must not be unreasonable *BALACUIT V. CFI AGUSAN (MOVIE HOUSES TIX CASE) -business may be regulated but regulation must be w/n the bounds of reason, that is, the regulatory ordinance must be reasonable, and its provisions cannot be oppressive amounting to arbitrary interference with the business or calling subject of regulation. A lawful business or calling may not, under the guise of regulation, be unreasonably interfered with even by the exercise of police power *VILLANUEVA V CASTANEDA (ON LEASE CONTRACTS OF PUBLIC PROPERTY) -Police power cannot be suspended/bargained away through a contract. Impairment clause is subject to and limited by the paramount police power. DACANAY V. ASSISTIO(ON LEASE CONTRACTS OF PUBLIC PROPERTY) -interest of a few should not prevail over good of the greater number in the community whose health, peace, safety, good order and general welfare the respondent city officials are under legal obligation to protect. SANGALAN V. IAC -If act is in the concept of police power no need for just compensation. Section 17: Basic Services and Facilities Brgy powers in general: -Minimal compared to the other political subdivisions because Congress was of the opinion that then, brgys do not yet possess either the structural capacity or the administrative knowhow to handle the vast powers that are now devolved to other LGUs Municipal Powers in general: more extensive, four major services: (a) agricultural and aquacultural, encouraged through cooperatives (b) health services connected to primary health care and access to secondary and health care and access to secondary and tertiary health services (c) social welfare services (d) other services Provincial powers: more sweeping Page 7 of 7

DR. ANTONIO G.M. LA VIA


(a) agriculture and aquaculture (b) industrial development services (c) health services (d) social services (e) investment support services (f) computerizing tax information and collection services (g) intra-municipal telecom services City powers; all services and facilities which the barangay, municipality and province have been empowered to deliver (except Katarungang Pambarangay), plus: (a) adequate communication and transportation facilities (b) support for education, police and fire services and facilities *devolution provision -LGUs can do everthing, subject to supervision of NG X: Environment still subject to control of DENR (a) provides devolution of NG agencies services BRGY: LIMITED SERVICES brgy is usually the governance unit: -involve constituents in decision-making -peace-making -delivery of some services *for BRgys, the most important services involves Agricultural and Health services *Envt not devolved though need proximate care Subsidiary: delegate all powers and decisions to level competent MUNICIPALITIES AND CITIES: BASIC UNIT W/C DELIVER SERVICES *(2)(ii) supervision AND CONTROL OF DENR: DENR could substitute judgment to what municipality does WHY INSERTED? Congressmen wanted to prevent mayors and governors to be too powerful! Provinces: Coordinator of services *no transfer of budget powers kasi konti rin lang naman ibubudget! ? W/c power only 1 LGU can exercise: Katarungang Pambarangay powers! Section 18: Power to Generate and Apply Resources Under Section 18, LGUs can raise resources primarily through the ff: 1. Taxes, fees, charges 2. IRA: just share in national taxes automatically and directly released to them w/o need of any further action Cha Mendoza

LOCAL GOVERNMENT REVIEWER (for finals!)


3. share in proceeds from the utilization and development of the national wealth and resources within their respective territorial jurisdictions 4. proprietary power: to acquire, develop, lease, encumber, alienate or otherwise dispose of real or personal property held by them in their proprietary capacity cf: ArtX, Secs 5,6 & 7 ESTANISLAO V. COSTALES (ON TAXATION POWERS) -LGUs have the power to create their own sources of revenue, levy taxes, etc. BUT subject to the guidelines and limitations set by Congress (IN ACCORDANCE W/SEC5, ART X OF CONSTI) PIMENTEL V. AGUIRRE Automatic Release of IRA MANDATORY. A basic feature of local fiscal autonomy is the automatic release of the shares of LGUs in the national internal revenue. This is mandated by no less than the constitution (ArtX, Sec6). The LGC specifies further that the release shall be made directly to the LGU concerned w/n 5d after every quarter of the year and shall not be subject to any lien or holdback that may be imposed by the national government for whatever purpose. Section 19: Eminent Domain Steps for expropriation of LGU 1. purpose: for public use/purpose or welfare for the benefit of the poor and landless THERE SHOULD BE A NECESSITY FOR THE TAKING: MASIKIP V. CITY OF PASIG 2. WHO: chief executive acting through an ordinance 3. ORDINANCE duly passed, AND NOT A RESOLUTION (BELUSO V. MUNICIPALITY OF PANAY, MUNICIPALITY OF PARANAQUE V VM REALTY) 4. valid and definite offer previously made to owner (JIL v. Pasig) 5. offer not accepted 6. IMMEDIATE POSSESSION ONLY UPON: (a) filing of expropriation proceedings; (b) make deposit with proper court of at least 15% of the FMV of the property based on the current tax declaration of the property to be expropriated 7. payment of just compensation: to be determined by the court based on the FMV AT THE TIME OF TAKING OF THE PROPERTY (EPZA v. DULAY) 8. property is private property (Chaves v. PEA foreshore and underwater lands) BELUSO V. MUNICIPALITY OF PANAY Page 8 of 8

DR. ANTONIO G.M. LA VIA


-Eminent domain, which is the power of a sovereign state to appropriate private property to particular uses to promote public welfare, is essentially lodged in the legislature. While such power may be validly delegated to local government units, other public entities and public utilities, the exercise of such power by the delegated entities is not absolute. In fact, the scope of delegated legislative power is narrower than that of the delegating authority and such entities may exercise the power to expropriate private property only when authorized by Congress and subjects to its control and restraints imposed through the law conferring the power or in other legislations. LGUs by themselves have no inherent power of eminent domain. The power of eminent domain delegated to an LGU is in reality not eminent but inferior since it must conform to the limits imposed by the delegation and thus partakes only of a share in eminent domain. The national legislature is still the principal of the LGUs and the latter cannot go against the principals will or modify the same. LAGCAO V. LABRA (LIMITATIONS): DUE PROCESS REQUISITES: JIL SCHOOL FOUNDATION V. MUNICIPALITY OF PASIG -The power of eminent domain is exercisable by all LGUs. The requisites for the valid exercise of that power: 1. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local chief executive, in behalf of the local government unit, to exercise the power of eminent domain or pursue expropriation proceedings over a particular private property. 2. The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose or welfare, or for the benefit of the poor and the landless. 3. There is payment of just compensation, as required under Section 9, Article III of the Constitution, and other pertinent laws. 4. A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the property sought to be expropriated, but said offer was not accepted. MASIKIP V. CITY OF PASIG -The right to take private property for public purposes necessarily originates from "the necessity" and the taking must be limited to such necessity. The very foundation of the right to exercise eminent domain is a genuine necessity and that necessity must be of a public character. -Morever, the ascertainment of the necessity must precede or accompany, and not follow, the taking of the land. Necessity w/n the rule that the particular property to be expropriated must be necessary, does not mean an absolute but only a reasonable or practical necessity, such as would combine the greatest benefit to the public with the least inconvenience and expense to the condemning party and the property owner consistens with such benefit. Cha Mendoza

LOCAL GOVERNMENT REVIEWER (for finals!)


EPZA V. DULAY -Just Compensation: the value of the property at the time of the taking. It means a fair and full equivalent for the loss sustained. All the facts as to the condition of the property and its surroundings, its improvements and capabilities, should be considered. *NO NEED FOR DAR AUTHORITY IF DOES NOT INVOLVE RECLASSIFICATION OF AGRICULTURAL LAND BY OWNER/BENEFICIARY TENANT: PROVINCE OF CAMARINES SUR V. CA Section 20: Reclassification of lands Section 21: Closure and Opening of Roads Permanent closure *by ORDINANCE approved by at least 2/3 of the members of the Sanggunian concerned *if necessary, an adequate substitute provided *there should be provisions for maintenance of public safety If FREEDOM PARKS: cannot close permanently w/o provision for its transfer or relocation to a new site Temporary closure: 1. actual emergency 2. fiesta celebrations 3. public rallies 4. agri and industrial fairs 5. undertaking of public infrastructure works 6. athletic/cultural/civic activities OFFICIALLY SPONSORED, RECOGNIZED OR APPROVED BY LGU concerned 7. THROUGH AN ORDINANCE: for bazaars, midnight sales, flea marketswhere commodities or articles of commerce may be sold and dispensed to the general public. CABRERA V. CA The closure of city streets is w/n the powers of the city council while the closure of provincial roads is w/n powers of provincial board. BAYAN V. ERMITA ON FREEDOM PARKS No prior permit may be required for the peoples exercise of their right to peaceably assemble and petition in any public park or plaza of a city or municipality until that city or municipality shall have complied with Sec;. 15 of BP 880 providing for FREEDOM PARKS in every LGU. Advance notices however should be given to LGUs to ensure proper coordination and orderly proceedings. Page 9 of 9

DR. ANTONIO G.M. LA VIA


Section 22: Corporate Powers a. POWERS (1) continuous succession in its corporate name (2) sue and be sued (3) have and use a corporate seal (4) acquire and convey real and personal property (5) enter into contracts (6) exercise other corporate powers b. continue using/modity/change corporate seals register with DILG c. NO CONTRACT CAN BE ENTERED BY LOCAL CHIEF EXECUTIVE IN BEHALF OF LGU W/O PRIOR AUTHORIZATION OF SANGGUNIAN CONCERNED d. full autonomy inexercise of proprietary functions and in the management of economic enterprises cf: authority to sue and be sued vs. entering into contracts power by local chief exec: can sue w/o authorization by sanggunian (CITY OF CALOOCAN V. CA) vs. cannot enter contracts in behalf of sanggunian w/o authorization by sanggunian (but cf: Ordonez v. Gustillo) MUNICIPALITY OF ECHAGUE V. ABELLERA (FERRIES CASE) -Municipality has the power to acquire or establish municipal ferries. Admin Code confers to LGUs the power to supervise public utilities and this was intended to provide additional sources of revenues to the LGUs for the maintenance of their maintenance and operations Section 23: Authority to Negotiate and Secure Grants GR: local chief execs + authority given by sanggunian concerned can negotiate and secure financial grants/donations in support of basic services or facilities from local and foreign assistance agencies W/O CLEARANCE OR APPROVAL OF NATIONAL AGENCIES X: if w/ NATIONAL SECURITY IMPLICATIONS Section 24: LIABILITY FOR DAMAGES LGUs and local officials not exempt from liability if: 1. death 2. injury 3. damage to property *dapat daw with MALICE OR NEGLIGENCE *NOT AUTOMATIC LIABILITY, BUT MERE SUABILITY

Cha Mendoza

LOCAL GOVERNMENT REVIEWER (for finals!)


