Princeton University Press

Utilitarianism, Vegetarianism, and Animal Rights Author(s): Tom Regan Source: Philosophy & Public Affairs, Vol. 9, No. 4 (Summer, 1980), pp. 305-324 Published by: Blackwell Publishing Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2265001 . Accessed: 15/08/2011 22:25
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TOM REGAN

Utilitarianism, Vegetarianism, and AnimalRights

is Philosophy notoriousforits disagreements. Give two philosophers the same premisesand we are not surprised thattheydisagreeoverthe conclusion theythinkfollowsfromthem. Give them the same conclusion and we expect them to disagree about the correctpremises. My remarksin this essay fall mainly in this latter category.Peter Singer and I both agree that we have a moral obligationto be vegetarians.This is our commonconclusion.We do not agree concerning whywe have this obligation.Important differences exist betweenus regarding premisesfromwhichthisconclusionshouldbe derived.' the My positionimplies boththat (a) the idea of animal rightsis intelligible2and also that (b) the view that certain animals have certain rightsmust play a role in adequately grounding the obligationto be
i. These differences broughtout most clearly in our respectivereplies to an are essay critical of our views by Michael Fox. See his "Animal Liberation: A Critique," Ethics, January 1978. See Singer's "The Parable of the Fox and the Unliberated Animals," and my "Fox's Critique of Animal Liberation," in the same issue. In this regard compare the firstchapter of Singer's Animal Liberation (New York: Random House, 1975) and my "The Moral Basis of Vegetarianism," Canadian Journalof Philosophy,October 1975. I discuss some of the differences between us at greaterlength in my "Animal Rights,Human Wrongs," a convocation address presentedat MuhlenbergCollege, Allentown,PA, in March 1979, and published in the Summer I980 issue of EnvironmentalEthics. of 2. On the intelligibility this idea see, for example, Joel Feinberg, "The Rights of Animals and Future Generations" in William Blackstone, ed., Philosophy and EnvironmentalCrisis (Athens: University Georgia Press, 1974); Tom of Regan, "Feinberg on What Sorts of Beings Can Have Rights,"Southern Journal of Philosophy, Winter 1976, and "McCloskey on Why Animals Cannot Have Rights," Philosophical Quarterly,Fall 1976.

? I980 by PrincetonUniversityPress Philosophy & Public Affairs9, no. 4

0048-3915/80/040305-19$00.95/ I

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vegetarian.I shall have more to say about my positionin the second sectionof this essay. To begin I shall note that Singer,for his part, mightaccept (a); that is, he mightaccept the view that the idea of he animal rightsis at least logicallycoherent.Clearly,however, does not accept (b). Readersfamiliarwithsomeof Singer'searlierwritings might forbe essay given for thinking otherwise.For example, in his well-known "All Animals Are Equal," he quotes Bentham'sfamous passage: "the questionis not, Can they(that is, non-humananimals) reason? nor Can theytalk? but,Can theysuffer?." Singerthencomments: as In this passage Bentham points to the capacity for suffering that gives a being the rightto equal considthe vital characteristic eration.3 Here, it perhapsbears emphasizing,Singerpointsto a particularcathe capacityfor suffering as he says a few lines or, pacity-namely, later,the capacityfor"suffering and/orenjoyment"-asthe basis for No mentionis made of utilitarian the rightto equal consideration. it On considerations. the contrary, would not be an unnatural,even if to it shouldturnout to be an incorrect, interpretation say that Singer thinksthatcertainbeingshave the rightto equal consideration inof terestsbecause of theirnature-because, as a matterof theirnature, or Singer theyhave the capacityto suffer to enjoy or both. Arguably, thatsome animals, at least, have one could be interpreted thinking as to naturalright:the right equal consideration theirinterests. of the Nor is thisright onlyrightSingermentions.To avoid the prejucalls "speciesism,"we dice which Singer,followingRichard Ryder,4 must"allow thatbeingswhichare similar(to humans) in all relevant At respectshave a similarrightto life."5 least some animals are suffisimilarto humans in "all relevant respects"; thus,at least some ciently
3. "All Animals Are Equal" originallyappeared in Philosophical Exchange i, It was reprintedin Animal Rights and Human Obligano. 5 (Summer 1974). tions, ed. Tom Regan and Peter Singer (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1976). 4. Richard Ryder, "Experiments on Animals," in Animals, Men and Morals, ed. Stanley and Roslind Godlovitchand John Harris (London: Gollancz, 1971). See also his Victims of Science (London: Davis-Poytner) I975. 5. Animal Liberation,p. 21.

