[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

11'ILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH ClRClTIT
No. 07-13540
Aug- 26, 2008
Non-Argument Calendar THOMAS K. KAHN
CLERK

D. C. Docket No. 06-02954-CV-WSO-l

JAMES B. STEGEMAN,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

STATE OF GEORGIA, thm Governor Sonny Perdue, in

his official capacity,
STATE OF GEORGIA DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES,
DEKALB COUNTY, THRU CEO VERNON JONES, in his
official capacity,
DEKALB COUNTY DEPT. OF FAMILY AND CHILDREN
SERVICES,
DEKALB COUNTY FIRE & RESCUE LT. HUGliE'lT - NO: 581,
individually and in her official capacity,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Georgia

(August 26, 200S)

Before HULL, MARCUS and WILSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

James B. Stegeman appeals pro se the district court's dismissal of his action

filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985(3). Stegeman's claims arise out of

proceedings in the DeKalb County Probate Court that revoked Stegeman's power

of attorney over his elderly aunt, Jean Caffrey; found that Stegeman had engaged

in elder abuse and [mancial fraud; appointed a guardian ad litem for Caffrey; and

later, after Caffrey died, appointed an administrator and probated her estate.

Stegeman alleged that numerous state and county entities and officials violated and

conspired to violate his due process and equal protection rights during the probate

court proceedings.' After review, we affmn the district court's dismissal. 2

First, all of Stegeman's claims stemming from actions taken prior to

December 5,2004 are barred by Georgia's two-year personal injury statute of

limitations. See Rozar v. Mullis. 85 F.3d 556,560-61 (11th Cir. 1996); O.C.G.A.

'Stegeman's complaint also asserted various state law claims, which the district court
dismissed without prejudice after declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over them. On
appeal, Stegeman does not challenge the dismissal of these claims.

2We review de novo a district court's order granting a motion to dismiss. Wagner v. First
Horizon Pharm. COI:p.. 464 F.3d 1273, 1276 (11th Cir. 2006). We reject as meritless Stegeman's
argument that the district court should have treated the defendants' motions to dismiss as
summary judgment motions because the district court did not consider matters outside the
pleadings. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d) (requiring a court to treat a Rule 12(b)(6) motion as a
summary judgment motion when matters outside the pleadings are considered).

2
§ 9-3-33. Furthermore) Stegeman's arguments that the statute of limitations was

tolled are without merit. Thus, Stegeman's only timely claims are against the

Georgia Superior Court, the DeKalb County Probate Court, Probate Judge Jeryl

Debra Rosh and DeKalb County relating to the administration ofCaffrey's estate

after December 5) 2004.

Second. Stegeman's claims against the Superior Court and the DeKalb

County Probate Court are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See Kaimowitz v.

Florida Bar, 996 F.2d II5t 1155 (lIth Cir. 1993) (explaining that actions against

state courts are barred by the Eleventh Amendment); Ga. Const. art. VI, § 1, t1
(vesting judicial power of the state in, inter alia, superior courts, state courts and

probate COurts).3

Third, Judge Rosh is entitled to judicial immunity. See Mireles v. Waco,

502 U.S. 9, 9-12,112 S. Ct. 286, 287-88 (1991) (concluding that judicial immunity

can be overcome only if the actions are not taken in the judge's judicial capacity or

if the actions, though judicial in nature. are taken in the complete absence of

jurisdiction). Judge Rosh's only alleg~d action occurring after December 5,2004
I

I
I

I
I

'I

3Stegeman' s argument that Congress abrogated sovereign immunity from claims under
the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"~ is unavailing because Stegeman did not assert
claims under the ADA. Congress bas not abrogated sovereign immunity from claims, such as
Stegeman's, brought under §§ 1983 and 1985. See Will v. Mi.cp. Dep't of State eolice, 491 U.S.
58,67.109 S. Ct 2304, 2310 (1989); Fmcherv. Fla.Dep't of Labor & Employment Sec., 798
F.2d 1371, 1372 (11th eir. 1986).

