JAAKKO HINTIKKA

INTUITIONISTIC LOGIC AS EPISTEMIC LOGIC

In the present day and age, it seems that every constructivist philosopher of mathematics and her brother wants to be known as an intuitionist. In this paper, it will be shown that such a self-identication is in most cases mistaken. For one thing, not any old (or new) constructivism is intuitionism because not any old relevant construction is carried out mentally in intuition, as Brouwer envisaged. But if so, if intuitionism is not (a variety of) constructivism, what is it? What do the intuitions of the genuine intuitionists add up to? Are their intentions reected faithfully in Heytings intuitionistic logic? Scarcely, for several different reasons. First, if Heytings axiomatization is intended as a rival to systems of the usual classical logic, it must be considered as a theory of logical truths (truths in every possible model), not of what is true simpliciter (intuitionistically or not) in the actual world, for that is what the axiomatizations of classical logic are. Perhaps we can gather from Heytings logic indirectly what intuitionistic truth (material truth, including mathematical truth) is supposed to be like. But such a subtext has not been uncovered yet. Moreover, even if Heytings axiom system is interpreted so as to deal with plain truth, it still is only a formalisation of how an intuitionist is supposed to talk about logic, for instance, about how to draw inferences, not a theory of the operations that constitute logic, that is, about what it is about those inferences that make them valid. One clue is nevertheless suggested by Heytings purportedly intuitionistic system. His logic has been successfully interpreted as a part of epistemic logic. This is highly suggestive, for Brouwer and his soulmates were obviously very much concerned with mathematical knowledge as much as (and more than) mathematical truths. For instance, Brouwers counter-examples to the law of excluded middle are blatantly in terms of what is known, not of what is the case. However, it will be shown later in this paper that Heytings logic misses the subtlest aspect of epistemic logic, the logic of our knowledge of objects (rather than truths). And this is not a minor blemish, for what Heyting misses is the aspect of epistemic logic that is precisely what is needed to capture intuitionists characteristic ideas, it will be argued below.
Synthese 127: 719, 2001. 2001 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

JAAKKO HINTIKKA

But what are the intentions of the founding fathers of intuitionism? An example can illustrate the situation. A crucial experiment is presented to us by the most important single bone of contention in the early controversies between intuitionists and their opponents. This paradigm problem concerns the status of the axiom of choice. This axiom was rmly rejected by Brouwer and it was mooted in the controversies between the French intuitionists and their opponents (cf. Moore 1982, 92103; 135137; 311320). For the purposes of this paper, we can consider the second-order form of the axiom schema for this axiom: (1) (x)(y)S[x, y] (f )(x)S[x, f (x)]

The antecedent of (1), that is, (2) (x)(y)S[x, y]

is true according to our intuitive presystematic ideas if and only if for each value of x there is a value of y, dependent on x, which makes the matrix S[x, y] true. Such verifying individuals are sometimes known as witness individuals. If f is a function that expresses the dependence of witness individual y on x, then f satises (3) (x)S[x, f (x)]

But this means that (1) always is true according to our intuitions if (2) is. The function f selects one member of each class {y : S[x, y]} and hence is a choice function in the sense of the axiom of choice. The axiom of choice is true. The idea of choosing or nding suitable individuals is systematised in what is known as game-theoretical semantics. For mathematicians, this semantics is no novelty, however, but little more than a regimentation and generalisation of the way of thinking that underlies mathematicians classical (or perhaps I should say Weierstrassian) epsilon-delta analyses of the basic concepts of calculus, such as continuity and differentiation. This epsilon-delta technique can be formulated in the form of a semantical game G(S) connected with each sentence S of a rst-order language (in negation normal form with , and & as the propositional connectives). My moves (the veriers moves) are choices of values of existentially quantied variables and of disjuncts; my opponents (the falsiers) moves are choices of values of universally quantied variables and of conjuncts. Negation means an interchange of the roles of the two players. I win if the

