Aging, Focus Switching, Task Switching – p.

Aging, focus switching and task switching in a continuous calculation task:

Evidence toward a new working memory control process

Paul Verhaeghen and William J. Hoyer

Syracuse University

Running head: AGING, FOCUS SWITCHING, TASK SWITCHING

 Aging, Focus Switching, Task Switching – p. 2

Abstract

This study examined switching of the focus of attention in working memory in relation to

global task switching in a continuous calculation task using two rules (midpoint and up-

and-down) in a group of 25 younger and a group of 23 older adults. Age differences

emerged in accuracy when participants worked on two strings simultaneously

(necessitating a focus switch); focus switching did not interact with age in the response

time domain. No age differences were obtained for global task switching. Ex-Gaussian

decomposition showed a shift due to focus switching in all parameters, but a shift in

leading edge only for task switching. The results suggest that task switching and focus

switching rely on different processes, and that there is a specific age-related deficit in

focus switching.
 Aging, Focus Switching, Task Switching – p. 3

Aging, focus switching and task switching in a continuous calculation task:

Evidence toward a new working memory control process

Age-related deficits in cognitive functioning have been observed in a large variety of

tasks, such as simple and choice reaction times, working memory tasks, tests of episodic

memory, tests of spatial and reasoning abilities, mental rotation, and visual search (for

reviews, see e.g., Kausler, 1991; Salthouse, 1985, 1991). It has also been noted that many

of the observed declines are correlated across tasks (Lindenberger & Baltes, 1994;

Salthouse & Ferrer-Caja, 2003;Verhaeghen & Salthouse, 1997), suggesting that a small

number of factors may account for the majority of age differences. Many researchers

have claimed that the fundamental factors may well be relatively general processes or

general aspects of cognition (e.g., Cerella, 1990; Hasher & Zacks, 1988; Li,

Lindenberger, & Frensch, 2000; Salthouse, 1996).

Early accounts of cognitive aging pointed to deficits in elementary processing

resources, such as speed (Birren, 1965; Salthouse, 1996), but recently, attention has

turned to processes of executive control as a basic mechanism to explain age differences

in relatively complex aspects of cognition. Age effects in several aspects of cognitive

control have already been investigated; notably, task coordination (e.g., Mayr & Kliegl,

1993; for a meta-analysis, see Verhaeghen, Steitz, Sliwinski, & Cerella, 2003), task

switching (e.g., Mayr, Spieler, & Kliegl, 2001; for a meta-analysis, see Wasylyshyn,

Verhaeghen, & Sliwinski, 2004), and inhibition (e.g., Hasher & Zacks, 1988; Hasher,

Zacks, & May, 1999; for a computational approach, see Braver & Barch, 2002; for meta-

analyses, see Verhaeghen & De Meersman, 1998a, 1998b). Recently, we (Verhaeghen &

Basak, in press; Verhaeghen, Cerella, Bopp, & Basak, in press) have argued for the
 Aging, Focus Switching, Task Switching – p. 4

existence of accuracy-related age-sensitivity in an additional control process, namely the

process of switching the focus of attention within working memory from one stored

element to another.

Focus switching

What is this focus-switching process? Recent work in the field of working

memory has shown that working memory – the temporary buffer of the cognitive system

− is not unitary. Rather, working memory appears to have a hierarchical two-tier structure

(e.g., Cowan, 1995, 2001). Cowan’s model distinguishes an inner zone, labeled the focus

of attention (typically considered to contain a magical number of 4 ± 1 elements), from a

larger, activated portion of long term memory (not capacity-limited per se, but subject to

interference and decay, which places practical limits on the number of items that can be

retained). What distinguishes the two working memory zones is the speed of access.

