Art. 13. Definitions. a. "Worker" means any member of the labor force, whether employed or unemployed. b.

"Recruitment and placement" refers to any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not: Provided, That any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee, employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement. c. "Private fee-charging employment agency" means any person or entity engaged in recruitment and placement of workers for a fee which is charged, directly or indirectly, from the workers or employers or both. d. "License" means a document issued by the Department of Labor authorizing a person or entity to operate a private employment agency. e. "Private recruitment entity" means any person or association engaged in the recruitment and placement of workers, locally or overseas, without charging, directly or indirectly, any fee from the workers or employers. f. "Authority" means a document issued by the Department of Labor authorizing a person or association to engage in recruitment and placement activities as a private recruitment entity.

g. "Seaman" means any person employed in a vessel engaged in maritime navigation. h. "Overseas employment" means employment of a worker outside the Philippines. i. "Emigrant" means any person, worker or otherwise, who emigrates to a foreign country by virtue of an immigrant visa or resident permit or its equivalent in the country of destination.

Art. 14. Employment promotion. The Secretary of Labor shall have the power and authority: a. To organize and establish new employment offices in addition to the existing employment offices under the Department of Labor as the need arises; b. To organize and establish a nationwide job clearance and information system to inform applicants registering with a particular employment office of job opportunities in other parts of the country as well as job opportunities abroad; c. To develop and organize a program that will facilitate occupational, industrial and geographical mobility of labor and provide assistance in the relocation of workers from one area to another; and d. To require any person, establishment, organization or institution to submit such employment information as may be prescribed by the Secretary of Labor. Art. 15. Bureau of Employment Services. a. The Bureau of Employment Services shall be primarily responsible for developing and monitoring a comprehensive employment program. It shall have the power and duty:

1. To formulate and develop plans and programs to implement the employment promotion objectives of this Title; 2. To establish and maintain a registration and/or licensing system to regulate private sector participation in the recruitment and placement of workers, locally and overseas, and to secure the best possible terms and conditions of employment for Filipino contract workers and compliance therewith under such rules and regulations as may be issued by the Minister of Labor; 3. To formulate and develop employment programs designed to benefit disadvantaged groups and communities; 4. To establish and maintain a registration and/or work permit system to regulate the employment of aliens; 5. To develop a labor market information system in aid of proper manpower and development planning; 6. To develop a responsive vocational guidance and testing system in aid of proper human resources allocation; and 7. To maintain a central registry of skills, except seamen.

b. The regional offices of the Ministry of Labor shall have the original and exclusive jurisdiction over all matters or cases involving employer-employee relations including money claims, arising out of or by virtue of any law or contracts involving Filipino workers for overseas employment except seamen: Provided, That the Bureau of Employment Services may, in the case of the National Capital Region, exercise such power, whenever the Minister of Labor deems it appropriate. The decisions of the regional offices of the Bureau of Employment Services, if so authorized by the Minister of Labor as provided in this Article, shall be appealable to the National Labor Relations Commission upon the same grounds provided in Article 223 hereof. The decisions of the National Labor Relations Commission shall be final and inappealable. (Superseded by Exec. Order 797, May 1, 1982). c. The Minister of Labor shall have the power to impose and collect fees based on rates recommended by the Bureau of Employment Services. Such fees shall be deposited in the National Treasury as a special account of the General Fund, for the promotion of the objectives of the Bureau of Employment Services, subject to the provisions of Section 40 of Presidential Decree No. 1177. Art. 16. Private recruitment. Except as provided in Chapter II of this Title, no person or entity other than the public employment offices, shall engage in the recruitment and placement of workers. Art. 17. Overseas Employment Development Board. An Overseas Employment Development Board is hereby created to undertake, in cooperation with relevant entities and agencies, a systematic program for overseas employment of Filipino workers in excess of domestic needs and to protect their rights to fair and equitable employment practices. It shall have the power and duty: 1. To promote the overseas employment of Filipino workers through a comprehensive market promotion and development program;

2. To secure the best possible terms and conditions of employment of Filipino contract workers on a government-to-government basis and to ensure compliance therewith; 3. To recruit and place workers for overseas employment on a government-to-government arrangement and in such other sectors as policy may dictate; and 4. To act as secretariat for the Board of Trustees of the Welfare and Training Fund for Overseas Workers. Art. 18. Ban on direct-hiring. No employer may hire a Filipino worker for overseas employment except through the Boards and entities authorized by the Secretary of Labor. Direct-hiring by members of the diplomatic corps, international organizations and such other employers as may be allowed by the Secretary of Labor is exempted from this provision. Art. 19. Office of Emigrant Affairs. a. Pursuant to the national policy to maintain close ties with Filipino migrant communities and promote their welfare as well as establish a data bank in aid of national manpower policy formulation, an Office of Emigrant Affairs is hereby created in the Department of Labor. The Office shall be a unit at the Office of the Secretary and shall initially be manned and operated by such personnel and through such funding as are available within the Department and its attached agencies. Thereafter, its appropriation shall be made part of the regular General Appropriations Decree. b. The office shall, among others, promote the well-being of emigrants and maintain their close link to the homeland by: 1. serving as a liaison with migrant communities; 2. provision of welfare and cultural services;

3. promote and facilitate re-integration of migrants into the national mainstream; 4. promote economic; political and cultural ties with the communities; and

5. generally to undertake such activities as may be appropriate to enhance such cooperative links. Art. 20. National Seamen Board. a. A National Seamen Board is hereby created which shall develop and maintain a comprehensive program for Filipino seamen employed overseas. It shall have the power and duty: 1. To provide free placement services for seamen; 2. To regulate and supervise the activities of agents or representatives of shipping companies in the hiring of seamen for overseas employment and secure the best possible terms of employment for contract seamen workers and secure compliance therewith; 3. To maintain a complete registry of all Filipino seamen.

b. The Board shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over all matters or cases including money claims, involving employer-employee relations, arising out of or by virtue of any law or contracts involving Filipino seamen for overseas employment. The decisions of the Board shall be appealable to the National Labor Relations Commission upon the same grounds provided in Article 223 hereof. The decisions of the National Labor Relations Commission shall be final and inappealable. Art. 21. Foreign service role and participation. To provide ample protection to Filipino workers abroad, the labor attaches, the labor reporting officers duly designated by the Secretary of Labor and the Philippine diplomatic or consular officials concerned shall, even without prior instruction or advice from the home office, exercise the power and duty: a. To provide all Filipino workers within their jurisdiction assistance on all matters arising out of employment; b. To insure that Filipino workers are not exploited or discriminated against;

c. To verify and certify as requisite to authentication that the terms and conditions of employment in contracts involving Filipino workers are in accordance with the Labor Code and rules and regulations of the Overseas Employment Development Board and National Seamen Board; d. To make continuing studies or researches and recommendations on the various aspects of the employment market within their jurisdiction; e. To gather and analyze information on the employment situation and its probable trends, and to make such information available; and f. To perform such other duties as may be required of them from time to time.

Art. 22. Mandatory remittance of foreign exchange earnings. It shall be mandatory for all Filipino workers abroad to remit a portion of their foreign exchange earnings to their families, dependents, and/or beneficiaries in the country in accordance with rules and regulations prescribed by the Secretary of Labor. Art. 23. Composition of the Boards. a. The OEDB shall be composed of the Secretary of Labor and Employment as Chairman, the Undersecretary of Labor as Vice-Chairman, and a representative each of the Department of Foreign Affairs, the Department of National Defense, the Central Bank, the Department of Education, Culture and Sports, the National Manpower and Youth Council, the Bureau of Employment Services, a workers organization and an employers organization and the Executive Director of the OEDB as members. b. The National Seamen Board shall be composed of the Secretary of Labor and Employment as Chairman, the Undersecretary of Labor as Vice-Chairman, the Commandant of the Philippine Coast Guard, and a representative each of the Department of Foreign Affairs, the Department of Education, Culture and Sports, the Central Bank, the Maritime Industry Authority, the Bureau of Employment Services, a national shipping association and the Executive Director of the NSB as members. The members of the Boards shall receive allowances to be determined by the Board which

shall

not

be

more

than

P2,000.00

per

month.

c. The Boards shall be attached to the Department of Labor for policy and program coordination. They shall each be assisted by a Secretariat headed by an Executive Director who shall be a Filipino citizen with sufficient experience in manpower administration, including overseas employment activities. The Executive Director shall be appointed by the President of the Philippines upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Labor and shall receive an annual salary as fixed by law. The Secretary of Labor shall appoint the other members of the Secretariat. d. The Auditor General shall appoint his representative to the Boards to audit their respective accounts in accordance with auditing laws and pertinent rules and regulations. Art. 24. Boards to issue rules and collect fees. The Boards shall issue appropriate rules and regulations to carry out their functions. They shall have the power to impose and collect fees from employers concerned, which shall be deposited in the respective accounts of said Boards and be used by them exclusively to promote their objectives. Chapter II REGULATION OF RECRUITMENT AND PLACEMENT ACTIVITIES Art. 25. Private sector participation in the recruitment and placement of workers.Pursuant to national development objectives and in order to harness and maximize the use of private sector resources and initiative in the development and implementation of a comprehensive employment program, the private employment sector shall participate in the recruitment and placement of workers, locally and overseas, under such guidelines, rules and regulations as may be issued by the Secretary of Labor. Art. 26. Travel agencies prohibited to recruit. Travel agencies and sales agencies of airline companies are prohibited from engaging in the business of recruitment and placement of workers for overseas employment whether for profit or not. Art. 27. Citizenship requirement. Only Filipino citizens or corporations, partnerships or entities at least seventy-five percent (75%) of the authorized and voting capital stock of which is owned and controlled by Filipino citizens shall be permitted to participate in the recruitment and placement of workers, locally or overseas. Art. 28. Capitalization. All applicants for authority to hire or renewal of license to recruit are required to have such substantial capitalization as determined by the Secretary of Labor. Art. 29. Non-transferability of license or authority. No license or authority shall be used directly or indirectly by any person other than the one in whose favor it was issued or at any place other than that stated in the license or authority be transferred, conveyed or assigned to any other person or entity. Any transfer of business address, appointment or designation of any agent or representative including the establishment of additional offices anywhere shall be subject to the prior approval of the Department of Labor.

RA 8759
Section 2. Declaration of Policy. - It is a declared policy of the State to promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all, and for this purpose, to strengthen and expand the existing employment facilitation service machinery of the government particularly at the local levels. Section 3. Establishment of the Public Employment Service Office. - To carry out the abovedeclared policy, there shall be established in all capital towns of provinces, key cities and other strategic areas a Public Employment Service Office, hereinafter referred to as "PESO," which shall be community-based and maintained largely by local government units (LGUs) and a number of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) or community-based organizations (CBOs) and state universities and colleges (SUCs). The PESOs shall be linked to the regional offices of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) for coordination and technical supervision, and to the DOLE central office, to constitute the national employment service network.

THIRD DIVISION [G.R. No. 157010. June 21, 2005] PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, petitioner, vs. FLORENCE O. CABANSAG, respondent. DECISION PANGANIBAN, J.: The Court reiterates the basic policy that all Filipino workers, whether employed locally or overseas, enjoy the protective mantle of Philippine labor and social legislations. Our labor statutes may not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or stipulations agreed upon, in a foreign country. The Case Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to reverse and set aside the July 16, 2002 Decision[2] and the January 29, 2003 Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR SP No. 68403. The assailed Decision dismissed the CA Petition (filed by herein petitioner), which had sought to reverse the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)s June 29, 2001 Resolution,[4] affirming Labor Arbiter Joel S. Lustrias January 18, 2000 Decision.[5] The assailed CA Resolution denied herein petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. The Facts The facts are narrated by the Court of Appeals as follows: In late 1998, [herein Respondent Florence Cabansag] arrived in Singapore as a tourist. She applied for employment, with the Singapore Branch of the Philippine National Bank, a private banking corporation organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines, with principal offices at the PNB Financial Center, Roxas Boulevard, Manila. At the time, the Singapore PNB Branch was under the helm of Ruben C. Tobias, a lawyer, as General Manager, with the rank of Vice-President of the Bank. At the time, too, the Branch Office had two (2) types of employees: (a) expatriates or the regular employees, hired in Manila and assigned abroad including Singapore, and (b) locally (direct) hired. She applied for employment as Branch Credit Officer, at a total monthly package of $SG4,500.00, effective upon assumption of duties after approval. Ruben C. Tobias found her eminently qualified and wrote on October 26, 1998, a letter to the President of the Bank in Manila, recommending the appointment of Florence O. Cabansag, for the position. xxx xxx xxx The President of the Bank was impressed with the credentials of Florence O. Cabansag that he approved the recommendation of Ruben C. Tobias. She then filed an Application, with the Ministry of Manpower of the Government of Singapore, for the issuance of an Employment Pass as an employee of the Singapore PNB Branch. Her application was approved for a period of two (2) years.

On December 7, 1998, Ruben C. Tobias wrote a letter to Florence O. Cabansag offering her a temporary appointment, as Credit Officer, at a basic salary of Singapore Dollars 4,500.00, a month and, upon her successful completion of her probation to be determined solely, by the Bank, she may be extended at the discretion of the Bank, a permanent appointment and that her temporary appointment was subject to the following terms and conditions: 1. You will be on probation for a period of three (3) consecutive months from the date of your assumption of duty. 2. You will observe the Banks rules and regulations and those that may be adopted from time to time. 3. You will keep in strictest confidence all matters related to transactions between the Bank and its clients. 4. You will devote your full time during business hours in promoting the business and interest of the Bank. 5. You will not, without prior written consent of the Bank, be employed in anyway for any purpose whatsoever outside business hours by any person, firm or company. 6. Termination of your employment with the Bank may be made by either party after notice of one (1) day in writing during probation, one month notice upon confirmation or the equivalent of one (1) days or months salary in lieu of notice. Florence O. Cabansag accepted the position and assumed office. In the meantime, the Philippine Embassy in Singapore processed the employment contract of Florence O. Cabansag and, on March 8, 1999, she was issued by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, an Overseas Employment Certificate, certifying that she was a bona fide contract worker for Singapore. xxx xxx xxx Barely three (3) months in office, Florence O. Cabansag submitted to Ruben C. Tobias, on March 9, 1999, her initial Performance Report. Ruben C. Tobias was so impressed with the Report that he made a notation and, on said Report: GOOD WORK. However, in the evening of April 14, 1999, while Florence O. Cabansag was in the flat, which she and Cecilia Aquino, the Assistant Vice-President and Deputy General Manager of the Branch and Rosanna Sarmiento, the Chief Dealer of the said Branch, rented, she was told by the two (2) that Ruben C. Tobias has asked them to tell Florence O. Cabansag to resign from her job. Florence O. Cabansag was perplexed at the sudden turn of events and the runabout way Ruben C. Tobias procured her resignation from the Bank. The next day, Florence O. Cabansag talked to Ruben C. Tobias and inquired if what Cecilia Aquino and Rosanna Sarmiento had told her was true. Ruben C. Tobias confirmed the veracity of the information, with the explanation that her resignation was imperative as a cost-cutting measure of the Bank. Ruben C. Tobias, likewise, told Florence O. Cabansag that the PNB Singapore Branch will be sold or transformed into a remittance office and that, in either way, Florence O. Cabansag had to resign from her employment. The more Florence O. Cabansag was perplexed. She then asked Ruben C. Tobias that she be furnished with a Formal Advice from the PNB Head Office in Manila. However, Ruben C. Tobias flatly refused. Florence O. Cabansag did not submit any letter of resignation. On April 16, 1999, Ruben C. Tobias again summoned Florence O. Cabansag to his office and demanded that she submit her letter of resignation, with the pretext that he needed a Chinese-speaking Credit Officer to penetrate the local market, with the information that a Chinese-speaking Credit Officer had already been hired and will be reporting for work soon. She was warned that, unless she submitted her letter of resignation, her employment record will be blemished with the notation DISMISSED spread thereon. Without giving any definitive answer, Florence O. Cabansag asked Ruben C. Tobias that she be given sufficient time to look for another job. Ruben C. Tobias told her that she should be out of her employment by May 15, 1999. However, on April 19, 1999, Ruben C. Tobias again summoned Florence O. Cabansag and adamantly ordered her to submit her letter of resignation. She refused. On April 20, 1999, she received a letter from Ruben C. Tobias terminating her employment with the Bank. xxx xxx xxx On January 18, 2000, the Labor Arbiter rendered judgment in favor of the Complainant and against the Respondents, the decretal portion of which reads as follows: WHEREFORE, considering the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered finding respondents guilty of Illegal dismissal and devoid of due process, and are hereby ordered: 1. To reinstate complainant to her former or substantially equivalent position without loss of seniority rights, benefits and privileges; 2. Solidarily liable to pay complainant as follows:

To pay complainant her backwages from 16 April 1999 up to her actual reinstatement. Her backwages as of the date of the promulgation of this decision amounted to SGD 40,500.00 or its equivalent in Philippine Currency at the time of payment; b) Mid-year bonus in the amount of SGD 2,250.00 or its equivalent in Philippine Currency at the time of payment; c) Allowance for Sunday banking in the amount of SGD 120.00 or its equivalent in Philippine Currency at the time of payment; d) Monetary equivalent of leave credits earned on Sunday banking in the amount of SGD 1,557.67 or its equivalent in Philippine Currency at the time of payment; e) Monetary equivalent of unused sick leave benefits in the amount of SGD 1,150.60 or its equivalent in Philippine Currency at the time of payment. f) Monetary equivalent of unused vacation leave benefits in the amount of SGD 319.85 or its equivalent in Philippine Currency at the time of payment. g) 13th month pay in the amount of SGD 4,500.00 or its equivalent in Philippine Currency at the time of payment; 3. Solidarily to pay complainant actual damages in the amount of SGD 1,978.00 or its equivalent in Philippine Currency at the time of payment, and moral damages in the amount of PhP 200,000.00, exemplary damages in the amount of PhP 100,000.00; 4. To pay complainant the amount of SGD 5,039.81 or its equivalent in Philippine Currency at the time of payment, representing attorneys fees. SO ORDERED. [6] [Emphasis in the original.] PNB appealed the labor arbiters Decision to the NLRC. In a Resolution dated June 29, 2001, the Commission affirmed that Decision, but reduced the moral damages to P100,000 and the exemplary damages to P50,000. In a subsequent Resolution, the NLRC denied PNBs Motion for Reconsideration. Ruling of the Court of Appeals In disposing of the Petition for Certiorari, the CA noted that petitioner bank had failed to adduce in evidence the Singaporean law supposedly governing the latters employment Contract with respondent. The appellate court found that the Contract had actually been processed by the Philippine Embassy in Singapore and approved by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA), which then used that Contract as a basis for issuing an Overseas Employment Certificate in favor of respondent. According to the CA, even though respondent secured an employment pass from the Singapore Ministry of Employment, she did not thereby waive Philippine labor laws, or the jurisdiction of the labor arbiter or the NLRC over her Complaint for illegal dismissal. In so doing, neither did she submit herself solely to the Ministry of Manpower of Singapores jurisdiction over disputes arising from her employment. The appellate court further noted that a cursory reading of the Ministrys letter will readily show that no such waiver or submission is stated or implied. Finally, the CA held that petitioner had failed to establish a just cause for the dismissal of respondent. The bank had also failed to give her sufficient notice and an opportunity to be heard and to defend herself. The CA ruled that she was consequently entitled to reinstatement and back wages, computed from the time of her dismissal up to the time of her reinstatement. Hence, this Petition.[7] Issues Petitioner submits the following issues for our consideration: 1. Whether or not the arbitration branch of the NLRC in the National Capital Region has jurisdiction over the instant controversy; 2. Whether or not the arbitration of the NLRC in the National Capital Region is the most convenient venue or forum to hear and decide the instant controversy; and 3. Whether or not the respondent was illegally dismissed, and therefore, entitled to recover moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees.[8] In addition, respondent assails, in her Comment, [9] the propriety of Rule 45 as the procedural mode for seeking a review of the CA Decision affirming the NLRC Resolution. Such issue deserves scant consideration. Respondent miscomprehends the Courts discourse in St. Martin Funeral Home v. NLRC,

a)

[10] which has indeed affirmed that the proper mode of review of NLRC decisions, resolutions or orders
is by a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals have concurrent original jurisdiction over such petitions for certiorari. Thus, in observance of the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts, these petitions should be initially filed with the CA.

[11]
Rightly, the bank elevated the NLRC Resolution to the CA by way of a Petition for Certiorari. In seeking a review by this Court of the CA Decision -- on questions of jurisdiction, venue and validity of employment termination -- petitioner is likewise correct in invoking Rule 45.[12] It is true, however, that in a petition for review on certiorari, the scope of the Supreme Courts judicial review of decisions of the Court of Appeals is generally confined only to errors of law. It does not extend to questions of fact. This doctrine applies with greater force in labor cases. Factual questions are for the labor tribunals to resolve. [13] In the present case, the labor arbiter and the NLRC have already determined the factual issues. Their findings, which are supported by substantial evidence, were affirmed by the CA. Thus, they are entitled to great respect and are rendered conclusive upon this Court, absent a clear showing of palpable error or arbitrary disregard of evidence.[14] The Courts Ruling The Petition has no merit. First Issue: Jurisdiction The jurisdiction of labor arbiters and the NLRC is specified in Article 217 of the Labor Code as follows: ART. 217. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the Commission. (a) Except as otherwise provided under this Code the Labor Arbiters shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within thirty (30) calendar days after the submission of the case by the parties for decision without extension, even in the absence of stenographic notes, the following cases involving all workers, whether agricultural or non-agricultural: 1. Unfair labor practice cases; 2. Termination disputes; 3. If accompanied with a claim for reinstatement, those cases that workers may file involving wage, rates of pay, hours of work and other terms and conditions of employment 4. Claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages arising from the employeremployee relations; 5. Cases arising from any violation of Article 264 of this Code, including questions involving the legality of strikes and lockouts; and 6. Except claims for Employees Compensation, Social Security, Medicare and maternity benefits, all other claims, arising from employer-employee relations, including those of persons in domestic or household service, involving an amount of exceeding five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) regardless of whether accompanied with a claim for reinstatement. (b) The commission shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all cases decided by Labor Arbiters. xxx xxx x x x. More specifically, Section 10 of RA 8042 reads in part: SECTION 10. Money Claims. Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the Labor Arbiters of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) shall have the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within ninety (90) calendar days after the filing of the complaint, the claims arising out of an employer-employee relationship or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas deployment including claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages. xxx xxx x x x Based on the foregoing provisions, labor arbiters clearly have original and exclusive jurisdiction over claims arising from employer-employee relations, including termination disputes involving all workers, among whom are overseas Filipino workers (OFW).[15] We are not unmindful of the fact that respondent was directly hired, while on a tourist status in Singapore, by the PNB branch in that city state. Prior to employing respondent, petitioner had to obtain

an employment pass for her from the Singapore Ministry of Manpower. Securing the pass was a regulatory requirement pursuant to the immigration regulations of that country.[16] Similarly, the Philippine government requires non-Filipinos working in the country to first obtain a local work permit in order to be legally employed here. That permit, however, does not automatically mean that the non-citizen is thereby bound by local laws only, as averred by petitioner. It does not at all imply a waiver of ones national laws on labor. Absent any clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, such permit simply means that its holder has a legal status as a worker in the issuing country. Noteworthy is the fact that respondent likewise applied for and secured an Overseas Employment Certificate from the POEA through the Philippine Embassy in Singapore. The Certificate, issued on March 8, 1999, declared her a bona fide contract worker for Singapore. Under Philippine law, this document authorized her working status in a foreign country and entitled her to all benefits and processes under our statutes. Thus, even assuming arguendo that she was considered at the start of her employment as a direct hire governed by and subject to the laws, common practices and customs prevailing in Singapore[17] she subsequently became a contract worker or an OFW who was covered by Philippine labor laws and policies upon certification by the POEA. At the time her employment was illegally terminated, she already possessed the POEA employment Certificate. Moreover, petitioner admits that it is a Philippine corporation doing business through a branch office in Singapore.[18] Significantly, respondents employment by the Singapore branch office had to be approved by Benjamin P. Palma Gil,[19] the president of the bank whose principal offices were in Manila. This circumstance militates against petitioners contention that respondent was locally hired; and totally governed by and subject to the laws, common practices and customs of Singapore, not of the Philippines. Instead, with more reason does this fact reinforce the presumption that respondent falls under the legal definition of migrant worker, in this case one deployed in Singapore. Hence, petitioner cannot escape the application of Philippine laws or the jurisdiction of the NLRC and the labor arbiter. In any event, we recall the following policy pronouncement of the Court in Royal Crown Internationale v. NLRC:[20] x x x. Whether employed locally or overseas, all Filipino workers enjoy the protective mantle of Philippine labor and social legislation, contract stipulations to the contrary notwithstanding. This pronouncement is in keeping with the basic public policy of the State to afford protection to labor, promote full employment, ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race or creed, and regulate the relations between workers and employers. For the State assures the basic rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining, security of tenure, and just and humane conditions of work [Article 3 of the Labor Code of the Philippines; See also Section 18, Article II and Section 3, Article XIII, 1987 Constitution]. This ruling is likewise rendered imperative by Article 17 of the Civil Code which states that laws which have for their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determination or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country. Second Issue: Proper Venue Section 1(a) of Rule IV of the NLRC Rules of Procedure reads: Section 1. Venue (a) All cases which Labor Arbiters have authority to hear and decide may be filed in the Regional Arbitration Branch having jurisdiction over the workplace of the complainant/petitioner; Provided, however that cases of Overseas Filipino Worker (OFW) shall be filed before the Regional Arbitration Branch where the complainant resides or where the principal office of the respondent/employer is situated, at the option of the complainant. For purposes of venue, workplace shall be understood as the place or locality where the employee is regularly assigned when the cause of action arose. It shall include the place where the employee is supposed to report back after a temporary detail, assignment or travel. In the case of field employees, as well as ambulant or itinerant workers, their workplace is where they are regularly assigned, or where they are supposed to regularly receive their salaries/wages or work instructions from, and report the results of their assignment to their employers. Under the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 (RA 8042), a migrant worker refers to a person who is to be engaged, is engaged or has been engaged in a remunerated activity in a state of which he or she is not a legal resident; to be used interchangeably with overseas Filipino worker.[21] Undeniably, respondent was employed by petitioner in its branch

office in Singapore. Admittedly, she is a Filipino and not a legal resident of that state. She thus falls within the category of migrant worker or overseas Filipino worker. As such, it is her option to choose the venue of her Complaint against petitioner for illegal dismissal. The law gives her two choices: (1) at the Regional Arbitration Branch (RAB) where she resides or (2) at the RAB where the principal office of her employer is situated. Since her dismissal by petitioner, respondent has returned to the Philippines -- specifically to her residence at Filinvest II, Quezon City. Thus, in filing her Complaint before the RAB office in Quezon City, she has made a valid choice of proper venue. Third Issue: Illegal Dismissal The appellate court was correct in holding that respondent was already a regular employee at the time of her dismissal, because her three-month probationary period of employment had already ended. This ruling is in accordance with Article 281 of the Labor Code: An employee who is allowed to work after a probationary period shall be considered a regular employee. Indeed, petitioner recognized respondent as such at the time it dismissed her, by giving her one months salary in lieu of a one-month notice, consistent with provision No. 6 of her employment Contract. Notice and Hearing Not Complied With As a regular employee, respondent was entitled to all rights, benefits and privileges provided under our labor laws. One of her fundamental rights is that she may not be dismissed without due process of law. The twin requirements of notice and hearing constitute the essential elements of procedural due process, and neither of these elements can be eliminated without running afoul of the constitutional guarantee.[22] In dismissing employees, the employer must furnish them two written notices: 1) one to apprise them of the particular acts or omissions for which their dismissal is sought; and 2) the other to inform them of the decision to dismiss them. As to the requirement of a hearing, its essence lies simply in the opportunity to be heard.[23] The evidence in this case is crystal-clear. Respondent was not notified of the specific act or omission for which her dismissal was being sought. Neither was she given any chance to be heard, as required by law. At any rate, even if she were given the opportunity to be heard, she could not have defended herself effectively, for she knew no cause to answer to. All that petitioner tendered to respondent was a notice of her employment termination effective the very same day, together with the equivalent of a one-month pay. This Court has already held that nothing in the law gives an employer the option to substitute the required prior notice and opportunity to be heard with the mere payment of 30 days salary.[24] Well-settled is the rule that the employer shall be sanctioned for noncompliance with the requirements of, or for failure to observe, due process that must be observed in dismissing an employee.

[25]
No Valid Cause for Dismissal Moreover, Articles 282,[26] 283[27] and 284[28] of the Labor Code provide the valid grounds or causes for an employees dismissal. The employer has the burden of proving that it was done for any of those just or authorized causes. The failure to discharge this burden means that the dismissal was not justified, and that the employee is entitled to reinstatement and back wages.[29] Notably, petitioner has not asserted any of the grounds provided by law as a valid reason for terminating the employment of respondent. It merely insists that her dismissal was validly effected pursuant to the provisions of her employment Contract, which she had voluntarily agreed to be bound to. Truly, the contracting parties may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they want, and their agreement would have the force of law between them. However, petitioner overlooks the qualification that those terms and conditions agreed upon must not be contrary to law, morals, customs, public policy or public order.[30] As explained earlier, the employment Contract between petitioner and respondent is governed by Philippine labor laws. Hence, the stipulations, clauses, and terms and conditions of the Contract must not contravene our labor law provisions. Moreover, a contract of employment is imbued with public interest. The Court has time and time again reminded parties that they are not at liberty to insulate themselves and their relationships from the

impact of labor laws and regulations by simply contracting with each other.[31]Also, while a contract is the law between the parties, the provisions of positive law that regulate such contracts are deemed included and shall limit and govern the relations between the parties.[32] Basic in our jurisprudence is the principle that when there is no showing of any clear, valid, and legal cause for the termination of employment, the law considers the matter a case of illegal dismissal.[33] Awards for Damages Justified Finally, moral damages are recoverable when the dismissal of an employee is attended by bad faith or constitutes an act oppressive to labor or is done in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy.[34] Awards for moral and exemplary damages would be proper if the employee was harassed and arbitrarily dismissed by the employer.[35] In affirming the awards of moral and exemplary damages, we quote with approval the following ratiocination of the labor arbiter: The records also show that [respondents] dismissal was effected by [petitioners] capricious and high-handed manner, anti-social and oppressive, fraudulent and in bad faith, and contrary to morals, good customs and public policy. Bad faith and fraud are shown in the acts committed by [petitioners] before, during and after [respondents] dismissal in addition to the manner by which she was dismissed. First, [respondent] was pressured to resign for two different and contradictory reasons, namely, cost-cutting and the need for a Chinese[-]speaking credit officer, for which no written advice was given despite complainants request. Such wavering stance or vacillating position indicates bad faith and a dishonest purpose. Second, she was employed on account of her qualifications, experience and readiness for the position of credit officer and pressured to resign a month after she was commended for her good work. Third, the demand for [respondents] instant resignation on 19 April 1999 to give way to her replacement who was allegedly reporting soonest, is whimsical, fraudulent and in bad faith, because on 16 April 1999 she was given a period of [sic] until 15 May 1999 within which to leave. Fourth, the pressures made on her to resign were highly oppressive, anti-social and caused her absolute torture, as [petitioners] disregarded her situation as an overseas worker away from home and family, with no prospect for another job. She was not even provided with a return trip fare. Fifth, the notice of termination is an utter manifestation of bad faith and whim as it totally disregards [respondents] right to security of tenure and due process. Such notice together with the demands for [respondents] resignation contravenes the fundamental guarantee and public policy of the Philippine government on security of tenure. [Respondent] likewise established that as a proximate result of her dismissal and prior demands for resignation, she suffered and continues to suffer mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock and social humiliation. Her standing in the social and business community as well as prospects for employment with other entities have been adversely affected by her dismissal. [Petitioners] are thus liable for moral damages under Article 2217 of the Civil Code. xxx xxx xxx [Petitioners] likewise acted in a wanton, oppressive or malevolent manner in terminating [respondents] employment and are therefore liable for exemplary damages. This should served [sic] as protection to other employees of [petitioner] company, and by way of example or correction for the public good so that persons similarly minded as [petitioners] would be deterred from committing the same acts.[36] The Court also affirms the award of attorneys fees. It is settled that when an action is instituted for the recovery of wages, or when employees are forced to litigate and consequently incur expenses to protect their rights and interests, the grant of attorneys fees is legally justifiable.[37] WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision and Resolution AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED. Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, and Garcia, JJ., concu

People v Panis
142 SCRA 664 (1986) Facts:

Four informations were filed on January 9, 1981, in the Court of First Instance of Zambales and Olongapo City alleging that Serapio Abug, private respondent herein, "without first securing a license from the Ministry of Labor as a holder of authority to operate a fee-charging employment agency, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally operate a private fee-charging employment agency by charging fees and expenses (from) and promising employment in Saudi Arabia" to four separate individuals named therein, in violation of Article 16 in relation to Article 39 of the Labor Code. Abug filed a motion to quash on the ground that the informations did not charge an offense because he was accused of illegally recruiting only one person in each of the four informations. Under the proviso in Article 13(b), he claimed, there would be illegal recruitment only "whenever two or more persons are in any manner promised or offered any employment for a fee." The posture of the petitioner is that the private respondent is being prosecuted under Article 39 in relation to Article 16 of the Labor Code; hence, Article 13(b) is not applicable. However, as the first two cited articles penalize acts of recruitment and placement without proper authority, which is the charge embodied in the informations, application of the definition of recruitment and placement in Article 13(b) is unavoidable. Issue: Whether or not the petitioner is guilty of violating Article 13(b) of P. D. 442, otherwise known as the Labor Code. Held: YES Article 13(b) of P. D. 442, otherwise known as the Labor Code, states that, "(b) 'Recruitment and placement' refers to any act of canvassing, 'enlisting, contracting, transporting, hiring, or procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not: Provided, That any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement." As we see it, the proviso was intended neither to impose a condition on the basic rule nor to provide an exception thereto but merely to create a presumption. The presumption is that the individual or entity is engaged in recruitment and placement whenever he or it is dealing with two or more persons to whom, in consideration of a fee, an offer or promise of employment is made in the course of the "canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring (of) workers." At any rate, the interpretation here adopted should give more force to the campaign against illegal recruitment and placement, which has victimized many Filipino workers seeking a better life in a foreign land, and investing hard-earned savings or even borrowed funds in pursuit of their dream, only to be awakened to the reality of a cynical deception at the hands of their own countrymen.

THIRD DIVISION [G.R. No. 125903. November 15, 2000] PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. ROMULO SAULO, AMELIA DE LA CRUZ, and CLODUALDO DE LA CRUZ, accused. ROMULO SAULO, Accused-Appellant. DECISION GONZAGA-REYES, J.: Accused-appellant, together with Amelia de la Cruz and Clodualdo de la Cruz, were charged with violation of Article 38 (b) of the Labor Code[1 for illegal recruitment in large scale in an information which states

CRIM. CASE NO. Q-91-21911 The undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor accuses ROMULO SAULO, AMELIA DE LA CRUZ and CLODUALDO DE LA CRUZ, of the crime of ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT IN LARGE SCALE (ART. 38(b) in relation to Art. 39(a) of the Labor Code of the Philippines, as amended by P.D. No. 2018, committed as follows: That on or about the period comprised from April 1990 to May 1990 in Quezon City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping one another, by falsely representing themselves to have the capacity to contract, enlist and recruit workers for employment abroad, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously for a fee, recruit and promise employment/job placement abroad to LEODEGARIO MAULLON, BENY MALIGAYA and ANGELES JAVIER, without first securing the required license or authority from the Department of Labor and Employment, in violation of said law. That the crime described above is committed in large scale as the same was perpetrated against three (3) persons individually or as [a] group penalized under Articles 38 and 39 as amended by PD 2018 of the Labor Code (P.D. 442). CONTRARY TO LAW.[2 In addition, accused were charged with three counts of estafa (Criminal Case Nos. Q-9121908, Q-91-21909 and Q-91-21910). Except for the names of the complainants, the dates of commission of the crime charged, and the amounts involved, the informations[3 were identical in their allegations CRIM. CASE NO. Q-91-21908 The undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor accuses ROMULO SAULO, AMELIA DE LA CRUZ AND CLODUALDO DE LA CRUZ of the crime of ESTAFA (Art. 315, par. 2 (a) RPC), committed as follows: That on or about the period comprised from April 1990 to May 1990, in Quezon City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping one another, with intent of gain, by means of false pretenses and/or fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud one BENY MALIGAYA, in the following manner, to wit: on the date and in the place aforementioned, accused falsely pretended to the offended party that they had connection and capacity to deploy workers for overseas employment and that they could secure employment/placement for said Beny Maligaya and believing said misrepresentations, the offended party was later induced to give accused, as in fact she did give the total amount of P35,000.00, Philippine Currency, and once in possession of the said amount and far from complying with their commitment and despite repeated demands made upon them to return said amount, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously and with intent to defraud, misappropriate, misapply and convert the same to their own personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of said offended party in the aforementioned amount and in such amount as may be awarded under the provisions of the Civil Code. CONTRARY TO LAW. Upon arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to all the charges against him. Meanwhile accused Amelia de la Cruz and Clodualdo de la Cruz have remained at large. During trial, the prosecution sought to prove the following material facts and circumstances surrounding the commission of the crimes: Benny Maligaya, having learned from a relative of accused-appellant that the latter was recruiting workers for Taiwan, went to accused-appellants house in San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City, together with Angeles Javier and Amelia de la Cruz, in order to discuss her chances for overseas employment. During that meeting which took place sometime in April or May, 1990, accused-appellant told Maligaya that she would be able to leave for Taiwan as

a factory worker once she gave accused-appellant the fees for the processing of her documents. Sometime in May, 1990, Maligaya also met with Amelia de la Cruz and Clodualdo de la Cruz at their house in Baesa, Quezon City and they assured her that they were authorized by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) to recruit workers for Taiwan. Maligaya paid accused-appellant and Amelia de la Cruz the amount of P35,000.00, which is evidenced by a receipt dated May 21, 1990 signed by accusedappellant and Amelia de la Cruz (Exhibit A in Crim. Case No. Q-91-21908). Seeing that he had reneged on his promise to send her to Taiwan, Maligaya filed a complaint against accused-appellant with the POEA.[4 Angeles Javier, a widow and relative by affinity of accused-appellant, was told by Ligaya, accused-appellants wife, to apply for work abroad through accused-appellant. At a meeting in accused-appellants Quezon City residence, Javier was told by accused-appellant that he could get her a job in Taiwan as a factory worker and that she should give him P35,000.00 for purposes of preparing Javiers passport. Javier gave an initial amount of P20,000.00 to accused-appellant, but she did not ask for a receipt as she trusted him. As the overseas employment never materialized, Javier was prompted to bring the matter before the POEA.

[5

On April 19, 1990, Leodigario Maullon, upon the invitation of his neighbor Araceli Sanchez, went to accused-appellants house in order to discuss his prospects for gaining employment abroad. As in the case of Maligaya and Javier, accused-appellant assured Maullon that he could secure him a job as a factory worker in Taiwan if he paid him P30,000.00 for the processing of his papers. Maullon paid P7,900.00 to accused-appellants wife, who issued a receipt dated April 21, 1990 (Exhibit A in Crim. Case No. Q-91-21910). Thereafter, Maullon paid an additional amount of P6,800.00 in the presence of accused-appellant and Amelia de la Cruz, which payment is also evidenced by a receipt dated April 25, 1990 (Exhibit B in Crim. Case No. Q-91-21910). Finally, Maullon paid P15,700.00 to a certain Loreta Tumalig, a friend of accused-appellant, as shown by a receipt dated September 14, 1990 (Exhibit C in Crim. Case No. Q-91-21910). Again, accused-appellant failed to deliver on the promised employment. Maullon thus filed a complaint with the POEA.[6 The prosecution also presented a certification dated July 26, 1994 issued by the POEA stating that accused are not licensed to recruit workers for overseas employment (Exhibit A in Crim. Case No. Q-91-21911).[7 In his defense, accused-appellant claimed that he was also applying with Amelia de la Cruz for overseas employment. He asserts that it was for this reason that he met all three complainants as they all went together to Amelia de la Cruz house in Novaliches, Quezon City sometime in May, 1990 in order to follow up their applications. Accused-appellant flatly denied that he was an overseas employment recruiter or that he was working as an agent for one. He also denied having received any money from any of the complainants or having signed any of the receipts introduced by the prosecution in evidence. It is accusedappellants contention that the complainants were prevailed upon by accused-appellants mother-in-law, with whom he had a misunderstanding, to file the present cases against him.

[8

The Trial court found accused-appellant guilty of three counts of estafa and of illegal recruitment in large scale. It adjudged: WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused Romulo Saulo: A. In Criminal Case No. Q-91-21908, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code as amended, without any mitigating or aggravating circumstances, and this Court hereby sentences the accused Romulo Saulo to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of three (3) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum to seven (7) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum, and to indemnify the complainant Beny Maligaya in the

amount of P35,000.00, with interest thereon at 12% per annum until the said amount is fully paid, with costs against the said accused. B. In Criminal Case No. Q-91-21909, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code as amended, without any mitigating or aggravating circumstances, and this Court hereby sentences the accused Romulo Saulo to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum, and to indemnify the complainant Angeles Javier in the amount of P20,000.00 with interest thereon at 12% per annum until the said amount is fully paid, with costs against said accused. C. In Criminal Case No. Q-91-21910, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code as amended, without any mitigating or aggravating circumstances, and this Court hereby sentences the accused Romulo Saulo to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum, and to indemnify the complainant Leodigario Maullon in the amount of P30,400.00 with interest thereon at 12% per annum until the said amount is fully paid, with costs against said accused. D. In Criminal Case No. Q-91-21911, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale as defined and punished under Article 38 (b) in relation to Article 39 (a) of the Labor Code of the Philippines as amended, and this Court sentences the accused Romulo Saulo to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00). Being a detention prisoner, the accused Romulo Saulo shall be entitled to the benefits of Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code as amended. SO ORDERED.[9 The Court finds no merit in the instant appeal. The essential elements of illegal recruitment in large scale, as defined in Art. 38 (b) of the Labor Code and penalized under Art. 39 of the same Code, are as follows: (1) the accused engages in the recruitment and placement of workers, as defined under Article 13 (b) or in any prohibited activities under Article 34 of the Labor Code; (2) accused has not complied with the guidelines issued by the Secretary of Labor and Employment, particularly with respect to the securing of a license or an authority to recruit and deploy workers, whether locally or overseas; and (3) accused commits the same against three (3) or more persons, individually or as a group.[10 Under Art. 13 (b) of the Labor Code, recruitment and placement refers to any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not; Provided, That any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement. After a careful and circumspect review of the records, the Court finds that the trial court was justified in holding that accused-appellant was engaged in unlawful recruitment and placement activities. The prosecution clearly established that accused-appellant promised the three complainants - Benny Maligaya, Angeles Javier and Leodigario Maullon employment in Taiwan as factory workers and that he asked them for money in order to process their papers and procure their passports. Relying completely upon such representations, complainants entrusted their hard-earned money to accused-appellant in

exchange for what they would later discover to be a vain hope of obtaining employment abroad. It is not disputed that accused-appellant is not authorized[11 nor licensed[12 by the Department of Labor and Employment to engage in recruitment and placement activities. The absence of the necessary license or authority renders all of accusedappellants recruitment activities criminal. Accused-appellant interposes a denial in his defense, claiming that he never received any money from the complainants nor processed their papers. Instead, accused-appellant insists that he was merely a co-applicant of the complainants and similarly deceived by the schemes of Amelia and Clodualdo de la Cruz. He contends that the fact that Benny Maligaya and Angleles Javier went to the house of Amelia and Clodualdo de la Cruz in Novaliches, Quezon City, to get back their money and to follow-up their application proves that complainants knew that it was the de la Cruz who received the processing fees, and not accused-appellant. Further, accused-appellant argues that complainants could not have honestly believed that he could get them their passports since they did not give him any of the necessary documents, such as their birth certificate, baptismal certificate, NBI clearance, and marriage contract. Accused-appellants asseverations are self-serving and uncorroborated by clear and convincing evidence. They cannot stand against the straightforward and explicit testimonies of the complainants, who have identified accused-appellant as the person who enticed them to part with their money upon his representation that he had the capability of obtaining employment for them abroad. In the absence of any evidence that the prosecution witnesses were motivated by improper motives, the trial courts assessment of the credibility of the witnesses shall not be interfered with by this Court.[13 The fact that accused-appellant did not sign all the receipts issued to complainants does not weaken the case of the prosecution. A person charged with illegal recruitment may be convicted on the strength of the testimonies of the complainants, if found to be credible and convincing.[14 The absence of receipts to evidence payment does not warrant an acquittal of the accused, and it is not necessarily fatal to the prosecutions cause.

