SHIRLEY LORIA TOLEDO and ROSIE LORIA DAJAC, complainants, vs. JUDGE ALFREDO E. KALLOS, Respondent.

For our resolution is the verified complaint, written in the vernacular and dated 21 August 2002, of siblings Shirley Loria Toledo and Rosie Loria Dajac against respondent Judge Alfredo E. Kallos, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Legazpi City, Branch 10, for violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct, the Code of Professional Responsibility, and Article 1491 (5) of the Civil Code. Prior to his appointment as a judge in March 1995,[1] Judge Kallos was complainants' counsel of record in Civil Case No. 4879 filed with the RTC of Legazpi City, Branch 4, involving the recovery of hereditary shares with damages. On 25 March 1979, a judgment was rendered ordering the defendants to, among other things, turn over to herein complainants, the plaintiffs therein, the possession and ownership of the total area of 4,514 square meters of 'lot 2082 Albay Cadastre. On appeal, the decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals and became final and executory on 16 December 1985.[2] Several years thereafter, or in February 2002, the respondent filed in the same action, Civil Case No. 4879, before the RTC of Legazpi, Branch 4, an Omnibus Motion[3] praying, inter alia, for the issuance an order constituting in his favor an attorney's lien to the extent of one-third over the lot awarded in favor of the complainants representing his attorney's fee. He based his motion on a written contingency agreement on attorney's fees for professional services rendered whereby he is entitled to one-third share of what would be awarded to the complainants. He claimed that this agreement had already been implemented when 'one of the three (3) lots levied upon by the sheriff to answer for the award of damages was given to (him) as his one-third share while the other two lots went to the plaintiffs as their two-third share ' [as] evidenced by the Definite Deed of Sale and Transfer Certificate of Titles Nos. T-77728, T-77458 and T-77459. However, he misplaced a copy of said written agreement. In the meantime, or on 5 September 2002, the complainants filed before this Court, through the Office of the Court Administrator, the subject verified complaint. Here, complainants pray for three things. First, they pray for an order directing the respondent to stop demanding his '1/3 share attorney's fees. They assert that the respondent has no basis for his claim because he failed to show in court proof of the alleged written contingency fee agreement. They also belie respondent's insistence in his Omnibus Motion that the said agreement had already been implemented when, on execution, one of three lots levied upon by the sheriff was given to him as his 1/3 share. They emphasize that all the lots levied by the sheriff were given to them. However, the respondent 'forced them to sign a Deed of Absolute Sale on 16 January 1990 involving a parcel of land valued in the document at P10,000, but actually worth more than P500,000, in payment of his attorney's fees. While they did not want to sign the document because respondent appeared in their case only during execution, they were constrained to do so for fear that something adverse might happen to their case, as the respondent so warned them. The latter told them that they would not have won the case were it not for his services. The complainants thus seek, as their second prayer, the recovery of the property involved in said Deed of Absolute Sale. They argue that pursuant to Article 1491(5) of the Civil Code, lawyers are prohibited from buying their client's properties when the same are still the object of litigation. To prove that the respondent was still their counsel when the sale took place, the complainants attached to their complaint the Motion to Terminate Services dated 23 June 1994, which was based on respondent's being remiss in his duties and responsibilities as their lawyer, and the Order of the court dated 29 June 1994, approving the termination. Third, the complainants pray for the removal of the respondent from his position as RTC judge for his alleged abusive conduct unbecoming a judge. In his Comment dated 25 November 2002, the respondent denies the allegations against him and asserts that he is only claiming what is due him. He vehemently denies that he appeared in the case only during the execution stage, pointing to the Minutes of Hearing and the Order, both dated 05 October 1973, which show that he entered his appearance as counsel for the complainants as early as 5 October 1973, or two months after the complaint was filed. He continuously handled the case from then on, as shown by copies of the minutes of the hearings and orders issued by the RTC, until a favorable judgment was rendered on 25 March 1979 and the subject properties were levied upon on execution to satisfy the judgment. He insists that he was never remiss in the performance of his duties and responsibilities as complainants' counsel. The respondent further alleges that the existence of the agreement on attorney's fees was admitted by complainant Shirley Loria Toledo as evidenced by the order issued by the court on 01 March 2002, which states that Ms. Toledo came to the court informally informing it that she had a copy of the contract on attorney's fees.