MUNICIPALITY OF SAN FERNANDO V. FIRME (in exercise of governmental function CANNOT BE SUED) IN GENERAL GR: State may not be sued w/o its consent: X: when theres consent Express Consent: embodied in a general law or a special law Implied Consent >money claims involving liability arising from contracts >when govt enters into business contracts, thereby descending to the level of the other contracting party >when the State files a complaint FOR MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS: Suable because their charter provided that they can sue and be sued in cases of TORTS, GR: liable if in the discharge of a proprietary capacity X: not liable if committed in the discharge of governmental functions CITY OF MANILA V. IAC (in exercise of proprietary function) can be sued GUILATCO V. CITY OF DAGUPAN: LGU would be liable under NCC for defective roads under its control and supervision in case of death or injury (prove it is under LGUs control and supervision) PECHUECO SONS CO V PROVINCIAL BOARD OF ANTIQUE: cannot apply doctrine of estoppel on the municipality to validate a contract CITY OF MANILA V. TARLAC DEVELOPMENT CORP - The rule is clear, and it is supposed by abundant authority, that a consent decree, in which the officials of a municipality assumed obligations not authorized by law, is null and void. The fact that, by consent of the municipal officers, an agreement or stipulation made by them has been put in the form of a judgment, in an effort to give it the force and effect of a judgment, does not cure a lack of power in the officers to make it, and if such power is lacking, the judgment as well as the stipulation is void. An invalid contract is not validated by a judgment consented to by the municipality, expressly stipulating that such a contract is valid and binding. Intergovernmental Relations Section 25: National supervision over LGUS a. PRESIDENT: *general supervision over LGUS ensure that their acts are w/n the scope of their prescribed powers and functions (cf ArtX, Sec4) Page 10 of 10

DR. ANTONIO G.M. LA VIA


*supervisory authority (1) DIRECTLY over: provinces, HUCs, ICCs (2) INDIRECTLY .through PROVINCE: component cities and municipalities through CITY AND MUNICIPALITY: brgys b. national agencies and offices w/ project implementation functions: coordinate w/ LGUs, ensure participation of LGUs in planning and implementation c. President may direct appropriate national agencies to provide FINANCIAL/TECHNICAL/OTHER FORMS OF ASSISTANCE to LGUs upon request, no extra cost d. National Agencies (including GOCCs) should furnish monthly reports to local chief executives concerned DOCTRINE OF QUALIFIED POLITICAL AGENCY not applicable to local government officials CARPIO V. EXEC SEC -the President has control of all executive departments, bureaus and offices - recognizes the establishment of a single executive - all elective and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of the various executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in person (or) the exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive. *DADOLE V. COA -here, recovnized that Congress exercises power of control over LGUs and President exercises power of supervision over acts of LGUs -President may only interfere in the affairs and activities of a LGU if he/she finds that the latter has acted contrary to law RADIA V. REVIEW COMMITTEE LG are not attached to the DILG in the same sense that bureaus and offices under the DOJ. Provinces and Municipalities are instrumentalities or units of LG, vested with their own legislative and executive powers under the LGC. So DILG does not have power to decide WON to remove LGU employee. Cha Mendoza

LOCAL GOVERNMENT REVIEWER (for finals!)


*So summary: the Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency recognizes that there is a single executive, the President, which exercises CONTROL over all executive departments, bureaus and offices. Since the president cannot perform all administrative functions of the a Chief Executive, all the adjuncts of the Executive Department are deemed as agents of the President through which the President acts. The president, thus, could exercise CONTROL over the acts of his/her agents. HOWEVER, local government units, particularly the local chief executives, are not covered by the DOCTRINE OF QUALIFIED POLITICAL AGENCY the President could only exercise general supervision over them. They are territorial and political units vested with their own legislative and executive powers, unlike agencies attached to the Executive Department. DRILON V. LIM -the exercise of SOJ of reviewing the validity of tax ordinances is a mere exercise of supervision by the Executive through the SOJ, as in review, the SOJ merely determines WON the officials concerned (the sanggunian) performed their functions in accordance with law Section 26: Duty of National Government Agencies in the Maintenance of Ecological Balance -national agency/ GOCC authorizing or involved in planning and implementation of any project or program (that may cause deterioration of the environment) -should CONSULT with >LGU >NGO >PO Community -what: envt and ecological balance measures that will be undertaken to minimize the adverse effects SECTION 27: PRIOR CONSULTATIONS REQUIRED -project by govt authorities (no mention WON national or local project) 1. consultation under SeC2: continuing consultation Sec26: consultation with LGUs, NGOs, Pos and the Community if it would involve environmental impact on the community 2. PRIOR APPROVAL by Sanggunian concerned Page 11 of 11

DR. ANTONIO G.M. LA VIA


3. If it would involve eviction: SHOULD PROVIDE APPROPRIATE RELOCATION SITES FIRST PROVINCE OF RIZAL V. EXEC SECRETARY Section 27, LGC requires that before a project by government is implemented, there should be: 1. Consultation in accordance with Sections 2 and 26; and 2. Prior approval of the Sanggunian concerned Section 28: Power of the Local Chief Executives over the Units of the PNP -operational supervision and control of local chief executives over >PNP >Fire protection units >jail management personnel -governed by DILG Act of 1990 INTERLOCAL GOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS SECTION 29. Provincial Relations with Component Cities and Municipalities Province(gov): ensure that every component city or municipality w/n its territorial jurisdiction acts w/n the scope of its prescribed powers and functions *HUCs and ICCs: independent of Province (cf: Section 25) Section 30: Review of Executive Orders Who reviews executive orders of subordinate local chief executives Gov (province): - component city mayor - municipal mayor (w/n jurisdiction) City/Municipal Mayor: Punong Brgy w/n his jurisdiction *copies of orders fwdd to Gov or City/Municipal Mayor w/n 3 days from issuance review WON ultra vires if fails to act w/n 30d: deemed consistent w/ law, presumed Valid CASINO V. CA Review: reconsideration/reexamination for purposes of correction the power of review is exercised to determine WON it is necessary to correct the acts of the subordinate and to see to it that he performs his duties in accordance with law.

Cha Mendoza

LOCAL GOVERNMENT REVIEWER (for finals!)


Section 31: submission of Municipal Questions to the Provincial Legal Officer or Prosecutor Section 32: City and Municipal Supervision over their respective Barangays Section 33: Cooperative undertakings among Local Government Units -through appropriate ordinances: group themselves, consolidatefor purposes commonly beneficial to all -to contribute funds, real estate, equipments: >approval by Sanggunian concerned >after a public hearing conducted for the purpose >terms and conditions through a MOA Relations with Peoples and NGOs Section 34: Role of POs and NGOs -active partners in the pursuit of local autonomy MAGTAJAS V. PRYCE PRPERTIES CORP INC. Though PAGCOR had the legal authority to open and operate a casino in CDO (and so the efforts of the civil society were useless in this case), it should re-examine and reevaluate its decision in the light of the vigorous opposition of the people Section 35: Linkages w/ Pos and NGOs -joint ventures -cooperative arrangements -purpose: >delivery of basic services >capacity building >livelihood projects >develop local enterprises Section 36: Assistance to Pos and NGOs -through Local chief executives -concurrence of the sanggunian concerned -provide financial assistance Local Pre-qualifications, Bids and Awards Committee -for the conduct of prequalification of contractors, bidding, evaluation of bids & recommendation of awards concerning local INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS -local chief executive = chair of the committee Page 12 of 12

DR. ANTONIO G.M. LA VIA


LOCAL TECHNICAL COMMITTEE: TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE -composed: *local engineer *local planning and development coordinator *chair designated Local Government Units BARANGAY Descript ion ni sir conduit for democracy MUNICIPALI TY general purpose government functional unit of LGUs CITY More urbanized and developed general purpose government Sec 448: general purpose government (same as Municipality) PROVINCE Conduit for LGUs

ROLE

Sec384: a. basic politic al unit b. prima ry planni ng and imple menti ng unit c. forum

