Proposed JCS Directive to CINCPAC regarding Defense of Formosa http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/FRUS/FRUS-idx? type=turn&id=FRUS.FRUS195254v14p1&entity=FRUS.FRUS195254 v14p1.p0190&q1=chinese %20nationalist&q2=okinawa&q3=formosa No. 85 611.

93/3-2553 Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Allison) to the Secretary of State 1 TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, March 25, 1953. Subject: Proposed JCS Directive to CINCPAC regarding Defense of Formosa 2 There is attached a draft directive to CINCPAC (Admiral Radford) from the JCS which authorizes basing patrol and reconnaissance aircraft on Formosa (they are now operating from Okinawa and a tender in the Pescadores); establishing necessary facilities on Formosa to permit the prompt basing of jet combat aircraft in the event of an emergency (no combat aircraft are to be stationed there without prior JCS authorization or an emergency which in the judgment of CINCPAC is so great as to not permit of any delay); stationing U.S. personnel at such U.S. installations to guard supplies and otherwise to maintain the internal security of the installations. The directive also provides that CINCPAC will coordinate with the Chinese Nationalist Government plans for the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores against invasion or attack, such defense to be by CINCPAC forces in coordination with Chinese Nationalist forces. It also provides that CINCPAC will develop and coordinate with the Chinese Nationalist Government plans for the offensive participation of Chinese Nationalist forces. Combined training exercises of U.S. and Chinese Nationalist forces are also authorized. CINCPAC is also to discuss with the Chinese, command relationships with the view to obtaining at least tacit agreement to U.S. command of combined forces in an emergency. In the event of air I Sent through Deputy Under Secretary Matthews, who initialed it.

2 The draft directive described here was not attached to the source text; a copy is in PPS files, lot 64 D 563, "China 1952-1953". Except for minor textual changes for purposes of transmission and one substantive change, it was identical to JCS telegram 935782, Document 90. The only substantive change was the addition of the second sentence in paragraph 3.a.(6). Copies of the draft directive were given to Department of State representatives at a State-JCS meeting on Mar. 6, according to a memorandum of discussion of the meeting. (State-JCS Meetings, lot 61 D 417) 162

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------or sea attack against U.S. forces they will take immediate and aggressive self-defense measures, but retaliatory action against targets on the Chinese mainland will be taken only with the approval of the JCS. U.S. forces will not participate in the defense of other Chinese Nationalist held islands unless Formosa or the Pescadores are also attacked. From a military point of view, this directive is a logical and essential step to assure the security of Formosa and the Pescadores. The directive is well drawn up so as to minimize the cost to the U.S. and the number of U.S. personnel required for the implementation of these measures. Coordinated planning for the offensive use of Chinese Nationalist forces is also logical if the Chinese Nationalist potential for action against the Chinese Mainland is to be of maximum effectiveness in the event that a situation arises in which the U.S. determines it should be utilized.

It would also be useful to the U.S. to know what offensive operations the Chinese Nationalists are proposing or carrying out and to be in a position to exercise influence over such operations. However, there are obvious problems in U.S. association, if only in planning with Chinese Nationalist operations against the mainland that may not fit in with U.S. planning. We believe that this portion of the directive should be clarified to whatever extent may be possible and practicable, and plan to discuss this with the JCS. Implementation of the Directive must of course be preceded by discussions with the Chinese Nationalists and their agreement to the measures necessary for the basing of patrol and reconnaissance aircraft on Formosa and the stand-by facilities for combat aircraft. The timing of both the discussions with the Chinese Nationalist Government and of the implementation of various measures authorized by the directive also need consideration and will be discussed with the JSC. Recommendation: Subject to the foregoing, it is recommended that you approve in principle this draft directive to CINCPAC. 163

