Speech to U.S.

-Taiwan Business Council

Defense Industry Conference
September 11, 2007
Annapolis
Thomas J. Christensen
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State

A Strong and Moderate Taiwan

OT-0715E | Date: 2007/9/12

http://www.ait.org.tw/en/news/officialtext/viewer.aspx?id=2007091201

Vice Minister Ko Cheng-heng, Dr. Su Chi, Rupert, other distinguished guests, I am

delighted to be able to speak today at this important event. Many thanks to all of you
for being here - especially our friends from Taiwan, who have taken time from busy
schedules and traveled so far. I would also like to thank the U.S.-Taiwan Business
Council, which has established this conference as the premier annual venue for
discussing Taiwan's security. As the State Department's representative, I will touch on
broad issues in Taiwan security in my remarks this morning, leaving detailed
questions of defense strategy and arms procurement to the military experts. My
remarks represent the agreed views of the United States Government. I invite you to
consider my comments in that light.

This conference is timely. In the year ahead, we will again celebrate Taiwan's
democracy, and we will also closely follow how Taiwan's leaders navigate the often
difficult circumstances in relations across the Taiwan Strait. Their actions will be a
major factor in determining whether the interests of their people are protected;
whether Taiwan will continue to flourish in an environment of peace and security; or
whether all that Taiwan has achieved might be put at risk by cross-Strait tensions or,
worse still, conflict.

For reasons that I will elaborate in a moment, the United States has an abiding interest
in a stable and peaceful relationship across the Taiwan Strait in which Taiwan thrives.
Anything that makes Taiwan stronger and safer is good for the United States, and, for
obvious reasons, is also good for the people of Taiwan. Anything that places such
peace and stability at risk runs directly against the interests of the United States. For
these reasons, we look to Taiwan to adopt strategies toward cross-Strait relations that
combine strength - both military and economic - with moderation. When we see
policies that diverge from these goals, we owe it to ourselves and to the Taiwan
people to speak out.

Origins of U.S. Interest

I would first like to address two fundamental questions: why does the United States
care about Taiwan's security, and what is the basis for our expression of views on this
important subject? The answers to the first are straight-forward. As a Pacific power
with global interests and obligations, the United States has a natural interest in peace
throughout Asia. Because the Taiwan Strait is a potential flashpoint for conflict, the
area demands our constant attention. Meanwhile, through our decades of close
friendship with the people of Taiwan, we have acquired deep admiration for their
achievements under difficult circumstances and a special concern for their democracy,
freedom from coercion, and prosperity. A successful Taiwan is a beacon for East Asia
and beyond. Finally, U.S. support for Taiwan is enshrined in U.S. domestic law in the
Taiwan Relations Act. In short, strategic, moral, and legal requirements compel a
continuous U.S. interest in Taiwan and its security.

The same arguments, in turn, give us a legitimate voice on issues touching on Taiwan
security. Naturally, judgments about how to defend Taiwan rest ultimately with the
people of Taiwan, as articulated through their democratic institutions. We respect that
prerogative. At the same time, to defend our own interests, satisfy our legal
obligations, and, indeed, support people whom we regard as old friends, we believe
we are right to express our views, including our real concerns, regarding Taiwan's
security policies. Because Taiwan is a democracy, the Taiwan people will decide for
themselves how to respond to the views expressed by their friends in the United
States.

With that, I would like to speak today about Taiwan's security in the broadest sense
and about the factors that are critical to sustaining it. Everything I say here is based
on a recognition of the growing PRC military threat to Taiwan posed by the fast-paced
military build-up opposite Taiwan and by Beijing's refusal to rule out the use of force
against Taiwan. The United States has demonstrated its rejection of any coercion of
Taiwan through both its defensive arms sales to Taipei and maintenance of our
unilateral capability to respond to such coercion, if our President were so to choose.
Actions speak louder than words, and no one on either side of the Strait has an excuse
for being ignorant of U.S. expectations and determination to protect our own
interests. At the same time, our resolute defense of these interests has benefited the
region for decades, providing the indispensable conditions for stability in the Strait, a
dramatic increase in prosperity on both sides, rich and growing cross-Strait
connections, and a democratic transformation on Taiwan that is an inspiration to the
world.

The Need for Taiwan's Strength and Moderation

As I stated at the outset, the United States believes that a strong and moderate Taiwan
is essential to the immediate and long-term security needs of the people of Taiwan.
Anything less than strength and moderation leaves Taiwan vulnerable, endangers
regional peace, and potentially threatens U.S. interests. Let me address these two
fundamental elements in turn.

A Strong Taiwan

A strong Taiwan is, very simply, one that maintains the military capacity to withstand
coercion for an extended period of time. To the extent Beijing knows it cannot
subdue Taiwan swiftly -- before the international community would be able to react --
deterrence is reinforced. Taiwan's prosperity and social stability are, of course,
additional sources of strength, but the military dimension is indispensable. A Taiwan
that can defend itself is a major factor for peace. A strong Taiwan can also negotiate
with Beijing with greater confidence and thereby pursue more effectively durable,
equitable arrangements for cross-Strait peace.