[4] As regards the Deed of Absolute Sale, respondent admits that he was still complainants' lawyer when the lot was transferred in his name. The lot was given to him by the complainants and their mother, pursuant to their written contingency agreement, as his 1/3 share in the three parcels of land levied upon by the sheriff to settle the accrued rentals awarded in the second paragraph of the dispositive portion of the decision. He did not pay for it. The figure appearing on the document was written only to facilitate the transaction. He never compelled the complainants and their mother to sell to him the parcel of land. Neither did he tell them that nothing would happen to their case without him. Finally, the respondent asserts that his claim for attorney's fees is still being litigated in Civil Case No. 4879. Thus, the instant complaint is premature. In their Rejoinder dated 7 January 2003, the complainants insist that there is no basis for respondent's claim for attorney's fees for the following reasons: (1) the respondent failed to present the agreement on attorney's fees; (2) attorney's fees were not awarded by the RTC or the Court of Appeals; and (3) Civil Case No. 4879 is in its execution stage. After evaluating the pleadings submitted by the parties, the Court Administrator found[5] that respondent was, indeed, complainants' counsel in Civil Case No. 4879, and he should therefore be compensated for his services. The act of demanding payment for his attorney's fees is not a ground for administrative liability. However, he can be allowed only fair and reasonable attorney's fees under Canon 20 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. As to this, the Court Administrator stated: On the question of whether respondent violated Article 1491(5) of the Civil Code, the Court Administrator found that this may be fairly resolved in an investigation, there being a factual dispute, and recommended that the complaint be referred to an Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals pursuant to Section 3, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court. On the basis of this recommendation, we referred the matter to Associate Justice Jose Mendoza of the Court of Appeals for investigation, report, and recommendation. In his Report,[6] Justice Mendoza found that the respondent indeed represented the complainants in Civil Case No. 4879. Like the Court Administrator, he expresses the view that the act of demanding attorney's fees for services rendered is not a ground for administrative sanction. He finds that when the respondent made the demand, he did so as a lawyer who obtained a favorable judgment for his client, and not as a judge. As a lawyer, it is but just that he be fairly compensated for his services. And his filing of a claim for

attorney's fees in Civil Case No. 4879 was an appropriate legal remedy. Considering the pendency of such claim, Justice Mendoza recommends the suspension of the determination of the instant administrative complaint until the rendition of a final judicial ruling on the matter of respondent's attorney's fees; thus: As the said issue is still being litigated in the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. 4879, it is the view of the undersigned that the complaint is still premature '. In other words, the complaint is not yet ripe for administrative evaluation. The hearing on the matter being conducted by the court below should be allowed to run its course as that court is the appropriate forum for a ruling on the dispute. To make a determination at this time on whether the respondent violated Article 1491 (A) would be to preempt the lower court in its resolution of the issue. Any recommendation by the undersigned in this administrative case and subsequent resolution by the Honorable Supreme Court on the matter would certainly affect or influence the thinking of the trial court before which the matter is pending. In such a case, it will be unfair to either party. At any rate, the party who would feel aggrieved might still elevate the decision to the higher courts. This recommendation is not without precedent. In the case of Spouses De Leon v. Hon. Bonifacio, Adm. Case No. 4467, October 10, 1997, the then Deputy Court Administrator, Hon. Reynaldo Suarez, recommended the dismissal of the case for being judicial in nature or, at least, premature. In this case, the respondent is not being charged for his acts or decisions as a judge. Rather, he has been charged for dealing with the property of his client which is prohibited by law. Nevertheless, the principle is the same, in that, the matter is still judicial in nature.We agree with Justice Mendoza. It is fundamental that a claim for attorney's fees may be asserted either in the very action in which the services of a lawyer had been rendered or in a separate action.