G.R. No. 136274. September 3, 2003] SUNFLOWER NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCIATION, represented by FLORO ARAGAN, petitioners, vs.

COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ACTING PRESIDING JUDGE LORIFEL LACAP PHIMNA, MeTC, Branch 77, Paraaque City and ELISA MAGLAQUI-CAPARAS, Respondents. DECISION CORONA, J.: This is a petition for review of the July 16, 1998 decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 46861 (a) declaring null and void the injunction orders respectively issued by Judge Amelita Tolentino in Civil Case No. 96-0253, for Expropriation, and Judge Rolando G. How in Civil Case No. 96-0480, for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction; and (b) ordering the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Paraaque City, Branch 78, to enforce its July 8, 1996 Writ of Demolition. The dispositive portion read: WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the injunction orders subject of the instant petition are hereby DECLARED NULL AND VOID. Corollary thereto, the Court of origin, Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 78, Paraaque, is hereby directed to ENFORCE its Writ of Demolition dated July 8, 1996. The antecedent facts follow. Private respondent Elisa Maglaqui-Caparas, in her capacity as executrix of the testate estate of Macaria Maglaqui, filed on March 16, 1993 a complaint for unlawful detainer (Civil Case No. 8550) against Alfredo Mogar and 46 other persons who were occupying several parcels of land (Lots 1-A, B, C, E, F and G) in Yellow Ville, United Paraaque Subdivision IV, Metro Manila. These parcels of land are covered by individual transfer certificates of title registered in the name of Macaria Maglaqui, private respondents mother. The MeTC of Paraaque City, Branch 78, eventually decided in favor of private respondent. On appeal, the decision of the MeTC was affirmed by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 66. Mogar et al. elevated the case to the Court of Appeals but their petition was dismissed by the appellate court on December 12, 1994. After the dismissal became final, a writ of demolition was issued by the MeTC of Paraaque City, Branch 78. The writ, however, was not immediately implemented because the case was transferred to Branch 77 of the same court. On February 6, 1997, Mogar et al. filed a petition with the RTC of Paraaque City, Branch 257, presided over by Judge Rolando G. How, to enjoin the implementation of the writ of demolition. However, this petition was denied and subsequently, an alias writ of demolition was issued by Judge Vivencio G. Lirio of MeTC Branch 77, the court of origin. The alias writ of demolition was, again, not executed, this time due to the ex parte issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction by Judge Amelita Tolentino, in connection with the expropriation case (Civil Case No. 96-0253) filed by the Municipality of Paraaque against the Testate Estate of Macaria Maglaqui. Meanwhile, another group of persons occupying portions of the parcels of land (Lots I-F and I-G) subject of the unlawful detainer case, organized themselves into the Sunflower Neighborhood Association (Sunflower), the petitioner herein. On November 18, 1996, Sunflower, represented by one Floro Aragan, filed a complaint for prohibition/injunction with preliminary injunction against private respondent also with the RTC of Paraaque City, Branch 257. Sunflower argued that its members should be excluded from the demolition order as they were not parties to the original unlawful detainer case. To include their houses in the demolition would be to deprive them of due process. This time, Judge How granted the injunction and ordered the exclusion of the houses belonging to petitioner from demolition. Thus, private respondent filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with the Court of Appeals (CA GR SP No. 46861) assailing both the injunction orders issued by Judge Tolentino in the expropriation case and by Judge How in the prohibition case. The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of private respondent holding that, as the judgment in the unlawful detainer case had already become final, the execution could not be enjoined. Consequently, the MeTC of Paraaque City, Branch 77 issued another alias writ of demolition on September 14, 1998. In order to stay the execution of the writ of demolition, Sunflower filed on January 7, 1999 an urgent motion in this Court for the issuance of a status quo order. This we granted in a resolution dated January 20, 1999. Prior to the issuance of our resolution, however, the writ of demolition was implemented on January 14, 1999. Petitioner thus filed a motion to allow its members to return to the premises, which we granted in another resolution dated April 28, 1999. Thereafter, we required both parties to submit their memoranda. Sometime in November 1998, the group of Mogar et al. filed in this Court a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA GR SP No. 46861. However, we dismissed the same on January 18, 1999 for failure of said petitioners to comply with certain procedural requirements, including their failure to submit a certification of non-forum shopping.

For its part, petitioner Sunflower likewise assailed the same decision of the Court of Appeals in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court. Before we proceed, it should be pointed out that any issue relating to the expropriation case (Civil Case No. 96-0253) filed by the Municipality of Paraaque has been rendered moot by the dismissal of that case. This Court, in a Resolution dated January 29, 2003, the presiding judge of the RTC of Paraaque City, Branch 274 to report on the status of the expropriation case filed by the Municipality of Paraaque against herein private respondent. The presiding judge reported that the case was already dismissed on June 1, 1999 in an order issued by then Presiding Judge Amelita Tolentino who granted the motion to dismiss filed by herein private respondent. Said dismissal was not challenged by the Municipality of Paraaque. The basic issue before us is whether petitioners members, who were not parties to the unlawful detainer case, may be ejected from the land subject of this case. We rule in the affirmative. It is well-settled that, although an ejectment suit is an action in personam wherein the judgment is binding only upon the parties properly impleaded and given an opportunity to be heard, the judgment becomes binding on anyone who has not been impleaded if he or she is: (a) a trespasser, squatter or agent of the defendant fraudulently occupying the property to frustrate the judgment; (b) a guest or occupant of the premises with the permission of the defendant; (c) a transferee pendente lite; (d) a sublessee; (e) a co-lessee or (f) a member of the family, relative or privy of the defendant. In the case at bar, the records show that petitioners members are trespassers or squatters who do not have any right to occupy the property of respondent. Petitioner does not dispute the ownership of the parcels of land in question. In fact, it even admitted that the subject property is owned by Macaria Maglaqui, mother of private respondent. Petitioner failed to establish any right which would entitle its members to occupy the land in any capacity, whether as lessees, tenants and the like. Petitioners only defense against the eviction and demolition orders is their supposed non-inclusion in the original detainer case. This defense, however, has no legal support since its members are trespassers or squatters who are bound by the judgment. Petitioners argument that the parcels of land occupied by its members (Lots I-F and I-G) were not included in the original ejectment complaint has no basis. The complaint private respondent filed with the MeTC of Paraaque City, Branch 78, clearly included Lots I-F and I-G as part of the subject matter under litigation in the unlawful detainer case. Thus, petitioners members, together with all the parties in the unlawful detainer case, must vacate the disputed land. The Court commiserates with respondent, already in her twilight years, who has been unlawfully deprived of her land for a good number of years. Thus, we exhort the court of origin to execute this decision with reasonable dispatch, consistent with the requirements of Section 28 of RA 7279 and EO 152, on eviction and demolition. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR SP No. 46861 is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 150633 : November 12, 2003] HEIRS OF DEMETRIO MELCHOR, represented by CLETO MELCHOR, petitioners, vs. JULIO MELCHOR, respondent. DECISION PANGANIBAN, J.: The Municipal Trial Court would not have jurisdiction over a purported unlawful detainer suit, if the complaint fails to allege jurisdictional facts. The Case Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to nullify the August 16, 2001 Decision2and the October 18, 2001Resolution3of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR SP No. 63465. The dispositive portion of the assailed Decision is as follows: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present petition is hereby DENIED DUE COURSE and accordingly DISMISSED, for lack of merit. The Joint Decision dated February 5, 2001 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 20 of Cauayan, Isabela which embodied the assailed judgment in Civil Case No. 20-1125 and affirmed the Decision dated September 1, 2000 of the Municipal Trial Court of Cauayan, Isabela, dismissing the complaint for ejectment of the petitioners in Civil Case No. 2325, entitled Heirs of Demetrio Melchor represented by Cleto Melchor v. Julio Melchor, is hereby AFFIRMED and REITERATED. Costs against the petitioners.4 The assailed Resolution denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. The Facts The facts of the case are narrated by the CA as follows:

Petitioners, who are the heirs of DEMETRIO MELCHOR, claim to be the owners, by way of succession, of the subject property allegedly in possession of respondent JULIO MELCHOR. The subject property is a portion of the twenty (20) hectares of land registered in the name of PEDRO MELCHOR, evidenced by Original Certificate of Title No.I-6020 of the Registry of Deeds for Isabela. The said property was purchased by the late DEMETRIO MELCHOR from PEDRO MELCHOR, the deceased father of herein respondent JULIO MELCHOR. During the lifetime of the late DEMETRIO MELCHOR, a request for the approval of the Deed of Sale dated February 14, 1947between DEMETRIO MELCHOR and PEDRO MELCHOR was made to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources on September 4, 1953, which was subsequently approved. Since February 14, 1947up to the present, petitioners further allege that respondent has been occupying the subject property and has been harvesting crops thereon and using it for grassing cows and carabaos.
A demand letter dated August 21, 1999 was allegedly sent by the petitioners to the respondent, demanding him to vacate and surrender the said property, but the latter refused. The disagreement reached the barangay authorities, which case was not amicably settled, resulting in the issuance of a certification to file action. Petitioners filed against respondent a complaint for ejectment before the MTC of Cauayan, Isabela which they subsequently refiled in their Second Amended Complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 2325 and dated May 31, 2001, to accommodate additional allegations therein.