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animalshave a right life,Singerimplies.Butif we ask whatthosereto spectsare in virtue whichthehumans and animals in questionhave of an equal claim to theright life,theseare thenaturalcapacitiesofthe to beings in question,whichfurther supportsinterpreting Singeras believingthatat least some animals have, as all or at least mosthumans do, certainnaturalrights-inthiscase, the naturalrightto life. Natural thoughthisinterpretation appears, Singerhas since stated clearlythatit fails to capturehis considered position.In responseto a recentcritic'scomplaintthat he has littleto say about the nature of rights, Singerwritesas follows: that I have littleto say about the nature of Why is it surprising It wouldonlybe surprising one who assumes thatmycase to rights? foranimal liberation based upon rightsand, in particular, is upon to the idea of extending rights animals. But thisis not myposition at all. I have littleto say about rights because rightsare not important to my argument.My argumentis based on the principleof equality,which I do have quite a lot to say about. My basic moral position (as my emphasis on pleasure and pain and my quoting Benthammighthave led [readers]to suspect) is utilitarian. make I littleuse of the word"rights" AnimalLiberation, in very and I could easily have dispensedwithit altogether. thinkthat the onlyright I I ever attribute animals is the "right" equal consideration to to of interests, and anything thatis expressedby talkingof such a right could equally well be expressedby the assertionthat animals' inwiththe like interests terestsoughtto be givenequal consideration of I thatI did allow of humans. (With the benefit hindsight, regret the conceptof a rightto intrudeinto my workso unnecessarily at if this point; it would have avoided misunderstanding I had not made thisconcessionto popularmoralrhetoric.) To the charge of having embroiledthe animal liberationdebate in theissue of animals'rights, As then,I plead not guilty. to who the real culprit mightbe....6 This passage leaves littleroomfordoubt as to what Singerthinks. to he His previousreferences "animal rights," thinks,not only were
6. "The Parable of the Fox and the Unliberated Animals," p.
122.

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unnecessaryforhis utilitarian position;theywere lamentable,somethinghe now "regrets," "concessionto popularmoralrhetoric" a rather than a reasonedappeal. Perhaps thisis so. Perhaps appeals to "therightsof animals"_ must bear thediagnosisSingergivesofhis own earlierefforts.do notknow. I But I do not thinkso. Granted is not uncommonforthosemounting it the box for some cause or otherto gladlyinvoke the idea of rights; grantedalso thatthis appeal is part of the stock-in-trade the moral of rhetorician, rhetorical "a device,"in D. G. Ritchie'swords,"forgaining a pointwithout the troubleof provingit"-(a "device"which,Ritchie goes on to observe, "maybe leftto the stump-orator party-journalist or but whichshouldbe discredited all seriouswriting").7 in Nevertheless, the testimony Ritchieand Singerto the contrary, of despite thereremains the possibility thatwe are drivento invoketheidea of rights for serious-minded, theoretical, non-rhetorical reasons.I believethisis true some of thetime.In particular, believethisis truein thecase of arguI ing well forthe obligation be vegetarian.I shall return this topic to to in the second section.However,my immediateinterest lies in paving the way forrationalacceptanceof thispossibility. This I proposeto do by arguingthat,shornof appeals to therights animals, Singerfails of to justify obligation be vegetarianor to treatanimals in a more the to humane manner.
I

Anyonewritingon the topic of the treatment animals must acof an knowledge enormousdebtto Singer.Because of his work, well as as workof RuthHarrison,the gruesomedetailsof factory thepioneering a farmingare finding place withinthe public consciousness.8 of All us by now know,or at least have had the opportunity findout,that to chickens are raised in incredibly crowded,unnatural environments; thatveal calves are intentionally raised on an anemic diet,are unable
7. D. G. Ritchie, Natural Rights (London: Allen & Unwin, I894). Relevant passages are included in Animal Rights and Human Obligations,p. I82. 8. See Ruth Harrison,Animal Machines (London: Vincent Stuart, I964). See also her essay, "On FactoryFarming," in Animals, Men and Morals.

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are to move enough even to clean themselves, keptin the dark most of theirlives; thatotheranimals, includingpigs and cattle,are being in raised intensively increasingnumbers. Personally,I do not know or to how anyone pretending the slightestsensitivity powers of emor pathycan lookon thesepracticeswithbenignindifference approval. utilitarianout growing ofhis professed In any event,Singer'sposition, to ism,is thatwe have a moralobligation stopeatingmeat,to become his Here is thewayhe brings case to itsmoraldestination: vegetarians. Since, as I have said, none of thesepractices(of raisinganimals inmore than our pleasures of taste,our tensively)cater foranything practiceof rearingand killingotheranimals in orderto eat themis of interests a clear instance of the sacrificeof the most important must stop this practice,and each of us has a moral obligationto the cease supporting practice.9 I wonderabout this.First,I wonderon what groundsSingerjudges Most of the people I interests." that"ourpleasuresof taste"are "trivial persons, do not regard the know, includingmany quite thoughtful to in situation thisway. Mostof themgo to a greatdeal of trouble prewheresuch foodis prerestaurants" pare tastyfoodor to find"thebest on pared. Singermightsay thatpeople who place so much importance the taste of food have a warped sense of values. And maybe theydo. thatstandsin need of rather But thattheydo, if theydo, is something which will not be found in any of Singer'spubelaborate argument, we This is not to say that the interest have in eating lished writings. food is as importantan interestas we (or animals) have in tasty avoidingpain or death.It is just to say thatit is unclear,and thatSingfood in to er has givenno argument show,thatourinterest eatingtasty is, in his words,"trivial." to Second-(and now granting Singerhis assumptionthat our inin terest eatingpleasant tastingfoodis trivial)-itis unclear how, as a he utilitarian, can argue thatwe have a moral obligationto stop supportingthe practice of raising animals intensively(this practice is
P. 9. Singer,"All Animals Are Equal," in Animal Rights and Human Obligations, 155. Page citations in the textreferto this version.

other beings in order to satisfy trivial interests of our own .