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------Revision of CINCPAC Orders General Bradley: We wanted to discuss the question of changing CINCPAC's orders about Formosa. As of now, he does base a few reconnaissance planes in the Pescadores, but none on Formosa. Now that his mission has become a little more touchy than it was before, we thought that some extra steps were called for. Admiral Fechteler: We propose under these draft instructions 2 to permit him to base patrol and reconnaissance aircraft on Formosa and to undertake development of those installations which would permit him to base other planes on Formosa in case of emergency. We propose to give him authority to install communications against an emergency. Further, the draft directive would give him authority to conduct reconnaissance over all Chinese coastal areas. As of now, he is limited on the south to Hong Kong. It calls for authority for him to talk to Chinese Nationalists on plans for the

defense of Formosa and to participate in combined training as necessary. It would give him authority in event of an attack to base other aircraft on Formosa and to augment other American personnel, with the exception of ground forces. It also gives him authority to pre-stock materials and equipment which might be necessary in an emergency. General Vandenberg: I would like to raise the general question as to whether we are completely clear on what we may be getting into. As I understand it, we are getting ready, unilaterally, since this is a purely U.S. undertaking, to protect Formosa. If the Chinese Communists should mount an air attack on Formosa, we would counter it. This would undoubtedly involve attacks on the mainland. Given the Sino-Russian agreement, 3 there would be every possibility that Russia would assist the Chinese Communists. In that case, we would be really getting into a war with the U.S.S.R. and China all by ourselves. It seems to me that if that is the policy, everybody involved should clearly recognize the implications. General Bradley: When we acted on this paper, we acted on the basis that Radford already had instructions to defend Formosa, but that he had no collateral instructions as to how to carry out this defense. General Vandenberg: I am not disagreeing with the directive. I agree with the paper completely. The only thing is that I think everybody should be clear as to what the possible implications are. As I see it, we have to realize that Chiang Kai-shek is a strong-headed sort of person. He is going to have planes with which he can, if he wants to, attack the Communist mainland. If he does, and if there are Communist attacks in retaliation, I think we should fully understand the kind of flypaper that we are stuck on. 3 The Sino-Soviet Treaty of Feb. 14, 1950; see footnote f, Document 50. 165 General Vandenberg: I guess my real question is as to whether the Secretary of State has been fully advised from the purely military point of view what the ramifications and implications of our

position are with respect to Formosa. It seems to me that the change of mission of the 7th Fleet was addressed primarily to a cold war effect. I am not questioning the decision in any way, but I do think that the Secretary of State should be fully advised on the military implications of the decision. Mr. Nitze: There really are a series of questions. The first is, are we prepared to defend Formosa against an unprovoked Communist attack? This question we really settled two years ago when the 7th Fleet was given its original mission. The second question is, wheth4 The quotation is inaccurate; section 4.b of the draft directive was identical to section 4.b of JCS telegram 935782, Document 90. 166 er we are prepared to defend Formosa against Chinese Communist attack if the attack is in response to Chinese Nationalist action. This is the question on which I don't think as yet we have a firm decision. The third question is the degree to which we should coordinate planning with the Chinese Nationalists. General Vandenberg: I wouldn't worry about the third question if the implications of the second question were clearly evident in the minds of the Secretary of State and the President. Admiral Fechteler: I think we do have some control over Chiang Kai-shek by reason of the paucity of his capabilities. General Bandenberg: He is getting fighters now that he can use if he wants to. General Bradley: He could bomb the Chinese coast and that might well bring Communist retaliation. I am inclined to share Collins' worry about joint offensive planning. Mr. Nitze: Would Collins' point be met if we omitted reference to 4, b in paragraph 3? General Collins: I think that would take care of it. Radford obviously has to coordinate with the Chinese Nationalists to carry out a defensive mission. Mr. Allison: There is, however, some language I believe in 48/5 5 which calls for the U.S. itself to prepare plans for possible use of

the Chinese Nationalist forces. Mr. Gleason: There is a new Formosa paper 6 now being worked on in the Planning Board 7 which, as I remember, repeats some such language. 8 5 For text of NSC 48/5, "United States Objectives, Policies and Courses of Action in Asia", May 17, 1951, see Foreign Relations, 1951, vol. VI, Part 1, p. 33. 6 Reference is to NSC 146, "United States Objectives and Courses of Action With Respect to Formosa and the National Government of China," Mar. 27, 1953, a paper prepared by the NSC Planning Board. (S/S-NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 146 Series) The statement of policy in NSC 146/2, Document 150, is a revised version of NSC 146. 7 The NSC Planning Board, created in March 1953, had assumed the functions formerly performed by the NSC Senior Staff. The Planning Board consisted of the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, chairman, and representatives from the Departments of State, Treasury, and Defense; the Office of Defense Mobilization; and the Office of the Special Assistant to the President on Disarmament. 8 Paragraph 13 of NSC 146 reads as follows: "Enter into a program