For his part, the defendant (now respondent) in Civil Case No. 2325 principally raised the matter of ownership by alleging affirmative/special defenses, among others, that the parcel of land in possession of the defendant is registered in the name of ANTONIA QUITERAS, the deceased mother of the defendant, as per Transfer of Certificate of Title No. T-274828 of the Registry of Deeds for Isabela, and that the same property is now owned by the defendant and his three (3) sisters and one (1) brother, having inherited the same from their late mother, ANTONIA QUITERAS. The Decision dated September 1, 2000, which was penned by acting MTC Judge BERNABE B. MENDOZA, was rendered in favor of the respondent, the pertinent portions of which read: There is no allegation that plaintiffs have been deprived of the possession of the land by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth. The dispossession was made in 1947. As such, ejectment is not the proper remedy. WHEREFORE, a judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the case. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. On appeal, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 20 of Cauayan, Isabela, presided over by Executive Judge HENEDINO P. EDUARTE, rendered, together with another related complaint for ejectment, i.e., Civil Case No. 20-1126, the Joint Decision dated February 5, 2001, the decretal portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered: 1. Affirming the decision in Civil Case No. Br. 20-1126 entitled, Heirs of Liberato Lumelay, et al. vs. Heirs of Julio Melchor. Costs against the appellants. 2. Affirming the decision in Civil Case No. 201-1125, entitled, Heirs of Demetrio Melchor, et al. vs. Julio Melchor. Costs against the appellants. SO ORDERED. Ruling of the Court of Appeals Sustaining the Regional Trial Court (RTC), the CA ruled that petitioners had failed to make a case for unlawful detainer. It opined that the MTC had never acquired jurisdiction over the case, because there was no allegation that the parties had entered into a contract -- express or implied -- or that there was possession by tolerance. Furthermore, the appellate court held that the proper remedy should have been a plenary action for recovery of possession, not a summary action for ejectment. Hence, this Petition. The Issue In their Memorandum, petitioners raised only one alleged error: The Court of Appeals committed a grave error when it ruled that the Second Amended Complaint does not allege a sufficient cause of action for x x x unlawful detainer. The Courts Ruling The Petition has no merit. Lone Issue: Sufficiency of the Complaint for Ejectment Petitioners filed a summary action for ejectment based on Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. Under Section 1 of the Rule, two separate remedies are available -- one for forcible entry and another for unlawful detainer. Petitioners maintain that while the Complaint does not support a cause of action for forcible entry, the allegations therein certainly indicate one for unlawful detainer. They add that they did not commit any jurisdictional infirmity in failing to allege prior physical possession, because that fact is not an element of unlawful detainer. We do not agree. Even if petitioners may be correct in saying that prior physical possession by the plaintiff need not be alleged in an action for unlawful detainer, the absence of such possession does not ipso facto make their Complaint sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the MTC. In ejectment cases, the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the allegations of the complaint. The test for determining the sufficiency of those allegations is whether, admitting the facts alleged, the court can render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer of the plaintiff.

A review of the Second Amended Complaint of petitioners discloses these pertinent allegations: the absolute owner of the subject land was their father, Demetrio Melchor, who bought it on February 14, 1947 from respondents father, Pedro Melchor; being the heirs of Demetrio Melchor, petitioners became the owners of the property by reason of succession; as such, they sent a formal demand letter to respondent, who had been using the property since February 14, 1947, for grazing cows and carabaos and for planting crops; and in that letter, they asked him to vacate and surrender the property, but he failed to do so. Accordingly, petitioners prayed for judgment ordering respondent to vacate the property and to pay P500,000, which represented the income earned from February 14, 1947to the present, as well the costs of the suit. It is clear from the foregoing that the allegations in the Complaint failed to constitute a case for either forcible entry or unlawful detainer. These actions, which deal with physical or de facto possession, may be distinguished as follows: (1) In an action for forcible entry, the plaintiff must allege and prove that he was in prior physical possession of the premises until deprived thereof, while in illegal detainer, the plaintiff need not have been in prior physical possession; and (2) in forcible entry, the possession by the defendant is unlawful ab initio because he acquires possession by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, while in unlawful detainer, possession is originally lawful but becomes illegal by reason of the termination of his right of possession under his contract with the plaintiff. In pleadings filed in courts of special jurisdiction, the special facts giving the court jurisdiction must be specially alleged and set out. Otherwise, the complaint is demurrable. As correctly held by the appellate court, [f]orcible entry must be ruled out as there was no allegation that the petitioners were denied possession of the subject property through any of the means stated in Section 1, Rule 70 [of the Rules of Court]. Neither was unlawful detainer satisfactorily alleged. In determining the sufficiency of a complaint therefor, it is not necessary to employ the terminology of the law. Not averred in this case, however, were certain essential facts such as how entry was effected, or how and when dispossession started. Petitioners merely alleged their ownership of the land, which had supposedly been possessed by respondent since 1947. There was no allegation showing that his possession of it was initially legal -- by virtue of a contract, express or implied -- and that it became illegal after the expiration of his right to possess. Neither did the Complaint claim as a fact any overt act on the part of petitioners showing that they had permitted or tolerated respondents occupancy of the subject property. It is a settled rule that in order to justify an action for unlawful detainer, the owners permission or tolerance must be present at the beginning of the possession. Furthermore, the complaint must aver the facts showing that the inferior court has jurisdiction to try the case; for example, by describing how defendants possession started or continued. The prayer of petitioners contradicts, however, the existence of possession by tolerance. It must be noted that they seek to be paid P500,000 as payment for the use of the property by respondent from 1947 to the present. This allegation implies that they never permitted him to possess the land. Since the Complaint did not satisfy the jurisdictional requirements of a valid cause for forcible entry or unlawful detainer, the appellate court was correct in holding that the MTC had no jurisdiction to hear the case. Verily, the failure of petitioners to properly allege a case for ejectment does not leave them without any other remedy. Under the proper circumstances, what may be filed is a case either for accion publiciana, which is a plenary action intended to recover the better right to possess; or an accion reivindicatoria,a suit to recover ownership of real property. This principle was laid down in Ong v. Parel as follows: The jurisdictional facts must appear on the face of the complaint. When the complaint fails to aver facts constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful detainer, as where it does not state how entry was effected or how and when dispossession started, as in the case at bar, the remedy should either be an accion publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria in the proper regional trial court. If private respondent is indeed the owner of the premises subject of this suit and she was unlawfully deprived of the real right of possession or the ownership thereof, she should present her claim before the regional trial court in an accion publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria, and not before the municipal trial court in a summary proceeding of unlawful detainer or forcible entry. For even if one is the owner of the property, the possession thereof cannot be wrested from another who had been in the physical or material possession of the same for more than one year by resorting to a summary action for ejectment. This is especially true where his possession thereof was not obtained through the means or held under the circumstances contemplated by the rules on summary ejectment. WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED, and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners. SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION [A.M. No. P-01-1527. April 22, 2002] LEAH H. BISCOCHO, JANET T. LABATA, VIRGINIA MANUEL, NORA MANUEL, LEDILLA DIONEDA, GIL CALICDAN, ELIZABETH SARMIENTO, thru Counsel Atty. CASIANO L. MONTES, complainants, v. CORNELIO C. MARERO, Sheriff IV , Respondent. DECISION PUNO,J.:

This is an administrative complaint against Cornelio Marero, Sheriff IV of the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City, Branch 72, for grave misconduct. The complainants allege in a verified complaint that on July 13, 1999, respondent sheriff implemented a Writ of Demolition issued in connection with RTC Civil Case No. 97-4486, entitled Pepito Samson v. Ernesto Sarmiento, et al., upon the residents of Sitio Lower East Kamias, Cogeo II, Antipolo City. The demolition included the houses of the complainants who were not parties to the civil case; hence, the complaint against the respondent who conducted the demolition. In his Comment, the respondent denies the charges, and claims that the demolition was pursuant to a lawful order which he is tasked to implement. He further contends that the demolition was conducted without threat or intimidation against the complainants who were illegally occupying the subject property. Finally, the complainants interest in the outcome of RTC Civil Case No. 97-4486, as indicated in their administrative complaint, is an implied admission that their houses were proper subjects of the demolition. The complainants allege in their Reply that the decision of the municipal trial court in Civil Case No. 2954 (RTC Civil Case No. 97-4486) was erroneous, and that the demolition of their houses was illegal. They attached the Sheriffs Return/Report on the Writ of Demolition to prove the respondents ignorance of his duties as a sheriff. The complaint was referred to the Office of the Court Administrator for evaluation, report and recommendation. The OCA found the respondent guilty of violating complainants right to due process of law and recommended thus:
xxx respondent be suspended from the service for six (6) months without pay and be ordered to pay a fine of P10,000.00 with a warning that repetition of the same or similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.