MANNE R OF CREATI ON OFFICIA LS IN GENER AL

Sec 440: general purpose government for coordination and delivery of basic, regular and direct services and effective governance of the inhabitants w/n its territorial jurisdiction See earlier table

Dynamic mechanism for development al processes and effective governance of LGUs w/n its territorial jurisdiction

Sec387: *punong barangay *7 sangguniang Barangay

Section 443: *municipal mayor *municipal Vmayor *Sanggunian

Section 454: *city mayor *vice mayor *Sanggunian g Panlungsod

Section 463: *governor *vice gov *members of the Sangguniang

Cha Mendoza

LOCAL GOVERNMENT REVIEWER (for finals!)


members *SK chair *brgy secretary *brgy treasurer g Bayan members (MANDATOR Y APPOINTIVE OFFICERS) *secretary to the Sangguniang Bayan *municipal treasurer *municipal assessor *municipal accountant *municipal budget officer *municipal planning and development coordinator *Municipal engineer/buil ding official *municipal health officer *municipal civil registrar **heads of depts. (subject to concurrence of the majority of all sangguniang bayan members + subject to civil service law, rules and members (MANDATOR Y APPOINTIVE OFFICERS) *secretary to the Sangguniang Panlungsod *city treasurer *city assessor *city accountant *city budget officer *City planning and development coordinator *city engineer/buil ding official *city health officer *city civil registrar *city administrato r *city legal officer *city vet *city social welfare and development officer *city general services officer *heads of depts. (subject to Panlalawigan (MANDATOR Y APPOINTIVE OFFICERS) *secretary to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan *provincial treasurer *provincial assessor *provincial accountant *provincial engineer *provincial budget officer *provincial planning and development coordinator *provincial legal officer! *provincial administrato r *provincial health officer *provincial social welfare and development officer *provincial general services officer *provincial agriculturist *provincial vet

DR. ANTONIO G.M. LA VIA


regulations) (DISCRETIO NARY APPOINTIVE OFFICERS) *municipal administrato r *municipal legal officer *municipal agriculturist *municipal environment and natural resources *municipal architect *municipal information officer concurrence of the majority of all sangguniang bayan members + subject to civil service law, rules and regulations) (DISCRETIO NARY APPOINTIVE OFFICERS) *city architect *city information officer *city agriculturist *city population officer City environment and natural resources officer *city cooperative officer TMTM (DISCRETIO NARY APPOINTIVE OFFICERS) *provincial population officer *provincial natural resources and environment officer *provincial cooperative officer *provincial architect *provincial information officer

Chief Executi ve Powers BARANGAY Sangguniang Kabataan 423: Creation and Election -Composition: 1. SK Chair (elected)

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LOCAL GOVERNMENT REVIEWER (for finals!)


2.. 7 members 3. secretary 4. treasurer -QUALIFICATIONS: 15 to 18 (on the day of election) Katipunan ng Kabataan -all citizens of the Philippines actually residing in the barangay for at least 6 months 15 but less than 18y.o. ON THE DAY OF THE ELECTION duly registered in the list of SK/in the official barangay list in the custody of the barangay secretary REYES V. FERRER -KB (former KK) still exists as an entity as shown by MC 87-18 of Ministry of Local Government ALUNAN V. MIRASOL -elections for SK officers are not subject to the supervision of COMELEC in the same way that contests involving SK officials do not fall w/n the jurisdiction of COMELEC (SK elections not covered by OMNIBUS ELECTIONS CODE) GARVIDA v. SALES -Less than 18y.o.a = not over 18, not beyond 18: 18 y x 365 d MUNICIPALITY Sec442: Requisites for Creation (d) municipalities de jure MUNICIPALITY OF CANDIJAY V. CA -subsequent govt acts point to states recognition of municipality created under a void EO of its continued existence as municipality De facto municipal corp? -defect was cured by Section 442(d) of LGC: provides that if municipal district organized pursuant to Presidential issuances/Eos have respective set of elective municipal officials holding office at the time of effectivity of this Code = considered REGULAR municipalities Sec444: powers of Chief Executive (1) general supervision and control of all municipal programs, projects, services and activities (2) enforces all laws and ordinances, and implements all municipal programs, projects, services and activities Page 14 of 14

DR. ANTONIO G.M. LA VIA


(3) initiates and maximizes the generation of resources and revenues and applies them to the priorities (4) ensures the delivery of basic services (5) exercises such powers and performs such duties as may be prescribed by law or ordinance OLIVARES V. SANDIGANBAYAN Power to issue permits and licenses for holding activities for any charitable or welfare purpose expressly provided by LGC MUNEZ V. ARINO -mayors no longer allowed to issue warrants, determine probable cause ORDONEZ V. GUSTILLO -as the Mayor represents the municipality in its business transactions, signs on its behalf all contracts and official documents made in accordance w/ law/ordinance, directs the formulation of municipal devt plans and programs which upon approval by the Sangguniang Bayan, he will execute and implement, there was no need for a new authority to sign it. (so may prior approval na, no need for another approval!) cf Sec22 LOPEZ V. CSC -if the City Charter designates the Sanggunian to appoint employees of the City council (but it is generally vested with the MAYOR), special law prevails over general law so MAYOR DOES NOT HAVE POWER TO APPOINT in this case STO DOMINGO V. ORDONEZ -the local chief executive who appoints a local officer ALSO HAS THE POWER TO REMOVE SAID OFFICIAL in accordance with the disciplinary jurisdiction of the Mayor LAGANAPAN V. ASEDILLO -the exercise of the power of discipline must be done in accordance with law NESSIA V. FERMIN -mayor may be held liable for damages for official inaction, which brings to standstill the administrative process and the public is left in the darkness of uncertainty ACEBEDO OPTICAL COMPANY V. CA business permit (not license) Cha Mendoza

LOCAL GOVERNMENT REVIEWER (for finals!)


-while a business may be regulated, such regulation must, however, be w/n the bounds of reason Sangguniang Bayan: Powers, Duties basically legislative powers of Congress delegated to local legislative bodies MUNICIPALITY OF MALOLOS V. LIBANGANG MALOLOS INC no longer controlling It is the municipal mayor, w/ authorization of the Sangguniang Bayan that has primary power to issue licenses for operation of ordinary cockpits. (NOW, NO SUPERVISION ON THE PART OF THE PHILIPPINE GAMEFOWL COMMISSION) LTO V. CITY OF BUTUAN Powers of LTO and LFTRB unaffected by LGC. Under LGC, some functions of DOTC were transferred to LGUs -LGUs now have power to regulate operation of trike for hire and to grant franchises for operation of tricycles .SUBJECT TO THE GUIDELINES IMPOSED BY DOTC MUNICIPALITY OF SAN JUAN V. CA -Municipality is be liable for unclosed manholes made in connection with laying gas, water, sewer and other pipes w/n its territorial jurisdiction -so STRICT LIABILITY UNDER NCC AUTOMATIC IF THE EXCAVATION W/C CAUSED THE INJURY IS RELATED TO THESE PIPELAYING ACTIVITES *~*~*~* CITY v. MUNICIPALITY -both general-purpose government -CITY: more urbanized and developed barangays vs. MUNICIPALITY: just barangay *but there are a few differences in services rendered(See Sec17) *IRA allocated differently for Cities and Municipalities MUNICIPALITY/CITY v. BARANGAY SIZE: Barangay smaller, CITY/MUNICIPALITY: composed of several barangays (at least 2) PURPOSE: Barangay is the conduit for democracy (primary planning and implementing unit/forum); CITY/MUNICIPALITY: General purpose government MUNICIPALITY/CITY v.PROVINCE Province: Conduit for LGUs services *Dynamic? look at the big picture, long-term view Page 15 of 15

DR. ANTONIO G.M. LA VIA


WHY CITY/MUNICIPALITY charged with delivery of services? Why not make barangay general purpose government? Why not PROVINCE? 1. size 2. scale 3. costs *City and municipality general purpose government because its level wherein it is most cost-effective to deliver services *Province/national level too large-scale; difficult to track work e.g. Solid Waste Management *~*~*~*~* THE CITY On requisites for creation Mariano, Jr. v. Comelec, 242 SCRA 211 (1995) Mete and bound requirement MANDATORY BUT this is an exceptional case. Congress has refrained from using the metes and bounds descriptions of land areas of other LGU with unsettled boundary disputes (not an exemption!) Plebiscite rule HOW IS CITY CREATED: By Act of Congress + plebiscite w/n120d by votes cast in by those directly affected *can a city be made from 2 municipalities? YES, by act of congress *IF municipality converted to an independent component city, should the whole province vote? YES. Whole province directly affected! If city not an ICC: not necessary to include whole province REQUISITES: *are these requirements absolute? Can congress make a city which does not follow the requisites in LGC? League of Cities v. COMELEC F: 16 cities created, not complying with the income criteria for cities in the LGC H: Black-letter law justification: The creation of local government units must follow the criteria established in the Local Government Code and not in any other law. There is only one Local Government Code. The Constitution requires Congress to stipulate in the Local Government Code all the criteria necessary for the creation of a city, including the conversion of a municipality into a city. Congress cannot write such criteria in any other law, like the Cha Mendoza

LOCAL GOVERNMENT REVIEWER (for finals!)