. we

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henceforth symbolizedas p) because of some statementabout the purposeof p. The questiontheutilitarian mustansweris not,(a) What is the purposeof p?. It is, (b) All thingsconsidered, what are the consequences of p, and how do theycompare to the value of the consequences thatwould resultif alternatives p were adopted and supto ported?Thus, when Singerobjectsto p on the groundthatit does not "caterforanything more than our pleasures of taste,"he gives us an answerto (a), not,as we shouldexpectfroma utilitarian, answer an to (b). The difference betweenthe two questionsand theirrespective answersis not unimportant. thoughthepurposeof p might corFor be rectly describedas thatof cateringto our (trivial) pleasures of taste, it does not followeitherthat this is a utilitarian objectionone might raise againstp-it is not,so far as I understand utilitarianism-or that, when a distinctively utilitarian it objectionis fothcoming, will dwell of on Singer'scharacterization p's purpose. His characterization also leaves out much which, from a utilitarianpoint of view, must be relevant determining morality p. to judged to be highly the of What I have in mind here is this. The animal industry big busis iness. I do not knowexactlyhow manypeople are involved it,directin lyor indirectly, certainly numbermusteasilyrunintothemany but the tens of thousands.There are, first and mostobviously, those who actuallyraise and sell the animals; but thereare many othersbesides, includingfeed producersand retailers;cage manufacturers and designers;the producers growth of stimulants and otherchemicals (for example,thosedesignedto ward offor to controldisease); those who butcher, package, and ship the meat or eggs or otheranimal products to whichSingermight(and does, as in the case of eggs frombatteryand theextension hens) takemoralexception, and veterinarpersonnel ians whose lives revolvearound the success or failureof the animal Also considerall the membersof the familieswho are the industry. of or dependents theseemployees employers. which Now, theinterests thesepersonshave in "business-as-usual," raisinganimals intensivein ly, go well beyondpleasures of taste and are far fromtrivial.These as people have a stake in the animal industry rudimentary and imor portantas having a job, feedinga family, laying aside moneyfor theirchildren's educationor theirown retirement. What do these peo-

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ple do about a job, a means of supporting or themselves theirdependof ents,if we or theysee theerror theiror our ways and become vegeit tarians?Certainly is no defenseof an immoralpracticeto plead that some people profit fromit. In the case of slavery,for example, we would not cease to condemnit merely because we were apprizedthat plantation ownersfoundit beneficial. But Singer,as a utilitarian, cannot just appeal to our moral intuitions assume that our intuitions or can be givena utilitarian basis. In the particularcase of the morality of raisinganimals intensively, Singer,as a utilitarian, cannot say that the interests those humans involvedin this practice,those whose of qualityof lifepresently bound up in it, are irrelevant. a utilitaris As ian, Singer,I believe,mustinsiston the relevanceof theirinterests as of well as the relevanceof the interests otherpersonswho are not directly involved the practicebut who mightbe adverselyaffected in by its suddenor gradualcessation. For example,the shortand long term of economicimplications a suddenor gradualtransition vegetarianto ism, by large numbersof persons,must seriouslybe investigated by It any utilitarian. is not enoughto pointout,as vegetarianssometimes do, that grains not used to feed intensively raised animals could be used to feed the starving masses of humanity;a utilitarian musthave the hard data to show that this possibility at least probable and, is judged on utilitariangrounds,desirable.The debate between Singer and Garrett Hardin over the desirability famine relief,judged on of is here and pointsto theenormity the utilitarian of principles, relevant task thatconfronts on anyone who would restvegetarianism utilitarianism.10 Thoughthe issues involvedare enormously complicatedand cannot receive anythingapproachingeven a modest airing on this occasion, one thingis certain: It is not obviously truethat the conseaffected wouldbe better, considered, intenforeveryone all quences if sive rearingmethodswere abandoned and we all (or most of us) beio. See Hardin, "Lifeboat Ethics: The Case Against Helping the Poor," PsychologyToday, September 1974; Peter Singer, "Famine, Affluence and Morality," Philosophy & Public Affairsi, no. 3 (Spring 1972). Both are reprintedin W. Aiken and H. LaFollette, eds., World Hunger and Moral Obligation (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1977). For a discussion of both views see Onora O'Neill, "The Moral Perplexities of Famine Relief," in Tom Regan, ed., Matters of Life and Death (New York: Random House, 1979).