We agree. An ejectment suit is an action in personam wherein judgment is binding only upon parties properly impleaded and given an opportunity to be heard. However, this rule admits of the exception that even a non-party may be bound by the judgment in an ejectment suit where he is any of the following: (1) trespasser, squatter or agent of the defendant fraudulently occupying the property to frustrate the judgment; (b) guest or occupant of the premises with the permission of the defendant; (c) transferee pendente lite; (d) sublessee; (e) co-lessee; or (f) member of the family, relative or privy of the defendant. It is clear that the complainants were not parties to the civil case for which the writ of demolition was issued.Nor is there anything on record to prove that they belong

to the abovementioned exceptions. Yet, the respondent sheriff, in utter disregard of the rights of the complainants, included their houses in the demolition. In a vain attempt to justify his actions, the respondent claims that he merely implemented a lawful order of the court. This contention is devoid of merit. The dispositive portion of the decision of the municipal trial court provides:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant and all persons claiming rights under them ordering the latter the following: 1. To vacate the subject properties and surrender the possession thereof to the plaintiff. 2. To pay plaintiff the amount of Five Hundred Pesos (P500.00) each as monthly rental or reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the subject properties from the filing of the complaint until after the possession thereof is surrendered to the plaintiff. 3. To pay plaintiff the sum of One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00) each as and by way of attorneys fees. 4. To pay plaintiff the costs of suit. SO ORDERED.

The Writ of Execution issued by the Regional Trial Court through officer-in-charge Antonio T. Ventayen quoted the foregoing dispositive portion and ordered the respondents, thus:
NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the foregoing premises, you are hereby commanded to effect the execution of the Courts judgment; that you cause the ejectment/eviction from subject premises in question of herein defendants and any and all persons claiming rights therefrom; that of the goods and chattels of the defendants in the premises and elsewhere, you cause to be had the quoted sums, together with all your lawful fees for the service of this writ, all in Philippine currency and that you render the same to said plaintiff, aside from your fees on this execution. In the event that payment cannot possibly be made against defendants personal properties to the satisfaction of this execution and your lawful fees thereon, then you are likewise commanded that of the lands and houses of said defendants, you make the said sums of money in the manner required by the Rules of Court. Make a return of this Writ with the required endorsement thereon within sixty (60) days from the date hereof.

xxx xxx xxx The Decision of the Municipal Trial Court and the Writ of Execution of the Regional Trial Court were specifically directed against the defendants and all persons claiming rights under them. It is plain error on the part of the respondent to implement the writ against the complainants who are neither the defendants nor persons who derived property rights from the defendants in the civil case. Such error translates into grave misconduct especially where the effect is to deny individuals of their fundamental right to due process of law. WHEREFORE, premises considered, Cornelio Marero, Sheriff IV, is found GUILTY of grave misconduct and is hereby SUSPENDED for six (6) months without pay and pay a fine of P10,000.00. He is WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar act in the future will be dealt with more severely. SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION CRISPINA UNIDA, married to G.R. No. 155432 ANTONIO MABALOT, NANCY Present: UNIDA, married to EUGENIO PANGANIBAN, Chairman, UNIDA, EDWIN DAMO, SANDOVAL- GUTIERREZ,* ANDREW MABALOT, RICARDO CORONA, DAMO and JOCELYN DAMO, CARPIO MORALES, and Petitioners, GARCIA, JJ. - versus Promulgated: HEIRS OF AMBROSIO URBAN, June 9, 2005 represented by LUCIO CABADDU, Respondent. x--------------------------------------------------x DECISION CARPIO MORALES, J.: The present petition for review on certiorari originated from a complaint for unlawful detainer filed by respondent, 'Heirs of Ambrocio Urban represented by Lucio Cabaddu, against the defendants-herein petitioners Crispina Unida et al. at the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Camalaniugan, Cagayan. Since the main issue raised is one of jurisdiction over the subject matter, a recital of the pertinent allegations of the complaint is in order. In its March 3, 1998 Complaint, the plaintiff-herein respondent who claims to be the owner of the property, which had been subdivided into Lots 298, 299, and 616, subject of the case alleged that: xxx 7. About ten (10) years ago, more or less, without the knowledge or consentof the owners, the defendants[-herein petitioners], without any legal rightwhatsoever, entered the premises of the land which is the subject of this suit and cultivated the same as their own, not giving any share to the owners; 8. Because the location of the land was then infested by the New People's Army at the time of the instrusion of the defendants, the owners did nothing but to tolerate their (defendants) stay and cultivation over the land in question; x x x[1](Underscoring supplied) In their Answer, the defendants-herein petitioners denied, among other things, having any knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief regarding the authority of Lucio Cabaddu to represent the plaintiff and concluded that 'he has no right and/or personality to represent the alleged [H]eirs' -plaintiff. On the merits, petitioners asserted that petitioner Crispina Unida has possessed Lots 298 and 616, and that petitioner Nancy Unida has possessed Lot 299, both in the concept of owner, personally and through their predecessors-in-interest, since time

immemorial, and that the title to the property subject of the complaint, OCT No. P48306, was fraudulently obtained by respondents.[2] By Decision[3]of June 7, 1999, the MTC, resolving in the affirmative the issues of 1) whether the plaintiff 'impliedly tolerated the defendants' act of cultivating the land, and 2) whether the plaintiff is the 'lawful owner of the land, accordingly rendered judgment against the defendants-herein petitioners. On appeal to the Regional Trial Court (RTC), the defendants-herein petitioners raised the following assignment of errors: 1. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DISMISSING THE CASE FOR THERE IS ABSOLUTELY NO EVIDENCE ON RECORD SHOWING THE AUTHORITY OF ALLEGED PLAINTIFF LUCIO CABADDU TO INSTITUTE THE PRESENT SUIT; 2. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE EJECTMENT OF THE DEFENDANTS ALTHOUGH THEY ARE IN ACTUAL, OPEN, PUBLIC AND NOTORIOUS POSSESSION OF THE LOTS IN DISPUTE UNDER BONAFIDE CLAIM OF OWNERSHIP EVEN BEFORE THE SECOND WORLD WAR HAVING INHERITED SAID LAND FROM THEIR FATHER LUIS UNIDA.[4](Underscoring supplied) By Decision[5]dated October 26, 1999, Branch 10 of the RTC of Cagayan reversed the MTC decision, it holding that although Lucio Cabaddu was given a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) subsequent to the filing of the complaint, the SPA did not contain a specific authorization for him to institute the complaint. In any event, the RTC held that the complaint was dismissible for while in its title Lucio Cabaddu appeared as the representative of the plaintiff-Heirs of Ambrocio Urban, paragraph 1 of the complaint alleged as follows: 1. Plaintiff[,] of legal age, married to Leticia Urban and a resident of Dugo, Camalaniugan, Cagayan, is the Authorized representative of the heirs of Ambrocio Urban,[6] thus clearly showing that he instituted it as plaintiff in behalf of the heirs, hence, 'not allowed as he is not the real party in interest. On the substantive issue, the RTC held that since the complaint itself asserted that petitioners' entry into the property was unlawful from the very beginning, respondents' alleged toleration thereof cannot be considered as toleration in contemplation of law in unlawful detainer cases, hence, the action for unlawful detainer was improper. Neither was forcible entry the proper remedy, added the RTC, as the entry of petitioners was not by 'means of force, violence, threats, intimidation, stealth or strategy. The RTC suggested though that the remedy of the plaintiff-herein respondent was to file an accion publiciana or reivindicatoriabefore the proper RTC. On appeal of respondent to the CA, it assigned two errors of the RTC, to wit: I. THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT PETITIONERS' REPRESENTATIVE LUCIO CABADDU LACKS THE PERSONALITY TO SUE DESPITE HIS CONSTITUTION AS AN ATTORNEY-IN-FACT BY PETITIONERS THROUGH A VALIDLY EXECUTED SPECIAL POWER OF ATTORNEY. II. THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT AND DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT ON THE GROUND THAT THE MODE OF ACTION (UNLAWFUL DETAINER) TAKEN BY THE PETITIONER IS INAPPROPRIATE DESPITE THE ALLEGATIONS IN THE COMPLAINT THAT RESPONDENTS POSSESSION OVER THE LAND IN DISPUTE WAS

ONLY UPON THE MERE TOLERANCE OF THE PETITIONERS.[7](Underscoring supplied) By Decision promulgated on September 19, 2001,[8]the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the RTC and reinstated that of the MTC. In reversing the RTC decision, the appellate court held that the subsequent execution of an SPA in favor of Lucio Cabaddu cured the defect in the filing of the complaint. And the appellate court 'agree[d] with the Municipal Trial Court that [the plaintiff-herein respondent] had established [its] right of possession as owners of the [property]. Furthermore, the appellate court held that 'an allegation that the defendant is unlawfully withholding possession from the plaintiff is deemed sufficient for one alleging that the withholding of possession or the refusal to vacate is unlawful, without necessarily employing the terminology of the law. Hence, the present Petition for Review with the following assignments of errors: a) THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN RULING THAT THE SUBSEQUENT SPECIAL POWER OF ATTORNEY CURES THE DEFECT IN THE COMPLAINT BECAUSE SUCH CONCLUSION WAS GROUNDED ENTIRELY ON SPECULATION, THE INFERENCE MADE IS MANIFESTLY MISTAKEN, AND THE JUDGMENT WAS BASED ON MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS.[9] b) THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE TRIAL COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE UNLAWFUL DETAINER CASE BECAUSE THE DEFENDANTS CRISPINA UNIDA AND HUSBAND ANTONIO MABALOT AND EUGENIO UNIDA MARRIED TO NANCY UNIDA ARE THE OWNERS OF THE LAND IN DISPUTE HAVING POSSESSED THE SAME SINCE PRE-WAR TIME AND INHERITED SAID LAND FROM THEIR FATHER LUIS UNIDA WHO OWNS SEVENTY TWO (72) HECTARES BEFORE THE SECOND WORLD WAR.[10](Underscoring supplied) As stated early on, the main issue, that reflected in herein petitioners' second assigned error, is one of jurisdiction over the complaint of herein respondent. From the earlier quoted material paragraphs-allegations of the complaint, petitioners' entry into the property was, by respondent's own information, unlawful from the very beginning. Respondent, nonetheless, claimed that it merely tolerated petitioners' presence in the property. Clearly, an unlawful detainer action does not lie. For to justify an action for unlawful detainer, the permission or tolerance must have been present at the beginning of the possession. Otherwise, if the possession was unlawful from the start, an action for unlawful detainer would be an improper remedy. 'Sarona v. Villegas elucidates thus: "A close assessment of the law and the concept of the word 'tolerance' confirms our view heretofore expressed that such tolerance must be present right from the start of possession sought to be recovered, to categorize a cause of action as one of unlawful detainer not of forcible entry[11](Emphasis and underscoring supplied) As correctly held then by the RTC, the case cannot be considered as an unlawful detainer case, the tolerance claimed by respondents not being that contemplated by law in unlawful detainer cases; neither can the case be considered as one for forcible entry because the entry of petitioners was not alleged to have been by means of force, intimidation, threats, stealth or strategy.