Items contained within the focus of attention are retrieved immediately, whereas items

stored outside the focus of attention are subject to an additional retrieval operation. It is

the cost associated with this retrieval operation that we label the focus-switching cost (see

Voigt & Hagendorf, 2002, for evidence that this focus switching cost is largely due to

retrieval). Recent research has shown that in particular types of tasks, namely tasks of

serial attention (such as the N-Back task, or tasks in which participants keep track of

separate types of items) the size of the focus of attention may effectively shrink to one

(Garavan, 1998; McElree, 2001; McElree & Dosher, 1998; Oberauer, 2002). Such tasks

seem to be particularly well-suited for studying the costs associated with focus switching,

and the effects of aging on these costs. Figure 1 (top portion) schematizes this state of

affairs.
 Aging, Focus Switching, Task Switching – p. 5

To illustrate the phenomenon, the bottom portion of Figure 1 shows data

previously collected on younger and older adults with a task yielding a focus of one

(Verhaeghen & Basak, in press; the result has also been replicated by Verhaeghen,

Cerella, & Basak, 2004). The task was an identity-judgment N-Back task, as pioneered

by McElree (2001). In this task, the participant is presented with a sequence of digits, one

at a time; she is required to press one of two keys to indicate whether the digit currently

presented on the screen is identical or not to the digit presented N positions back in the

sequence. This task requires retrieval of the item from the position N back. If all items are

immediately accessible, we would expect either identical response times for all items or a

ramp function with a shallow slope of about 40 ms/item (Sternberg, 1966; this result

would be compatible with parallel search processes in a limited-capacity system, e.g.,

Ratcliff, 1978; Van Zandt & Townsend, 1993). That is not what was found. Instead, in

younger adults, response time increased dramatically from N = 1 to N = 2 and remained

flat thereafter. This result suggests the existence of a focus-switching process operating

on a focus of attention which can hold no more than a single item. The result also shows

that this increase is not simply due to increased working-memory load: in that case, one

would expect a further increase in response time after N = 2. Such increase is not

observed in younger adults, and it is rather slight in older adults.

Verhaeghen and Basak (in press) observed no age differences with regard to

focus-switching costs in response times once general slowing was taken into account.

The focus-switching cost in accuracy, however, was age-sensitive. Item loss outside the

focus of attention is likely due to item interference, and this age-sensitivity in accuracy

may then be due to an increased susceptibility to interference with advancing age.

 Aging, Focus Switching, Task Switching – p. 6

Another possibility is that in old age items decay more rapidly when stored outside the

focus of attention.

An important question is whether focus switching is indeed a cognitive primitive.

In the Verhaeghen and Basak (in press) study, we compared focus-switching with two

other control processes that might be related to or implicated in focus switching. The first

was updating, that is, the requirement to change the identity of an item that is stored in

working memory. In focus switching, updating the content of the focus, and potentially of

items outside the focus, seems to be one of the constituent processes. The second

comparison process was (global) task switching. Task switching and focus switching

obviously share a switching requirement. In focus switching, the task remains the same

across trials, but items have to be swapped in and out of the focus of attention. In task

switching, the task changes from trial to trial, but no storage (and therefore no swapping)

of items is necessary. Switching between tasks, like focus switching, increases response

times (e.g., Jersild, 1927; Rogers & Monsell, 1995). (Note that in this study, as in the

present experiment, we compared alternating sequences with pure sequences for task

switching, thereby including local, or specific, task switching costs, due to selection

between task sets, in the global task switching cost.) Our study suggested quite clearly

that focus switching is largely independent from both updating and task switching. First,

focus-switch costs did not interact with either updating costs (Experiments 1 and 2) or

global task-switching costs (Experiment 2). Second, two age-related dissociations were

found: Focus switching was age-sensitive in accuracy, but no age-sensitivity was found

for the either updating or task switching. Such dissociations can be taken as evidence for

the modular independence of processes (Perfect & Maylor, 2000; Sternberg, 2001).
 Aging, Focus Switching, Task Switching – p. 7

Taken together, our earlier findings suggest (a) that focus switching is a control process

in its own right, distinct from task switching and updating, and (b) that focus switching

shows a specific age-related deficit, but only in the accuracy domain.

The current experiment

The aim of the present study is to provide additional evidence regarding the

particulars of this process of focus switching. More specifically, we examined three main

questions. First and foremost, we investigated whether focus-switching costs in both

response times and accuracy could be observed in a new task, namely a continuous-

calculation task. This would indicate that the process is not task-specific, but rather

operates whenever a focus switch is necessary. Second, we investigated whether this

focus-switching cost was larger in older adults than in younger adults in the accuracy

domain, but not the response time domain, as could be predicted from the N-Back study.