Cityhood Laws. Therefore, Congress cannot make cities which does not comply with the criteria in LGC! -on EPC violation: There is no substantial difference between the pending th cities of the 11 Congress and the other cities which were not yet pending -why did the League opposed these cityhood bills: their share in the IRA would be diminished! (which is SO WRONG as the purpose of LGC is to make these LGUs independent from the National Government!) -What should have the congress have done to make these municipalities as cities: >amend the LGC first >amend the IRA law: Review the incentives! Section 451: classification of cities CLASSIFICATION OF CITIES (3) Why classification? Whats the significance: if the city wants to become part of a province or not INDEPENDENT COMPONENT CITIES: -component cities -charters prohibit their voters from voting for provincial elective officials -independent of the province -ICC may be declared as such by Congress! Congress has a choice! HIGHLY URBANIZED CITIES -min population of 200k inhabitants AND -latest annual income of at least P50M amended so now P100M -also not entitled to vote for elective provincial officials *has right to have a representative in congress? Minimum requirements for electorate? -automatically proclaimed a highly urbanized city once it vs. ICC (not automatically proclaimed) COMPONENT CITIES -did not meet the requirements for highly urbanized cities -allow their voters to participate in the election of provincial officials and whose annual income or population does not qualify them to be highly urbanized Officials of city government Mama, Jr. v. CA, 196 SCRA 489 (1991) -It is within the legal competence of the City Council of Ozamis, in the exercise of its sound discretion, to create such other offices as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of the city government or consolidate the Page 16 of 16

DR. ANTONIO G.M. LA VIA


functions of any one of such offices with another in the interest of efficiency and economy. -It may also create, consolidate, and reorganize city offices and positions wholly supported by local funds -The City Council has no obligation to keep a useless office of a position that is neither needed nor in the public interest by reason of, as in this case, financial losses and incapacity to render adequate public services Powers of chief executives Social Justice Society (SJS), Cabigao and Tumbokon v. Atienza, 7 March 2007 It is the duty of the Mayor to enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of the city, pursuant to Sec 455 (b)(2) of LGC. It is a ministerial duty. Ordinance enacted pursuant to the police power delegated to LGUs, a principle described as the power inherent in a government to enact laws, within constitutional limits, to promote the order, safety, health, morals and general welfare of the society. Sanggunian has power to reclassify lands within the jurisdiction of the city. Sir was included in this case: SJS wanted Mayor Atienza to enforce the Ordinance In the Philippines, a lot of our oil are imported. Pandacan was set aside as the oil base for Manila. But since we were not strict for land use (residential area first, but converted to industrial area with the construction of the oil depot, then with the ordinance, converted to commercial). 9-11 was an opportunity for LGU to have the oil depot to leave. Spot zoning should not be allowed! (SIR) Zoning is the power of the Sangguian. Now the oil depots are faced with the problem of relocation. This case shows that land use is a powerful power which should be exercised rationally. SIR: Why should we change LGC when we have not yet maximized the potentials of the LGUs GORDON V. VERIDIANO -the power to issue licenses includes the power to revoke it, but the latter is limited by the authority to grant license: can only revoke license if theres a violation of the condition for granting of that license. If license granted by authority of another body (i.e. a national agency), then it may only be revoked when theres a violation of the guidelines of that other authority CITY OF CALOOCAN V. CA

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LOCAL GOVERNMENT REVIEWER (for finals!)


-mayor has the authority to file suits for recovery of funds and property on behalf of the city, even w/o prior authorization from sanggunian APPOINTIVE LOCAL OFFICIALS COMMON TO ALL MUNICIPALITIES, CITIES AND PROVINCES Mandatory vs. Optional Mandatory: required: the LGU has the duty to appoint Optional: its the choice of the appointing official to appoint it Pattern: Determine WON the function/duty performed is crucial to the delivery of the basic services or to the operation of the local government ACCOUNTABILITY OF LGUS Mandatory positions 1. Sanggunian Secretary 2. Treasurer 3. Assessor 4. Accountant 5. Budget Officer 6. Engineer 7. Planning and Development Coordinator 8. Health Officer 9. Legal Officer, also optional 10. Civil Registrar 11. Administrator, also optional 12. Agriculturist 13. Social Welfare and Development Officer Optional Asst. Treasurer Legal Officer Asst. Assessor Administrator Agriculturist Social Welfare and Development Officer SENRO Who appoints generally: head of local government Subject to confirmation: *first level civil service eligible? highest or basic level?

DR. ANTONIO G.M. LA VIA


ROLE of CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION: Power to check if the appointees are qualified for the positions they cannot appoint or change the appointment -what if there is a violation of the Civil Service Law: then the CSC has the power to remove the appointed official disapprove the appointment Usual qualifications (1) he is a citizen of the Philippines (2) a resident of the local government unit concerned (3) of good moral character (4) a holder of a college degree preferably in (course concerned) from a recognized college or university, and (5) a first grade civil service eligible or its equivalent. (6) He must have acquired experience (relevant field) for at least five (5) years in the case of the city or provincial appointive official, and three (3) years in the case of the municipal appointive official *Treasurer and Asst. Treasurer: appointed by SOF Basic job description Assessor: real property values Accountant: internal auditor of the LGU Treasuer: collection of local taxes Budget Officer: allocation of budget Cases On treasurer Macalincag v. Chang, 208 SCRA 413 (1992) Municipal treasurer was under the DOF as provided in Section 3 of PD 477 (SABI NI PIMENTEL). SOF is proper disciplining authority to issue preventive suspension order. Mayor/Gov may still exercise power to investigate erring local officials pursuant to Sections 444(x), 455(x) and 456 (x) of LGC. -HISTORY OF POWER TO APPOINT TREASURER: before (PD 477) Provincial Treasurers and Assessors appoint municipal treasurers. Then power to appoint transferred to SOF (PD 921). Chang argues that the power to discipline him should be vested on the President who he alleges that under EO 392 had the power to appoint him. However, under the Civil Service Law, the heads of the departments have the power to discipline and PD 477 provides that SOF has disciplinary supervision over municipal treasurers. -as re: replacement required: Both the CIVIL SERVICE LAW and the then LGC does not require a replacement to be appointed first before the preventive suspension would be effective. OLD LGC even provides that in the case of temporary disability of the treasurer, the assistant treasurer would Cha Mendoza

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automatically take-over his position. PREVENTIVE EFFECTIVE UPON CHANGS RECEIPT THEREOF SUSPENSION

DR. ANTONIO G.M. LA VIA


PIMENTEL: Requirement under OLD LGC that City Engineer must have been an Asst. City Engineer or has engaged in the practice of his profession for at least 5 years NO LONGER CONTROLLING On Health Officer Alba v. Perez, 154 SCRA 225 (1987) Dr. Perez is a national government employee, thus entitled to the salary increase. He is included among the national officials performing municipal functions under the direct control of the Health Minister and not the city mayor. Provincial and city health officers are all considered national government officials irrespective of source of funds for their salary because preservation of health is a national service. PIMENTEL: Not controlling anymore. LGC makes Local Health Officers local officials. Pandi v. CA, 380 SCRA 436 (2002) * IPHO-APGH: Integrated Provincial Health Officer-Amai Pakpak General Hospital -Governor Mutilan of Lanao had no authority to appoint Saber as OIC IPHOAPGH since at the time he made the appointment, IPHO-APGH was still under national government, officials paid from national funds entirely. Sabers appointment VOID. -Section 478, LGC: not a grant of powers to governors and mayors to appoint local health officers but simply a directive that those empowered to appoint local health officers are mandated to do so (so DUTY, NOT POWER) -Designation made by Macacua after EO 133 valid. -After EO 133, the ARMM Local Code was passed. Under the ARMM Local Code, the provincial health officer was converted from a regional government official to a provincial official, and thus is under the general supervision and control of the Provincial Governor and not of the Regional Secretary of Health. It is only after the ARMM Code that Governor Mutilan could have validly appointed Saber as OIC IPHO-APGH. On Legal Officer Grio v. CSC, 194 SCRA 458 (1991) legal officer as a confidential officer Quoting Cadiente v. Santos, a city legal officer is one requiring that utmost confidence on the part of the mayor. The relationship existing between a lawyer and his client, whether a private individual or a public officer, is one that depends on the highest degree of trust that the latter entertains for the counsel selected. Being a primarily confidential, the Provincial Atty.s services can be terminated based on loss of confidence and trust. -As regards the staff: legal work involved can be delegated. They do not occupy primarily confidential positions, instead, they occupy positions that are remote from the appointing authority and are subject to the supervision Cha Mendoza

On Budget Officer Lira v. CSC, Jaranilla, 144 SCRA 541 (1986) -PD 1375 transferred the local budget administration from the Ministry of Finance to the Ministry of Budget. Liras position as part of the Office of the Mayor is but a budget policy-determining arm of the local chief executive, otherwise it would be performing same functions as the Local Budget Staff of the City Treasurers Office. PD 1375 created the new position of City Budget Officer as a result of the transfer and since its a new position, its open to ALL QUALIFIED! -QUALIFICATIONS: 3yr experience in treasury service or equivalent in budgeting or in any related field + minimum qualification requirements, subject to Civil Service Law and approval of Commissioner of Budget. Local Chief Executives discretion and prerogative in his choice of appointee to a new office is limited: should consider only those who are qualified and eligible. -Liras appointment was not done pursuant to Local Budget Circular No. 8 which requires that if a Local Budget Officer be appointed before June 19, 1980, the said officer should be issued a new appointment to the position. Lira was not issued a new appointment, nor was her appointment approved by the Minister of Budget. -Jaranilla has more experience: 6 years budgeting work vs. 2 years in Liras case. Court, CSC found her more qualified than Lira On Engineer Genoblazo v. CA, 174 SCRA 124 (1989) Manila City Engineer was authorized to issue a demolition order on his finding that the disputed structures are dangerous and structures within the meaning of the National Building Code (dangerous or ruinous). Patagoc v. CSC, 185 SCRA 411 (1990) -CSC cannot disapprove the appointment made by the City Mayor when the appointed official is qualified. The power of appointment is essentially discretionary and the Commission cannot substitute its judgment for that of the appointment power. CSC under PD 807 may only approve or disapprove the appointment after determining WON the appointee possesses the appropriate civil service eligibility or the required qualifications. It cannot order or direct the appointment of a successful protestant. -Both Patagoc and the Incumbent Asst. City Engineer were qualified.