After a frankly disappointing performance for several years, there recently has been
good news in this area. In budgetary terms alone, Taipei has done much to provide
for its defense. For some time the Taiwan defense budget declined as a percentage of
GDP. Even during that period, however, it remained substantial - higher than in all
but a few other Asian peers. As a portion of a large economy, those budgets provided
a basis for some progress. This year, the defense budget has at last begun to increase
as a portion of GDP. We congratulate Taiwan's leaders from all major parties for
finding a way to break this logjam.

Funding is only part of the defense equation, of course. Taiwan also is pursuing
smarter priorities and defensive strategies. It is allocating more money to hardening
and sustainment, and it is embracing modern warfighting doctrine, taking advantage
of Taiwan's greatest practical asset, its geography. Taiwan and its surroundings
constitute an intrinsically challenging military environment, and wise defense
expenditures and planning can keep it that way.

U.S. arms sales have played an important role in keeping Taiwan strong, and, of
course, today's audience has a special interest in the subject. The Bush
Administration demonstrated its recognition of the U.S. role when it approved its
2001 arms package. The Administration's commitment to fulfillment of TRA
requirements remains beyond question. The principal issue in Taiwan's defense,
however, is not whether Taipei buys a particular weapon system or whether that
system comes from domestic factories or from abroad. The principal issue is the
substance of Taiwan's overall defensive strategy and the maintenance of core
capacities to sustain it. And the decision on that strategy, once again, rests with the
Taiwan people themselves. Frankly, an abiding U.S. concern is that Taiwan as yet has
still not had the sort of sustained, general debate on security that we think it deserves.
We hope that, in the coming election season, the people of Taiwan will demand of
their political candidates an intelligent and productive discussion of this profoundly
important subject.

At the same time, I want to give credit to both Taiwan's ruling party and the
opposition for the very real progress that they have made in recent years. Under
President Chen's leadership, the MND has begun compiling more sophisticated
budgets and sought increases in overall funding. For its part, the opposition-
controlled legislature has performed its role by vetting and passing these budgets,
giving the executive branch most of what it requested. The United States welcomes
these developments as hopeful signs that we are witnessing a maturation of the public
debate on Taiwan, one in which political leaders lay aside damaging accusations
against one another's basic patriotism and agree to place defense above partisan
politics. Whether or not these recent events become a long-term trend will depend on
leaders from all political parties, including many in the audience today.

A Moderate Taiwan

I would now like to turn to the other indispensable dimension of Taiwan's security, a
moderate, sophisticated, effective political approach toward cross-Strait relations.
Without moderation, Taiwan's security will be compromised, no matter how much
money Taipei spends on defense and no matter how wisely those defense dollars have
been allocated. On the other hand, all things being equal, a moderate approach by
Taipei to relations across the Strait will reduce the challenges faced by Taiwan's
armed forces.

Taiwan occupies a delicate and, indeed, unique political position. The absence of a
resolution of cross-Strait disputes causes understandable frustration among many
people, but it's a fact of life that the majority of Taiwan citizens understand. That
recognition is reflected in opinion polling that shows powerful, consistent support for
the status quo.

In terms of security, the proposition is reasonably simple: as long as Taiwan

maintains a credible defensive capability, the chief threats to its welfare are political
actions by Taipei itself that could trigger Beijing's use of force. The United States has
repeatedly made clear that the use of force would be unacceptable, and we have
repeatedly called on Beijing to demonstrate more military transparency, to cease its
arms buildup opposite Taiwan, and to reduce its armed threat to Taiwan. But as much
as we oppose Beijing's threat to use force, we also take it seriously, and Taipei cannot
afford to do otherwise. It is for this reason that Taiwan's security is inextricably
linked to the avoidance of needlessly provocative behavior. This does not mean that
Taipei should or can be passive in the face of PRC pressure. But it means that
responsible leadership in Taipei has to anticipate potential Chinese red lines and
reactions and avoid unnecessary and unproductive provocations.

The USG's recent expression of concern about certain policies advocated by the Chen
Administration has flowed directly from this perspective. I want to emphasize that
the overall U.S.-Taiwan relationship is as close and mutually beneficial as ever. The
friendship between the American people and the people of Taiwan has deep roots and
continues to flourish. The disagreements that have arisen occur in a comparatively
narrow part of the U.S.-Taiwan agenda. Since it is the part that directly relates to
peace and stability, however, the disagreement is very important.

In particular, we have expressed special concern about Chen Administration support

for a proposed referendum on UN membership in the name of Taiwan. Much has
been said on Taiwan about U.S. positions, a lot of it wrong. Let me try to provide
some clarity.