3
was her ruling on the petition for discharge filed by the Temporary Administrator

of Caffrey's estate, which was taken in her judicial capacity as a probate judge and

within the jurisdiction of the probate court. See O.C.G.A. § 15-9-30(a) (conferring

upon probate courts subject matter jurisdiction over, inter ~ the probating of

wills and aU controversies regarding the administration of an estate).4

Fourth, Stegeman failed to state a § 1983 claim against DeKalb County

because his complaint did not allege any claimed constitutional violations that

were the result of an official policy or custom. ~ Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs.,

436 U.S. 658, 690-91, 98 S. Ct. 2018, 2035-36 (1978) (concluding that to state a §

1983 claim against a municipality, the plaintiff must allege that the constitutional

deprivation was pursuant to a governmental policy or custom).

Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Stegeman's

motion for defaultjudgment.5 Although the State Court of Georgia and the

DeKalb County Solicitor's Office did not file an answer or other responsive

4Stegeman's claim that Judge Rosh presided over a criminal hearing is without merit.
Stegeman's complaint alleges that, on June 5,2002, Judge Rosh found that Stegeman had
engaged in elder abuse and financial fraud and revoked his power of attorney over Caffrey.
However, any claims regarding this finding are time-barred. The only timely action relating to
Judge Rosh is her ruling on the petition for discharge. Nothing in Stegeman's complaint
suggests the ruling on the petition for discharge was criminal in nature.

5Wereviewfor abuseof discretiona districtcourt's denialof a motionfor default

judgment. Mitchellv. Brown & WilliamsonTobacco COlp., 294 F.3d 1309, 1316 (lIth eir.
2002).

4
 "-- ,--"

pleading. Stegeman's complaint did not present a sufficient basis for a default

judgment against them. See Nishimatsu Constr. Co v. Houston Nafl Bank, 515

F.2d 1200. 1206 (5th eir. 1975) (explaining that "a defendant's default does not in

itself warrant the court entering a default judgment," and that "[t]here must be a

sufficient basis in the pleadings for the judgment entered,,).6 From the face of

Stegeman's complaint, it is clear his claims against the State Court of Georgia are

barred by the Eleventh Amendment and the claims against the DeKalb County

Solicitor's Office are time-barred.

The State of Georgia, the State of Georgia Department of Human Resources,

DeKalb County Department of Family and Children Services and the Georgia

Superior Court ("the state defendants") waived service of process pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(d) and ll1ed a responsive pleading in the form of

a pre-answer motion to dismiss. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b), 55(a). Because the

district court granted the state defendants' motion to dismiss, they were not

required to file an answer and were not in default. 7

~s Court adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed
down prior to the close of business on September 30, 1981. See Bonner v. City of Prieharg, 661
F.2d 1206, 1209 (lIth Cir. 1981) (en bane).

7Contrary to Stegeman's assertio~ the state defendants' failure to include the three-initial
suffix to the case number on its pleadings, as required by local role, would not support a default
judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 83(a)(2) (prohibiting a local rule imposing form requirements
from being enforced in a manner that causes a party to lose rights unless the violation is willful).
Additionally, there is no evidence in the record that attorney Matthew LaVallee did not represent
the state defendants or improperly :filed pleadings on their behalf.

5
 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court's order granting the

defendants' motions to dismiss and denying Stegeman's motions for default

judgment.

AFFIRMED.

6
 Q,J§§_E.!\.Bq:lJ::lQJ'~§

August 19, 2008 ( Information last refreshed 19-AUG-2008 06:41:23 PM EST) LOGOUT

Civil Case Search

Case 10: 105CV13909 Case Type: jAil Types .::1

Last Name I First Name: ISTEGEMAN IJAMES
Case Status: (i Open r All

OR Company Name: I Court Code: jAil Courts :.3

F Exact Last Name Search r Phonetic Search Filing Date From:

Filing Date To:

IMM/DDIYYYY.3J

~~
••••••••.. ,';f'.• :'r.r.r::I
... '. I~ ......--r.r.r
....'~".r
'~
.. IMM/DDIYYYY L2I

Case Information Parties

Case: 05CV13909 (Open) IN RE ESTATE OF GENEVA CAFFREY (PMC) Party Type
Filing Date: 12/2212005 Type: Superior General Civil ESTATE OF GENEVA S. CAFFREY Plaintiff
Judge: Mark Anthony Scott Superior Court STEGEMAN. JAMES B. Plaintiff
Secondary: Appeals Other L1LLlG, FRANK J. Defendant
Tertiary:
Related Cases:
No Related Cases.