Since the complaint did not satisfy the jurisdictional requirement of a valid cause for unlawful detainer or forcible entry, the MTC had no jurisdiction over the case.[12]It is in this light that this Court finds that the RTC correctly found that the MTC had no jurisdiction over the complaint. Parenthetically, it was error for the RTC to find the complaint dismissible also on the ground that Lucio Cabaddu was not the real party in interest. That paragraph 1 of the complaint alleged that 'plaintiff [is] of legal age, married to Leticia Urban . . . is the Authorized representative of the heirs of Ambrocio Urban did not modify the name of the plaintiff appearing in the title of the complaint. In other words, that the plaintiff appearing in the title was worded as 'Heirs of Ambrocio Urban represented by Lucio Cabaddu complied with Section 3 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court which reads: SEC. 3.Representative as parties. ' Where the action is allowed to be prosecuted or defended by a representative or someone acting in a fiduciary capacity, the beneficiary shall be included in the title of the case and shall be deemed to be the real party in interest. A representative may be a trustee of an express trust, a guardian, an executor or administrator, or a party authorized by law or these Rules. An agent acting in his own name and for the benefit of an undisclosed principal may sue or be sued without joining the principal except when the contract involves things belonging to the principal. (Underscoring supplied) The foregoing discussion renders it unnecessary to still rule on the first issue of whether the Special Power of Attorney presented by Lucio Cabaddu, the representative of respondent, may be validly considered, it not having been formally offered in evidence before the MTC. Suffice it to state that, as a rule, documents presented as proof of a fact in issue must be offered in evidence before a trial court.[13] A final note. Since the RTC found that the MTC had no jurisdiction over the case, it should have followed the mandate of Sec. 8, Rule 40, which provides: Sec. 8.Appeal from orders dismissing case without trial; lack of jurisdiction. If an appeal is taken from an order of the lower court dismissing the case without a trial on the merits, the Regional Trial Court may affirm or reverse it, as the case may be. In case of affirmance and the ground of dismissal is lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, the Regional Trial Court, if it has jurisdiction thereover, shall try the case on the merits as if the case was originally filed with it. In case of reversal, the case shall be remanded for further proceedings. If the case was tried on the merits by the lower court without jurisdiction over the subject matter, the Regional Trial Court on appeal shall not dismiss the case if it has original jurisdiction thereof, but shall decide the case in accordance with the preceding section, without prejudice to the admission of amended pleadings and additional evidence in the interest of justice.(Emphasis and underscoring supplied) WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Let the records of the case be remanded to Branch 10 of the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan which is hereby directed to take action on it in accordance with the abovequoted provision of Sec. 8 of Rule 40 of the Rules of Court. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 146364. June 3, 2004 COLITO T. PAJUYO, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS and EDDIE GUEVARRA, respondents. DECISION CARPIO, J.: The Case Before us is a petition for review of the 21 June 2000 Decision and 14 December 2000 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 43129. The Court of Appeals set aside the 11 November 1996 decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 81, affirming the 15 December 1995 decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 31. The Antecedents In June 1979, petitioner Colito T. Pajuyo (Pajuyo) paid P400 to a certain Pedro Perez for the rights over a 250-square meter lot in Barrio Payatas, Quezon City. Pajuyo then constructed a house made of light materials on the lot. Pajuyo and his family lived in the house from 1979 to 7 December 1985. On 8 December 1985, Pajuyo and private respondent Eddie Guevarra (Guevarra) executed a Kasunduan or agreement. Pajuyo, as owner of the house, allowed Guevarra to live in the house for free provided Guevarra would maintain the cleanliness and orderliness of the house. Guevarra promised that he would voluntarily vacate the premises on Pajuyos demand. In September 1994, Pajuyo informed Guevarra of his need of the house and demanded that Guevarra vacate the house.Guevarra refused. Pajuyo filed an ejectment case against Guevarra with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 31 (MTC). In his Answer, Guevarra claimed that Pajuyo had no valid title or right of possession over the lot where the house stands because the lot is within the 150 hectares set aside by Proclamation No. 137 for socialized housing. Guevarra pointed out that from December 1985 to September 1994, Pajuyo did not show up or communicate with him. Guevarra insisted that neither he nor Pajuyo has valid title to the lot. On 15 December 1995, the MTC rendered its decision in favor of Pajuyo. The dispositive portion of the MTC decision reads: WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered for the plaintiff and against defendant, ordering the latter to: A) vacate the house and lot occupied by the defendant or any other person or persons claiming any right under him; B) pay unto plaintiff the sum of THREE HUNDRED PESOS (P300.00) monthly as reasonable compensation for the use of the premises starting from the last demand; C) pay plaintiff the sum of P3,000.00 as and by way of attorneys fees; and D) pay the cost of suit. SO ORDERED. Aggrieved, Guevarra appealed to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 81 (RTC). On 11 November 1996, the RTC affirmed the MTC decision. The dispositive portion of the RTC decision reads: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds no reversible error in the decision appealed from, being in accord with the law and evidence presented, and the same is hereby affirmed en toto.

SO ORDERED. Guevarra received the RTC decision on 29 November 1996. Guevarra had only until 14 December 1996 to file his appeal with the Court of Appeals. Instead of filing his appeal with the Court of Appeals, Guevarra filed with the Supreme Court a Motion for Extension of Time to File Appeal by Certiorari Based on Rule 42 (motion for extension). Guevarra theorized that his appeal raised pure questions of law. The Receiving Clerk of the Supreme Court received the motion for extension on 13 December 1996 or one day before the right to appeal expired. On 3 January 1997, Guevarra filed his petition for review with the Supreme Court. On 8 January 1997, the First Division of the Supreme Court issued a Resolution referring the motion for extension to the Court of Appeals which has concurrent jurisdiction over the case. The case presented no special and important matter for the Supreme Court to take cognizance of at the first instance. On 28 January 1997, the Thirteenth Division of the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution granting the motion for extension conditioned on the timeliness of the filing of the motion. On 27 February 1997, the Court of Appeals ordered Pajuyo to comment on Guevaras petition for review. On 11 April 1997, Pajuyo filed his Comment. On 21 June 2000, the Court of Appeals issued its decision reversing the RTC decision. The dispositive portion of the decision reads: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Decision of the court a quo in Civil Case No. Q-9626943 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE; and it is hereby declared that the ejectment case filed against defendant-appellant is without factual and legal basis. SO ORDERED. Pajuyo filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision. Pajuyo pointed out that the Court of Appeals should have dismissed outright Guevarras petition for review because it was filed out of time. Moreover, it was Guevarras counsel and not Guevarra who signed the certification against forumshopping. On 14 December 2000, the Court of Appeals issued a resolution denying Pajuyos motion for reconsideration. The dispositive portion of the resolution reads: WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED. No costs. SO ORDERED. The Ruling of the MTC The MTC ruled that the subject of the agreement between Pajuyo and Guevarra is the house and not the lot. Pajuyo is the owner of the house, and he allowed Guevarra to use the house only by tolerance. Thus, Guevarras refusal to vacate the house on Pajuyos demand made Guevarras continued possession of the house illegal. The Ruling of the RTC The RTC upheld the Kasunduan, which established the landlord and tenant relationship between Pajuyo and Guevarra. The terms of the Kasunduanbound Guevarra to return possession of the house on demand. The RTC rejected Guevarras claim of a better right under Proclamation No. 137, the Revised National Government Center Housing Project Code of Policies and other pertinent laws. In an ejectment suit, the RTC has no power to decide Guevarras rights under these laws.The RTC declared that in an ejectment case, the only issue for resolution is material or physical possession, not ownership. The Ruling of the Court of Appeals The Court of Appeals declared that Pajuyo and Guevarra are squatters. Pajuyo and Guevarra illegally occupied the contested lot which the government owned. Perez, the person from whom Pajuyo acquired his rights, was also a squatter. Perez had no right or title over the lot because it is public land. The assignment of rights between Perez and Pajuyo, and the Kasunduan between Pajuyo and Guevarra, did not have any legal effect. Pajuyo and Guevarra are in pari delicto or in equal fault. The court will leave them where they are. The Court of Appeals reversed the MTC and RTC rulings, which held that the Kasunduan between Pajuyo and Guevarra created a legal tie akin to that of a landlord and tenant relationship. The Court of Appeals ruled that the Kasunduan is not a lease contract but a commodatum because the agreement is not for a price certain. Since Pajuyo admitted that he resurfaced only in 1994 to claim the property, the appellate court held that Guevarra has a better right over the property under Proclamation No. 137. President Corazon C. Aquino (President Aquino) issued Proclamation No. 137 on 7 September 1987. At that time, Guevarra was in physical possession of the property. Under Article VI of the Code of Policies Beneficiary