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came (all at once or gradually) vegetarians.Some nice calculations are necessaryto show this.Withoutthem,a utilitarian-based vegetarianism cannot command our rational assent. Even the most sympatheticreader,even a "fellowtraveler" like myselfwill fail to findthe necessarycalculationsin Singer'swork.Theysimply notthere. are Singer,or a defenderof his position,can be expectedto protestat thispointby notingthatutilitarianism, he understands involves as it, acceptanceof a principle equality.Thereis some unclarity of concerning how we should interpret Singer'sunderstanding this principle. of Sometimes writesas though he thisprinciple applies to interests; sometimeshe writesas thoughit applies to treatment. shall considerthe I latteralternative below. For thepresentI shall considerhow thisprinciple is thought him to applyto interests. by At one point Singerexplains the principleof equality as follows: "The interests every of being affected an action are to be takeninto by account and giventhe same weightas the like interests any other of being" ("All Animals Are Equal," p. I52). I propose to call this "the equality of interestsprinciple."Abstractly, this principlestates that equal interestsare (and ought to be considered) equal in value, no matter whose interests theyare, and thatthe interests all affectof ed partiesare to be takeninto account. Thus, if a human's interest in avoidingpain is a non-trivial, important interest, then,giventhisprinciple,thelike interest a non-human of animal also is (and oughtto be considered) non-trivial important. and Suppose this principleis accepted and is conjoined with the prinHave we thenbeen givena utilitarian ciple of utility. basis forthe obligationto be vegetarian?I do not believe so. The problemwith the is equalityof interests principle thatit does not tell us what we ought to do, once we have taken the interests all affected of partiesinto account and counted equal interests equally. All that it tells us is that thisis something must do. If, in additionto this principle, are we we also suppliedwiththe principleof utility, are still some distance we fromthe obligationto be vegetarian.For what we would have to be shown,and what Singerfails to show,as I have argued in the above, is thatthe consequencesof all or mostpersonsadoptinga vegetarian

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than if we did not. That is all way of lifewould be better, considered, are by thatequal interests equal. not shownmerely insisting A defenderof Singermightobject that I have overlookedan imOn portantargument. a numberof occasions (for example,"All Animals Are Equal," p. I56) Singerargues thatwe would not allow to be done to human imbecileswhatwe allow to be done to moreintelligent, moreself-conscious animals; forexample,we would not allow trivial, to painfulexperiments be conductedupon these humans,whereaswe of do allow themto be conductedon primates.Thus, we are guilty a gross formof prejudice ("speciesism"): we are grosslyinconsistent fromthe moralpointof view. considerablemoral weight.But This view of Singer'sis not without utilitarian his basis forvegetarianism howdoes it strengthen avowedly of for or,moregenerally, morehumane treatment animals? Not at all, for so faras I understand issues. In orderforthisargument moral the to basis formorehumane treatment consistency providea utilitarian of animals, Singerwouldhave to show thatit would be just as wrong, on utilitarian to grounds, treatanimals in certainways as it is to treat humans in comparable ways. Singer,however,does not show, first, that, on utilitariangrounds,it would be wrongto treat humans in the ways described(here he merelyappeals to our settledconviction thatit wouldbe wrongto do this) and, second,thatit would be wrong at all, on utilitariangrounds,to treat animals in certain ways, let alone, again on utilitariangrounds,that it would be just as wrong to treatthemin these ways as it would be to treathumans. In short, a basis forthe arresembling utilitarian Singerfails to give anything for gument moralconsistency. Nor will it do, as a defense of Singer,merelyto assume that the treatmustbe violatedbythedifferential principle equalityofinterests mentof the humans and animals in question.That would have to be the since,a priori, followgrounds, shown,not assumed,on utilitarian are ing seems possible. The interestsof animals raised intensively of counted as equal to the interests human imbecileswho mightbe but the conseraised as a food source under similarcircumstances, whereas quences of treatingthe animals in this way are optimific

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would not be. More fromraisingimbecilesintensively thoseresulting of generally, dissimilartreatment beings with equal interestsmight well have greatlyvaryingconsequences. So, even grantingthat we imbecilichumans in the ways animals would not approveof treating and even assumingthatthehumans and animals are routinely treated, in themselves have an equal interest avoidingpain or death, it does basis forvegetarianism notfollowthatwe have been givena utilitarian of If or thecause ofmorehumane treatment animals generally. bythe priniciple equalitySingermeans what I have called the equalityof of we interests principle, mustconcludethathe has failed to groundthe to obligation be vegetarianon utilitarianism. in As mentioned earlier,Singer, additionto arguingthatequalityapsometimes writesas if equalityapplies to treatalso plies to interests, him at one pointsayingthattheprinment.Thus, forexample,we find of ciple of equality,as it applies to humans,"is a prescription how we humans" ("All AnimalsAreEqual," p. I 52, myemphasis). shouldtreat It is possible,therefore, that,in additionto the equalityof interests principle, Singeralso recognizesanotherprincipleof equality,what I this principle Abstractly shall call the equalityof treatment principle. thus: beings with equal interestsought to be mightbe formulated treatedequally. This principlehas an advantage over the equalityof in interests principle, thatit does professto tell us how we oughtto act: we oughtto treatbeings withequal interests equally. This prinfroma certaindegreeof vagueness,in that,by suffers ciple,however, what constitutes it equal treatitself, does not tellus how to determine to it cannotbe interpreted mean (and I do notmean to ment.Certainly suggestthat Singerthinksthat it means) that beings with equal interestsoughtto be treatedidentically; that,forexample,we oughtto give dancing lessons to pigs if we give them to little girls on the thatpigs and littlegirlsbothenjoydancing.Still,whatcounts grounds is whateverthe apas equal treatment far fromclear. Nevertheless, it criteria are,I think is fairto say thatSingerwouldagreeto propriate that thefollowing-namely, if we thinkit wrongto inflict unnecessary in pain on humans whohave an interest avoidingit,thenwe mustalso thinkit just as wrongto inflict unnecessarypain on non-humananiin mals who have an equal interest avoidingit. Not to thinkit just as