The United States is not opposed to referenda; Taiwan is as entitled to hold referenda
as is any other democracy. But the topic and content of any particular referendum
must be considered. A referendum on applying to the UN without the suggestion of
name change as part of that referendum - while striking us as odd and unproductive -
would not elicit a very strong reaction from the United States. Given that everyone
knows the bulk of Taiwan's citizens would like to see Taipei apply to the United
Nations and given that such a referendum would have no prospect of improving the
likelihood of success in such an application, everybody would know that support for
such a referendum would only be useful in domestic political posturing in Taiwan.
For the United States' part, the matter of how to respond would be straightforward: we
would reiterate that we do not support Taiwan's membership in international
organizations that require statehood and therefore would not support such a
referendum.

The particular referendum supported by President Chen concerns us considerably

more than would a generic referendum on applying to the UN. What worries us, very
specifically, is the issue of name change. This draft referendum raises the question of
what Taiwan should be called in the international community. Moreover, it does so in
what could be interpreted by many to be a legally-binding popular vote. In an ideal
world, we would not have to worry about this. In the vernacular, we all speak of
"Taiwan." The State Department does, people in Taiwan do, even Beijing does. So
why worry about using the same word in this more formal political and legal context?
The simple reality is that, in the world of cross-Strait relations, political symbolism
matters, and disagreements over it could be the source of major tensions or even
conflict. President Chen recognized the importance of such "symbolic" issues in 2000
and 2004 when he promised our President and the international community not to
pursue a change in Taiwan's official name, and he has reaffirmed that promise
repeatedly.

It is the apparent pursuit of name change in the referendum, therefore, that makes the
initiative appear to us to be a step intended to change the status quo. Arguments that
the referendum, even if passed, would not amount to a pursuit of name change,
frankly, strike us as purely legalistic. After all, if the specific nomenclature does not
matter, why include it in the referendum in the first place? At a fundamental level,
such legalistic arguments from supporters of the referendum make it seem that they
do not take seriously Taiwan's commitments to the United States and the international
community, are willing to ignore the security interests of Taiwan's most steadfast
friend, and are ready to put at some risk the security interests of the Taiwan people for
short-term political gain. Our bottom line is that the downsides of such an initiative
for Taiwan and U.S. interests are potentially large, and, as with any UN referendum,
the benefits for Taiwan's international status are non-existent, so we must oppose such
an initiative strongly.
I would like to face head-on the accusation that the U.S. position on the referendum
constitutes interference in Taiwan's democracy. On behalf of the U.S. Government, I
reject this accusation categorically. Given the decades of America's commitment to
Taiwan's security and support for its democratization, the idea just does not stand up
to scrutiny. The reality is that democracies can and do disagree over policies. It
happens all the time around the world. Moreover, friends have an obligation to warn
friends who are moving in an unwise direction. The U.S. obligation is even stronger,
given our interest in Taiwan's security. After all, it is not just Taiwan's peace and
stability that Taipei's actions may threaten.

The United States has neither the power nor the right to tell the Taiwan people what
they can and cannot do. As friends, however, we feel it is our obligation to warn that
the content of this particular referendum is ill-conceived and potentially quite
harmful. Bad public policy initiatives are made no better for being wrapped in the
flag of "democracy." Fortunately, if the referendum goes forward unchanged, we
anticipate that Taiwan's perceptive, intelligent citizens will see through the rhetoric
and make a sound judgment that the referendum does not serve their interests because
it will be fundamentally harmful to Taiwan's external relations.

Beyond the obvious threat to stability in the Taiwan Strait, the United States also
opposes the proposed referendum because it will do the exact opposite of what it
promises: it will limit, not expand, Taiwan's international space. Arguments to the
contrary sound heroic, but they stand in opposition to the evidence all around us. I
can say this to you with real experience, because it is the State Department that takes
the lead in the U.S. Government in trying to help preserve and expand the Taiwan
people's international space. The frustrating truth is that needlessly provocative
actions by Taipei strengthen Beijing's hand in limiting Taiwan's space and scare away
potential friends who might help Taiwan.

This is again an area where we have to acknowledge a tough truth. Whether we like it
or not, most countries in the world accept Beijing's characterization of Taiwan, and,
when energized, the PRC can call in overwhelming support to marginalize Taipei.
The Taiwan people are, of course, long accustomed to PRC pressure, and we are
certainly not telling them not to resist these efforts; our own position is far from
passive. That said, Taipei needs to push back intelligently and in a sophisticated
manner that plays to its strengths. Frontal assaults on Beijing's sensitivities are bound
to fail and, at the end of the day, leave Taipei further behind. The referendum on
applying to the UN under the name Taiwan is just such a frontal assault with no hope
of changing Taiwan's actual status on the international stage while increasing cross-
Strait tensions and alienating potential supporters of Taiwan's increased international
space.