[15

Accused-appellant contends that he could not have committed the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale since Nancy Avelino, a labor and employment officer at the POEA, testified that licenses for recruitment and placement are issued only to corporations and not to natural persons. This argument is specious and illogical. The Labor Code states that any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement.[16 Corrolarily, a nonlicensee or nonholder of authority is any person, corporation or entity which has not been issued a valid license or authority to engage in recruitment and placement by the Secretary of Labor, or whose license or authority has been suspended, revoked, or canceled by the POEA or the Secretary.[17 It also bears stressing that agents or representatives appointed by a licensee or a holder of authority but whose appointments are not previously authorized by the POEA fall within the meaning of the term nonlicensee or nonholder of authority.[18 Thus, any person, whether natural or juridical, that engages in recruitment activities without the necessary license or authority shall be penalized under Art. 39 of the Labor Code. It is well established in jurisprudence that a person may be charged and convicted for both illegal recruitment and estafa. The reason for this is that illegal recruitment is a malum prohibitum, whereas estafa is malum in se, meaning that the criminal intent of the accused is not necessary for conviction in the former, but is required in the latter.[19 The elements of estafa under Art. 315, paragraph 2 (a), of the Revised Penal Code are: (1) that the accused has defrauded another by abuse of confidence or by deceit, and (2) that

damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation is caused to the offended party or third person.[20 The trial court was correct in holding accused-appellant liable for estafa in the case at bench. Owing to accused-appellants false assurances that he could provide them with work in another country, complainants parted with their money, to their damage and prejudice, since the promised employment never materialized. Under Art. 315 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for the crime of estafa is as follows: 1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed under the provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be. xxx xxx xxx Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum term of the penalty shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the Revised Penal Code, and the minimum shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed for the offense. Since the penalty prescribed by law for the estafa charge against accused-appellant is prision correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum, the penalty next lower in degree is prision correccional minimum to medium. Thus, the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence should be anywhere within six (6) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months. In fixing the maximum term, the prescribed penalty of prision correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum should be divided into three equal portions of time, each of which portion shall be deemed to form one period, as follows Minimum Period : From 4 years, 2 months and 1 day to 5 years, 5 months and 10 days Medium Period : From 5 years, 5 months and 11 days to 6 years, 8 months and 20 days Maximum Period : From 6 years, 8 months and 21 days to 8 years pursuant to Article 65, in relation to Article 64, of the Revised Penal Code. When the amounts involved in the offense exceeds P22,000, the penalty prescribed in Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional P10,000.00, although the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty (20) years.[21 Accordingly, the following penalties shall be imposed upon accused-appellant: In Criminal Case No. Q-91-21908 where accused-appellant defrauded Benny Maligaya in the amount of P35,000.00, one year for the additional amount of P13,000.00 in excess of P22,000.00 provided for in Article 315 shall be added to the maximum period of the prescribed penalty of prision correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum. Thus, accused-appellant shall suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, and two (2) months of prision correccionalmedium, as minimum to nine (9) years of prision mayor as maximum.[22 Accused-appellant shall also pay Benny Maligaya P35,000.00 by way of actual damages. In Criminal Case No. Q-91-21909 where accused-appellant defrauded Angeles Javier in the amount of P20,000.00, accused-appellant shall suffer the indeterminate penalty of one (1) year, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional minimum to five (5) years, five (5) months and eleven (11) days of prision correccional maximum. Accusedappellant shall also pay Angeles Javier P20,000.00 by way of actual damages. In Criminal Case No. Q-91-21910 where accused-appellant defrauded Leodigario Maullon in the amount of P30,400.00, accused-appellant shall suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional medium, as minimum to eight (8)

years of prision mayor, as maximum.[23 Accused-appellant shall also pay Leodigario Maullon P30,400.00 by way of actual damages. In addition, for the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale (Criminal Case No. Q91-21911) and pursuant to Article 39 (a) of the Labor Code, accused-appellant shall suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00). WHEREFORE, the March 6, 1996 Decision of the trial court finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale and estafa is hereby AFFIRMED subject to the following modifications: In Criminal Case No. Q-91-21908 where accused-appellant defrauded Benny Maligaya in the amount of P35,000.00, one year for the additional amount of P13,000.00 in excess of P22,000.00 provided for in Article 315 shall be added to the maximum period of the prescribed penalty of prision correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum. Thus, accused-appellant shall suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, and two (2) months of prision correccionalmedium, as minimum to nine (9) years of prision mayor as maximum. Accused-appellant shall also pay Benny Maligaya P35,000.00 by way of actual damages. In Criminal Case No. Q-91-21909 where accused-appellant defrauded Angeles Javier in the amount of P20,000.00, accused-appellant shall suffer the indeterminate penalty of one (1) year, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional minimum to five (5) years, five (5) months and eleven (11) days of prision correccional maximum. Accusedappellant shall also pay Angeles Javier P20,000.00 by way of actual damages. In Criminal Case No. Q-91-21910 where accused-appellant defrauded Leodigario Maullon in the amount of P30,400.00, accused-appellant shall suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional medium, as minimum to eight (8) years of prision mayor, as maximum. Accused-appellant shall also pay Leodigario Maullon P30,400.00 by way of actual damages. In addition, for the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale (Criminal Case No. Q-9121911) and pursuant to Article 39 (a) of the Labor Code, accused-appellant shall suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00). Costs against accused-appellant. SO ORDERED. Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, and Panganiban, JJ., concur. [G.R. No. 123146. June 17, 2003] PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. ALONA BULI-E and JOSEFINA (JOSIE) ALOLINO, appellants. DECISION AZCUNA, J.: Appellants Alona Buli-e and Josefina Alolino assail the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 15, finding them guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal recruitment committed in large scale and eight counts of estafa. On March 16, 1993, the following information was filed against Jose Alolino and appellants, Alona Buli-e and Josefina Alolino: The undersigned accuses ALONA BULI-E, JOSEFINA (JOSIE) ALOLINO and JOSE ALOLINO for VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 38 (b), PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 442, AS AMENDED BY P.D. 1920 FURTHER AMENDED BY P.D. 2018, committed in large scale, which is an act of economic sabotage, and by a syndicate, committed as follows: That during the period from March 1991 to July 1992, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused representing themselves to have the capacity to contract, enlist

and hire and transport Filipino workers for employment abroad did then and there willfully and unlawfully, for a fee, recruit and promise employment / job placement to the following persons: 1. Constancio Macli-ing 2. Jesssica Estay 3. Sidolia Fias-eo 4. John Mangili 5. Nieva Lampoyas 6. Sabado Agapito 7. Joseph Oratil and 8. Joel Oratil in Taiwan without first obtaining or securing license or authority from the proper government agency CONTRARY TO LAW.[1] On the same day, eight separate informations for estafa were also filed against Jose Alolino and appellants Alona Buli-e (Buli-e for brevity) and Josefina Alolino (Josefina, for brevity). Except as to the dates, amounts involved[2] and the names of complainants, the following information in Criminal Case No. 11123-R typified the seven other informations for the crime of estafa: That on or about the 12th day of July, 1992, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually aiding one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud one Constancio Macli-ing by way of false pretenses, which are executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud, as follows, to wit: the accused knowing fully well that they are not authorized job recruiters for persons intending to secure work abroad convinced said Constancio Macli-ing and pretended that they could secure a job for him/her abroad, for and in consideration of the sum of P15,000.00 when in truth and in fact they could not; the said Constancio Macli-ing, deceived and convinced by the false pretenses employed by the accused, parted away the total sum of P15,000.00 in favor of the accused, to the damage and prejudice of the said Constancio Macli-ing in the aforementioned amount of FIFTEEN THOUSAND PESOS (P15,000.00), Philippine Currency.[3] Jose Alolino was never apprehended and remains at large. Upon arraignment, appellants pleaded not guilty to each of the nine informations filed against them. A joint trial ensued since the cases involved the same factual milieu. Evidence for the prosecution showed that on various dates from June 1990 to July 1992, complainants went to the house of appellant Buli-e at No. 63 Sanitary Camp, Baguio City upon learning that she was recruiting workers for overseas employment. A cousin of complainant Lampoyas, whom Bulie helped deploy abroad, introduced Lampoyas to Buli-e in 1990. [4] The brothers Oratil went to see Buli-e about possible overseas employment in April 1992.[5] Mangili inquired from Buli-e if she was recruiting workers for overseas employment also in April 1992.[6]Sabado and Macli-ing approached Buli-e for possible overseas work in May 1992,[7] while Estay, accompanied by her sister, went to see Buli-e on June 17, 1992.[8] Fias-eo approached Buli-e on July 13, 1992, accompanied by Lampoyas.[9] Buli-e confirmed to complainants that she was, in fact, recruiting contract workers for Taiwan and that, although she did not have a license of her own to recruit, her boss in Manila who was a licensed recruiter, was in the process of getting her one which would soon be issued. [10] Buli-e identified her superiors in Manila to be the spouses Jose[11] and Josefina Alolino. Josefina was connected with Rodolfo S. Ibuna Employment Agency (RSI for brevity), a private employment agency licensed to recruit overseas contract workers. Buli-e informed complainants that requirements for application of overseas work included submission of bio-data, passport, NBI clearance, and medical examination clearance to show that the applicant is physically and mentally fit. There was also a placement fee of P40,000 of which P15,000 must be paid in advance. Buli-e told complainants that if they were interested in applying, they may submit to her said requirements which she, in turn, will submit to her boss who was in charge of processing the necessary documents. In the case of complainant Lampoyas who originally applied with Buli-e for employment in Kuwait, she was informed by Buli-e that the latter was working for a certain Jessie Agtarep.[12] Lampoyas gave Buli-e P4,000 on March 14, 1991 as downpayment for the placement fee andP5,000 on August 24, 1991. Lampoyas application papers were processed by Jamal Enterprises in Makati, Metro Manila but in

1992 , Buli-e transferred Lampoyas application to appellant Josefina, whom Buli-e referred to as her new boss.[13] Lampoyas was enticed to work in Taiwan instead of Kuwait and was assured that her deployment papers would be processed more quickly.[14] From March to August 1992, Buli-e accompanied complainants, on separate occasions, to Manila where they had their medical check-up at Saints Peter and Paul Medical Clinic in Ermita. Lampoyas had her medical check-up in March 1992[15] while Mangili and Joseph Oratil had their medical check-up in May 1992.[16] On June 20, 1992, Estay had her medical check-up, [17] while Agapito and Macli-ing had their medical examination on July 5, 1992.[18] Fias-eo had her medical examination on July 20, 1992 while Joel Oratil had his medical examination in August 1992. Complainants paid for the medical examination, the results of which were given to Buli-e. Immediately after complainants had undergone medical examination, Buli-e brought them to No. 11 Concorde Street, Airmans Village, Las Pias, Metro Manila purportedly to introduce them to her boss, the spouses Alolino. Complainants, except for Macli-ing and Agapito, were able to meet only Jose Alolino on the same day that they had undergone medical examination. Jose Alolino allegedly told complainants that his wife, Josefina, was in Taiwan following up applications but he assured them that they too would be deployed abroad in a matter of months. [19] Mangili, Estay, and the brothers Oratil were able to meet Josefina personally when they returned to the residence of the Alolinos in Manila to follow up their applications.[20] Fias-eo and Lampoyas, on the other hand, never met Josefina personally although they were able to talk to her over the telephone several times when they were following up the status of their applications.[21] It was during these telephone conversations that Josefina instructed Fias-eo and Lampoyas to have their medical examinations and secure their NBI clearance in Manila accompanied by Buli-e whom she identified as her agent.[22] Complainants were assured by one or both of the spouses that they were licensed to recruit overseas contract workers and that they can deploy workers within two to three months. [23] Complainants were informed by Buli-e and Josefina that deployment for Taiwan is on a first-come, first-served basis and that those who can comply with the requirements, particularly the advance payment of P15,000, shall be deployed first.[24] On different dates from May 1992 to July 1992, complainants handed to Buli-e at Sanitary Camp, Baguio City their advance payments of P15,000 for which they were issued receipts. [25] Mangili paid P11,000 on May 22, 1992 and P4,000 on June 18, 1992.[26] The Oratil brothers paid P15,000 each in installments from May 1992 to July 15, 1992.[27] Macli-ing paid P15,000 on July 12, 1992.[28] Fiaseo gave Buli-e P15,000 on July 13, 1992.[29] In addition to her previous payments amounting to P9,000, Lampoyas paid Buli-e P5,000 also on July 13, 1992.[30] Estay gave P15,000 on July 21, 1992[31] while Agapito paid Buli-e P15,000 on July 22, 1992.[32] Buli-e assured complainants that she delivered the payments to Josefina. Aside from giving the downpayment of the placement fee, complainants complied with the rest of the requirements which included submission of pictures, bio-data, passports, NBI clearances and medical examination reports. After months of waiting and despite compliance with all the requirements, complainants were not deployed abroad as promised by appellants. From August 1992 to February 1993, complainants trooped to Buli-es house but Buli-e merely kept on telling them to wait. When complainants called up Josefina by long distance telephone, they were also told just to wait. Weary of the interminable waiting, complainants went to the POEA office in Baguio City on February 2, 1993, to check whether appellants were indeed licensed to recruit overseas contract workers. They were dismayed to find out that appellants had no license to recruit in Baguio City or any part of the Cordillera Administrative Region (CAR). On the same day, complainants filed their complaints with the POEA-CAR and the Prosecutors Office of Baguio City. After appellants were apprehended and during their detention at the Baguio City Jail, Josefina, through counsel, refunded complainant Fias-eo P15,000 for his downpayment on the placement fee. [33] Complainant Mangili also demanded a refund and he was paid by Josefina, again through her counsel, the sum of P25,000 for his advance payment of P15,000 and as reimbursement of the actual expenses he incurred for his application.[34]

During trial, Buli-e testified that she worked for RSI and had been referring applicants to the agency before 1991. She met Josefina a year after she resigned from RSI.[35] In 1990, Buli-e had an applicant for Singapore, a certain Prescilla Laoayan from Baguio City. Buli-e referred Prescilla to RSI which, through Mrs. Fe Go, handled the processing of her application. As part of the requirements of the agency, Prescilla had to undergo training at the house of Josefina, who was then the Marketing Director of RSI. In 1991, Josefina sent Buli-e a note, through Prescilla, telling her to go to the house of Josefina at No.11 Concorde Street, Airmans Village, Las Pias, Metro Manila to discuss matters about recruitment of workers. Buli-e went to the house of Josefina as requested and it was then that she was appointed as an agent of Josefina.[36] Buli-e was tasked to find job applicants for Taiwan, Korea or Singapore whom she can refer to RSI through Josefina. Buli-e would then be paid for each referral. When Buli-e asked Josefina if the latter was authorized or had any license to recruit for overseas placement, Josefina answered in the affirmative.[37] Thereafter, Buli-e started recruiting job applicants for Taiwan, Singapore and Korea at her house in No. 63 Sanitary Camp, Baguio City. Complainants sought her of their own accord and Buli-e informed them of the requirements for job application which consisted of submission of bio-data, passport, NBI clearance and placement fee of P40,000 of which P15,000 must be paid in advance upon instructions of Josefina. Josefina allegedly instructed Buli-e to accompany complainants to Sts. Peter and Paul Medical Clinic in Ermita, Manila for medical check-up.[38]Buli-e was likewise instructed by Josefina to accompany some of the complainants in securing their NBI clearance and to receive whatever documents complainants will be submitting including the P15,000 advance payment, all of which should be submitted to Josefina. Buli-e said that she submitted the documents and the payments either to Jose Alolino or to Josefina.[39] She clarified that she did not have a hand in securing the passports of complainants[40] and received instructions from Josefina only when she communicated with Josefina through the telephone or went to Manila. She averred that she and several members of her family also tried to apply for overseas work with Josefina and paid the latter P100,000. [41] Buli-e presented Mrs. Nonette Legaspi-Villanueva, Unit Coordinator of POEA-CAR, to testify that RSI was a licensed employment agency and that Josefina was a licensed recruiter at the time that Buli-e had dealings with her co-appellant. Mrs. Villanueva testified that she has been with the POEA since 1985. Part of her functions included administrative and technical supervision of the staff regarding employment, facilitation, licensing, investigation and monitoring of the provincial recruitment authority as well as issuance of authorization to personnel to conduct inspection of licensed agencies in the City of Baguio.[42] Mrs.Villanueva said that, as per the certification of the Chief of the Licensing Branch of the POEA, RSI was a private employment agency with a license which expired on July 14, 1992. Josefina Alolino was included in the list of the personnel submitted by the agency in July 1990 as Marketing Consultant.[43] Mrs. Villanueva, however, clarified that licenses or permits to recruit workers are territorial in nature so that an agency licensed in Manila can only engage in recruitment activities within the place specified in the license although the applicants may be non-residents of Metro Manila. She further testified that she cannot remember if Buli-e was given any authority to recruit in Baguio City.[44] Josefina, on the other hand, testified that on September 16, 1987, she was appointed as one of the four Marketing Directors of RSI which was located in 408 Jovan Condominium, Shaw Boulevard, Mandaluyong, Metro Manila. RSI, represented by Rodolfo S. Ibuna as proprietor, was a private employment agency with a license which expired on July 14, 1992. As Overseas Marketing Director of RSI, Josefina was tasked to represent the agency in negotiating with employers in Taiwan, Malaysia, United States and Singapore[45] for said employers to avail of the services of RSI in recruiting, hiring, processing and deploying Filipino contract workers. She was also authorized to solicit applicants for overseas placement through advertisements, referrals, walk-ins, etc., and to undertake screening, evaluation and final selection of applicants. As per agreement with RSI, Josefina was entitled to a certain share for each successful negotiation with a foreign employer.[46] Josefina denied that Buli-e was her agent and insisted that she never gave Buli-e authority to recruit for RSI. On the contrary, Buli-e allegedly informed Josefina that she was an agent of Mrs. Fe Go, another marketing Director of RSI. Sometime in 1991, Mrs. Go referred to Josefina a certain Prescilla Laoayan, who wanted to apply as a domestic helper in Taiwan. Upon being told that she could not be

deployed unless she would give a downpayment of P15,000 for the placement fee, Prescilla informed Josefina that she already gave P15,000 to an agent whom she identified to be Buli-e. Josefina then wrote a note for Buli-e informing her that there was a problem regarding the processing of Prescillas application. Prescilla delivered the note to Buli-e who in turn went to see Josefina at her house in No. 11 Concorde Street, Airmans Village, Las Pias, Metro Manila. Josefina said that she and Buli-e merely talked about Prescillas application and that was the first time that Josefina met and talked with Buli-e although she had already seen her before in the office of Mrs. Fe Go.[47] Josefina testified that herein complainants were originally referred by Buli-e to Mrs. Fe Go who, in turn, referred them to her. Josefina said that she accepted referrals from Buli-e even though the latter was not her agent nor connected with RSI because their agency accepts referrals from everyone. In 1992, Buli-e, claiming that complainants authorized and designated her to act as their spokesperson, went to the house of Josefina several times to follow up the progress of their applications.[48] Josefina denied having given Buli-e instructions to accompany complainants to Saints Peter and Paul Medical Clinic in Ermita, Manila. She also denied having an understanding with Buli-e to receive payments from each of complainants and to bring them to her house in Las Pias, Metro Manila. [49] Josefina explained that the deployment of complainants was delayed because the Taiwanese government changed its previous policy of allowing foreign employment agencies like RSI to negotiate directly with prospective employers in Taiwan. Foreign employment agencies were instead allowed to negotiate only with local employment agencies in Taiwan, which, in turn, were responsible for negotiating with the Taiwanese employers. The change in the policy caused delay in the deployment of complainants since the local employment agencies in Taiwan demanded additional requirements such as additional fees. Josefina said she informed complainants of the delay and the reason for it but complainants could not wait to be deployed and, instead, demanded the refund of their payments.[50] On March 2, 1993, Josefina allegedly gave Buli-e P75,000 with the instruction that she was to give complainant Lampoyas P5,000 as refund, and P10,000 each to complainants Macli-ing, Estay, Fiaseo, Mangili, Agapito, and the Oratil brothers. Upon having been approached by complainants for the refund of their money, Josefina informed them that she already gave their refunds through Bulie. Complainants, however, claimed that they did not receive their refunds from Buli-e. When complainants could not wait for the refund of their payments and failed to see Josefina who was always out of the country due to her work, they filed the present cases.[51] Emelita Racelis testified that she was an employee of RSI from 1989 to 1992 and was one of the two persons assigned to Josefina.[52] Ms. Racelis said that Buli-e frequently went to the RSI, bringing applicants with her three times a month. Among the applicants whom Buli-e referred to RSI through one of the marketing directors, Mrs. Fe Go, was a certain Prescilla Laoayan. Racelis said that Laoayan was endorsed by Mrs. Go to Josefina because it is the practice that when the applicant of one of the marketing directors cannot be deployed, the applicant will be endorsed to another marketing director with a job opening. Josefina, however, had trouble deploying Ms. Laoayan whose placement fee had not been forwarded by Buli-e to RSI.[53] On July 4, 1995, the Trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads, as follows: WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered as follows: 1. In Criminal Case No. 11122-R, the Court finds the accused Alona Buli-e and Josefina (Josie) Alolino guilty beyond reasonable doubt, by direct participation and in conspiracy with each other, of the crime of illegal recruitment in a large scale as defined and penalized under Article 38(b) in relation to Article 39 of PD 442 as amended by PD 2018 and sentences each of them to life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P100,000.00 each, and to pay the costs. 2. In Criminal case No. 11123-R to 11130-R (8 counts), the court finds the accused Alona Buli-e and Josefina (Josie) Alolino guilty beyond reasonable doubt by direct participation and in conspiracy with each other of the crime of Estafa as charged in the Informations in the aforesaid 8 cases as defined and penalized under Article 315 first paragraph in relation to No. 2 (a) of the same article and sentences each of them, applying the indeterminate sentence law, to an imprisonment ranging from six (6) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum to six (6) years, eight (8) months and twenty (20) days of prision mayor as maximum in each of the

aforesaid 8 cases; to indemnify jointly and severally the offended parties Constancio Macli-ing, Jessica Estay, Sidolia Fias-eo, John Mangili, Sabado Agapito, Joseph Oratil and Joel Oratil the sum of P15,000.00 each and Nieva Lampoyas the sum of P14,000.00 as actual damages without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs. The accused Alona Buli-e and Josefina (Josie) Alolino being detention prisoners are entitled to be credited 4/5 of their preventive imprisonment in the service of their sentence in accordance with Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code. SO ORDERED.[54] In rendering the decision, the trial court ruled that by their acts, Buli-e and Josefina, conspired and confederated with one another in the illegal recruitment of complainants for overseas employment. Buli-e performed the recruitment activities in Baguio and Josefina, in Manila. The trial court specifically noted Buli-es acts of accompanying the complainants to Manila for their medical examinations, securing complainants NBI clearances and passports as well as receiving complainants downpayments for the purported placement fee as an indication that she directly participated in the recruitment of all complainants. The trial court observed that Buli-e practically confessed her acts of recruitment in open court and justified the same by claiming that she was just acting as an agent of Josefina or was authorized to act in behalf of the latter. As regards Josefina, the trial court held that she directly participated in the recruitment of complainants even if she did not personally go to Baguio City since she received the applications and other requirements such as NBI clearances, passports, bio-data as well as the advanced payments of complainants from Buli-e. Either she or her husband Jose, or both of them, entertained complainants who were brought by Buli-e to their home at No. 11 Concorde Street, Airmans Village, Las Pias, Metro Manila. The spouses repeatedly promised to work or make arrangements for complainants deployment abroad. The trial court ruled that the authority given to Josefina as Overseas Marketing Director of RSI, a duly licensed employment agency, was confined to negotiating with foreign employers in Taiwan and she was not supposed to recruit overseas Filipino workers. The court stressed that assuming Josefina was authorized to recruit in Manila, she had no authority to do so in Baguio City. Citing Article 29 of the Labor Code which states that no license or authority shall be used directly or indirectly by any person other than the one in whose favor it was issued or at any place other than that stated in the license or authority, nor may such license or authority be transferred or conveyed to any other person or entity, the trial court ruled that appellants could not use the RSI license in Manila to recruit overseas contract workers in Baguio City. The trial court further noted that the license of RSI employment office was already suspended on June 8, 1992 and expired on July 14, 1992. Consequently, the authority given by RSI to Josefina was likewise suspended on June 8, 1992 and expired on July 14, 1992. Finally, the trial court said that Josefinas act of returning the advanced payments of some of complainants would not exculpate her and only proved that she had in fact received money from complainants who were made to believe that they would be deployed abroad at the soonest possible time. With regard to the eight charges of estafa filed against appellants, the trial court convicted them on the ground that all the elements of estafa were present under each of the eight charges filed. The trial court held that appellants through false pretenses and fraudulent acts represented to complainants that they had the power, authority and capacity to deploy workers abroad for a fee of P40,000, of which P15,000 should be paid as advance payment. The false pretenses and fraudulent acts were executed prior to or simultaneous with appellants taking the sum of P15,000 as advance payment from each of private complainants[55] which were received by Buli-e in Baguio City and turned over by her to Josefina in Manila. Complainants relied on the pretenses and misrepresentations of appellants and parted with substantial sums of money as advance payments of their placement fees. As a result of the false pretenses and misrepresentations, complainants were damaged and prejudiced to the extent of the sums they had given as downpayment since appellants failed to send them abroad as promised. In her appeal before us, appellant Buli-e contends that the trial court erred: I. IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE THE DEFENSE OF THE CO-ACCUSED ALONA BULI-E THAT SHE MERELY REFERRED THE PRIVATE OFFENDED PARTIES TO CO-ACCUSED

SPOUSES JOSE AND JOSEFINA ALOLINO, WHOM SHE HONESTLY BELIEVED TO BE BONA FIDE OVERSEAS JOB RECRUITERS; II. IN HOLDING THAT THERE WAS CONSPIRACY BETWEEN HEREIN APPELLANT BULI-E AND SPOUSES ALOLINO IN THE COMMISSION OF THE CRIMES OF LARGE SCALE ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT AND ESTAFA; AND III. HOLDING CO-ACCUSED ALONA BULI-E LIABLE FOR ESTAFA WHEN THERE WAS NO SHOWING THAT SAID ACCUSED BENEFITED FROM THE ALLEGED MISREPRESENTATION. Appellant Josefina, on the other hand, presents the following assignments of error: I. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING JOSEFINA ALOLINO GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT BY DIRECT PARTICIPATION AND IN CONSPIRACY WITH COACCUSED ALONA BULI-E OF THE CRIME OF ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT IN LARGE SCALE AS DEFINED AND PENALIZED UNDER ARTICLE 38[b] IN RELATION TO ARTICLE 39 OF P.D. 442 AS AMENDED BY P.D. 2018 AND IN SENTENCING EACH OF THEM TO LIFE IMPRISONMENT AND TO PAY A FINE OF P100,000. II. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED JOSEFINA ALOLINO GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT BY DIRECT PARTICIPATION AND IN CONSPIRACY WITH CO-ACCUSED ALONA BULI-E OF THE CRIME OF ESTAFA AS CHARGED IN THE INFORMATION IN THE AFORESAID 8 CASES AS DEFINED AND PENALIZED UNDER ARTICLE 315 FIRST PARAGRAPH IN RELATION TO NO. 2[A] OF THE SAME ARTICLE. We shall discuss the interrelated issues together. Under Article 13(b) of the Labor Code, recruitment and placement refer to any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, and include referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not; provided that any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment or placement. The essential elements of the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale are (1) the accused engages in acts of recruitment and placement of workers defined under Article 13(b) or in any prohibited activities under Article 34 of the Labor Code; (2) the accused has not complied with the guidelines issued by the Secretary of Labor and Employment, particularly with respect to the securing of a license or an authority to recruit and deploy workers, either locally or overseas; and (3) the accused commits the unlawful acts against three or more persons, individually or as a group.[56] When illegal recruitment is committed in large scale or when it is committed by a syndicate, i.e., if it is carried out by a group of three or more persons conspiring and/or confederating with one another, it is considered as an offense involving economic sabotage. The factual backdrop shows that appellants engaged in recruitment activities involving eight persons. The recruitment activities were made by appellants without having the license or authority to do so as evidenced by the certification issued by Legal Officer of the POEA Regional Extension Unit, Cordillera Administrative Region, which stated that Alona Buli-e, Hilario Antonio,[57] Josie Alolino and Jose Alolino were not licensed nor authorized to recruit workers for overseas employment in the City of Baguio or in any part of the region.[58] Appellant Buli-e herself does not deny that she had no license or authority to recruit workers for overseas employment. She, however, insists that she had never directly participated in recruiting complainants since it was in fact complainants who sought her help in applying for overseas employment. Buli-e explained that she merely referred complainants to the spouses Alolino whom she honestly believed to be bona fideoverseas job recruiters and, since she, herself, had intentions of applying for overseas work, she tagged along with complainants to Manila to see the spouses Alolino. Inasmuch as she and complainants were all from Baguio City, complainants allegedly designated her to conduct all negotiations and follow up of their applications with the spouses. Buli-es claim deserves scant consideration. It is true that Buli-e did not actively seek complainants to recruit them for overseas employment. It was complainants who sought her out. Nevertheless, when complainants approached her, Buli-e gave complainants the impression that she had the ability to send workers abroad by saying that although she did not have a license of her own to recruit, her boss, who was a licensed recruiter, was already in the process of securing her a license.[59] She not only informed

complainants of the requirements in applying for overseas employment and even accompanied them to Manila to procure the necessary documents such as passport, medical and NBI clearances. [60] It was she who brought them to the house of the spouses Alolino and it was also she who received from complainants advanced payments for placement fee which she handed over to the spouses. Her claim that she and her relatives were also victims of illegal recruitment by the spouses Alolino is not substantiated. We also find no reason to disturb the findings of the trial court that Josefina Alolino conspired and confederated with Buli-e in recruiting applicants for overseas employment from Baguio City although neither she nor Buli-e had license or authority to do so. Her claim that she did not have a direct participation in the recruitment in Baguio City and that she merely assisted the complainants by referring them to RSI to facilitate their papers does not merit credence. There is no showing that complainants ever set foot in the RSI office. They were always brought by Buli-e to the house of the spouses Alolino in Las Pias after their medical check up. Complainants, who were with other applicants, were entertained and generously fed breakfast or dinner by one or both of the spouses who assured them that they would be able to fly to Taiwan in just a matter of months.[61] Although Josefina alleged that the documents and payments were handed by Buli-e to the RSI office, Josefina could show no proof to substantiate her claim. It is significant to note that after the informations for illegal recruitment and eight counts of estafa were already filed in court, some of the complainants were given a refund of their advances for the placement fees by Josefina herself, through counsel, and not by RSI. Josefinas acts clearly show that she and Buli-e acted in concert towards the accomplishment of a common felonious purpose which was to recruit workers for overseas employment even though they had no license to do so. Settled is the rule that if it is proved that two or more persons, aimed, by their acts, at the accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their acts, although apparently independent, were in fact connected and cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal association and a concurrence of sentiment, a conspiracy may be inferred even though no actual meeting between or among them to coordinate ways and means is proved. [62] Josefina, however, maintains that as Overseas Marketing Director for RSI, she was authorized to solicit applicants for overseas placement through advertisements, referrals, walk-ins, etc. and to undertake screening, evaluation and final selection of applicants. Apart from her bare testimony, there is nothing on record to corroborate Josefinas claim that as Marketing Director she was authorized to solicit applicants for overseas placement through advertisements, referrals, walk-ins, etc. Josefina did not bother to formally offer as evidence the document allegedly supporting her claim that part of her duties as Marketing Director included recruitment of overseas contract workers. The document not having been formally offered in court cannot be considered, pursuant to Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. Moreover, the Licensing Branch of the POEA confirmed that the license of RSI had already been suspended on June 8, 1992 and expired on July 14, 1992. [63] Consequently, even if Josefina was licensed to recruit workers for overseas employment, her authority to do so ceased when the license of her agency, RSI, was suspended and when it eventually expired. Josefina, however, despite the suspension and expiration of the RSI license, continued to engage in recruitment activities for overseas employment. Except for Lampoyas who met Jose Alolino at the latters house in March 1992, and Mangili and Joseph Oratil who met Jose Alolino in May 1992, complainants were entertained at the house of the Alolinos after the license of RSI had already been suspended. Lampoyas, Macli-ing and Mangili completed the P15,000 downpayment of the placement fee after the license of RSI had already been suspended. The rest of complainants gave payments for the placement fee after the license of RSI had already expired. Furthermore, Josefinas alleged authority to recruit applicants for overseas employment as Marketing Director of RSI was only confined to Metro Manila. Article 29 of the Labor Code provides: Art. 29. Non-transferability of license or authority No license or authority shall be used directly or indirectly by any person other than the one in whose favor it was issued or at any place other than that stated in the license or authority, nor may such license or authority be transferred, conveyed or assigned to any other person or entity. Any transfer of business address, appointment or designation of any agent or representative including the establishment of additional offices anywhere shall be subject to the prior approval of the Secretary of Labor.

We are not persuaded by Josefinas claim that no recruitment activity was being done outside of the territorial permit of RSI and it was only incidental that complainants who were referred to her by Buli-e were residents of Baguio City. As earlier discussed, there is no indication that complainants ever set foot in the RSI office. They were always brought by Buli-e to Las Pias, Metro Manila where they were entertained by one or both of the spouses Alolino who repeatedly assured them that they would be able to fly to Taiwan in a matter of months. Josefina, who claims to have authority to recruit applicants for overseas employment in behalf of RSI, should have known that licensed agencies are prohibited from conducting any provincial recruitment, job fairs or recruitment activities of any form outside of the address stated in the license, acknowledged branch or extension office, without securing prior authority from the POEA.[64] Pursuant to the POEA rules and regulations, Josefina could recruit applicants for overseas employment and process their applications only at the RSI office in Mandaluyong, Metro Manila since there was no showing that RSI had an acknowledged branch or extension office in Baguio City or that the prior approval of the POEA for provincial recruitment or recruitment activities outside the RSI office was obtained. Finally, the trial court did not err in finding appellants guilty of eight (8) counts of estafa. It is settled that a person convicted of illegal recruitment under the Labor Code can also be convicted of violation of the Revised Penal Code provisions on estafa provided that the elements of the crime are present. [65] The elements for estafa are: (a) that the accused defrauded another by abuse of confidence or by means of deceit, and (b) that damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation is caused to the offended party or third person.[66] Appellants deceived complainants into believing that they had the authority and capability to send them to Taiwan for employment. By reason or on the strength of such assurance, complainants parted with their money in payment of the placement fees. Since the representations of appellants proved to be false, paragraph 2(a), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code is applicable. Buli-es claim that she did not benefit from the money collected from complainants since she gave the payments to Josefina is of no moment. It was clearly established that she acted in connivance with Josefina in defrauding complainants. As regards Josefina, the fact that she returned the payment of some of the complainants will not exculpate her from criminal liability. Criminal liability for estafa is not affected by compromise or novation, for it is a public offense which must be prosecuted and punished by the government on its own motion even though complete reparation has been made of the damage suffered by the offended party.[67] The actual damages in the sum of P15,000 awarded to each of complainants Fias-eo and Mangili, however, should be deleted inasmuch as said amounts have already been reimbursed by Josefina during her detention. WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 15, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the actual damages awarded to Fias-eo and Mangili in Criminal Cases Nos. 11125-R and 11126-R are deleted. Costs de oficio. SO ORDERED. Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Vitug, Ynares-Santiago, and Carpio, JJ., concur. [G.R. No. 150530. February 20, 2003] PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ALEX BAYTIC, accused-appellant. DECISION BELLOSILLO, J.: ALEX BAYTIC appeals from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City [1] finding him guilty of illegal recruitment in large scale and sentencing him to life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P500,000.00. Accused is further ordered to reimburse complaining witnesses Ofelia Bongbonga, Millie Passi and Nolie Bongbonga P3,500.00, P4,000.00 and P4,000.00, respectively, representing the amounts fraudulently taken from them. On 24 September 1998 Kennedy Hapones accompanied by accused Alex Baytic went to the house of his aunt Ofelia Bongbonga at 514 Tabigo Street, Manggahan, Quezon City. There they found Ofelia, Nolie and Zenaida, all surnamed Bongbonga, together with Millie Passi, Yolanda Barrios and Elvira Nacario. Accused Alex Baytic told the girls that he was looking for workers willing to work in Italy

as utility personnel. He explained that interested applicants should give him money for processing of their medical certificate, certificate of employment and other travel documents. Since the offer appeared to be a good opportunity to work abroad, Ofelia Bongbonga on the same day gave the accusedP3,500.00, followed by Millie Passi with P4,000.00 the next day, and Nolie Bongbonga with P4,000.00 on 5 October as their placement fees. All these transactions were evidenced by receipts issued by accused Alex Baytic. According to private complainant Ofelia Bongbonga, accused Baytic promised her and her two (2) co-applicants an interview by his cousin, a doctor from Italy, on 7 October 1998 at the Corinthian Gardens. However, on the appointed date of their interview, the accused failed to appear. Ofelia, Millie and Nolie frantically searched for him but he was nowhere to be found. Ofelia further testified that sometime in January 1999 they heard over the radio that accused Baytic was arrested in Pasig City for illegal recruitment activities. Upon inquiry from the radio station, she learned that the accused was already detained at the Pasig Provincial Jail, so she followed him there. Thereafter, she and her two (2) other companions, Millie and Nolie, who were likewise victimized by the accused filed the instant case against him. On the witness stand, both private complainants Millie Passi and Nolie Bongbonga corroborated the testimony of Ofelia Bongbonga on every material point. In particular, Millie Passi recounted that she was also enticed to part with P4,000.00 when Baytic promised her a good paying job abroad. According to her, there was no reason for her to be suspicious of the identity of the accused as well as of his representations since he was a good friend of her cousin Kennedy Hapones. Like the two (2) other complainants, Nolie Bongbonga averred that the accused through misrepresentations persuaded her to give himP4,000.00 for the processing of certain travel documents. As proof thereof she presented a receipt dated 5 October 1998 purportedly signed and issued by the accused. Accused Alex Baytic, testifying in his defense, not only denied the accusations against him but also insisted that it was actually Kennedy Hapones, a new acquaintance, who was the illegal recruiter. He recounted that sometime in November 1999, he went to the house of Hapones who was trying to recruit him for deployment abroad. According to the accused, Hapones told him to prepare P250,000.00 although the former eventually accepted an initial advance payment of P4,500.00. He again met Hapones the following month when the latter told him and a group of other applicants, including Ofelia Bongbonga, that their requirements were ready. That was the last time he saw Hapones who, he later learned, had already left for abroad. He was suspected of being in cahoots with Hapones because whenever the latter and the applicants talked, Hapones would always point at him, although he never had the opportunity to know what Hapones had actually said to them. But the trial court sustained the complaining witnesses and gave more credence to their straightforward and consistent testimonies. It opined that all the essential requisites of the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale as defined in Art. 13, par. (b), of the Labor Code[2] were present x x x x The accused made representations to each of the complainants that he could send them to Italy as janitor/utility aides through direct hiring, which constitutes a promise of employment which amounted to recruitment as defined under Article 13(b) of the Labor Code. The testimonies of the three prosecution witnesses that they were actually recruited for overseas employment by the accused and were induced by him to part with their money retain undiminished probative worth and weight. The receipts (Exhibits A, C, and D) respectively issued to the complainants are sufficient proofs of his guilt as against accuseds mere denial of the signatures appearing therein. The modus operandi of the accused was well established by the corroborative testimonies of the witnesses. [3] Accused-appellant now prays that the Court to take a second hard look at his conviction in view of the alleged failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. He takes exception to the finding of the trial court that all the elements of the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale are present. He argues that the first element, i.e., the accused engages in the recruitment and placement of workers, defined under Art. 13, or in any prohibited activities under Art. 34, of the Labor Code, is not present because he did not solicit any money from the complainants nor did he promise them employment in Italy. The truth of the matter, according to him, is that he himself was victimized by Kennedy Hapones, the real illegal recruiter. He explained that when Hapones could not be contacted, the complainants vented their anger towards him, being Hapones constant companion.