Selection and Disposition of Homelots and Structures in the National Housing Project (the Code), the actual occupant or caretaker of the lot shall have first priority as beneficiary of the project. The Court of Appeals concluded that Guevarra is first in the hierarchy of priority. In denying Pajuyos motion for reconsideration, the appellate court debunked Pajuyos claim that Guevarra filed his motion for extension beyond the period to appeal. The Court of Appeals pointed out that Guevarras motion for extension filed before the Supreme Court was stamped 13 December 1996 at 4:09 PM by the Supreme Courts Receiving Clerk. The Court of Appeals concluded that the motion for extension bore a date, contrary to Pajuyos claim that the motion for extension was undated. Guevarra filed the motion for extension on time on 13 December 1996 since he filed the motion one day before the expiration of the reglementary period on 14 December 1996. Thus, the motion for extension properly complied with the condition imposed by the Court of Appeals in its 28 January 1997 Resolution. The Court of Appeals explained that the thirty-day extension to file the petition for review was deemed granted because of such compliance. The Court of Appeals rejected Pajuyos argument that the appellate court should have dismissed the petition for review because it was Guevarras counsel and not Guevarra who signed the certification against forum-shopping. The Court of Appeals pointed out that Pajuyo did not raise this issue in his Comment. The Court of Appeals held that Pajuyo could not now seek the dismissal of the case after he had extensively argued on the merits of the case.This technicality, the appellate court opined, was clearly an afterthought. The Issues Pajuyo raises the following issues for resolution: WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED OR ABUSED ITS AUTHORITY AND DISCRETION TANTAMOUNT TO LACK OF JURISDICTION: 1) in GRANTING, instead of denying, Private Respondents Motion for an Extension of thirty days to file petition for review at the time when there was no more period to extend as the decision of the Regional Trial Court had already become final and executory. 2) in giving due course, instead of dismissing, private respondents Petition for Review even though the certification against forum-shopping was signed only by counsel instead of by petitioner himself. 3) in ruling that the Kasunduan voluntarily entered into by the parties was in fact a commodatum, instead of a Contract of Lease as found by the Metropolitan Trial Court and in holding that the ejectment case filed against defendantappellant is without legal and factual basis. 4) in reversing and setting aside the Decision of the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. Q-96-26943 and in holding that the parties are in pari delicto being both squatters, therefore, illegal occupants of the contested parcel of land. 5) in deciding the unlawful detainer case based on the so-called Code of Policies of the National Government Center Housing Project instead of deciding the same under the Kasunduan voluntarily executed by the parties, the terms and conditions of which are the laws between themselves. The Ruling of the Court The procedural issues Pajuyo is raising are baseless. However, we find merit in the substantive issues Pajuyo is submitting for resolution. Procedural Issues Pajuyo insists that the Court of Appeals should have dismissed outright Guevarras petition for review because the RTC decision had already become final and executory when the appellate court acted on Guevarras motion for extension to file the petition. Pajuyo points out that Guevarra had only one day before the expiry of his period to appeal the RTC decision. Instead of filing the petition for review with the Court of Appeals, Guevarra filed with this Court an undated motion for extension of 30 days to file a petition for review. This Court merely referred the motion to the Court of Appeals. Pajuyo believes that the filing of the motion for extension with this Court did not toll the running of the period to perfect the appeal. Hence, when the Court of Appeals received the motion, the period to appeal had already expired. We are not persuaded. Decisions of the regional trial courts in the exercise of their appellate jurisdiction are appealable to the Court of Appeals by petition for review in cases involving questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law. Decisions of the regional trial courts involving pure questions of law are appealable directly to this Court by petition for review. These modes of appeal are now embodied in Section 2, Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Guevarra believed that his appeal of the RTC decision involved only questions of law. Guevarra thus filed his motion for extension to file petition for review before this Court on 14 December 1996. On 3 January 1997, Guevarra then filed his petition for review with this Court. A perusal of Guevarras petition for review gives the impression that the issues he raised were pure questions of law. There is a

question of law when the doubt or difference is on what the law is on a certain state of facts. There is a question of fact when the doubt or difference is on the truth or falsity of the facts alleged. In his petition for review before this Court, Guevarra no longer disputed the facts. Guevarras petition for review raised these questions: (1) Do ejectment cases pertain only to possession of a structure, and not the lot on which the structure stands? (2) Does a suit by a squatter against a fellow squatter constitute a valid case for ejectment?(3) Should a Presidential Proclamation governing the lot on which a squatters structure stands be considered in an ejectment suit filed by the owner of the structure? These questions call for the evaluation of the rights of the parties under the law on ejectment and the Presidential Proclamation. At first glance, the questions Guevarra raised appeared purely legal. However, some factual questions still have to be resolved because they have a bearing on the legal questions raised in the petition for review.These factual matters refer to the metes and bounds of the disputed property and the application of Guevarra as beneficiary of Proclamation No. 137. The Court of Appeals has the power to grant an extension of time to file a petition for review. In Lacsamana v. Second Special Cases Division of the Intermediate Appellate Court, we declared that the Court of Appeals could grant extension of time in appeals by petition for review. In Liboro v. Court of Appeals, we clarified that the prohibition against granting an extension of time applies only in a case where ordinary appeal is perfected by a mere notice of appeal. The prohibition does not apply in a petition for review where the pleading needs verification. A petition for review, unlike an ordinary appeal, requires preparation and research to present a persuasive position. The drafting of the petition for review entails more time and effort than filing a notice of appeal. Hence, the Court of Appeals may allow an extension of time to file a petition for review. In the more recent case of Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals, we held that Liboros clarification of Lacsamana is consistent with the Revised Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court Circular No. 1-91. They all allow an extension of time for filing petitions for review with the Court of Appeals. The extension, however, should be limited to only fifteen days save in exceptionally meritorious cases where the Court of Appeals may grant a longer period. A judgment becomes final and executory by operation of law. Finality of judgment becomes a fact on the lapse of the reglementary period to appeal if no appeal is perfected. The RTC decision could not have gained finality because the Court of Appeals granted the 30-day extension to Guevarra. The Court of Appeals did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it approved Guevarras motion for extension. The Court of Appeals gave due course to the motion for extension because it complied with the condition set by the appellate court in its resolution dated 28 January 1997. The resolution stated that the Court of Appeals would only give due course to the motion for extension if filed on time. The motion for extension met this condition. The material dates to consider in determining the timeliness of the filing of the motion for extension are (1) the date of receipt of the judgment or final order or resolution subject of the petition, and (2) the date of filing of the motion for extension. It is the date of the filing of the motion or pleading, and not the date of execution, that determines the timeliness of the filing of that motion or pleading. Thus, even if the motion for extension bears no date, the date of filing stamped on it is the reckoning point for determining the timeliness of its filing. Guevarra had until 14 December 1996 to file an appeal from the RTC decision. Guevarra filed his motion for extension before this Court on 13 December 1996, the date stamped by this Courts Receiving Clerk on the motion for extension. Clearly, Guevarra filed the motion for extension exactly one day before the lapse of the reglementary period to appeal. Assuming that the Court of Appeals should have dismissed Guevarras appeal on technical grounds, Pajuyo did not ask the appellate court to deny the motion for extension and dismiss the petition for review at the earliest opportunity. Instead, Pajuyo vigorously discussed the merits of the case. It was only when the Court of Appeals ruled in Guevarras favor that Pajuyo raised the procedural issues against Guevarras petition for review. A party who, after voluntarily submitting a dispute for resolution, receives an adverse decision on the merits, is estopped from attacking the jurisdiction of the court. Estoppel sets in not because the judgment of the court is a valid and conclusive adjudication, but because the practice of attacking the courts jurisdiction after voluntarily submitting to it is against public policy. In his Comment before the Court of Appeals, Pajuyo also failed to discuss Guevarras failure to sign the certification against forum shopping. Instead, Pajuyo harped on Guevarras counsel signing the verification, claiming that the counsels verification is insufficient since it is based only on mere information. A partys failure to sign the certification against forum shopping is different from the partys failure to sign personally the verification. The certificate of non-forum shopping must be signed by the party, and not by counsel. The certification of counsel renders the petition defective. On the other hand, the requirement on verification of a pleading is a formal and not a jurisdictional requisite. It is intended simply to secure an assurance that what are alleged in the pleading are true and correct and not the product of the imagination or a matter of speculation, and that the pleading is filed in good faith. The party need not sign the verification. A partys representative, lawyer or any person who personally knows the truth of the facts alleged in the pleading may sign the verification. We agree with the Court of Appeals that the issue on the certificate against forum shopping was merely an afterthought. Pajuyo did not call the Court of Appeals attention to this defect at the early stage of the proceedings. Pajuyo raised this procedural issue too late in the proceedings.