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in wrong thecase of animals as in thecase of humans,if I understand principle. Singer,would be a breach of the equalityof treatment prinMyquestionnow is this.Supposethattheequalityof treatment case forthe obligationto be vegetarian.How, if the ciple strengthens basis? If I at all, does Singerprovidethis principlewitha utilitarian I him correctly, believewe must conclude thathe fails to understand providethisprinciplewithsuch a basis. thereappear to be threepossibilities.( i ) The equality Abstractly, (2) of is of treatment principle identicalwiththeprinciple utility. The principlefollowsfromthe principleof utility. equalityof treatment by is principle presupposed theprinciple (3) The equalityof treatment in of utility. shall examine each alternative its turn. I It is implausibleto maintain that the equality of treatment (i) directsus to Utility is principle identicalwiththe principleof utility. good overnonpossiblebalance of non-moral bringabout the greatest equalbeingswithequal interests whether treating moralevil; a priori, goal is an open questhe utilitarian ly wouldbe conduciveto realizing it tion.In otherwords,a priori, is at least conceivablethatsystematic could be optimific. of violationsof the principle equalityof treatment If thisis so, thenit cannotplausiblybe maintainedthatthe two principles are identical. printhatthe equalityof treatment Possiblyit will be thought (2) in ciple followsfromutility two ways: (a) the equalityprinciplefollows logicallyfrom (is logicallyentailed by) the principleof utility; when supplied withcertainfactual prem(b) the equalityprinciple, alternative, As by ises, can be justified an appeal to utility. forthefirst to maintainthattheequality it mustagain be said thatit is implausible Certainly is of treatment principle entailedby the principleof utility. the it appears possiblethat someone mightaffirm principleof utility without principle and, at the same time,denytheequalityof treatment someone himself.To put the point differently, contradicting thereby mightmaintainthatwe oughtto act so as to bringabout the greatest evil and maintain good overnon-moral possiblebalance of non-moral that to realize thisobjectiveit may be necessaryto treatsome beings principleis not unequally.If thisis so, thenthe equalityof treatment of entailedbythe principle utility. logically

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The second argument theequalityof treatment for principle following from utilityis that the utilitarianobjective is assisted if this principle accepted.On thisview,we oughtto treatbeingswithequal is interests equallybecause, as a matter fact,thisis optimific. of Now, it is certainly open to a utilitarian argue in this way. Indeed, what I to wantto emphasizeis that,if thisis how theequalityof treatment principle is supposedto followfromtheprinciple utility, of thenit mustbe arguedfor. No such argumentis forthcoming from Singer,I believe, despite certain appearances to the contrary. There are occasions, alluded to earlier,whereSingerarguesthatwe are morally inconsistent when we allow thingsto be done to animals thatwe would not allow to be done to less developedhumans. In doingthis,Singerthinks, I understand if him correctly, violatethe equalityof treatment we principle. However, in orderforthisfinding strengthen allegedlyutilitarian to his basis for vegetarianism and animal liberation generally, Singerwouldfirst have to show (at least) thatpracticeswhichviolatethis principlealso violate the principleof utility. is not adequate merelyto assume that It thisis so, since one thereby begs the questionat issue-namely,whether the equalityof treatment does followfromtheprinciple principle of in utility, the sense of "follows from" underdiscussion.By merely noting thattheway we allow animals to be treated violatestheequalityof treatment principle, assumingthatit does, Singerfails to give us any argument opposingthistreatment animals on distinctively for of utilitariangrounds. How, then, mighthe argue, on utilitarianlines, against treating animals as theyare treated?The questionis enormously complicated. I have already alluded to its difficulty earlier,when I mentionedthe animal industry. What Singerwould have to show, I believe,is that ,theconsequences of treatinganimals as they are at presentbeing treatedare worse,all considered,than those that would resultif we treatedthem differently-for example, if theywere not raised intensively.Possiblythis could be shown. I do not know. However,Singer has notevenbegunto showthis.Andyet,if I am right, thisis precisely whathe mustshow,ifhe is to givethecase foranimal liberation utilia tarianbasis. And thisis as much as to say that,judged on his published