INTUITIONISTIC LOGIC AS EPISTEMIC LOGIC

eventual outcome is a true atomic sentence, the falsier wins if it is a false one. The sentence S is true if and only if there exists a winning strategy for the verier. In (2) a winning strategy means a function f that satises (3). Hence the consequent of (1) (4) (f )(x)S[x, f(x)]

is precisely the truth-condition of (2), and (1) is therefore a simple consequence of the truth-denition for the language in question. This result can be generalised. The function f is what is known as a Skolem function of (2). In game-theoretical semantics, the truth-condition of a rst-order sentence simply says that all its Skolem functions exist. Strictly speaking, the notion of a Skolem function has to be extended here somewhat, so that Skolem functions govern, not only the choices of the values of existentially quantied variables, but also choices of disjuncts. Here we already have reached an interesting possibility. We can generalise the axiom of choice by requiring that all the Skolem functions of any true sentence exist. This generalisation has all the same reasons backing it up as the special case (1), that is, the case that can be said to embody the usual axiom of choice. Indeed, the generalisation is clearly valid in second-order logic. It even looks as if in this way (that is, by generalising (1)) we could obtain interesting new axioms of set theory. This may turn out to be possible, but it is not a procedure that can be used systematically. For, unlike the usual axiom of choice, its full generalisation is inconsistent with the usual axioms of rst-order set theory, indeed, with any rst-order axioms of set theory, as I have shown in another paper (Hintikka 1998). To return to the usual axiom of choice, it is thus seen to be unproblematically true. How can any intuitionist deny the axiom of choice, that is, in effect, doubt (1)? What can possibly go wrong here? Moreover, evoking the concept of knowledge, either in the form of epistemic logic or informally, does not seem to help an intuitionistic critic of the axiom of choice at all, either. For the prima facie epistemic counterpart to (1), that is, (5) K(x)(y)S[x, y] K(f )(x)S[x, f(x)]

is as fully true as (1). Informally speaking, if F logically implies G, then knowing that F implies knowing that G, unless the connection between F and G is so complex that the knower does not see it. But there is nothing hidden in the relationship between (2) and (4). The question is not whether their relationship is so complex that the implications cannot be seen. The relationship is

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amply clear; the only question is whether it is one of logical consequence or not. An answer can be seen from the example construed by Bertrand Russell. He envisages a millionaire who is so rich that he owns an innite number of pairs of shoes and pairs of socks. The task he faces is to select a member of each pair, in both cases. Selecting from pairs of shoes is in principle easy. Russells millionaire can for instance always select the right shoe. But in the case of an innite number of pairs of socks, there is no way of specifying which sock to choose. The task then is to capture the difference between the two cases (shoes vs. socks) in explicit logical terms. If we look at the problem as a merely combinatorial one, and look at functions as classes of ordered pairs, then the two cases seem to be on a par. Both classes of pairs have the same cardinality; hence no scruples about innity affect our line of thought. The difference between the two is epistemic rather than combinatorial. In the case of shoes, we know a way of making the choice, that is, know at least one of the choice functions f doing the job. For instance, we can always choose the right shoe. In contrast, in the case of the socks we do not know and apparently cannot come to know such a function. Russells cute example can be generalised. The stumbling block that prevents intuitionists from accepting the axiom of choice is clearly not the combinatorial inexistence of Skolem functions of true sentences but the fact that we do not know what functions they are and that in some cases we cannot know what they are. What this suggests is that in general what Brouwerian intuitionists were primarily concerned with was our knowledge of the objects of mathematics. This is in keeping with the preoccupation of the Brouwerian intuitionists with mathematical knowledge. But the striking thing of the diagnosis that we have reached of Brouwers syndrome is not that it turns on mathematical knowledge rather than on mathematical truth. The most fundamental feature of the diagnosis is that the key notion of the intuitionists turns out to be, not our knowledge of mathematical truths, but our knowledge of mathematical objects, prominently including our knowledge of the identity of functions. The crucial notion, in other words, is not knowing that but knowing what (which, who, where, . . . ), in brief knowing + an indirect question, that is, knowledge of objects rather than knowledge of truths. This distinction might not seem to be much of a novelty until one begins to look for a logical analysis of the distinction in the literature. No general analysis is found in the earlier books and papers, except for one of my earlier papers (Hintikka 1996a).