Such being the case, accused-appellant insists that the second element, which is the absence of license or authority to recruit, could not have been present because there was in fact no need for him to apply for the license as he was not in the recruitment business. We are not impressed. Illegal recruitment is committed when two (2) elements concur. First, the offender has no valid license or authority required by law to enable one to engage lawfully in recruitment and placement of workers. Second, he or she undertakes either any activity within the meaning of recruitment and placement defined under Art. 13, par. (b), or any prohibited practices enumerated under Art. 34 of the Labor Code. In case of illegal recruitment in large scale, a third element is added: that the accused commits the acts against three or more persons, individually or as a group.[4] The first element is present. POEA representative Flordeliza Cabusao presented in evidence a certification from one Hermogenes Mateo, Director III, Licensing Branch, showing that accused-appellant was neither licensed nor authorized to recruit workers for overseas employment.[5] The second element is likewise present. Accused-appellant is deemed engaged in recruitment and placement under Art. 13, par. (b), of the Labor Code when he made representations to each of the complainants that he could send them to Italy for employment as utility personnel. Prosecution witness Ofelia Bongbonga categorically stated that accused-appellant promised her employment for a fee, a testimony corroborated by both complaining witnesses Nolie Bongbonga and Millie Passi. His promises and misrepresentations gave the complainants the distinct impression that he had the authority to engage in recruitment, thus enabling him to collect from them various amounts for recruitment and placement fees without license or authority to do so. Accused-appellants vain attempt at exculpating himself by pinpointing Hapones as the culprit cannot mislead this Court from his transparent and obvious machinations. His self-serving statement that he himself was a victim of Hapones wilts in the face of the complaining-witnesses testimonies that he made promises of employment, solicited money from them and even signed receipts as proof of payment. His protestations notwithstanding, he failed to prove that the complaining witnesses were incited by any motive to testify falsely against him. It is contrary to human nature and experience for persons to conspire and accuse a stranger of a crime, or even a casual acquaintance for that matter, that would take the latters liberty and send him to prison just to appease their feeling of rejection and assuage the frustration of their dreams to go abroad.[6] His denials cannot prevail over the positive declaration of the prosecution witnesses. Accused-appellant's unsubstantiated denials cannot be given greater evidentiary value over the testimony of credible witnesses who testified on affirmative matters.[7] There is therefore no discernible reason to disturb the findings of the trial court, which is in the best position to assess the witnesses' credibility and to appreciate complainants' candor and truthfulness.[8] Accused-appellant recruited at least three (3) persons, giving them the impression that he had the authority to deploy people abroad. As such, his crime of economic sabotage can be categorized as illegal recruitment in large scale punishable by life imprisonment and a fine ofP100,000.00, now increased to a minimum of P500,000.00 by virtue of Rep. Act No. 8042, also known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995." [9] WHEREFORE, the appealed decision finding accused-appellant ALEX BAYTIC guilty of illegal recruitment in large scale, sentencing him to life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P500,000.00 as well as reimburse complainants Ofelia Bongbonga, Millie Passi, and Nolie Bongbonga the amounts of P3,500.00, P4,000.00 and P4,000.00, respectively, is AFFIRMED. Costs against accused-appellant. SO ORDERED. Mendoza, Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur. G.R. No. 143726 February 23, 2004 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. LETICIA SAGAYAGA, ALMA SO, VICENTE SO YAN HAN and ORLANDO BURGOS, accused. LETICIA SAGAYAGA, appellant. DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.: This is an appeal from the Decision1 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 35, convicting the appellant Leticia Sagayaga of large scale illegal recruitment as defined in Section 6, Republic Act No. 8042 and sentencing her to suffer life imprisonment. The Indictment The appellant was charged with large scale illegal recruitment in an Information, the accusatory portion of which reads: That during the period from October 1997 to December 1997 and sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the City of Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and helping each other and representing themselves to have the power, capacity and lawful authority to deploy complainants as factory workers in Taiwan, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously recruit and promise employment to ELMER JANER, ERIC FAROL and ELMER RAMOS for and in consideration of amounts ranging from P70,000.00 to P75,000.00 which they paid to said accused, without the latter having deployed and/or reimbursed complainants of their payments despite demands, to the damage and prejudice of said complainants. CONTRARY TO LAW.2 Only the appellant was arrested, duly arraigned, and, with the assistance of counsel, pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. The other accused remained at large. The Case for the Prosecution As culled by the Office of the Solicitor General, the facts which triggered the case in the trial court are as follows: Re: Elmer Janer Sometime in the last week of October 1997, Elmer Janer went to the office of Alvis Placement Service Corporation located at AP Building 1563 F. Agoncillo St., corner Pedro Gil St., Ermita, Manila, to apply for overseas employment as factory worker in Taiwan (pp. 4, 5 and 14, TSN, September 7, 1999). Appellant Leticia Sagayaga, after personally receiving Elmer's application, required him to submit the necessary documents (p. 5, TSN, September 7, 1999). Appellant further asked Elmer to pay seventy-five thousand pesos (P75,000.00) as placement fee (Id.). Elmer paid the said fee to appellant in three (3) installments, the first, on November 5, 1997, in the amount of twenty-five thousand pesos (P25,000.00); the second, on November 13, 1997, in the amount of five thousand pesos (P5,000.00); and the third, on November 19, 1997, in the amount of forty-five thousand pesos (P45,000.00). All the payments were made inside Alvis Placement Agency (p. 6, id.). As required, Elmer also had his medical examination at the Angeles Medical Clinic, the result of which confirmed that he was fit to work (p. 9, Ibid.). Thereafter, he was told to wait for the arrival of the employer. After seven (7) months, no employer arrived. Tired of waiting, Elmer demanded that he be refunded of his money (Id.). Despite appellant's promises to pay, Elmer was not refunded of his money. Exasperated, Elmer asked appellant for a promissory note, which appellant executed, promising to pay Elmer seventy-five thousand (P75,000.00) on May 6, 1998 (pp. 10 and 11, TSN, September 7, 1999). In said promissory note, appellant designated herself as the assistant general manager of the placement agency (Id.). When appellant failed to refund the amount to Elmer on the date stated in the promissory note, the latter went to the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) and filed a sworn complaint against appellant (p. 11, TSN, September 7, 1999). Re: Testimony of Eric Farol On November 20, 1997, Eric Farol first met appellant at Alvis Placement Service Corporation when he applied for an overseas job in Taiwan as a plastic factory worker (pp. 3-4, TSN, September 20, 1999). Appellant and her co-accused Vicente So Yan Han discussed with Eric about the latter's job application (Id.). They required Eric to submit to them his passport, National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) clearance, medical clearance and to pay seventy-five thousand

pesos (P75,000.00) as placement fee (Id.). Eric submitted all the aforestated requirements and paid the seventy-five thousand pesos to appellant in two (2) installments, for which the latter issued receipts affixing her signature thereon (pp. 5-9, TSN, September 20, 1999). Appellant then promised Eric that he will be leaving for Taiwan before Christmas of 1997. Failing to fulfill her promise, appellant and Vicente So Yan Han told Eric to wait up to the month of January 1998 (pp. 10 and 11, Ibid.). When appellant failed to comply with her commitment to send Eric to Taiwan in January 1998, Eric demanded from appellant the refund of his money (pp. 11 and 12, Ibid.). Appellant then issued to him a check dated February 5, 1998, affixing her signature thereon, for the amount of seventy-two thousand five hundred pesos (P72,500.00). But when Eric presented the check to the drawee bank for payment, the same was dishonored by reason: "ACCOUNT CLOSED" (pp. 11-14, TSN, September 20, 1999). Insistent that he be refunded of his money, Vicente So Yan Han gave him cash amounts on different dates: February 6, 1998 - - five thousand pesos; February 7, 1998 - - five thousand pesos; and February 17, 1998 - - one thousand pesos (pp. 14-18, TSN, September 20, 1999). Eric was told to return on April 4, 1998 for the full payment of the refund. However, when Eric went back on the first week of April, appellant gave him a letter that the full refund of his money would be given on April 30, 1998 (p. 19, Ibid). Eric returned to appellant on April 30, 1998, but still, appellant failed to refund the money (p. 20, Id.). On May 8, 1998, Eric filed a complaint against appellant and Vicente So Yan Han at the POEA (pp. 20-21, TSN, September 20, 1999). Re: Elmer Ramos Om September 27, 1997, Elmer Ramos went to the office of Alvis Placement Services Corporation to apply for overseas employment as factory worker in Taiwan (pp. 8 and 9, TSN, September 27, 1999). Initially, he took up his application with Vicente So Yan Han who required him to submit his passport, NBI and medical clearances and to pay seventy thousand pesos (P70,000.00) as placement fee (pp. 10 and 11, TSN, September 27, 1999). Elmer submitted the aforestated requirements and paid the placement fee in two (2) installments: twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) - - paid to appellant and Vicente So Yan Han on October 22, 1997; and fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) - - paid to Vicente So Yan Han on November 12, 1997 (pp. 11-15, TSN, September 27, 1999). Vicente So Yan Han then assured Elmer that he would be included for deployment in the first batch on the first week of December 1997 which, however, did not materialize (pp. 19 and 20, TSN, September 27, 1997). Elmer decided to withdraw his application. The documents submitted were returned to Elmer but not the placement fee he paid (pp. 21 and 22, TSN, September 27, 1999). Instead, appellant issued a check dated February 5, 1998 for the amount of seventy thousand pesos (P70,000.00) (p. 22, Id.). When Elmer encashed the check with the bank, it was dishonored by reason: "closed account" (p. 23, Ibid.). On May 6, 1998, Elmer went back to the office of Alvis Placement Service Corporation to demand the refund of his money. Elmer discussed the matter with appellant, but the latter failed to return Elmer's money. The next day (May 7, 1998), Elmer went to the POEA and filed a sworn complaint against appellant and Vicente So Yan Han (pp. 25 and 26, TSN, September 27, 1999). On May 9, 1998, Elmer again tried to get a refund from appellant, but the latter only issued a promissory note assuring Elmer payment of the seventy thousand pesos on May 14 and 15, 1998 at 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon (pp. 27 and 28, Ibid.). On May 15, 1998, appellant gave Elmer the amount of only five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) (p. 29, Ibid.).3 The Case for the Appellant The appellant restates her case as follows: On different dates in 1997, the three (3) complaining witnesses in this case (Elmer Ramos, Elmer Janer and Eric Farol) filed separate applications for job placement as factory workers in Taiwan with ALvis Placement Services Corporation, with business address at Rm. 507, AP Bldg., 1563 F. Agoncillo cor. Pedro Gil Sts., Ermita, Manila[,] where the appellant Leticia Sagayaga was then working as corporate treasurer. Elmer Ramos filed his application sometime in September 1997 with the corporation, through accused-at-large Vicente So Yan Han. It was the same Vicente So Yan Han who asked him to submit the required documents (NBI and medical clearances, etc.), and to pay the amount of P70,000.00 as placement fee. He submitted the required documents, and paid the placement fee

in two (2) installments as follows: P20,000.00 was paid by him on 22 October 1997 to appellant Letecia Sagayaga and Vicente So Yan Han on the office of the corporation; and P50,000.00 was paid by him on 12 November 1997 to Vicente So Yan Han. Then So Yan Han informed him that he would be deployed in Taiwan in the first week of December 1997. The promised deployment or job placement never came. He then decided to withdraw his application and get back the documents he submitted and the money he had paid. He was issued a check for the fee he had paid but the check was dishonored by the bank for the reason "account closed." Failing to get his money ba[c]k, he filed a complaint with the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration where he executed a "Sinumpaang Salaysay" on 7 May 1998. Elmer Janer filed his job placement application with Alvis Placement Services Corporation in the last week of October 1997. Similarly, he was required to submit the necessary documents and to pay the amount of P75,000.00 as placement fee. He submitted the requisite documents and paid the placement in three (3) installments, as follows: He paid P25,000.00 on 5 November 1997; P5,000.00 on 13 November 1997; and P45,000.00 on 19 November 1997. Thereafter, he was asked to wait for 7 months for his employer to arrive. No employer arrive[d]. He decided to withdraw his application and asked to be reimbursed the money he had paid. Appellant Leticia Sagayaga gave him instead a "promissory note" indicating that the amount of P75,000.00 will be paid to Elmer Janer on 6 May 1998. When no payment was made to him as promised, he filed a complaint with the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration and where he executed a "Sinumpaang Salaysay" on 13 May 1998. Eric Farol filed his job placement application with Alvis Placement Services Corporation on 20 November 1997. After submitting the required documents, he paid the placement fee of P75,000.00 in two (2) installments as follows: He paid the first installment of P15,000.00 on 12 December 1997; and the balance of P60,000.00 was paid by him on 16 December 1997. The appellant Leticia Sagayaga promised that he would be able to leave for Taiwan before Christmas of 1997. When he was not able to leave for Taiwan before the end of 1997, he was asked to wait until January 1998. When he failed to leave as promised, he decided to withdraw his application and asked that he be refunded the amount of P75,000.00 he had paid as placement fee. The check given to him by the appellant bounced for the reason "account closed." Forthwith, Vicente So Yan Han paid him on different dates the amounts of P5,000.00 on 6 February 1998, another P5,000.00 on 7 February 1998, and P1,000.00 on 17 February 1998. And as he was not refunded the full amount of the fee paid by him, he filed a complaint with the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration and executed a "Sinumpaang Salaysay" on 7 May 1998. As supplied by the unrebutted testimony of the appellant, the persons who had effective and actual control, management and direction of the business and transactions of Alvis Placement Services Corporation were the accused-spouses Vicente So Yan Han and Alma So. As Treasurer of the corporation, her duties were limited to receiving money or fees paid to the agency by applicants and to deposit the same in the bank in the name and for the account of the corporation. Although she (appellant) received money from the complainants Elmer Janer and Eric Farol, the same was deposited by her with the bank under the account of the corporation. And if ever she signed promissory notes in behalf of the corporation and issued checks to the complainants, she did so upon the instruction and assurance of accused-spouses So Yan Han and Alma So that said notes and checks would have sufficient funds on their due dates. And said checks and notes were never paid because the accused-spouses disappeared and left for unknown addresses.4 After trial, the Trial court rendered judgment convicting the appellant of the crime charged, the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered pronouncing accused LETICIA SAGAYAGA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal recruitment in large scale and sentencing said accused to suffer the penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT and to pay a fine of P750,000.00, and the costs. The accused is further ordered to refund to Elmer Janer the sum of P75,000.00; to Eric V. Farol the amount of P61,500.00; and to Elmer Ramos the amount of P65,000.00. SO ORDERED.5 The appellant assails the decision of the trial court contending that:

-ITHE LOWER COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT "NO WEIGHT CAN BE GIVEN TO THE CONTENTION OF THE ACCUSED THAT SHE IS NOT CRIMINALLY LIABLE BECAUSE SHE HAD NO PARTICIPATION IN THE OPERATION OF THE ALVIS PLACEMENT SERVICE CORPORATION, AND SHE HAD NO KNOWLEDGE ABOUT ITS RECRUITMENT ACTIVITIES." - II THE LOWER COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT AS TREASURER OF ALVIS PLACEMENT SERVICE CORPO[R]ATION, THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT "WAS IN CHARGE (OF) THE MANAGEMENT AND CONTROL OF THE FINANCIAL AFFAIRS AND RESOURCES OF THE CORPORATION." - III THE LOWER COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT AS THE VICEPRESIDENT/TREASURER AND ASSISTANT GENERAL MANAGER OF ALVIS PLACEMENT SERVICE CORPORATION, THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT WAS A TOP RANKING OFFICER OF SAID CORPORATION, WITH AUTHORITY TO PARTICIPATE DIRECTLY IN THE CONTROL, MANAGEMENT OR DIRECTION OF ITS BUSINESS AFFAIRS. - IV THE LOWER COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT WAS GUILTY OF ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT "IN LARGE SCALE" AND IN SENTENCING HER TO SUFFER THE PENALTY OF "LIFE IMPRISONMENT."6 The appellant avers that she is not criminally liable for the crime charged because the prosecution failed to prove that she had a direct or actual control, management or direction of the business and recruitment activities of the Alvis Placement Services Corporation (APSC). She asserts that she had no knowledge of the recruitment activities of APSC and had no participation whatsoever in its operation. In dealing with the private complainants, she was merely performing routinary office work as a mere employee. Her participation as an employee of APSC with respect to the employment application of Elmer Ramos for Taiwan was to receive his placement fee of P20,000.00. Hence, the appellant avers, she cannot be held criminally liable for illegal recruitment in large scale. If, at all, she can be held liable only with respect to the employment applications of Janer and Farol. Thus, according to the appellant, the trial court erred in sentencing her to life imprisonment. The appeal has no merit. Under Section 6 (m) of Rep. Act No. 8042,7 illegal recruitment may be committed by any person, whether a non-licensee, non-holder of authority, licensee or holder of authority, thus: (m) Failure to reimburse expenses incurred by the worker in connection with his documentation and processing for purposes of deployment, in cases where the deployment does not actually take place without the worker's fault....8 Under the last paragraph of the said section, those criminally liable are the principals, accomplices and accessories. In case of a juridical person, the officers having control, management or direction of the business shall be criminally liable. In this case, the appellant, as shown by the records of the POEA, was both the APSC Vice-PresidentTreasurer and the Assistant General Manager. She was a high corporate officer who had direct participation in the management, administration, direction and control of the business of the corporation. As the trial court aptly declared in its decision: Again, no weight can be given to the contention of the accused. The terms "control, management or direction" used in the last paragraph of Section 6 of Republic Act No. 8042 broadly cover all phases of business operation. They include the aspects of administration, marketing and finances, among others. From the records of the POEA, the accused appears as the Vice President (V.P.)/Treasurer of the Alvis Placement Service Corporation (Exhibit A). Moreover, in the promissory note dated April 30, 1998 (Exhibit K), which the accused issued to Elmer Janer, she designated her position in the said corporation as its "Asst. General Manager" (Exhibit K-1). Undoubtedly, the positions of vicepresident, treasurer, and assistant general manager are high ranking corporate positions in any

corporate body. These positions invest on the incumbent the authority of managing, controlling and directing the corporate affairs. The claim of the accused that her designation in the certification of the POEA (Exhibit A) as the vice-president of Alvis Placement Service Corporation has surprised her because, according to her, the vice-president was Vicente So Yan Han (TSN, Mar. 13, 2000, pp. 16-17), hardly inspires belief. If this were true, she would have no difficulty in securing from the POEA an authenticated copy of the list of all officials of the corporation which they were required to file with the said Office. For no stated reason, however, the defense omitted to secure such list and submit it to this Court. At any rate, the accused has expressly admitted in the course of her testimony that she was at the time the Treasurer of their recruitment agency. As such she was in charge of the management and control of the financial affairs and resources of the corporation. She was in charge of collecting all its receivables, safely keeping them, and disbursing them. She testified that it was part of her duties to receive and collect the monies paid by applicants (TSN, Mar. 13, 2000, p. 5). Her disbursing authority has been clearly demonstrated by her co-signing the checks Exhibits D-2 and G.9 The appellant is guilty of illegal recruitment as a principal by direct participation, having dealt directly with the private complainants. In fact, she received their placement fees and even signed, in her capacity as the Assistant General Manager of the APSC, the promissory note on May 6, 1998 in favor of private complainant Elmer Janer, obliging the APSC to pay to him the amount of P75,000.00. However, despite the private complainants' demands, their placement fees were not reimbursed in full. In People vs. Cabais,10 we held thus: Accused-appellant contends that she was not involved in recruitment but was merely an employee of a recruitment agency. An employee of a company or corporation engaged in illegal recruitment may be held liable as principal, together with his employer, if it is shown that he actively and consciously participated in illegal recruitment. Recruitment is "any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not: Provided, That any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement11 In this case, the overwhelming evidence on record indubitably shows that the appellant engaged in illegal recruitment. As aptly ruled by the trial court: The first line of defense invoked by the accused to exonerate herself of the criminal charge is clearly and conclusively without merit. There is no dispute about the fact that the three complainants engaged (sic) the Alvis Placement Service Corporation, a recruitment agency duly authorized by the POEA wherein the accused was one of its top officers, to deploy them as factory workers in Taiwan. Admittedly, they incurred expenses, designated as placement fees, in connection with their documentation and processing for purposes of their de[pl]oyment. Elmer Janer paid to the accused, who received the payment, the total amount of P75,000.00 for his placement fee (Exhibit J; TSN, Sept. 7, 1999, pp. 6-8). Eric Farol paid also to the accused a similar amount for the same purpose (Exhibit E; TSN, Sept. 20, 1999, pp. 5-8). Elmer Ramos paid to the agency the sum of P70,000.00 of which P20,000.00 was received by the accused, and the balance of P50,000.00 was received by Vicente So Yan Han (Exhibit F; TSN, Sept. 27, 1999, pp. 10-18). In the course of her testimony, the accused admitted that she received these payments by the complainants of their placement fees. However, the expected deployment of the complainants as factory workers in Taiwan, or even elsewhere, did not take place, without any fault on their part. There is absolutely no evidence reflecting that the failure to deploy them was imputable to their faults. The evidence has satisfactorily established that the complainants have not been reimbursed the full amount of their placement fees, notwithstanding their persistent demands. Not a single peso of his placement fee was returned to Elmer Janer. Instead, on April 30, 1998, the accused executed a promissory note (Exhibit K) in behalf of the Alvis Placement Service

Corporation, undertaking to pay Elmer Janer the amount of P75,000.00 on May 6, 1998. However, the amount covered by the promissory note was not paid (TSN, Sept. 7, 1999, p. 11). On the other hand, although Eric Farol and Elmer Ramos were reimbursed of P11,000.00 and P5,000.00 in cash, respectively, and the balance of their placement fees were covered by checks (Exhibits D-2 and G), these transactions did not relieve the accused of her criminal liability. The reimbursement contemplated by paragraph (m) of Section 6 of Republic Act No. 8042 is full reimbursement of the expenses incurred by the worker in connection with the documentation and processing of his deployment. To rule otherwise would be offensive to the administration of justice, as illegal recruiters could easily escape criminal liability with impunity by simply returning an insignificant portion of the amount they collected from the worker. The checks drawn and issued by the accused to these two complainants, however, did not produce the effect of payment, for they were both dishonored by the drawee bank on the ground of closed account. Pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 1249 of the Civil Code, "(t)he delivery of promissory notes payable to order, or bills of exchange or other mercantile documents shall produce the effect of payment only when they have been cashed, or when through the fault of the creditor they have been impaired."12 The appellant's bare denial of her involvement in the management, administration, control and operation of APSC cannot prevail over her judicial admissions, the positive testimonies of the private complainants and the documentary evidence adduced by the prosecution. Section 6 of Rep. Act No. 8042 provides that illegal recruitment shall be considered an offense involving economic sabotage if committed in large scale, viz, committed against three (3) or more persons individually or as a group, the imposable penalty for which is life imprisonment and a fine of not less than P500,000.00 nor more than P1,000,000.00.13 In this case, there are three private complainants, namely, Elmer Janer, Eric Farol and Elmer Ramos. The trial court, thus, correctly convicted the appellant of large scale illegal recruitment and sentenced her to suffer life imprisonment. IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 35, is AFFIRMED. Costs against the appellant. SO ORDERED. Puno, (Chairman), Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez, and Tinga, JJ., concur. G.R. No. 155903 September 14, 2007 C.F. SHARP CREW MANAGEMENT, INC., petitioner, vs. HON. UNDERSECRETARY JOSE M. ESPANOL, JR., HON. SECRETARY LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING and RIZAL INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING SERVICES, respondents. DECISION NACHURA, J.: The petitioner C.F. Sharp Crew Management, Inc. (C.F. Sharp) appeals by certiorari the April 30, 2002 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 53747 and the November 5, 2002 Resolution2 denying its reconsideration. In 1991, Louis Cruise Lines (LCL), a foreign corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of Cyprus, entered into a Crewing Agreement3 with Papadopolous Shipping, Ltd. (PAPASHIP). PAPASHIP in turn appointed private respondent Rizal International Shipping Services (Rizal) as manning agency in the Philippines, recruiting Filipino seamen for LCLs vessel. On October 3, 1996, LCL terminated the Crewing Agreement with PAPASHIP to take effect on December 31, 1996. It then appointed C.F. Sharp as crewing agent in the Philippines. C.F. Sharp requested for accreditation as the new manning agency of LCL with the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA), but Rizal objected on the ground that its accreditation still existed and would only expire on December 31, 1996. Pending approval of the accreditation, Theodoros Savva and Adrias Tjiakouris of LCL arrived in the Philippines and conducted a series of interviews for seafarers at C.F. Sharps office. Rizal reported LCLs recruitment activities to the POEA on December 9, 1996, and requested an ocular inspection of C.F. Sharps premises.

On December 17, 1996, POEA representatives conducted an inspection and found Savva and Tjiakouris at C.F. Sharp interviewing and recruiting hotel staffs, cooks, and chefs for M/V Cyprus, with scheduled deployment in January 1997.4 The Inspection Report5 signed by Corazon Aquino of the POEA and countersigned by Mr. Reynaldo Banawis of C.F. Sharp was thereafter submitted to the POEA. On January 2, 1997, Rizal filed a complaint6 for illegal recruitment, cancellation or revocation of license, and blacklisting against LCL and C.F. Sharp with the POEA, docketed as POEA Case No. RV-97-01-004. Then, on January 31, 1997, Rizal filed a Supplemental Complaint7 adding violation of Section 29 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, for designating and/or appointing agents, representatives and employees, without prior approval from the POEA. For its part, C.F. Sharp admitted that Savva and Tjiakouris conducted interviews at C.F. Sharps office, but denied that they were for recruitment and selection purposes. According to C.F. Sharp, the interviews were held for LCLs ex-crew members who had various complaints against Rizal. It belittled the inspection report of the POEA inspection team claiming that it simply stated that interviews and recruitment were undertaken, without reference to who were conducting the interview and for what vessels.8 C.F. Sharp also averred that Rizal was guilty of forum shopping, and prayed for the dismissal of the complaint on this ground and for its lack of merit. 9 The POEA Administrator was not persuaded and found C.F. Sharp liable for illegal recruitment. According to the Administrator, the inspection report of Ms. Aquino established that Savva and Tjiakouris had conducted, and, at the time of the inspection, had been conducting interviews, selection and hiring for LCL, without any authority from the POEA. The Administrator also held that C.F. Sharp violated Section 29 of the Labor Code when it designated officers and agents without prior approval of the POEA. 10 Thus, the Administrator disposed: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the respondent CF Sharp Agency is as it is hereby ordered suspended for a period of six (6) months or in lieu thereof, it is ordered to pay a fine of P50,000.00 for violation of Art. 29 of the Labor Code, as amended in relation to Sec. 6(b), Rule II, Book II of the Rules and Regulations Governing Overseas Employment in accordance with the schedule of penalties. Further, the respondent CF Sharp is as it is hereby ordered suspended for another period of [eighteen] (18) months or to pay the fine of P180,000.00 for committing 9 counts of violation of Article 29 of the Labor Code as amended in relation to Sec. 2(k), Rule I, Book VI of the Rules and Regulations governing Overseas Employment. The period of suspension shall be served cummulatively (sic). The charges of violation of Sec. 6(b) of RA 8042 are hereby referred to the Anti-Illegal Recruitment Branch for appropriate action. SO ORDERED.11 C.F. Sharp elevated the Administrators ruling to the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE). On December 19, 1997, the then Secretary of Labor, Leonardo A. Quisumbing,12 issued an Order,13 ruling that: WHEREFORE, except as above MODIFIED, the Order dated March 13, 1997 of the POEA Administrator is AFFIRMED. Accordingly, the C.F. Sharp Crew Management, Inc. is hereby found guilty of having violated Sec. 6, R.A. 8042 in relation to Article 13 (b) and (f), and Article 16 of the Labor Code as amended; Rule II (jj), Book I and Sec 1 and 6, Rule I, Book II, POEA Rules and Regulations Governing Overseas Employment, for having conspired and confederated with the [Louis] Cruise Lines, Theodorus Savva and Andrias (sic) Tjiakouris in the recruitment of seafarers for LCLs ships, before it was duly accredited by POEA as the manning agency of LCL, thus a non-holder of authority at the time. The penalty imposed against it of suspension of its license for six (6) months or in lieu thereof, to pay a fine of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00), is AFFIRMED. Further, C.F. Sharp Crew Management, Inc. is hereby found guilty of one (1) count of violation of Art. 29 of the Labor Code in relation to Sec. 2 (k), Rule I, Book VI of the Rules and Regulations

Governing Overseas Employment, and is imposed the penalty of two (2) months suspension of its license or in lieu thereof, to pay a fine of P20,000.00. The penalties of suspension for both violations shall be served cumulatively. Out of the P230,000.00 cash supersedeas bond posted by the petitioner-appellant, let the amount ofP160,000.00 be released and refunded to it, retaining P70,000.00 to be applied to the payment of the fines as imposed above, should the petitioner opt to pay the fine instead of undergoing suspension of its license. However, the suspension shall remain in force until such fine is paid, or in the event that the petitioner-appellant further appeals this Order. The charge and finding of violation of Sec. 6 (b) of R.A. 8042 are hereby referred to the AntiIllegal Recruitment Branch for appropriate action. SO ORDERED.14 C.F. Sharps motion for reconsideration having been denied on February 5, 1999 by the then Undersecretary, Jose M. Espanol, Jr.,15 it elevated the case to this Court on petition for certiorari, with the case docketed as G.R. No. 137573. But, in the June 16, 1999 Resolution, this Court referred the petition to the CA. In the meantime, on April 15, 1999, C.F. Sharp requested the lifting of the suspension decreed by the Secretary of Labor in his December 19, 1997 Order,16 which was granted by Deputy Administrator for Licensing and Adjudication Valentin C. Guanio. C.F. Sharp was allowed to deploy seafarers for its principals. Consequently, on April 30, 2002, the CA denied C.F. Sharps petition for certiorari,17 holding that C.F. Sharp was already estopped from assailing the Secretary of Labors ruling because it had manifested its option to have the cash bond posted answer for the alternative fines imposed upon it. By paying the adjudged fines, C.F. Sharp effectively executed the judgment, having acquiesced to, and ratified the execution of the assailed Orders of the Secretary of Labor. The CA also agreed with the POEA Administrator and the Secretary of Labor that Savva and Tjiakouris of LCL, along with C.F. Sharp, undertook recruitment activities on December 7, 9 to 12, 1996, sans any authority. Finally, it affirmed both labor officials finding that C.F. Sharp violated Article 29 of the Labor Code and Section 2(k), Rule I, Book VI of the POEA Rules when it appointed Henry Desiderio as agent, without prior approval from the POEA. Thus, the appellate court declared that the Secretary of Labor acted well within his discretion in holding C.F. Sharp liable for illegal recruitment. C.F. Sharp filed a motion for reconsideration,18 but the CA denied it on November 25, 2002.19 Hence, this appeal, positing these issues: A. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY ERRED IN RULING THAT PETITIONER IS IN ESTOPPEL IN QUESTIONING THE ORDER DATED DECEMBER 19, 1997 AND THE RESOLUTION DATED FEBRUARY 5, 1999. B. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT PETITIONER IS LIABLE FOR VIOLATION OF SECTION 6[,] R.A. NO. 8042 IN RELATION TO ARTICLE 13 (b) and (f) AND ARTICLE 66 (sic) OF THE LABOR CODE AS AMENDED; RULE II (jj) BOOK I; AND SECTIONS 1 AND 6, RULE I, BOOK III POEA RULES AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT PETITIONER IS LIABLE FOR VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 29 OF THE LABOR CODE, AS AMENDED, IN RELATION TO SECTION II (k)[,] RULE I, BOOK VI OF THE RULES AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT.20 C.F. Sharp faults the CA for ruling that petitioner is estopped from questioning the resolutions of the Secretary of Labor. It denied that it voluntarily executed, or acquiesced to, the assailed resolutions of the Secretary. The general rule is that when a judgment has been satisfied, it passes beyond review, satisfaction being the last act and the end of the proceedings, and payment or satisfaction of the obligation thereby established produces permanent and irrevocable discharge; hence, a judgment debtor who acquiesces to and voluntarily complies with the judgment is estopped from taking an appeal therefrom.21

In holding C.F. Sharp in estoppel, the CA apparently relied on the April 15, 1999 Order of the POEA, and, thus, declared: [P]etitioner C.F. Sharp had already manifested its option to have the cash bond posted as an answer for the alternative fines imposed in the Orders dated December 19, 1997 as stated in the Order dated April 15, 1999 of the POEA, Adjudication Office x x x. Thus, for voluntary execution of the Order of the Secretary of DOLE dated December 19, 1997 by paying the adjudged fines, the petitioner was then estopped from assailing such Order before Us by way of petition for certiorari. Where a party voluntarily executes, partially or totally a judgment or acquiesces or ratifies the execution of the same, he is estopped from appealing therefrom. x x x.22 The April 15, 1999 Order of Deputy Commissioner Valentin C. Guanio reads: Respondent C.F. Sharp Crew Management, Inc., thru counsel having manifested its option to have the cash bond posted answer for the alternative fines imposed in the above-entitled case; the alternative suspension imposed in the Order of the Secretary dated December 19, 1997 is hereby Lifted. SO ORDERED.23 This Order was issued in response to C.F. Sharps request to lift the suspension decree of the Secretary of Labor. The request stated, viz.: [W]e write in behalf of our client, C.F. Sharp Crew Management Inc., regarding the Advice To Operating Units dated April 15, 1999, which arose from the Decision of the Office of the Secretary of Labor in the case entitled C.F. Sharp Crew Management, Inc. versus Rizal Shipping and docketed as RV 97-01-004. In this connection, we would like to express our option to have the cash bond posted by us in the case entitled C.F. Sharp Crew Management, Inc. versus Rizal Shipping and docketed as RV 9701-044 to answer for any fine that the Supreme Court may finally decide that our client should pay in the Case entitled, C.F. Sharp Crew Management, Inc. vs. Secretary Leonardo Quisumbing and Rizal International Shipping Services and docketed as G.R. No. 137573. Under the circumstances, it is most respectfully requested that the aforesaid advice be RECALLED and that a clearance be issued in favor of our client, C.F. Sharp Crew Management, Inc. Hoping for your immediate and favorable action on the matter.24 (Emphasis supplied) C.F. Sharps letter was explicit that the cash bond posted would be answerable for any fine that it may ultimately be held liable to pay by virtue of a final decision. In fact, on March 25, 1999, prior to the filing of the above-quoted letter-request, C.F. Sharp had already filed a petition for certiorari assailing the Orders of the Secretary of Labor. Furthermore, there is no showing that the assailed Order of then Secretary Quisumbing was indeed executed to warrant the appellate courts conclusion that C.F. Sharp was estopped from assailing the said Order. Clearly, there is no basis for the CA to rule that

C.F. Sharp voluntarily executed, or acquiesced to, the execution of the unfavorable ruling of the Secretary of Labor.
The first issue having been settled, we now resolve whether C.F. Sharp is liable for illegal recruitment. C.F. Sharp denies committing illegal recruitment activities in December 1996. It posits that the interviews undertaken by Savva and Tjiakouris do not amount to illegal recruitment under Section 6 of Republic Act No. 8042 or the Migrants Workers Act. Further, it contends that the interviews conducted were not for selection and recruitment purposes, but were in connection with the seamens past employment with Rizal, specifically, their complaints for non-remittance of SSS premiums, withholding of wages, illegal exactions from medical examinations and delayed allotments. It claims that it was only upon approval of its application for accreditation that the employment contracts were entered into and actual deployment of the seamen was made. C.F. Sharp, thus, concludes that it cannot be held liable for illegal recruitment. The reasoning is specious. Undoubtedly, in December 1996, LCL had no approved POEA license to recruit. C.F. Sharps accreditation as LCLs new manning agency was still pending approval at that time. Yet Savva and Tjiakouris, along with C.F. Sharp, entertained applicants for LCLs vessels, and conducted preparatory interviews. Article 13(b) of the Labor Code defines recruitment and placement as:

any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad whether for profit or not: Provided, That any person or entity which in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement. On the basis of this definition and contrary to what C.F. Sharp wants to portray - the conduct of preparatory interviews is a recruitment activity. The fact that C.F. Sharp did not receive any payment during the interviews is of no moment. From the language of Article 13(b), the act of recruitment may be "for profit or not." Notably, it is the lack of the necessary license or authority, not the fact of payment, that renders the recruitment activity of LCL unlawful. C.F. Sharps claim that the interviews were not for selection and recruitment purposes does not impress. As the Secretary of Labor aptly said: This Office cannot conceive of a good reason why LCL/Savva/Tjiakouris should be interested at the time in unearthing alleged violations committed by Rizal Shipping whose representative status as manning agency was to be terminated in just a few weeks thereafter, spending valuable time and money in the process. They stood to gain nothing from such taxing exercise involving several hundreds of ex-crew members, which could be handled by government agencies like the POEA, NLRC, SSS. The observation of the POEA Administrator that the complaints of the crewmen were filed only after Rizal Shipping filed its complaints with the POEA merely to bolster the defense of CF Sharp/LCL/Savva and Tjiakouris, is telling. Upon the other hand, it was more to LCLS gain to interview, select and recruit the disembarking crewmen previously recruited by Rizal Shipping, using CF Sharps facilities, as this would result in less recruitment time and cost. Finally, the claim of Savva and Tjiakouris that Savva "talked to the POEA representative during their visit" about these interviews and the violations which were confirmed, is just an afterthought to support their defense; there is no entry in the Inspection Report confirming such claim. If such claim were true, then the "able officer" of CF Sharp (LCLs Attorney-in fact) who signed his conformity on the 4th page of the report, and put his initial on the last page of the report containing the handwritten findings of the inspectors on the selection and recruitment activities of Savva and Tjiakouris, would have insisted that an entry be made thereon about what Savva told the inspectors, or he could simply himself have written thereon that the two LCL officials merely conducted interviews on the violations committed by Rizal Shipping. However, the report is bereft of anything to that effect. More significant is the fact that the inspectors, in their Memorandum dated December 11, 1996 (the very same day they conducted the inspection), stated that they "approached said persons" (referring to Banawis, Savva and Tjiakouris) "and told us that they were doing interview to select applicants to complement the crew of a passenger ship for [LOUIS] CRUISE LINES."25 Indeed, it was Savva and Tjiakouris that conducted the interviews, and undertook selection and hiring. However, C.F. Sharp cannot steer clear of liability for it conspired with LCL in committing illegal recruitment activities. As the Secretary of Labor had taken pains to demonstrate: x x x [T]here is substantial evidence on record that as alleged by Rizal Shipping, CF Sharp conspired with LCL and its officers Savva and Tjiakouris to conduct recruitment activities in its offices, at a time when LCL was not yet its POEA-accredited principal, in violation of Sec. 6, R.A. 8042 in relation to Article 13(b) and (f) and Article 16 of the Labor Code as amended; Rule II(jj) Book I, and Sec. 1 and 6, Rule I, Book III, all of the POEA Rules and Regulations Governing Overseas Employment. Indeed, C.F. Sharp was aware of these violations when it alleged in its Petition for Review that: "in any and all events, the findings relied upon by the Public Respondent show, at best, that the parties responsible for the alleged acts of illegal recruitment are LCL and its officers alone, or at worst, LCL and its officers, in conspiracy with petitioner. Yet, it is petitioner alone, who is severely punished and penalized." (underscoring supplied) xxxx

The intention, agreement and both common design of both LCL and CF Sharp to engage in recruitment of crewmen for LCLs ships had already been made manifest when LCL through Savva had instructed, in the October 14, 1996 letter to disembarking crewmembers, for the latter to report to CF Sharp for processing of their papers. This was followed by the execution by LCL on October 17, 1996 of a Special Power of Attorney in favor of CF Sharp as new manning agent and attorney-in-fact of LCL, with authority, among others, "to sign, authenticate and deliver all documents necessary to complete any transaction related to the recruitment and hiring of Filipino seamen including the necessary steps to facilitate the departure of recruited seamen"; "to assume, on our behalf and for our account, any liability that may arise in connection with the recruitment of seamen and/or implementation of the employment contract of said seamen." And on November 8, 1996, CF Sharp applied for accreditation as manning agent of LCL for the latters five named vessels. The discovery by the POEA inspectors of the selection and recruitment activities undertaken by Savva and Tjiakouris at CF Sharps offices on December 11, 1996, followed. The interviews by Savva and Tjiakouris at CF Sharps offices on December 7, 1996 with around 300 crewmen, as sworn to by 98 crewmen (their affidavits were submitted in evidence by CF Sharp); the interviews for selection and recruitment from December 9 to 12, 1996 as found by the POEA inspectors; and the immediate deployment of 154 crewmen for LCL right after [the] POEA approval of accreditation of LCL as principal of CF Sharp, could not have been undertaken without the assistance and cooperation of CF Sharp, even before such transfer of accreditation was granted by POEA. The petitioner-appellant must be reminded that prior to approval of the transfer of accreditation, no recruitment or deployment may be made by the principal by itself or through the would-be transferee manning agency, or by the latter, as this would constitute illegal recruitment by a non-holder of authority under Sec. 6, R.A. 8042 in relation to Article 13(b) and (f) and Article 16 of the Labor Code as amended; Rule II(jj), Book I, and Sec. 1 and 6, Rule 1, Book III, POEA Rules and Regulations Governing Overseas Employment. The petitioner-appellant alleges that "there is no need for a license to enable LCLs officers to conduct their alleged activities of interviewing, selecting and hiring crewmen. Indeed, LCLs officers could have conducted these activities without a license." Such claim is without legal basis, as direct hiring by employers of Filipino workers for overseas employment is banned; they can only do so through, among others, licensed private recruitment and shipping/mining agencies (Art. 18, Labor Code as amended; Sec. 1, Rule 1, Book II, POEA Rules and Regulations Governing Overseas Employment).26 We need not say more. C.F. Sharp also denies violating Article 29 of the Labor Code. It insists that Henry Desiderio was neither an employee nor an agent of C.F. Sharp. Yet, except for its barefaced denial, no proof was adduced to substantiate it. Desiderios name does not appear in the list of employees and officials submitted by C.F. Sharp to the POEA. However, his name appeared as the contact person of the applicants for the position of 2nd and 3rd assistant engineers and machinist/fitter in C.F Sharps advertisement in the February 2, 1997 issue of The Bulletin Today.27 Article 29 of the Labor Code is explicit, viz.: Art. 29. NON-TRANSFERABILITY OF LICENSE OR AUTHORITY No license or authority shall be used directly or indirectly by any person other than the one in whose favor it was issued or at any place other than that stated in the license or authority, nor may such license or authority be transferred, conveyed or assigned to any other person or entity. Any transfer of business address, appointment or designation of any agent or representative including the establishment of additional offices anywhere shall be subject to the prior approval of the Department of Labor. (Emphasis ours) Thus, Section 2(k), Rule 1, Book VI of the POEA Rules Governing Overseas Employment provides: Section 2. Grounds for Suspension/Cancellation of License. xxxx k. Appointing or designating agents, representatives or employees without prior approval from the Administration.

The appointment or designation of Desiderio as an employee or agent of C.F. Sharp, without prior approval from the POEA, warrants administrative sanction. The CA, therefore, correctly rejected C.F. Sharps posture. Apparently, realizing the folly of its defenses, C.F. Sharp assails the admissibility of the Memorandum and Inspection Report of the POEA. It contends that these are patently inadmissible against C.F. Sharp for it was not given an opportunity to crossexamine the POEA inspectors regarding the report. The argument does not deserve even a short shrift. First, C.F. Sharp did not raise it before the POEA and Secretary of Labor. The issue was raised for the first time in its petition for certiorari with the CA, where the jurisdiction of the appellate court is limited to issues of jurisdiction and grave abuse of discretion. On numerous occasions, we have made it clear that to allow fresh issues at this stage of the proceedings is violative of fair play, justice and due process.28 Second, jurisprudence is replete with rulings that administrative bodies are not bound by the technical niceties of law and procedure and the rules obtaining in the courts of law.29 Hence, whatever merit C.F. Sharps argument might have in the context of ordinary civil actions, where the rules of evidence apply with greater rigidity, disappears when adduced in connection with labor cases. The claim of denial of due process on the part of C.F. Sharp must also be rejected. The essence of due process lies in the reasonable opportunity afforded a party to be heard and to submit any evidence in support of its defense. What is vital is not the opportunity to cross-examine an adverse witness, but an opportunity to be heard.30 In this case, C.F. Sharp was given ample opportunity to be heard, to adduce evidence in support of its version of the material occurrences, and to controvert Rizals allegation and the Inspection Report. It submitted its position paper with supporting affidavits and documents, and additionally pleaded its causes on appeal before the Secretary of Labor. Under the circumstances, a claim of denial of due process on C.F. Sharps part is completely unavailing. C.F. Sharp next impugns the probative value given by the Administrator and the Secretary of Labor to the Inspection Report. It alleges that the POEA Administrator, the Labor Secretary and the CA relied only on the Inspection Report and gave very little or no probative value to the affidavits that it submitted in support of its claim. C.F. Sharp would have us re-evaluate the factual veracity and probative value of the evidence submitted in the proceedings a quo. C.F. Sharp may well be reminded that it is not our function to review, examine, and evaluate or weigh the evidence adduced by the parties. Elementary is the principle that this Court is not a trier of facts. Judicial review of labor cases does not go beyond the evaluation of the sufficiency of the evidence upon which the labor officials' findings rest. Hence, where the factual findings of the labor tribunals or agencies conform to, and are affirmed by, the CA, the same are accorded respect and finality, and are binding upon this Court. It is only when the findings of the labor agencies and the appellate court are in conflict that this Court will review the records to determine which findings should be upheld as being more in conformity with the evidentiary facts. Where the CA affirms the labor agencies on review and there is no showing whatsoever that said findings are patently erroneous, this Court is bound by the said findings.31 Although the rule admits of several exceptions, none of them are in point in this case. In any event, we have carefully examined the factual findings of the CA and found the same to be borne out of the record and sufficiently anchored on the evidence presented. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No. 53747 are AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED. Ynares-Santiago, Chairperson, Austria-Martinez, Chico-Nazario, Reyes, JJ., concur.