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a movement basis of thiskind. he writings, fails to givethisliberation (3) In defenseof Singerone mightsay that,thoughthe equality is principle not identicalto, is not entailedby and is not of treatment it by shown by Singerto be justified the principleof utility, remains presupposesequality.Thus, it is by means of thispretruethatutility makes its ensuppositionthat the principleof equalityof treatment And since equalityentersin this,a logitheory. tranceintoutilitarian cally respectable way, Singer's use of the equality of treatment basis afterall. has a utilitarian principle I do not believe this argumentholds. What groundsthereare for principle presupposesthe equalityof treatment that utility thinking and the equality betweenthisprinciple the turnon ignoring difference presupposesthe It of interests principle. is arguablethatutilitarianism that principlebeing,again, that equal principle, equalityof interests or are interests equal-that is, have likeimportance value-and thatthe partiesare to be takeninto account.Thus, the of all affected interests not us, idirects as utilitarians, to attempt principle equalityofinterests on beingsdifferently the groundsthat,for different treating to justify are in example,thoughA's and B's have a like interest C, A's interests That is have like importance. than B's. Like interests moreimportant must presupposeeven to get offthe ground. utilitarianism something prinSuppose this is true.What, then,of the equalityof treatment its theory. ciple? Nothingfollowsconcerning statuswithinutilitarian it Certainly does not followthat we ought to treatbeings with equal interestsequally just because they have equal interests.More conbased ethic. thisdoes notfollowlogicallygivena utilitarian spicuously, principlepresupposedby utilitarianNor is the equalityof treatment ism. If it were,therewould be another,more fundamentalprinciple And that, of the than utility-namely, principle equalityof treatment. withthat would be inconsistent utilitarianism, so far as I understand is of One cannothold boththattheprinciple utility theone and theory. moral principleand thatthisprinciplepresupposes onlyfundamental thatof equalityof different morefundamental and principle, another, So, 'treatment. this attemptto defend Singer's utilitarianbasis for and for animal liberationgenerally, just won't do. vegetarianism, is as follows.If Singer actually is to give a The upshot of this

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utilitarian basis forvegetarianism, must argue in a quite different he way. In particular, equalityof treatment the principlemust be given a solidutilitarian justification before can be justified usingit,as a he in utilitarian, supportof vegetarianism. in to justify this principle Now, on utilitarian grounds, Singermustshow thatacceptingit and extending its scope to the treatment animals would bringabout better of resultsthan are now obtainedby treating animals as though are not they coveredby this principle. is possiblethatthis can be shown.But to It show it would require enormous amounts of complicatedempirical data, concerning, example,thelong-term for economicimplication of Westernsociety's giving meat eating.Singergivesus no such data. up Thus, if the preceding sound,he fails to give a utilitarian is justificationof theequalityoftreatment principle, mostespeciallyofextending this principleto animals; and thus he fails to give a utilitarian basis forhis objectionsagainst meat eating. Of course,if Singerwere to insistthat,whateverthe consequences of treating animals differently, factremains, the thattreating themas theyare treatednow is a clear violationof theirrightsand so ought to be stopped-werehe to insist on this, apart from considerations about long-term consequences,thenhe would have a decidedlydifferent argument, thatdid not turnout,afterall, to be utilitarian. one For one can hardlyargue as a utilitarian and say, in effect, devil take the the consequences,it's the animal's rightsthat are being violated. So, Singercould dispense withthe need to investigate systematically the probableconsequencesof changingour eatinghabits,but he could do this onlyby payinga certainprice: givingup his beliefin an exclubasis forvegetarianism. a word,then,thedilemma sivelyutilitarian In I thinkSingermustface is this: ifhe is a utilitarian, thenhe mustgive a radically different argumentthan the one he has actually given; whereas,if he restshis case forvegetarianism theargument has on he actuallygiven,thenhe cannot continueto believethathe has givena utilitarian basis forthe moralobligation be vegetarian.Possiblythe to of appeal to therights animals is not a "concessionto popularrhetoric" afterall. That it may not be is what I hope to explain in the next section.

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II My argument the of beginsby considering situation thoseunfortunate humans to whom Singerdraws our attention-namely, menseverely tally enfeebled humans. (For convenience's sake I shall normally referto these humans as groupG.) Like Singer,I shall assume that thoughtful people would agree thatit is wrongto treatthe humans in questionin certainways-forexample, to use themin painful,trivial researchortoraise themintensively a "gourmet" as foodsource(again, as a matterof convenience,I shall normallyreferto these practices as treatment T.) So, the question that divides Singer and me is not this is wrongbut how, theoretically, wrongness whether its can most adequatelybe grounded. Now, suppose we were to concede, what is far fromcertain,that, giventhecondition theworldat present, of subjecting groupG to treatment T is not optimific. The point that needs emphasis is that,even if thisshouldhappen to be truenow, thereis no guaranteethatit will continueto be so in the future.Thus, if the treatment of group G T should, in the future,become optimific, it might,then,if we acas cepted the principleof utility our sole fundamentalprinciple,we as wouldhave no rationalchoicebutto changeourmindaboutthewrongness of the treatment question.We would have to say that using in the G's in painful,trivialresearch or raising them intensively a as food source,althoughthese once were wrong,had ceased to gourmet be so. And if we asked how thischange in themorality thepractices of had come to pass, what we wouldhave to say, as utilitarians, thatit is was due to a change in thevalue of the consequencesof the practices. had not been optimific It was because practiceswhichpreviously had become so. I resistsuch a changein moraljudgment. do notthink I thatpersons to not alreadycommitted utilitarianism be would,on reflection, willing theirjudgment about the wrongnessof the practices in to change question merely on the grounds that these practices had become whereaspreviously optimific theywerenot. I thinkthose who are not to would want to know a good deal alreadycommitted utilitarianism