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Why has the distinction not been analysed in the earlier literature? The basic notion of the received epistemic logic is knowing that. Hence understanding the distinction depends on understanding its other term, knowledge of objects (entities). Why has it not been analysed, for example dened in terms of knowing that? A prima facie reason is that the ordinary use of such locutions as knowing who is not only complex but extraordinarily uid, seemingly yielding little foothold for informative generalisation. A deeper reason is that knowing who simply cannot be analysed in the sole terms of knowing that plus the apparatus of received rst-order logic. Here the independence notation which I have developed for the purpose of extending ordinary rst-order logic and which has been called independence-friendly (IF) rst-order logic (Hintikka 1996b). The only notational novelty is an independence-indicating slash /. It serves to exempt a quantier, say (x), from the dependence on another, say (y), within whose scope it occurs, by writing it (x/y). Only in epistemic logic, the intended liberation is from the scope of the it is known that operator (in brief, K) rather than from the scope of a quantier. Hence we will have expressions like (x/K) or (/K). What does it mean that a function like the f in (4) is known? At rst sight, we apparently can express it as (6) (f )K(x)S[x, f(x)]

But (6) is not entirely satisfactory. There is a sense in which one cannot quantify into a context governed by K. For in such cases, the knowledge statement does not specify any content that the knower can be said to be aware of. Formally speaking, any knowledge statement should therefore be expressible in the form where K is prexed to an entire sentence. This is not the case in (6), and it cannot be done in the received epistemic logic. It is here that the independence notation saves the day and perhaps even makes an epistemic logicians day. Semantically speaking, the operator K is like a universal operator, ranging over epistemically possible worlds. It codies my opponents (the falsiers) choice of one alternative scenario to be considered by the players at the next move in the game. That (f ) precedes K in (6) means that the choice of a value of f is made before the choice of an epistemic alternative. But such a choice could equally well be made after the choice mandated by K, provided that the choice of the relevant function f is made independently of the choice prompted by K. This means that (6) is equivalent to (7) K(f/K)(x)S[x, f (x)]

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where the slash / signals independence. But according to what was found earlier, (7) is equivalent to (8) K(x)(y/K)S[x, y]

Here we can see why the earlier attempts to analyse the knowledge of objects in the sole terms of knowing that plus traditional rst-order logic were doomed to fail. In such an approach, the only way of expressing the requirement that the choice associated with (y) is independent of K is to have it precede K. But (y) depends on (x) and would therefore have to follow it. Yet the choice associated with (x) depends on K, at the very least because the domain of individuals may be different in different epistemically possible scenarios. Such patterns of dependence and independence cannot be expressed by means of the resources of traditional epistemic logic, because only transitive patterns of dependence can be expressed in the received logic. These observations admit of an elegant generalisation. Consider any sentence of the form KS, where S is a rst-order statement in negation normal form. By the same token as in (6), we can express the knowledge of what a relevant value of an existential quantier (x) in S is by replacing it by (x/K). Likewise we can express knowledge of which disjunct in (S1 S2 ) in S is the truth-making one by writing it (S1 (/K)S2 ). Multiple slashes serve to codify multiple knowledge (information), such as is requested in multiple questions. (What did Santa give to whom?) In this way we can reach a uniform treatment to several different types of knowledge, including knowledge of objects. A crucial role is played by the independence indicator slash. It can be thought of as the codication in the language of epistemic logic of the question ingredient in subordinate questions. (This result is in fact important for the semantics of direct as well as subordinate questions in natural language in general.) When the slash is attached to a disjunction, as in (/K), we have an instance of propositional knowledge. When it is attached to an existential quantier, as in (x/K), we are dealing with knowledge of objects (entities). Indeed, in this way we obtain an explicit and rich formal treatment of knowledge of objects, including the way such knowledge differs from knowledge of propositions (facts). Among other things, we can now see what is valid in the theses of the intuitionists. What they are rejecting is not (5) but the stronger conditional (9) K(x)(y)S[x, y] K(f/K)(x)S[x, f(x)] K(x)(y)S[x, y] K(x)(y/K)S[x, y]

which is equivalent with (10)