Scheduled Events
Scheduled DatelTimeEvent Description Building Room
05-JUN-08 09:00:00 Peremptory Calendar 6A

I I(

Docket Entries
Description Filing Date Text Assoc. Party?
NOTICE 28-MA Y -2008 Docket entry for the letter produced from CSAEOUT on 28-MAY-2008 by TYROBINS. No
MOTION 24-MAR-2006 FOR ORDER ON VOID JUDGMENT. (PMC) No
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 24-MAR-2006 OF MOTION FOR ORDER ON VOID JUDGMENT. (PMC) No
MOTION 24-MAR-2006 FOR ORDER ON APPEAL. (PMC) No
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 24-MAR-2006 OF MOTION FOR ORDER ON APPEAL (PMC) No
ORDER FILED 08-MAR-2006 ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISM ISS APPEAL SIGNE BY JUDGE SCOTT ON MARCH 8TH 2006 ....more No
NOTICE 22-FEB-2006 OF INTENT TO APPEAL, SUBMITTED BY JAMES B. STEGEMAN (MT) No
NOTICE 22-FEB-2006 OF INTENT TO APPEAL. SUBMITTED BY JAMES B. STEGEMAN (MT) No
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 22-FEB-2006 OF NOTICE OF INTENT TO APPEAL. APPEAL TO THE SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA AND APPEAL ...more No
MOTION TO DISMISS 18-JAN-2006 FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM. LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION. LACK OF APPEL ...more No
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 18-JAN-2006 OF MOTION TO DISMISS WITH EXHIBITS A AND S, (MTI+ No
MOTION 22-DEC-2005 CAVEATOR-APPELLANTS MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT W/ATTACHMENTS (AMT:$ 82.50/ ...more No
 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF DEKALB COUNTY
STATE OF GEORGIA ",'~,' "
Inr{Jr' ,',, "
,-'~, ., .:1 , "',
APPEAL FROM PROBATE COURT OF DEKALB CQlJJ'Q)T, ,_
STATEOFGEORGIA~ ',~' ,i:,','; :~::'"
~~, " :" ,,:DsCv 1"6 '10 q-o <1
ESTATE OF GENEVA S. CAFFREY IN RE: ESTATE No. 2002-1161
DECEASED
RE: ORDER ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT
JAMES B. STEGEMAN, CAVEATOR Dated: November 3, 2005

FRANK J. LILLIG, III, VOID JUDGMENT AT LAW

EXECUTOR\ADMINISTRA TORI
PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE

CAVEATOR-APPELLANTS MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT

COMES NOW, James B. Stegeman Objector to the Discharge of Frank Lillig, III
Administrator\Executor\Personal Representative of the Estate of Geneva S. Caffrey.

Mr. Stegeman is Appealing The Order on Summary Judgment Hearing on

October 27,2005.

October 05,2005 Ms. McDonald hand delivered to The Probate Court for Mr.
Stegeman, who is 100% Federally disabled, the following documents:
1) "Mr. Stegeman's Response to Summary Judgment" wlExhibits,
2) "Brief in Support of Summary Judgment in Favor of Mr. Stegeman"
wlExhibits,
3) "Summary Judgment Memo" wlExhibits, "Petition to Revoke Letters of
Testamentary" wlExhibits showing concrete evidence that the Letters of
Testamentary were obtained fraudulently,
4) "~on to Compel Discovery" on the 4'Objection to Discharge" filed by Mr.
Stegeman April 14, 2005.
5) "Third Party Complaint" wlExhibits by Ms. McDonald
6) "Affidavit" w\Exhibits by Ms. McDonald as first-band knowledge of the
events supporting both Mr. Stegeman's claims and supporting her complaint.