Absence of Title over the Disputed Property will not Divest the Courts of Jurisdiction to Resolve the Issue of Possession Settled is the rule that the defendants claim of ownership of the disputed property will not divest the inferior court of its jurisdiction over the ejectment case. Even if the pleadings raise the issue of ownership, the court may pass on such issue to determine only the question of possession, especially if the ownership is inseparably linked with the possession. The adjudication on the issue of ownership is only provisional and will not bar an action between the same parties involving title to the land. This doctrine is a necessary consequence of the nature of the two summary actions of ejectment, forcible entry and unlawful detainer, where the only issue for adjudication is the physical or material possession over the real property. In this case, what Guevarra raised before the courts was that he and Pajuyo are not the owners of the contested property and that they are mere squatters. Will the defense that the parties to the ejectment case are not the owners of the disputed lot allow the courts to renounce their jurisdiction over the case?The Court of Appeals believed so and held that it would just leave the parties where they are since they are in pari delicto. We do not agree with the Court of Appeals. Ownership or the right to possess arising from ownership is not at issue in an action for recovery of possession.The parties cannot present evidence to prove ownership or right to legal possession except to prove the nature of the possession when necessary to resolve the issue of physical possession. The same is true when the defendant asserts the absence of title over the property. The absence of title over the contested lot is not a ground for the courts to withhold relief from the parties in an ejectment case. The only question that the courts must resolve in ejectment proceedings is - who is entitled to the physical possession of the premises, that is, to the possession de facto and not to the possession de jure. It does not even matter if a partys title to the property is questionable, or when both parties intruded into public land and their applications to own the land have yet to be approved by the proper government agency. Regardless of the actual condition of the title to the property, the party in peaceable quiet possession shall not be thrown out by a strong hand, violence or terror. Neither is the unlawful withholding of property allowed. Courts will always uphold respect for prior possession. Thus, a party who can prove prior possession can recover such possession even against the owner himself. Whatever may be the character of his possession, if he has in his favor prior possession in time, he has the security that entitles him to remain on the property until a person with a better right lawfully ejects him. To repeat, the only issue that the court has to settle in an ejectment suit is the right to physical possession. In Pitargue v. Sorilla, the government owned the land in dispute. The government did not authorize either the plaintiff or the defendant in the case of forcible entry case to occupy the land. The plaintiff had prior possession and had already introduced improvements on the public land.The plaintiff had a pending application for the land with the Bureau of Lands when the defendant ousted him from possession. The plaintiff filed the action of forcible entry against the defendant. The government was not a party in the case of forcible entry. The defendant questioned the jurisdiction of the courts to settle the issue of possession because while the application of the plaintiff was still pending, title remained with the government, and the Bureau of Public Lands had jurisdiction over the case. We disagreed with the defendant. We ruled that courts have jurisdiction to entertain ejectment suits even before the resolution of the application. The plaintiff, by priority of his application and of his entry, acquired prior physical possession over the public land applied for as against other private claimants. That prior physical possession enjoys legal protection against other private claimants because only a court can take away such physical possession in an ejectment case. While the Court did not brand the plaintiff and the defendant in Pitargue as squatters, strictly speaking, their entry into the disputed land was illegal. Both the plaintiff and defendant entered the public land without the owners permission. Title to the land remained with the government because it had not awarded to anyone ownership of the contested public land. Both the plaintiff and the defendant were in effect squatting on government property. Yet, we upheld the courts jurisdiction to resolve the issue of possession even if the plaintiff and the defendant in the ejectment case did not have any title over the contested land. Courts must not abdicate their jurisdiction to resolve the issue of physical possession because of the public need to preserve the basic policy behind the summary actions of forcible entry and unlawful detainer. The underlying philosophy behind ejectment suits is to prevent breach of the peace and criminal disorder and to compel the party out of possession to respect and resort to the law alone to obtain what he claims is his. The party deprived of possession must not take the law into his own hands. Ejectment proceedings are summary in nature so the authorities can settle speedily actions to recover possession because of the overriding need to quell social disturbances. We further explained in Pitargue the greater interest that is at stake in actions for recovery of possession. We made the following pronouncements in Pitargue: The question that is before this Court is: Are courts without jurisdiction to take cognizance of possessory actions involving these public lands before final award is made by the Lands Department, and before title is given any of the conflicting claimants? It is one of utmost importance, as there are public lands everywhere and there are thousands of settlers, especially in newly opened regions. It also involves a matter of policy, as it requires the determination of the respective authorities and functions of two coordinate branches of the Government in connection with public land conflicts.

Our problem is made simple by the fact that under the Civil Code, either in the old, which was in force in this country before the American occupation, or in the new, we have a possessory action, the aim and purpose of which is the recovery of the physical possession of real property, irrespective of the question as to who has the title thereto. Under the Spanish Civil Code we had the accion interdictal, a summary proceeding which could be brought within one year from dispossession (Roman Catholic Bishop of Cebu vs. Mangaron, 6 Phil. 286, 291); and as early as October 1, 1901, upon the enactment of the Code of Civil Procedure (Act No. 190 of the Philippine Commission) we implanted the common law action of forcible entry (section 80 of Act No. 190), the object of which has been stated by this Court to be to prevent breaches of the peace and criminal disorder which would ensue from the withdrawal of the remedy, and the reasonable hope such withdrawal would create that some advantage must accrue to those persons who, believing themselves entitled to the possession of property, resort to force to gain possession rather than to some appropriate action in the court to assert their claims. (Supia and Batioco vs. Quintero and Ayala, 59 Phil. 312, 314.) So before the enactment of the first Public Land Act (Act No. 926) the action of forcible entry was already available in the courts of the country. So the question to be resolved is, Did the Legislature intend, when it vested the power and authority to alienate and dispose of the public lands in the Lands Department, to exclude the courts from entertaining the possessory action of forcible entry between rival claimants or occupants of any land before award thereof to any of the parties? Did Congress intend that the lands applied for, or all public lands for that matter, be removed from the jurisdiction of the judicial Branch of the Government, so that any troubles arising therefrom, or any breaches of the peace or disorders caused by rival claimants, could be inquired into only by the Lands Department to the exclusion of the courts? The answer to this question seems to us evident. The Lands Department does not have the means to police public lands; neither does it have the means to prevent disorders arising therefrom, or contain breaches of the peace among settlers; or to pass promptly upon conflicts of possession. Then its power is clearly limited to disposition and alienation, and while it may decide conflicts of possession in order to make proper award, the settlement of conflicts of possession which is recognized in the court herein has another ultimate purpose, i.e., the protection of actual possessors and occupants with a view to the prevention of breaches of the peace. The power to dispose and alienate could not have been intended to include the power to prevent or settle disorders or breaches of the peace among rival settlers or claimants prior to the final award. As to this, therefore, the corresponding branches of the Government must continue to exercise power and jurisdiction within the limits of their respective functions. The vesting of the Lands Department with authority to administer, dispose, and alienate public lands, therefore, must not be understood as depriving the other branches of the Government of the exercise of the respective functions or powers thereon, such as the authority to stop disorders and quell breaches of the peace by the police, the authority on the part of the courts to take jurisdiction over possessory actions arising therefrom not involving, directly or indirectly, alienation and disposition. Our attention has been called to a principle enunciated in American courts to the effect that courts have no jurisdiction to determine the rights of claimants to public lands, and that until the disposition of the land has passed from the control of the Federal Government, the courts will not interfere with the administration of matters concerning the same. (50 C. J. 1093-1094.) We have no quarrel with this principle. The determination of the respective rights of rival claimants to public lands is different from the determination of who has the actual physical possession or occupation with a view to protecting the same and preventing disorder and breaches of the peace. A judgment of the court ordering restitution of the possession of a parcel of land to the actual occupant, who has been deprived thereof by another through the use of force or in any other illegal manner, can never be prejudicial interference with the disposition or alienation of public lands. On the other hand, if courts were deprived of jurisdiction of cases involving conflicts of possession, that threat of judicial action against breaches of the peace committed on public lands would be eliminated, and a state of lawlessness would probably be produced between applicants, occupants or squatters, where force or might, not right or justice, would rule. It must be borne in mind that the action that would be used to solve conflicts of possession between rivals or conflicting applicants or claimants would be no other than that of forcible entry. This action, both in England and the United States and in our jurisdiction, is a summary and expeditious remedy whereby one in peaceful and quiet possession may recover the possession of which he has been deprived by a stronger hand, by violence or terror; its ultimate object being to prevent breach of the peace and criminal disorder. (Supia and Batioco vs. Quintero and Ayala, 59 Phil. 312, 314.) The basis of the remedy is mere possession as a fact, of physical possession, not a legal possession. (Mediran vs. Villanueva, 37 Phil. 752.) The title or right to possession is never in issue in an action of forcible entry; as a matter of fact, evidence thereof is expressly banned, except to prove the nature of the possession. (Second 4, Rule 72, Rules of Court.) With this nature of the action in mind, by no stretch of the imagination can conclusion be arrived at that the use of the remedy in the courts of justice would constitute an interference with the alienation, disposition, and control of public lands. To limit ourselves to the case at bar can it be pretended at all that its result would in any way interfere with the manner of the alienation or disposition of the land contested? On the contrary, it would facilitate adjudication, for the question of priority of possession having been decided in a final manner by the courts, said question need no longer waste the time of the land officers making the adjudication or award. (Emphasis ours) The Principle of Pari Delicto is not Applicable to Ejectment Cases The Court of Appeals erroneously applied the principle of pari delicto to this case. Articles 1411 and 1412 of the Civil Code embody the principle of pari delicto. We explained the principle of pari delicto in these words: The rule of pari delictois expressed in the maxims ex dolo malo non eritur actio and in pari delicto potior est conditio defedentis. The law will not aid either party to an illegal agreement. It leaves the parties where it finds them. The application of the pari delicto principle is not absolute, as there are exceptions to its application. One of these exceptions is where the application of the pari delicto rule would violate well-established public policy.