[7] The respondent chose to file his claim for attorney's fees in the same case in which he served as counsel for the complainants. As mentioned, this is a proper remedy under our jurisdiction and is preferred to an independent action as it avoids multiplicity of suits. Besides, the right to recover attorney's fees is but an incident of the case in which the services of counsel have been rendered. Moreover, the court trying the case is to a certain degree already familiar with the nature and extent of the lawyer's services[8] and is in a better position to decide the question of fees. Undisputably, respondent's claim for attorney's fees is under litigation. We find in the records an Order dated 7 January 2004 issued in Civil Case No. 4879 which granted respondent's prayer for '1/3 share of attorney's fees in the proceeds of litigation as claimed in his Omnibus Motion dated 14 February 2002. This Order is the subject of a motion for reconsideration by the complainants, as stated in respondent's Manifestation dated 24 January 2004[9] filed in the investigation proceedings conducted by Justice Mendoza. Also part of the records is respondent's Affidavit dated 1 December 2003, filed in the same investigation proceedings, alluding to the complainants' filing of a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus in the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 80090, seeking to reverse the Order of the trial court denying complainants' Motion to Dismiss respondent's Omnibus Motion. We, therefore, find no cogent reason for us to resolve complainants' first two issues raised in the verified complaint, for they are inextricably inherent in the claim of the respondent in his Omnibus Motion, which is pending judicial determination. 'Since respondent's claim for attorney's fees in the main case has not yet become final, the objection of prematurity obtains, as a contrary holding may be preemptive of a final judicial determination of factual and evidentiary matters inherent in the claim.[10] Clearly, the reliefs asked by the complainants are judicial in nature.[11] And, if only for an orderly administration of justice, the proceedings in Civil Case No. 4879 should be allowed to continue and take its course, and the claim of the respondent judicially settled first. But while we give deference to the wisdom of the trial court to initially decide respondent's claim for attorney's fees, we deem it appropriate to reiterate certain principles governing the payment of attorney's fees and impart our observations on the instant claim. Foremost of these principles is that the act of demanding attorney's fees for services rendered is not a ground for an administrative sanction. On the contrary, Canon 20 of the Code of Professional Responsibility allows lawyers to charge fair and reasonable fees. As long as a lawyer honestly and in good faith serves and represents the interest of the client, he should have a reasonable compensation for his service.[12] Lawyers are thus as much entitled to judicial protection against injustice on the part of their clients as the clients are against abuses on the part of counsel. The duty of the court is not only to see that lawyers act in a proper and lawful manner, but also to see that lawyers are paid their just and lawful fees.[13] Thus, in J.K. Mercado and Sons Agricultural Enterprises, Inc. v. De Vera, [14] citing Albano v. Coloma,[15] we stressed: While, indeed, the practice of law is not a business venture, a lawyer, nevertheless, is entitled to be duly compensated for professional services rendered. So, also, he must be protected against clients who wrongly refuse to give him his just due. In Albano vs. Coloma, this Court has said: Counsel, any counsel, who is worthy of his hire, is entitled to be fully recompensed for his services. With his capital consisting solely of his brains and with his skill, acquired at tremendous cost not only in money but in the expenditure of time and energy, he is entitled to the protection of any judicial tribunal against any attempt on the part of a client to escape payment of his fees. It is indeed ironic if after putting forth the best that is in him to secure justice for the party he represents, he himself would not get his due. Such an eventuality this Court is determined to avoid. It views with disapproval any and every effort of those benefited by counsel's services to deprive him of his hard-earned honorarium. Such an attitude deserves condemnation. It should be stressed in this connection that the absence of a written contract will not preclude the finding that there was a professional relationship that justifies the collection of attorney's fees for professional services rendered. Documentary formalism is not an essential element in the employment of an attorney; the contract may be express or implied. To establish the relation, it is sufficient that the advice and assistance of an attorney is sought and received in any matter pertinent to his profession.[16] Hence, with or without a contingency agreement between the complainants and the respondent, the trial court must determine the propriety of respondent's claim for attorney's fees and the reasonable amount thereof. The third issue raised in the verified complaint deserves a short shrift. No evidence was presented to prove respondent's alleged abusive conduct unbecoming a judge. The complainants do not dispute the fact that the respondent was not yet a judge when the assailed action or conduct was allegedly committed by him. As such, and to that extent, there is no reason to bind him by the strict standards of the Code of Judicial Conduct for acts committed as counsel to a case prior to his appointment as a judge. WHEREFORE, the instant administrative complaint is DISMISSED for being premature and for lack of merit.Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.