Ms. King Clerk of the Probate Court informed Ms. McDonald that The Court w~
not going to allow the filing of any documents pertaining to the Summary Judgment.
The lack of action of Mr. Stegeman would have automatically allowed the Court to find
Summary Judgment in favor of Mr. Lillig) ill.
Ms. McDonald questioned the reason for denying Mr. Stegeman and or herself the
right of filing. Ms. King advised that she would have the "Staff Attorney') review the

1
documents and give a call the following day to notify whether or not The Court would
allow the tiling of the documents.
October 06, 2005 Ms. McDonald left a voice mail for Ms. King inquiring into the
decision of The Court. There was no return call. At or around 4:00 p.m., Ms. McDonal~
sent a Fax to Ms. King to inform the Court that refusing to allow Mr. Stegeman the righ~
to file the above listed papers, it was a violation of Constitutional Rights guaranteed by
The United States Constitution, State of Georgia Constitution and Mr. Stegeman's Civil
Rights. Ms. King then returned the call. Ms. King stated that the staff attorney had
reviewed the documents and The Court was not going to allow the documents to be :file~.
Ms. McDonald asked Ms. King that she explain it to Mr. Stegeman. When Ms.
King insisted to Mr. Stegeman that he could not filed the documents, Mr. Stegeman
asked Ms. McDonald to get the recording device and informed Ms. King that it would be
recorded "for the record."
Ms. King connected Mr. Fowler, Staff Attorney of The Probate Court who again
insisted that no documents would be filed. Mr. Fowler was questioned on the format and
language of the documents. Mr. Fowler advised that everything was done properly even
the format and advised: "We just are not going to let you file them." Again, Mr.
Stegeman advised this was a violation ofms Rights. Mr. Fowler eventually,
begrudgingly agreed that all of the documents could be filed except Ms. McDonald's
"Third Party" and "Affidavif'. Ms. McDonald's Affidavit was the only "Affidavit" in
support of Mr. Stegeman and was from firsthand knowledge. Mr. Fowler again seemed
irritated and begrudgingly agreed when pressed by Mr. Stegeman that there was a fee
owed for the filing of the documents.
Mr. Fowler as staff attorney for the Probate Court should have known that
refusing Mr. Stegeman the right of filing Response to Sllmmary Judgment along with the
other Petitions and Motions was a direct violation of due process along with equal access
to the Courts.
October 07,2005, Ms. McDonald returned to the Court and paid the filing fee of
$391.00 on behalf of Mr. Stegeman.

October 31, 2005, Ms. McDonald reviewing the progress of~The Estate
Proceedings" for the Estate of Geneva S. Caffrey, fOWldthat Mr. Stegeman's documents
were not showing as ":filed".
November 01, 2005 Ms. McDonald sends email to Mr. Brandenburg, Staff
Attorney for the Probate Court who had attended the Summary Judgment Hearing
inquiring about the filing of the documents and "My understanding also was that the
Petitions and Motions are "heard" in the order in which they are filed 15-9-37. Am I
incorrect in this'r Mr. Brandenburg replied: "contact the Probate Court Record Room
and ask for Magda Rojas (404) 371-2605. She may be able to explain the system better."
And "1 do not understand why you are asking your second question, and therefore, I will
not answer it. The Official Code of Georgia speaks for itself."
Ms. McDonald called the record room and was advised that Magda Rojas was not
in. Ms. McDonald asked about the filing of records and was advised that he, the man
answering the phone, could not answer her questions.