[G.R Nos. 117145-50 & 117447. March 28, 2000] PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PlaintiffAppellee, v. LEONIDA MERIS y PADILLA, accusedappellant.HATOL

DECISION KAPUNAN, J.: This is an appeal from the Joint Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 1, convicting accused-appellant Leonida Meris y Padilla of illegal recruitment in large-scale and six counts of estafa. The dispositive portion of the decision1 reads as follows: WHEREFORE, this court finds the accused, Leonida Meris y Padilla, GUILTY, beyond reasonable doubt of six (6) counts of estafa in Criminal Cases Nos. 91-94192 to 91-94197, and of illegal recruitment in large scale in Criminal Case No. 91-94198 and, as a consequence thereof, sentences her as follows: 1. In Criminal Case No. 91-94192, to suffer the indeterminate penalty of one (1) year, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional as minimum to five (5) years, five (5) months and eleven (11) months (sic) of prision correccional as maximum; 2. In Criminal Case No. 91-94193, to suffer the indeterminate penalty of one (1) year, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional as minimum to five (5) years, five (5) months and eleven (11) days of prision correccional as maximum; 3. In Criminal Case No. 91-94194, to suffer an indeterminate penalty of one (1) year, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional as minimum to five (5) years, five (5) months and eleven (11) days of prision correccional as maximum; 4. In Criminal Case No. 91-94195, to suffer an indeterminate penalty of one (1) year, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional as minimum to five (5) years, five (5) months and eleven (11) days of prision correccional as maximum; 5. In Criminal Case No. 91-94196, to suffer an indeterminate penalty of one (1) year, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional as minimum to five (5) years, five (5) months and eleven (11) days of prision correccional as maximum; 6. In Criminal Case No. 91-94197, to suffer an indeterminate penalty of one (1) year, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional as minimum to five (5) years, five (5) months and eleven (11) days of prision correccional as maximum; 7. In Criminal Case No. 91-94198, to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P100,000.00. Further, the accused shall indemnify the private complainants, Napoleon Ramos, Cristina Nava, Margarita Nadal, Purita Conseja and Leo delos Santos, the sum of P30,000.00 each and complainant Merlita Bombarda the amount of P20,000.00 with interest thereon at the legal rate from the date of institution of these cases, i.e., April 29, 1991, until fully paid. Costs against the accused in all the above-captioned cases. SO ORDERED. The above conviction stemmed from seven informations. The information in Criminal Case No. 91-94192 reads: That on or about and during the period comprised between January 12, 1991 and February 17, 1991, both dates inclusive, prior or subsequent thereto in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused conspiring and confederating with three others whose true names, identities and present whereabouts are still unknown, helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud NAPOLEON RAMOS y ESPEJO in the following manner, to wit: the said accused, by means of false manifestations and fraudulent

representation which they made to said NAPOLEON E. RAMOS to the effect that they had the power and capacity to recruit and employ him as Factory Worker in Hongkong and could facilitate the processing of the pertinent papers if given the necessary amount to meet the requirements thereof, and by means of other similar deceits, induced and succeeded in inducing said NAPOLEON E. RAMOS to give and deliver, as in fact (he) gave and delivered to said accused the amount of P30,000.00 on the strength of said manifestations and representations, said accused well knowing that the same were false and fraudulent and were made solely to obtain, as in fact did obtain the amount of P30,000.00 which amount once in possession, with intent to defraud he (sic) willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriated, misapplied and converted to their own personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of said NAPOLEON E. RAMOS, in the aforesaid amount of P30,000.00, Philippine Currency. CONTRARY TO LAW.2 The information in Criminal Cases Nos. 91-94193, 91-94194, 91-94195, 91-94196 and 9194197 likewise charged accused-appellant with Estafa and contain substantially the same allegations as the above-quoted information, except as to the name of the complainants and the amounts involved.3 The seventh information in Criminal Case No. 91-94198 charged accused-appellant with illegal recruitment in large-scale, to wit: That on or about and during the period comprised between December 21, 1990 and February 17, 1991, inclusive, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring and confederating together with others still unknown and helping one another, and representing herself to have the capacity to contract, enlist and transport Filipino workers for employment abroad, did then and there willfully and unlawfully, for a fee, recruit and promise employment abroad to Leo D. delos Santos, Merlita L. Bombarda, Margarita R. madae (sic), Purita A. Conceja, Cristina I. Nava and Napoleon E. Ramos, without first securing the required license or authority from the Dept. of Labor. Contrary to law.4 Criminal Case No. 91-94198 was originally filed before Branch 45 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila where, upon arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty.5 The six other cases were filed before Branch I of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, where accusedappellant, likewise, entered a plea of "not guilty" to all the indictments. The cases were eventually consolidated and tried jointly before Branch I.6 The evidence for the prosecution, as summarized by the trial court, is reproduced herein: Napoleon Ramos, complainant in Criminal Cases Nos. 91-94192 and 9194198, testified that he was at the house of the accused on Estrada Street, Urdaneta, Pangasinan, in the evening of January 9, 1991, between the hours of 7:00 and 8:00 oclock. Also in the house were Nadal, Conseja and Bombarda. The accused told the private complainants that she knew someone in Manila who could help them secure employment in Hongkong; that if they are interested she would take them to Manila on January 12, 1991, and that they should be prepared to make an initial payment of P15,000.00 each, for their placement fees. On the early morning of January 12, 1991, Ramos, Nadal, Conseja and Bombarda together with the accused proceeded to Manila by bus. They went directly to a house on Lardizabal Street, Sampaloc, Manila, where they were served breakfast. After a while, a woman arrived and was introduced by the

accused to the private complainants as Julie Micua. The complainants were assured by Micua that she could get them overseas employment and upon payment of their placement fees of P35,000.00 each, they would leave for Hongkong within one month. Ramos, Nadal, Conseja and Bombarda made a downpayment of P5,000.00 each to the accused and her husband. The corresponding receipts, however, which were prepared by the accused, were in the name of and signed by Micua, Exhibits "E-1," "L," "H," "D," and "C." xxx On January 14, 1991, Ramos went back to the House in Sampaloc, Manila, and handed to the accused the sum of P15,000.00. As in the first payment, the accused prepared a receipt in the name of Micua, who signed the same, Exhibit "E." On January 17, 1991, Ramos paid the accused an additional sum of P10,000.00 and the latter prepared a receipt in the name of Micua, who signed it, Exhibit "E-2." After Ramos failed to leave for Hongkong or secure overseas employment for more than two months since January 1991, he became suspicious and later realized that he and the other complainants had been hoodwinked. On April 26, 1991, Ramos and the other five complainants went to Manila and lodged with the Western Police District Command, Manila, criminal complaints for estafa and illegal recruitment against the accused, which led to her immediate arrest, Exhibit "A" and "B." On the other hand, Merlita Bombarda, complainant in Criminal Cases Nos. 9194196 and 91-94198, declared that in 1987, the accused offered to recruit her for overseas employment in Japan, but she declined the offer, due to her singing engagement in Dagupan. Later, she worked in Singapore. Upon her return to the Philippine in 1990, she again met the accused in Urdaneta, Pangasinan. The accused told Bombarda that she knew of an agency that was recruiting people for overseas employment as factory workers in Hongkong, in consideration of a placement fee of P45,000.00. In the evening of January 9, 1991, she was at the accuseds house where she met the other complainants, Nadal, Ramos, Delos Santos and Conseja. The accused discussed with them the requirements for their overseas employment such as documentation, payment of placement fees and their trip to Manila. On the early morning of January 12, 1991, the complainants and the accused left by bus for Manila. They were taken by the accused to a house on Lardizabal Street, Sampaloc, Manila. Bombarda was assured by Micua that she would be employed in Hongkong as a factory worker with a monthly salary of H$4,000.00. She and the other complainants were asked by Micua to sign blank contracts of employment. After signing the blank contracts, complainants paid P5,000.00 each to the accused, who prepared the receipts that Micua signed. The receipt issued to Bombarda was marked as Exhibit "D2." On January 17, she paid another P5,000.00 to the accused at the same house in Sampaloc, Manila, Exhibit "D-1." On February 17, she again paid P10,000.00 to the accused at the latters house in Urdaneta, Pangasinan, Exhibit "D," in the presence of Micua. She was told by the accused that she (Bombarda) would leave for Hongkong within two months, but she waited in vain. Neither was her money returned by the accused. Leo delos Santos, complainant in Criminal Case Nos. 91-94197 and 91-94198, asserted that he met the accused in Urdaneta, Pangasinan in October 1990. The accused persuaded him to apply for overseas employment, by telling him

that she knew a recruiter who could deploy workers abroad. He was further advised by the accused to prepare P15,000.00 as initial payment of his placement fee. On December 21, 1990, January 21 and February 17, 1991, De los Santos gave to the accused the respective sums of P8,000.00, P10,000.00 and P12,000.00, Exhibits "F," "F-2," "F-3," and "F-4." The accused assured De los Santos that he would leave for Hongkong and work thereat as a factory worker within two months, but his projected trip never materialized. Neither was his money returned. When recalled to the witness stand by the prosecution as a witness for Margarita Nadal, complainant in Criminal Cases Nos. 91-94194 and 91-94198, Napoleon Ramos declared that Nadal was his neighbor in Urdaneta, Pangasinan; that on January 9, 1991, he was with Nadal when she applied with the accused a the latter's house in Urdaneta, Pampanga, for employment abroad; that he was present when Nadal handed to the accused the sum of P5,000.00 in Sampaloc, Manila, and he saw the accused prepare a receipt therefor that was signed by Micua, Exhibit "J;" that he was also present when Nadal gave an additional sum of P10,000.00 to the accused at her residence on Estrada Street, Urdaneta, Pangasinan, for which a receipt was issued by the accused, Exhibit "J-3 that Nadal had gave (sic) to him other receipts of payments she had made to the accused on January 21 and 22, 1991 in the respective sums of P5,000 and P10,000.00, Exhibits "J-1" and "J-2," but he was not present when these two payments were made, and that Nadal was unable to testify, because she is now abroad. The prosecution next presented Cristina Nava, complainant in Criminal Cases Nos. 91-94193 and 91-94198, who testified that sometime in 1991, the accused went to her (Navas) house in San Nicholas, Villasis, Pangasinan, and offered to recruit her for overseas employment in Hongkong. Nava told the accused that she would consult her husband about the matter. A few weeks later, the accused again visited Nava and she (accused) succeeded in convincing the reluctant Nava to accept the offer. The accused told Nava that her placement fee would be P40,000.00 of which P30,000.00 was to be paid in advance and the balance of P10,000.00 would be deducted from her salary. On different occasions, Nava delivered to the accused various amounts totalling P30,000.00 as placement fee, Exhibit "G," "G-1," and "G-2." The accused assured Nava that she would leave for and work in Hongkong within two months, but the promised employment turned out to be a dud. Despite repeated demands from Nava, the accused has failed and refused to return the latters money. x x x.7 Testifying in her own defense, accused-appellant denied the charges of engaging in recruitment activities and of receiving money from complainants. She described herself as a public school teacher living in Pangasinan with her four children and unemployed husband. Like the other complainants, she claimed she was a victim of Julie Micua. She first met Micua on December 17, 1990, at the house of Lina Salcedo in Sampaloc, Manila. Micua was introduced to her as a recruiter of overseas workers. Interested, she applied for a job abroad. Micua informed her that she would be a factory worker and showed her a contract. Accused-appellant was required to submit her medical certificate and passport and to make an advance payment of P5,000.00 as part of the P40,000.00 placement.8 When complainants learned that she had applied for overseas employment, they sought her help in going to the agency where she applied. Hence, on January 12, 1991, accusedappellant accompanied the complainants to see Julie Micua who assured them that they would be leaving for Hongkong within two or three months. They were also informed that

their placement fee would be P45,000.00. On that day, accused-appellant and complainants gave Julie Micua the amount of P5,000.00. On February 17, 1991, accused-appellant gave Micua an additional P5,000.00. According to her, complainants were all given corresponding receipts for their payments. The receipts were issued and signed by Micua. Accused-appellant got to know complainant Ramos when she was invited by his wife Marita to a birthday party at the couples residence. In that party, they talked about applying for a job abroad and Marita convinced her husband to apply. It was Ramos who introduced accused-appellant to complainant Nadal. Ramos convinced Nadal to apply for overseas employment. On the other hand, accused-appellants co-teacher, Isabel Valdez, brought complainant Delos Santos to accused-appellants classroom and sought her assistance in applying for an overseas job through the agency she was using. With respect to Merlita Bombarda, accused-appellant met her through her cousin Nadal who also accompanied Merlita to accused-appellants house to apply. Purita Conceja, who was also introduced to accused-appellant, sought her help in applying for a job abroad through the agency she was using. As regards complainant Cristina Nava, accused-appellant met her through Cristinas husband who was a regular customer of her store. Accused-appellant claims she never represented herself as having the capacity to deploy workers abroad. She only told them that she could accompany them to the agency where she also applied. According to accused-appellant, two months after they were unable to leave for abroad, she and the complainants had a meeting. They discussed how they could recover their money. On April 26, 1991, upon Nadals invitation, she voluntarily joined the complainants in going to Manila. Their main purpose was to look for Julie Micua. In Manila, they went to Blumentritt where they met Blas Santos, a police officer whom Ramos knew. Accusedappellant saw Ramos collecting money from his companions. Afterwards, they proceeded to the United Nations Police Headquarters. Santos endorsed them to investigator Val Torres, who, in turn, typed the consolidated affidavits of complainants. The money collected by Ramos was given to the investigator. The complaint filed by the complainants included accused-appellant as one of the defendants.9 Lina Salcedo corroborated accused-appellants testimony. Salcedo testified that she owns the house on 1333 Lardizabal St., Sampaloc, Manila. Also living there was a house boarder named Paz Alonzo who had a friend named Julie Micua. Sometime in December 1990, Micua visited Paz at Salcedos boarding house when accused-appellant arrived. It was on this occasion that Julie Micua and accused-appellant met for the first time and they discussed how to get employment in HongKong. After Christmas, accused-appellant returned to Salcedos house with some companions. Salcedo saw the members of the group giving money to Julie Micua for which the latter issued corresponding receipts. It was Julia Micua who did all the explaining. Accused-appellant and her companions returned to Salcedos house on two other occasions. According to Salcedo, she was present when all the transactions took place and she observed that Julie Micua never gave money or any consideration to accused-appellant.10 Lina Salcedos testimony was corroborated on the witness stand by her sister Violy Constantino.11 On March 1, 1994, the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch I, rendered the decision now on appeal before this Court. In justifying accused-appellants conviction, the trial court gave full credence to the testimonies of the complainants as they were "clear and straightforward" and "reflect spontaneity and are replete with details, which conform to what appears from the other evidence on record." It found that the complainants "positively identified the accused as the one who had persuaded them to apply for overseas employment, accompanied them all the way from Pangasinan to Manila, [and] personally received from them various sums as placement fees." Further, the trial court found no improper motive on the part of the complainants, thus:

xxx it is hard to believe that the private complainants, who all reside in Urdaneta, Pangasinan, would undergo the expense, rigor and inconvenience of a public trial if their motive is not to bring to justice the person/s who had defrauded them. xxx12 Accordingly, the trial court held that all the elements of Article 315, Paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code were proven in the cases for estafa. In likwise finding accused-appellant guilty of illegal recruitment in large scale, the trial court stated: x x x this court is convinced beyond moral certainty that there was unity of action, purpose and design between the accused and Julie Micua to recruit the private complainants for overseas employment in Hongkong without first securing a license or an authority therefor from the Philippine Overseas and Employment Agency. The accused took a direct and active participation in the recruitment of the private complainants by referring and persuading them to apply for deployment abroad, accompanying them all the way from Urdaneta, Pangasinan, to Manila to refer them to Micua, who presented herself as a recruiter of worker(s) for overseas employment, personally collecting and receiving from them various amounts for their placement fees, and preparing the receipts therefor.13 Hence, this appeal. Accused-appellant raises the following assignment of errors: I THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DISMISSING THIS CASE ON THE GROUND OF LACK OF JURISDICTION ON ITS PART OVER THE PERSON OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT BY REASON OF THE FACT THAT THE WARRANTLESS ARREST OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT WAS ILLEGAL. II THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT RECRUITED THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANTS FOR DEPLOYMENT AS LAND WORKERS IN HONGKONG. III THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FIND (SIC) THAT ALL THE ESSENTIAL REQUISITES OF ESTAFA AS DEFINED IN ARTICLE 315, REVISED PENAL CODE, ARE CONCURRENTLY SATISFIED IN THIS CASE. We find no valid grounds to reverse accused-appellants conviction. Accused-appellants first assignment of error challenges the trial courts judgment on a jurisdictional ground. She argues that her arrest without warrant was illegal and, therefore, following the settled rule that the trial court does not acquire jurisdiction over the person of one who is illegally arrested, the case should have been dismissed.14 This contention is untenable. Jurisdiction over the person of the accused is acquired either by arrest or voluntary appearance in court. The record amply demonstrates that accused-appellant voluntarily appeared in court at her arraignments, entered a plea of "not guilty" to all the charges against her, and later actively participated in the trial. Hence, granting arguendo that accused-appellants arrest was defective, such is deemed cured upon her voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court.15 It should be stressed that the question of legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the accused. Consequently, if objections based on this ground are waived, the fact that the arrest was illegal is not sufficient cause for setting aside an otherwise valid judgment. The technicality cannot render the subsequent proceedings void and deprive the State of its right to convict the guilty when all the facts on record point to the culpability of the accused.16

The second and third assigned errors regarding accused-appellants culpability for the crimes of estafa and illegal recruitment in large scale are closely interrelated, hence, shall be discussed jointly. These alleged errors boil down to the issue of credibility. All the complainants are one in saying that accused-appellant made representations that she knew someone who could help them secure employment in Hongkong. Relying on these representations, they applied for placement for employment abroad and paid various sums of money therefor. Unfortunately, accused-appellant failed to comply with her promise of employment or restitute the amounts she received from them. For her part, accused-appellant claims that she merely helped complainants find an agency that could secure for them employment overseas. She acted as a "good samaritan" by facilitating their quest for a better economic status. She denies receiving the fees paid by complainants and asserts that it was Julie Micua who recruited complainants and collected the placement fees for overseas employment. An examination of the records, however, reveals that accused-appellant is as culpable as Julie Micua. As to which of the contending claims should be believed is fundamentally an issue of credibility. Well settled is the rule that the issue of credibility is the domain of the trial court that had observed the deportment and manner of the witnesses as they testified. The findings of facts of a trial court, arrived at only after a hearing and evaluation of what can usually be expected to be conflicting testimonies of witnesses certainly deserve respect by an appellate court.17 We find no cogent reason to depart from this time-honored doctrine. Accused-appellant failed to show that complainants, who were mostly her townmates and some even her relatives, were ill-motivated in filing the cases against her; hence, their testimonies merit full faith and credit. The Court finds unacceptable accused-appellants claim that the complainants are "barking at the wrong tree" and that they only turned their ire on her because the alleged real culprit, Julie Micua, was nowhere to be found.18 Complainants would not run after her if she, too, were really a victim. The lame defense consisting of accused-appellants bare denial cannot overcome the prosecutions positive evidence proving her guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Moreover, compared to accused-appellants evidence, which is mainly one of denial, the prosecution presented evidence showing her positive acts of complicity with Julie Micua in recruiting complainants. The accordance of greater probative value to evidence that is positive in nature than that which is negative in character is a time-honored principle. Hence, the negative assertions of accused-appellant cannot prevail over the positive testimony of the complainants.19 The prosecution undoubtedly proved that accused-appellant, without license or authority, engaged in recruitment and placement activities. This was done in collaboration with Julie Micua, when they promised complainants employment in Hongkong. Art. 13, par. (b) of the Labor Code defines recruitment and placement as "any act of canvassing enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not; Provided that any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement." In People v. Agustin,20 therein appellant argued that she could not be convicted of illegal recruitment because in introducing the complainants to the alleged recruiters, she merely acted "out of the goodness of her heart." In resolving said case, the Court ruled: Hence, the inevitable query is whether or not appellant Agustin merely introduced complainants to the Goce couple or her actions went beyond that. The testimonial evidence hereon show that she indeed

further committed acts constitutive of illegal recruitment. All four prosecution witnesses testified that it was Agustin whom they initially approached regarding their plans of working overseas. It was from her that they learned about the fees they had to pay, as well as the papers that they had to submit. It was after they had talked to her that they met the accused spouses who owned the placement agency. As such, the Court concluded that appellant was an employee of the Goce spouses, as she was actually making referrals to the agency. She was, therefore, engaged in recruitment activities. The same factual circumstance obtains in this case. Although accused-appellant was not an employee of the alleged illegal recruiter Julie Micua, the evidence show that she was the one who approached complainants and prodded them to seek employment abroad. It was through her that they met Julia Micua. This is clearly an act of referral. Worse, accused-appellant declared that she was capable of placing them in jobs overseas. Suffice it to say that complainants recruitment would not have been consummated were it not for the direct participation of accused-appellant in the recruitment process. Article 38, paragraph (a) of the Labor Code provides that: Any recruitment activities, including the prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34 of this Code, to be undertaken by non-licensees or nonholders of authority shall be deemed illegal and punishable under Article 39 of this Code. Illegal recruitment is conducted in a large scale if perpetrated against three (3) or more persons individually or as a group. This crime requires proof that the accused: (1) engaged in the recruitment and placement of workers defined under Article 13 or in any of the prohibited activities under Article 34 of the Labor Code; (2) does not have a license or authority to lawfully engage in the recruitment and placement of workers; and (3) committed the infraction against three or more persons, individually or as a group.21 All these three essential elements are present in the case at bar. As earlier discussed, accused-appellant recruited the six complainants. Further, the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration certified that neither accused-appellant nor Julie Micua is licensed to recruit workers for overseas employment.22 Accused-appellants contention that she was a mere applicant and eventually a victim like complainants holds no water. Note should be made of the fact that throughout the trial of the case, no mention was made that accused-appellant exerted any effort to seek a refund for her money nor did she file a case against Julie Micua, her alleged victimizer. Her only excuse was that at the time of the filing of the complaint in Manila, she was confused and the investigating officer would not listen to her side of the controversy. Moreover, accused-appellant and her husbands acts of receiving almost all the payments of the complainants and issuing receipts signed by Julie Micua contradict her claim of being a mere applicant. There were even times that accused-appellant herself signed the receipts for the placement fees.23 Taken as a whole, the evidence shows that accused-appellant conspired and actively participated in the deceitful plan adopted by her co-accused Julie Micua, Rico Cordova and her own husband, Renato Meris, to hire without license or authority, gullible and nave applicants for non-existent overseas jobs. Likewise, we find that accused-appellant committed the crime of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code. This is committed by any person who defrauds another by using a fictitious name, or falsely pretends to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions, or by means of similar deceits executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud. The

offended party must have relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means of the accused-appellant and as a result thereof, the offended party suffered damages.24 Complainants parted with their money upon accused-appellants prodding and enticement, and on the false belief that she had the capacity to deploy them abroad. In the end, complainants were neither able to leave nor get their money back. A close scrutiny of the appealed decision warrants correction of the penalty imposed in each of the estafacases. The pertinent provision of the Revised Penal Code is as follows: ART. 315. Swindling (estafa). - Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by: 1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos; and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which maybe imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such case, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, a the case may be; xxx In People v. Gabres,25 where the amounts swindled ranged from P40,000 to P50,000, the Court said: Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum term of the penalty shall be "that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed" under the Revised Penal Code, and the minimum shall be "within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed" for the offense. The penalty next lower should be based on the penalty prescribed by the Code for the offense, without first considering any modifying circumstance attendant to the commission of the crime. The determination of the minimum penalty is left by law to the sound discretion of the court and it can be anywhere within the range of the penalty next lower without any reference to the periods into which it might be subdivided. The modifying circumstances are considered only in the imposition of the maximum term of the indeterminate sentence. The fact that the amounts involved in the instant case exceed P22,000.00 should not be considered in the initial determination of the indeterminate penalty; instead, the matter should be so taken as analogous to modifying circumstances in the imposition of the maximum term of the full indeterminate sentence. This interpretation of the law accords with the rule that penal laws should be construed in favor of the accused. Since the penalty prescribed by law for the estafa charge against accused-appellant is prision correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum, the penalty next lower would be prision correccional minimum to medium. Thus, the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence should be anywhere within six (6) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months while the maximum term of the indeterminate sentence should at least be six (6) years and one (1) day because the amounts involved exceeded P22,000.00 plus an additional one (1) year for each additional P10,000.00. Here, the amounts involved are P20,000.00 in Criminal Case No. 91-94196 and P30,000.00 each in Criminal Cases Nos. 91-94192, 91-94193, 91-94194, 91-94195 and 91-94197. The amounts in excess of the P22,000.00 as provided for in the first paragraph of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code are less than P10,000.00, hence, do not warrant the imposition of

an additional one-year imprisonment. There being no proven modifying circumstances, the correct penalty in each of the six (6) estafa cases should be the indeterminate penalty ranging from two (2) years and four (4) months of prision correccional as minimum to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum. With respect to Criminal Case No. 91-94198, the trial court correctly imposed the penalty of life imprisonment and fine of P100,000.00. WHEREFORE, the decision in question is hereby AFFIRMED subject to the modification that in each of the six (6) estafa cases, the indeterminate sentence that appellant Leonida Meris y Padilla must serve is two (2) years and four (4) months of prision correccional as minimum to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayormaximum. Costs against appellant. SO ORDERED. 6/21/00 1:40 PM Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Pardo, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur. [G.R. NO. 148137. January 16, 2003] PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. DOMINGA CORRALES FORTUNA, appellant. DECISION VITUG, J.: On 29 September 1998, Dominga Corrales Fortuna, herein appellant, was charged with illegal recruitment in large scale under Section 6, paragraph (m), of Republic Act No. 8042, said to have been committed thusly: That sometime in the month of July, 1998, in the City of Cabanatuan, Republic of the Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused who is neither a licensee nor holder of authority in the overseas private recruitment or placements activities, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously undertake a recruitment activity by inducing and convincing REBECCA P. DE LEON, ANNIE M. NUQUE, NENITA A. ANDASAN, ANGELYN N. MAGPAYO, LINA N. GANOT and EDGARDO C. SALVADOR, that she could secure for them a job in Taiwan, and as a result of such enticement, said Rebecca P. De Leon, Annie M. Nuque, Nenita A. Andasan, Angolan N. Magpayo, Lina N. Ganot and Edgardo C. Salvador, who were interested to have such employment, gave and delivered to the accused the total sum of THIRTY TWO THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED PESOS (P32,400.00), Philippine Currency, representing medical fees in connection thereof, to the latters damage and prejudice as they were not able to get a job in Taiwan through no fault of their own as promised by the accused, who likewise failed to reimburse to herein complainants the aforementioned amount despite repeated demands; that considering that there are six (6) or more complainants prejudiced by the unlawful acts of the accused, the same is deemed committed in large scale and considered an offense involving economic sabotage.[1] When arraigned on 29 February 2000, appellant Dominga Fortuna, with the assistance of counsel, pleaded not guilty to the crime charged; trial then ensued. Taking the witness stand for the prosecution were private complainants Lina Ganot, Nenita Andasan and Angelyn Magpayo. Lina N. Ganot, Angelyn N. Magpayo, Nenita A. Andasan, Rebecca P. De Leon, Annie M. Nuque and Edgardo L. Salvador met Dominga Fortuna y Corrales in a seminar on Tupperware products being then promoted for sale in Cabanatuan City. Fortuna took the occasion to converse with private complainants, along with some of the attendees, offering job placements in Taiwan. Convinced that Fortuna could actually provide them with jobs abroad, private complainants, on 06 July 1998, each gave her the amount of P5,400.00 to take care of the processing fee for medical examination and other expenses for securing their respective passports. On 13 July 1998, private complainants took the medical examination in Manila. Weeks went by but the promised departure had not materialized. Suspecting that something was not right, they finally demanded that Fortuna return their money. Fortuna, in the meanwhile, went into hiding. After having later learned that Fortuna had neither a license nor an authority to undertake recruiting activities, Angelyn Magpayo filed a complaint which, in due time, ultimately resulted in the indictment of Fortuna for illegal recruitment. During the preliminary investigation, as well as later at the trial, Fortuna gave assurance to have the money she had received from private complainants returned to them but, except for the amount of P1,250.00 paid to Angelyn Magpayo, Fortuna was unable to make good her promise.

Dominga Fortuna, in her testimony, admitted having attended the seminar on June 1998 where she then met Annie Nuque, Rebecca De Leon, Nenita Andasan, Edgardo Salvador, Angelyn Magpayo and Lina Ganot. During the seminar, she purchased Tupperware products from private complainants after she was convinced to be their sub-agent. Initially, she was able to remit payments to private complainants on her sales but, when she failed to make subsequent remittances, she was threatened with criminal prosecution. In order to settle the matter, she executed separate promissory notes. When she again failed to pay, private complainants filed the case for illegal recruitment against her. Originally, there were six private complainants but eventually only three of them pursued the case because the others were finally able to leave for abroad. In its decision, dated 02 January 2001, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 27, Cabanatuan City, held Dominga Corrales Fortuna guilty of Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale. The trial court held: WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Dominga Fortuna GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale and hereby imposes upon her the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of Five Hundred Thousand (P500,000.00) pesos, as the same involves economic sabotage. She is likewise ordered to reimburse five thousand four hundred (P5,400.00) each to Lina Ganot, Nenita Andasan representing the amount they gave to the accused as processing fee and the amount of four thousand one hundred fifty (P4,150.00) pesos in favor of Angelyn Magpayo, as there was a partial restitution during the trial of the original five thousand four hundred (P5,400.00) pesos she delivered to the accused.[2] Seeking a reversal of her conviction, appellant Fortuna, in her assignment of errors, would now have the Court conclude that I. The court a quo erred in convicting the accused-appellant on an information wherein the facts alleged therein do not constitute an offense; II. The court a quo erred in finding that accused-appellant violated Section 6, par. (m) of R.A. 8042 when it did not reimburse the alleged amounts received from private complainants; III. The court a quo erred standing its finding that the accused-appellant was guilty of illegal recruitment.[3] The appeal is bereft of merit. The crime of illegal recruitment is committed when, among other things, a person who, without being duly authorized according to law, represents or gives the distinct impression that he or she has the power or the ability to provide work abroad convincing those to whom the representation is made or to whom the impression is given to thereupon part with their money in order to be assured of that employment.[4] Verily, the testimony presented at the trial by the complaining witnesses adequately established the commission of the offense. Testimony of complainant Lina Ganot Q. Mrs. Witness, where were you in the month of June, 1998? A. At Macatbong, Cabanatuan City, sir. Q. Were you gainfully employed at that time? A. No, sir. Q. On that particular month, June, 1998, having been unemployed at that time, was there ever an occasion that you tried to look for a job? A. Yes, sir, I [tried] to look for a job. Q. Was there ever an occasion that you tried to be a seller of Tupperware products? A. Yes, sir. Q. Please tell us in connection with this intention of yours to sell Tupperware products, did you ever attend a seminar? A. Yes, sir. Q. Where? A. At Burgos Avenue, Cabanatuan City, sir. Q. Have you ever come across this particular name Dominga Corrales Fortuna? A. Yes, sir. Q. And where were you able to meet this particular person? A. At the seminar of the Tupperware, sir.

Q. What transpired with respect to this particular meeting? A. She recruited us and told us that she will give us good jobs, sir. COURT Q. Where is she now? A. There, sir (witness pointing to a person who, when asked, answered by the name of Dominga Corrales Fortuna). FISCAL Q. How was this accused able to relate to you that job placement will be available for you in Taiwan? A. She told me [to give] her P5,400.00 for processing fee and she went to our house and I gave the said amount, sir. Q. Upon hearing this particular proposition, what was your reaction? A. I believe[d] and I thought that I [could] really work, sir. Q. Aside from the processing fee of P5,400.00, were there any other financial matter that was given by you? A. None, sir; when we went to Manila, we shouldered our expenses. Q. When did you go to Manila? A. July 13, 1998, sir. Q. What was the purpose why you went there? A. For medical purpose, according to her, sir. Q. And who was with you? A. The accused, sir. Q. Aside from you and the accused, were there any other persons? A. We were accompanied by my co-complainants, sir, aside from the accused.[5] Testimony of Angelyn Magpayo COURT: Q. Do you know the accused? A. Yes, Your Honor. Q. Point to her now. A. Shes the one, sir. (Witness pointing to a person whom when asked of her name answered Dominga Fortuna y Corrales.) Q. How did you come to know her? A. I came to know her during the seminar of Tupperware, Your Honor. FISCAL MACARAIG: Q. Why did you have to attend this seminar in the selling of Tupperware? A. As an additional business, sir. Q. Could you please tell us, where this seminar [was] being held at that time? A. At Burgos St., Cabanatuan City, sir. Q. And when did you meet the accused for the first time? A. At the seminar in Tupperware, sir. Q. Could you please tell us what transpired during the first meeting with the accused? A. She introduced herself to us, sir. Q. Afterwards, what happened next? A. She conversed with us and asked if we want[ed] to work outside the Philippines, sir. Q. And what was your response to the offer of the accused? A. I said I [was] willing because I already have a passport, sir. Q. Aside from that particular question, what other matters that you and the accused talked [about]? A. She asked me if I [had] P5,400.00 for the processing of necessary papers, sir. Q. And what was your response to this question?

A. Q. A. Q.

I said I will raise [the] money, sir. [Were] you able to raise [the] money? Yes, sir. When was the appointed time that you [would] have to hand or give the money to the accused? A. July 6, 1998, sir. Q. And were you able to actually give the money, the P5,400.00? A. Yes, sir. Q. Was there a receipt of this particular payment? A. None, sir. Q. Could you please tell us why there was no receipt for this particular payment? A. Because I trusted her, sir. Q. And after the payment of P5,400.00 what happened next? A. She brought us to Manila for medical purposes, sir. Q. And what happened thereafter? A. I was not able to get the result of the medical examination, sir. Q. By the way, what country was mentioned to you by the accused where you were going to work? A. Taiwan, sir. Q. And were you able to go to Taiwan? A. No, sir. Q. Could you please tell us why there was a failure in going to Taiwan? A. After the medical examination, she never showed herself, sir.[6] Testimony of Nenita Andasan Q. Do you know a certain Dominga Fortuna y Corrales? A. Yes, sir. Q. In what capacity were you able to know this Dominga Fortuna? A. During the seminar of Tupperware, sir. Q. And what is this seminar all about? A. About selling Tupperware products, sir. Q. And where was this seminar of Tupperware held? A. At Burgos Avenue, Cabanatuan City, sir. Q. Do you know who [was] the one conducting this seminar? A. No, sir. Q. Why did you attend this particular seminar of Tupperware products? A. Because I was invited, sir. Q. How many persons attended that seminar? A. I cannot recall how many persons there were, sir. Q. When was this seminar held? A. In the month of June, 1998, sir. Q. June of what year? A. 1998, sir. Q. You mentioned awhile ago that it was during the seminar of Tupperware products that you were able to meet Dominga Fortuna, will you please tell us what transpired during that particular meeting? A. We [had] conversation and then she asked us if we wanted to go abroad, sir. Q. Who was the one [who] asked you that? A. The accused Dominga Fortuna, sir. Q. And what was your particular response? A. I said to her yes, sir, because I want[ed] to have a job.

Q. Were you the only one [who] was present at the seminar of Tupperware that was offered this job? A. Also my co-complainants, sir. Q. What happened afterwards, after you told her that you were interested in working abroad? A. We set the date in order to fix our papers, sir. Q. By the way, were those the only matters told to you by the accused at that point in time? A. She also told us to prepare money needed for that, sir. Q. And how much would that money be to be prepared by you? A. P5,400.00, sir. Q. And did she tell you what this P5,400.00 is all about? A. For processing of papers needed, sir. Q. And when was the time that you had to actually pay or tender this P5,400.00? A. In July, 1998, sir. Q. Were you able to comply with this particular requirement? A. Yes, sir. Q. And when did you actually comply with this requirement? A. On July 6, 1998, sir. Q. To whom did you personally tender this P5,400.00? A. In the house of Mrs. Ganot, sir. Q. And where is the house of this Mrs. Ganot? A. At Macatbong, Cabanatuan City, sir. Q. By the way, who is this Mrs. Ganot? A. She is the one heading us, sir, Q. Do you have knowledge whether this Mrs. Ganot [was] also interested in working abroad? A. Yes, sir. Q. How many were you who were present when you actually tendered the P5,400.00? A. We were six (6), sir. Q. Do you know the names of the others? A. Yes, sir. Q. Will you please tell us the names of those other persons who were present when you actually tender the P5,400.00 to the accused? A. Rebecca de Leon, Annie Nuque, Nenita Andasan, Angelyn Magpayo, Lina Ganot and Edgardo Salvador, sir. Q. At that point in time after you had given the amount of P5,400.00 to the accused, was there an official receipt that was issued or given to you by the accused? A. None, sir. Q. Do you know of any reason why there was no receipt? A. Because we trusted her, sir, because we were barriomates. Q. At that point in time that you actually handed the P5,400.00, where was Dominga Fortuna? A. She was present, sir. Q. Did she tell you anything before and after the giving of this P5,400.00? A. She said that we will be going to Manila to process our papers and passport and we will have a medical examination, sir.[7] The narration made by the complaining witnesses does appear to be straightforward, credible and convincing, and there scarcely is any reason for ignoring the trial court in its evaluation of their credibility. Indeed, the trial court has additionally observed: x x x. There is no showing that any of the complainants had ill-motives against accused Dominga Fortuna other than to bring her to the bar of justice. Furthermore, appellant was a stranger to private complainants before the recruitment. It is contrary to human nature and experience for persons to conspire and accuse a stranger of such a serious crime like this that would take the latters liberty and send him or her to prison. Against the prosecutions overwhelming evidence, accused could only offer a bare denial and an obviously concocted story.

Doctrinally, the assessment made on testimonial evidence by the trial judge is accorded the highest respect for it is he who has the distinct opportunity to directly perceive the demeanor of witnesses and personally ascertain their reliability. The rule has been said that a person charged with illegal recruitment may be convicted on the strength of the testimony of the complainants, if found to be credible and convincing, and that the absence of receipts to evidence payment to the recruiter would not warrant an acquittal, a receipt not being fatal to the prosecution's cause.[8] The pertinent provisions of Republic Act No. 8042 state: SEC. 6. Definition. For purposes of this act, illegal recruitment shall mean any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers and includes referring, contract of services, promising or advertising for employment abroad, whether for profit or not, when undertaken by a non-license or non-holder of authority contemplated under Article 13(f) of Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, otherwise known as the Labor Code of the Philippines: Provided, that any such non-licensee or non-holder who, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment abroad to two or more persons shall be deemed so engaged. x x x xxx x x x. Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of three (3) or more persons conspiring or confederating with one another. It is deemed committed in large scale if committed against three (3) or more persons individually or as a group. Sec. 7. Penalties. (a) Any person found guilty of illegal recruitment shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment of not less than six (6) years and one (1) day but not more than twelve (12) years and a fine of not less than Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) nor more than Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00). (b) The penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of not less than Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) nor more than One million pesos (P1,000,000.00) shall be imposed if illegal recruitment constitutes economic sabotage as defined herein. Provided, however, That the maximum penalty shall be imposed if the person illegally recruited is less than eighteen (18) years of age or committed by a non-licensee or non-holder of authority. This Court finds the information which has charged appellant with the offense of Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale, defined and penalized in Republic Act No. 8042, to be sufficient in form and substance. While the information cited Section 6, paragraph (m), of Republic Act No. 8042, its factual averments, however, are sufficient to constitute the crime of Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale under the aforequoted provisions of the law. It is not the specific designation of the offense in the information that controls but it is the allegations therein contained directly apprising the accused of the nature and cause of the accusation against him that matter.[9] The requisites constituting the offense of Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale have sufficiently been proven by the prosecution. First, appellant, undeniably, has not been duly licensed to engage in recruitment activities; second, she has engaged in illegal recruitment activities, offering private complainants employment abroad for a fee; and third, she has committed the questioned illegal recruitment activities against three or more persons. Illegal recruitment in large scale (when committed against three or more persons), like illegal recruitment committed by a syndicate (when carried out by a group of three or more persons), would be deemed constitutive of economic sabotage[10] carrying a penalty, under section 7, paragraph (b), of Republic Act 8042, of life imprisonment and a fine of not less than five hundred thousand (P500,000.00) pesos nor more than one million (P1,000,000.00) pesos. The sentence imposed by the trial court thus accords with the penalty prescribed by law. A word in passing. No two cases are exactly alike; almost invariably, surrounding circumstances vary from case to case. It is this reality that must have compelled the adoption by the Revised Penal Code of the scheme of graduated penalties providing, correspondingly, for the circumstances that affect criminal liability. The system allows the judge to have a good latitude in the sentencing process. Indeed, in other jurisdictions, a bifurcated proceeding is prescribed in order to help make certain that the penalty is commensurate to the wrong done. Under this procedure, the guilt and the innocence of the accused is first determined and then, after a verdict of plea or guilt, a pre-sentence hearing is conducted where the judge or a jury would hear argument and receive additional evidence on such matters as the nature of the offense, manner of its commission, the milieu of time and place, as well as the education, religion, physical and mental state of the accused, along with still other conditions or circumstances, that may find relevance in either mitigating or aggravating the punishment to be meted,[11] all calculated to enhance a

fair judgment. Statutory provisions for a single penalty, like those prescribed in Republic Act No. 8042, virtually ignore these safeguards that help obviate the danger of imposing either too great or too little a punishment for the offense. It is in the above light and given the factual circumstances of the case at bar, that Congress might see it fit to revisit Republic Act No. 8042 towards adopting the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on penalties, including its traditional nomenclatures, that could pave the way for the proper appreciation of the various circumstances long tested that affect criminal liability. Meanwhile, the Court respectfully recommends to the President of the Philippines a possible commutation of sentence. WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Regional Trial Court, Cabanatuan City, in Criminal Case No. 8589 for Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale against appellant Dominga Corrales is AFFIRMED. Let copies of this decision be forwarded to the Office of the President and to the Congress of the Philippines. SO ORDERED. Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.