Dalisay Versus Artty. Mauricio

At bar is a motion for reconsideration of our Decision dated April 22, 2005 finding Atty. Melanio Batas Mauricio, Jr., respondent, guilty of malpractice and gross misconduct and imposing upon him the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months. A brief revisit of facts is imperative, thus On October 13, 2001, Valeriana U. Dalisay, complainant, engaged respondents services as counsel in Civil Case No. 00-044, entitled Lucio De Guzman, etc., complainants, v. Dalisay U. Valeriana, respondent, pending before the Municipal Trial Court, Branch 1, Binangonan, Rizal. Notwithstanding his receipt of documents and attorneys fees in the total amount of P56,000.00 from complainant, respondent never rendered legal services for her. As a result, she terminated the attorney-client relationship and demanded the return of her money and documents, but respondent refused. On January 13, 2004, Investigating Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar Discipline, found that for the amount of P56,000.00 paid by the complainant x x x, no action had been taken nor any pleadings prepared by the respondent except his alleged conferences and opinions rendered when complainant frequented his law office. She recommended that respondent be required to refund the amount of P56,000.00 to the complainant, and surprisingly, that the complaint be dismissed. On February 27, 2004, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XVI-2004-121, adopting and approving in totoCommissioner Navarros Report and Recommendation. On April 22, 2005, we rendered the assailed Decision. Incidentally, upon learning of our Decision, respondent went to the MTC, Branch I, Binangonan, Rizal to verify the status of Civil Case No. 00-044. There, he learned of the trial courts Decision dated December 6, 2001 holding that the tax declarations and title submitted by complainant are not official records of the Municipal Assessor and the Registry of Deed. Thereupon, respondent filed a Sworn Affidavit Complaint[1] against complainant charging her with violations of Article 171[2] and 172,[3] and/or Article 182[4] of the Revised Penal Code. He alleged that complainant offered tampered evidence. In this motion for reconsideration, respondent raises the following arguments: First, complainant did not engage his services as counsel in Civil Case No. 00-044. She hired him for the purpose of filing two new petitions, a petition for declaration of nullity of title and a petition for review of a decree. Second, Civil Case No. 00-044 was considered submitted for decision as early as August 6, 2001, or more than two months prior to October 13, 2001, the date he was engaged as counsel, hence, he could not have done anything anymore about it. Third, complainant refused to provide him with documents related to the case, preventing him from doing his job. And fourth, complainant offered tampered evidence in Civil Case No. 00-004, prompting him to file falsification cases against her. In her opposition to the motion, complainant contends that: (1) respondent violated the principle of confidentiality between a lawyer and his client when he filed falsification charges against her; (2) respondent should have returned her money; (3)respondent should have verified the authenticity of her documents earlier if he really believed that they are falsified; and (4) his refusal to return her money despite this Courts directive constitutes contempt. We deny respondents motion for reconsideration. It is axiomatic that no lawyer is obliged to act either as adviser or advocate for every person who may wish to become his client. He has the right to decline employment. But once he accepts money from a client, an attorney-client relationship is established, giving rise to the duty of fidelity to the clients cause.[5] From then on, he is expected to be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. He must serve the client with competence and diligence, and champion the latters cause with wholehearted devotion. [6] Respondent assumed such obligations when he received the amount of P56,000.00 from complainant and agreed to handle Civil Case No. 00-044. Unfortunately, he had been remiss in the performance of his duties. As we have ruled earlier, there is nothing in the records to show that he (respondent) entered his appearance as counsel of record for complainant in Civil Case No. 00-044. Neither is there any evidence nor pleading submitted to show that he initiated new petitions. With ingenuity, respondent now claims that complainant did not engage his services for Civil Case No. 00-044 but, instead, she engaged him for the filing of two new petitions. This is obviously a last-ditch attempt to evade culpability. Respondent knows very well that if he can successfully disassociate himself as complainants counsel in