2
 November 03, 2005 when it became apparent that the papers had not been filed,
no one was going to address the issue. Ms. McDonald contacted Ms. Gretchen Landau,
Operations Manager at The Probate Court. Ms. Landau advised: "Good question! It was
a mistake on our part. We do have the documents and they will be entered today. Thank
you for bringing this to myanention."
At that time, it was noticeably too late as the Hearing had already been held.
Oddly enough, Judge Rosh of the Probate Court that same day of November 03,
2005 made her "Order on Smnmary Judgment".
The Probate Court is trying to commit "Fraud Upon the Court" in refusing Mr.
Stegeman "access to the court" by returning your Notice of Appeal recorded and filed
November 28, 2005, which is attached hereto.

The claims pursuant to Void Judgment are enumerated below:

ENUMERATION OF ISSUES SUBSTANTIATING A VOID JUDGEMENT

1. The Court fraudulently admitted the amount listed in "Finding of Facts" 3.

Guardian of Property of Ms. Caffrey's records reflect $27,261.59 before his Final
Accounting was submitted on June 10,2004. The Court knew that $33,000 listed
as going to "beneficiary" was in the accounting of Joyner plus the Extra
Compensation to Mr. Joyner through Mr. Lillig, ill and approved by The Probate
Court in an amount of over $15,000 is over $48,000.00.
2. The Court fraudulently accepted the monetary claims oftbe Guardian's Final
accounting and knew or should have known it was signed by Judge Marion Guess
who was no longer a Judge and had no jurisdiction; retired Judges may only
perform marriages.
3. The Court fraudulently referred to Mr. Stegeman as "beneficiary" of the deceased
in #5 and knew or should have known that Mr. Stegeman "Objected to Discharg~"
saying he was co-signer of the Heritage Bank loan, never a beneficiary.
4. The Court violated the Petitioner's substantive rights at Common Law by failing
to recognize concrete proof that the deceased took out the Heritage Bank. loan and
that Mr. Stegeman was only co-signer.
5. The Court knew or should have known that there is a First Union\Wachovia Visa
debt that belonged solely to the deceased that remains unpaid.
6. The Court knew or should have known that the First Union\Wachovia Visa bill
had gone to Mr. Lillig's home address and was ignored.
7. October 07,2005 the Court was presented with Mr. Stegeman's (1) Response to
Summary Judgement (2) Brief to Summary Judgment to Find in Favor of Mr.
Stegeman (3) Memo on Summary Judgement (4) Motion to Compel Discovery
on the Objection to Discharge (5) Petition to Revoke Letters of Testamentary
citing fraud as the reason (6) Affidavit of Janet McDonald (7) Third Party
Complaint of Janet McDonald. The Comt knew or should have known that the
Clerk advised that staff attorney would have to review the documents before
allowing Mr. Stegeman to file them. The Cowt fraudulently advised Mr.
Stegeman that he would not be allowed to filed any docwnents. and knew or