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and control of the legal officer, who can ensure that the judiciary duties inherent in the attorney-client relationship are observed. Accordingly, they enjoy security of tenure as mandated by the Civil Service Law. Ramos v. CA, 269 SCRA 34 (1997) GR: Only the provincial fiscal, provincial attorney and municipal attorney should represent a municipality in its lawsuits. Only accountable public officers may act for and in behalf of public entities and that public funds should not be expended to hire private lawyers. X: 1. when the municipality is an adverse party in a case involving the provincial government or another municipality or city within the province; 2. if and when the provincial fiscal is disqualified to represent in court a particular municipality; 3. when the original jurisdiction of a case involving the municipality is vested in the Supreme Court 4. in a case involving the municipality, he or his wife, or child is pecuniary involved as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise. OTHER PROVISIONS APPLICABLE TO LGUs Chapter 1 Settlement of Boundary Dispute SECTION 118. Jurisdictional Responsibility for Settlement of Boundary Dispute. GR: settle amicably X: if not able to settle amicably, refer for settlement to Sanggunian concerned (a) bet 2+ Brgys in the same city or municipality: Sangguniang Panlungsod/Bayan concerned (b) bet 2+ municipalities w/n same province: Sangguniang Panlalawigan (c) bet municipalities/component cities of DIFFERENT PROVINCES: jointly to Sangguinang Panlalawigans (d) component city/municipality vs. HUC 0r bet 2+ HUCs jointly referred to the respective sanggunians (e) if FAILED TO EFFECT AMICABLE SETTLEMENT W/N 60D FROM DATE DISPUTE WAS REFERRED: ISSUE CERTIFICATE then formally tried by sanggunian concerned, decide w/n 60d from date of certification Section 119: Appeal -elevate decision of Sanggunian to proper RTC -jurisdiction determined by location of area in dispute -RTC decide w/n 1yr fr filing *status quo maintained pending dispute Local Initiative & Referendum Page 19 of 19

DR. ANTONIO G.M. LA VIA


Sec 120: Local Initiative Defined -legal process whereby the registered voters of a LGU may directly propose, enact or amend any ordinance *a form of DIRECT INITIATIVE: the voters themselves start the legislative process for the enactment, amendment, or repeal of an ordinance or resolution in the absence of positive action of the sanggunian INDIRECT INITIATIVE: voters want a piece of legislation or an ordinance or resolution enacted, amended, or repealed but they do not do so directly; they course their action through their elected representatives in the national legislature *may cover all sorts of measures as long as these are w/n the competence of the sanggunian to enact Sec121: Who may Exercise Initiative and Referendum -all registered voters of the PCMB Sec122: Procedure in Local Initiative (a) petition filed w/ Sanggunian proposing the adoption, enactment, repeal, or amendment of an ordinance by 1k registered voters: Provinces and cities .100 registered voters: Brgys (b) no favorable action w/n 30d from presentation: proponents (through duly authorized and registered reps) invoke power of initiative give notice to Sanggunian concerned (c) proposition NUMBERED SERIALLY STARTING FROM ROMAN NUMERAL I. COMELEC extend assistance (d) 2+ propositions may be submitted in an initiatie (e) Collect number of signatures: *period (counted from NOTICE to Sanggunian): -90d: provinces and cities -60d: municipalities -30d: Brgys *may designate stations for collecting signatures: in a public place in the LGU *whose presence required: -election registrar/rep -rep of proponent -rep of Sanggunian concerned (f) CERTIFICATION of number of obtained signatures: after lapse of periods provided determine WON required signatures obtained if failed to obtain the required number of signatures: wala na Cha Mendoza

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(g) If obtained: COMELEC set a date for the initiative (proposition shall be submitted to the registered voters of the LGU concerned for their approval) *period: w/n ___days from date of CERTIFICATION -60d: provinces and cities -45d: municipalities -30d: brgys results certified and proclaimed by COMELEC Sec 123: Effectivity of Local Propositions -approved by a MAJORITY OF THE VOTES CAST take effect 15d after COMELEC Certification Sec 124: Limitations on local Initiatives (a) only 1x per year (b) subject: those w/n legal powers of Sanggunians to enact (c)if Sanggunian adopts the proposition before initiative held, local chief exec approves the same: Initiative cancelled but those against such action may still apply for initiative Sec125: Limits upon Sanggunians -CANNOT repeal, modify or amend proposition/ordinance approved through initiative w/n 6m from date of approval; can only do so 3y AFTER by a vote of 3/4 of all members (18m for brgys) Sec126: Local Referendum Defined -legal process whereby the registered voters of the LGU may approve, amend, or reject any ordinance enacted by the Sanggunian -held under CONTROL AND DIRECTION OF COMELEC w/n *60d: Provinces and cities *45d: municipalities *30d: brgys -COMELEC certifies and proclaims results Sec127: proposition approved pursuant to an initiative/referendum may be declared null and void by the proper courts Grounds: 1. violation of COnsti 2. want of capacity of Sanggunian concerned to enact measure Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority v. Comelec, 262 SCRA 492 (1996): In enacting the Initiative and Referendum Act, Congress differentiated one term from the other, thus: Initiative Referendum -Power of the people to propose -power of the electorate to Page 20 of 20

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amendments to the Constitution or to propose and enact legislations through an election called for the purpose -Indirect initiative: exercise of initiative by the people through a proposition sent to Congress or the local legislative body for action -3 systems of initiative: 1. Initiative on the Constitution: petition proposing amendments to the Constitution 2. Initiative on Statutes: petition proposing to enact a national legislation 3. Initiative on local legislation: petition proposing to enact a regional/provincial/city/municipal/barangay law, resolution or ordinance -resorted to by the people directly either because the lawmaking body fails or refuses to enact the law/ordinance/resolution/act that they desire or because they want to amend or modify one already existing. approve or reject a legislation through an election called for the purpose.

-2 classes: 1. Referendum on statutes: petition to approve or reject an act/law, or part thereof, passed by Congress 2. Referendum on local law: petition to approve or reject a law/resolution/ordinance enacted by regional assemblies and local legislative bodies -the lawmaking body submits to the registered voters of its territorial jurisdiction, for approval or rejection, any ordinance or resolution which is duly enacted or approved by such lawmaking authority

PEOPLE AND STRUCTURES IN THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT ELECTIVE OFFICIALS Qualifications and Election Section 39. Qualifications General Requirements (a) citizen of the Philippines (regardless if natural born or naturalized CO v ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL OF THE HOUSE) (b) registered voter in the LGU (if exec) or district (if Sanggunian) (c) resident therein for at least 1 yr immediately preceding the day of the election ABELLA V. COMELEC, SUPRA:difference between place of work vs. place of domicile: domicile (where the person ultimately wants to reside, intent to return) vs. place of work; residence = domicile` - IMPORTANT UNG ANIMUS REVERTENDI DUMPIT-MICHELENA V. BOADO: to successfully effect a change of domicile, there must be a clear and positive proof of concurrence of the Cha Mendoza

LOCAL GOVERNMENT REVIEWER (for finals!)


ff: (1) an actual removal or an actual change of domicile; (2) a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one; (3) acts which correspond w/ the purpose. (d) able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect (e) AGE REQUIREMENT: at least *23 y.o. on election day: GOV/VICE GOV/mem of Sangguniang Panlalawigan (PROVINCE) or MAYOR/Vmayor/member of Sangguniang Panglungsod (HUC) *21 y.o. on election day: MAYOR/VMAYOR of ICCs, Component cities and municipalities *18y.o. on election day: mem of Sangguniang Panglungsod (ICC, Component cities)/bayan (component municipality) *18y.. on election day: Punong Barangay/mem of Sangguniang Barangay *at least 15 y.o. but not more than 21 y.o.a. on election day: Sangguniang Kabataan Section 40. Disqualification a. sentenced by FINAL JUDGMENT for an offense involving moral turpitude punishable by 1 year or more of imprisonment .w/n 2yrs after serving sentence MORENO V. COMELEC: if under probation, not serving sentence anymore and restored to all civil rights lost or suspended as a result of conviction b. removed from office as a result of an administrative case c. convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of allegiance of the Republic a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to 2+ states MERCADO V. MANZANO: Dual citizenship vs. dual allegiance (see corresponding items for def) d. those w/dual citizenship* - w/ concurrent application of the different laws of 2 or more states, the person is simultaneously a national by the said states *In Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003 (DUAL CITIZENSHIP LAW), a natural-born citizen who lost Philippine Citizenship by naturalization of a foreign country should: (1) take oath; (2) make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship; (3) should not be occupying a public office abroad ; and/or (4) not in active service as commissioned/non-commissioned officers e. fugitives from justice: criminal/nonpolitical cases here/abroad: includes not only those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise those who, after being charged, flee to avoid Page 21 of 21