Third, we tested whether further evidence could be found for the independence of the

focus-switching process from the processes involved in global task switching. To assess

independence, we used the dissociation method described above, that is, we examined

whether both processes were equally sensitive to aging, or not. If they were not, this

would be evidence for independence. Additionally, we examined the response time

distributions using ex-Gaussian decomposition (see Methods), and examined whether the

two types of switching yielded identical effects on all three parameters. If they did not,

this would indicate independence.

Our paradigm of choice was a continuous calculation task. The task was modeled

after a number reduction task used by Woltz, Bell, Kyllonen, and Gardner (1996) and

Woltz, Gardner, and Bell (2000). In the continuous calculation task, participants are
 Aging, Focus Switching, Task Switching – p. 8

presented with a string of single-digit numbers, only one of which is visible at any given

time. A particular rule is applied to each successive pair of numbers; what rule is to be

applied is signified by the numerical difference between the numbers (see Methods). We

chose the continuous calculation task for two reasons. First, this task lends itself naturally

to an orthogonal manipulation of task switching (by alternating between the two rules; it

is in fact close to Jersild’s original experiment, 1927, where participants switched

between addition and subtraction) and focus switching (by requiring the participant to

solve problems, alternating between two strings, only one of which is shown on the

screen at any time; this necessitates continuous switching between strings). Second, the

sequential nature of the task allows us to record a large number of responses in a

relatively short period of time. This in turn allows for the examination of the shape of the

response time distributions.

Method

Participants

The sample consisted of 25 younger adults (mean age = 18.8 years; SD = 1.2; 13

females) and 23 older adults (mean age = 68.1 years; SD = 4.3; 15 females). Young

adults were recruited from the human participant pool of the Department of Psychology

at Syracuse University. The older adults were community-residing volunteers recruited

from the registry of the Adult Cognition Laboratory at Syracuse University. Participants

reported their education level and medication usage, and used a 5-point scale to rate their

overall physical health and their illness-related physical limitations. Individuals who

reported that they were not taking any medications known to affect memory or learning

and who rated their health and physical activity level as good or excellent (ratings of 2 or
 Aging, Focus Switching, Task Switching – p. 9

1, respectively) were eligible to participate in the experiment. Participants’ near visual

acuity (with normal correction) was tested using a hand-held screener, and individuals

were excluded from participation if acuity was worse than 20/30. Mean years of

education for the younger adults and older adults were 12.4 (SD = 0.9) and 15.0 (SD =

2.9), respectively, and this difference was significant, t(46) = -3.99.

Task and procedure

In the continuous calculation task, a series of single-digit numbers was presented

on a computer screen, one at a time. The participant was instructed to perform a

calculation on the first pair, type in an answer, combine this answer with the following

item to perform the next calculation, and so on. Items were shown in one column (the

single condition) or two columns (the dual condition) on the screen. The digits shown

were 18 mm tall and 9 mm wide, the vertical separation between items was 5 mm;

horizontal separation between columns was 1.3 cm. Participants were encouraged to

choose a comfortable viewing distance from the screen; most preferred a distance of

about 50 cm, corresponding to a visual angle of horizontal separation of two-column

stimuli of 1.5 degree. Only one digit was shown at any time; the order of presentation

was top-to-bottom when one column was shown, and a reading pattern (left-to-right, then

top-to-bottom) when two columns were shown. The first item of each column was

presented for 2,000 ms; from the second item in each column on, participants pressed one

of the keys on the numerical keyboard to indicate their answer. Immediately upon each

key press, the next stimulus was shown.

Two types of calculations (‘rules’) were used. When the numbers differed by two,

the participant reported the average of the two, and used that number to be combined with
 Aging, Focus Switching, Task Switching – p. 10

the next number shown on the screen (‘midpoint rule’). When the numbers differed by

one, the participant reported the next number in the up or down sequence, and used that

number to be combined with the next number shown on the screen (‘up-and-down rule’).