3
3) Jurisdiction of subject:
of felony offenses, TheProbate
and the ProbateCourt
Courtknew
claimed that Mr.
or should Stegeman
have was itguilt>,
known that had
no jurisdiction to fmd someone guilty of felonies. Void Judgment exists therein,
where jurisdiction was not proper. Many times since the Probate Court deemed
Mr. Stegeman was "guilty", the Guardian of Property of Caffrey as well as
Attorney Robert Turner who worked in the same office as the Guardian of
Property, The Law Firm of Joyner and Burnett, Wachovia Banl4 Wachovia
Securities have all used the alleged "guilty of a felony"" decision as protection
when confronted about illegal actions they themselves have taken: "Mr.
Stegeman stole his Aunt's money" or "'M£. Stegeman should not have abused his
Aunt". It is a fact that Mr. Stegeman never committed these crimes, and any
claim to the contrary is aVoid Judgment.
4) The Probate Court decision was based on falsities, perjury, sworn to by Sandra
AI-Khaja a caseworker for DFeS, and Mavis Turner in order to exploit and
defraud not only Mr. Stegeman and Ms. Caffrey but Ms. McDonald as welL Void
Judgment exists where ajudgment is "induced by fraud".
5) The Probate Court does not have the power to find Mr. Stegeman guilty of
felonies but did so in order to revoke a Durable Power of Attorney with both a
'"Death" clause and "Incompetent" clause so that it could fraudulently appoint
John Joyner Guardian of Property of Ms. Caffrey. Mr. Stegeman has never beeJ;l
charged, arrested or convicted of the crimes The Probate Court alleged. The
Durable Power of Attorney was made at a time that Ms. Caffrey was fully
competent and also contains a clause: "This document can never be questioned"
it was irrevocable, till death. It was on filed at the DeKalb County Courthouse,
the banks; and the doctors had a Health Care Directive on file that was also a
Health Care Power of Attorney naming Mr. Stegeman. Void Judgment exists
where a judgment is "'induced by fraud."
6) The claim that Mr. Stegeman was caregiver of Ms. Caffiey was totally untrue.
Ms. McDonald had been caregiver at the request of Ms. Caffrey and approval of
Primary Physician of Caffrey, Dr. Michael Baron. Any investigation would have
show this, and there was no investigation done by DFCS as required by law to b~
done before Guardianship hearings. Void Judgment exists as the claim was
known or should have been know by the Court to be fraudulent.
7) Mavis Turner maliciously and knowingly filed a fraudulent complaint to DFCS
claiming that Ms. Caffrey bad fallen and was being kept against her will April
2001. Ms. Caffrey was suspected of having a stroke, taken to hospital by Mr.
Stegeman and found to have no signs of stroke. Ms. Turner should be prosecuted
for peIjury, exploitation of the elderly, exploitation of the disabled, and filing a
false complaint. Void Judgment exists as the claim was known or should have
been know by the Court to be fraudulent.
&) Dr. Baron paid an unannounced visit around two weeks prior and there was no
complaint from Caffi'ey about any form of abuse, quite the contrary. Dr. Baron's
report states that she was fine. Mr. Stegeman had asked Dr. Baron prior to the
unannoWlced visit to make a house call as Ms. Caffrey had been behaving
strangely and had left the gas on the stove on two different occasions and Ms.

5
 Caffrey was refusing to go to doctor visits. Dr. Baron said he would not make a.
house call.
9) AI-Khaja's Petition for Guardian states: "Ms. Caffrey is afraid of her nephew",
"no longer wants him to manage her finances"", '"afraid to return home". The
Probate Court had previously found Ms. Caffrey to be mentally incompetent to
the point that she could not carry on a one to one conversation. Any claim
thereafter fails to meet proper case management, and faIls under Void Judgment
where it is herein submitted as a fraud upon the court.

LAW

The Official Code of Georgia as published by the State of Georgia.

GA Code 29-5-2(c): Persons who are not disqualified have preference in the
following order:
(1): An individual nominated by the incapacitated adult prior to the filing of thi;
petition for a finding of capacity. if at the time of nomination the incaPQcitated adul(
was 18 or more years of age and had stdficient mental capacity to make an
intelligent choice (Durable Power of Attorney); and
(2): Other persons. such as relatives; or other persons providing income or
other care to the incapacitated adult (Ms. McDonald or Mr. Stegeman, both were
providing money, spent $145,000 of their own estates)
(3): If no other person is available to be the guardian of property of the ward,
may the county guardian to guardian of the property.
In revoking Mr. Stegeman's Durable Power of Attorney and appointing a County
Guardian
29-5-6. (2) The petition for the appointment of a guardian shall set forth:
(D) A statement of the reasons the proposed guardianship is sought, including the
facts which support the claim of incapacity; (No facts were provided.)
(H) All known income and assets of the Proposed ward and. in any case involving
the creation or termination of a guardianship over property where the proposed ward
has an interest in real property, the name of the county in which such property is located;
and (ifDFCS had done an investigation as required by law, the information would have
been proper, it was not.)
(4) In addition to stating the specific incapacity of the proposed ward and the
facts, which support the determination. the qfJidavit shall state any foreseeable limits on
the duration of such incapacity. (The facts were falsified, "occasional visits by her
nephew and niece in law and claims emotional abuse and withholding of financial
situation by them". Ms. McDonald provided three meals a day and walked to the Caffryy
home more than five times a day. There was no emotional abuse and the money paying
Caffrey's bills, buying her medication, clothing etc did not come from Caffrey's accounts
but in fact C&lle from the McDonald\Stegeman accounts.)
(E) Appoint a guardianship evaluation physician or psychologist as provided
insubsectton (c) of this Code section.
(2) The physician or psychologist shall evaluate the proposed ward