In Drilon v. Gaurana, we reiterated the basic policy behind the summary actions of forcible entry and unlawful detainer. We held that: It must be stated that the purpose of an action of forcible entry and detainer is that, regardless of the actual condition of the title to the property, the party in peaceable quiet possession shall not be turned out by strong hand, violence or terror. In affording this remedy of restitution the object of the statute is to prevent breaches of the peace and criminal disorder which would ensue from the withdrawal of the remedy, and the reasonable hope such withdrawal would create that some advantage must accrue to those persons who, believing themselves entitled to the possession of property, resort to force to gain possession rather than to some appropriate action in the courts to assert their claims. This is the philosophy at the foundation of all these actions of forcible entry and detainer which are designed to compel the party out of possession to respect and resort to the law alone to obtain what he claims is his. Clearly, the application of the principle of pari delicto to a case of ejectment between squatters is fraught with danger. To shut out relief to squatters on the ground of pari delictowould openly invite mayhem and lawlessness. A squatter would oust another squatter from possession of the lot that the latter had illegally occupied, emboldened by the knowledge that the courts would leave them where they are. Nothing would then stand in the way of the ousted squatter from re-claiming his prior possession at all cost. Petty warfare over possession of properties is precisely what ejectment cases or actions for recovery of possession seek to prevent. Even the owner who has title over the disputed property cannot take the law into his own hands to regain possession of his property. The owner must go to court. Courts must resolve the issue of possession even if the parties to the ejectment suit are squatters. The determination of priority and superiority of possession is a serious and urgent matter that cannot be left to the squatters to decide. To do so would make squatters receive better treatment under the law. The law restrains property owners from taking the law into their own hands. However, the principle of pari delicto as applied by the Court of Appeals would give squatters free rein to dispossess fellow squatters or violently retake possession of properties usurped from them. Courts should not leave squatters to their own devices in cases involving recovery of possession. Possession is the only Issue for Resolution in an Ejectment Case The case for review before the Court of Appeals was a simple case of ejectment. The Court of Appeals refused to rule on the issue of physical possession. Nevertheless, the appellate court held that the pivotal issue in this case is who between Pajuyo and Guevarra has the priority right as beneficiary of the contested land under Proclamation No. 137. According to the Court of Appeals, Guevarra enjoys preferential right under Proclamation No. 137 because Article VI of the Code declares that the actual occupant or caretaker is the one qualified to apply for socialized housing. The ruling of the Court of Appeals has no factual and legal basis. First.Guevarra did not present evidence to show that the contested lot is part of a relocation site under Proclamation No. 137. Proclamation No. 137 laid down the metes and bounds of the land that it declared open for disposition to bona fide residents. The records do not show that the contested lot is within the land specified by Proclamation No. 137. Guevarra had the burden to prove that the disputed lot is within the coverage of Proclamation No. 137. He failed to do so. Second. The Court of Appeals should not have given credence to Guevarras unsubstantiated claim that he is the beneficiary of Proclamation No. 137. Guevarra merely alleged that in the survey the project administrator conducted, he and not Pajuyo appeared as the actual occupant of the lot. There is no proof that Guevarra actually availed of the benefits of Proclamation No. 137. Pajuyo allowed Guevarra to occupy the disputed property in 1985.President Aquino signed Proclamation No. 137 into law on 11 March 1986. Pajuyo made his earliest demand for Guevarra to vacate the property in September 1994. During the time that Guevarra temporarily held the property up to the time that Proclamation No. 137 allegedly segregated the disputed lot, Guevarra never applied as beneficiary of Proclamation No. 137. Even when Guevarra already knew that Pajuyo was reclaiming possession of the property, Guevarra did not take any step to comply with the requirements of Proclamation No. 137. Third.Even assuming that the disputed lot is within the coverage of Proclamation No. 137 and Guevarra has a pending application over the lot, courts should still assume jurisdiction and resolve the issue of possession. However, the jurisdiction of the courts would be limited to the issue of physical possession only. In Pitargue, we ruled that courts have jurisdiction over possessory actions involving public land to determine the issue of physical possession. The determination of the respective rights of rival claimants to public land is, however, distinct from the determination of who has the actual physical possession or who has a better right of physical possession. The administrative disposition and alienation of public lands should be threshed out in the proper government agency. The Court of Appeals determination of Pajuyo and Guevarras rights under Proclamation No. 137 was premature.Pajuyo and Guevarra were at most merely potential beneficiaries of the law. Courts should not preempt the decision of the administrative agency mandated by law to determine the qualifications of applicants for the acquisition of public lands. Instead, courts should expeditiously resolve the issue of physical possession in ejectment cases to prevent disorder and breaches of peace.

Pajuyo is Entitled to Physical Possession of the Disputed Property Guevarra does not dispute Pajuyos prior possession of the lot and ownership of the house built on it. Guevarra expressly admitted the existence and due execution of the Kasunduan. The Kasunduan reads: Ako, si COL[I]TO PAJUYO, may-ari ng bahay at lote sa Bo. Payatas, Quezon City, ay nagbibigay pahintulot kay G. Eddie Guevarra, na pansamantalang manirahan sa nasabing bahay at lote ng walang bayad. Kaugnay nito, kailangang panatilihin nila ang kalinisan at kaayusan ng bahay at lote. Sa sandaling kailangan na namin ang bahay at lote, silay kusang aalis ng walang reklamo. Based on the Kasunduan, Pajuyo permitted Guevarra to reside in the house and lot free of rent, but Guevarra was under obligation to maintain the premises in good condition. Guevarra promised to vacate the premises on Pajuyos demand but Guevarra broke his promise and refused to heed Pajuyos demand to vacate. These facts make out a case for unlawful detainer. Unlawful detainer involves the withholding by a person from another of the possession of real property to which the latter is entitled after the expiration or termination of the formers right to hold possession under a contract, express or implied. Where the plaintiff allows the defendant to use his property by tolerance without any contract, the defendant is necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will vacate on demand, failing which, an action for unlawful detainer will lie. The defendants refusal to comply with the demand makes his continued possession of the property unlawful. The status of the defendant in such a case is similar to that of a lessee or tenant whose term of lease has expired but whose occupancy continues by tolerance of the owner. This principle should apply with greater force in cases where a contract embodies the permission or tolerance to use the property. The Kasunduanexpressly articulated Pajuyos forbearance. Pajuyo did not require Guevarra to pay any rent but only to maintain the house and lot in good condition. Guevarra expressly vowed in the Kasunduan that he would vacate the property on demand. Guevarras refusal to comply with Pajuyos demand to vacate made Guevarras continued possession of the property unlawful. We do not subscribe to the Court of Appeals theory that the Kasunduan is one of commodatum. In a contract of commodatum, one of the parties delivers to another something not consumable so that the latter may use the same for a certain time and return it. An essential feature of commodatum is that it is gratuitous. Another feature of commodatumis that the use of the thing belonging to another is for a certain period. Thus, the bailor cannot demand the return of the thing loaned until after expiration of the period stipulated, or after accomplishment of the use for which the commodatum is constituted. If the bailor should have urgent need of the thing, he may demand its return for temporary use. If the use of the thing is merely tolerated by the bailor, he can demand the return of the thing at will, in which case the contractual relation is called aprecarium. Under the Civil Code, precarium is a kind of commodatum. The Kasunduan reveals that the accommodation accorded by Pajuyo to Guevarra was not essentially gratuitous. While the Kasunduan did not require Guevarra to pay rent, it obligated him to maintain the property in good condition. The imposition of this obligation makes the Kasunduan a contract different from a commodatum.The effects of the Kasunduan are also different from that of a commodatum. Case law on ejectment has treated relationship based on tolerance as one that is akin to a landlord-tenant relationship where the withdrawal of permission would result in the termination of the lease. The tenants withholding of the property would then be unlawful. This is settled jurisprudence. Even assuming that the relationship between Pajuyo and Guevarra is one of commodatum, Guevarra as bailee would still have the duty to turn over possession of the property to Pajuyo, the bailor. The obligation to deliver or to return the thing received attaches to contracts for safekeeping, or contracts of commission, administration and commodatum. These contracts certainly involve the obligation to deliver or return the thing received. Guevarra turned his back on the Kasunduan on the sole ground that like him, Pajuyo is also a squatter. Squatters, Guevarra pointed out, cannot enter into a contract involving the land they illegally occupy. Guevarra insists that the contract is void. Guevarra should know that there must be honor even between squatters. Guevarra freely entered into the Kasunduan. Guevarra cannot now impugn the Kasunduan after he had benefited from it. The Kasunduan binds Guevarra. The Kasunduan is not void for purposes of determining who between Pajuyo and Guevarra has a right to physical possession of the contested property. The Kasunduan is the undeniable evidence of Guevarras recognition of Pajuyos better right of physical possession. Guevarra is clearly a possessor in bad faith. The absence of a contract would not yield a different result, as there would still be an implied promise to vacate. Guevarra contends that there is a pernicious evil that is sought to be avoided, and that is allowing an absentee squatter who (sic) makes (sic) a profit out of his illegal act. Guevarra bases his argument on the preferential right given to the actual occupant or caretaker under Proclamation No. 137 on socialized housing. We are not convinced.