To aid participants, all items for which the midpoint rule had to be used were shown in

yellow on a black background; all up-and-down items were shown in light blue on the

same black background.

Focus switching was manipulated by having the participant work on one

continuous series (‘single’ condition, no focus switching) versus having the participant

work on two series, each one shown in a different column on the screen (‘dual’ condition,

focus switching). Task switching was manipulated orthogonally by either having the

participant work according to a single rule throughout a trial (‘pure’ condition) or by

mixing the two rules according to a predictable ABAB… schema, always starting with

the midpoint rule (‘mixed’ condition). Note that this implies that in the combination of

focus switching and task switching (a mixed dual trial), the right-hand column always

contained only midpoint items, the left-hand column only up-and-down items. Table 1

shows an example for each of the four conditions.

Each stimulus set (a ‘trial’) contained 10 to-be-responded to items. After each

trial, the subject received feedback about accuracy and average response time. An online

algorithm that used a random seed determined the exact composition of a trial; after the

second item was presented, the participant’s response was used to construct the next item.

This was done to spare the participants confusion after they made an error – we simply

took the erroneous answer as the basis for the next item. Note that the number of errors in

the pure, single condition was extremely low. Therefore, we can assume that there were
 Aging, Focus Switching, Task Switching – p. 11

relatively few instances in which participants pressed the wrong answer key and

consequently received a “nonsensical” digit for the next response.

A total of 21 trials (yielding a total of 210 response times) was presented: 6 trials

each for pure single midpoint, pure dual midpoint, pure single up-and-down, pure dual

up-and-down, mixed single, and mixed dual; then 5 trials each for mixed dual, mixed

single, pure dual up-and-down, pure single up-and-down, pure dual midpoint, pure single

midpoint; then 5 trials each for pure single midpoint, pure dual midpoint, pure single up-

and-down, pure dual up-and-down, mixed single, and mixed dual; then 5 trials each for

mixed dual, mixed single, pure dual up-and-down, pure single up-and-down, pure dual

midpoint, pure single midpoint. Participants were encouraged to take breaks between

blocks (i.e., each set of one type of trials). All participants were tested in a single session,

typically lasting between 60 and 90 minutes.

Response time analysis

All response time analyses were conducted on correct responses only. Reaction

times of 100 ms or less were considered anticipatory; the corresponding data were

removed from the data set (this concerned 0.1% of the responses of younger adults, and

0.4% of the responses of older adults). For the analysis of variance, median RTs were

used rather than means, because these are less influenced by skew and outlying values.

Decomposition of response time distributions

We used the ex-Gaussian model for the decomposition of response time

distributions. This model was chosen because it is the most commonly used model in the

decomposition of response times (e.g., Van Zandt, 2000). Briefly, the ex-Gaussian model

assumes that each response time can be represented as the sum of a normally distributed
 Aging, Focus Switching, Task Switching – p. 12

random variable and an independent exponentially distributed random variable. The ex-

Gaussian distribution has three constituents: mu and sigma are the mean and standard

deviation, respectively, of the normal distribution and tau is the mean of the exponential

distribution. Mu and sigma determine the location of the leading edge of the distribution;

tau reflects slow responses at the tail of the distribution (the skew). This decomposition

provides more information from the set of response times than the summary measures of

mean and variance (note that the observed mean of the distribution equals the sum of mu

and tau; its variance equals the sum of sigma-squared and tau-squared). While it is naive

to assume that the components of the ex-Gaussian distribution will map directly onto

particular stages of processing (e.g., Hockley, 1984; Hohle, 1965; Luce, 1986), it has

been shown that the parameters can be differentially sensitive to experimental

manipulations (such as a Stroop manipulation; Spieler, Balota, & Faust, 1996), to

particular tasks performed on identical materials (Hockley, 1984), and to group

differences (comparing boys with attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder with age-

matched controls, Leth-Steenen, King Elbaz, & Douglas, 2000; examining developmental

differences, Leth-Steenen, King Elbaz, & Douglas, 2000; and studying age differences in

the adult portion of the lifespan, Molenaar & Van der Molen, 1994; Spieler et al., 1996).