6
Any ruling made by a court in which there was a lack of subject matter jurisdiction is
called a "voidjudgment". Subject matter can never be presume<L never be waived, and
cannot be construed even by mutual consent oftbe parties. Subject matter jurisdiction is
two-part: the statutory or common law authority for the court to hear the case and the
appearance and testimony of a competent fact witness.

In addition, any ruling that involves violation of due process of law under the Fifth, Sixth,
or Seventh Amendments is also a void judgment. Void judgment can be attacked or
vacated at any time and there is no statute of limitation. See Long v. Shore bank
Development Corp_. 182 F.3d 548 (CA. 7 Dl. 1999). A void judgment is one which,
fTom its inception, was a complete nullity and without legal effect, Lubben v. Selective
Service System Local Bd No. 27,453 F.2d 645. 14 A.L.R.Fed. 298 (C.A. 1 Mass. 1972).

On motion and upon such terms as are just the court may relieve a party or a party's legal
representative from a final judgment, order or proceeding for the following reasons: (1)
mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence
which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial
under Rule 59(d); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic),
misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5)
the judgment has been satisfied. released or discharged. or a prior judgment on which it is
based has been reversed or otherwise vaaUed, or it is no longer equitable that the
judgment should have prospective application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief
from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be filed within a reasonable time,
and for reasons (l), (2) and (3) not more than six months after the judgment or order w~
entered or proceeding was taken. A motion under this subdivision does not affect the
finality of a judgment or suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the power of a
court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order or
proceeding, or to grant relief to a defendant served by publication as provided by Rule
590) or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. The procedure for ~btaining any
relieffrom ajudgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these rules or by an
independent action.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

r-
or'l ~
Mr. Stegeman prays that this Honorable Court will grant ReliefFro~t._." ~ ,--~,~,.,-,~,.<

in the fonn of Void Judgment on both the Summary Judgment of ~ 21f.r2005 :: g

0-0 N
and the Guardianship Hearing of June 13,.2002. gj
21"'1
S. ~ ;': , ffY'A
R~ly Sabmi~~~
-<::.v 'n"

TEGEMAN, Pro Se
821 Sheppard Rd

\2
 AFFIDAVIT FOR PROOF OF MAILING

I. JanetD. McDonald ofDeKalb County of Georgia, being duly sworn before a Notary
Public, deposes and says that on the 2200 day of December, 2005 did send by US Postal
Mail, Certified Mail- Return Receipt Requested, full paid thereon and with sufficient
return address:

L) APPEAL FROM PROBATE COURT TO SUPERIOR COURT -13 PAGES

2.) APPEAL AS FILED WITH PROBATE COURT W/CHECK - 2 PAGES
3.) LETTER FROM PROBATE COURT -I PAGE
4.) AFFIDAVIT FOR PROOF OF MAILING

To the following parties as individuals and in their respective offices:

Probate Court ofDeKalb County (Certified Mail Return Receipt)

DeKalb County Courthouse
556 N. McDonough Street
Room 1100
Decatur. GA 30030

Robert E. Turner, Attorney for Frank LilIig, lIT (Us Postal Mail)
111North McDonough Street
Decatur. GA 30030

VI

J
This, the 22nd day of December. 2005
z_
=c-:l r"
om
D~--;
J>O
C)
1-r;2J
-c:-
COU')
J>g
~, =
-10
·c:~
I~S2
...-..
-<;:0
:;0
=
N
U
"fy
......,C='
--3 '-'"'
\'0
..
";.,

,,-. &-.

.~