of coordinated military planning with the Chinese National Government designed to achieve maximum cooperation from the Nationalists in furtherance of over-all U.S. military strategy in the Far East." A memorandum of Apr. 6 by Lay to the National Security Council, incorporated into the copy of NSC 146 cited above, requested that the paragraph be revised, as agreed by the Planning Board, by deleting the words "in the Far East" and adding the following sentence: "In undertaking such a program of coordinated military planning, secure a commitment that Chinese National Forces will not engage in offensive operations considered by the United States to be inimical to the best interest of the United States." General Bradley: I should think we could present them in connection with the April 8 meeting, 9 or the Chiefs could comment on the new Formosa paper. 9 NSC 146 was scheduled for discussion at the Apr. 8 meeting of the National Security Council; see the memorandum of discussion, Document 93. 168

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------Chinese Nationalist Government as reflected in the attached memorandum. As you know, Chiang Kai-shek will be very unhappy

if an armistice is achieved in Korea: he wants to broaden the conflict, not end it. He may well be tempted to undertake some adventures with his F-84's either with or without a deliberate intention of involving the US in a broader war with Communist China. I think we should study possible ways to prevent this happening. 2 2 Secretary Dulles replied in a personally drafted memorandum of Apr. 4, filed with the Matthews and Stelle memoranda, which reads: "I have your memorandum of March 31 with reference to the worries of the JCS arising from the delivery of US F-84 Aircraft to Formosa. I share these worries. I understand we are attempting to get an agreement with Chiang Kaishek that he will not use the new equipment we give him against the China mainland without our prior consent. I consider this of the utmost importance, and I believe that the Defense Department should suspend any deliveries of aircraft capable of attacking the mainland until we get the political agreement we want. "General Smith mentioned this same topic to me and I expressed to him the same views."

http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/FRUS/FRUS-idx? type=turn&id=FRUS.FRUS195254v14p1&entity=FRUS.FRUS195254 v14p1.p0918&q1=chinese %20nationalist&q2=okinawa&q3=formosa Ambassador Koo said that the reference in the U.S. draft note 3

to "disposition of forces" was giving some difficulty to the Chinese Government. Joint control over "disposition of forces" between Formosa and the off-shore islands had not been proposed in the earlier stages of the negotiations. Mr. Robertson said that we were concerned with the disposition of forces which might be involved in offensive actions over which we had no control. If the lack of provision for any Chinese control over U.S. forces on Okinawa created a problem for the Chinese Government, we would be willing to eliminate all reference to the U.S. islands of the West Pacific in the Treaty. We thought that reciprocity was established; it was a mutual defense pact and mutual meant reciprocal. Free China benefited from all the efforts of the U.S. to defend the Free World. Formosa was involved in unresolved civil strife and was in imminent and constant danger of attack. The situation was different from that in other countries covered by defense pacts. The arrangements needed to be somewhat different. Ambassador Koo said he had received a telegram from the Generalissimo on the night of November 11. Apparently the Generalissimo did not object to a U.S. veto on the use of Chinese Nationalist armed forces, but he did emphasize that it was essential to use the same language in reference to U.S. armed forces in the treaty area. This was necessary in order to satisfy the Chinese people that the sovereign equality of their Government had been maintained. Mr. Robertson said that we could not use U.S. forces which would be stationed on Formosa without Chinese consent any more than the Chinese could use their forces without U.S. concurrence. There was reciprocity. In order to make the treaty more responsive to the needs of the situation and the wishes of the Chinese Government, the U.S. was volunteering to make a change in Article V, substituting "an armed attack in the West Pacific area directed against the territories of either of the parties" for "armed attack . . . on the territories.... )' 4This would broaden the provisions of the article by making it clear that a Communist attack on territory other than Formosa was covered if such an attack appeared to be eventually aimed at Formosa and the Pescadores. The chief difficulty was how to make some provision for the off-shore islands. This language represents an attempt to give some coverage