The algorithm for fitting the ex-Gaussian model to the response time distributions

was the Quantile Maximum Likelihood Estimation procedure (QMLE) proposed by

Heathcote, Brown, and Mewhort (2002). Monte Carlo simulation has indicated that this

algorithm is more efficient and less biased that any other method currently available.

Because QMLE can be vulnerable to extreme values, we truncated the data set at the
 Aging, Focus Switching, Task Switching – p. 13

97.5th percentile; in practice, this amounted to discarding response times longer than 7 s.

This concerned 1.11% of the data of the young and 4.25% of the data of the old.

Alpha level for all statistical testing was set at p = .05.

Results

Response time analysis

The response time results are presented in Figure 2. We conducted an ANOVA

with focus switching (single vs. dual), and task switching (pure vs. mixed) as within-

subject factors, and age category (younger vs. older) as the between-subject factor. Only

the main effects were significant: single trials were executed faster than dual trials, F (1,

47) = 75.71, MSE = 118,362.33; pure trials were executed faster than mixed trials, F (1,

47) = 65.92, MSE = 39,470.27, and older adults were slower than younger adults, F (1,

47) = 34.19, MSE = 1,600,682.37. None of the interaction terms reached significance, all

Fs < 1.

Ex-Gaussian decomposition of response times

Results of the ex-Gaussian decomposition are depicted in Figure 3. The parameter

estimates were not independent: The two Gaussian components (mu and sigma) were

highly positively correlated (median r = .87), mu and tau tended to have a moderately

negative correlation (median r = -.21).

For the mu parameter (the mean of the Gaussian component), all three main

effects were significant. Single trials yielded lower values of mu than dual trials, F (1, 47)

= 36.92, MSE = 284,349.01. Pure trials yielded lower values of mu than mixed trials.

Older adults had higher mu values than younger adults, F (1, 47) = 27.18, MSE =

1,160,573.06. None of the interactions terms reached significance, all Fs < 2.03.
 Aging, Focus Switching, Task Switching – p. 14

For the sigma parameter (the standard deviation of the Gaussian component), only

the main effects of focus switching and age were significant in the expected direction.

Single trials yielded lower values of sigma than dual trials, F (1, 47) = 31.30, MSE =

66,576.83, and older adults had higher values of sigma than younger adults, F (1, 47) =

4.95, MSE = 153,509.86. There was a significant main effect of task switching, F (1, 47)

= 9.52, MSE = 13,751.78, but this went in the opposite direction from what would be

expected: Mixed trials yielded smaller values of sigma than pure trials. This effect was

rather small (367 ms vs. 315 ms). None of the interaction terms reached significance, all

Fs < 1.

For the tau parameter (the mean of the exponential component), the main effects

of focus switching and age reached significance. Dual trials yielded higher values of tau

than single trials, F (1, 47) = 15.66, MSE = 71,298.50, and older adults had higher values

of tau than younger adults, F (1, 47) = 26.09, MSE = 91,451.45. Task switching

interacted with focus switching; the increase in tau due to focus switching was larger in

pure trials (206 ms) than in mixed trials (96 ms). All other effects failed to reach

significance, all Fs < 1.58.

Accuracy analysis

The accuracy results are presented in Figure 2. We conducted an ANOVA with

focus switching (single vs. dual), and task switching (pure vs. mixed) as within-subject

factors, and age category (younger vs. older) as the between-subject factor. All main

effects were significant: single trials yielded higher accuracy than dual trials, F (1, 47) =

68.49, MSE = 0.003; pure trials yielded higher accuracy than mixed trials, F (1, 47) =

5.98, MSE = 0.001, and older adults had lower accuracy overall than younger adults, F
 Aging, Focus Switching, Task Switching – p. 15

(1, 47) = 9.53, MSE = 0.009. Only the interaction between age and focus switching

reached significance, F (1, 47) = 5.94, MSE = 0.003; all other F < 1.44.

