COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS Submitted by: SANDRA MAY B.

GRUPO

MARIA ELOISA ROCHA, vs. EMILIA TUASON Y PATIO, widow of Jose Gregorio Rocha,
FACTS: The appellee moved for the appointment of an administrator for the estate of Jose Gregorio Rocha, deceased. The Court then ordered for hearing to be set inorder that the appointment of an administrator be determined. Thereafter, said order was appealed.The appellee contends that the order appealed from is not appealable and that the appeal should be dismissed. ISSUE: Whether or not the order setting the hearing can be appealable. RULING: An order of a court setting a day for a hearing is not an appealable order. Such an order decides no controversy, affects no rights, and determines nothing. It simply gives the parties an opportunity to be heard and the court an occasion for action. The objection of the appellant to the continuance of the proceedings for the appointment of an administrator was not in real sense a motion; and the expression of the court is not to be taken literally when in denied "the countermotion" of the appellant. The objection interposed by the appellant to the continuance of the proceeding to appoint an administrator, as stated in the objection papers, was valueless for any purpose. The proper procedure for appellant was to appear on the day set for the hearing and present her objections to the proceeding and support them by such evidence or argument as she may have had. Then if the court had appointed an administrator over her objections she would have had some definite ruling of the court, obtained in a legal manner, that would have been subject to exception. But the mere objection that a motion or proceeding be heard at all is neither a countermotion nor a motion, nor does it have any effect whatever in law. As a result a mere objection in a proceeding to appoint an administrator to the effect that the court should not hear the proceeding has no value and produces no effect in law.

MONICO CONCEPCION vs. PACIENCIA STA. ANA

FACTS: An action was instituted to annul the sale made by the late Perpetua Concepcion, sister of the plaintiff, of three parcels of land with the improvements thereon to the defendant. The complaint alleges, among others, that the plaintiff is the only surviving legitimate brother of Perpetua Concepcion, who died on or about January 28, 1948, without issue and without leaving any will; that in her life time, said Perpetua Concepcion, in connivance with the defendant and with intent to defraud the plaintiff, sold and conveyed three parcels of land for a false and fictitious consideration to the defendant, who secured transfer certificates of title of said lands issued under her name and that the defendant has been in possession of the properties sold since the death of Perpetua Concepcion, thereby causing damages to the plaintiff. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it does not state a cause of action, because the deceased being the owner of the properties sold had the right to enjoy and dispose of them without further limitation than those established by law.

ISSUE: Whether or not the deceased Perpetua Concepcion has transmitted to the plaintiff any right arising from the contract under consideration in order that he can bring an action to annul the sale voluntarily made by her to the defendant with a false consideration. RULING: As the deceased had no forced heir, she was free to dispose of all her properties as absolute owner thereof, without further limitation than those established by law, and the right to dispose of a thing involves the right to give or to convey it to another without any consideration. The plaintiff in the present case, not being a forced heir of the late Perpetua Concepcion, can not institute an action to annul under article 1300 or to rescind under article 1291 (3) of the Civil Code the contract under consideration entered into by the deceased with the defendant.

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
In the case of Rocha vs Tuason, the court ruled that a mere objection in a proceeding to appoint an administrator to the effect that the court should not hear the proceeding has no value and produces no effect in law. Hence, a mere order stating that the the countermotion of Sr. Varela is denied". The objection of the appellant to the continuance of the proceedings for the appointment of an administrator was not in real sense a motion; and the expression of the court is not to be taken literally when in denied "the countermotion" of the appellant. The objection interposed by the appellant to the continuance of the proceeding to appoint an administrator, as stated in the objection papers, was valueless for any purpose While in the case of Concepcion vs Sta Ana, ruled that a valid sale may not be annulled for false consideration because the plaintiff contending so possesses no right to bring an action to annul the sale voluntarily made by her to the defendant with a false consideration. The striking difference between the two cases is that, the ruling in the Rocha case was based merely on a procedural question while that of the Concepcion case answered a substantial quality as to vested right to annul a transaction or sale.

Rights of the Adopted Child

I. a) Q: inheritance? Can the adoptee represent the adopter in the

A: Although ART V, SEC. 17 of RA 8552 provides that adoptee shall be considered the legitimate son/daughter of the adopter(s) for all intents and purposes and as such is entitled to all the rights and obligations provided by law to legitimate sons/daughters born to them without discrimination of any kind. Such right does not extend to the right of representation. As cited in the case of Teotica vs Del Val, the Court ruled that : The Adopted child cannot represent adopter to inherit from the latters parents (because there is no filiation between adopted child and adopters parents. Legal filiation exists only between adopter and adopted. Under our law, the relationship established by adoption is limited solely to the adopter and the adopted and does not extend to the relatives of the adopting parents or of the adopted child. Hence,

no relationship is created between the adopted and the collaterals of the adopting parents. As a consequence, the adopted is an heir of the adopter but not of the relatives of the adopter.

b) Q: Can the biological parents inherit from the estate of the adopted child in the presence of the legitimate child? A: No, the biological parents cannot inherit in the presence of a legitimate child unless otherwise provided under testamentary succession.

c)

Q:

Is the adopted child an intestate heir of: 1) his biological parents and other blood relatives? A: Yes, the adopted child is an intestate heir of his biological parents and other blood relatives. PD 603 , art 39 expressly provides that : The adopter shall not be a legal heir of the adopted person, whose parents by nature shall inherit from him, except that if the latter are both dead, the adopting parent or parents take the place of the natural parents in the line of succession, whether testate or interstate.

2) Adopting parents and blood relatives of the adopting parents? A: The adoptee can be an intestate of the adopting parents however the adoptee cannot be an intestate heir of the blood relatives of adopting parents. Article 39 of RA 8552 provides that the adoption shall: Xxx 4. Make the adopted person a legal heir of the adopter: Provided, That if the adopter is survived by legitimate parents or ascendants and by an adopted person, the latter shall not have more successional rights than an acknowledged natural child. Hence, if the adoptee is the sole heir of the adopting parents then he can inherit the entire estate of the adopting parents. However, if the adopter is survived by legitimate parents or ascendant and the adoptee, then the adoptee can only inherit as much as an acknowledged natural child. d) Q: If both parents and adopter survives the adopted child, who shall inherit? A: We have two contrasting provisions of the law on this. PD 603, Art 39 expressly provides that : The adopter shall not be a legal heir of the adopted person, whose parents by nature shall inherit from him, except that if the latter are both dead, the adopting parent or parents take the place of the natural parents in the line of succession, whether testate or interstate.

However, RA 8552 Sec 18 provides that: In legal and intestate succession, the adopter(s) and the adoptee shall have reciprocal rights of succession without distinction from legitimate filiation. However, if the adoptee and his/her biological parent(s) had left a will, the law on testamentary succession shall govern. In view of these contrasting provisions, it is submitted that the recent special law must be observed. Hence, the legitimate parents and adoptee must have reciprocal rights. e) Q: Is the adopter entitled to his legitime of the estate of the adopted child? A: Yes, the adopter is entitled to his legitime of the estate of the adopted child if the biological parents are still alive. RA 8552 Section 16. Parental Authority. Except in cases where the biological parent is the spouse of the adopter, all legal ties between the biological parent(s) and the adoptee shall be severed and the same shall then be vested on the adopter(s). Article 39. Effects of Adoption. - The adoption shall: Xxx : Provided, further, That any property received gratuitously by the adopted from the adopter shall revert to the adopter should the former predecease the latter without legitimate issue unless the adopted has, during his lifetime, alienated such property. Hence, adopter shall be entitled to his legitime .