I would like to emphasize that we do not like having to express publicly our
disagreement with the Chen Administration on this or any other policy. Taiwan is a
longstanding U.S. friend, and we do not like there to be gaps between us on important
issues. I can assure you that we would not have done so had we not exhausted every
private opportunity through consistent, unmistakable, and authoritative messages over
an extended period of time. The problem here is not misunderstanding or lack of
communications: it is that we believe this initiative is not good for Taiwan or us and
that we have found ourselves with no alternative but to express our views directly to
the Taiwan people.

A Confident Taiwan

While I am using this podium to convey tough truths, let me raise a more positive
point that is not often mentioned but deserves to be: let me debunk the myth that the
people of Taiwan are isolated or that Taiwan is an international orphan. Yes, Taipei
has formal diplomatic relationships with only a small number of states, and it is not a
member of the United Nations. The reality, however, is that Taiwan could not be the
first world, democratic, commercial powerhouse it is if it were not extensively
integrated into global society. Its citizens could not travel the world on business and
pleasure, its airliners and freighters could not span the globe, and it could not be one
of the world's premier sources of information technology. Taipei may not have many
embassies, but it has dozens of unofficial offices around the planet staffed with
professional representatives who carry on the business of the people of Taiwan. In the
trade arena alone, Taipei would be an economic backwater if it were not thoroughly
linked into the dense web of global institutions that support international commerce.
Many of Taipei's most important relationships are unofficial, and yet genuine
communication and cooperation goes on every day of the year.

To confirm this, just follow the news to see the steady stream of senior Taiwan
officials who visit Washington and other parts of the United States. People often
focus on the absence of visits at the highest levels, but those are infrequent in any
relationship. For anybody who bothers to pay attention, it quickly becomes clear that
the U.S.-Taiwan dialogue is comparable in substance and scope to that with any other
medium-size partner.
I am not trying to downplay the genuine limitations on the international space of the
Taiwan people, and I appreciate the frustrations that these must generate. At the end
of the day, Taiwan occupies an unusual place in the global community. For Taiwan's
elected leadership, the challenge ahead is how to maximize the people's interest
within this context. Fortunately, Taiwan has done remarkably well, and, when Taipei
plays its hand well, it has a range of positive opportunities in the years ahead.

Strategic U.S. Interests

The United States has a consistent policy toward the Taiwan Strait. Year in and year
out, and over administrations from both major parties, that policy has provided great
benefits not only for the American people but also for the people of Taiwan. If there
is any doubt about this, just consider Taiwan's circumstances at the time of de-
recognition nearly 30 years ago now. Its vibrant democracy and prosperous, first
world society today offer a vastly better life to the people of Taiwan. And as a friend
of Taiwan, as an indispensable supporter of its democracy and freedoms, the United
States ranks second to none. Americans can feel justifiably proud for having done the
right thing, again and again.

While our support for Taiwan is beyond question, nobody here will be surprised if I
say that the United States defines its own interests and interprets East Asian regional
developments for itself. There is, therefore, absolutely no foundation to the assertion
that the United States coordinates its Taiwan policy with Beijing. It just does not
happen. Words like coordination and cooperation simply do not apply to the
relationship between Washington and Beijing on Taiwan policy. Do Chinese views
influence U.S. thinking? Of course: we would be reckless, as would Taipei, if we did
not take them into consideration. But I can assure you that no USG official at any
level spends any amount of time coordinating our policies toward Taiwan with
Beijing. Rumors of such coordination abound, but as with many rumors, they have no
basis in fact.

By the same token, while we have a close, friendly relationship with Taipei, we also
do not let Taipei define our positions. For well-established reasons, the United States
has declared its opposition to unilateral changes to the status quo by either side of the
Taiwan Strait. Some Taiwan leaders in recent years have asserted that Taiwan
independence is the status quo that should be defended. On that point, let me be
perfectly clear: while U.S. opposition to Chinese coercion of Taiwan is beyond
question, we do not recognize Taiwan as an independent state, and we do not accept
the argument that provocative assertions of Taiwan independence are in any way
conducive to maintenance of the status quo or peace and stability across the Taiwan
Strait. For the reasons I have given above, in fact, we rank such assertions along with
the referendum on joining the UN under the name Taiwan as needless provocations
that are patently not in the best interests of the Taiwan people or of the United States.

Conclusion

Let me bring this presentation to a close by returning to the fundamental issue that has
brought all of us together here. Regardless of whether members of this audience are
officials in President Chen's Administration, opposition party leaders, U.S. corporate
executives, journalists, scholars, or U.S. Government officials, we all share an abiding
interest in the security of Taiwan, an important friend of the United States occupying a
delicate position in a sensitive neighborhood. The United States Government believes
that a strong and moderate Taiwan is essential to peace and stability in the Taiwan
Strait, and we will remain the steadfast partner of the people of Taiwan as they seek to
advance their interests in the years ahead.