[G.R. No. 148198 October 1, 2003] PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. ELIZABETH BETH CORPUZ, appellant. DECISION YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: This is an appeal from the decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 54, in Criminal Case No. 99-176637 finding appellant Elizabeth Corpuz guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale constituting economic sabotage under Sec. 6 (l) and (m) in relation to Sec. 7(b) of R.A. No. 8042, otherwise known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of l995, and sentencing her to life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P500,000.00. The Information against appellant reads as follows: That sometime in July 1998 in the City of Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, representing herself to have the capacity to contract, enlist and transport workers abroad, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously recruit for a fee the following persons, namely: BELINDA CABANTOG, CONCEPCION SAN DIEGO, ERLINDA PASCUAL AND RESTIAN SURIO for employment abroad without first obtaining the required license and/or authority from the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration and said accused failed to actually deploy without valid reasons said complainants abroad and to reimburse the expenses incurred by them in connection with their documentation and processing for purposes of deployment abroad to their damage and prejudice. CONTRARY TO LAW.[2] When arraigned on March 21, 2000, appellant pleaded not guilty. Whereupon, trial on the merits ensued. The facts of the case are as follows: In June 1998, private complainants Belinda Cabantog, Concepcion San Diego, Erlinda Pascual and Restian Surio went to Alga-Moher International Placement Services Corporation at 1651 San Marcelino Street, Malate, Manila to apply for employment as factory workers in Taiwan. They were accompanied by a certain Aling Josie who introduced them to the agencys President and General Manager Mrs. Evelyn Gloria H. Reyes.[3] Mrs. Reyes asked them to accomplish the application forms. Thereafter, they were told to return to the office with P10,000.00 each as processing fee.[4] On July 30, 1998, private complainants returned to the agency to pay the processing fees. Mrs. Reyes was not at the agency that time, but she called appellant on the telephone to ask her to receive the processing fees. Thereafter, appellant advised them to wait for the contracts to arrive from the Taiwan employers.[5] Two months later, nothing happened to their applications. Thus, private complainants decided to ask for the refund of their money from appellant[6] who told them that the processing fees they had paid were already remitted to Mrs. Reyes. When they talked to Mrs. Reyes, she told them that the money she received from appellant was in payment of the latters debt. Thus, on January 13, 1999, private

complainants filed their complaint with the National Bureau of Investigation[7] which led to the arrest and detention of appellant. On March 23, 2000, while the case was before the trial court, private complainants received the refund of their processing fees from appellants sister-in-law. Consequently, they executed affidavits of desistance[8] from participation in the case against appellant. For her part, appellant resolutely denied having a hand in the illegal recruitment and claimed that she merely received the money on behalf of Mrs. Reyes, the President/General Manager of Alga-Moher International Placement Services Corporation, where she had been working as secretary for three months prior to July 30, 1998. On that day, Mrs. Reyes called her on the telephone and told her to receive private complainants processing fees. In compliance with the order of her employer and since the cashier was absent, she received the processing fees of private complainants, which she thereafter remitted to Mrs. Reyes. She had no knowledge that the agencys license was suspended by the POEA on July 29, 1998.

[9]
On November 16, 2000, the trial court rendered the assailed decision, the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, in view of the above observations and findings accused Elizabeth Beth Corpuz is hereby found guilty of the offense charged in the Information for violation of Sec. 6 (l), (m) in relation to Sec. 7 (b) of R.A. 8042 without any mitigating nor aggravating circumstances attendant to its commission, without applying the benefit of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, Elizabeth Beth Corpuz is hereby sentenced to suffer a life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P500,000.00. Her body is hereby committed to the custody of the Director of the Bureau of Correction for Women, Mandaluyong City thru the City Jail Warden of Manila. She shall be credited with the full extent of her preventive imprisonment under Art. 29 of the Revised Penal Code. No pronouncement of civil liability is hereby made since all the complainants have been refunded of the fees. SO ORDERED.[10] In this appeal, appellant raises the following assignment of errors: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED IN THAT: A. THE PROSECUTION FAILED TO PROVE BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT THAT THE ACCUSED REPRESENTED HERSELF TO HAVE THE CAPACITY TO CONTRACT, ENLIST AND TRANSPORT WORKERS ABROAD, OR UNLAWFULLY RECRUIT THE COMPLAINANTS FOR A FEE. B. THE PROSECUTION FAILED TO PROVE BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT THAT THE ACCUSED HAS MANAGEMENT CONTROL OVER ALGA-MOHERs RECRUITMENT BUSINESS.[11] The Information charged appellant for Illegal recruitment in large scale under Section 6 (l) and (m) of R.A. No. 8042, otherwise known asMigrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, which reads: SECTION 6. Definition. For purposes of this Act, illegal recruitment shall mean any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers and includes referring, contract services, promising or advertising for employment abroad, whether for profit or not, when undertaken by a non-licensee or non-holder of authority contemplated under Article 13(f) of Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, otherwise known as the Labor Code of the Philippines: Provided, That any such non-licensee or non-holder who, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment abroad to two or more persons shall be deemed so engaged. It shall likewise include the following acts, whether committed by any person, whether a non-licensee, non-holder, licensee or holder of authority: xxx xxx xxx (l) Failure to actually deploy without valid reason as determined by the Department of Labor and Employment; and (m) Failure to reimburse expenses incurred by the worker in connection with his documentation and processing for purposes of deployment, in cases where the deployment does not actually take place without the worker's fault. Illegal recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in large scale shall be considered an offense involving economic sabotage. xxx xxx xxx

Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of three (3) or more persons conspiring or confederating with one another. It is deemed committed in large scale if committed against three (3) or more persons individually or as a group. The persons criminally liable for the above offenses are the principals, accomplices and accessories. In case of juridical persons, the officers having control, management or direction of their business shall be liable. Appellant contends that she is not liable for the foregoing illegal recruitment activities considering that she was merely an employee having no control over the recruitment business of the AlgaMoher International Placement Services Corporation and that she did not actually recruit the private complainants. Moreover, she did not appropriate for her own use the processing fees she received and she had no knowledge that the agencys license was suspended by the POEA. The trial court convicted appellant based on its findings that despite the suspension of the agencys license, appellant still convinced the applicants to give their money with the promise to land a job abroad. Moreover, as the registered secretary of the agency she had management control of the recruitment business. It is axiomatic that findings of facts of the trial court, its calibration of the collective testimonies of witnesses and probative weight thereof and its conclusions culled from said findings are accorded by this Court great respect, if not conclusive effect, because of the unique advantage of the trial court in observing and monitoring at close range, the conduct, deportment and demeanor of the witnesses as they testify before the trial court.[12] However, this principle does not apply if the trial court ignored, misunderstood or misconstrued cogent facts and circumstances of substance which, if considered, would alter the outcome of the case.[13] The exception obtains in this case. The records of the case show that Alga-Moher International Placement Service Corporation is a licensed land-based recruitment agency. Its license was valid until August 24, 1999. [14] Likewise, appellant was its registered secretary while Mrs. Evelyn Gloria H. Reyes is its President/General Manager.[15] Part of its regular business activity is to accept applicants who desire to work here or abroad. Appellant, as secretary of the agency, was in charge of the custody and documentation of the overseas contracts. On July 30, 1998, appellant received the processing fees of the private complainants since the cashier was absent that day. Her receipt of the money was in compliance with the order of her employer, Mrs. Reyes. She did not convince the applicants to give her their money since they went to the agency precisely to pay the processing fees upon the earlier advice of Mrs. Reyes. Private complainant Belinda Cabantog testified as follows: FISCAL BALLENA: Q. Please tell the Court how did it happen that you went to the said agency? A. When someone brought us there and introduced to the owner, Sir. Q. And who is this friend or person you said you know who accompanied you? A. Aling Josie, Sir. Q. What is her full name? A. I do not know, Sir. Q. And who is this owner to whom you were introduced? A. Mrs. Evelyn Ty, Sir. Q. And why do you know this Ty was the owner? A. Because she is the friend of Aling Josie, Sir. Q. Now, after the introduction to this owner what happened? A. We were told to fill up the application form by Mrs. Evelyn Ty, Sir. Q. And after filling up this application form, what did you do with the same? A. We went home and we were asked to come back, Sir. Q. Now, did you come back? A. Yes, Sir. Q. When did you come back? A. July 30, Sir. COURT:

Q. What year? A. 1998, Your Honor. FISCAL BALLENA: Q. What happened when you come back? A. When we came back we brought along the processing fee they needed, Sir. Q. Why did you bring this processing fee? A. We were required to bring it for the smooth processing of the papers, Sir. Q. Who required you to bring this processing fee? A. Mrs. Evelyn Ty, Sir. Q. Now, when you came back what happened? A. She was not at the office so she called up by phone and told us to give the money, Sir. Q. And to whom did to give the money? A. Beth Corpuz, Sir.[16]

From the foregoing testimony, it is clear that all appellant did was receive the processing fees upon instruction of Mrs. Reyes. She neither convinced the private complainants to give their money nor promised them employment abroad.
Moreover, as stated in the last sentence of Section 6 of RA 8042, the persons who may be held liable for illegal recruitment are the principals, accomplices and accessories. In case of juridical persons, the officers having control, management or direction of their business shall be liable. In the case at bar, we have carefully reviewed the records of the case and found that the prosecution failed to establish that appellant, as secretary, had control, management or direction of the recruitment agency. Appellant started her employment with the agency on May 1, 1998 and she was tasked to hold and document employment contracts from the foreign employers.[17] She did not entertain applicants and she had no discretion over how the business was managed.[18] The trial courts finding that appellant, being the secretary of the agency, had control over its business, is not only non sequitur but has no evidentiary basis. An employee of a company or corporation engaged in illegal recruitment may be held liable as principal, together with his employer, if it is shown that he actively and consciously participated in illegal recruitment. Settled is the rule that the existence of the corporate entity does not shield from prosecution the corporate agent who knowingly and intentionally causes the corporation to commit a crime. The corporation obviously acts, and can act, only by and through its human agents, and it is their conduct which the law must deter. The employee or agent of a corporation engaged in unlawful business naturally aids and abets in the carrying on of such business and will be prosecuted as principal if, with knowledge of the business, its purpose and effect, he consciously contributes his efforts to its conduct and promotion, however slight his contribution may be. The law of agency, as applied in civil cases, has no application in criminal cases, and no man can escape punishment when he participates in the commission of a crime upon the ground that he simply acted as an agent of any party. The culpability of the employee therefore hinges on his knowledge of the offense and his active participation in its commission. Where it is shown that the employee was merely acting under the direction of his superiors and was unaware that his acts constituted a crime, he may not be held criminally liable for an act done for and in behalf of his employer.[19] Anent the issue of whether or not appellant knowingly and intentionally participated in the commission of the crime charged, we find that she did not. In the appreciation of evidence in criminal cases, it is a basic tenet that the prosecution has the burden of proof in establishing the guilt of the accused for the offense with which he is charged. [20] Ei incumbit probation qui dicit non qui negat, i.e., he who asserts, not he who denies, must prove.[21] The conviction of appellant must rest not on the weakness of his defense, but on the strength of the prosecutions evidence.[22] In the case at bar, the prosecution failed to adduce sufficient evidence to prove appellants active participation in the illegal recruitment activities of the agency. As already established, appellant received the processing fees of the private complainants for and in behalf of Mrs. Reyes who ordered her to receive the same. She neither gave an impression that she had the ability to deploy them abroad

nor convinced them to part with their money. More importantly, she had no knowledge that the license was suspended the day before she received the money. Their failure to depart for Taiwan was due to the suspension of the license, an event which appellant did not have control of. Her failure to refund their money immediately upon their demand was because the money had been remitted to Mrs. Reyes on the same day she received it from them. While we strongly condemn the pervasive proliferation of illegal job recruiters and syndicates preying on innocent people anxious to obtain employment abroad, nevertheless, we find the pieces of evidence insufficient to prove the guilt of appellant beyond reasonable doubt. They do not pass the requisite moral certainty, as they admit of the alternative inference that other persons, not necessarily the appellant, may have perpetrated the crime. Where the evidence admits of two interpretations, one of which is consistent with guilt, and the other with innocence, the accused must be acquitted. Indeed, it would be better to set free ten men who might be probably guilty of the crime charged than to convict one innocent man for a crime he did not commit.[23] WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial Court Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 54, in Criminal Case No. 99-176637 finding appellant Elizabeth Corpuz guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale constituting economic sabotage under Sec. 6 (l) and (m) in relation to Sec. 7(b) of R.A. No. 8042, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant Elizabeth Corpuz is ACQUITTED of the offense charged on the ground of reasonable doubt. The Superintendent of the Correctional Institution for Women is directed to cause the immediate release of appellant unless she is lawfully held for another offense, and to inform this Court of the date of her release, or the ground for her continued confinement, within ten days from notice. SO ORDERED. Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Vitug, and Carpio, JJ., concur. Azcuna, J., on leave.

G.R. No. 124439 February 5, 2004 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee vs. FLOR GUTIERREZ Y TIMOD, appellant. DECISION TlNGA, J.: In its decision dated 22 March 1996, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City, Branch 1081 found accused Flor Gutierrez y Timod guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale and sentenced her to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P100,000.00. The Information in Criminal Case No. 95-6796 reads as follows: That from the months of April to August 1994 in Pasay City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused FLOR GUTIERREZ Y TIMOD conspiring and confederating with CECILIA BAUTISTA, ESTHER GAMILDE, LINDA RABAINO and MARILYN GARCIA (whose present whereabouts are unknown) and mutually helping one another, acting in common accord, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, engage in recruitment activities for overseas job placement and actually contract, enlist and recruit EVELYN V. RAMOS, ROSEMARIE I. TUGADE, GENEROSA G. ASUNCION and ROSALYN B. SUMAYO as domestic helpers in Dubai, United Arab Emirates, for a fee of various amounts ranging from P10,000.00 to P15,000.00 each, without first obtaining the required license and/or authority from the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA). CONTRARY TO LAW.2 Arraigned on April 24, 1995, the accused entered a plea of not guilty. The version of the prosecution is as follows: On April 18, 1994, Rosemarie Tugade went to the house of one Celia Bautista, a "recruiter-agent" of the accused, at Brgy. Bulala, Vigan, Ilocos Sur.3 Celia told Rosemarie that she had to submit the following requirements for her application to work in Dubai as a domestic helper: P4,000.00 as placement fee, P1,200.00 for passport, P850.00 for "medical," six (6) 2x2 pictures and her original birth certificate.4

The next day, Rosemarie, together with "recruiter-agent" Celia Bautista and fellow applicant Evelyn Ramos, traveled to Manila to the house of one Esther Gamilde, another of the accused's "recruiteragents."5 There, Rosemarie and Evelyn filled out their bio-data forms. The two then underwent a medical examination before having their whole-body picture taken. Esther told them that they would know the results of their application from Celia.6 Two weeks later, Celia told Rosemarie that her application for Dubai was already approved and that she will be receiving $150.00-dollars per month. For the first three (3) months, however, there will be salary deductions.7 On August 27, 1994, Rosemarie and Evelyn, along with Celia and Esther, went to the accused's office at Sarifudin Manpower and General Services at EDSA Extension, Pasay City.8 The accused told Rosemarie that she needed to pay P2,000.00 more.9 The accused said she had received all of Rosemarie's documents and the money paid to Celia.10 Trusting in Celia, Rosemarie did not demand a receipt from the accused. On August 31, 1994, the accused asked Rosemarie to give P500.00 as terminal fee for her departure in a week's time.11 Rosemarie paid the amount, as evidenced by a receipt.12 The scheduled departure did not push through, however. Instead, Rosemarie was told that she was to leave on September 15, 1994, but, again, this did not materialize.13 A series of postponements followed until finally she was told that she would be leaving before Christmas 1994. Almost predictably, her trip never came to pass.14 Private complainant Evelyn Ramos was with Rosemarie when she went to Celia Bautista's house on April 19, 1994.15Celia told Evelyn that for P4,000.00 she could leave for Dubai to work as a domestic helper.16 Like Rosemarie, Evelyn gave all her documents and paid the fees to Celia, who in turn handed them to Esther Gamilde in Tondo.17 On June 10, 1994, Ramos gave Bautista P8,000.00, which was also turned over to Gamilde.18 On August 22, 1994, Celia told Evelyn that she only had to wait one more week before she left for Dubai.19 On August 27, 1994, Esther brought Evelyn to the accused's office,20 where the accused asked for an additional P2,000.00 as processing fee for the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency (POEA).21 Evelyn paid the amount on August 31, 1994,22 including a terminal fee of P500.00. Like Rosemarie, Evelyn was not able to leave the country despite the accused's promises. Another complainant, Rosalyn D. Sumayo, also applied for overseas job placement as a domestic helper in Dubai. Her experience was more agonizing. In her case, it was one Marilyn Garcia who assisted Rosalyn.23 She submitted a copy of her birth certificate, six (6) copies of 2 x 2 pictures, two (2) copies of her whole-body picture, passport, and medical certificate.24 Marilyn also asked Rosalyn to pay: a processing fee of P7,500.00, P2,620.00 as full tax, P500.00 as terminal fee, and P3,000.00 as service charge.25 All the documents and money given by Rosalyn to Marilyn were subsequently remitted to the accused at her office on June 28, 1994.26 The accused told Rosalyn that she would be leaving anytime, but after three months, Rosalyn's departure did not push through.27 Despite the setback, the accused kept assuring Rosalyn that she would still be able to leave.28 One time, the accused brought her to the airport and instructed her to hide in the airport restroom.29 After fifteen minutes, the accused told her that they had to leave the airport because "mahigpit sa immigration."30 On another occasion, the accused directed Rosalyn to hide inside the Kayumanggi Restaurant for fifteen (15) minutes.31 Nothing happened after, though, and they went home. On November 14, 1994, Rosalyn was again at the airport.32 The accused warned her, though, that if the Immigration Officer insisted on seeing her papers, it would be better for her to leave.33 As directed, she left the airport when she was asked to produce her documents.34 Exasperated, Rosalyn went to the accused's house and demanded the return of her money and her documents. Instead of acceding to Rosalyn's demands, the accused shouted at her and warned her that she had to pay a cancellation fee of $300.00.35 Rosalyn was not able to give the amount so she stayed with the accused, who assured her that she would still be able to leave the country and that she would receive a monthly salary of $150 to $200.36These promises were never fulfilled. Rosalyn thus went to the POEA, where POEA Administrator Felicisimo Joson, Jr. informed her that the accused did not have a license to recruit.37 Generosa Asuncion suffered the same fate as her co-applicants. In August 1994, she applied for overseas job placement with one Linda Rabaino.38 Generosa submitted her passport, medical certificate, clearance from the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), birth certificate, bio-data and pictures.39 She

also paid P15,000.00 in two installments on September 9 and 12, 1994,40 which payments were not receipted. Linda told Generosa she would be leaving on September 13, 1994.41 However, she was not able to leave because, according to Linda, at 25, Generosa was under-aged.42 Linda then referred Generosa to the accused in the latter's office, where Linda turned over Generosa's documents as well as the P15,000 00 to the accused.43 The accused promised that Linda would be able to leave, but her departure never took place.44 When Generosa demanded the return of her money and her documents, the accused told her that she had to pay a cancellation fee of $600.00.45 Stunned, Linda just opted to await the further outcome of her application.46 Her waiting was all for naught. With the promises of jobs abroad unfulfilled, complainants decided to verify if the accused was a licensed recruiter. Upon learning from the POEA that she was not so licensed,47 they proceeded to the Philippine Anti-Crime Commission (PACC) to execute their respective affidavits.48 SPO4 Johnny Marqueta investigated the women's complaint. He confirmed with the POEA that the accused was not licensed or authorized to recruit overseas contract workers.49 The four complainants also informed him that the accused wanted to meet with the group on January 26, 1995.50 SPO4 Marqueta thus had their money, totaling P2,000.00,51 marked at the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) Forensic Section for their entrapment operation.52 On January 26, 1995, the accused met with the four complainants at Jollibee, Commonwealth Avenue, Quezon City. As soon as she finished counting the marked money and wrapping it in Jollibee napkins, the accused was arrested.53 In her defense, the accused claimed that as an "employee" of a duly licensed agency who was tasked to recruit and offer job placements abroad, she could not be held liable for illegal recruitment.54 She admitted that she had no authority to recruit in her personal capacity,55 but that her authority emanated from a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) and a Certification issued by a licensed agency.56 At the time complainants applied for overseas employment, the accused was "employed" as a Marketing Directress of Sarifudin Manpower and General Services,57 a duly licensed agency with License No. OS91-LB-61193-NL issued by the Department of Labor and Employment.58 A Special Power of Attorney (SPA) from Sarifudin, dated May 1, 1994,59states that she was authorized: 1. To negotiate, enter into business transactions for manpower supply particularly in the Middle East countries; 2. For and in behalf of SARIFUDIN, MANPOWER AND GENERAL SERVICES using as guidelines and terms and conditions by both parties to secure: (a) Verified Job Orders; (b) Special Power of Attorney; (c) Copy of Certified Certificate of Business Registration; (d) VISA Authorization and/or NOC VISA. ....60 A Certification61 dated February 3, 1995, issued by the same agency, also states that: "MRS. FLOR T. GUTIERREZ was (sic) employed as OVERSEAS MARKETING DIRECTRESS of SARIFUDIN MANPOWER AND GENERAL SERVICES, effective May 1994, up to the present"62 The defense also submitted several documents to prove compliance with the requirements of the agency for her to assume her duties under the SPA. These include receipts63 for a cash bond in the amount of P30,000.00 that she paid in several installments. She also paid a royalty fee of P4,000.0064 and an office rental fee of P3,000.00.65 The accused was also required by the agency to submit a monthly report for June 1994, as evidenced by a Memorandum signed by the General Manager, Leah Salud.66 She submitted said monthly report, indeed, several monthly reports.67 A document calling on all Marketing Directresses/Directors to attend a meeting on July 8, 1994, was also presented.68 The accused did not receive any salary or allowances from Sarifudin but received commissions from the agency's principals, the employers from foreign countries (ten in the Middle East and two in Singapore) at the rate of U.S. $100.00 per person.69 From her commissions, she paid rent and royalty to Sarifudin.70 Edwin Cristobal, POEA Labor Employment Officer, confirmed that Sarifudin was duly licensed to engage in recruitment activities.71 He presented a Certification issued by Ma. Salome S. Mendoza, Manager of the Licensing Branch72 and containing the list of officers and staff of Sarifudin. On said list appear the names

"Florna Gutierrez" and "Flor Gutierrez,"73 apparently, one and the same person.74 In the same Certification, appears the following: It is further certified that the said agency revoked the appointment of Ms. Flor Gutierrez as Overseas Mktg. Director/Manager in a letter dated Dec. 15, 1995, although this Office has not received nor acknowledged the representation of Ms. Gutierrez.75 Cristobal explained that the POEA, "Never had a letter from Sarifudin registering or authorizing Flor Gutierrez... rather, [what] we received [was a] revocation of her appointment."76 He also revealed that the name of the accused does not appear in the records of the POEA as being employed by the agency from the assumption of its license on June 11, 1993, up to its termination on June 11, 1995.77 The defense likewise alleged that complainants Rosemarie Tugade and Evelyn Ramos executed Affidavits of Desistance dated May 12, 1995,78 stating that the accused had returned to them the amounts they paid her and that the complaint was a result of a misunderstanding. On March 22, 1996, the trial court rendered its Decision finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale: WHEREFORE, after evaluating all the foregoing, the accused FLOR GUTIERREZ is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale, and judgment is hereby rendered as follows: (a) Convicting the accused of Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale and sentencing her to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and payment of P100,000.00 fine; (b) No reimbursement to complainants is needed since their money have already been returned; (c) Accused to pay moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 to each complainant; (d) Accused to pay exemplary damages in the amount of P50,000.00 to each complainant; and (e) To pay the costs of the suit.79 Accused Flor Gutierrez filed the present appeal seeking the reversal of her conviction. Illegal recruitment is committed when two elements concur, namely: (1) the offender has no valid license or authority required by law to enable one to lawfully engage in recruitment and placement of workers; and (2) he undertakes either any activity within the meaning of "recruitment and placement" defined under Art. 13(b), or any of the prohibited practices enumerated under Art. 34 of the Labor Code.80 Art. 13(b) of the Labor Code defines "recruitment and placement" as "any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not: Provided, That any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more persons, shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement."81 The crime becomes Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale when the two elements concur, with the addition of a third element: the recruiter committed the same against three or more persons, individually or as a group.82 Appellant argues that as a representative of a duly licensed recruitment agency, she cannot be held guilty of Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale. We disagree. Section 11, Rule II, Book II of the Rules and Regulations Governing Overseas Employment requires the prior approval of the POEA of the appointment of representatives or agents: Section 11. Appointment of Representatives. Every appointment of representatives or agents of licensed agency shall be subject to prior approval or authority of the Administration. The approval may be issued upon submission of or compliance with the following requirements: a. Proposed appointment or Special Power of Attorney; b. Clearances of the proposed representative or agent from NBI; c. A sworn or verified statement by the designating or appointing person or company assuming full responsibility for all the acts of the agent or representative done in connection with the recruitment and placement of workers. Approval by the Administration of the appointment or designation does not authorize the agent or representative to establish a branch or extension office of the licensed agency represented. Any revocation or amendment in the appointment should be communicated to the administration. Otherwise, the designation or appointment shall be deemed as not revoked or amended.

Section 1, Rule X of the same Book, in turn, provides that "recruitment and placement activities of agents or representatives appointed by a licensee, whose appointments were not authorized by the Administration shall likewise constitute illegal recruitment." The Certification from the POEA that it "has not received nor acknowledged the representation of Ms. Gutierrez" establishes that the appointment of appellant by Serafudin as a representative or agent was not authorized by the POEA. It may be true that the POEA received from Serafudin a revocation of appellant's appointment, but still is of no consequence since Serafudin in the first place did not submit her appointment to the POEA, and so the POEA has nothing to approve. As found by the trial court83 the evidence on record, notably appellant's own version, indicates that she was running her own labor recruitment business. Appellant cannot escape liability by claiming that she was not aware that before working for her employer in the recruitment agency, she should first be registered with the POEA.84 Illegal recruitment in large scale is malum prohibitum, not malum in se.85 Good faith is not a defense. That appellant engaged in recruitment and placement is beyond dispute. The complaining witnesses categorically testified that the accused promised them on several occasions that they would be leaving for work abroad. Appellant received complainants' money and documents, a fact that the complainants themselves witnessed and which the accused acknowledged when she returned the same to them after the filing of the case against her. Appellant even brought complainant Rosalyn Sumayo to the airport three times, raising her expectations, but leaving her hanging in mid-air. The accused even had the audacity to demand cancellation fees from the complainants when they asked for a refund. The Affidavits of Desistance executed by two of the complainants deserve little weight. The Court attaches no persuasive value to affidavits of desistance, especially when executed as an afterthought. As held in the case of People v. Ubina,86 "it would be a dangerous rule for courts to reject testimonies solemnly taken before the courts of justice simply because the witnesses who had given them later on changed their mind for one reason or another; for such rule would make solemn trials a mockery and place the investigation of truth at the mercy of unscrupulous witnesses."87 As appellant committed illegal recruitment against three or more persons, she is liable for Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale. WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, finding appellant Flor Gutierrez y Timod guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale and sentencing her to life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P100,000.00 is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED. Puno, (Chairman), Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez, and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur. G.R. No. 105204 March 9, 1995 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. THELMA REYES and NICK REYES, accused, THELMA REYES accused-appellant.chanrobles virtual law library MENDOZA, J.: chanrobles virtual law library This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Laguna, Branch 35, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows: WHEREFORE, the prosecution having established the guilt of the accused Thelma Reyes beyond reasonable doubt of Illegal Recruitment defined and penalized under Article 38, P.D. No. 442 as amended, the Court hereby sentences said accused to suffer a penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and to pay a fine in the amount of P100,000.00 and to indemnify Rosalino Bitang and Fabian Baradas, Mr. de Castro, Lorenzo Blanza and Ramon Mendoza the sum of P45,000.00 and to pay the costs. Appellant Thelma Reyes was charged together with her husband Nick Reyes, but the latter was at large and so has remained up to now. Consequently, the trial proceeded only with respect to Thelma Reyes in view of her plea of not guilty.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The prosecution's first witness, Rosalino Bitang, testified that sometime in 1985, he and five others (Lorenzo Blanza, Fabian Baradas, Edgardo Garcia, Ramon Mendoza and Dionisio de Castro) went to the house of the appellant in Los Baos, Laguna, to apply for employment abroad; that he gave P5,000 to Nick Reyes as downpayment for the recruitment fees; that Nick Reyes handed the money to his wife Thelma Reyes, and afterward issued a receipt (Exh. A), which reads: RECEIPT chanrobles virtual law library RECEIVED from MR. RIZALINO BITANG the amount of FIVE THOUSAND (P5,000.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Manila, September 19, 1985. (SGD.) NICK N. REYES, SR. Bitang testified that on January 14, 1986, he and his companions paid P34,000.00 more to the spouses through Dionisio de Castro. Of this amount, P8,500.00 was for his (witness Bitang's) placement fee, while the balance was for payment of his companions' fees. As before Nick Reyes received the amount and gave it to his wife, Thelma Reyes, after which he issued a receipt (Exh. B) which reads: RECEIPT chanrobles virtual law library RECEIVED from MR. DIONISIO DE CASTRO the amount of THIRTY FOUR THOUSAND (P34,000.00) Pesos, Philippine Currency for the following: Edgardo Garcia Ramon Mendoza Lorenzo Blanza, Fabian Barradas, and Rosalino Bitang.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Manila, January 14, 1986. (SGD) NICHOL REYES SR. According to complainant, Nick Reyes promised to notify them as soon as they were accepted for employment so that they could leave for abroad, but this promise was not fulfilled. He said that he checked with the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) and found out that the spouses were not licensed recruiters. A certification to this effect was issued to him by the POEA. (Exh. C) chanrobles virtual law library The other complainant Fabian Baradas also testified. He stated that he was introduced to Thelma Reyes sometime in September, 1985 at Lemery, Batangas, while the latter was recruiting workers for deployment in Saudi Arabia.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library On several occasions between September and December, 1985, he and several others went to appellant's house at Junction, Los Baos Laguna for overseas employment and were required to submit travel documents, such as passports, birth certificates and NBI clearances and to pay various amounts of money.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library On January 9, 1986, he gave P6,000.00 to Nick and Thelma Reyes, through his godfather Dionisio de Castro, for which Nick Reyes issued to him a receipt (Exh. E), reading: RECEIPT chanrobles virtual law library Received from Mr. Dionisio de Castro the amount of Six Thousand (P6,000.00) Pesos, Philippine Currency.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Manila, January 9, 1986. (SGD.) NICK N. REYES On January 14, 1986, he paid the additional amount of P12,000.00 to Reyes through Dionisio de Castro as evidenced by Exh. B. The money was supposed to cover the cost of the processing papers. However, as no job was forthcoming, he went to the POEA to inquire, and, like Rosalino Bitang, he learned that the spouses were not licensed recruiters.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The complainants both testified that as soon as they obtained the POEA certification that appellant and her husband were not licensed to recruit, they demanded from the spouses

the return of their money and when the latter did not give back their money, they filed the complaint in this case.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Only the appellant Thelma Reyes testified in her behalf. She claimed that she met the witnesses Bitang and Baradas only when they were looking for her husband at their house in Los Baos, Laguna, between March and May of 1986. She denied having met them before.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library She admitted that the receipts (Exhs. A, B and E) were all written and signed by her husband, but she denied she had anything to do with her husband's activities. She said they had been estranged since March 1986 precisely because she did not approve of her husband's illegal activities. She claimed that she had told her husband that, even though they were poor, they could live on their earning and the monthly support of P10,000.00 which they were receiving from her mother-in-law who lived in the United States.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library According to appellant, she and her husband saw each other only occasionally, whenever they visited their children in Los Baos where they were studying because she lived in Singalong, Manila. She presumed that her husband had told complainants to go to the house in Los Baos which they were merely renting for their children and that she was included in the complaint only because her husband could not be located.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library On cross-examination she admitted that there were fourteen (14) other cases of Illegal Recruitment filed and/or pending against her and her husband in different courts of Manila and claimed that some of the cases had been dismissed or settled after she had refunded the money of the complainants.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Testifying on rebuttal for the prosecution, Rosalino Bitang stated that it was Thelma Reyes herself who gave the job applicants the address and sketch of their house in Los Baos, Laguna, and that she represented to him that she was negotiating for job placements abroad. Bitang reiterated that money paid to Nick Reyes was given to Thelma Reyes who counted it before Nick Reyes issued receipts.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library On the basis of the parties' evidence, the trial court found Thelma Reyes guilty of illegal recruitment and sentenced her as stated in the beginning. Hence this appeal.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Appellant claims that the trial court erred 1. IN FINDING THAT THE PROSECUTION HAS MARSHALLED THE QUANTUM OF EVIDENCE SUFFICIENT TO CONVICT THE ACCUSED OF THE CRIME OF ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT UNDER ARTICLE 38, P.D. NO. 442.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library 2. IN NOT CONSIDERING THE FACT THAT THERE ARE ONLY TWO COMPLAINANTS IN THE INFORMATION FILED ON DECEMBER 11, 1986 AGAINST THE ACCUSED HENCE THEY CANNOT BE PROSECUTED UNDER ARTICLE 38, P.D. NO. 442.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library 3. IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE VERBAL TESTIMONIES OF PRIVATE COMPLAINANTS RATHER THAN THE DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE. We shall now deal with these contentions of appellant. First. Appellant contends that the testimonies of Bitang and Baradas are insufficient to sustain conviction. She contends that Dionisio de Castro, who allegedly advanced P34,000.00 for the complainants and their companions, should have been presented to corroborate the claim of the claimants.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The contention is without merit. To be sure, an accused can be convicted on the strength of the testimony of a single witness, if such testimony is credible and positive and produces a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. 1 That the witness is also the complainant in a case

makes little difference as long as the court is convinced beyond doubt that the witness is telling the truth. For instance, inHernandez v. Court of Appeals 2 this Court held: Petitioner claims that the decision of the trial court is not supported by the evidence, which is contrary to the findings of the Court of Appeals that said decision is "in accordance with law and the evidence" (Rollo, p. 12). He points out that the appellate court should not have believed the trial court's conclusion that "the sole testimony of the offended party would have sufficed to sustain her assertions" (Rollo, p. 47). He claims that self-serving declarations of a party favorable to himself are not admissible and that none of the alleged witnesses to the transactions were presented.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The common objection known as "self-serving" is not correct because almost all testimonies are self-serving. The proper basis for objection is "hearsay" (Wenke, Making and Meeting Objections, 69).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Petitioner fails to take into account the distinction between self-serving statements and testimonies made in court. Self-serving statements are those made by a party out of court advocating his own interest; they do not include a party's testimony as a witness in court (National Development Co. v. Workmen's Compensation Commission, 19 SCRA 861 [1967]).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Self-serving statements are inadmissible because the adverse party is not given the opportunity for cross-examination, and their admission would encourage fabrication of testimony. This cannot be said of a party's testimony in court made under oath, with full opportunity on the part of the opposing party for crossexamination.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library It is not true that none of the alleged witnesses to the transactions was presented in court (Rollo, p. 13). Yolanda Dela Rosa, an eye-witness to some of the transactions, testified for the prosecution. Assuming that Dela Rosa was not presented as a witness, the testimony of de Leon sufficed to sustain the conviction of petitioner. The conviction of an accused may be on the basis of the testimony of a single witness (People v. Rumeral, 200 SCRA 194 [1991]). In determining the value and credibility of evidence, witnesses are to be weighed, not counted (People v. Villalobos, 209 SCRA 304 [1992]). In the case at bar, the trial court gave weight to the testimonies of complainants because, Except for the denial of accused Thelma Reyes that she has nothing to do with the recruitment of the complaining witnesses as well as the collection of the amount from them, said accused failed to sufficiently overthrow the convincing testimony of the complaining witnesses that accused Thelma Reyes was present and even counted the money evidenced by Exhibit[s] "A" and "B" after her husband hands it to her and that her husband Nick Reyes who issued the receipts to the complainants. Moreover, when the issue is the credibility of witnesses, appellate courts will in general not disturb the findings of the trial court unless certain facts or circumstances of weight have been overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied which, if considered, might affect the result of the case. This is because the trial court heard the testimony of the witnesses and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial. 3 With respect to the fact that Dionisio de Castro was not presented to testify, it is sufficient to say that there was no necessity for this because there is no question that the amount of P34,000.00 which he had advanced for the complainants and others was received by Nick Reyes. Second. Appellant contends that the receipts constitute the best evidence to show that only Nick Reyes received the amounts stated therein because only his signature appears on the receipts. That the receipts were signed by Nick Reyes alone only proves that it was to him that the amounts were paid. What, on the other hand, complainants are saying is that appellant is guilty because she and her husband, conspiring together, acted and made them believe that they were licensed recruiters. If so, the acts of the husband were likewise those

of her. Indeed, the evidence shows that after receiving the amounts from complainants, Nick Reyes handed the money paid to the appellant and that Nick Reyes issued the receipts in question only after appellant Thelma Reyes had counted it.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Appellant claims that she and her husband separated in 1985 precisely because she did not want to be involved in his illegal activities. This seems to be us to be a convenient way to dissociate herself, but her mere claim is not enough to overcome the evidence of the prosecution. If there was anyone whose testimony needed corroboration it was appellant.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Taking another tack, appellant points out that complainants cannot explain why the purpose for which payment was made is not stated in the receipts nor why the receipts purport to have been issued in "Manila" and not in Los Baos where they said they had made all the payments. She argues that if the illegal recruitment was made in Manila, then the Regional Trial Court of Laguna had no jurisdiction to try the case.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The circumstances pointed out by appellant only underscores the deviousness of appellant and her husband. Complainants have an elementary education only. It is not for them - but for appellant and her husband - to explain these circumstances because it was the latter who made-the receipts. It is not far fetched that they made the receipts this way precisely to create doubt as to their real import. It is enough that complainants positively identified the appellant and her husband as having illegally recruited them and collected money from them. Their testimonies have not been successfully rebutted by the lame denial of appellant. Third. Appellant contends that in any event the testimonies of the two complainants could not be the basis for a finding of illegal recruitment on a large scale and for imposing the penalty of life imprisonment on her. The Labor Code prescribes the penalty of life imprisonment for illegal recruitment when committed on a "large scale." Art. 38 (b) of the Code provides: (b) Illegal recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in large scale shall be considered an offense involving economic sabotage and shall be penalized in accordance with Article 39 hereof. And Art. 39 (a) provides: Art. 39. Penalties. - (a) The penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000) shall be imposed if illegal recruitment constitutes economic sabotage as defined herein. We agree with this contention.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library In this case the information against appellant mentioned only the two complainants Fabian Baradas and Rosalino Bitang as having been illegally recruited by appellant and her husband. The trial Court, however, held appellant guilty of illegal recruitment on a large scale because aside from Baradas and Bitang, appellant and her husband allegedly recruited others, namely, Lorenzo Blanza, Edgardo Garcia, Ramon Mendoza, and Dionisio de Castro.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library This is error. To be sure, Blanza and Garcia, according to complainant Baradas were able to obtain overseas employment. On the other hand, with respect to De Castro there is no evidence that he, too, had been illegally recruited by the spouses. What appears in the record is that he advanced the amount of P34,000.00 in behalf of the complainants and the three others. Only two, therefore, had been illegally recruited.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library There are, it is said, 14 other cases filed pending in the courts against the accused for illegal recruitment. These cases cannot be taken into account for the purpose of Art. 38(b). When the Labor Code speaks of illegal recruitment "committed against three (3) or more persons individually or as a group," it must be understood as referring to the number of

complainants in each case who are complainants therein, otherwise, prosecutions for single crimes of illegal recruitment can be cummulated to make out a case of large scale illegal recruitment. In other words, a conviction for large scale illegal recruitment must be based on a finding in each case of illegal recruitment of three or more persons whether individually or as a group.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Moreover, even it Blanza and Garcia had been illegally recruited so as to make the number of persons illegally recruited four and make the crime that of illegal recruitment on a large scale, since this was not alleged in the information and this is the more serious offense which includes that which was charged, the appellant can only be found guilty of the less serious offense charged, pursuant to Rule 120, 4.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Accordingly, appellant must be punished under Art. 39(c) of the Labor Code which provides: (c) Any person who is neither a licensee nor a holder of authority under this Title found violating any provision thereof or its implementing rules and regulations shall upon conviction thereof, suffer the penalty of imprisonment of not less than four years nor more than eight years or a fine of not less than P20,000 nor more than P100,000 or both such imprisonment and fine, at the discretion of the court. WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is SET ASIDE and another one is rendered, finding appellant Thelma Reyes guilty of illegal recruitment on two (2) counts and is hereby sentenced for each crime to suffer imprisonment of 6 years and 1 day to 8 years and pay a fine of P50,000.00; and ordered to indemnify Rosalino Bitang in the amount of P13,500.00 and Fabian Baradas in the amount of P18,000.00 and pay the costs.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library SO ORDERED. Narvasa, C.J., Bidin, Regalado and Puno, JJ., concur. [G.R. Nos. 149014-16. February 5, 2004] PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. ROSE DUJUA (at large); EDITHA S. SING (at large); GUILLERMO WILLY SAMSON (at large); RAMON SAMSON DUJUA, accused, RAMON SAMSON DUJUA, appellant. DECISION TINGA, J.: Ramon Dujua appeals from the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC of Manila, Branch 51), finding him guilty of Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale and of two counts of estafa. Ramon, his mother Rose Dujua, his aunt Editha Singh, and his uncle Guillermo Willy Samson were charged in Criminal Case No. 92-108910, with Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale in an Information alleging That in or about and during the period comprised between August, 1991 and March 14, 1992, inclusive, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring and confederating together and helping one another, being then private individuals and representing themselves to have the capacity to contract, enlist, and transport Filipino workers for employment abroad, did then and there willfully and unlawfully, for a fee, recruit and promise employment/job placement to the following applicants, namely: Jaime Cabus y Co, Beldon S. Caluten, Fernando P. Cunanan, Paulino B. Correa, Martin D. Nacion, Romulo Partos y Tuangco, Jesus B. Briagas, Arturo Torres, Roberto A. Perlas, Ronald Alvarez and Vivencio L. Batiquin without first having secured the required license or authority from the Department of Labor as required by law. CONTRARY TO LAW.[1] The four were also charged in Criminal Case Nos. 92-108912 and 92-108920 with separate counts of estafa committed against Roberto Perlas and Jaime Cabus. Except for the date of the commission, the name of the victim, and the amount involved, the two Informations in the estafa cases make similar allegations against the accused. The Information in Criminal Case No. 92-108912 states: That on or about October 28, 1991, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused conspiring and confederating together and helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud Roberto A. Perlas

in the following manner, to wit: the said accused, by means of false manifestations and fraudulent representation which they made to said Roberto A. Perlas to the effect that they had the power and capacity to recruit and employ him abroad and could facilitate the processing of the pertinent papers if given the necessary amount to meet the requirements thereof, and by means of other similar deceits, induced and succeeded in inducing said Roberto A. Perlas to give and deliver, as in fact gave and delivered to said accused the amount of P17,000.00 on the strength of said manifestations and representations, said accused well knowing that the same were false and fraudulent and were made solely to obtain, as in fact they did obtain the amount ofP17,000.00 which amount once in possession, with intent to defraud they, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriated, misapplied and converted to their own personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of said Roberto A. Perlas in the aforesaid amount of P17,000.00, Philippine currency. CONTRARY TO LAW.[2] That in Criminal Case No. 92-108920 reads: That in or about and during the comprised [period] between October 1991 and March 14, 1992, inclusive, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused conspiring and confederating together and helping one another did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud Jaime Cabus y Co in the following manner, to wit: the said accused, by means of false manifestations and fraudulent representation which they made to said Jaime Cabus y Co to the effect that they had the power and capacity to recruit and employ him abroad and could facilitate the processing of the pertinent papers if given the necessary amount to meet the requirements thereof, and by means of other similar deceits, induced and succeeded in inducing said Jaime Cabus y Co to give and deliver, as in fact he gave and delivered to said accused the amount of P47,000.00 on the strength of said manifestations and representations, said accused well knowing that the same were false and fraudulent and were made solely to obtain, as in fact they did obtain the amount of P47,000.00 which amount once in possession, with intent to defraud they, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriated, misapplied and converted to their own personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of said Jaime Cabus y Co in the aforesaid amount of P47,000.00, Philippine currency. CONTRARY TO LAW.[3] Of the four accused, only Ramon Dujua was arrested and arraigned. His mother, aunt and uncle remain at large. Ramon entered a plea of not guilty to each of the charges, whereupon trial commenced. While the Information for illegal recruitment named several persons as having been promised jobs by the accused, only four of them testified. In August 1991, private complainant Beldon Caluten, accompanied by his cousin, went to the accuseds office, the World Pack Travel and Tours located in Suite 28, Manila Midtown Arcade, Adriatico Street, Ermita, Manila.[4] Upon Beldons inquiry, Ramon Dujua said that he sends applicants abroad and gave Beldon an application form. Beldon filled up the form and submitted it to Ramon, who told him that he must pay a processing fee and make an advance payment.[5] Beldon was promised work as a factory worker in Japan.[6] On August 15, 1991, he paid Ramon the processing fee of P1,000.00 and, the next day, an advance payment of P10,000.00.[7] Beldon paid Ramon an additional P15,000.00 on August 21, 1991 as placement fee. [8] For these payments, Beldon was issued receipts[9] signed by Ramons mother Rose Dujua.[10] On the last week of August 1991, Beldon gave another P10,000.00 to Benita Valdes, another applicant in the accuseds office, but no receipt was issued for the amount.[11] Finally, Beldon gave P41,000.00 to Rose Dujua but when Beldon asked for a receipt for the latter payment, Rose said she already gave him one.[12] When, despite such payments, the promise to send Beldon to work in Japan remained unfulfilled, Beldon asked Ramon to give him back his money. [13] Beldon never recovered his payments, however, prompting him and his fellow applicants to file a complaint at the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).