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prosecution. ESTABLISH INTENT TO EVADE (RODRIGUEZ V. COMELEC) f. permanent residents of a foreign country have acquired right to reside abroad + continue to avail the same right after the effectivity of this Code g. insane or feebleminded GREGO V COMELEC: no provision for retroactive application is it a lifetime ban for local office the fact that you have been administratively removed you are disqualified? It seems so under Section 40 (b). understood to be removal FOR CAUSE BRY SJ: seems unfair that one cannot run for being removed through an administrative case but those sentenced by final judgment for criminal conviction can run again if pardoned unconditionally Marge: under B, the lawmakers may have thought that these persons were already given the opportunity to work for the government but did not perform well Section 41: Manner of Election (a) AT LARGE/THROUGHOUT THE TERRITORIAL JURISDICITON OF THE LGU CONCERNED *Gov/vgov: entire province *mayor/vmayor: entire city/municipality *punong brgy: entire brgy (b) BY DISTRICT: regular mems of the various sanggunians (c) BY BARANGAY: mems of Sangguniang Brgy (d) BY LEAGUE: presidents of the leagues (e) BY SECTOR: reps of *women *workers *other sectors as determined by the Sanggunian concerned *DE GUIA V COMELEC: why by district for Sangguian mems: to reduce the number of positions to be voted for and ensure the efficiency of electoral processes Section 42: Date of Elections -every 3 yrs nd -on 2 Monday of May Section 43: Term of Office a. FOR ALL LOCAL ELECTIVE OFFICIALS: 3yrs b. NO SERVICE FOR MORE THAN 3 CONSECUTIVE TERMS in the same position Cha Mendoza

LOCAL GOVERNMENT REVIEWER (for finals!)


voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time: not considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for the elective official concerned was elected c. BRGY OFFICIALS AND SK MEMS: 3 YEARS Cf: Art X, Sec8 BORJA V. COMELEC: not enough that SERVED 3 consecutive terms; should also have been ELECTED to the same position for the same number of times (so if only succeeded the office, not applicable) *Sa president and VP, if VP continues the term for more than 2 years, then he cannot run for President. 4 years and above considered a full term. ONG V ALLEGRE: for the 3-term limit for elective local officials to apply, 2 conditions or requisites must concur: (1) the official concerned has been elected for 3 consecutive terms to the same local government post (2) he has FULLY SERVED 3 consecutive terms. -SERVICE NOT FULL when involuntary interruption/break in continuity of service -BUT: considered full term if declared loser in a mayoralty electoral protest OSMENA V. COMELEC: the legislature cannot extend the term of office by providing that they shall hold over until their successors are elected and qualified DIMAPORO V. MITRA: term vs. tenure TERM: may not be extended or shortened by the legislature TENURE: period during w/c an officer holds the office may be affected by circumstances w/n or beyond the power of said officer * in this case, once a Congressman files for candidacy to another position when his TERM is not yet completed (so his tenure was just for the period w/n w/c he was a congressman), he is deemed to have voluntarily cut short his tenure. His term may be continued by another person *in practice, can run again after 3 consecutive terms after lapse of 1 year *policy wise, its a term limits are bad ideas: Reason: family dynasties discouraged, long-term totalitarian rule BUT OPPOSITE HAPPENS! if people wants their local government officials, let the official govern them long term planning difficult with term limits *if Vice mayor becomes a mayor when mayor dies, is that considered a term? Page 22 of 22

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Vacancies and Succession Section 44: Permanent Vacancies in the Office of the Governor (local chief execs) PERMANENT VACANCY: when an ELECTIVE LOCAL OFFICIAL 1. fills a HIGHER VACANT OFFICE 2. refuses to assume office 3. fails to qualify 4. dies 5. removed from office 6. voluntarily resigns/otherwise 7. permanently incapacitated to discharge the functions of his office IF PERMANENT VACANCY OCCURS IN THE OFFICE OF *Gov/Mayor: VICE gov/mayor becomes gov/mayor *gov and vice gov/mayor and vice mayor: highest ranking sanggunian member/second highest ranking (in case of permanent inability) subsequent vacancies: filled automatically by other sanggunian mems ACCORDING TO RANKING *PUNONG BRGY: highest ranking sanggunian barangay mem. IN CASE OF TIE: draw lots! Successors: serve only the unexpired terms of their predecessors Ranking: determined on basis of proportion of votes obtained by each winning candidate to the total number of voters in each district in the immediately preceding local election MENZON V. PETILLA: VACANCY: when there is no person lawfully authorized to assume and exercise at present the duties of the office -in case of temporary vacancy in the VICE POSITION, and the code is silent, THE PRESIDENT, THROUGH DILG SEC may appoint the temporary replacement *QUESTION: is this still applicable, when the code states that in case of vacancy in the VICE position, the highest ranking sanggunian mem would become vice??? GOVS OF THE PHILIPPINES V. PIMENTEL: NOT APPLICABLE ANYMORE. These cases were ruled during the time of AQUINO where there was no CONSTI yet and the DILG sec may appoint officials who would support the presidentNOW, THERE IS AUTOMATIC SUCCESSION QUESTION: what if theres a permanent vacancy in the sanggunian, as caused by the permanent vacancy in the local executiveseto na: Cha Mendoza

LOCAL GOVERNMENT REVIEWER (for finals!)


Section 45: Permanent Vacancies in the Sanggunian -applies when 44 does not apply (no more sanggunian member that could fill up the spot vacant) -permanent vacancy filled by APPOINTMENT of: a. PRESIDENT (THROUGH EXEC SEC note: not DILG sec): Sangguniang Panlalawigan .Sangguniang Panlungsod of HUCs Sangguniang Panlungsod of ICCs b. GOVERNOR: .Sangguniang Panlungsod of component cities .Sangguniang Bayan c. CITY/MUNICIPAL MAYOR: sangguniang Brgy, upon recommendation of Sangguniang Brgy Concerned ON RECOMMENDEES/NOMINEES GR: nominated by the political party under w/c the sanggunian mem concerned had been elected and whose elevation to the next higher position created the last vacancy TERM: serve the unexpired term REQUISITES: (1) nomination (2) certificate of membership of the appointee from the highest official of the political party concerned X: 1. sangguniang brgy vacancy: recommendation of Sangguniang Brgy concerned 2. if sanggunian member DOES NOT BELONG TO ANY POLITICAL PARTY: recommendation of sanggunian concerned, Appointed by LOCAL CHIEF EXECUTIVE (same as those above: FARINAS v. BARBA) 3. when vacancy in the REPS: automatically filled by the official nex in rank of the org concerned: a. youth b. brgy rep to the sanggunian of a municipality, city or province Section 46: TEMPORARY VACANCY in the OFFICE OF THE LOCAL CHIEF EXEC a. FOR GOV/CITY OR MUNICIPAL MAYOR/PUNONG BRGY: -temporarily incapacitated to perform his duties for physical/legal reasons: *LOA *travel abroad *suspension from office Page 23 of 23

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VICE or highest ranking Sangguniang Brgy mem in case of PUNONG BRGY shall AUTOMATICALLY EXERCISE GR: POWERS AND PERFORM DUTIES AND FUNCTIONS OF THE LOCAL CHIEF EXEC X: power to *appoint *suspend *dismiss employees can only exercise 3 if temporary incapacity EXCEEDS 30d TERMINATION OF TEMPORARY INCAPACITY 1. submission to appropriate sanggunian of a written declaration by the local chief exec concerned that he has reported back to office 2. LEGAL CAUSES: submission of necessary docs showing that the legal cause no longer exist if absence caused by TRAVEL w/n country but OUTSIDE TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION for less than or equal to 3d: designate in writing OIC OIC: anyone -authorization should specify powers, duties, functions -if no authorization/designation given + if absent for MORE THAN 3 days: vice gov/ city/municipal mayor/ highest ranking Sanggunian Barangay mem may assume powers of local chief exec Sec 47: LOAs By whom, who approves: a. GOV/mayor of HUC/ mayor of ICC: president b. Vice gov/ vice mayor: local chief exec concerned c. Sanggunian mems: vice concerned d. Component city/municipality mayor: gov e. Punong brgys: city/municipal mayor f. Sanggunian brgy mems: punong brgy if application for LOA not acted upon w/n 5 working days from receipt: deemed approved Local Legislation SECTION 48. Local Legislative Power. - Local legislative power shall be exercised by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan for the province; the Sangguniang Panlungsod for the city; the Sangguniang bayan for the municipality; and the Sangguniang Barangay for the Barangay. SECTION 49. Presiding Officer. Cha Mendoza