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morethan just how much thevalue of the consequenceshad changed withthe passage of timeand circumstances. But if thoughtful people would not change theirjudgmenton utilitarian groundsalone; and if utilitarianism requiresthattheyshould change theirjudgmentin the face of these imagined changes in consequences; then the grounds forthinking wrongnow to treatthehumans in questionin the ways it in questionare not adequatelyilluminatedby the principleof utility. Even granting, that is, that the practicesare not now or ever will be optimific, thereis, it would appear, something else involvedover and above and distinct fromhow good or bad are the consequences.11 The argumentjust sketched,I believe, spells troublefor theories otherthan utilitarianism. Ethical egoism,or what Jan Narvesoncalls "rationalegoism,"runs into similarproblems.The groundsunderpinT ning our objectionto treatment of groupG, Narveson argues, are that,thoughG's are not rationaland thushave no rightsthemselves, theynevertheless the object of the sentimental are interests other of human beings who,because theyare rational,do have rights, including the right to have others respect their sentimentalinterests.'2 Narveson's claims about the sentimentalinterestsof people at the presenttimeare, I think, highly speculative.Howevermuch we might wish to deny or conceal it, a lot of human beings would ratherhave done withgroupG's, includingthose conventionally "closest"to them -for example, relatives.But even concedingthat G's are the object interests other (rational) human beings,there of of the sentimental is no guaranteethattheywill continueto be so in thefuture. Perhaps, rationalhumans mightall cease to have such an interest; and severely mentallyenfeebled, orphanedhumans mightcome to be regardedas kin to verminor worse. Thus, if our judgmentthat we oughtnot to T subject groupG to treatment were foundedon rationalegoism,we should be preparedto say that it would become morallypermissible to or even morallyobligatory treatthemin these ways if the future
i i. The general point argued forhere and in what followshas become clearer to me throughconversationswith Dale Jamieson. For some firstinklings of this line of argument,see my "Narveson on Rational Egoism and the Rights of Animals," Canadian Journalof Philosophy,March 1977. 12. Jan Narveson, "Animal Rights," Canadian Journal of Philosophy, March

'977.

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sentimental interestsof rational egoists happened to change as described.However,I do not believe that thoughtful people not already committed the positionof rationalegoismwould be preparedto say to this,whichleads me again to the positionthat something otherthan and distinct fromtheinterests rationalhuman beingsunderliesour of thatit wouldbe wrongto subjectGroupG to treatment judgment T. Similar remarksapply to Kant's position,I believe, thoughthis is conjectural;I am not certainwhat his positionwould be. His theory, on we know,places constraints how one rationalbeingmay treathimselfor herselfas well as otherrationalbeings: we are always to treat rationalfreebeings as ends, nevermerelyas means. The problemis, severelymentallyenfeebledhumans are not rational and so, given of Kant'sviewson freewill (or myunderstanding his views), theyalso lack free will. What constraints, then,could Kant consistently place on how we may treatthem? I conjecturethat his positioncould be of We analogous to his positionon the treatment animals.13 oughtnot to maltreat severelymentallyenfeebledhumans, Kant could hold, lead us to maltreatrational,freebebecause doing so will eventually ings. We owe nothingto these humans themselves. Rather,we owe it to ourselves,and to otherrationalfreebeings thatwe do not do those thingswhichin the future will lead us to treatrationalfreebeings as meremeans. of My objection to my (conjectural) interpretation Kant is this. that treating the humans in questionin certainways Even granting now leads to the sortof futureKant supposes-(one wherethe perpeor trators treatthemselves otherrationalfreebeingsas meremeans)In thereis no reason whythismustcontinueto be so in thefuture. the rationalfree beings mightdraw a verysharp line indeed befuture, human beings,and, as a contween (say) moronicand non-moronic
I3. Immanuel Kant, "Our Duties to Animals and Spirits," in Lectures on Ethics, trans. Louis Infield (New York: Harper & Row, I963). Relevant portions are reprintedin Animal Rights and Human Obligations. For a critique of Kant's views on the wrongness of cruelty to animals, see my "Exploring the Idea of Animal Rights"in Animal Rights: A Symposium (London: Centaur Press, I978). See also Alexander Broadie and Elizabeth Pybus, "Kant's Treatmentof Animals," Philosophy,October I974. For a defense of Kant against their line of criticism, see my "Broadie and Pybus on Kant," Philosophy,October I976.

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sequence of this distinction, theymighthave radicallydifferent attitudes and feelingsabout membersof the two classes. From a psychological point of view it does not seem implausibleto suggestthat,if people drew a sharp enough distinction betweenwhat theybelieved about and felttowardmoronicand non-moronic human beings,there would cease to be a strong widespreadtendency(assuming it exists or at present) thatleads thosewho treatmoronsas meremeans to treat themselves otherrationalfreebeingsas meremeans also. However, or if this actuallywereto come to pass; and if the groundsforjudgingit wrongto treatmoronsin the ways in questionwere Kantian,then we should be preparedto alter our judgmentaccordingly:thoughit is wrongnow to treatthemthus,it would cease to be so in the future, if the futureheld the consequences we have imagined. Once more, I though, do not think anyonenot alreadycommitted a Kantian-type to would alterthe judgment thesereasons.This leads me once theory for again to conjecturethat there is somethingelse that underliesour present judgmentthatit is wrongto subjectgroupG to treatment T. It is not only utilitarianism, therefore, that must face the kind of I difficultyhave been tracing.But now, if I ask myselfhow to avoid this difficulty, find that I am ineluctablydrawn to the idea that I morons(even) have certainrights, thatwe owe it to themnot to treat themin certainways,not out of niceness,or sentimental interest, or because theyprovidea sortof "warm-up" the reallyseriousmoral for game playedbetweenrationalfreebeings,14 because treating or them thusis optimific-rather, owe it to themnot to treatthemin certain we ways because theythemselves have a moral rightnot to be treatedin theseways. It is only,I think, rightsare postulatedeven in the case if of moronsthatwe can givea sufficiently theoretical firm basis forour conviction thatit is wrongto treatthemin the ways in question. For a certainty thereis much in the precedingthatis leftup in the air. For example,I have not shown thathuman moronsdo have any
I4. See Ross' analogous observation: "If we think we ought to behave in a certain way to animals, it is out of considerationprimarilyfor theirfeelings that we thinkwe ought to behave so; we do not thinkof them merelyas a practicinggroundforvirtue."W. D. Ross, The Right and the Good (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, I930), p. 49. Ross' groundsfordenyingrightsto animals are subjected to a critical review in my "Exploring the Idea of Animal Rights."