[14]
Private complainant Jaime Cabus was introduced to Ramon on the first week of October 1991 by Jaimes neighbor who worked in front of the accuseds office.[15] Ramon said they were deploying workers to Taiwan and that if Jaime could afford the placement fee of P45,000.00, plus the passport and processing fee, he could leave for Taiwan in a few weeks.[16] The following day, Jaime gave Ramon P2,000.00 at the latters office, the World Pack Travel and Tours at Suite 28, Manila Midtown Arcade, Adriatico St., Ermita, Manila, for the processing of his passport.

[17] Jaime was not issued a receipt for his payment but was assured that the passports processing would take just two days.[18] Indeed, Jaime was able to see his passport.[19]
In the latter part of October 1991, Jaime paid P10,000.00 as down payment for the placement fee.

[20] Jaime gave Ramon the sum inside the accuseds office.[21] On March 16, 1994, when they were
about to leave for the airport Jaime handed Rose P47,000.00 representing the balance of the placement fee.[22] At the airport, Ramon told Jaime that the tickets were still being processed.[23] Feeling that his and the other thirty applicants flight would not push through, Jaime asked for a refund. Ramon and his mother refused to pay him back[24] because the money was supposedly going to be used in the processing of their tickets.[25] Rose assured him, though, that they would be able to leave the following day.[26] The flight and the job never materialized, however, so after a week Jaime decided to file a complaint with the NBI.[27] Another complainant, Roberto Perlas, was introduced to Ramon Dujua by his compadre, complainant Jaime Cabus, in the first week of October 1991.[28] Roberto went to the accuseds office at Midtown Plaza in Ermita to apply for a job abroad.[29] Ramon told him that they were deploying factory workers to Taiwan.[30] Convinced, Roberto accomplished the bio-data form given by Ramon.[31] Roberto also paid a total of P30,000.00 as placement fee.[32] On separate occasions, Roberto gave Ramon P7,000.00 and P10,000.00, for which he was issued the corresponding receipts by Rose Dujua.[33]The balance of the P30,000.00 he later gave to Rose, who did not issue a receipt therefor because at the time a lot of people were milling about.[34] Notwithstanding payment, Roberto was not able to leave for Taiwan.[35] Rose and Ramon kept on telling him that he would leave the following day but Roberto waited in vain. [36] The money he gave was never refunded.[37] Finally, he decided to file a complaint against the accused.[38] In August 1991, private complainant Romulo Partos was introduced to Ramon Dujua at the latters office at the World Pack Travel and Tours in the Manila Midtown Arcade, Adriatico St., Manila, by one Baby Ramos.[39] Baby, like Romulo, was an applicant for deployment to Taiwan. [40]Ramon told Romulo about the work in Taiwan and in Japan. Ramon said that Romulo would get the job he was applying for and leave within a week if he paid P45,000.00. Romulo and his wife Melodea Villanueva then decided that Romulo would withdraw his application and that Melodea would be the one to leave for abroad.[41] The amount of P45,000.00 that Romulo was supposed to pay was changed to P25,000.00, payable upon application.[42]Romulo also had to pay P50,000.00 upon the release of the visa and another P75,000.00 upon departure.[43] Romulo paid Ramon P18,000.00 for his wifes application, and Rose Dujua issued the corresponding receipt.[44] Subsequently, Romulo gave another P7,000.00 to complete the required P25,000.00.[45] No receipt was issued for the latter payment.[46] Romulos wife raised another P50,000.00, which was given to Rose, for her Japanese visa.[47] As nothing came about of the employment promised, Romulo decided to file a complaint with the NBI.[48] The prosecution also presented a Certification[49] dated March 27, 1998, issued by Hermogenes C. Mateo, Director II, Licensing Branch of the POEA, stating that Ramon Dujua is not licensed or authorized by the POEA to recruit workers abroad. Another Certification,[50] of even date shows that neither is the World Pack Travel and Tours authorized to recruit workers abroad. The accused Ramon Dujua admitted having met private complainants[51] but denied that he was a recruiter.[52] He claimed that he was a mere janitor, messenger and errand boy of the World Pack Travel and Tours, where he worked from October 28, 1991 up to June 20, 1992. [53]The company is owned by his aunt, Editha Singh, and managed by his mother Rose Dujua.[54]

While admitting that he did not have a license to recruit,[55] Ramon acknowledged receiving the money given by complainants but denied knowing what it was for. [56] He said, however, that his mother only asked him to count the money. [57] He further maintained that he did not sign any receipt relative to the payments made by private complainants.[58] The accused claimed that he was being charged only because complainants were angry with his mother.[59] Zenaida Perez, who used to work for World Pack Travel and Tours, corroborated Ramons claim that he was a janitor/messenger in said office.[60] On February 28, 2001, the RTC rendered its Decision convicting Ramon Dujua of illegal recruitment in large scale, committed against Jaime Cabus, Beldon Caluten and Roberto Perlas, and of two counts of estafa, committed against Cabus and Perlas. The dispositive portion of the RTC Decision reads: WHEREFORE, the Court, finding the accused Ramon Dujua guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense in Criminal Case 92-108910 which is for Illegal Recruitment for Violation of Art. 38 (a and b) in relation to Art. 39 of PD 442, as amended by PD 1412 and further amended by PD 1920 and PD 2018, hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay fine in the amount of P100,000.00. He is further ordered to pay the private complainants a) Jaime Cabus the amount of P47,000.00; b) Benton [sic] C. Caluten the amount of P26,000.00; and c) Roberto Perlas the amount of P17,000.00. In so far as Romulo Partos is concerned, his case is dismissed. With costs. With respect to Criminal Case No. 92-108912 and Criminal Case No. 92-108920 involving private complainants Roberto Perlas and Jaime Cabus, respectively, the Court, finding the accused Ramon Dujua guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged which is for Estafa, hereby sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of two (2) years, eleven (11) months and eleven (11) days of prision correccional as minimum to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional as maximum for each of the cases. Considering that the accused had been ordered to pay private complainant Roberto Perlas the amount of P17,000.00 and private complainant Jaime Cabus the amount of P47,000.00 in Criminal Case No. 92-108910 for Illegal Recruitment they should not be awarded again the said amounts in these Estafa cases. With costs. Considering that the accused Ramon Dujua is a detention prisoner, he shall be credited in the service of his sentence with the full time during which he has undergone preventive imprisonment. As against accused Rose Dujua, Editha S. Sing [sic] and Guillermo Willy Samson who remained at-large, their cases were archieved [sic] (Order dated November 23, 1992). SO ORDERED.[61] Seeking the reversal of his conviction, Ramon Dujua contends that the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that he committed the crimes of illegal recruitment in large scale and estafa. The essential elements of the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale are: (1) the accused engages in acts of recruitment and placement of workers defined under Article 13(b) or in any prohibited activities under Art. 34 of the Labor Code; (2) the accused has not complied with the guidelines issued by the Secretary of Labor and Employment, particularly with respect to the securing of a license or an authority to recruit and deploy workers, either locally or overseas; and (3) the accused commits the unlawful acts against three or more persons, individually or as a group.[62] All three elements have been established beyond reasonable doubt. First, the testimonies of the complaining witnesses satisfactorily prove that appellant promised them employment and assured them placement overseas. Complainants were firm and categorical. All of them positively identified appellant as the person who recruited them for employment abroad. Their testimonies dovetail each other on material points. There is no adequate showing that any of them was impelled by any ill motive to testify against appellant. Their testimonies were straightforward, credible and convincing. As against the positive and categorical testimonies of the three complainants, appellants mere denials cannot prevail.[63] It is irrelevant whether or not complainants claims are supported by receipts. The absence of receipts in a case for illegal recruitment does not warrant the acquittal of the appellant and is not fatal to the prosecutions case. As long as the prosecution is able to establish through credible testimonial evidence that the appellant has engaged in Illegal Recruitment, a conviction for the offense can very well be justified.[64]

Second, appellant did not have any license or authority to recruit persons for overseas work, as shown by the Certification issued by the POEA. Neither did his employer, the World Pack Travel and Tours, possess such license or authority. Third, it bears clarifying that although Romulo Portos was named as among those recruited by appellant the evidence reveals that Romulo withdrew his application in lieu of which his wife Melodea Villanueva applied for placement with appellant. Villanueva, however, is not named as one of appellants victims. Nevertheless, it has been alleged and proven that appellant undertook the recruitment of not less than three persons, namely, Cabus, Caluten and Perlas. The RTC, therefore, aptly meted upon appellant the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P100,000.00, in accordance with Article 39(a) of the Labor Code. The following elements of estafa, as defined by Article 315 (2) (a) are also present in this case, to wit: (1) the accused has defrauded the offended party by means of abuse of confidence or by deceit; and (2) as a result, damage or prejudice, which is capable of pecuniary estimation, is caused to the offended party or third person. Appellant misrepresented himself to Jaime Cabus and Roberto Perlas as one who can make arrangements for job placements in Taiwan and Japan and, by reason of such misrepresentations, the two complainants were induced to part with their money, causing them damage. The RTC, however, erred in imposing upon appellant, for each count of estafa, the penalty of two (2) years, eleven (11) months and eleven (11) days of prision correccional, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum. Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code provides that: ART. 315. Swindling (estafa). Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by: 1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such case, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be. . 2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud: (a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions; or by means of other similar deceits. In Criminal Case No. 92-108920, the prosecution alleged and proved that appellant defrauded complainant Jaime Cabus in the amount ofP47,000.00, which exceeds the sum of P22,000.00. Thus, the penalty prescribed, i.e., prision correccional in its maximum period (4 years, 2 months and 1 day to 6 years) to prision mayor in its minimum period (6 years and 1 day to 8 years), shall be imposed in its maximum period. The penalty prescribed by Article 315, however, is composed of only two, not three, periods, in which case Article 65 of the Revised Penal Code requires the division into three equal portions the time included in the penalty, forming one period of each of the three portions. Applying this provision, the minimum, medium and maximum periods of the penalty prescribed are: Maximum - 6 years, 8 months, 21 days to 8 years Medium - 5 years, 5 months, 11 days to 6 years, 8 months, 20 days Minimum - 4 years, 2 months, 1 day to 5 years, 5 months, 10 days Thus, the maximum period is 6 years, 8 months and 21 days to 8 years. Article 315 further states that one year shall be added for each additional P10,000.00 defrauded in excess of P22,000.00. The amount defrauded, P47,0000.00, less P22,000.00 is P25,000.00, or two additional amounts of P10,000.00. These two years shall be added to the maximum period of 6 years, 8 months and 21 days to 8 years of prision mayor for a total of 8 years, 8 months and 21 days to 10 years of prision mayor. In imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by the Revised Penal Code, the Indeterminate Sentence Law requires courts to impose upon the accused an indeterminate sentence.

[65] The maximum term thereof shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of the said Code.[66] In this case, such maximum term is within the
period of 8 years, 8 months and 21 days to 10 years of prision mayor. On the other hand, the minimum term shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense.[67] The penalty next lower to that prescribed by Article 315 is prision correccional in its minimum period (6 months, 1 day to 2 years and 4 months) toprision correccional in its medium period (2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months). Thus, the Court sentences appellant, for the crime of estafa committed against private complainant Cabus, to a minimum period of four (4) years of prision correccional to a maximum period of nine (9) years of prision mayor. In Criminal Case No. 92-108912, appellant was charged and proven to have defrauded private complainant Perlas in the amount ofP17,000.00. Thus, the penalty prescribed shall be imposed in its medium period, or 5 years, 5 months, 11 days to 6 years, 8 months, 20 days, as the amount defrauded does not exceed P22,000.00 and as no aggravating or mitigating circumstances are present. From this period shall be taken the maximum term for purposes of the Indeterminate Sentence Law. As in the case of the estafa committed against Cabus, the minimum shall be within the range of prision correccional in its minimum period toprision correccional in its medium period. Accordingly, the Court sentences appellant, for the estafa committed against private complainant Perlas, to a minimum period of four (4) years of prision correccional to a maximum period of seven (7) years of prision mayor. WHEREFORE, the decision of the court a quo finding appellant Ramon Samson Dujua guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale and Estafa is AFFIRMED with the following modifications: In Criminal Case No. 92-108912 for estafa involving private complainant Roberto Perlas, the Court sentences appellant Ramon Samson Dujua to suffer a minimum period of four (4) years of prision correccional to a maximum period of seven (7) years of prision mayor. In Criminal Case No. 92-108920, for estafa, involving private complainant Jaime Cabus, the Court sentences appellant Ramon Samson Dujua to suffer a minimum period of four (4) years of prision correccional to a maximum period of nine (9) years of prision mayor. SO ORDERED. Puno, (Chairman), Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez, and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 131719

May 25, 2004

THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, THE SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, AND THE SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, OWWA PUNO, ADMINISTRATOR, and POEA ADMINISTRATOR, petitioners, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ASIAN RECRUITMENT COUNCIL PHILIPPINE CHAPTER (ARCO-PHIL.), INC., representing its members: Worldcare Services Internationale, Inc., Steadfast International Recruitment Corporation, Dragon International Manpower Services Corporation, Verdant Manpower Mobilization Corporation, Brent Overseas Personnel, Inc., ARL Manpower Services, Inc., Dahlzhen International Services, Inc., Interworld Placement Center, Inc., Lakas Tao Contract Services, Ltd. Co., and SSC Multiservices, respondents. DECISION CALLEJO, SR., J.:

In this petition for review on certiorari, the Executive Secretary of the President of the Philippines, the Secretary of Justice, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, the Secretary of Labor and Employment, the POEA Administrator and the OWWA Administrator, through the Office of the Solicitor General, assail the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 38815 affirming the Order2 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City dated August 21, 1995 in Civil Case No. Q-95-24401, granting the plea of the petitioners therein for a writ of preliminary injunction and of the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the trial court on August 24, 1995. The Antecedents Republic Act No. 8042, otherwise known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, took effect on July 15, 1995. The Omnibus Rules and Regulations Implementing the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipino Act of 1995 was, thereafter, published in the April 7, 1996 issue of the Manila Bulletin. However, even before the law took effect, the Asian Recruitment Council Philippine Chapter, Inc. (ARCO-Phil.) filed, on July 17, 1995, a petition for declaratory relief under Rule 63 of the Rules of Court with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City to declare as unconstitutional Section 2, paragraph (g), Section 6, paragraphs (a) to (j), (l) and (m), Section 7, paragraphs (a) and (b), and Sections 9 and 10 of the law, with a plea for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the respondents therein from enforcing the assailed provisions of the law. In a supplement to its petition, the ARCO-Phil. alleged that Rep. Act No. 8042 was self-executory and that no implementing rules were needed. It prayed that the court issue a temporary restraining order to enjoin the enforcement of Section 6, paragraphs (a) to (m) on illegal recruitment, Section 7 on penalties for illegal recruitment, and Section 9 on venue of criminal actions for illegal recruitments, viz: Viewed in the light of the foregoing discussions, there appears to be urgent an imperative need for this Honorable Court to maintain the status quo by enjoining the implementation or effectivity of the questioned provisions of RA 8042, by way of a restraining order otherwise, the member recruitment agencies of the petitioner will suffer grave or irreparable damage or injury. With the effectivity of RA 8042, a great majority of the duly licensed recruitment agencies have stopped or suspended their operations for fear of being prosecuted under the provisions of a law that are unjust and unconstitutional. This Honorable Court may take judicial notice of the fact that processing of deployment papers of overseas workers for the past weeks have come to a standstill at the POEA and this has affected thousands of workers everyday just because of the enactment of RA 8042. Indeed, this has far reaching effects not only to survival of the overseas manpower supply industry and the active participating recruitment agencies, the countrys economy which has survived mainly due to the dollar remittances of the overseas workers but more importantly, to the poor and the needy who are in dire need of income-generating jobs which can only be obtained from abroad. The loss or injury that the recruitment agencies will suffer will then be immeasurable and irreparable. As of now, even foreign employers have already reduced their manpower requirements from the Philippines due to their knowledge that RA 8042 prejudiced and adversely affected the local recruitment agencies.3 On August 1, 1995, the trial court issued a temporary restraining order effective for a period of only twenty (20) days therefrom. After the petitioners filed their comment on the petition, the ARCO-Phil. filed an amended petition, the amendments consisting in the inclusion in the caption thereof eleven (11) other corporations which it alleged were its members and which it represented in the suit, and a plea for a temporary

restraining order enjoining the respondents from enforcing Section 6 subsection (i), Section 6 subsection (k) and paragraphs 15 and 16 thereof, Section 8, Section 10, paragraphs 1 and 2, and Sections 11 and 40 of Rep. Act No. 8042. The respondent ARCO-Phil. assailed Section 2(g) and (i), Section 6 subsection (a) to (m), Section 7(a) to (b), and Section 10 paragraphs (1) and (2), quoted as follows: (g) THE STATE RECOGNIZES THAT THE ULTIMATE PROTECTION TO ALL MIGRANT WORKERS IS THE POSSESSION OF SKILLS. PURSUANT TO THIS AND AS SOON AS PRACTICABLE, THE GOVERNMENT SHALL DEPLOY AND/OR ALLOW THE DEPLOYMENT ONLY OF SKILLED FILIPINO WORKERS.4 Sec. 2 subsection (i, 2nd par.) Nonetheless, the deployment of Filipino overseas workers, whether land-based or seabased, by local service contractors and manning agents employing them shall be encourages (sic). Appropriate incentives may be extended to them. II. ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT SEC. 6. Definition. For purposes of this Act, illegal recruitment shall mean any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers and includes referring, contract services, promising or advertising for employment abroad, whether for profit or not, when undertaken by a non-licensee or non-holder of authority contemplated under Article 13(f) of Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, otherwise known as the Labor Code of the Philippines: Provided, That any such non-licensee or nonholder who, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment abroad to two or more persons shall be deemed so engaged. It shall, likewise, include the following acts, whether committed by any person, whether a non-licensee, non-holder, licensee or holder of authority: (a) To charge or accept directly or indirectly any amount greater than that specified in the schedule of allowable fees prescribed by the Secretary of Labor and Employment, or to make a worker pay any amount greater than that actually received by him as a loan or advance; (b) To furnish or publish any false notice or information or document in relation to recruitment or employment; (c) To give any false notice, testimony, information or document or commit any act of misrepresentation for the purpose of securing a license or authority under the Labor Code; (d) To induce or attempt to induce a worker already employed to quit his employment in order to offer him another unless the transfer is designed to liberate a worker from oppressive terms and conditions of employment; (e) To influence or attempt to influence any person or entity not to employ any worker who has not applied for employment through his agency;

(f) To engage in the recruitment or placement of workers in jobs harmful to public health or morality or to the dignity of the Republic of the Philippines; (g) To obstruct or attempt to obstruct inspection by the Secretary of Labor and Employment or by his duly authorized representative; (h) To fail to submit reports on the status of employment, placement vacancies, remittance of foreign exchange earnings, separation from jobs, departures and such other matters or information as may be required by the Secretary of Labor and Employment; (i) To substitute or alter to the prejudice of the worker, employment contracts approved and verified by the Department of Labor and Employment from the time of actual signing thereof by the parties up to and including the period of the expiration of the same without the approval of the Department of Labor and Employment; (j) For an officer or agent of a recruitment or placement agency to become an officer or member of the Board of any corporation engaged in travel agency or to be engaged directly or indirectly in the management of a travel agency; (k) To withhold or deny travel documents from applicant workers before departure for monetary or financial considerations other than those authorized under the Labor Code and its implementing rules and regulations; (l) Failure to actually deploy without valid reason as determined by the Department of Labor and Employment; and (m) Failure to reimburse expenses incurred by the worker in connection with his documentation and processing for purposes of deployment, in cases where the deployment does not actually take place without the workers fault. Illegal recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in large scale shall be considered an offense involving economic sabotage. Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of three (3) or more persons conspiring or confederating with one another. It is deemed committed in large scale if committed against three (3) or more persons individually or as a group. The persons criminally liable for the above offenses are the principals, accomplices and accessories. In case of juridical persons, the officers having control, management or direction of their business shall be liable. SEC. 7. Penalties. (a) Any person found guilty of illegal recruitment shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment of not less than six (6) years and one (1) day but not more than twelve (12) years and a fine of not less than two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) nor more than five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00).

(b) The penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of not less than five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) nor more than one million pesos (P1,000,000.00) shall be imposed if illegal recruitment constitutes economic sabotage as defined herein. Provided, however, That the maximum penalty shall be imposed if the person illegally recruited is less than eighteen (18) years of age or committed by a non-licensee or nonholder of authority. Sec. 8. Prohibition on Officials and Employees. It shall be unlawful for any official or employee of the Department of Labor and Employment, the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA), or the Overseas Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA), or the Department of Foreign Affairs, or other government agencies involved in the implementation of this Act, or their relatives within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity, to engage, directly or indirectly, in the business of recruiting migrant workers as defined in this Act. The penalties provided in the immediate preceding paragraph shall be imposed upon them. (underscoring supplied) Sec. 10, pars. 1 & 2. Money Claims. Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the Labor Arbiters of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) shall have the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within ninety (90) calendar days after the filing of the complaint, the claims arising out of an employer-employee relationship or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas deployment including claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages. The liability of the principal/employer and the recruitment/placement agency for any and all claims under this section shall be joint and several. This provision shall be incorporated in the contract for overseas employment and shall be a condition precedent for its approval. The performance bond to be filed by the recruitment/placement agency, as provided by law, shall be answerable for all money claims or damages that may be awarded to the workers. If the recruitment/placement agency is a juridical being, the corporate officers and directors and partners as the case may be, shall themselves be jointly and solidarily liable with the corporation or partnership for the aforesaid claims and damages. SEC. 11. Mandatory Periods for Resolution of Illegal Recruitment Cases. The preliminary investigations of cases under this Act shall be terminated within a period of thirty (30) calendar days from the date of their filing. Where the preliminary investigation is conducted by a prosecution officer and a prima facie case is established, the corresponding information shall be filed in court within twenty-four (24) hours from the termination of the investigation. If the preliminary investigation is conducted by a judge and a prima facie case is found to exist, the corresponding information shall be filed by the proper prosecution officer within fortyeight (48) hours from the date of receipt of the records of the case.

The respondent averred that the aforequoted provisions of Rep. Act No. 8042 violate Section 1, Article III of the Constitution.5 According to the respondent, Section 6(g) and (i) discriminated against unskilled workers and their families and, as such, violated the equal protection clause, as well as Article II, Section 126 and Article XV, Sections 17 and 3(3) of the Constitution.8 As the law encouraged the deployment of skilled Filipino workers, only overseas skilled workers are granted rights. The respondent stressed that unskilled workers also have the right to seek employment abroad. According to the respondent, the right of unskilled workers to due process is violated because they are prevented from finding employment and earning a living abroad. It cannot be argued that skilled workers are immune from abuses by employers, while unskilled workers are merely prone to such abuses. It was pointed out that both skilled and unskilled workers are subjected to abuses by foreign employers. Furthermore, the prohibition of the deployment of unskilled workers abroad would only encourage fly-by-night illegal recruiters. According to the respondent, the grant of incentives to service contractors and manning agencies to the exclusion of all other licensed and authorized recruiters is an invalid classification. Licensed and authorized recruiters are thus deprived of their right to property and due process and to the "equality of the person." It is understandable for the law to prohibit illegal recruiters, but to discriminate against licensed and registered recruiters is unconstitutional. The respondent, likewise, alleged that Section 6, subsections (a) to (m) is unconstitutional because licensed and authorized recruitment agencies are placed on equal footing with illegal recruiters. It contended that while the Labor Code distinguished between recruiters who are holders of licenses and non-holders thereof in the imposition of penalties, Rep. Act No. 8042 does not make any distinction. The penalties in Section 7(a) and (b) being based on an invalid classification are, therefore, repugnant to the equal protection clause, besides being excessive; hence, such penalties are violative of Section 19(1), Article III of the Constitution.9 It was also pointed out that the penalty for officers/officials/employees of recruitment agencies who are found guilty of economic sabotage or large-scale illegal recruitment under Rep. Act No. 8042 is life imprisonment. Since recruitment agencies usually operate with a manpower of more than three persons, such agencies are forced to shut down, lest their officers and/or employees be charged with large scale illegal recruitment or economic sabotage and sentenced to life imprisonment. Thus, the penalty imposed by law, being disproportionate to the prohibited acts, discourages the business of licensed and registered recruitment agencies. The respondent also posited that Section 6(m) and paragraphs (15) and (16), Sections 8, 9 and 10, paragraph 2 of the law violate Section 22, Article III of the Constitution10 prohibiting ex-post facto laws and bills of attainder. This is because the provisions presume that a licensed and registered recruitment agency is guilty of illegal recruitment involving economic sabotage, upon a finding that it committed any of the prohibited acts under the law. Furthermore, officials, employees and their relatives are presumed guilty of illegal recruitment involving economic sabotage upon such finding that they committed any of the said prohibited acts. The respondent further argued that the 90-day period in Section 10, paragraph (1) within which a labor arbiter should decide a money claim is relatively short, and could deprive licensed and registered recruiters of their right to due process. The period within which the summons and the complaint would be served on foreign employees and, thereafter, the filing of the answer to the complaint would take more than 90 days. This would thereby shift on local licensed and authorized recruiters the burden of proving the defense of foreign employers. Furthermore, the respondent asserted, Section 10, paragraph 2 of the law, which provides for the joint and several liability of the officers and employees, is a bill of attainder and a violation of the right of the said corporate officers and employees to due process. Considering that such corporate officers and employees act with

prior approval of the board of directors of such corporation, they should not be liable, jointly and severally, for such corporate acts. The respondent asserted that the following provisions of the law are unconstitutional: SEC. 9. Venue. A criminal action arising from illegal recruitment as defined herein shall be filed with the Regional Trial Court of the province or city where the offense was committed or where the offended party actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense: Provided, That the court where the criminal action is first filed shall acquire jurisdiction to the exclusion of other courts: Provided, however, That the aforestated provisions shall also apply to those criminal actions that have already been filed in court at the time of the effectivity of this Act. SEC. 10. Money Claims. Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the Labor Arbiters of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) shall have the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within ninety (90) calendar days after the filing of the complaint, the claims arising out of an employer-employee relationship or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas deployment including claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages. Sec. 40. The departments and agencies charged with carrying out the provisions of this Act shall, within ninety (90) days after the effectiviy of this Act, formulate the necessary rules and regulations for its effective implementation. According to the respondent, the said provisions violate Section 5(5), Article VIII of the Constitution11 because they impair the power of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules of procedure. In their answer to the petition, the petitioners alleged, inter alia, that (a) the respondent has no cause of action for a declaratory relief; (b) the petition was premature as the rules implementing Rep. Act No. 8042 not having been released as yet; (c) the assailed provisions do not violate any provisions of the Constitution; and, (d) the law was approved by Congress in the exercise of the police power of the State. In opposition to the respondents plea for injunctive relief, the petitioners averred that: As earlier shown, the amended petition for declaratory relief is devoid of merit for failure of petitioner to demonstrate convincingly that the assailed law is unconstitutional, apart from the defect and impropriety of the petition. One who attacks a statute, alleging unconstitutionality must prove its invalidity beyond reasonable doubt (Caleon v. Agus Development Corporation, 207 SCRA 748). All reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of a statute (People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56). This presumption of constitutionality is based on the doctrine of separation of powers which enjoin upon each department a becoming respect for the acts of the other departments (Garcia vs. Executive Secretary, 204 SCRA 516 [1991]). Necessarily, the ancillary remedy of a temporary restraining order and/or a writ of preliminary injunction prayed for must fall. Besides, an act of legislature approved by the executive is presumed to be within constitutional bounds (National Press Club v. Commission on Elections, 207 SCRA 1).12 After the respective counsels of the parties were heard on oral arguments, the trial court issued on August 21, 1995, an order granting the petitioners plea for a writ of preliminary injunction upon a

bond of P50,000. The petitioner posted the requisite bond and on August 24, 1995, the trial court issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the enforcement of the following provisions of Rep. Act No. 8042 pending the termination of the proceedings: Section 2, subsections (g) and (i, 2nd par.); Section 6, subsections (a) to (m), and pars. 15 & 16; Section 7, subsections (a) & (b); Section 8; Section 9; Section 10; pars. 1 & 2; Section 11; and Section 40 of Republic Act No. 8042, otherwise known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995. 13 The petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals assailing the order and the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the trial court on the following grounds: 1. Respondent ARCO-PHIL. had utterly failed to show its clear right/s or that of its memberagencies to be protected by the injunctive relief and/or violation of said rights by the enforcement of the assailed sections of R.A. 8042; 2. Respondent Judge fixed a P50,000 injunction bond which is grossly inadequate to answer for the damage which petitioner-officials may sustain, should respondent ARCO-PHIL. be finally adjudged as not being entitled thereto.14 The petitioners asserted that the respondent is not the real party-in-interest as petitioner in the trial court. It is inconceivable how the respondent, a non-stock and non-profit corporation, could sustain direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the law. They argued that if, at all, any damage would result in the implementation of the law, it is the licensed and registered recruitment agencies and/or the unskilled Filipino migrant workers discriminated against who would sustain the said injury or damage, not the respondent. The respondent, as petitioner in the trial court, was burdened to adduce preponderant evidence of such irreparable injury, but failed to do so. The petitioners further insisted that the petition a quo was premature since the rules and regulations implementing the law had yet to be promulgated when such petition was filed. Finally, the petitioners averred that the respondent failed to establish the requisites for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction against the enforcement of the law and the rules and regulations issued implementing the same. On December 5, 1997, the appellate court came out with a four-page decision dismissing the petition and affirming the assailed order and writ of preliminary injunction issued by the trial court. The appellate court, likewise, denied the petitioners motion for reconsideration of the said decision. The petitioners now come to this Court in a petition for review on certiorari on the following grounds: 1. Private respondent ARCO-PHIL. had utterly failed to show its clear right/s or that of its member-agencies to be protected by the injunctive relief and/or violation of said rights by the enforcement of the assailed sections of R.A. 8042; 2. The P50,000 injunction bond fixed by the court a quo and sustained by the Court of Appeals is grossly inadequate to answer for the damage which petitioners-officials may sustain, should private respondent ARCO-PHIL. be finally adjudged as not being entitled thereto.15 On February 16, 1998, this Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the respondents from enforcing the assailed order and writ of preliminary injunction. The Issues

The core issue in this case is whether or not the trial court committed grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed order and the writ of preliminary injunction on a bond of only P50,000 and whether or not the appellate court erred in affirming the trial courts order and the writ of preliminary injunction issued by it. The petitioners contend that the respondent has no locus standi. It is a non-stock, non-profit organization; hence, not the real party-in-interest as petitioner in the action. Although the respondent filed the petition in the Regional Trial Court in behalf of licensed and registered recruitment agencies, it failed to adduce in evidence a certified copy of its Articles of Incorporation and the resolutions of the said members authorizing it to represent the said agencies in the proceedings. Neither is the suit of the respondent a class suit so as to vest in it a personality to assail Rep. Act No. 8042; the respondent is service-oriented while the recruitment agencies it purports to represent are profitoriented. The petitioners assert that the law is presumed constitutional and, as such, the respondent was burdened to make a case strong enough to overcome such presumption and establish a clear right to injunctive relief. The petitioners bewail the P50,000 bond fixed by the trial court for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and affirmed by the appellate court. They assert that the amount is grossly inadequate to answer for any damages that the general public may suffer by reason of the nonenforcement of the assailed provisions of the law. The trial court committed a grave abuse of its discretion in granting the respondents plea for injunctive relief, and the appellate court erred in affirming the order and the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the trial court. The respondent, for its part, asserts that it has duly established its locus standi and its right to injunctive relief as gleaned from its pleadings and the appendages thereto. Under Section 5, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, it was incumbent on the petitioners, as respondents in the RTC, to show cause why no injunction should issue. It avers that the injunction bond posted by the respondent was more than adequate to answer for any injury or damage the petitioners may suffer, if any, by reason of the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the RTC. In any event, the assailed provisions of Rep. Act No. 8042 exposed its members to the immediate and irreparable damage of being deprived of their right to a livelihood without due process, a property right protected under the Constitution. The respondent contends that the commendable purpose of the law to eradicate illegal recruiters should not be done at the expense and to the prejudice of licensed and authorized recruitment agencies. The writ of preliminary injunction was necessitated by the great number of duly licensed recruitment agencies that had stopped or suspended their business operations for fear that their officers and employees would be indicted and prosecuted under the assailed oppressive penal provisions of the law, and meted excessive penalties. The respondent, likewise, urges that the Court should take judicial notice that the processing of deployment papers of overseas workers have come to a virtual standstill at the POEA. The Courts Ruling The petition is meritorious. The Respondent Has Locus Standi To File the Petition in the RTC in Representation of the Eleven Licensed and Registered Recruitment Agencies Impleaded in the Amended Petition The modern view is that an association has standing to complain of injuries to its members. This view fuses the legal identity of an association with that of its members.16 An association has standing

to file suit for its workers despite its lack of direct interest if its members are affected by the action. An organization has standing to assert the concerns of its constituents.17 In Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines v. Commission on Elections,18 we held that standing jus tertii would be recognized only if it can be shown that the party suing has some substantial relation to the third party, or that the right of the third party would be diluted unless the party in court is allowed to espouse the third partys constitutional claims. In this case, the respondent filed the petition for declaratory relief under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court for and in behalf of its eleven (11) licensed and registered recruitment agencies which are its members, and which approved separate resolutions expressly authorizing the respondent to file the said suit for and in their behalf. We note that, under its Articles of Incorporation, the respondent was organized for the purposes inter alia of promoting and supporting the growth and development of the manpower recruitment industry, both in the local and international levels; providing, creating and exploring employment opportunities for the exclusive benefit of its general membership; enhancing and promoting the general welfare and protection of Filipino workers; and, to act as the representative of any individual, company, entity or association on matters related to the manpower recruitment industry, and to perform other acts and activities necessary to accomplish the purposes embodied therein. The respondent is, thus, the appropriate party to assert the rights of its members, because it and its members are in every practical sense identical. The respondent asserts that the assailed provisions violate the constitutional rights of its members and the officers and employees thereof. The respondent is but the medium through which its individual members seek to make more effective the expression of their voices and the redress of their grievances.19 However, the respondent has no locus standi to file the petition for and in behalf of unskilled workers. We note that it even failed to implead any unskilled workers in its petition. Furthermore, in failing to implead, as parties-petitioners, the eleven licensed and registered recruitment agencies it claimed to represent, the respondent failed to comply with Section 2 of Rule 6320 of the Rules of Court. Nevertheless, since the eleven licensed and registered recruitment agencies for which the respondent filed the suit are specifically named in the petition, the amended petition is deemed amended to avoid multiplicity of suits.21 The Assailed Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction Is Mooted By Case Law The respondent justified its plea for injunctive relief on the allegation in its amended petition that its members are exposed to the immediate and irreparable danger of being deprived of their right to a livelihood and other constitutional rights without due process, on its claim that a great number of duly licensed recruitment agencies have stopped or suspended their operations for fear that (a) their officers and employees would be prosecuted under the unjust and unconstitutional penal provisions of Rep. Act No. 8042 and meted equally unjust and excessive penalties, including life imprisonment, for illegal recruitment and large scale illegal recruitment without regard to whether the recruitment agencies involved are licensed and/or authorized; and, (b) if the members of the respondent, which are licensed and authorized, decide to continue with their businesses, they face the stigma and the curse of being labeled "illegal recruiters." In granting the respondents plea for a writ of preliminary injunction, the trial court held, without stating the factual and legal basis therefor, that the enforcement of Rep. Act No. 8042, pendente lite, would cause grave and irreparable injury to the respondent until the case is decided on its merits.

We note, however, that since Rep. Act No. 8042 took effect on July 15, 1995, the Court had, in a catena of cases, applied the penal provisions in Section 6, including paragraph (m) thereof, and the last two paragraphs therein defining large scale illegal recruitment committed by officers and/or employees of recruitment agencies by themselves and in connivance with private individuals, and imposed the penalties provided in Section 7 thereof, including the penalty of life imprisonment.22 The Informations therein were filed after preliminary investigations as provided for in Section 11 of Rep. Act No. 8042 and in venues as provided for in Section 9 of the said act. In People v. Chowdury,23 we held that illegal recruitment is a crime of economic sabotage and must be enforced. In People v. Diaz,24 we held that Rep. Act No. 8042 is but an amendment of the Labor Code of the Philippines and is not an ex-post facto law because it is not applied retroactively. In JMM Promotion and Management, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,25 the issue of the extent of the police power of the State to regulate a business, profession or calling vis--vis the equal protection clause and the nonimpairment clause of the Constitution were raised and we held, thus: A profession, trade or calling is a property right within the meaning of our constitutional guarantees. One cannot be deprived of the right to work and the right to make a living because these rights are property rights, the arbitrary and unwarranted deprivation of which normally constitutes an actionable wrong. Nevertheless, no right is absolute, and the proper regulation of a profession, calling, business or trade has always been upheld as a legitimate subject of a valid exercise of the police power by the state particularly when their conduct affects either the execution of legitimate governmental functions, the preservation of the State, the public health and welfare and public morals. According to the maxim, sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, it must of course be within the legitimate range of legislative action to define the mode and manner in which every one may so use his own property so as not to pose injury to himself or others. In any case, where the liberty curtailed affects at most the rights of property, the permissible scope of regulatory measures is certainly much wider. To pretend that licensing or accreditation requirements violates the due process clause is to ignore the settled practice, under the mantle of the police power, of regulating entry to the practice of various trades or professions. Professionals leaving for abroad are required to pass rigid written and practical exams before they are deemed fit to practice their trade. Seamen are required to take tests determining their seamanship. Locally, the Professional Regulation Commission has begun to require previously licensed doctors and other professionals to furnish documentary proof that they had either re-trained or had undertaken continuing education courses as a requirement for renewal of their licenses. It is not claimed that these requirements pose an unwarranted deprivation of a property right under the due process clause. So long as professionals and other workers meet reasonable regulatory standards no such deprivation exists. Finally, it is a futile gesture on the part of petitioners to invoke the non-impairment clause of the Constitution to support their argument that the government cannot enact the assailed regulatory measures because they abridge the freedom to contract. In Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. vs. Drilon, we held that "[t]he non-impairment clause of the Constitution must yield to the loftier purposes targeted by the government." Equally important, into every contract is read provisions of existing law, and always, a reservation of the police power for so long as the agreement deals with a subject impressed with the public welfare.