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vice-governor: Sangguniang Panlalawigan; city vice-mayor: Sangguniang Panlungsod; municipal vice-mayor: Sangguniang bayan; Punong Barangay: Sangguniang Barangay. The presiding officer shall vote only to break a tie. *if absent: temporary presiding officer among themselves: if they constitute a quorum + only among those present SECTION 50. Internal Rules of Procedure. RULES of procedure st adopted, update on 1 regular session w/n90d after CONTENTS 1. Organization, standing committees, jurisdiction of each committee, election of chair 2. order and calendar of business 3. legislative process 4. conduct of members during sessions 5. discipline of members for DISORDERLY BEHAVIOR .ABSENCES W/O JUSTIFIABEL CAUSE FOR 4 CONSECUTIVE SESSIONS CONVICTION by FINAL judgment to imprisonment of at least 1 yr: AUTOMATIC EXPULSION SECTION 51. Full Disclosure of Financial and Business Interests of Sanggunian Members. SECTION 52. Sessions. Min # of regular sessions: 1/week: Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Sangguniang Sangguniang Bayan 2/month: Sangguniang Barangay *special sessions: -called by local chief exec/majority of sanggunian .-when public interest demands *sessions OPEN TO PUBLIC X: closed-door session security decency .morality *no 2 sessions in 1 day SECTION 53. Quorum MAJORITY of ALL mems elected and qualified Page 24 of 24

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If none: -presiding officer may declare a recesss -majority of mems may adjourn from day to day -majority of mems may compel immediate attendance if member absent w/o justifiable cause if wala pa rin: NO BIZ TRANSACTED, DECLARE SESSION ADJOURNED FOR LACK OF QUORUM SECTION 54. Approval of Ordinances. -present to the local chief exec concerned, who may: a. approve it: affix signature on EACH AND EVERY PAGE b. veto and return w/ OBJECTIONS (should state reasons Sec 55!): Sanggunian may reconsider it, override veto by 2/3 vote of ALL MEMS c. sit on it: deemed valid after lapse of period 15d for province .10d for municipality or city -if Brgy Ordinance: approval of majority of all mems + approval of punong brgy *APPROVAL OF LOCAL CHIEF EXEC NOT A MINISTERIAL ACT (DE LOS REYES V. SANDIGANBAYAN) *Presumption of validity also applicable to ordinances. Police power also delegated to LGUs. Should show clear violation of Consti or law. This is not delegated, it is constitutionally recognized. *Proof required to contest the constitutionality of ordinance: substantive evidence only, not proof beyond reasonable doubt. Lowest quantum of evidence required. Lagcao v. Labra, supra. (1) For an Ordinance to be valid, USE TATEL STANDARDS! conditions 1-6 are generally applicable to all laws. The requirement that it is within the corporate powers of the LGU is the special condition for LGUs. Tano v. Socrates, 278 SCRA154 (1997) PRESUMPTION OF CONSITUTIONALITY Ordinances enacted in the exercise of the powers under the Code (Gen Welfare Clause) enjoy the presumption of constitutionality. In the light of the principles of decentralization and devolution enshrined in the Code and of the powers granted therein to local government units which unquestionably involve the exercise of police power, the validity of ordinances relative to the protection and preservation of the environment, cannot be doubted. To Cha Mendoza

Panlungsod

and

LOCAL GOVERNMENT REVIEWER (for finals!)


overthrow this presumption, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not merely a doubtful or argumentative contradiction. *par 2, Sec 5, par8: enumerations presumed to be constitutionally valid, thats why SC has the power to review those enumerated. SECTION 55. Veto Power of the Local Chief Executive GROUND: *it is ultra vires *it is prejudicial to the public welfare reasons stated in writing ITEM VETO: does not affect the item or items not objected to items vetoed should be overrided by Sanggunian or else the previous items concerning those vetoed would be deemed reenacted LIMIT: ONLY VETO AN ORDINANCE ONCE: once approved by 2/3 of ALL mems of Sanggunian, cannot veto again! *why exercise similar powers of congress but dont have contempt powers: NORECO case. Legislatures power is inherent to them vs. local legislative bodies its delegated! But isnt there separation of powers in the local levels as well? Contempt powers inherent in the Judiciary. + powers of local governments should be explicitly provided for. NEGROS ORIENTAL II ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD OF DUMAGUETE (1987) There being no provision in the LGC explicitly granting local legislative bodies, the power to issue compulsory process and the power to punish for contempt, the Sangguinang Panlungsod of Dumaguete is devoid of power to punish petitioners for contempt! Review of Ordinances Section 56: Review of Component City and Municipal Ordinances (and Resolutions) -done by Sangguniang Panlalawigan/provincial attorney/prosecutor -if no action w/n30d after submission: presumed consistent w/ law, valid MODAY V. CA: Sanggunian can only hold a resolution as invalid ON THE SOLE GROUND THAT IT IS BEYOND THE POWER OF THE SANGGUNIAN CONCERNED, OR THE MAYOR TO ISSUE IT MUNICIPALITY OF PARANAQUE V. VM REALTY CORP: ORDINANCE V. RESOLUTION ORDINANCE RESOLUTION Page 25 of 25 law

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Merely a declaration of the sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking body on a specific matter temporary rd Only needs 3 reading if decided by a majority of all sanggunian mems

General and permanent rd Needs 3 reading

Section 57: Review of Brgy Ordinances by the Sangguniang Panlungsod or Bayan Section 58: Enforcement of Disapproved Ordinances/Resolution -sufficient ground for SUSPENSION/DISMISSAL OF THE OFFICIAL OR EMPLOYEE CONCERNED Section 59: Effectivity of Ordinances/Resolutions GR: 10d after copy is posted in bulletin board + at least 2 other conspicuous places X: ORDINANCE/RESOLUTION PROVIDES OTHERWISE Disciplinary Actions * Maraming Bar Exam Questions dito! Also in PubOff so the grounds will not be discussed really * What applies to appointive local officials? Civil Service Law, Code of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act *Elective officials usually rely on subordinates. Is it a ground for disciplinary action? [Arias v Sandiganbayan ] SECTION 60. Grounds for Disciplinary Actions. - An elective local official may be disciplined, suspended, or removed (DSR) from office on any of the following grounds: (a) Disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines; (b) Culpable violation of the Constitution; (c) Dishonesty, Oppression misconduct in office gross negligence dereliction of duty; (d) Commission of any offense involving moral turpitude or an offense punishable by at least prision mayor (6Y,1D TO 12Y); (e) Abuse of authority; (f) Unauthorized absence for fifteen (15) consecutive working days, Cha Mendoza

LOCAL GOVERNMENT REVIEWER (for finals!)


members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Sangguniang Panlungsod, Sangguniang bayan, and Sangguniang Barangay (not regularly going to work everyday. Only required to be in sessions); (g) Application for, or acquisition of, foreign citizenship or residence or the status of an immigrant of another country; and (h) Such other grounds as may be provided in this Code and other laws. *REMOVAL: BY ORDER OF PROPER COURTAn elective local official may be removed from office on the grounds enumerated above by order of the proper court. *JURISDICTION: IMPT! Reliance on Good Faith a valid defense (but it doesnt mean you can be careless) ARIAS V. SANDIGANBAYAN. 180 SCRA 309 (1989): Arias should have probed records, inspected documents, reviewed procedures, and questioned persons. It is doubtful if any auditor of a fairly sized office could personally do all these things for all vouchers presented for his signature. The Court would be asking for the impossible. All heads of offices (mayors and governors included) have to rely to a reasonable extent on their subordinates an on the good faith of those who prepare bids, purchase supplies, or enter into negotiations. DELOSO V. SANDIGANBAYAN, 217 SCRA 49 (1993) -ENTERING INTO AN ORAL CONTRACT (LATER REDUCED INTO WRITING BY SANGGUNIAN) IS NOT A GROUND FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION Section 61: Form and Filing of Admin Complaints -VERIFIED COMPLAINT -to whom: *against any elective official of a province/HUC/ICC/component city: Office of President *against any elective official of a municipality: Sangguniang Panlalawigan, appealable to Office of the President *against any elective brgy official: Sangguniang Panlungsod or Bayan, deci FINAL AND EXECUTORY Section 62: Notice of Hearing Section 53: Preventive Suspension WHO IMPOSES on WHOM *President: elective official of a province/HUC/ICC Page 26 of 26
EXCEPT:

DR. ANTONIO G.M. LA VIA


*Governor: elective official of a municipality or component city *Mayor: elective official of a brgy WHEN IMPOSED -anytime when the issues are joined (answer already fi.led) -when the evidence of guilt is strong -given the gravity of the offense, there is great probability that the continuance in office of the respondent could .influence the witness .pose threat to the safety and integrity of the records and other evidence *1 preventive suspension: MAX 60d If several administrative cases filed: max 90d/yr on same ground/s existing and known at time of first suspension REINSTATEMENT: expiration of preventive suspension Abuse of power of preventive suspension = abuse of authority *The OMBUDSMAN also has power to suspend local officials (example: Merceditas Gutierrez suspended Mayor Pewee Trinidad of Pasayun lang wala daw basis ung suspension so ultra vires) The Presidents power of Preventive Suspension comes from the power of general supervision (vs. Control: president cannot control the LG executives, cannot substitute his decision) YABUT V. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN A preventive suspension is not meant to be a penalty but a means taken to insure the proper and impartial conduct of an investigation. A preventive suspension may be ordered even before the charges are heard, as well as before the official concerned is given an opportunity to prove his innocence, being merely a measure that is precisely designed in order not to hamper the normal course of an investigation through the use of influence and authority. *In practice they do credit suspension prior to administrative decision *In a way it is a penalty because you would lose your salary for those days you are preventively suspendedthats why usually it is credited. CARPIO V. EXEC SEC -The President may preventively suspend only 3 categories of local elective officials: (a) those of a province; (b) those of a highly urbanized city and (c) those of an independent component city. -Under the so-called doctrine of qualified political agency, the members of the Cabinet may act for and in behalf of the President in certain matters because the President cannot be expected to exercise his control (and supervisory) powers personally and all at the same time. He may, therefore, have to delegate some of his powers to his Cabinet members except when he is required by the Constitution or law to act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he acts personally. Cha Mendoza

LOCAL GOVERNMENT REVIEWER (for finals!)