Correlations between focus-switching and task-switching costs

Costs were calculated as difference scores (i.e., [dual trials – single trials] for

focus switching, and [mixed trials - pure trials] for task switching). The correlation

between focus-switching cost and task-switching cost was not significant (.19) for

response time; for accuracy, however, the correlation was reliable (.56).

Discussion

The experiment was designed to answer three questions. First, we hypothesized

that the continuous calculation task would reveal a focus-switching cost in both response

times and accuracy. Second, we hypothesized that this focus-switching cost would be

larger in older adults than in younger adults in terms of accuracy of responses, but not in

terms of response times. Third, we hypothesized that the focus-switching process would

be independent from the task-switching process. Our research yielded positive evidence

for each of these hypotheses; we examine each in turn.

First, we indeed found the predicted focus-switching cost in the continuous

calculation task. This cost takes the form, first, of slower response times, and second, of

decreased accuracy. The best estimate of this cost is obtained by comparing the dual

condition with the single condition within the pure (i.e., non-task-switch) conditions in

the younger adults (i.e., the population most often used in cognitive experiments). The

focus-switching requirement increased these response times from 1,275 ms to 1,898 ms,

or by 623 ms. This is arguably a very substantial cost. In the present study, the global

task-switching requirement raised response times from 1,275 ms to 1,494 ms, or a 219 ms
 Aging, Focus Switching, Task Switching – p. 16

increase. The focus-switching effect is therefore almost three times as large as the already

large global task-switching effect. Focus switching decreased accuracy from 98% to

93%, or by 5%; in comparison, task switching decreased accuracy by 0.5%. These results

confirm both the existence of the focus-switching process and its importance.

We should point out that alternative accounts of these data are possible. One is

that the focus-switch cost is not related to retrieval, but that it is a function of working

memory load. Previous research (Verhaeghen & Basak, in press; Voigt & Hagendorf,

2002), however, casts serious doubt on this alternative hypothesis. In the Verhaeghen and

Basak study, increases in working load beyond two items did not produce further RT

costs in younger adults, and only slight costs in older adults. Voigt and Hagendorf clearly

showed that focus-switching costs are sensitive to the retrieval demands of the task.

Another possibility is that the RT cost is due to a speed-accuracy trade-off, that is,

participants slow down their responses in order to retain an acceptable level of accuracy.

Correlational analysis shows that this is unlikely. The correlation between the cost in RT

and the costs in accuracy is negative (-.31), indicating that individuals who slow down

most due to the focus switch are also more likely to have the largest decreases in

accuracy.

Second, we found, as predicted, that the focus-switching cost was larger for older

adults than for younger adults in the accuracy domain, but not the response time domain.

This result replicates earlier findings with the identity judgment N-Back task

(Verhaeghen & Basak, in press, Experiment 1 and Experiment 2). The previous results

were obtained with a much easier task, namely identity judgment, and were ascribed to

item interference in the zone of working memory outside the focus of attention. The
 Aging, Focus Switching, Task Switching – p. 17

findings of the present study are consistent with this interpretation. It is important to note,

however, that accuracy was high for both older and younger adults throughout, and it is

possible that the interaction was entirely due to a ceiling effect for the single trials. Three

arguments plead against this interpretation. First, in our opinion, the ceiling effect is not a

psychometric artifact, but it is theoretically meaningful. That is, in the pure, single

condition, we basically ask our participants if they can retrieve an item just seen on the

screen. Performance on this task should be errorless. Therefore, very high accuracy in the

pure, single condition is not an indication of failings of the experimenter to elicit a range

of performance; it is simply a characteristic of the cognitive system. Additionally, there

are two empirical reasons to trust the findings as useful rather than artifactual. First, we

conducted an exploratory analysis in which we deleted participants who performed at

ceiling, that is, with scores of 99% correct or more in the single, pure trials. We were left

with 6 younger adults and 13 older adults; the 6 selected younger adults scored 97%

correct on single, pure trials and 93% on dual, pure trials; the 13 selected older adults

scored 96% and 86%, respectively. Consequently, this selected sample yielded the same

result as the full sample: a larger focus-switch-related drop in accuracy in older adults

than in younger adults. Second, the correlation between the drop in accuracy due to task

switching and the drop in accuracy due to focus switching was relatively high (.56). If the

very high accuracy in the single, pure trials masked a higher level of true performance,

neither the focus-switch switch cost nor the task-switch cost would be meaningful

quantities, and they would not correlate.