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rights.To do this I would have to show that what I believe is true, that ( i ) it is onlyif theyhave rightsthatwe actuallyis true-namely, can givea sufficiently theoretical firm in basis fortheconviction question, (2) that this convictionis true,and (3) that the adequacy of theoriesdepends on theirabilityto illuminateand account for such convictions. show this,however, wouldhave to showthatevery To I alternative theory fails to give this convictiona sufficiently basis. firm I have not shownthis.I am not even sure how I mighttry. That effort, if it comes,willhave to come at somelaterdate.15 I Moreover, have not ventured any analysis of what rightsare (Are theyvalid claims? Entitlements? Powers?), nor have I advanced anything approachinga completeaccount of the range of rightsmoronscan or do have, assumingthat theycan or do have some. For example, I have not endeavoredto argueforor againsttheview thattheyhave a right life, to or to pursue happiness.1o There are many complicatedquestionsthat wouldhave to be considered each of these (and other) cases. I canin not explorethem here. However,while conceding (or, rather,insisting) thatthereis much in the precedingthatis leftunsaid, the relevance of what has been said to the questionof animal rightscan now be brought into sharperfocus. For if, as I think, our search forthe in most adequate theory account forour settledmoral convictions to we are drivento postulatethatmorons (even) have certainrights, reit mains to be asked what thereis about them that could serve as the groundsor basis of the rightstheyhave, if theyhave them. Singer,I thatit cannotbe thefactthattheyare believe,has arguedpersuasively human beings, that theybelong to the species homo sapiens, which accounts for this; that is to mark moral boundariesin a way which invitescomparisonsto racism and sexism. Nor can it be argued that moronshave the rightstheydo, if theydo, because theyare autonomous or veryintelligent; theyare not. Nor, again, will it do to argue
I5. I have explored some of the relevant problems in my "An Examination and Defense of One Argument Concerning Animal Rights," Inquiry, Summer
I979. 205ff. Singer subjects my views to a careful critical examination in his "Animals

i6. I take up this question in my "The Moral Basis of Vegetarianism," pp.

and the Value of Life," in Tom Regan, ed., Matters of Life and Death (New York: Random House, I980). See also my "Exploringthe Idea of Animal Rights."

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are thattheybelongto a specieswhosemembers normally rationaland it thelike.17Rather,if thereis some basis fortheirhavingrights, must thatforms aboutthecapacitiesof themoronsthemselves be something to the groundsof theirhavingthem.What thisis, is controversial, be sure,but if we search roundforthe most promising candidates,what we findis thatmany,many animals will satisfy the groundsin question.18 Take, forexample,Singer'smentionof "thecapacityto experience pain and/or enjoyment." That seems to me to be a verystrong candidate for grounding rightsin the case of human morons.But if at thatis so, thenwe seem to be inconsistent bestifwe withhold ascribing any rightswhateverin the case of those animals who have the capacityin question.I do notmean to suggestthatit is a simplematter to say what the groundsare forattributing rightsto human morons, it. or to humans generally. from What I do mean to suggestis that Far the strongest arguments describing how it is thathuman moronshave rightswill rationally compel us to ascribe similarrightsto many aniin mals, if I am correct thinking that (i) it is wrongto treathuman moronsin the ways in question; (2) we would not (and should not) in change thisjudgment thewaysutilitarianism, egoismor Kantianism if wouldrequire, thefuture happened to change in the ways described on earlier; (3) if, in our search for the most adequate moral theory that human which to groundthis belief,we are drivento postulating morons(even) have certainrights;and (4) if the groundsunderlying theirpossessing the rightstheypossess are common grounds,as it were,betweenthemand manyotheranimals.If all thisis correct, then I thinkthe case for animal rightsis verystrongindeed. But even if this must be because my argumentsare unsound, none of it is right, at thereare no arguments all. ThoughI might confused notbecause be in my reasoning,I thinkI can tell the difference betweenreasoning and rhetoric.
I7. On this point see my reply to Fox, "Fox's Critique of Animal Liberation,"
pp. I29ff.

at i8. I examine this controversy length in my "An Examination and Defense of One ArgumentConcerningAnimal Rights."