一個 強大和 穩健的 台灣
美國副助理國務卿柯慶生
美台商會美台國防工業會議講話
2007 年 9 月 11 日
於馬里蘭州安納波利斯

OT-0715C | 日期: 2007/9/13

柯承亨副部長、蘇起博士、魯珀特(Rupert)和其他貴賓們，我很高興能在今天這一
重要會議上講話。十分感謝諸位的光臨，特別是在百忙中遠道而來的台灣朋友們。
我還要感謝美台商會(U.S.-Taiwan Business Council)建立了這一會議機制，作為
一年一度討論台灣安全問題的平台。作為國務院的代表，我將在今天上午的講話
中，談及有關台灣安全的整體問題，而 由軍事專家們來詳細論述有關防禦戰略
和軍購問題。我的講話代表美國政府的一致意見。我請諸位以這種方式看待這個
講話。

這次會議開得很及時。在未來的一年中，我們將再次慶祝台灣的民主，我們還將
密切注視台灣領導人，如何處理台灣海峽兩岸關係中，那些往往很困難的情況。
他們的行動將成為一個主要因素，將決定台灣人民的利益能否得到保護；台灣
能否在和平與安全的環境中繼續繁榮；以及台灣所取得的一切成就，是否會因
為兩 岸關係的緊張，乃致更為可怕的衝突而受到威脅。

鑒於我過一會兒將詳細說明的理由，一個使台灣得以繁榮發展的穩定、和平的台
海關係，事關美國的長久利益。有利於台灣強大和安全的一切，都符合美國的利
益；基於顯而易見的道理，也符合台灣人民的利益。危及和平與穩定的一切，都
會直接損害美國的利益。由於這些原因，我們期待台灣在兩岸關係問題上採取力
量 ──軍事的和經濟的──與穩健相結合的策略。當我們看到有關政策偏離這
些目標時，我們認為應該為自己也為台灣人民，坦率表明我們的意見。

美國關注的由來

我首先想談一談兩個根本的問題：美國為什麼關心台灣的安全，以及我們在這
個重要問題上表達觀點的根據是什麼？對第一個問題的回答很簡單。作為擁有全
球利益和責任的太平洋大國，美國自然關注整個亞洲的和平。由於台灣海峽是一
個潛在的衝突導火點，這個地區要求我們持續給予關注。同時，經由與台灣人民
數十年的親密友誼，我們十分欽佩台灣人民在困境中取得的各項成就，我們對
他們的民主、不受打壓和繁榮給予特別的關注。一個成功的台灣是東亞乃至更廣
大地區的一座燈塔。最後，美國對台灣的支持在美國國內法律《台灣關係法》
(Taiwan Relations Act)中有所規定。簡而言之，從戰略、道義和法律上來說，美國
都必須對台灣及其安全給予不斷關注。

出於同樣的理由，我們在涉及台灣安全的問題上，也有權發出我們的聲音。當然，
如何保衛台灣的最終決斷屬於台灣人民，這將經由其民主機制加以表述。我們尊
重他們這一絕對的權利。同時，為了捍衛我們自己的利益、履行我們的法律義務，
並支持被視作老朋友的人民，我們認為，在台灣安全問題上表明我們的觀點，
包括我們的真實關切，是正確的做法。由於台灣是一個民主體，應由台灣人民自
己決定如何對美國朋友表達的看法作出反應。

在作了這些說明之後，我今天想談一談最廣義上的台灣安全問題，和保持台灣
安全的關鍵因素。我今天的演講完全是基於這樣的認識：台灣對岸的快速軍事發
展，以及北京拒絕排除對台動武的可能性，使中華人民共和國對台灣的軍事威
脅越來越大。美國通過向台北出售防禦性武器，和保持我們對這種脅迫手段作出
反應的單邊能力──如果我國總統選擇作出反應的話，美國已經表明我們不接
受任何對台灣的脅迫。行動勝於雄辯，海峽兩岸誰也沒有藉口，對美國的期待和
美國保衛自己利益的決心置若罔聞。同時，數十年來，我們保衛這些利益的堅定
立場，也使整個地區受益，為台灣海峽的穩定、海峽兩岸突飛猛進的繁榮、豐富
和日益密切的兩岸聯繫、以及激勵全世界的台灣民主改革，提供了不可或缺的條
件。

台灣保持強大和穩健的必要性

如我在一開始時所說，美國認為一個強大和穩健的台灣，對台灣人民當前和長
遠的安全需要至關重要。在力量和穩健上有任何不足，都會使台灣易遭不利，危
及地區和平，並有可能威脅美國的利益。我來依次談談這兩個根本因素。

強大的台灣

一個強大的台灣，簡單說，就是一個維持足夠的軍力、能夠在相當長的時期內頂
住打壓的台灣。只要北京知道，它無法在國際社會尚未作出反應前迅速制服台灣，
嚇阻就會產生作用。台灣的繁榮與社會安定當然也是另一個力量的泉源，但軍事
力量是不可缺少的。一個有自衛能力的台灣是和平的重要因素。一個強大的台灣
可以更有信心地與北京談判，從而為海峽兩岸的和平爭取更有效、更持久和更平
等的安排。