ESPIRITU V. MELGAR BEFORE LGC the Minister of Local Government to impose preventive suspension if the respondent is a provincial or city official (or) the provincial governor if the respondent is an elective municipal official. *Now, the Secretary of DILG is not mentioned as one of those officials who have any power to suspend any subordinate elective official. The only officials authorized by the Code to impose preventive suspension under appropriate circumstances are the President, the governor and the mayor. GANZON V. CA -simultaneous service of the suspension orders - allowing petitioner to serve simultaneously the overlapping third and fourth suspensions will favor him (and presumably the local constituency) and certainly lessen if not offset the harsh effects of the respondent Secretary in issuing those successive suspension orders. *DILG Sec still suspends, by order of the President (para matanggal ung political taint ng suspension) BUNYE V. ESCAREAL -SANDIGANBAYAN is mandated to preventively suspend a local official if a criminal case is filed against him (but max of 90d only) Section 64: Salary of Respondent pending suspension -during suspension: NONE -if exonerated and suspended: would be paid full salary including those during suspension Section 65: Righst of Respondent Full opportunity to appear and defend himself in person or by counsel To confront and cross-examine witness against him To require attendance of witnesses and the production of documentary evidence in his favor through subpoena Section 66: Form and Notice of Deci FORM: in writing SUSPENSION: shall not exceed the unexpired term of the respondent a period of 6m for every administrative offense -not a bar to the candidacy of the respondent as long as he meets the qualifications required for office (cf: Section 40: REMOVAL IS A BAR) REMOVAL: considered bar to candidacy! Page 27 of 27

DR. ANTONIO G.M. LA VIA


Section 67: Administrative Appeal -w/n30d from receipt APPEALED TO WHOM FROM WHOM: *SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN: >Sangguniang Panlungsod of component cities >Sanggunian Bayan *Office of the President: >Sangguniang Panlalawigan >Sangguniang Panlungsod of HUCs > Sangguniang Panlungsod of ICCs *Deci of PRESIDENT FINAL AND EXECUTORY ??? IF DECI SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD AND SANGGUNIANG BAYAN CONCERNS ADMIN CASES VS. BRGY OFFICIALS, AND WHOSE DECISIONS ARE DEEMED FINAL AND EXECUTORY UNDER SECTION 61, WHY IS IT STILL APPEALABLE? Section 68: decisions may be executed pending appeal During pendency of appeal: considered placed under preventive suspension Chapter 5 Recall *it is a special election, One is automatically a candidate *recall can not be conducted when THERE IS NOT FUNDS *IS RECALL APPLICABLE TO CONGRESSMEN? TO senators? NO. LGC does not apply to them! SECTION 69. By Whom Exercised for loss of confidence (ONLY GROUND) by the registered voters of a local government unit to which the local elective official subject to such recall belongs. GARCIA V. COMELEC, 227 SCRA 100 (1993) - HISTORY OF RECALL H: Recall is a mode of removal of public officer by the people before the end of his term of office. an incident of their sovereign power and in the absence of constitutional restraint, the power is implied in all governmental operations. has been held to be indispensable for the proper administration of public affairs. frequently described as a fundamental right of the people in a representative democracy. maiden appearance: 1973 Constitution, Section 2 of Article XI: Batasang Pambansa shall enact a local government codedefining a more responsive and accountable local government structure with an effective system of recall Cha Mendoza

LOCAL GOVERNMENT REVIEWER (for finals!)


.The Batasang Pambansa then enacted BP 337 entitled The Local Government Code of 1983. Section 54 of its Chapter 3 provided only one mode of initiating recall elections of local elective officials, i.e., by petition of at least 25% of the total number of registered voters in the local government unit concerned. -Our legal history does not reveal any instance when this power of recall as provided by BP 337 was exercised by our people. In February 1986, however, our people more than exercised their right of recall for they resorted to revolution and they booted of office the highest elective officials of the land. Section 3, Article X of 1987 Constitution reiterated the mandate for Congress to enact a local government code which shall provide for more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum. In response to this constitutional call, Congress enacted LGC of 1991. LGC of 1991 provided for a second mode of initiating the recall process through a preparatory recall assembly which in the provincial level is composed of all mayors, vice mayors and sanggunian members of the municipalities and component cities. A reading of the legislative history of these recall provisions will reveal that the idea of empowering a preparatory recall assembly to initiate the recall from office of local elective officials originated from the House of Representatives and not the Senate. The legislative records reveal there were 2 principal reasons why this alternative mode of initiating the recall process through an assembly was adopted, viz: (a) diminish the difficulty of initiating recall through the direct action of the people; and (b) to cut down on its expense. Our lawmakers took note of the undesirable fact that the mechanism initiating recall by direct action of the electorate was utilized only one in the City of Angeles, Pampanga, but even this lone attempt to recall the city mayor failed. Former Congressman Cainglet explained that this initiatory process by direct action of the people was too cumbersome, too expensive and almost impossible to implement. Consequently, our legislators added in the second mode of initiating the recall of local officials that this second mode may cause instability in the local government units due to its imagined ease. EVARDONE V. COMELEC Loss of confidence as a ground for recall is a political question. In the words of the court, WON the electorate of the Municipality of Sulat has lost confidence in the incumbent mayor is a political question. It belongs to the realm of politics where only the people are the judge. Page 28 of 28

DR. ANTONIO G.M. LA VIA


Loss of confidence: a ground for recall: a formal withdrawal by an electorate of their trust in a persons ability to discharge his office previously bestowed on him by the same electorate. Section 70. Initiation of the Recall Process. a. The Recall of any ELECTIVE PROVINCIAL, CITY, MUNICIPAL OR BARANGAY
OFFICIAL

shall be commenced by: >petition of a registered voter in the local government unit concerned >supported by the registered voters in the local government unit concerned during the election in which the local official sought to be recalled was elected subject to the following percentage requirements: 1. At least 25%: voting population of not more 20,000; 2. At least 20%: voting population of at least 20,000 but not more than seventy-five thousand (75,000): Provided, That in no case shall the required petitioners be less than 5,000; 3. At least 15%: voting population of at least 75,000 but not more than 300,000: Provided, however, That in no case shall the required number of petitioners be less than 15,000; and 4. At least 10%: a voting population of over 300,000 Provided, however, That in no case shall the required petitioners be less than forty-five thousand (45,000). b. PROCEDURE: 1. A written petition for recall duly signed by the representatives of the petitioners before the election registrar or his representative, shall be filed with the Comelec through its office in the local government unit concerned. 2. CONTENTS: a. The names and addresses of the petitioners written in legible form and their signatures; b. The barangay, city or municipality, local legislative district and the province to which the petitioners belong; c. The name of the official sought to be recalled; and d. A brief narration of the reasons and justifications therefore. 2. COMELEC certify sufficiency of number required 3. if sufficient in form: COMELEC provides official sought to be recalled a copy of the petition .publish it and post it Purpose: allow interested parties to examine and verify the validity of the petition and the authenticity of the signatures contained therein. Cha Mendoza

LOCAL GOVERNMENT REVIEWER (for finals!)


3. COMELEC also proceed with independent verification and authentication of signatures -challenge/protest may be filed (w/n 20d) 4. acceptance of candidates: includes automatically the name of the official sought to be recalled ANGUBUNG V. COMELEC -petition must be filed NOT BY ONE PERSON ONLY but by the minimum required votes SEC. 71. Election on Recall. - Upon the filing of a valid petition for recall with the appropriate local office of the Comelec COMELEC set the DATE OF THE ELECTION OR RECALL: not later than 30 days upon the completion: barangay, city or municipal officials, 45 days in the case of provincial officials. The officials sought to be recalled shall automatically be considered as duly registered candidate or candidates to the pertinent positions and, like other candidates, shall be entitled to be voted upon. Section 72: Effectivity of Recall -only upon election and proclamation of a successor: person receiving highest number of votes cast -if official sought to be recalled won: continue office Section 73: Prohibition from Resignation -official sought to be recalled CANNOT RESIGN while the recall process is in progress Section 74: LIMITS ON RECALL 1. once during term of office for each local elective official 2. no recall w/n .1yr from date of officials assumption of office .1 yr immediately preceding a regular local election (where the position of the official to be recalled is to be actually contested and filled by the electorate ANGUBONG V. COMELEC) Section 75: Expenses of Recall Elections SHOULDERED BY COMELEC! ON IRA Section 284 ALLOTMENT OF INTERNAL REVENUE -share in the national internal revenue taxes Page 29 of 29

DR. ANTONIO G.M. LA VIA


-currently at 40% Can be reduced to MAX 30% when: -national government incurs an unmanageable public sector deficit -authorized by PRESIDENT -upon recommendation of *SOF *SILG *SBM -subject to consultation w/ *presiding officers of both houses of congress *presidents of liga _automatically released!

Cha Mendoza

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