A last point. Petitioners suggest that the singling out of entertainers and performing artists under the assailed department orders constitutes class legislation which violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution. We do not agree. The equal protection clause is directed principally against undue favor and individual or class privilege. It is not intended to prohibit legislation which is limited to the object to which it is directed or by the territory in which it is to operate. It does not require absolute equality, but merely that all persons be treated alike under like conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities imposed. We have held, time and again, that the equal protection clause of the Constitution does not forbid classification for so long as such classification is based on real and substantial differences having a reasonable relation to the subject of the particular legislation. If classification is germane to the purpose of the law, concerns all members of the class, and applies equally to present and future conditions, the classification does not violate the equal protection guarantee.26 The validity of Section 6 of R.A. No. 8042 which provides that employees of recruitment agencies may be criminally liable for illegal recruitment has been upheld in People v. Chowdury:27 As stated in the first sentence of Section 6 of RA 8042, the persons who may be held liable for illegal recruitment are the principals, accomplices and accessories. An employee of a company or corporation engaged in illegal recruitment may be held liable as principal, together with his employer, if it is shown that he actively and consciously participated in illegal recruitment. It has been held that the existence of the corporate entity does not shield from prosecution the corporate agent who knowingly and intentionally causes the corporation to commit a crime. The corporation obviously acts, and can act, only by and through its human agents, and it is their conduct which the law must deter. The employee or agent of a corporation engaged in unlawful business naturally aids and abets in the carrying on of such business and will be prosecuted as principal if, with knowledge of the business, its purpose and effect, he consciously contributes his efforts to its conduct and promotion, however slight his contribution may be. 28 By its rulings, the Court thereby affirmed the validity of the assailed penal and procedural provisions of Rep. Act No. 8042, including the imposable penalties therefor. Until the Court, by final judgment, declares that the said provisions are unconstitutional, the enforcement of the said provisions cannot be enjoined. The RTC Committed Grave Abuse of Its Discretion Amounting to Excess or Lack of Jurisdiction in Issuing the Assailed Order and the Writ of Preliminary Injunction The matter of whether to issue a writ of preliminary injunction or not is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. However, if the court commits grave abuse of its discretion in issuing the said writ amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction, the same may be nullified via a writ of certiorari and prohibition. In Social Security Commission v. Judge Bayona,29 we ruled that a law is presumed constitutional until otherwise declared by judicial interpretation. The suspension of the operation of the law is a matter of extreme delicacy because it is an interference with the official acts not only of the duly elected representatives of the people but also of the highest magistrate of the land. In Younger v. Harris, Jr.,30 the Supreme Court of the United States emphasized, thus:

Federal injunctions against state criminal statutes, either in their entirety or with respect to their separate and distinct prohibitions, are not to be granted as a matter of course, even if such statutes are unconstitutional. No citizen or member of the community is immune from prosecution, in good faith, for his alleged criminal acts. The imminence of such a prosecution even though alleged to be unauthorized and, hence, unlawful is not alone ground for relief in equity which exerts its extraordinary powers only to prevent irreparable injury to the plaintiff who seeks its aid. 752 Beal v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Corp., 312 U.S. 45, 49, 61 S.Ct. 418, 420, 85 L.Ed. 577. And similarly, in Douglas, supra, we made clear, after reaffirming this rule, that: "It does not appear from the record that petitioners have been threatened with any injury other than that incidental to every criminal proceeding brought lawfully and in good faith " 319 U.S., at 164, 63 S.Ct., at 881.31 The possible unconstitutionality of a statute, on its face, does not of itself justify an injunction against good faith attempts to enforce it, unless there is a showing of bad faith, harassment, or any other unusual circumstance that would call for equitable relief.32 The "on its face" invalidation of statutes has been described as "manifestly strong medicine," to be employed "sparingly and only as a last resort," and is generally disfavored.33 To be entitled to a preliminary injunction to enjoin the enforcement of a law assailed to be unconstitutional, the party must establish that it will suffer irreparable harm in the absence of injunctive relief and must demonstrate that it is likely to succeed on the merits, or that there are sufficiently serious questions going to the merits and the balance of hardships tips decidedly in its favor.34 The higher standard reflects judicial deference toward "legislation or regulations developed through presumptively reasoned democratic processes." Moreover, an injunction will alter, rather than maintain, the status quo, or will provide the movant with substantially all the relief sought and that relief cannot be undone even if the defendant prevails at a trial on the merits.35 Considering that injunction is an exercise of equitable relief and authority, in assessing whether to issue a preliminary injunction, the courts must sensitively assess all the equities of the situation, including the public interest.36 In litigations between governmental and private parties, courts go much further both to give and withhold relief in furtherance of public interest than they are accustomed to go when only private interests are involved.37 Before the plaintiff may be entitled to injunction against future enforcement, he is burdened to show some substantial hardship.38 The fear or chilling-effect of the assailed penal provisions of the law on the members of the respondent does not by itself justify prohibiting the State from enforcing them against those whom the State believes in good faith to be punishable under the laws: Just as the incidental "chilling effect" of such statutes does not automatically render them unconstitutional, so the chilling effect that admittedly can result from the very existence of certain laws on the statute books does not in itself justify prohibiting the State from carrying out the important and necessary task of enforcing these laws against socially harmful conduct that the State believes in good faith to be punishable under its laws and the Constitution.39 It must be borne in mind that subject to constitutional limitations, Congress is empowered to define what acts or omissions shall constitute a crime and to prescribe punishments therefor.40 The power is inherent in Congress and is part of the sovereign power of the State to maintain peace and order. Whatever views may be entertained regarding the severity of punishment, whether one believes in its efficiency or its futility, these are peculiarly questions of legislative policy.41 The comparative

gravity of crimes and whether their consequences are more or less injurious are matters for the State and Congress itself to determine.42 Specification of penalties involves questions of legislative policy.43 Due process prohibits criminal stability from shifting the burden of proof to the accused, punishing wholly passive conduct, defining crimes in vague or overbroad language and failing to grant fair warning of illegal conduct.44 Class legislation is such legislation which denies rights to one which are accorded to others, or inflicts upon one individual a more severe penalty than is imposed upon another in like case offending.45 Bills of attainder are legislative acts which inflict punishment on individuals or members of a particular group without a judicial trial. Essential to a bill of attainder are a specification of certain individuals or a group of individuals, the imposition of a punishment, penal or otherwise, and the lack of judicial trial.46 Penalizing unlicensed and licensed recruitment agencies and their officers and employees and their relatives employed in government agencies charged with the enforcement of the law for illegal recruitment and imposing life imprisonment for those who commit large scale illegal recruitment is not offensive to the Constitution. The accused may be convicted of illegal recruitment and large scale illegal recruitment only if, after trial, the prosecution is able to prove all the elements of the crime charged.47 The possibility that the officers and employees of the recruitment agencies, which are members of the respondent, and their relatives who are employed in the government agencies charged in the enforcement of the law, would be indicted for illegal recruitment and, if convicted sentenced to life imprisonment for large scale illegal recruitment, absent proof of irreparable injury, is not sufficient on which to base the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to suspend the enforcement of the penal provisions of Rep. Act No. 8042 and avert any indictments under the law.48 The normal course of criminal prosecutions cannot be blocked on the basis of allegations which amount to speculations about the future.49 There is no allegation in the amended petition or evidence adduced by the respondent that the officers and/or employees of its members had been threatened with any indictments for violations of the penal provisions of Rep. Act No. 8042. Neither is there any allegation therein that any of its members and/or their officers and employees committed any of the acts enumerated in Section 6(a) to (m) of the law for which they could be indicted. Neither did the respondent adduce any evidence in the RTC that any or all of its members or a great number of other duly licensed and registered recruitment agencies had to stop their business operations because of fear of indictments under Sections 6 and 7 of Rep. Act No. 8042. The respondent merely speculated and surmised that licensed and registered recruitment agencies would close shop and stop business operations because of the assailed penal provisions of the law. A writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the enforcement of penal laws cannot be based on such conjectures or speculations. The Court cannot take judicial notice that the processing of deployment papers of overseas workers have come to a virtual standstill at the POEA because of the assailed provisions of Rep. Act No. 8042. The respondent must adduce evidence to prove its allegation, and the petitioners accorded a chance to adduce controverting evidence. The respondent even failed to adduce any evidence to prove irreparable injury because of the enforcement of Section 10(1)(2) of Rep. Act No. 8042. Its fear or apprehension that, because of time constraints, its members would have to defend foreign employees in cases before the Labor Arbiter is based on speculations. Even if true, such inconvenience or difficulty is hardly irreparable injury.

The trial court even ignored the public interest involved in suspending the enforcement of Rep. Act No. 8042 vis--vis the eleven licensed and registered recruitment agencies represented by the respondent. In People v. Gamboa,50 we emphasized the primary aim of Rep. Act No. 8042: Preliminarily, the proliferation of illegal job recruiters and syndicates preying on innocent people anxious to obtain employment abroad is one of the primary considerations that led to the enactment of The Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995. Aimed at affording greater protection to overseas Filipino workers, it is a significant improvement on existing laws in the recruitment and placement of workers for overseas employment. Otherwise known as the Magna Carta of OFWs, it broadened the concept of illegal recruitment under the Labor Code and provided stiffer penalties thereto, especially those that constitute economic sabotage, i.e., Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale and Illegal Recruitment Committed by a Syndicate.51 By issuing the writ of preliminary injunction against the petitioners sans any evidence, the trial court frustrated, albeit temporarily, the prosecution of illegal recruiters and allowed them to continue victimizing hapless and innocent people desiring to obtain employment abroad as overseas workers, and blocked the attainment of the salutary policies52embedded in Rep. Act No. 8042. It bears stressing that overseas workers, land-based and sea-based, had been remitting to the Philippines billions of dollars which over the years had propped the economy. In issuing the writ of preliminary injunction, the trial court considered paramount the interests of the eleven licensed and registered recruitment agencies represented by the respondent, and capriciously overturned the presumption of the constitutionality of the assailed provisions on the barefaced claim of the respondent that the assailed provisions of Rep. Act No. 8042 are unconstitutional. The trial court committed a grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed order and writ of preliminary injunction. It is for this reason that the Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the enforcement of the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the trial court. IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision of the appellate court isREVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The Order of the Regional Trial Court dated August 21, 1995 in Civil Case No. Q-95-24401 and the Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued by it in the said case on August 24, 1995 are NULLIFIED. No costs. SO ORDERED.

G & M (PHIL.), INC., Petitioner,

G. R. No. 151849 Present:

- versus -

PANGANIBAN, J., Chairman, SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, CORONA, CARPIO MORALES, and GARCIA, JJ.

WILLIE BATOMALAQUE, Respondent. Promulgated: June 23, 2005 _________________ x------------------------------------------------ x

DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.: Culled from the records of the case are the following facts material to the appeal of petitioner. Sometime in February 1992, Abdul Aziz Abdullah Al Muhaimid Najad Car Maintenance Association (Abdul Aziz), a Saudi Arabian entity based in Riyadh, hired respondent, Willie Batomalaque, as a car painter at a monthly salary of US$370.00[1] for a two-year period[2] through its agent, petitioner G&M (Phil.), Inc. In accordance with the employment contract, respondent started working for Abdul Aziz on March 10, 1992[3] at a monthly salary of US$370.00[4] which according to him was equivalent to 1,200 Saudi riyals.[5] On June 7, 1994[6] respondent was repatriated and on January 3, 1995 he filed a complaint[7] against petitioner, Abdul Aziz, and Country Empire Insurance Company with the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration[8] for nonpayment and underpayment of salaries and damages. In his Complaint-Affidavit respondent claimed that for the first four months of employment, he received a monthly salary of 900 Saudi riyals,[9] and for the fifth month (July 1992) up to the end of the 12th month (February 1993), he received a

monthly salary of 700 Saudi riyals;[10] that after a one-year stint with Abdul Aziz, the workshop where he was working was sold but the new owner did not hire him; [11] that for eleven months he was jobless;[12] that Abdul Aziz hired him again and started working for it in February 1994 for which he was paid 1,200 Saudi riyals; [13] and that he resigned in May 1994 since he was not paid his salary for the months of March and April 1994,[14] which 2-month salary, was, however, used to purchase his airline ticket on his repatriation to the Philippines. Respondent thus prayed in his Complaint-Affidavit for the award to him of damages arising from the following:
a. Non-payment of wages for 11 months from April 1993 to January 1994; b. Non-payment of salaries for the months of March and April 1994; c. Non-payment of salary differentials int (sic) the amount of SR500 per month for seven months deducted from his salary starting the 5th month of his work or July 1992 up to February 1993 or the totla (sic) amount of SR3,500; d. moral and exemplary damages of P50,000.00; e. other just and equitable remedies are prayed for.[15] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Among other claims, petitioner denied respondents claim that he was underpaid, it maintaining that he was paid his salaries in full.[16] By Decision[17] of July 22, 1996, Labor Arbiter Fatima Jambaro-Franco credited respondents complaint for underpayment of salaries during the first year of his contract but denied his other claims in this wise:
After due consideration, this Office finds the complaint for underpayment of salaries and wages meritorious. Well-settled is the rule that in cases of non-payment and underpayment of salaries and wages, the employer has the burden of proof to show that the worker/employee has been paid all his salaries and wages since it has in its possession the proof of payment such as payrolls and/or vouchers (Sambalonay vs. Jose Cuevas, NLRC No. RB IV 186447, February 13, 1980) and in the absence of proof to the contrary, it is deemed that no payment has been made. In the case at bar, except for their bare allegation that complainants salaries was not underpaid, no evidence was adduced to show that complainants salaries and wages were fully paid constraining the undersigned to grant the claim of the complainant as shown in the computation below, to wit:

Agreed Salary SR1,200 Salary Received SR900 for 5 months SR700 for 8 months Salary differential SR1,200 SR900 = SR300 x 5 mos. = SR1,500 SR1,200 SR 700 = SR500 x 8 mos. = SR4,000 SR5,500 The claim for the non-payment of salaries for eleven (11) months (April 1993 to January 1994) is, however, untenable. The records show that complainant was repatriated on June 7, 1994, more than two (2) years from his deployment on March 9, 1992. While he claims for underpayment of salaries and wages for thirteen (13) months, he did not claim for illegal dismissal, although he claims for the payment of salaries from April 1993 to January 1994.[18] This Office is in a quandary why complainant stayed at the jobsite for eleven (11) months, without work, yet there was no complaint lodged in the Labor/Consulate Office in Saudi Arabia. The undersigned opines that if complainant really felt aggrieved, then he could have easily filed a complaint at the jobsite. However, complainant did nothing to vindicate his right, in fact, he stayed on until June 1994. Under these circumstances, this Office gives more credence to the respondents assertion that complainant completed his 2 years (sic) contract and even extended for another 2 months before his repatriation. It is worthy to note that complainant never claimed that he was constructively dismissedrendering his claim for payment of the unexpired portion of the contract untenable. The claim for refund of transportation expenses is likewise, not allowable in the absence of proof that the repatriation cost was actually shouldered by him. (Underscoring supplied)

The labor arbiter thus disposed as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondents G & M (Phils.), Inc., Abdul Aziz Abdullah Al Muhaimid Najad Car Maintenance Association and Country Empire Insurance Company are hereby ordered to pay jointly and severally complainant Willie Batomalaque the amount of FIVE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED SAUDI RIYALS (SR5,500) or in Philippine currency at the prevailing rate of exchange as certified to by the Central Bank at the time of payment, representing his underpayment of salaries and wages. All other claims are dismissed for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.[19] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Petitioner appealed[20] the labor arbiters decision to the National Labor Relation Commission (NLRC) which, by Resolution[21] of February 11, 1999, affirmed the same. Aggrieved, petitioner, via a petition for certiorari[22] under Rule 65, brought the case to the Court of Appeals which docketed it as CA-G.R. No. 52920. By the assailed decision[23] of April 27, 2001, the Court of Appeals dismissed petitioners petition, it holding that the NLRC committed no error much less any grave abuse of discretion. Petitioners motion for reconsideration[24] having been denied by the Court of Appeals, by Resolution[25] of January 8, 2002, it lodged the present petition.[26] Petitioner maintains that respondent had been paid his salaries in full and it was incumbent upon him to prove otherwise. Petitioners claim fails. It is settled that as a general rule, a party who alleges payment as a defense has the burden of proving it.[27] Specifically with respect to labor cases, the burden of proving payment of monetary claims rests on the employer, the rationale being
that the pertinent personnel files, payrolls, records, remittances and other similar documents which will show that overtime, differentials, service incentive leave and other claims of workers have been paid are not in the possession of the worker but in the custody and absolute control of the employer.[28]

Aside, however, from its bare allegation that its principal Abdul Aziz had fully paid respondents salaries, petitioner did not present any evidence, e.g., payroll or payslips, to support its defense of payment. Petitioner thus failed to discharge the onus probandi. Petitioner, as the recruiter and agent of Abdul Aziz, is thus solidarily liable with the latter for the unpaid wages of respondent. This Court, through Justice Irene Cortes, in Royal Crown Internationale v. NLRC[29] explains the basis thereof:
Petitioner conveniently overlooks the fact that it had voluntarily assumed solidary liability under the various contractual undertakings it submitted to the Bureau of Employment Services. In applying for its license to operate a private

employment agency for overseas recruitment and placement, petitioner was required to submit, among others, a document or verified undertaking whereby it assumed all responsibilities for the proper use of its license and the implementation of the contracts of employment with the workers it recruited and deployed for overseas employment [Section 2(e), Rule V, Book I, Rules to Implement the Labor Code (1976)]. It was also required to file with the Bureau a formal appointment or agency contract executed by the foreign-based employer in its favor to recruit and hire personnel for the former, which contained a provision empowering itto sue and be sued jointly and solidarily with the foreign principal for any of the violations of the recruitment agreement and the contracts of employment [Section 10 (a) (2), Rule V, Book I of the Rules to Implement the Labor Code (1976)]. Petitioner was required as well to post suchcash and surety bonds as determined by the Secretary of Labor to guarantee compliance with prescribed recruitment procedures, rules and regulations, and terms and conditions of employment as appropriate [Section 1 of Pres. Dec. 1412 (1978) amending Article 31 of the Labor Code]. These contractual undertakings constitute the legal basis for holding petitioner, and other private employment or recruitment agencies, liable jointly and severally with its principal, the foreign-based employer, for all claims filed by recruited workers which may arise in connection with the implementation of the service agreements or employment contracts [See Ambraque International Placement and Services v. NLRC, G.R. No. 77970, January 28, 1988, 157 SCRA 431; Catan v. NLRC, G.R. No. 77279, April 15, 1988, 160 SCRA 691; Alga Moher International Placement Services v. Atienza, G.R. No. 74610, September 30, 1988][30] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied; italics in the original)

Petitioner argues, however, that the foregoing rule has no application in the case at bar because it applies only to one which raises the issue of non-payment but not one which raises issues of underpayment,[31] hence, the burden was on respondent to show that he was indeed underpaid.[32] Petitioner does not persuade. On repeated occasions, this Court ruled that the debtor has the burden of showing with legal certainty that the obligation has been discharged by payment. [33] To discharge means to extinguish an obligation,[34] and in contract law discharge occurs either when the parties have performed their obligations in the contract, or when an event the conduct of the parties, or the operation of law releases the parties from performing.[35] Thus, a party who alleges that an obligation has been extinguished must prove facts or acts giving rise to the extinction.

The fact of underpayment does not shift the burden of evidence to the plaintiff-herein respondent because partial payment does not extinguish the obligation.[36] Only when the debtor introduces evidence that the obligation has been extinguished does the burden of evidence shift to the creditor who is then under a duty of producing evidence to show why payment does not extinguish the obligation. The lack of merit of petitioners petition notwithstanding, this Court finds that the appellate courts affirmance of the award to respondent of salaries for a 13month period, as reflected in the computation of salary differential in the decision of the labor arbiter, calls for modification. Respondent himself alleged in his Complaint-Affidavit having been underpaid for 12 months[37] albeit, oddly enough, in the above-quoted prayer of his said Complaint-Affidavit, he prayed for salary differential in the amount of SR500 per month for seven [7] months starting the 5th month of his work or July 1992 up to February 1993 or [a total] amount of SR3,500. Respondent being entitled to a monthly salary of US$370.00,[38] its equivalent of 1,200 Saudi riyals of which has not been disputed, and his allegation that he received a monthly salary of 900 Saudi riyals for the first 4 months and 700 Saudi riyals for the 5thmonth until the end of the 12th month not having been successfully refuted, he is entitled to SR5,200,[39] not SR5,500, representing the total deficient payment of his salaries for a 12-month period. WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. SP. No. 52920 is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that respondent, Willie Batomalaque, is only entitled to 5,200 Saudi riyals, instead of 5,500 Saudi riyals. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 167614 - ANTONIO M. SERRANO, petitioner, versus GALLANT MARITIME SERVICES, INC. AND MARLOW NAVIGATION CO., INC., respondents. x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION CARPIO, J.: I concur that the provision or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less in Section 10, paragraph 5,[1] of Republic Act (RA) No. 8042[2] is unconstitutional, but on a different ground. The provision violates the prohibition against deprivation of property without due process of law. It is an invalid exercise of police power. Section 1, Article III, of the Constitution states that no person shall be deprived of property without due process of law. Protected property includes the right to work and the right to earn a living. In JMM Promotion and Management, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[3] the Court held that:
A profession, trade or calling is a property right within the meaning of our constitutional guarantees. One cannot be deprived of the right to work and the right to make a living because these rights are property rights, the arbitrary and unwarranted deprivation of which normally constitutes an actionable wrong. (Emphasis supplied)

The right to work and the right to earn a living necessarily includes the right to bargain for better terms in an employment contract and the right to enforce those terms. If protected property does not include these rights, then the right to work and the right to earn a living would become empty civil liberties the State can deprive persons of their right to work and their right to earn a living by depriving them of the right to negotiate for better terms and the right to enforce those terms. The assailed provision prevents the OFWs from bargaining for payment of more than three months salary in case the employer wrongfully terminates the employment. The law may set a minimum amount that the employee can recover, but it cannot set a ceiling because this unreasonably curtails the employees right to bargain for better terms of employment. The right to bargain for better terms of employment is a constitutional right that cannot be unreasonably curtailed by the State. Here, no compelling State interest has been advanced why the employees

right to bargain should be curtailed. The claim that that the three-month salary cap provides an incentive to service contractors and manning agencies is specious because such incentive is at the expense of a protected and disadvantaged class the OFWs. The right to property is not absolute the prohibition against deprivation of property is qualified by the phrase without due process of law. Thus, the State may deprive persons of property through the exercise of police power.[4] However, the deprivation must be done with due process. Substantive due process requires that the means employed in depriving persons of property must not be unduly oppressive. In Social Justice Society v. Atienza, Jr.,[5] the Court held that:
[T]he State x x x may be considered as having properly exercised [its] police power only if the following requisites are met: (1) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require its exercise and (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. In short, there must be a concurrence of a lawful subject and a lawful method. (Emphasis supplied)

Moreover, the exercise of police power, to be valid, must be reasonable and not repugnant to the Constitution.[6] InPhilippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. v. Drilon,[7] the Court held that:
Notwithstanding its extensive sweep, police power is not without its own limitations. For all its awesome consequences, it may not be exercised arbitrarily or unreasonably. Otherwise, and in that event, it defeats the purpose for which it is exercised, that is, to advance the public good. (Emphasis supplied)

The assailed provision is unduly oppressive, unreasonable, and repugnant to the Constitution. It undermines the mandate of the Constitution to protect the rights of overseas workers and to promote their welfare. Section 3, Article XIII, of the Constitution states that the State shall (1) afford full protection to overseas labor, (2) promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all, and (3) guarantee the rights of all workers to security of tenure, humane conditions of work, and a living wage. Section 18, Article II, of

the Constitution states that, The State affirms labor as a primary social economic force. It shall protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare. The assailed provision also undermines the declared policies of RA No. 8042. Section 2 of RA No. 8042 states that (1) the State shall, at all times, uphold the dignity of Filipino migrant workers; (2) the State shall afford full protection to overseas labor and promote full employment opportunities for all; (3) the existence of overseas employment program rests solely on the assurance that the dignity and fundamental human rights and freedoms of Filipinos shall not, at any time, be compromised or violated; and (4) it is imperative that an effective mechanism be instituted to ensure that the rights and interest of distressed Filipino migrant workers are adequately protected and safeguarded. The assailed provision is the reverse of the constitutional mandate and the declared policies of RA No. 8042: (1) instead of protecting the rights and promoting the welfare of OFWs, it unreasonably curtails their freedom to enter into employment contracts; (2) instead of empowering OFWs, it prevents them from bargaining for better terms; (3) instead of setting the minimum amount that OFWs are entitled to in case they are terminated without just, valid or authorized cause, it provides a ceiling; (4) instead of allowing OFWs who have been terminated without just, valid or authorized cause to recover what is rightfully due, it arbitrarily sets the recoverable amount to their three-month salary. OFWs belong to a disadvantaged class, are oppressed, and need protection. In Olarte v. Nayona,[8] the Court held that:
Our overseas workers belong to a disadvantaged class. Most of them come from the poorest sector of our society. Their profile shows they live in suffocating slums, trapped in an environment of crimes. Hardly literate and in ill health, their only hope lies in jobs they find with difficulty in our country. Their unfortunate circumstance makes them easy prey to avaricious employers. They will climb mountains, cross the seas, endure slave treatment in foreign lands just to survive. Out of despondence, they will work under subhuman conditions and accept salaries below the minimum. The least we can do is to protect them in our laws. (Emphasis supplied)

In Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc.,[9] the Court held that:

What concerns the Constitution more paramountly is that x x x employment be above all, decent, just, and humane. It is bad enough that the country has to send its sons and daughters to strange lands because it cannot satisfy their employment needs at home. Under these circumstances, the Government is duty-bound to insure that our toiling expatriates have adequate protection, personally and economically, while away from home. (Emphasis supplied)

With the inclusion of the assailed provision in RA No. 8042, the OFWs, whom the Constitution and the law particularly seek to protect, end up even more oppressed. In her ponencia, Justice Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez held that the assailed provision violated the equal protection clause. The application of the equal protection clause is improper because local workers and OFWs are differently situated. Local workers who perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer are deemed regular after six months of service. This is true even if the workers are for a fixed term. In Glory Philippines, Inc. v. Vergara,[10] the Court held that:
[W]e cannot give credence to petitioners claim that respondents were fixed term employees. x x x In the instant case, respondents original employment contracts were renewed four times. x x x In Philips Semiconductors (Phils.), Inc. v. Fadriquela, we held that such a continuing need for respondents services is sufficient evidence of the necessity and indispensability of their services to petitioners business. Consequently, we find that respondents were regular employees defined under Article 280 of the Labor Code as those who have been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of petitioner. (Emphasis supplied)

On the other hand, OFWs are never deemed regular. In Brent School, Inc. v. Zamora,[11] the Court held that:
Some familiar examples may be cited of employment contracts which may be neither for seasonal work nor for specific projects, but to which a fixed term is an essential and natural appurtenance: overseas employment contracts, for one, to which, whatever the nature of the engagement, the concept of regular employment with all that it implies does not appear ever to have been applied, Article 280 of the Labor Code notwithstanding. (Emphasis supplied)

Accordingly, I vote to declare the provision or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less in Section 10, paragraph 5, of Republic Act No. 8042 as unconstitutional for violation of the due process clause.

G.R. No. L-15422

November 30, 1962

NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, petitioner, vs. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and NATIONAL TEXTILE WORKERS UNION, respondents. Government Corporate Counsel Simeon M. Gopengco and Lorenzo R. Mosqueda for petitioner. Eulogio R. Lerum for respondent National Textile Workers Union. Mariano B. Tuason for respondent Court of Industrial Relations. REGALA, J.: This is a case for review from the Court of Industrial Relations. The pertinent facts are the following: At the National Development Co., a government-owned and controlled corporation, there were four shifts of work. One shift was from 8 a.m. to 4 p.m., while the three other shifts were from 6 a.m. to 2 p.m; then from 2 p.m. to 10 p.m. and, finally, from 10 p.m. to 6 a.m. In each shift, there was a one-hour mealtime period, to wit: From (1) 11 a.m. to 12 noon for those working between 6 a.m. and 2 p.m. and from (2) 7 p.m. to 8 p.m. for those working between 2 p.m. and 10 p.m. The records disclose that although there was a one-hour mealtime, petitioner nevertheless credited the workers with eight hours of work for each shift and paid them for the same number of hours. However, since 1953, whenever workers in one shift were required to continue working until the next shift, petitioner instead of crediting them with eight hours of overtime work, has been paying them for six hours only, petitioner that the two hours corresponding to the mealtime periods should not be included in computing compensation. On the other hand, respondent National Textile Workers Union whose members are employed at the NDC, maintained the opposite view and asked the Court of Industrial Relations to order the payment of additional overtime pay corresponding to the mealtime periods. After hearing, Judge Arsenio I. Martinez of the CIR issued an order dated March 19, 1959, holding that mealtime should be counted in the determination of overtime work and accordingly ordered petitioner to pay P101,407.96 by way of overtime compensation. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was dismissed by the CIR en banc on the ground that petitioner failed to furnish the union a copy of its motion. Thereafter, petitioner appealed to this Court, contending, first, that the CIR has no jurisdiction over claims for overtime compensation and, secondary that the CIR did not make "a correct appraisal of the facts, in the light of the evidence" in holding that mealtime periods should be included in overtime work because workers could not leave their places of work and rest completely during those hours. In support of its contention that the CIR lost its jurisdiction over claims for overtime pay upon the enactment of the Industrial Peace Act (Republic Act No. 875), petitioner cites a number of decisions of this Court. On May 23,

1960, however, We ruled in Price Stabilization Corp. v. Court of Industrial Relations, et al., G.R. No. L-13206, that Analyzing these cases, the underlying principle, it will be noted in all of them, though not stated in express terms, is that where the employer-employee relationship is still existing or is sought to be reestablished because of its wrongful severance, (as where the employee seeks reinstatement) the Court of Industrial Relations has jurisdiction over all claims arising out of, or in connection with the employment, such as those related to the Minimum Wage Law and the Eight-Hour Labor Law. After the termination of their relationship and no reinstatement is sought, such claims become mere money claims, and come within the jurisdiction of the regular courts, We are aware that in 2 cases, some statements implying a different view have been made, but we now hold and declare the principle set forth in the next preceding paragraph as the one governing all cases of this nature. This has been the constant doctrine of this Court since May 23, 1960.1 A more recent definition of the jurisdiction of the CIR is found in Campos, et al. v. Manila Railroad Co., et al., G.R. No. L-17905, May 25, 1962, in which We held that, for such jurisdiction to come into play, the following requisites must be complied with: (a) there must exist between the parties an employer-employee relationship or the claimant must seek his reinstatement; and (b) the controversy must relate to a case certified by the President to the CIR as one involving national interest, or must arise either under the Eight-Hour Labor Law, or under the Minimum Wage Law. In default of any of these circumstances, the claim becomes a mere money claim that comes under the jurisdiction of the regular courts. Here, petitioner does not deny the existence of an employer-employee relationship between it and the members of the union. Neither is there any question that the claim is based on the Eight-Hour Labor Law (Com. Act No. 444, as amended). We therefore rule in favor of the jurisdiction of the CIR over the present claim. The other issue raised in the appeal is whether or not, on the basis of the evidence, the mealtime breaks should be considered working time under the following provision of the law; The legal working day for any person employed by another shall be of not more than eight hours daily. When the work is not continuous, the time during which the laborer is not working and can leave his working place and can rest completely shall not be counted. (Sec. 1, Com. Act No. 444, as amended. Emphasis ours.) It will be noted that, under the law, the idle time that an employee may spend for resting and during which he may leave the spot or place of work though not the premises2 of his employer, is not counted as working time only where the work is broken or is not continuous. The determination as to whether work is continuous or not is mainly one of fact which We shall not review as long as the same is supported by evidence. (Sec. 15, Com. Act No. 103, as amended, Philippine Newspaper Guild v. Evening News, Inc., 86 Phil. 303). That is why We brushed aside petitioner's contention in one case that workers who worked under a 6 a.m. to 6 p.m. schedule had enough "free time" and therefore should not be credited with four hours of overtime and held that the finding of the CIR "that claimants herein rendered services to the Company from 6:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. including Sundays and holidays, . . . implies either that they were not allowed to leave the spot of their working place, or that they could not rest completely" (Luzon Stevedoring Co., Inc. v. Luzon Marine Department Union, et al., G.R. No. L-9265, April 29, 1957). Indeed, it has been said that no general rule can be laid down is to what constitutes compensable work, rather the question is one of fact depending upon particular circumstances, to be determined by the controverted in cases. (31 Am. Jurisdiction Sec. 626 pp. 878.)

In this case, the CIR's finding that work in the petitioner company was continuous and did not permit employees and laborers to rest completely is not without basis in evidence and following our earlier rulings, shall not disturb the same. Thus, the CIR found: While it may be correct to say that it is well-high impossible for an employee to work while he is eating, yet under Section 1 of Com. Act No. 444 such a time for eating can be segregated or deducted from his work, if the same is continuous and the employee can leave his working place rest completely. The time cards show that the work was continuous and without interruption. There is also the evidence adduced by the petitioner that the pertinent employees can freely leave their working place nor rest completely. There is furthermore the aspect that during the period covered the computation the work was on a 24-hour basis and previously stated divided into shifts. From these facts, the CIR correctly concluded that work in petitioner company was continuous and therefore the mealtime breaks should be counted as working time for purposes of overtime compensation. Petitioner gives an eight-hour credit to its employees who work a single shift say from 6 a.m. to 2 p.m. Why cannot it credit them sixteen hours should they work in two shifts? There is another reason why this appeal should dismissed and that is that there is no decision by the CIR en banc from which petitioner can appeal to this Court. As already indicated above, the records show that petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the order of March 19, 1959 was dismissed by the CIR en banc because of petitioner's failure to serve a copy of the same on the union. Section 15 of the rules of the CIR, in relation to Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 103, states: The movant shall file the motion (for reconsideration), in six copies within five (5) days from the date on which he receives notice of the order or decision, object of the motion for reconsideration, the same to be verified under oath with respect to the correctness of the allegations of fact, and serving a copy thereof personally or by registered mail, on the adverse party. The latter may file an answer, in six (6) copies, duly verified under oath. (Emphasis ours.) In one case (Bien, et al. v. Castillo, etc., et al., G.R. No. L-7428, May 24, 1955), We sustained the dismissal of a motion for reconsideration filed outside of the period provided in the rules of the CIR. A motion for reconsideration, a copy of which has not been served on the adverse party as required by the rules, stands on the same footing. For "in the very nature of things, a motion for reconsideration against a ruling or decision by one Judge is in effect an appeal to the Court of Industrial Relations, en banc," the purpose being "to substitute the decision or order of a collegiate court for the ruling or decision of any judge." The provision in Commonwealth Act No. 103 authorizing the presentation of a motion for reconsideration of a decision or order of the judge to the CIR, en banc and not direct appeal therefore to this Court, is also in accord with the principal of exhaustion of administrative remedies before resort can be made to this Court. (Broce, et al., v. The Court of Industrial Relations, et al., G.R. No. L-12367, October 29, 1959). Petitioner's motion for reconsideration having been dismissed for its failure to serve a copy of the same on the union, there is no decision of the CIR en banc that petitioner can bring to this Court for review. WHEREFORE, the order of March 19, 1959 and the resolution of April 27, 1959 are hereby affirmed and the appeal is dismissed, without pronouncement as to costs. Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon and Makalintal concur. Bengzon, C.J., took no part.

G.R. No. L-15422

November 30, 1962

NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, petitioner, vs. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and NATIONAL TEXTILE WORKERS UNION, respondents. Government Corporate Counsel Simeon M. Gopengco and Lorenzo R. Mosqueda for petitioner. Eulogio R. Lerum for respondent National Textile Workers Union. Mariano B. Tuason for respondent Court of Industrial Relations. REGALA, J.: This is a case for review from the Court of Industrial Relations. The pertinent facts are the following: At the National Development Co., a government-owned and controlled corporation, there were four shifts of work. One shift was from 8 a.m. to 4 p.m., while the three other shifts were from 6 a.m. to 2 p.m; then from 2 p.m. to 10 p.m. and, finally, from 10 p.m. to 6 a.m. In each shift, there was a onehour mealtime period, to wit: From (1) 11 a.m. to 12 noon for those working between 6 a.m. and 2 p.m. and from (2) 7 p.m. to 8 p.m. for those working between 2 p.m. and 10 p.m. The records disclose that although there was a one-hour mealtime, petitioner nevertheless credited the workers with eight hours of work for each shift and paid them for the same number of hours. However, since 1953, whenever workers in one shift were required to continue working until the next shift, petitioner instead of crediting them with eight hours of overtime work, has been paying them for six hours only, petitioner that the two hours corresponding to the mealtime periods should not be included in computing compensation. On the other hand, respondent National Textile Workers Union whose members are employed at the NDC, maintained the opposite view and asked the Court of Industrial Relations to order the payment of additional overtime pay corresponding to the mealtime periods. After hearing, Judge Arsenio I. Martinez of the CIR issued an order dated March 19, 1959, holding that mealtime should be counted in the determination of overtime work and accordingly ordered petitioner to pay P101,407.96 by way of overtime compensation. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was dismissed by the CIR en banc on the ground that petitioner failed to furnish the union a copy of its motion. Thereafter, petitioner appealed to this Court, contending, first, that the CIR has no jurisdiction over claims for overtime compensation and, secondary that the CIR did not make "a correct appraisal of the facts, in the light of the evidence" in holding that mealtime periods should be included in overtime work because workers could not leave their places of work and rest completely during those hours. In support of its contention that the CIR lost its jurisdiction over claims for overtime pay upon the enactment of the Industrial Peace Act (Republic Act No. 875), petitioner cites a number of decisions of this Court. On May 23, 1960, however, We ruled in Price Stabilization Corp. v. Court of Industrial Relations, et al., G.R. No. L-13206, that Analyzing these cases, the underlying principle, it will be noted in all of them, though not stated in express terms, is that where the employer-employee relationship is still existing or is sought to be reestablished because of its wrongful severance, (as where the employee seeks reinstatement) the Court of Industrial Relations has jurisdiction over all claims arising out of, or in connection with the employment, such as those related to the Minimum Wage Law and the Eight-Hour Labor Law. After the termination of their relationship and no

reinstatement is sought, such claims become mere money claims, and come within the jurisdiction of the regular courts, We are aware that in 2 cases, some statements implying a different view have been made, but we now hold and declare the principle set forth in the next preceding paragraph as the one governing all cases of this nature. This has been the constant doctrine of this Court since May 23, 1960.1 A more recent definition of the jurisdiction of the CIR is found in Campos, et al. v. Manila Railroad Co., et al., G.R. No. L-17905, May 25, 1962, in which We held that, for such jurisdiction to come into play, the following requisites must be complied with: (a) there must exist between the parties an employer-employee relationship or the claimant must seek his reinstatement; and (b) the controversy must relate to a case certified by the President to the CIR as one involving national interest, or must arise either under the Eight-Hour Labor Law, or under the Minimum Wage Law. In default of any of these circumstances, the claim becomes a mere money claim that comes under the jurisdiction of the regular courts. Here, petitioner does not deny the existence of an employeremployee relationship between it and the members of the union. Neither is there any question that the claim is based on the Eight-Hour Labor Law (Com. Act No. 444, as amended). We therefore rule in favor of the jurisdiction of the CIR over the present claim. The other issue raised in the appeal is whether or not, on the basis of the evidence, the mealtime breaks should be considered working time under the following provision of the law; The legal working day for any person employed by another shall be of not more than eight hours daily. When the work is not continuous, the time during which the laborer is not working and can leave his working place and can rest completely shall not be counted. (Sec. 1, Com. Act No. 444, as amended. Emphasis ours.) It will be noted that, under the law, the idle time that an employee may spend for resting and during which he may leave the spot or place of work though not the premises2 of his employer, is not counted as working time only where the work is broken or is not continuous. The determination as to whether work is continuous or not is mainly one of fact which We shall not review as long as the same is supported by evidence. (Sec. 15, Com. Act No. 103, as amended, Philippine Newspaper Guild v. Evening News, Inc., 86 Phil. 303). That is why We brushed aside petitioner's contention in one case that workers who worked under a 6 a.m. to 6 p.m. schedule had enough "free time" and therefore should not be credited with four hours of overtime and held that the finding of the CIR "that claimants herein rendered services to the Company from 6:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. including Sundays and holidays, . . . implies either that they were not allowed to leave the spot of their working place, or that they could not rest completely" (Luzon Stevedoring Co., Inc. v. Luzon Marine Department Union, et al., G.R. No. L-9265, April 29, 1957). Indeed, it has been said that no general rule can be laid down is to what constitutes compensable work, rather the question is one of fact depending upon particular circumstances, to be determined by the controverted in cases. (31 Am. Jurisdiction Sec. 626 pp. 878.)

In this case, the CIR's finding that work in the petitioner company was continuous and did not permit employees and laborers to rest completely is not without basis in evidence and following our earlier rulings, shall not disturb the same. Thus, the CIR found: While it may be correct to say that it is well-high impossible for an employee to work while he is eating, yet under Section 1 of Com. Act No. 444 such a time for eating can be segregated or deducted from his work, if the same is continuous and the employee can leave his working place rest completely. The time cards show that the work was continuous and without interruption. There is also the evidence adduced by the petitioner that the pertinent employees can freely leave their working place nor rest completely. There is furthermore the aspect that during the period covered the computation the work was on a 24-hour basis and previously stated divided into shifts. From these facts, the CIR correctly concluded that work in petitioner company was continuous and therefore the mealtime breaks should be counted as working time for purposes of overtime compensation. Petitioner gives an eight-hour credit to its employees who work a single shift say from 6 a.m. to 2 p.m. Why cannot it credit them sixteen hours should they work in two shifts? There is another reason why this appeal should dismissed and that is that there is no decision by the CIR en banc from which petitioner can appeal to this Court. As already indicated above, the records show that petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the order of March 19, 1959 was dismissed by the CIR en banc because of petitioner's failure to serve a copy of the same on the union. Section 15 of the rules of the CIR, in relation to Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 103, states: The movant shall file the motion (for reconsideration), in six copies within five (5) days from the date on which he receives notice of the order or decision, object of the motion for reconsideration, the same to be verified under oath with respect to the correctness of the allegations of fact, and serving a copy thereof personally or by registered mail, on the adverse party. The latter may file an answer, in six (6) copies, duly verified under oath. (Emphasis ours.) In one case (Bien, et al. v. Castillo, etc., et al., G.R. No. L-7428, May 24, 1955), We sustained the dismissal of a motion for reconsideration filed outside of the period provided in the rules of the CIR. A motion for reconsideration, a copy of which has not been served on the adverse party as required by the rules, stands on the same footing. For "in the very nature of things, a motion for reconsideration against a ruling or decision by one Judge is in effect an appeal to the Court of Industrial Relations, en banc," the purpose being "to substitute the decision or order of a collegiate court for the ruling or decision of any judge." The provision in Commonwealth Act No. 103 authorizing the presentation of a motion for reconsideration of a decision or order of the judge to the CIR, en banc and not direct appeal therefore to this Court, is also in accord with the principal of exhaustion of administrative remedies before resort can be made to this Court. (Broce, et al., v. The Court of Industrial Relations, et al., G.R. No. L-12367, October 29, 1959). Petitioner's motion for reconsideration having been dismissed for its failure to serve a copy of the same on the union, there is no decision of the CIR en banc that petitioner can bring to this Court for review. WHEREFORE, the order of March 19, 1959 and the resolution of April 27, 1959 are hereby affirmed and the appeal is dismissed, without pronouncement as to costs.

Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon and Makalintal concur. Bengzon, C.J., took no part.
G.R. No. L-9265 April 29, 1957

LUZON STEVEDORING CO., INC., petitioner, vs. LUZON MARINE DEPARTMENT UNION and THE HON. MODESTO CASTILLO, THE HON. JOSE S. BAUTISTA, THE HON. V. JIMENEZ YANSON and THE HON. JUAN L. LANTING, Judges of the Court of Industrial Relations,respondents. Perkins, Ponce Enrile and Associates for petitioner. Mariano B. Tuason for respondent Judge of the Court of Industrial Relations. Sioson, Roldan and Vidanes for respondent union. FELIX, J.: This case involves a petition for certiorari filed by the Luzon Stevedoring Co., Inc., to review a resolution dated June 5, 1955, issued by the Court of Industrial Relations. On September 5, 1955, with leave of court, a supplemental petition was filed by said petitioner, and both petitions were given due course by resolution of this Court of September 15, 1955. The facts of the case may be summarized as follows: On June 21, 1948, herein respondent Luzon Marine Department Union filed a petition with the Court of Industrial Relations containing several demands against herein petitioner Luzon Stevedoring Co., Inc., among which were the petition for full recognition of the right of COLLECTIVE bargaining, close shop and check off. However, on July 18, 1948, while the case was still pending with the CIR, said labor union declared a strike which was ruled down as illegal by this Court in G.R. No. L-2660 promulgated on May 30, 1950. In view of said ruling, the Union filed a "Constancia" with the Court of Industrial Relations praying that the remaining unresolved demands of the Union presented in their original petition, be granted. Said unresolved demands are the following: a. Point No. 2. That the work performed in excess of eight (8) hours he paid an overtime pay of 50 per cent the regular rate of pay, and that work performed on Sundays and legal holidays be paid double the regular rate of pay. b. Point No. 7. That all officers, engineers and crew members of motor tugboats who have not received their pay corresponding to the second half of December, 1941, be paid accordingly. c. Point No. 11. That Ciriaco Sarmiento, Chief Mate, M/V Marlin, Rafael Santos, Port Engineer, and Lorenzo de la Cruz, Chief Engineer, M/V Shark who have been suspended without justifiable cause and for union activities, be reinstated with pay from time of suspension. d. Point No. 12. That all officers, engineers and crew members of the motor tugboats "Shark", "Hearing", "Pike" and "Ray", who have been discharged without justifiable cause and for union activities, be reinstate with pay from time of discharge. (p. 65-66, Record).