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If rejecting (9)(10) as logical truths is what such intuitionists intend, they are correct. Knowing (2) does not per se enable me to know any of its Skolem functions. This is not only what epistemic logic tells us; it is in keeping with anyones intuitions, not just with Brouwers. Intuitionists are thus right about something, but are they right about the same thing as their opponents were talking about? The answer is no. In fact, the rejection of (9)(10) has nothing to do with what us ordinary folk mean by the axiom of choice. The rejection of (9)(10) is perfectly compatible with the validity of (1) or of (5). That intuitionists have been talking about the axiom of choice in the rst place can be seen as a confusion between knowing that a Skolem function (choice function) exists and knowing what function it is. We could also speak here of the knowledge of truths as distinguished from the knowledge of objects (entities) like functions. It is interesting to see that at least one early defender of the axiom of choice tipped his hand by basing his defense on the fact that existence . . . is a fact, like any other or else it does not occur (cf. Moore 1982, 317). The discussion of the axiom of choice between intuitionists and classicists has conducted at cross-purposes. It can only be dissolved by making distinction between knowing that and knowing what that neither party has made explicit. What is the epistemic logic like in which the distinction can be made and in which the correctly understood claims of the Brouwerian intuitionists can be vindicated? First, in it the point just made can be generalised. If a sentence S is true, its Skolem functions exist, for that is what the truth of S means. However, it does not follow that one has any way of knowing what they are. If this is what intuitionists are interested in, they should embrace IF epistemic logic as their own logic. But what laws hold in such a logic? The most important differences as compared with ordinary rst-order logic concern the laws governing quantiers. A typical one concerns existential generalisation. In epistemic logic, one cannot any longer infer a sentence of the form (11) from (12) KS[b] (x)KS[x]

where b is a singular term (simple or complex), as one can infer in rstorder logic. Here (11) is equivalent with (13) K(x/K)S[x]

What one can infer from (12) is (14) K(x)S[x]

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Analogous (or, rather, mirror-symmetrical) things can be said of universal instantiation. All these remarks can be generalised. In order to validate an inference from (12) to (10) one needs an additional premise, viz. (15) (x)K(b = x)

which is equivalent to (16) K(x/K)(b = x)

In a sense, existential generalisation is valid inside the scope of K both for (x) and for (x/K). This illustrates the naturalness of the notation used here. These remarks are closely related to the diagnosis of the problems about the axiom of choice discussed earlier. For instance, the mistake objected to by intuitionists there can be said to try to infer (17) from (18) K(x)(y)S[x, y] (g)K(x)S[x, g(x)]

when the correct inference is to (19) K(g)(x)S[x, g(x)]

Here the function term g(x) plays the same role as the constant term b in (11)(14). Indeed, (17) is equivalent to (20) Now from (21) K(x)S[x, g(x)] K(g/K)(x)S[x, g(x)]

one can infer (20) = (17) only in conjunction with the further premise (22) K(f/K)(x)(g(x) = f (x))

which can be expressed elliptically as (23) (f )K(g = f )

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in perfect analogy with (15). If you like snappy lines, you can sum up a part of what has been found by saying that the axiom of choice is valid for the knowledge of truths but not for the knowledge of mathematical objects. Now an interesting thing is that Heytings intuitionistic logic does not bring out these logical relationships in an adequate manner. For instance, the rule of existential generalisation is valid in Heytings logic unconditionally. This makes it useless for dealing with our knowledge of mathematical objects, which was in the last analysis the purpose of intuitionistic mathematics. One might perhaps try to explain this particular feature away by suggesting that the singular terms Heyting has tacitly in mind are all numerals, of which we of course know what (i.e., which number) they refer to. But even if this is Heytings motivation, his assumption does not carry over to second-order level, the reason being that we do not know of all explicitly described functions which functions they are, mathematically speaking. Hence a suitable epistemic logic brings out the intentions of the intuitionists more fully than Heytings logic. Now we can also begin to see the relationship between intuitionism and constructivism. The basic difference in fact allows a simple formulation. An intuitionist of the classical variety wants to restrict his or her attention to known mathematical objects. A constructivist wants to restrict his or her attention to effective or otherwise constructible objects. But is this a distinction with difference? More obviously has to be said here. The two coincide if and only if it is a necessary and sufcient condition for a mathematical object like a function to be knowable that it be constructible. Is this perhaps the case? The actual historical facts are messy. For one thing, Brouwer sometimes talked about mathematical objects as having been created by us in imagination. If so, they should presumably be constructible. On the other side of the ledger, Gdels construction produces effectively, given an axiomatization of elementary arithmetic, an arithmetical proposition not provable in it and hence presumably unknowable on the basis of that axiomatization. It is not obvious what to make of such arguments. The best way I can see of making the issues clearer is to give a sharper interpretation to the basic ideas of the constructivists. One way of doing systematically is to go on dening the truth of a sentence S as the existence of a winning strategy for the verier in a semantical game G(S) played starting with S but to restrict the strategies available to the verier to effective ones. In the light of what has been said, this means saying that S is true if and only if it has a full set of recursive Skolem functions.