Third, we indeed found evidence for the independence of focus switching from

global task switching. The evidence we uncovered is threefold. First, the costs in
 Aging, Focus Switching, Task Switching – p. 18

response times for the two processes are correlated only slightly (.19), and this

correlation did not reach significance. This indicates that the underlying processes must

be largely independent. There is, however, a significant correlation between focus-

switching and task-switching costs in the accuracy domain, suggesting that a more

general mechanism might drive the information loss associated with the cost. The

connecting mechanism might be interference. In focus switching, the item stored away

outside the focus probably receives interference from the item currently processed (see

Verhaeghen, Cerella, & Basak, 2003, for a more comprehensive take on this issue).

Likewise, it has been shown that in task switching, the two mental sets for the tasks

compete for activation and interfere with each other (e.g., Allport & Wylie, 2000).

Second, we found differential age effects for focus switching versus global task

switching. The former process is age-sensitive in the accuracy domain but not the

response time domain; the latter turned out not to be age-sensitive in either the accuracy

or response time domain. The age-constancy of global task switching may be somewhat

surprising, given that age effects in response times usually do emerge in this aspect of

task switching (see Wasylyshyn, Verhaeghen, & Sliwinski, 2004, for a meta-analysis).

Recent research, however, has shown that when task switching is highly predictable and

cued, as is the case in our experiment, age differences may disappear (Kray, Li,

Lindenberger, 2002). We note that the failure to obtain age effects in global task

switching is not due to a failure to obtain a global task switching cost itself; such an

effect was observed for both response times and accuracy. We also note that the observed

age-constancy is not due to lack of statistical power: All F values for the relevant age by

condition terms were close to and often smaller than 1.

 Aging, Focus Switching, Task Switching – p. 19

Third, there were differential effects of focus switching and task switching in the

parameters of the ex-Gaussian distribution. Focus switching produced a substantial

increase in each of the parameters, indicating that both the leading edge and the

dispersion (including the skew) of the distribution was affected. This can be contrasted

with the effect of task switching, which produced an increase in mu, or the leading edge

of the distribution, only. Sigma decreased slightly (by about 50 ms) when the task

switching requirement was added, and tau remained stable. Thus, task switching has the

effect of shifting the distribution along the horizontal axis, without changing its

dispersion, including the skew. As stated earlier, one-on-one correspondences between

ex-Gaussian parameters and cognitive processes are seldom obtained, and we were using

the decomposition primarily for the purpose of examining possible dissociations. Some

tentative conclusions can be drawn, however. The global task-switching results suggest

that global task switching works additively (see also Wasylyshyn, Verhaeghen &

Sliwinski, 2004), that is, the result can be explained by the insertion of a set of normally

distributed processes that do not interfere with the computational requirements of the

continuous calculation task itself. Such an insertion only affects the leading edge of the

distribution, and not its shape. The focus-switching results cannot be explained through

such a mechanism. Rather, the results suggest either that an additional ex-Gaussian

process is added to the original distribution, or that several of the main component

processes of the original distribution are slowed by a multiplicative factor. Given that the

increase in mu seems to be proportionally larger than the increase in tau, the effects are

larger for the normally distributed processes than for the exponentially distributed

component processes. The underadditive interaction between focus switching and task
 Aging, Focus Switching, Task Switching – p. 20

switching in the tau parameter suggests that at least part of the components involved in

both processes can be executed in parallel. Alternatively, it is possible that task switching

is simply easier to perform in the dual condition than in the single condition because in

the former, screen location works as an external cue for task switching.

Summarized, in support of previous findings, the results of the present experiment

demonstrated that focus switching is distinct from task switching, and that focus

switching is age-sensitive, but only in the accuracy domain.