On the basis of these demands, the case was set for hearing and the parties submitted their respective evidence, both oral and documentary, from June 8,1951, to January 7, 1954. In one of the hearings of the case, the original intervenor in Union de Obreros Estibadores de Filipinas (UOEF), through counsel, moved for the withdraw al of said Union from the case, which motion was granted by the Court. After the parties had submitted exhaustive memoranda, the trial Judge rendered a decision on February 10, 1955, finding that the company gave said employees 3 free meals every day and about 20 minutes rest after each mealtime; that they worked from 6:00 am. to 6:00 p.m. every day including Sundays and holidays, and for work performed in excess of 8 hours, the officers, patrons and radio operators were given overtime pay in the amount of P4 each and P2 each for the rest of the crew up to March, 1947, and after said date, these payments were increased to P5 and P2.50, respectively, until the time of their separation or the strike of July 19, 1948; that when the tugboats underwent repairs, their personnel worked only 8 hours a day excluding Sundays and holidays; that although there was an effort on the part of claimants to show that some had worked beyond 6:00 p.m., the evidence was uncertain and indefinite and that demand was, therefore, denied; that respondent Company, by the nature of its business and as defined by law (Section 18-b of Commonwealth Act as amended) is considered a public service operator by the Public Service Commission in its decision in case No. 3035-C entitled "Philippine Shipowners. Association vs. Luzon Stevedoring Co., Inc., et al."(Exh. 23), and, therefore, exempt from paying additional remuneration or compensation for work performed on Sundays and legal holidays, pursuant to the provisions of section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 444 (Manila Electric Co. vs. Public Utilities Employees Association, 79 Phil., 408. 44 Off. Gaz., 1760); and ruled that: For the above reasons, the aforementioned employees are only entitled to receive overtime pay for work rendered in excess of 8 hours on ordinary days including Sundays and legal holidays. However, the respondent company has proved to the satisfaction of the Court that it has paid its employees for such overtime work as shown above Exhs. 1 to 20-B). It is, therefore, only a matter of computation whether such over time pay by the respondent for overtime services rendered covers the actual overtime work performed by the employees concerned equivalent to 25 per cent which is the minimum rate fixed by law in the absence of other proof to justify the granting of more beyond said minimum rate. Demands Nos. 11 and 12 regarding the reinstatement to the service of the employees named therein were denied and respondent Company was only or to pay the separation pay and overtime work rendered by Ciriaco Sarmiento, Rafael Santos and Lorenzo de la Cruz, after making the pronouncement that their separation or dismissal was not due to union activities but for valid and legal grounds. The Luzon Marine Department Union, through counsel, therefore, filed a motion for reconsideration praying that the decision of February 10, 1955, be modified so as to declare and rule that the members of the Union who had rendered services from 6:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. were entitled to 4 hours' overtime pay; that allotted to the taking of their meals should not be deducted from the 4 hours of overtime rendered by said employees, that the amounts of P3 and P2 set aside for the daily meals of the employees be considered as part of their actual compensation in determining the amount due to said employees separated from the service without just cause be paid their unearned wages and salaries from the date of their separation up to the time the decision in case L-2660 became final; and for such other relief as may be just and equitable in the premises. Luzon Stevedoring Co., Inc. also sought for the reconsideration of the decision only in so far as it interpreted that the period during which a seaman is aboard a tugboat shall be considered as "working time" for the purpose of the Eight-Hour-Labor Law. In pursuance of Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 103, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 254 and further amended by Commonwealth Act No. 559, the motions for reconsideration were passed upon by the Court en banc, and on June 6, 1955, a resolution modifying the decision of February 10, 1955, was issued, in the sense that the 4 hours of overtime work included in the regular daily schedule of work from 6:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. should be paid independently of the so-called "coffee-money", after making a finding that said extra amounts were given to crew members of some tugboats for work performed beyond 6:00 p.m. over a period of some 16 weeks. The Company's motion for reconsideration was denied.

From this resolution, the Luzon Stevedoring Co., Inc. filed the present petition for certiorari and when the Court of Industrial Relations, acting upon said Company's motion for clarification, ruled that the 20 minutes' rest given the claimants after mealtime should not be deducted from the 4 hours of overtime worked performed by said claimants, petitioner filed a supplemental petition for certiorari dated September 5, 1955, and both petitions were given due course by this Court. Respondent Luzon Marine Labor Union filed within the reglementary period a motion to dismiss, which this Court considered as an answer by resolution of October 14, 1955, alleging that the decision, resolution and order of the Court of Industrial Relations sought to be reviewed by petitioner do not present any question of law, the issues in said CIR case No. 147-V being purely factual. The respondent Judges of the Court of Industrial Relations, represented by counsel, timely filed an answer likewise asserting that there could have been no question of law involved or error of law committed by the said Judges in the resolutions appealed from, same having been based on purely findings of fact. In this instance, petitioner does not seek to alter the lower court's finding that the regular daily schedule of work of the members of the herein respondent Union was from 6:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. Petitioner, however, submits several "issues" which We will proceed to discuss one after the other. They are the following: I. Is the definition for "hours of work" as presently applied to dryland laborers equally applicable to seamen? Or should a different criterion be applied by virtue of the fact that the seamen's employment is completely different in nature as well as in condition of work from that of a dryland laborer? Petitioner questions the applicability to seamen of the interpretation given to the phrase "hours of work" for the purpose of the Eight-Hour Labor Law, insinuating that although the seamen concerned stayed in petitioner's tugboats, or merely within its compound, for 12 hours, yet their work was not continuous but interrupted or broken. It has been the consistent stand of petitioner that while it is true that the workers herein were required to report for work at 6:00 a.m. and were made to stay up to 6:00 p.m., their work was not continuous and they could have left the premises of their working place were it not for the inherent physical impossibility peculiar to the nature of their duty which prevented them from leaving the tugboats. It is the Company's defense that a literal interpretation of what constitutes non-working hours would result in absurdity if made to apply to seamen aboard vessels in bays and rivers, and We are called upon to make an interpretation of the law on "nonworking hours" that may comprehend within its embrace not only the non-working hours of laborers employed in land jobs, but also of that particular group of seamen, i.e., those employed in vessels plying in rivers and bays, since admittedly there is no need for such ruling with respect to officers and crew of interisland vessels which have aboard 2 shifts of said men and strictly follow the 8-hour working period. Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 444, known as the Eight-Hour Labor Law, provides: SEC. 1. The legal working day for any person employed by another shall be of not more than eight hours daily. When the work is not continuous, the time during which the laborer is not working AND CAN LEAVE HIS WORKING PLACE and can rest completely, shall not be counted. The requisites contained in this section are further implemented by contemporary regulations issued by administrative authorities (Sections 4 and 5 of Chapter III, Article 1, Code of Rules and Regulations to Implement the Minimum Wage Law). For the purposes of this case, We do not need to set for seamen a criterion different from that applied to laborers on land, for under the provisions of the above quoted section, the only thing to be done is to determine the meaning and scope of the term "working place" used therein. As We understand this term, a laborer need not leave the premises of the factory, shop or boat in order that his period of rest shall not be counted, it being enough that he "cease to work", may rest completely and leave or may leave at his will the spot where he actually stays while working, to go somewhere else, whether within or outside the premises of said factory, shop or boat. If these requisites are complied with, the period of such rest shall not be counted. In the case at bar We do not need to look into the nature of the work of claimant mariners to ascertain the truth of petitioners allegation that this kind of seamen have had enough "free time", a task of which We are relieved,

for although after an ocular inspection of the working premises of the seamen affected in this case the trial Judge declared in his decision that the Company gave the complaining laborers 3 free meals a day with a recess of 20 minutes after each meal, this decision was specifically amended by the Court en banc in its Resolution of June 6, 1955, wherein it held that the claimants herein rendered services to the Company from 6:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. including Sundays and holidays, which implies either that said laborers were not given any recess at all, or that they were not allowed to leave the spot of their working place, or that they could not rest completely. And such resolution being on a question essentially of fact, this Court is now precluded to review the same (Com. Act No. 103, Sec. 15, as amended by Sec. 2 of Com. Act No. 559; Rule 44 of the Rules of Court; Kaisahan Ng Mga Manggagawa sa Kahoy sa Filipinas vs. Gotamco Sawmill, 80 Phil., 521; Operators, Inc. vs. Pelagio, 99 Phil, 893, and others). II. Should a person be penalized for following an opinion issued by the Secretary of Justice in the absence of any judicial pronouncement whatsoever? Petitioner cites Opinion No. 247, Series of 1941 of the Secretary of Justice to a query made by the Secretary of Labor in connection with a similar subject matter as the one involved, in this issue, but that opinion has no bearing on the case at bar because it refers to officers and crew on board interisland boats whose situation is different from that of mariners or sailors working in small tugboats that ply along bays and rivers and have no cabins or places for persons that man the same. Moreover, We can not pass upon this second issue because, aside from the fact that there appears nothing on record that would support petitioner's assertion that in its dealing with its employees, it was guided by an opinion of the Secretary of Justice, the issue involves a mere theoretical question. III. When employees with full knowledge of the law, voluntarily agreed to work for so many hours in consideration of a certain definite wage, and continue working without any protest for a period of almost two years, is said compensation as agreed upon legally deemed and retroactively presumed to constitute full payment for all services rendered, including whatever overtime wages might be due? Especially so if such wages, though received years before the enactment of the Minimum Wage Law, were already set mostly above said minimum wage? IV. The members set of respondent Union having expressly manifested acquiescence over a period of almost two years with reference to the sufficiency of their wages and having made no protest whatsoever with reference to said compensation does the legal and equitable principle of estoppel operate to bar them from making a claim for, or making any recovery of, back overtime compensation? We are going to discuss these two issues jointly. Section 6 of Commonwealth Act No. 444 provides: Sec. 6. Any agreement or contract between the employer and the laborer or employee contrary to the provisions of this Act shall be null and void ab initio. In the case of the Manila Terminal Co. vs. Court of Industrial Relations et al., 91 Phil., 625, 48 Off. Gaz., 2725, this Court held: The principles of estoppel and laches cannot be, invoked against employees or laborers in an action for the recovery of compensation for past overtime work. In the first place, it would be contrary to the spirit of the Eight-Hour Labor Law, under which. as already seen, the laborers cannot waive their right to extra compensation. In the second place, the law principally obligates the employer to observe it, so much so that it punishes the employer for its violation and leaves the employee free and blameless. In the third place, the employee or laborer is in such a disadvantageous position as to be naturally reluctant or even apprehensive in asserting a claim which may cause the employer to devise a way for exercising his right to terminate the employment. Moreover, if the principle of estoppel and laches is to be applied, it would bring about a situation whereby the employee or laborer, can not expressly renounce the right to extra compensation under the Eight-Hour Labor Law, may be compelled to accomplish the same thing by mere silence or lapse of time, thereby frustrating the purpose of the law by indirection.

This is the law on the matter and We certainly adhere, to it in the present case. We deem it, however, convenient to say a few words of explanation so that the principle enunciated herein may not lead to any misconstruction of the law in future cases. There is no question that the right of the laborers to overtime pay cannot be waived. But there may be cases in which the silence of the employee or laborer who lets the time go by for quite a long period without claiming or asserting his right to overtime compensation may favor the inference that he has not worked any such overtime or that his extra work has been duly compensated. But this is not so in the case at bar. The complaining laborers have declared that long before the filing of this case, they had informed Mr. Martinez, a sort of overseer of the petitioner, that they had been working overtime and claiming the corresponding compensation therefor, and there is nothing on record to show that the claimants, at least the majority of them, had received wages in excess of the minimum wage later provided by Republic Act No. 602, approved April 6, 1951. On the contrary, in the decision of the trial Judge, it appears that 34 out of the 58 claimants received salaries less than the minimum wage authorized by said Minimum Wage Law, to wit: Per month P82.50

1. Ambrosio Taada .. but after passing the examinations his wages were increased to P225 per month; 2. Patricio Santiago .. but after passing the examinations his wages were increased to P225 per month; 3. Fidelino Villanueva 4. Pedro Filamor then his wage was reduced to P67.50 per month as cook; 5. Emiliano Irabon . then his wage was reduced to P60 and he stayed for 1 month only; it was increased again to P67.50; 6. Juanito de Luna 7. Benigno Curambao 8. Salvador Mercadillo 9. Nicasio Sta. Lucia 10. Damaso Arciaga 11. Leonardo Patnugot 12. Bienvenido Crisostomo 13. Isidro Malabanan 14. Saturnino Tumbokon 15. Bonifacio Cortez 16. Victorio Carillo 17. Francisco Atilano 18. Gualberto Legaspi 19. Numeriano Juanillo 20. Moises Nicodemus 21. Arsenio Indiano 22. Ricardo Autencio 23. Mateo Arciaga 24. Romulo Magallanes 25. Antonio Belbes

oiler

quartermaster

82.50

oiler quartermaster

82.50 82.50

seaman

82.50

oiler oiler oiler cook seaman oiler oiler cook seaman quartermaster cook cook seaman quartermaster quartermaster seaman oiler seaman quartermaster seaman

82.50 82.50 82.50 82.50 82.50 82.50 82.50 82.50 67.50 82.50 67.50 67.50 67.50 82.50 82.50 82.50 82.50 67.50 82.50 67.50

26. Benjamin Aguirre 27. Emilio Anastasio 28. Baltazar Labrada 29. Emeterio Magallanes 30. Agripino Laurente 31. Roberto Francisco 32. Elias Matrocinio 33. Baltazar Vega 34. Jose Sanchez

quartermaster quartermaster oiler seaman quartermaster oiler seaman seaman oiler

82.50 82.50 82.50 67.50 82.50 82.50 82.50 67.50 82.50

Consequently, for lack of the necessary supporting evidence for the petitioner, the inference referred to above cannot be drawn in this case. V. Granting, without conceding, that any overtime pay in arrears is due, what is the extent and rule of retroactivity with reference to overtime pay in arrears as set forth and established by the precedents and policies of the Court of Industrial Relations in past decisions duly affirmed by the Honorable Supreme Court? VI. Is the grant of a sizeable amount as back overtime wages by the Court of Industrial Relations in consonance with the dictates of public policy and the avowed national and government policy on economic recovery and financial stability? In connection with issue No. 5, petitioner advances the theory that the computation of the overtime payment in arrears should be based from the filing of the petition. In support of this contention, petitioner cites the case of Gotamco Lumber Co. vs- Court of Industrial Relations, 85 Phil., 242; 47 Off. Gaz., 3421. This case is not in point; it merely declares that Commonwealth Act No. 444 imposes upon the employer the duty to secure the permit for overtime work, and the latter may not therefore be heard to plead his own negligence as exemption or defense. The employee in rendering extra services at the request of his employer has a right to assume that the latter has complied with the requirements of the law and therefore has obtained the required permission from the Department of Labor (47 Off, Gaz., 3421). The other decisions of the Court of Industrial Relations cited by petitioner, to wit: Cases 6-V, 7-V and 8-V, Gotamco & Co., Dy Pac & Co., Inc. and D. C. Chuan; Case 110-V, National Labor Union vs. Standard Vacuum Oil Co.; Case No. 76-v, Dee Cho Workers, CLO vs. Dee Cho Lumber Co., and Case No. 70-V, National Labor Union vs. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co., do not seem to have reached this Court and to have been affirmed by Us. It is of common occurrence that a workingman has already rendered services in excess of the statutory period of 8 hours for some time before he can be led or he can muster enough courage to confront his employer with a demand for payment thereof. Fear of possible unemployment sometimes is a very strong factor that gags the man from asserting his right under the law and it may take him months or years before he could be made to present a claim against his employer. To allow the workingman to be compensated only from the date of the filing of the petition with the court would be to penalize him for his acquiescence or silence which We have declared in the case of the Manila Terminal Co. vs. CIR, supra, to be beyond the intent of the law. It is not just and humane that he should be deprived of what is lawfully his under the law, for the true intendent of Commonwealth Act No. 444 is to compensate the worker for services rendered beyond the statutory period and this should be made to retroact to the date when such services were actually performed. Anent issue No. VI, petitioner questions the reasonableness of the law providing for the grant of overtime wages. It is sufficient for Us to state here that courts cannot go outside of the field of interpretation so as to inquire into the motive or motives of Congress in enacting a particular piece of legislation. This question, certainly, is not within Our province to entertain. It may be alleged, however, that the delay in asserting the right to back overtime compensation may cause an unreasonable or irreparable injury to the employer, because the accumulation of such back overtime wages may become so great that their payment might cause the bankruptcy or the closing of the business of the employer who might not be in a position to defray the same. Perhaps this situation may occur, but We shall not

delve on it this time because petitioner does not claim that the payment of the back overtime wages it is ordered to pay to its claimant laborers will cause the injury it foresees or force it to close its business, a situation which it speaks of theoretically and in general. VII. Should not a Court of Industrial Relations' resolution, en banc, which is clearly unsupported in fact and in law, patently arbitrary and capricious and absolutely devoid of sustaining reason, be declared illegal? Especially so, if the trial court's decision which the resolution en banc reversed, is most detailed, exhaustive and comprehensive in its findings as well as most reasonable and legal in its conclusions? This issue was raised by petitioner in its supplemental petition and We have this much to say. The Court of Industrial Relations has been considered "a court of justice" (Metropolitan Transportation Service vs. Paredes,* G.R. No. L-1232, prom. January 12, 1948), although in another case. We said that it is "more an administrative board than a part of the integrated judicial system of the nation" (Ang Tibay vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 69 Phil., 635). But for procedural purposes, the Court of Industrial Relations is a court with well-defined powers vested by the law creating it and with such other powers as generally pertain to a court of justice (Sec. 20, Com. Act No. 103). As such, the general rule that before a judgment becomes final, the Court that rendered the same may alter or modify it so as to conform with the law and the evidence, is applicable to the Court of Industrial Relations (Connel Bros. Co.(Phil.) vs. National Labor Union, G.R. No. L-3631, prom. January 30, 1956). The law also provides that after a judge of the Court of Industrial Relations, duly designated by the Presiding Judge therein to hear a particular case, had rendered a decision, any agrieved party may request for reconsideration thereof and the judges of said Court shall sit together, the concurrence of the 3 of them being necessary for the pronouncement of a decision, order or award (See. 1, Com. Act No. 103). It was in virtue of these rules and upon motions for reconsideration presented by both parties that resolution subject of the present petition was issued, the Court en banc finding it necessary to modify a part of the decision of February 10, 1955, which is clearly within its power to do. On the other hand, the issue under consideration is predicated on a situation which is not obtaining in the case at bar, for, it presupposes that the resolutions en banc of the respondent Court "are clearly unsupported in fact and in law, patently arbitrary and capricious and absolutely devoid of any sustaining reason", which does not seem to be the case as a matter of fact. Wherefore, and on the strength of the foregoing consideration, the resolutions of the Court of Industrial Relations appealed from are hereby affirmed, with costs against petitioner. It is so ordered.

G.R. No. L-12444

February 28, 1963

STATES MARINE CORPORATION and ROYAL LINE, INC., petitioners, vs. CEBU SEAMEN'S ASSOCIATION, INC., respondent. Pedro B. Uy Calderon for petitioners. Gaudioso C. Villagonzalo for respondent. PAREDES, J.: Petitioners States Marine Corporation and Royal Line, Inc. were engaged in the business of marine coastwise transportation, employing therein several steamships of Philippine registry. They had a collective bargaining contract with the respondent Cebu Seamen's Association, Inc. On September 12, 1952, the respondent union filed with the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR), a petition (Case No. 740-V) against the States Marine Corporation, later amended on May 4, 1953, by including as party respondent, the petitioner Royal Line, Inc. The Union alleged that the officers and men working on board the petitioners' vessels have not been paid their sick leave, vacation leave and overtime pay; that the petitioners threatened or coerced them to accept a reduction of salaries, observed by other

shipowners; that after the Minimum Wage Law had taken effect, the petitioners required their employees on board their vessels, to pay the sum of P.40 for every meal, while the masters and officers were not required to pay their meals and that because Captain Carlos Asensi had refused to yield to the general reduction of salaries, the petitioners dismissed said captain who now claims for reinstatement and the payment of back wages from December 25, 1952, at the rate of P540.00, monthly. The petitioners' shipping companies, answering, averred that very much below 30 of the men and officers in their employ were members of the respondent union; that the work on board a vessel is one of comparative ease; that petitioners have suffered financial losses in the operation of their vessels and that there is no law which provides for the payment of sick leave or vacation leave to employees or workers of private firms; that as regards the claim for overtime pay, the petitioners have always observed the provisions of Comm. Act No. 444, (Eight-Hour Labor Law), notwithstanding the fact that it does not apply to those who provide means of transportation; that the shipowners and operators in Cebu were paying the salaries of their officers and men, depending upon the margin of profits they could realize and other factors or circumstances of the business; that in enacting Rep. Act No. 602 (Minimum Wage Law), the Congress had in mind that the amount of P.40 per meal, furnished the employees should be deducted from the daily wages; that Captain Asensi was not dismissed for alleged union activities, but with the expiration of the terms of the contract between said officer and the petitioners, his services were terminated. A decision was rendered on February 21, 1957 in favor of the respondent union. The motion for reconsideration thereof, having been denied, the companies filed the present writ of certiorari, to resolve legal question involved. Always bearing in mind the deep-rooted principle that the factual findings of the Court of Industrial Relations should not be disturbed, if supported by substantial evidence, the different issues are taken up, in the order they are raised in the brief for the petitioners. 1. First assignment of error. The respondent court erred in holding that it had jurisdiction over case No. 740-V, notwithstanding the fact that those who had dispute with the petitioners, were less than thirty (30) in number. The CIR made a finding that at the time of the filing of the petition in case No. 740-V, respondent Union had more than thirty members actually working with the companies, and the court declared itself with jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case. Against this order, the herein petitioners did not file a motion for reconsideration or a petition for certiorari. The finding of fact made by the CIR became final and conclusive, which We are not now authorized to alter or modify. It is axiomatic that once the CIR had acquired jurisdiction over a case, it continues to have that jurisdiction, until the case is terminated (Manila Hotel Emp. Association v. Manila Hotel Company, et al., 40 O.G. No. 6, p. 3027). It was abundantly shown that there were 56 members who signed Exhibits A, A-I to A-8, and that 103 members of the Union are listed in Exhibits B, B-1 to B-35, F, F-1 and K-2 to K-3. So that at the time of the filing of the petition, the respondent union had a total membership of 159, working with the herein petitioners, who were presumed interested in or would be benefited by the outcome of the case (NAMARCO v. CIR, L-17804, Jan. 1963). Annex D, (Order of the CIR, dated March 8, 1954), likewise belies the contention of herein petitioner in this regard. The fact that only 7 claimed for overtime pay and only 7 witnesses testified, does not warrant the conclusion that the employees who had some dispute with the present petitioners were less than 30. The ruling of the CIR, with respect to the question of jurisdiction is, therefore, correct.

2. Second assignment of error. The CIR erred in holding, that inasmuch as in the shipping articles, the herein petitioners have bound themselves to supply the crew with provisions and with such "daily subsistence as shall be mutually agreed upon" between the master and the crew, no deductions for meals could be made by the aforesaid petitioners from their wages or salaries. 3. Third assignment of error. The CIR erred in holding that inasmuch as with regard to meals furnished to crew members of a vessel, section 3(f) of Act No. 602 is the general rule, which section 19 thereof is the exception, the cost of said meals may not be legally deducted from the wages or salaries of the aforesaid crew members by the herein petitioners. 4. Fourth assignment of error. The CIR erred in declaring that the deduction for costs of meals from the wages or salaries after August 4, 1951, is illegal and same should be reimbursed to the employee concerned, in spite of said section 3, par. (f) of Act No. 602. It was shown by substantial evidence, that since the beginning of the operation of the petitioner's business, all the crew of their vessels have been signing "shipping articles" in which are stated opposite their names, the salaries or wages they would receive. All seamen, whether members of the crew or deck officers or engineers, have been furnished free meals by the ship owners or operators. All the shipping articles signed by the master and the crew members, contained, among others, a stipulation, that "in consideration of which services to be duly performed, the said master hereby agrees to pay to the said crew, as wages, the sums against their names respectively expressed in the contract;and to supply them with provisions as provided herein ..." (Sec. 8, par. [b], shipping articles), and during the duration of the contract "the master of the vessel will provide each member of the crew such daily subsistence as shall be mutually agreed daily upon between said master and crew; or, in lieu of such subsistence the crew may reserve the right to demand at the time of execution of these articles that adequate daily rations be furnished each member of the crew." (Sec. 8, par. [e], shipping articles). It is, therefore, apparent that, aside from the payment of the respective salaries or wages, set opposite the names of the crew members, the petitioners bound themselves to supply the crew with ship's provisions, daily subsistence or daily rations, which include food. This was the situation before August 4, 1951, when the Minimum Wage Law became effective. After this date, however, the companies began deducting the cost of meals from the wages or salaries of crew members; but no such deductions were made from the salaries of the deck officers and engineers in all the boats of the petitioners. Under the existing laws, therefore, the query converges on the legality of such deductions. While the petitioners herein contend that the deductions are legal and should not be reimbursed to the respondent union, the latter, however, claims that same are illegal and reimbursement should be made. Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to prove their case not covered by this stipulation of facts.
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We hold that such deductions are not authorized. In the coastwise business of transportation of passengers and freight, the men who compose the complement of a vessel are provided with free meals by the shipowners, operators or agents, because they hold on to their work and duties, regardless of "the stress and strain concomitant of a bad weather, unmindful of the dangers that lurk ahead in the midst of the high seas." Section 3, par. f, of the Minimum Wage Law, (R.A. No. 602), provides as follows

(f) Until and unless investigations by the Secretary of Labor on his initiative or on petition of any interested party result in a different determination of the fair and reasonable value, the furnishing of meals shall be valued at not more than thirty centavos per meal for agricultural employees and not more than forty centavos for any other employees covered by this Act, and the furnishing of housing shall be valued at not more than twenty centavos daily for agricultural workers and not more than forty centavos daily for other employees covered by this Act. Petitioners maintain, in view of the above provisions, that in fixing the minimum wage of employees, Congress took into account the meals furnished by employers and that in fixing the rate of forty centavos per meal, the lawmakers had in mind that the latter amount should be deducted from the daily wage, otherwise, no rate for meals should have been provided. However, section 19, same law, states SEC. 19. Relations to other labor laws and practices. Nothing in this Act shall deprive an employee of the right to seek fair wages, shorter working hours and better working conditions nor justify an employer in violating any other labor law applicable to his employees, in reducing the wage now paid to any of his employees in excess of the minimum wage established under this Act, or in reducing supplements furnished on the date of enactment. At first blush, it would appear that there exists a contradiction between the provisions of section 3(f) and section 19 of Rep. Act No. 602; but from a careful examination of the same, it is evident that Section 3(f) constitutes the general rule, while section 19 is the exception. In other words, if there are no supplements given, within the meaning and contemplation of section 19, but merely facilities, section 3(f) governs. There is no conflict; the two provisions could, as they should be harmonized. And even if there is such a conflict, the respondent CIR should resolve the same in favor of the safety and decent living laborers (Art. 1702, new Civil Code).. It is argued that the food or meals given to the deck officers, marine engineers and unlicensed crew members in question, were mere "facilities" which should be deducted from wages, and not "supplements" which, according to said section 19, should not be deducted from such wages, because it is provided therein: "Nothing in this Act shall deprive an employee of the right to such fair wage ... or in reducing supplements furnished on the date of enactment." In the case of Atok-Big Wedge Assn. v. Atok-Big Wedge Co., L-7349, July 19, 1955; 51 O.G. 3432, the two terms are defined as follows "Supplements", therefore, constitute extra remuneration or special privileges or benefits given to or received by the laborers over and above their ordinary earnings or wages. "Facilities", on the other hand, are items of expense necessary for the laborer's and his family's existence and subsistence so that by express provision of law (Sec. 2[g]), they form part of the wage and when furnished by the employer are deductible therefrom, since if they are not so furnished, the laborer would spend and pay for them just the same. In short, the benefit or privilege given to the employee which constitutes an extra remuneration above and over his basic or ordinary earning or wage, is supplement; and when said benefit or privilege is part of the laborers' basic wages, it is a facility. The criterion is not so much with the kind of the benefit or item (food, lodging, bonus or sick leave) given, but its purpose. Considering, therefore, as definitely found by the respondent court that the meals were freely given to crew members prior to August 4, 1951, while they were on the high seas "not as part of their wages but as a necessary matter in the maintenance of the health and efficiency of the crew personnel during the

voyage", the deductions therein made for the meals given after August 4, 1951, should be returned to them, and the operator of the coastwise vessels affected should continue giving the same benefit.. In the case of Cebu Autobus Company v. United Cebu Autobus Employees Assn., L-9742, Oct. 27, 1955, the company used to pay to its drivers and conductors, who were assigned outside of the City limits, aside from their regular salary, a certain percentage of their daily wage, as allowance for food. Upon the effectivity of the Minimum Wage Law, however, that privilege was stopped by the company. The order CIR to the company to continue granting this privilege, was upheld by this Court. The shipping companies argue that the furnishing of meals to the crew before the effectivity of Rep. Act No. 602, is of no moment, because such circumstance was already taken into consideration by Congress, when it stated that "wage" includes the fair and reasonable value of boards customarily furnished by the employer to the employees. If We are to follow the theory of the herein petitioners, then a crew member, who used to receive a monthly wage of P100.00, before August 4, 1951, with no deduction for meals, after said date, would receive only P86.00 monthly (after deducting the cost of his meals at P.40 per meal), which would be very much less than the P122.00 monthly minimum wage, fixed in accordance with the Minimum Wage Law. Instead of benefiting him, the law will adversely affect said crew member. Such interpretation does not conform with the avowed intention of Congress in enacting the said law. One should not overlook a fact fully established, that only unlicensed crew members were made to pay for their meals or food, while the deck officers and marine engineers receiving higher pay and provided with better victuals, were not. This pictures in no uncertain terms, a great and unjust discrimination obtaining in the present case (Pambujan Sur United Mine Workers v. CIR, et al., L7177, May 31, 1955). Fifth, Sixth and Seventh assignments of error. The CIR erred in holding that Severino Pepito, a boatsman, had rendered overtime work, notwithstanding the provisions of section 1, of C.A. No. 444; in basing its finding ofthe alleged overtime, on the uncorroborated testimony of said Severino Pepito; and in ordering the herein petitioners to pay him. Severino Pepito was found by the CIR to have worked overtime and had not been paid for such services. Severino Pepito categorically stated that he worked during the late hours of the evening and during the early hours of the day when the boat docks and unloads. Aside from the above, he did other jobs such as removing rusts and cleaning the vessel, which overtime work totalled to 6 hours a day, and of which he has not been paid as yet. This statement was not rebutted by the petitioners. Nobody working with him on the same boat "M/V Adriana" contrawise. The testimonies of boatswains of other vessels(M/V Iruna and M/V Princesa), are incompetent and unreliable. And considering the established fact that the work of Severino Pepito was continuous, and during the time he was not working, he could not leave and could not completely rest, because of the place and nature of his work, the provisions of sec. 1, of Comm. Act No. 444, which states "When the work is not continuous, the time during which the laborer is not working and can leave his working place and can rest completely shall not be counted", find no application in his case. 8. Eighth assignment of error. The CIR erred in ordering petitioners to reinstate Capt. Carlos Asensi to his former position, considering the fact that said officer had been employed since January 9, 1953, as captain of a vessel belonging to another shipping firm in the City of Cebu. The CIR held Finding that the claims of Captain Carlos Asensi for back salaries from the time of his alleged lay-off on March 20, 1952, is not supported by the evidence on record, the same is hereby dismissed. Considering, however, that Captain Asensi had been laid-off for a long time and

that his failure to report for work is not sufficient cause for his absolute dismissal, respondents are hereby ordered to reinstate him to his former job without back salary but under the same terms and conditions of employment existing prior to his lay-off, without loss of seniority and other benefits already acquired by him prior to March 20, 1952. This Court is empowered to reduce the punishment meted out to an erring employee (Standard Vacuum Oil Co., Inc. v. Katipunan Labor Union, G.R. No. L-9666, Jan. 30, 1957). This step taken is in consonance with section 12 of Comm. Act 103, as amended." (p. 16, Decision, Annex 'G'). The ruling is in conformity with the evidence, law and equity. Ninth and Tenth assignments of error. The CIR erred in denying a duly verified motion for new trial, and in overruling petitioner's motion for reconsideration. The motion for new trial, supported by an affidavit, states that the movants have a good and valid defense and the same is based on three orders of the WAS (Wage Administration Service), dated November 6, 1956. It is alleged that they would inevitably affect the defense of the petitioners. The motion for new trial is without merit. Having the said wage Orders in their possession, while the case was pending decision, it was not explained why the proper move was not taken to introduce them before the decision was promulgated. The said wage orders, dealing as they do, with theevaluation of meals and facilities, are irrelevant to the present issue, it having been found and held that the meals or food in question are not facilities but supplements. The original petition in the CIR having been filed on Sept. 12, 1952, the WAS could have intervened in the manner provided by law to express its views on the matter. At any rate, the admission of the three wage orders have not altered the decision reached in this case. IN VIEW HEREOF, the petition is dismissed, with costs against the petitioners.

G.R. No. 78210 February 28, 1989 TEOFILO ARICA, DANILO BERNABE, MELQUIADES DOHINO, ABONDIO OMERTA, GIL TANGIHAN, SAMUEL LABAJO, NESTOR NORBE, RODOLFO CONCEPCION, RICARDO RICHA, RODOLFO NENO, ALBERTO BALATRO, BENJAMIN JUMAMOY, FERMIN DAAROL, JOVENAL ENRIQUEZ, OSCAR BASAL, RAMON ACENA, JAIME BUGTAY, and 561 OTHERS, HEREIN REPRESENTED BY KORONADO B. APUZEN, petitioners vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, HONORABLE FRANKLIN DRILON, HONORABLE CONRADO B. MAGLAYA, HONORABLE ROSARIO B. ENCARNACION, and STANDARD (PHILIPPINES) FRUIT CORPORATION,respondents. Koronado B. Apuzen and Jose C. Espinas for petitioners. The Solicitor General for public respondent. Dominguez & Paderna Law Offices Co. for private respondent.

PARAS, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the National Labor Relations Commission dated December 12, 1986 in NLRC Case No. 2327 MC-XI-84 entitled Teofilo Arica et al. vs. Standard (Phil.) Fruits Corporation (STANFILCO) which affirmed the decision of Labor Arbiter Pedro C. Ramos, NLRC, Special Task Force, Regional Arbitration Branch No. XI, Davao City dismissing the claim of petitioners. This case stemmed from a complaint filed on April 9, 1984 against private respondent Stanfilco for assembly time, moral damages and attorney's fees, with the aforementioned Regional Arbitration Branch No. XI, Davao City. After the submission by the parties of their respective position papers (Annex "C", pp. 30-40; Annex "D", Rollo, pp. 41-50), Labor Arbiter Pedro C. Ramos rendered a decision dated October 9, 1985 (Annex 'E', Rollo, pp. 51-58) in favor of private respondent STANFILCO, holding that: Given these facts and circumstances, we cannot but agree with respondent that the pronouncement in that earlier case, i.e. the thirty-minute assembly time long practiced cannot be considered waiting time or work time and, therefore, not compensable, has become the law of the case which can no longer be disturbed without doing violence to the time- honored principle of res-judicata. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the instant complaint should therefore be, as it is hereby, DISMISSED. SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 58) On December 12, 1986, after considering the appeal memorandum of complainant and the opposition of respondents, the First Division of public respondent NLRC composed of Acting Presiding Commissioner Franklin Drilon, Commissioner Conrado Maglaya, Commissioner Rosario D. Encarnacion as Members, promulgated its Resolution, upholding the Labor Arbiters' decision. The Resolution's dispositive portion reads: 'Surely, the customary functions referred to in the above- quoted provision of the agreement includes the long-standing practice and institutionalized noncompensable assembly time. This, in effect, estopped complainants from pursuing this case. The Commission cannot ignore these hard facts, and we are constrained to uphold the dismissal and closure of the case. WHEREFORE, let the appeal be, as it is hereby dismissed, for lack of merit. SO ORDERED. (Annex "H", Rollo, pp. 86-89). On January 15, 1987, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was opposed by private respondent (Annex "I", Rollo, pp. 90-91; Annex J Rollo, pp. 92-96). Public respondent NLRC, on January 30, 1987, issued a resolution denying for lack of merit petitioners' motion for reconsideration (Annex "K", Rollo, p. 97). Hence this petition for review on certiorari filed on May 7, 1987.

The Court in the resolution of May 4, 1988 gave due course to this petition. Petitioners assign the following issues: 1) Whether or not the 30-minute activity of the petitioners before the scheduled working time is compensable under the Labor Code. 2) Whether or not res judicata applies when the facts obtaining in the prior case and in the case at bar are significantly different from each other in that there is merit in the case at bar. 3) Whether or not there is finality in the decision of Secretary Ople in view of the compromise agreement novating it and the withdrawal of the appeal. 4) Whether or not estoppel and laches lie in decisions for the enforcement of labor standards (Rollo, p. 10). Petitioners contend that the preliminary activities as workers of respondents STANFILCO in the assembly area is compensable as working time (from 5:30 to 6:00 o'clock in the morning) since these preliminary activities are necessarily and primarily for private respondent's benefit. These preliminary activities of the workers are as follows: (a) First there is the roll call. This is followed by getting their individual work assignments from the foreman. (b) Thereafter, they are individually required to accomplish the Laborer's Daily Accomplishment Report during which they are often made to explain about their reported accomplishment the following day. (c) Then they go to the stockroom to get the working materials, tools and equipment. (d) Lastly, they travel to the field bringing with them their tools, equipment and materials. All these activities take 30 minutes to accomplish (Rollo, Petition, p. 11). Contrary to this contention, respondent avers that the instant complaint is not new, the very same claim having been brought against herein respondent by the same group of rank and file employees in the case of Associated Labor Union and Standard Fruit Corporation, NLRC Case No. 26-LS-XI-76 which was filed way back April 27, 1976 when ALU was the bargaining agent of respondent's rank and file workers. The said case involved a claim for "waiting time", as the complainants purportedly were required to assemble at a designated area at least 30 minutes prior to the start of their scheduled working hours "to ascertain the work force available for the day by means of a roll call, for the purpose of assignment or reassignment of employees to such areas in the plantation where they are most needed." (Rollo, pp. 64- 65) Noteworthy is the decision of the Minister of Labor, on May 12, 1978 in the aforecited case (Associated Labor Union vs. Standard (Phil.) Fruit Corporation, NLRC Case No. 26-LS-XI-76 where significant findings of facts and conclusions had already been made on the matter.

The Minister of Labor held: The thirty (30)-minute assembly time long practiced and institutionalized by mutual consent of the parties under Article IV, Section 3, of the Collective Bargaining Agreement cannot be considered as waiting time within the purview of Section 5, Rule I, Book III of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code. ... Furthermore, the thirty (30)-minute assembly is a deeply- rooted, routinary practice of the employees, and the proceedings attendant thereto are not infected with complexities as to deprive the workers the time to attend to other personal pursuits. They are not new employees as to require the company to deliver long briefings regarding their respective work assignments. Their houses are situated right on the area where the farm are located, such that after the roll call, which does not necessarily require the personal presence, they can go back to their houses to attend to some chores. In short, they are not subject to the absolute control of the company during this period, otherwise, their failure to report in the assembly time would justify the company to impose disciplinary measures. The CBA does not contain any provision to this effect; the record is also bare of any proof on this point. This, therefore, demonstrates the indubitable fact that the thirty (30)-minute assembly time was not primarily intended for the interests of the employer, but ultimately for the employees to indicate their availability or non-availability for work during every working day. (Annex "E", Rollo, p. 57). Accordingly, the issues are reduced to the sole question as to whether public respondent National Labor Relations Commission committed a grave abuse of discretion in its resolution of December 17, 1986. The facts on which this decision was predicated continue to be the facts of the case in this questioned resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission. It is clear that herein petitioners are merely reiterating the very same claim which they filed through the ALU and which records show had already long been considered terminated and closed by this Court in G.R. No. L-48510. Therefore, the NLRC can not be faulted for ruling that petitioners' claim is already barred by res-judicata. Be that as it may, petitioners' claim that there was a change in the factual scenario which are "substantial changes in the facts" makes respondent firm now liable for the same claim they earlier filed against respondent which was dismissed. It is thus axiomatic that the non-compensability of the claim having been earlier established, constitute the controlling legal rule or decision between the parties and remains to be the law of the case making this petition without merit. As aptly observed by the Solicitor General that this petition is "clearly violative of the familiar principle of res judicata.There will be no end to this controversy if the light of the Minister of Labor's decision dated May 12, 1979 that had long acquired the character of finality and which already resolved that petitioners' thirty (30)-minute assembly time is not compensable, the same issue can be re-litigated again." (Rollo, p. 183) This Court has held: In this connection account should be taken of the cognate principle that res judicata operates to bar not only the relitigation in a subsequent action of the issues squarely raised, passed upon and adjudicated in the first suit, but also the ventilation

in said subsequent suit of any other issue which could have been raised in the first but was not. The law provides that 'the judgment or order is, with respect to the matter directly adjudged or as to any other matter that could have been raised in relation thereto, conclusive between the parties and their successors in interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action .. litigating for the same thing and in the same capacity.' So, even if new causes of action are asserted in the second action (e.g. fraud, deceit, undue machinations in connection with their execution of the convenio de transaccion), this would not preclude the operation of the doctrine of res judicata. Those issues are also barred, even if not passed upon in the first. They could have been, but were not, there raised. (Vda. de Buncio v. Estate of the late Anita de Leon, 156 SCRA 352 [1987]). Moreover, as a rule, the findings of facts of quasi-judicial agencies which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters are accorded not only respect but at times even finality if such findings are supported by substantial evidence (Special Events & Central Shipping Office Workers Union v. San Miguel Corporation, 122 SCRA 557 [1983]; Dangan v. NLRC, 127 SCRA 706 [1984]; Phil. Labor Alliance Council v. Bureau of Labor Relations, 75 SCRA 162 [1977]; Mamerto v. Inciong, 118 SCRA 265 (1982]; National Federation of Labor Union (NAFLU) v. Ople, 143 SCRA 124 [1986]; Edi-Staff Builders International, Inc. v. Leogardo, Jr., 152 SCRA 453 [1987]; Asiaworld Publishing House, Inc. v. Ople, 152 SCRA 219 [1987]). The records show that the Labor Arbiters' decision dated October 9, 1985 (Annex "E", Petition) pointed out in detail the basis of his findings and conclusions, and no cogent reason can be found to disturb these findings nor of those of the National Labor Relations Commission which affirmed the same. PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit and the decision of the National Labor Relations Commission is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.