Civil Case No.00-044, he cannot be held guilty of any dereliction of duties. But respondents current assertion came too late in the day. He is already bound by his previous statements. In his Verified Comment on the Affidavit-Complaint,[7] he categorically stated that complainant engaged his services in Civil Case No. 00-044, originally handled by Atty. Oliver Lozano, thus: 4.a. Complainant was referred to the Respondent by Atty. Oliver Lozano. 4.b. The referral intrigued Respondent no end, simply because Atty. Oliver Lozano is a bright lawyer and is very much capable of handling Civil Case No. 00-044. 4.c. Respondent-out of respect from Atty. Oliver Lozano did not inquire the reason for the referral. But he was made to understand that he was being referred because Atty. Oliver Lozano believed that Respondent would be in a better position to prosecute and/or defend the Complainant in Civil Case No. 00-044. 5.c. Complainant went to the law office of Respondent on October 13, 2001 and demanded that he provides her with free legal service.5.e. Respondent, however, told Complainant that the case (Civil Case No. 00-044) would not entitle her to a free legal service and advised her to just re-engage the services of Atty. Oliver Lozano. 5.f. Undaunted, Complainant asked Respondent to assess her case and how she and her lawyer should go prosecuting and/or defending her position therein. 5.g. Honestly believing that Complainant was no longer represented by counsel in Civil Case No. 00-044 at that time, Respondent gave his professional opinion on the factual and legal matters surrounding the said case.5.h. Apparently impressed with the opinion of the Respondent, Complainant became even more adamant in asking the former to represent her in Civil Case No. 00-044. 5.i. Respondent then told Complainant that she would be charged as a regular client is she insists in retaining his services. 5.j. It was at this juncture that Complainant asked Respondent about his fees. 5.k. After re-assessing Civil Case No. 00-044, Respondent told Complainant that he will have to charge her with an acceptance fee of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00), aside form being charged for papers/pleadings that may have to be prepared and filed in court in connection with the aforesaid case.5.n. A few days after, Respondent got a call from Atty. Oliver Lozano. The said Atty. Oliver Lozano interceded for and in behalf of Complainant and asked that the acceptance fee that Respondent was charging the Complainant be reduced. 5.r. Complainant then returned to the office of the Respondent on October 20, 2001. The latter then informed the former of his conversation with Atty. Oliver Lozano and his (respondents) decision to reduce the acceptance fee. 5.s. Complainant was very grateful at the time, even shedding a tear or two simply because Respondent had agreed to handle her case at a greatly reduced acceptance fee. Statements of similar tenor can also be found in respondents Memorandum[8] filed with the IBP. Undoubtedly, respondents present version is a flagrant departure from his previous pleadings. This cannot be countenanced. A party should decide early what version he is going to advance. A change of theory in the latter stage of the proceedings is objectionable, not due to the strict application of procedural rules, but because it is contrary to the rules of fair play, justice and due process.[9] The present administrative case was resolved by the IBP on the basis of respondents previous admission that complainant engaged his legal services in Civil Case No. 00-044. He cannot now unbind himself from such admission and its consequences. In fact, if anything at all has been achieved by respondents inconsistent assertions, it is his dishonesty to this Court. At any rate, assuming arguendo that complainant indeed engaged respondents services in filing the two (2) new petitions, instead of Civil Case No. 00-044, still, his liability is unmistakable. There is nothing in the records to show that he filed any petition. The ethics of the profession demands that, in such a case, he should immediately return the filing fees to complainant. In Parias v. Paguinto,[10] we held that a lawyer shall account for all money or property collected from the client. Money entrusted to a lawyer for a specific purpose, such as for filing fee, but not used for failure to file the case must immediately be returned to the client on demand. Per records, complainant made repeated demands, but respondent is yet to return the money.Neither do we find merit in respondents second argument. The fact that Civil Case No. 00-044 was already submitted for decision