to the off-shore islands and to keep the Communists guessing as to what U.S. intentions are as to the off-shore islands. The Defense Department appeared to be willing to accept these broadened provi3 The draft note under reference has not been found in Department of State files. 4 Ellipses in the source text. 890 sions. But its reaction to the latest Chinese proposal would be another matter. Ambassador Koo said the Generalissimo had no intention of vetoing the use of U.S. forces on Okinawa and Guam. He merely wanted the reciprocal provisions for appearance's sake in order to forestall the wave of discontent, despair and criticism which would come from a unilateral restriction against Nationalist China. Ambassador Koo thought at the very least the reference in the U.S. draft note to "military dispositions" could be eliminated. Mr. Robertson pointed out that we would be involved with the Chinese in the defense of the treaty area. The U.S. would have major responsibilities. If nearly all Chinese troops could be moved to say, Quemoy, leaving few Chinese forces to defend Formosa, the U.S. in principle might be compelled to bring in U.S. infantry to defend Formosa. Such a necessity of course should never arise, and even though the possibility was remote, it seemed appropriate for the treaty to recognize the vital interest of the U.S. in the disposition of Chinese forces in an area for the defense of which we have joint responsibilities. The Treaty should realistically cover all contingencies so far as possible, even if they were remote. The Chinese Nationalist military strength was small compared to that of the Chinese Communists. Both the U.S. and Chinese Governments should work for the best disposition of available forces to meet the threat. Ambassador Koo thought the off-shore islands commanded the invasion routes from the Mainland to Formosa and greatly decreased the danger of attack so long as they were held by the forces of his Government. Mr. Robertson questioned this, pointing out that an invasion attempt could bypass the off-shore islands,

and that the off-shore islands could not eliminate the threat of air bombing of Formosa. Ambassador Koo said that his government desired reciprocity and an elimination of formal U.S. control over Chinese Government military actions, mainly for political reasons. In practice the U.S. had ample controls through the presence of the MAAG Mission on Formosa and control over the supply of practically all the essentials of war. There were many practical ways in which the U.S. could restrain the use of Chinese forces. Since any Chinese Mainland operation without U.S. support in practice was out of the question, it was unnecessary to invoke diplomatic language for this purpose. Mr. Robertson remarked that the matter of military dispositions was fundamental. Provocative actions could involve the U.S. in war. 891 http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/FRUS/FRUS-idx? type=turn&id=FRUS.FRUS1950v06&entity=FRUS.FRUS1950v06.p03 87&q1=struble&q2=chiang Admiral Struble indicated need and desire return Formosa near future in order firm up liaison details. Generalissimo recalled that he took over Formosa as Allied Commander of Chinese theater pending peace -treaty while General MacArthur took over Japan and other areas ,as SCAP; now Chinese government was here, but he hoped despite this fact Struble would not feel he coming to foreign territory in visiting Formosa. He stated he has special regard for and real friendship with each US naval commander in Far East; admired Navy particularly because they always willing come to help of friends in need. Call of 40 minutes on Chen Cheng passed in exchange of pleasantries only. 'Vice Adm. Arthur D. Struble was Commander of the United States Seventh Fleet. 'Adm. Charles M. Cooke, U.S. Navy (ret.), former Commander of the Seventh

Fleet, was in Formosa in a private capacity; see footnote 4 to telegram 181, August 3, from Taipei, p3. 4'13. http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/FRUS/FRUS-idx? type=turn&id=FRUS.FRUS1951v07p2&entity=FRUS.FRUS1951v07p 2.p0169&q1=struble&q2=chiang b. Gimo appeared genuinely perplexed over recent change command of 7th Fleet.2 Seemed to feel such change either forerunner or follow up of change in US official policy toward Taiwan which might not be best interests of ChiNats. Comment: Practically impossible for most Chinese to comprehend western democratic system of normal rotation and relief, especially of high ranking officers. Characteristic of Chinese never relieve a winner. c. Gimo inquired as to job Maj Gen Chase3 will have on arrival Taiwan. Also inquired as to relationship of Chase to me as Senior Military Attache and to Chinese military. Comment: Though he did not so state, Gimo gave appearance of thinking Gen Chase might be colming here to assume position similar that of late Gen Stilwell 4 as Gimos Chief of Staff with demand and strong backing of highest level US Govt for Chase take actual control China's military. 2Vice Adm. Harold M. Martin had replaced Vice Admiral Struble as Commander, Seventh Fleet, on March 28. 3 Maj. Gen. William C. Chase had been appointed Chief of the newly-established Military Assistance Advisory Group, Formosa. 4Lt. Gen. Joseph W. Stilwell, Commanding General, U.S. Army Forces, ChinaBurma-India, and Chief of Staff to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, Supreme Commander, China Theater, 1942-1944.