在數年明顯令人失望的表現後，近來在這方面有了令人高興的消息。僅從預算角
度來說，台北在提供國防經費方面作出了很大努力。台灣國防經費占國內生產毛
額的比例曾一度下降。但即使在那段時期，其國防預算仍相當可觀，比亞洲大多
數國家和地區都要高。鑒於佔大規模經濟中的一部分，這些預算為取得某些進展
奠定了基礎。今年，國防預算占國內生產毛額的比例終於又開始增大。我們對台
灣各大政黨領導人找到打破障礙的途徑表示祝賀。

當然，經費問題只是整體防禦的一部分。台灣還在確立更明智的優先重點和防衛
戰略。台灣增加了強化和保持防禦的預算，並採納現代作戰原則，利用台灣最重
要的實際資產，即其地理位置。台灣及其周邊地區構成一個具有天然軍事挑戰力
的環境，明智的國防支出和規劃可以保持這種環境。

美國的軍售為保持台灣的力量發揮了重要作用，當然，今天在場的各位對這一
主題會有特殊的興趣。布希政府於 2001 年批准了一整批軍售計畫，表明了美國
對本身角色的認識。布希政府履行《台灣關係法》規定的決心始終不容置疑，但台
灣防禦的主要問題，並非台北是否購買特定的武器系統，或這種武器系統是否
由本土工廠製造或從國外進口。主要問題是台灣整體防禦戰略的實質和維護延續
這一戰略的核心能力。針對這項戰略，也應該由台灣人民自己作出決定。坦率地
說，美國一貫關切的問題是，台灣至今尚未就美國認為台灣應有的安全，進行
長期廣泛的辯論。我們希望，在即將到來的選舉期間，台灣人民會要求自己的政
治候選人對這個極其重要的問題進行有理性、有成果的討論。
同時，我要對台灣執政黨和在野黨近年來的實質進展表示讚賞。在陳總統的領導
下，台灣國防部已開始制定更加周密的預算，並爭取增加整體國防開支。而由在
野黨控制的立法院則善盡職責，審查通過了有關預算，滿足了行政部門的大部
分經費要求。美國對這些發展表示歡迎，認為這是有希望的徵兆，讓我們看到台
灣的公共辯論日趨成熟，政治領導人放下追究彼此基本愛國立場的破壞性指責，
一致同意將防禦問題置於黨派政治之上。這些最近的事件能否變成一種長期的趨
勢，將取決於各政黨的領導人，包括今天在座的很多人。

穩健的台灣

現在我想談談另一個對台灣安全不可或缺的層面，即以穩健、精明、有效的政治
方式對待兩岸關係。如果不採取穩健立場，無論台北為防禦花費多少金錢、這 些
錢的分配有多麼合理，台灣的安全還是要受影響。同時，在所有條件相同的情況
下，台北對兩岸關係採取穩健立場，將減輕台灣軍隊所承受的壓力。

台灣處於一種微妙、而且確實獨特的政治地位。兩岸問題懸而未決，理所當然會
使很多人焦慮不安，但這是台灣大多數人民都能理解的生活現實。這種體認反映
在民意調查所顯示的，對維持現狀有力和一貫的支持。

就安全而言，情況基本清楚：只要台灣保持可靠的防衛能力，對台灣福祉的首
要威脅，是台北所採取的政治行動，有可能導致北京動武。美國一直反復表明不
容動用武力，我們也反復敦促北京提高軍事透明度，停止在台灣對岸的軍事集
結，並減少對台灣的軍事威脅。但我們在極力反對北京動武的同時，也嚴肅對待
這一威脅；台北也不能不這樣做，否則後果不堪設想。正因為如此，台灣的安全
與避免無謂的挑釁行為密不可分。這並不意味著，台北面對中華人民共和國的壓
力，應當或 只能處於被動，而是意味著有責任感的台北領導人，必須意識到潛
在的中國紅線和反應，避免不必要的、於事無助的挑釁行為。

正是從上述觀點出發，美國政府最近對陳水扁政府宣導的某些政策表示關注。我
想強調，美國與台灣整體的關係親密與互利一如既往。美國人民與台灣人民之間
的友誼根深蒂固，日益深厚。現在出現的分歧只涉及美台關係中相對窄小的一部
分。但由於這一部分直接關係到和平與穩定，因此這一分歧就很重要。