does not justify his inaction. After agreeing to handle Civil Case No. 00-044, his duty is, first and foremost, to enter his appearance. Sadly, he failed to do this simple task. He should have returned complainants money. Surely, he cannot expect to be paid for doing nothing. In his third argument, respondent attempts to evade responsibility by shifting the blame to complainant. He claims that she refused to provide him with documents vital to the case. He further claims that he would be violating the Code of Professional Responsibility by handling a case without adequate preparation. This is preposterous. When a lawyer accepts a case, his acceptance is an implied representation that he possesses the requisite academic learning, skill and ability to handle the case.[11] As a lawyer, respondent knew where to obtain copies of the certificates of title. As a matter of fact, he admitted that his Law Office, on its own, managed to verify the authenticity of complainants title. It bears reiterating that respondent did not take any action on the case despite having been paid for his services. This is tantamount to abandonment of his duties as a lawyer and taking undue advantage of his client. Finally, in an ironic twist of fate, respondent became the accuser of complainant. In his fourth argument, respondent accuses her of offering falsified documentary evidence in Civil Case No. 00-004, prompting him to file falsification cases against her. He thus justifies his inability to render legal services to complainant.Assuming that complainant indeed offered falsified documentary evidence in Civil Case No. 00-044, will it be sufficient to exonerate respondent? We believe not. First, Canon 19 outlines the

procedure in dealing with clients who perpetrated fraud in the course of a legal proceeding. Consistent with its mandate that a lawyer shall represent his client with zeal and only within the bounds of the law, Rule 19.02 of the same Canon specifically provides: Rule 19.02 A lawyer who has received information that his clients has, in the course of the representation, perpetrated a fraud upon a person or tribunal, shall promptly call upon the client to rectify the same, and failing which he shall terminate the relationship with such client in accordance with the Rules of Court. As a lawyer, respondent is expected to know this Rule. Instead of inaction, he should have confronted complainant and ask her to rectify her fraudulent representation. If complainant refuses, then he should terminate his relationship with her. Understandably, respondent failed to follow the above-cited Rule. This is because there is no truth to his claim that he did not render legal service to complainant because she falsified the documentary evidence in Civil Case No.00-044. This brings us to thesecond reason why we cannot sustain his fourth argument. The pleadings show that he learned of the alleged falsification long after complainant had terminated their attorney-client relationship. It was a result of his active search for a justification of his negligence in Civil Case No. 00-044. As a matter of fact, he admitted that he verified the authenticity of complainants title only after the news of his suspension spread in the legal community. To our mind, there is absurdity in invoking subsequent knowledge of a fact as justification for an act or omission that is fait accompli.Obviously, in filing falsification charges against complainant, respondent was motivated by vindictiveness. In fine, let it be stressed that the authority of an attorney begins with his or her retainer.[12] It gives rise to a relationship between an attorney and a client that is highly fiduciary in nature and of a very delicate, exacting, and confidential character, requiring a high degree of fidelity and good faith.[13] If much is demanded from an attorney, it is because the entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it the correlative duties not only to the client but also to the court, to the bar, and to the public. A lawyer who performs his duty with diligence and candor not only protects the interest of his client; he also serves the ends of justice, does honor to the bar, and helps maintain the respect of the community to the legal profession.[14] Indeed, law is an exacting goddess demanding of her votaries not only intellectual but also moral discipline. WHEREFORE, we DENY respondents motion for reconsideration. Our Decision dated April 22, 2005 is immediately executory. Respondent is directed to report immediately to the Office of the Bar Confidant his compliance with our Decision. Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to his personal record and copies furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts. SO ORDERED.