 Aging, Focus Switching, Task Switching – p. 21

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Author notes

Paul Verhaeghen and William J. Hoyer, Department of Psychology and Center for Health

and Behavior, Syracuse University. This research was supported by research grant

AG11451 and AG16201. We thank Korena Onyper for assistance with data collection,

and we acknowledge helpful discussions with John Cerella. Correspondence should be

addressed to Paul Verhaeghen or William J. Hoyer, Department of Psychology and

Center for Health and Behavior, 430 Huntington Hall, Syracuse University, Syracuse,

NY 13244-2340, pverhaeg@psych.syr.edu, or wjhoyer@psych.syr.edu.

 Aging, Focus Switching, Task Switching – p. 28

Tables

Table 1.

Examples of a single trial (i.e., 10 items) for each of the four conditions in the

experiment. In reality, stimuli were shown one at a time, in a reading pattern (left to right,

then on the next line, etc.). The participant’s answer is indicated between brackets. The

first row was presented at a 2 s/item pace; presentation of subsequent stimuli was

participant-paced. When the stimulus was projected in yellow (here simulated by the

default font), the midpoint rule had to be used; when the stimulus was projected in blue

(here simulated by italics), the up-and-down rule had to be applied.

Conditions
Single, pure Single, Mixed Dual, pure Dual, mixed
1 5 1 6 1 6
3 (2) 3 (4) 3 (2) 8 (7) 3 (2) 5 (4)
4 (3) 3 (2) 4 (3) 5 (6) 4 (3) 3 (2)
1 (2) 4 (3) 1 (2) 4 (5) 1 (2) 3 (4)
4 (3) 2 (1) 4 (3) 3 (4) 4 (3) 5 (6)
5 (4) 3 (2)
6 (5) 3 (4)
7 (6) 6 (5)
4 (5) 4 (3)
7 (6) 5 (4)
Focus switch No No Yes Yes
Task switch No Yes No Yes
 Aging, Focus Switching, Task Switching – p. 29

Figure captions

Figure 1. An illustration of the expected effects. The top of the figure illustrates the two-

tier structure of working memory (McElree, 2001): Within working memory, only the

single item held in the focus-of-attention (FoA) is immediately accessible. If more than

two items are present in working memory, item swapping becomes necessary before the

second element can be processed. The bottom of the figure shows data obtained in a

previous study (Verhaeghen & Basak, in press, Expt 1) from an identity-judgment N-

Back task: a step function in response times (the size of the step defines the focus-

switching effect) and a monotonic decline in accuracy over increasing values of N.

Figure 2. Response time (correct trials only) and accuracy data, separated by condition

and group. Focus-switch costs are calculated as the difference in performance between

single and dual trials; task-switch costs as the difference in performance between pure

and mixed trials. Error bars denote standard errors.

Figure 3. Ex-Gaussian decomposition of response times, separated by condition and

group. Focus-switch costs are calculated as the difference in performance between single

and dual trials; task-switch costs as the difference in performance between pure and

mixed trials. Error bars denote standard errors.

 Aging, Focus Switching, Task Switching – p. 30

FoA
X
X
X X

2000 1
1800 0.95

1600 0.9

1400 0.85
Percent correct
Response time

1200 0.8
0.75
1000
0.7
800
0.65
600
0.6 Younger
400 Older
0.55
200
0.5
0
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
N-Back value N-back value
 Aging, Focus Switching, Task Switching – p. 31

3500

3000

2500
Response time

2000

1500

1000

500 Younger
Older
0
Pure, Pure, Mixed, Mixed,
single dual single dual

0.95
Percent correct

0.9

0.85

0.8
Younger
Older
0.75
Pure, Pure, Mixed, Mixed,
single dual single dual
 Aging, Focus Switching, Task Switching – p. 32
2500 Mu parameter

2000

Parameter value
1500

1000

500
Younger
Older

0
Pure, Pure, Mixed, Mixed,
single dual single dual

2500
Sigma parameter Younger
Older

2000
Parameter value

1500

1000

500

Pure, Pure, Mixed, Mixed,

single dual single dual

2500
Tau parameter

2000
Parameter value

1500

1000

500
Younger
Older
0

Pure, Pure, Mixed, Mixed,

single dual single dual