我們尤其表示特別關注的是，陳水扁政府支持以台灣名稱申請加入聯合國的公
投。台灣已有很多關於美國立場的說法，其中很多是錯誤的。請允許我做一些澄
清。

美國並不反對公投方式，台灣與其他任何民主體一樣有權舉行公投。但必須考慮
到任何公投的主題和內容。就申請加入聯合國舉行公投，但不在公投中提及更改
名稱──雖然在我們看來是奇怪無益的──但不會引起美國的強烈反應。鑒於人
人皆知，台灣大部分人民都希望看到台北申請加入聯合國，鑒於這樣的公投不
可能增加申請成功的可能性，大家也都會明白，支持這樣的公投只對影響台灣
島內的政治態勢有用。美國對此如何作出反應是明確的：我們會重申不支持台灣
申請加入需 要國家資格的國際組織，因而也不支持這樣的公投。

與申請加入聯合國的一般性公投相比，陳總統所支持的這項公投，使我們的關
注要大得多。確切而言，令我們擔心的是更改名稱問題。公投草案提出了台灣在
國際社會應使用什麼名稱的問題。而且，很多人可能將此視為具有法律效力的全
民表決。在理想世界中，我們沒有必要為此擔心。在各方用語中，我們都用"台
灣"這個名稱。國務院、台灣人民、甚至北京政府都用"台灣"。那麼，在這種比較正
式的政治和法律場合中，使用同樣的名稱又有什麼值得擔心的呢？但明顯的現
實是，在兩岸關係的現實世界中，政治象徵事關重大，對此的歧見可能引起嚴
重緊張局勢，甚至引發衝突。陳總統在 2000 年與 2004 年體認這類"象徵性"議題
的重要性，而向布希總統及國際社會保證，不會提出更改台灣的官方名稱，此
後也一再重申這個保證。

正是公投中要更改名稱的明顯意圖，使我們認為這項計畫是一個要改變現狀的
步驟。有人聲稱，這項公投即使通過，也不會等於是要更改名稱，坦率地說，我
們認為這完全是法律教條說法。歸根結底，如果具體名稱無關緊要，當初為什麼
還要把它列入公投草案呢？從根本的角度來講，公投支持者的教條論調讓人覺
得，他們不是在嚴肅對待台灣對美國和國際社會的承諾，可以無視台灣最堅定
的盟友的安全利益，而且不惜為短期政治利益，給台灣人民的安全利益帶來風
險。我們的根本立場是，這項公投給台灣和美國利益可能造成的損害也許很大，
而且與任何申請加入聯合國的公投一樣，對台灣的國際地位毫無助益，因此，
我們必須強烈反對這項公投。

我要正面反駁，指責美國在公投問題上的立場是在干涉台灣民主的言論。我代表
美國政府，堅決駁斥這一指控。鑒於美國幾十年來對台灣安全的承諾和對台灣
民主化過程的支持，這種指控根本站不住腳。現實情況是，民主體彼此可能而且
確實在政策問題上會有分歧。世界各地隨時都有這種情況發生。此外，如果一個
盟友正朝著不明智的方向發展，其他盟友理應提出告誡。鑒於美國對台灣安全的
關切，我們在這方面有更大責任。歸根結底，台北的行為可能威脅到的不僅是台
灣的和平與穩定。

美國無力也無權告訴台灣人民應如何行事。但作為朋友，我們感到有義務告誡台
灣人民，這項公投的內容考慮欠妥，有可能造成嚴重後果。給糟糕的公共政策提
案打上"民主"的旗號並不能美化它。令人慶幸的是，如果這項公投照舊舉行，我
們預料台灣有洞察力、有智慧的人民，將能看透言辭背後的真相並作出正確的判
斷，認識到公投不符合他們的利益，因為它會從根本上損害台灣的對外關係。除
了明顯威脅到台灣海峽的穩定以外，美國反對公投案的另一原因是，它對實現
所保證 的目標將適得其反：它會限制──而不是擴大──台灣的國際空間。與
此相反的論點聽起來壯烈激昂，但與我們周圍的證據相左。我可以以實際經歷這
樣對你們說，因為正是國務院在美國政府內，率先努力幫助維護和擴大台灣人
民的國際空間。令人懊惱的事實是，台北採取的沒有必要的挑釁行動，為北京限
制台灣的空間增加了籌碼，並會嚇跑可能幫助台灣的朋友。

這又是一個我們必須承認嚴峻事實的方面。不管我們喜歡不喜歡，世界上大多數
國家接受北京對台灣的界定，而且，在受激時，中華人民共和國可以號召壓倒
性支持，將台北邊緣化。當然，台灣人民長期受到中華人民共和國的壓力，我們
絕不是在要他們逆來順受；我們的立場絕非是被動的。但儘管如此，台北需要用
明智、周全的方式予以抵制，善用自己具有的優勢。正面出擊北京的敏感之處註
定要失敗，最終會導致台北更加遠落。舉行以台灣為名稱的入聯公投正是這樣一
種正面出擊，既沒有希望改變台灣在國際舞台上的實際地位，同時加劇了台海
緊張局勢，並且疏遠了可能支持台灣擴大國際空間的各方。