LUZVIMINDA C. LIJAUCO,A.C. No. 6317 ATTY. ROGELIO P. TERRADO,

DECISION YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: On February 13, 2004, an administrative complaint[1] was filed by complainant Luzviminda C. Lijauco against respondent Atty. Rogelio P. Terrado for gross misconduct, malpractice and conduct unbecoming of an officer of the court when he neglected a legal matter entrusted to him despite receipt of payment representing attorney's fees. According to the complainant, she engaged the services of respondent sometime in January 2001 for P70,000.00 to assist in recovering her deposit with Planters Development Bank, Buendia, Makati branch in the amount of P180,000.00 and the release of her foreclosed house and lot located in Calamba, Laguna. The property identified as Lot No. 408-C-2 and registered as TCT No. T-402119 in the name of said bank is the subject of a petition for the issuance of a writ of possession then pending before the Regional Trial Court of Binan, Laguna, Branch 24 docketed as LRC Case No. B-2610. Complainant alleged that respondent failed to appear before the trial court in the hearing for the issuance of the Writ of Possession and did not protect her interests in the Compromise Agreement which she subsequently entered into to end LRC Case No. B-2610.[2] Respondentdenied the accusations against him.He averred that the P70,000.00 he received from complainant was payment for legal services for the recovery of the deposit with Planters Development Bank and did not include LRC Case No. B-2610 pending before the Regional Trial Court of Bian, Laguna. The complaint was referred[3] to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. On September 21, 2005, the Investigating Commissioner submitted his report finding respondent guilty of violating Rules 1.01 and 9.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provide: Rule 1.01 ' A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Rule 9.02 ' A lawyer shall not divide or stipulate to divide a fee for legal services with persons not licensed to practice law, except: a)cralawWhere there is a pre-existing agreement with a partner or associate that, upon the latter's death, money shall be paid over a reasonable period of time to his estate or to the persons specified in the agreement; or b)cralawWhere a lawyer undertakes to complete unfinished legal business of a deceased lawyer; or c)cralawWhere a lawyer or law firm includes non-lawyer employees in a retirement plan, even if the plan is based in whole or in part, on a profit-sharing arrangement. In finding the respondent guilty of violating Rules 1.01 and 9.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Investigating Commissioner opined that: In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant. To be made the suspension or disbarment of a lawyer, the charge against him must be established by convincing proof. The record must disclose as free from doubt a case which compels the exercise by the Supreme Court of its disciplinary powers. The dubious character of the act done as well as of the motivation thereof must be clearly demonstrated. x x x. In the instant scenario, despite the strong protestation of respondent that the Php70,000.00 legal fees is purely and solely for the recovery of the Php180,000.00 savings account of complainant subsequent acts and events say otherwise, to wit: 1.)cralawThe Php70,000.00 legal fees for the recovery of a Php180,000.00 savings deposit is too high; 2.)cralawRespondent actively acted as complainant's lawyer to effectuate the compromise agreement. By openly admitting he divided the Php70,000.00 to other individuals as commission/referral fees respondent violated Rule 9.02, Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that a lawyer shall not divide or stipulate to divide a fee for legal services with persons not licensed to practice law. Worst, by luring complainant to participate in a compromise agreement with a false and misleading assurance that complainant can still recover after Three (3) years her foreclosed property respondent violated Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which says a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.[4] The Investigating Commissioner thus recommended: WHEREFORE, finding respondent responsible for aforestated violations to protect the public and the legal profession from his kind, it is recommended that he be suspended for Six (6) months with a stern warning that similar acts in the future will be severely dealt with.[5] The IBP Board of Governors adopted the recommendation of the investigating commissioner.[6] We agree with the findings of the IBP. The practice of law is a privilege bestowed on those who show that they possessed and continue to possess the legal qualifications for it. Indeed, lawyers are expected to maintain at all times a high standard of legal proficiency and morality, including honesty, integrity and fair dealing. They must perform their fourfold duty to society, the legal profession, the courts and their clients, in accordance with the values and norms of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility.[7]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary Lawyers are prohibited from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct[8] and are mandated to serve their clients with competence and diligence.[9]They shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to them, and this negligence in connection therewith shall render them liable.[10]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary Respondent's claim that the attorney's fee pertains only to the recovery of complainant's savings deposit from Planter's Development Bank cannot be sustained. Records show that he acted as complainant's counsel in the drafting of the compromise agreement between the latter and the bank relative to LRC Case No. B-2610. Respondent admitted that he explained the contents of the agreement to complainant before the latter affixed her signature.Moreover, the Investigating