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Apart from any comparison with other approaches, this is an eminently natural construal of the truth of S. This truth amounts, as was seen, to being able to nd in principle this witness individuals of S. It is precisely the job of Skolem functions to tell you how to nd them. It is very much in the spirit of constructivists enterprise to maintain that S is constructively true if and only if it has a battery of Skolem functions that are in some reasonable sense constructive. In game-theoretical terms, this restricts the veriers strategies to constructive ones. This is not an unnatural limitation. One might even try to argue that the computability of strategies is a necessary condition of the actual human playability of semantical games. For how can any human being actually play a semantical game in accordance with a strategy such that there is no way of actually calculating in all cases what her or his next move will be? Even though a closer analysis will show as I have suggested (Hintikka 1996b, chapter 10) that this objection can be met, the prima facie appeal of this restriction on strategies is conspicuous. It might be objected that a restriction on strategies is impossible to implement in practice. For how can you forbid a player to use a nonrecursive strategy when any nite sequence of moves on her or his part is compatible with the use of a recursive strategy? This observation points to interesting epistemological problems, it is not a conclusive objection. The enforcement of a prohibition of nonrecursive strategies can scarcely be a black-and-white matter. However, a probabilistic enforcement may be possible. In Las Vegas, pitbosses can without great difculties recognise counters using a system in blackjack, even though any nite sequence of plays is in principle compatible with a players not using any particular system. Is it not possible to have a pitboss trained by Kolmogorov (1983, 15) and Martin-Lf (1966) so that she or he can recognise when a player is likely to use a nonrecursive strategy? There does not seem to be anything logically impossible in such an idea. The kind of constructivistic truth denition explained above is related to Gdels famous Dialectica interpretation of elementary logic and arithmetic (Gdel 1990, 217251). There are certain differences, however, affecting this similarity. First, Gdel interprets negation and conditionals in a way different from the way done here. This forces him to go beyond the second-order case and hence beyond what can be captured by epistemic rst-order logic, even IF one. Second, it is not clear whether Gdel is thinking of his interpretation as yielding a truth-denition or a deductive axiom system. It has in fact been interpreted differently.

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In any case, when the constructivity restriction is imposed on the veriers strategies in a semantical game, the game-theoretical truth-denition yields a constructivistic concept of truth. This in turn serves to dene a constructivistic notion of logical truth (truth in every model). This concept is not axiomatisable, and hence cannot be captured by manipulating axioms and rules of inference, as Heyting and others have tried to do. Since the fragment of epistemic IF rst-order logic (i.e. all slashes occur in the combination (/K)) is axiomatisable, we nd here one more difference between constructivistic and intuitionistic logic. It is not on my agenda for this paper to discuss whether constructivism, so construed, is right or wrong. What is being inquired into here are the consequences of the constructivistic position, so interpreted. One thing that happens then is that clear-cut differences between intuitionisms begin to emerge. What the strategy restriction involves in general is a certain nonclassical interpretation of quantiers, implemented through a restriction on their Skolem functions. When this is done, sentences like (2) do no longer say that for each x one can nd y such that S[x, y]. It now says that this nding can be accomplished constructivistically. But that means that the consequent (4) is true, when constructivistically interpreted. Hence a consistent constructivist must accept verbally the axiom of choice. This conclusion has in fact been drawn by some of the most prominent recent constructivists, including Michael Dummett (1977) and Per Martin-Lf (1984). This acceptance stands in stark contrast to the words of intuitionists proper, for they have been seen to reject the very same formulation of the axiom of choice. Of course this is due to the fact that the two kinds of logicians interpret the same form of words in two different ways. The difference has not prevented the likes of Dummett and Martin-Lf from calling themselves intuitionists rather than constructivists. The fact must also be registered that there are other interpretations of constructivism on some of which the axiom of choice is not valid. They are not as natural than the interpretation outlined in this paper, however. And in any case they do not affect the need of the distinction between intuitionism and constructivism announced above. What precisely the logic of constructivism is or should be remains to be discussed. The logic of intuitionism is IF epistemic logic. Now the crucial differences between intuitionism and constructivism are beginning to be more clearly in evidence. Brouwer clearly thought that a mathematical object can be constructive, but not known, viz. when we do not know what the construction law is or when the construction does not follow any law. Conversely, even though this idea does not seem to have been operative in Brouwer, one can know so much about a mathematical