我要強調，我們不願意公開表示，我們與陳水扁政府在這個或任何其他政策上
的分歧。台灣是美國長期的朋友，我們不願意雙方在重要的議題上存在分歧。我
可以向你們保證，如果不是在長時期內，用盡了一切私下機會，傳遞始終如一
的、明確無誤的和有權威性的訊息，我們是不會這麼做的。問題不是誤解或缺乏
溝通，而是我們認為，這一舉措於台灣、於我們都不利，而我們別無他法，只好
直接向台灣人民表達我們的觀點。

有信心的台灣

在我用這個講台說明嚴峻事實的同時，讓我提出比較積極的一點，它雖不常被
提及但值得一提：讓我打破所謂台灣人民處境孤立或台灣是國際孤兒的迷思。是
的，台北只與很少國家有正式外交關係，而且不是聯合國成員。然而實情是：如
果台灣沒有廣泛融入國際社會，它就不可能是現在這樣一個第一世界、民主和商
業的重鎮；它的人民就不可能在全球從事商務旅行和觀光，它的民航班機和貨
輪就不可能穿越全球，它就不可能成為世界最重要的資訊技術源頭之一。台北也
許不能在外設立很多大使館，但它在全球設有幾十個非官方代表處，有專業外
交人員辦公，代理台灣人民的事務。僅在貿易領域，台北若非完全交織在支持國
際商務的國際機制密集網絡中，台灣會是一潭經濟死水。台北許多最重要的關係
雖為非官方，但真正的交流與合作每天每日都在進行。
要證實這點，只需注意新聞便可看到，台灣高階官員不斷一批批訪問華盛頓和
美國其他地方。人們常注重於沒有最高層訪問，但這類訪問在任何關係中都並非
頻繁。任何人只要留意便可清楚地看到，美台對話就實質和範圍而論，是與任何
其他中型夥伴旗鼓相當的。

我並不是力圖淡化台灣人民在國際空間上受到的真實限制，我也能體會由此導
致的沮喪。畢竟台灣在國際社會中的位置非同尋常。對於台灣民選領導層來說，
未來的挑戰是如何在這一背景下，促進人民的最大利益。令人慶幸的是，台灣過
去做得十分出色，如果台北好好利用自己的條件，今後會有多種積極正面的機
會。

美國的戰略利益

美國針對台灣海峽有著一貫的政策。年復一年，不論兩大黨哪一黨的政府，這項
政策不僅為美國人民而且為台灣人民帶來巨大好處。如果對於這一點有絲毫懷疑
的話，只要想一想距今差不多 30 年前，美國取消受承認台灣時的情況。今天它
生機勃勃的民主以及繁榮的第一世界社會，為台灣人民帶來了優越得多的生活。
作為台灣的朋友，作為對其民主與自由的不可或缺的支持者，美國在這方面地
位首屈一指。美國人民有理由為自己一次又一次的正確行動感到驕傲。

儘管我們對台灣的支持無庸置疑，但如果我說，美國界定自己的利益並對東亞
地區的各種發展作出自己的解釋，在座不會有人感到驚奇。因此，所謂美國與北
京協調對台政策的說法毫無根據。這種事根本不會發生。協調和合作這類字眼，
完全不適於用涉及台灣政策的華盛頓-北京關係。中國的觀點是否對美國的思維
有影響？當然有：如果我們不考慮中國的觀點，我們就是莽撞行事，台北也一
樣。但我可以向你們保證，美國政府各級官員中，沒有人花任何時間與北京協調
我們的對台政策。關於這類協調的謠傳很多；但如同許多其他謠傳一樣，沒有事
實根據。

同樣的，雖然我們與台北有著緊密、友好的關係，但我們也不讓台北來界定我們
的立場。為了眾所周知的原因，美國已經表明，反對台灣海峽兩岸任何一方片面
改變現狀。最近幾年台灣某些領導人堅稱台灣獨立是現狀，應該得到保護。對此，
請讓我最明確地說：雖然美國毫無疑問反對中國打壓台灣，但我們不承認台灣
是一個獨立的國家，我們不能接受主張台灣獨立有助於維持現狀和台海和平穩
定的論點。根據我上面舉出的理由，事實上，我們把這些主張連同以台灣名義加
入聯合國的公投，列為絕然不符合台灣人民或美國人最佳利益的無謂挑釁。

結語
請讓我回到使我們大家聚集在這裡的根本議題，來結束這次講話。無論在座各位
是陳總統政府中的官員、反對黨領袖、美國企業主管、新聞記者、學者、還是美國政
府官員，我們都對台灣的安全有著持久關注──台灣是美國的一個重要朋友，
在一個敏感地區中佔有微妙的地位。美國政府相信，一個強大和穩健的台灣，對
台灣海峽的和平與穩定十分重要；在今後台灣人民尋求促進他們利益的歲月裡，
我們將繼續是台灣人民堅貞不渝的夥伴。(完)