Commissioner observed that the fee of P70,000.00 for legal assistance in the recovery of the deposit amounting to P180,000.00 is unreasonable. A lawyer shall charge only fair and reasonable fees.[11]cralaw cralaw Respondent's disregard for his client's interests is evident in the iniquitous stipulations in the compromise agreement where the complainant conceded the validity of the foreclosure of her property; that the redemption period has already expired thus consolidating ownership in the bank, and that she releases her claims against it.[12] As found by the Investigating Commissioner, complainant agreed to these concessions because respondent misled her to believe that she could still redeem the property after three years from the foreclosure.The duty of a lawyer to safeguard his clients interests commences from his retainer until his discharge from the case or the final disposition of the subject matter of litigation.Acceptance of money from a client establishes anattorney-client relationship and gives rise to the duty of fidelity to the clients cause.The canons of the legal profession require that once an attorney agrees to handle a case, he should undertake the task with zeal, care and utmost devotion.[13]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary Respondent's admission[14] that he divided the legal fees with two other people as a referral fee does not release him from liability. A lawyer shall not divide or stipulate to divide a fee for legal services with persons not licensed to practice law, except in certain cases.[15]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a member of the Bar may be disbarred or suspended on the following grounds: 1) deceit; 2) malpractice, or other gross misconduct in office; 3) grossly immoral conduct; 4) conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; 5) violation of the lawyer's oath; 6) willful disobedience to any lawful order of a superior court; and 7) willfully appearing as an attorney for a party without authority. In Santos v. Lazaro[16]and Dalisay v. Mauricio, Jr.,[17] we held that Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility is a basic postulate in legal ethics. When a lawyer takes a client's cause, he covenants that he will exercise due diligence in protecting his rights. The failure to exercise that degree of vigilance and attention makes such lawyer unworthy of the trust reposed in him by his client and makes him answerable not just to his client but also to the legal profession, the courts and society. A lawyer should give adequate attention, care and time to his clients case. Once he agrees to handle a case, he should undertake the task with dedication and care. If he fails in this duty, he is not true to his oath as a lawyer. Thus, a lawyer should accept only as much cases as he can efficiently handle in order to sufficiently protect his clients' interests. It is not enough that a lawyer possesses the qualification to handle the legal matter; he must also give adequate attention to his legal work. Utmost fidelity is demanded once counsel agrees to take the cudgels for his clients cause.[18] In view of the foregoing, we find that suspension from the practice of law for six months is warranted. In addition, he is directed to return to complainant the amount he received by way of legal fees pursuant to existing jurisprudence.[19] WHEREFORE, Atty. Rogelio P. Terrado is found GUILTY of violating Rules 1.01, 9.02, 18.02 and 20.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months effective from notice, and STERNLY WARNED that any similar infraction will be dealt with more severely. He is further ordered to RETURN, within thirty (30) days from notice, the sum of P70,000.00 to complainant Luzviminda C. Lijauco and to submit to this Court proof of his compliance within three (3) days therefrom. Let copies of this Decision be entered in the record of respondent and served on the IBP, as well as on the Court Administrator who shall circulate it to all courts for their information and guidance. SO ORDERED.

Section 24. Compensation of attorneys; agreement as to fees. An attorney shall be entitled to have and recover from his client no more than a reasonable compensation for his services, with a view to the importance of the subject matter of the controversy, the extent of the services rendered, and the professional standing of the attorney. No court shall be bound by the opinion of attorneys as expert witnesses as to the proper compensation, but may disregard such testimony and base its conclusion on its own professional knowledge. A written contract for services shall control the amount to be paid therefor unless found by the court to be unconscionable or unreasonable.