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object that one is justied in saying that one knows what it is or perhaps which mathematical object it is even when it is not constructive. For instance, we know so much about the class of all recursive functions that it would be extremely awkward to say that we dont know which class of functions it is, even though it is not it is not itself recursive. A closer analysis of Brouwers views shows that this epistemic interpretation does indeed being out some of the essential features of his views. Since I have been using the axiom of choice as a test case, it might be pointed out that at rst sight there might seem to be an intuitionistic vindication of the axiom of choice. Other critics have suggested that the axiom of choice fails because we cannot make an innity of choices which would embody a choice function like the f in (3). Russells millionaire cannot make an innite number of choices of one sock out of each pair. But this is not at all Brouwers objection to the axiom of choice. He has a concept that in a sense does the job that is required here. This is Brouwers notion of choice sequence. In the same way in which any choice sequence of ones and zeros determines an intuitionistic real (cf. e.g. van Dalen 1999), in the same way a choice sequence of socks determines a function that picks out one sock of each pair and therefore seems to vindicate the axiom of choice. Brouwers objection is not that the sequence of choices is impossible, but that it is not determined. For instance, one of his earlier objections was to point out that if the same person were presented the same sequence of choices again, he or the world would make exactly the same choices. It does not according to Brouwer sufce that there is method of calculating the subsequent choices, for instance in the case of the binary expansion of reals to calculate all the successive zeros and ones. This method must be such that knowing it enables us to decide once and for all the identities and nonidentities of the imported real with all reals. This comes very close to requiring, not that the purported real can be constructed, but that it is known. Such epistemic determinacy is what the choice sequences lack that rst seem to vindicate the axioms of choice. In the history of epistemology, we nd a tradition that emphasises a close relationship between constructing or making something and knowing what that something is. For instance, according to Kant, We can know a priori of things only what we ourselves put into them (Critique of Pure Reason B viii). There are similarities between Brouwer and Kant, but the link between construction and knowledge is for Brouwer even more complicated than for Kant. One can according to him construct an innite choice sequence of zeros and ones, but we do not thereby come to know what the real number is whose binary expansion one thereby obtains.

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All told, there is unmistakably an epistemic element in the intuitionistic way of thinking. And what makes that observation timely is that an opportunity of implementing that epistemic element by means of an explicit epistemic logic has just been opened. It has turned out that the notion of informational independence is the key to a truly general logical theory of different kinds of knowledge, including knowledge of objects and not only knowledge of propositions.

REFERENCES

Brouwer, L. E. J.: 1975, in A. Heyting (ed.), Collected Works, Vol. 1: Philosophy and Foundations of Mathematics, North-Holland, Amsterdam. Dummett, M.: 1977, Elements of Intuitionism, Clarendon Press, Oxford. Gdel, K.: 1990, in S. Feferman et al. (eds), Collected Works, vol. 2, Oxford University Press, New York. Hintikka, J.: 1996a, Knowledge Acknowledged: Knowledge of Propositions vs. Knowledge of Objects, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61, 251273. Hintikka, J.: 1996b, The Principles of Mathematics Revisited, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Hintikka, J.: 1998, Truth Denitions, Skolem Functions and Axiomatic sets Theory, Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 4, 303337. Kolmogorov, A. N.: 1983, On Logical Foundations of Probability Theory, in K. Ito and J. V. Prokhov (eds), Probability Theory and Mathematical Statistics (Lecture Notes in Mathematics), Vol. 1021, Springer, New York, Heidelberg. Martin-Lf, P.: 1966, The Denition of Random Sequences, Information and Control 6, 60219. Martin-Lf, P.: 1984, Intuitionistic Type Theory, Bibliopolis, Napoli. Moore, G.: 1982, Zermelos Axiom of Choice, Springer, New York, Heidelberg. Stigt, W. P.: 1990, Brouwers Intutionism, North-Holland, Amsterdam. van Dalen, D.: 1996, Mystic, Geometer and Intuitionist: The Life of L. E. J. Brouwer, Vol. 1, Clarendon Press, Oxford. Department of Philosophy Boston University 745 Commonwealth Avenue Boston, MA 02215 U.S.A. E-mail: hintikka@bu.edu