Pajuyo did not profit from his arrangement with Guevarra because Guevarra stayed in the property without paying any rent. There is also no proof that Pajuyo is a professional squatter who rents out usurped properties to other squatters. Moreover, it is for the proper government agency to decide who between Pajuyo and Guevarra qualifies for socialized housing. The only issue that we are addressing is physical possession. Prior possession is not always a condition sine qua non in ejectment. This is one of the distinctions between forcible entry and unlawful detainer. In forcible entry, the plaintiff is deprived of physical possession of his land or building by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth. Thus, he must allege and prove prior possession. But in unlawful detainer, the defendant unlawfully withholds possession after the expiration or termination of his right to possess under any contract, express or implied. In such a case, prior physical possession is not required. Pajuyos withdrawal of his permission to Guevarra terminated the Kasunduan.Guevarras transient right to possess the property ended as well. Moreover, it was Pajuyo who was in actual possession of the property because Guevarra had to seek Pajuyos permission to temporarily hold the property and Guevarra had to follow the conditions set by Pajuyo in the Kasunduan. Control over the property still rested with Pajuyo and this is evidence of actual possession. Pajuyos absence did not affect his actual possession of the disputed property. Possession in the eyes of the law does not mean that a man has to have his feet on every square meter of the ground before he is deemed in possession. One may acquire possession not only by physical occupation, but also by the fact that a thing is subject to the action of ones will. Actual or physical occupation is not always necessary. Ruling on Possession Does not Bind Title to the Land in Dispute We are aware of our pronouncement in cases where we declared that squatters and intruders who clandestinely enter into titled government property cannot, by such act, acquire any legal right to said property. We made this declaration because the person who had title or who had the right to legal possession over the disputed property was a party in the ejectment suit and that party instituted the case against squatters or usurpers. In this case, the owner of the land, which is the government, is not a party to the ejectment case. This case is between squatters. Had the government participated in this case, the courts could have evicted the contending squatters, Pajuyo and Guevarra. Since the party that has title or a better right over the property is not impleaded in this case, we cannot evict on our own the parties. Such a ruling would discourage squatters from seeking the aid of the courts in settling the issue of physical possession. Stripping both the plaintiff and the defendant of possession just because they are squatters would have the same dangerous implications as the application of the principle of pari delicto.Squatters would then rather settle the issue of physical possession among themselves than seek relief from the courts if the plaintiff and defendant in the ejectment case would both stand to lose possession of the disputed property. This would subvert the policy underlying actions for recovery of possession. Since Pajuyo has in his favor priority in time in holding the property, he is entitled to remain on the property until a person who has title or a better right lawfully ejects him. Guevarra is certainly not that person. The ruling in this case, however, does not preclude Pajuyo and Guevarra from introducing evidence and presenting arguments before the proper administrative agency to establish any right to which they may be entitled under the law. In no way should our ruling in this case be interpreted to condone squatting. The ruling on the issue of physical possession does not affect title to the property nor constitute a binding and conclusive adjudication on the merits on the issue of ownership. The owner can still go to court to recover lawfully the property from the person who holds the property without legal title. Our ruling here does not diminish the power of government agencies, including local governments, to condemn, abate, remove or demolish illegal or unauthorized structures in accordance with existing laws. Attorneys Fees and Rentals The MTC and RTC failed to justify the award of P3,000 attorneys fees to Pajuyo. Attorneys fees as part of damages are awarded only in the instances enumerated in Article 2208 of the Civil Code. Thus, the award of attorneys fees is the exception rather than the rule. Attorneys fees are not awarded every time a party prevails in a suit because of the policy that no premium should be placed on the right to litigate. We therefore delete the attorneys fees awarded to Pajuyo. We sustain the P300 monthly rentals the MTC and RTC assessed against Guevarra. Guevarra did not dispute this factual finding of the two courts.We find the amount reasonable compensation to Pajuyo. The P300 monthly rental is counted from the last demand to vacate, which was on 16 February 1995. WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. The Decision dated 21 June 2000 and Resolution dated 14 December 2000 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 43129 are SET ASIDE. The Decision dated 11 November 1996 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 81 in Civil Case No. Q-96-26943, affirming the Decision dated 15 December 1995 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 31 in Civil Case No. 12432, is REINSTATED with MODIFICATION. The award of attorneys fees is deleted. No costs. SO ORDERED.

RUDY LAO, Petitioner, vs. JAIME LAO, respondent. DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

As early as 1956, the spouses Julian Lao and Anita Lao had constructed a building on a parcel of land in Balasan, Iloilo City, owned by Alfredo Alava and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 28382. They then occupied and leased the same without any written agreement thereon. Anita Lao also put up her business in the premises. On May 12, 1982, Alfredo Alava, as lessor, and Anita Lao, as lessee, executed a Contract of Lease[1]over the said property. The parties agreed that the lease of the property was to be for a period of 35 years, at an annual rental of P120.00. However, the contract of lease was not filed with the Office of the Register of Deeds; hence, was not annotated at the dorsal portion of the said title. Aside from Anita Lao, petitioner Rudy Lao also leased another portion of the same property where he put up his business. In fact, Anita Lao's building was adjacent to where the petitioner conducted his business. At that time, the petitioner knew that Anita Lao and her husband were the owners of the said building. He also knew that she had leased that portion of the property, and that respondent Jaime Lao, their son, managed and maintained the building, as well as the business thereon. In the meantime, on March 21, 1995, the petitioner purchased the property from Alava, and was later issued TCT No. 152,097 in his name. By then, the property had been classified as commercial, but the yearly rental of P120.00 in the contract of lease between Alava and Anita Lao subsisted. On July 14, 1997, the petitioner filed a Complaint for Unlawful Detainer against the respondent with the 1st Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Carles-Balasan, Iloilo City. The petitioner alleged, inter alia, that the respondent had occupied a portion of his property without any lease agreement and without paying any rentals therefor, and that the same was only through his tolerance and generosity. The petitioner prayed that, after due proceedings, judgment be rendered in his favor as follows: 1. Ordering the defendant, his agents and/or representatives and all persons claiming under him, to vacate the premises he occupies, remove all improvements thereon and restore possession thereof to the plaintiff; 2. Directing the defendant, his agents and/or representatives and all persons claiming under him, when proper, jointly and severally, to pay plaintiff the sums of: P50,000.00 as attorney's fees; at least P15,000.00 as miscellaneous litigation and necessary expenses; such compensation for use of the portion she (sic) occupies, at the rate of P5,000.00 a month from January 24, 1997, until the full and complete surrender thereof to the plaintiff; and 3. The costs of this suit.ry In his answer to the complaint, the respondent alleged that the petitioner had no cause of action against him, the truth being that the lessee of the property was his mother, Anita Lao, as evidenced by a contract of lease executed by Alava, the former owner thereof. He further alleged that she had been paying the annual rentals therefore, the last of which was on July 16, 1997 and evidenced by a receipt. He further alleged that she had designated him as manager to maintain the building, pay rentals and operate the business. He then prayed for the dismissal of the complaint.

During the preliminary conference, the respondent admitted that he was in actual possession of the property. For his part, the petitioner admitted that he had been renting another portion of the same property from Alava for years, and that his business establishment and that of Anita Lao's were adjacent to each other. He also admitted that Anita Lao had been renting the said portion of the property for years before he bought it. The respondent adduced in evidence the contract of lease between his mother, Anita Lao, and Alava. On March 4, 1999, the MCTC rendered judgment in favor of the petitioner and against the respondent. The fallo of the decision reads: WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing circumstances, JUDGMENT is hereby rendered in favor of the Plaintiff, Rudy Lao and as against defendant, Jaime Lao, as follows: 1. Ordering defendant, Jaime Lao, his successors-in-interest, agents, members of his family, privies or any person or persons claiming under his name to vacate the portion of Lot No. 3 occupied by him, and to deliver the physical possession thereof to plaintiff, Rudy Lao; 2. Ordering defendant to pay plaintiff, Rudy Lao, the sum of P3,000.00 representing as the monthly rentals of the premises occupied by defendant on Lot No. 3 starting the month of January 1997, until the possession thereof is actually delivered and turned over to the plaintiff; 3. Ordering defendant, Jaime Lao, to pay plaintiff the amount of P20,000.00 as attorney's fees; 4. Ordering defendant, Jaime Lao, to pay Plaintiff, Rudy Lao, the sum of P10,000.00 representing as litigation expenses; and to pay the costs of this suit. SO ORDERED.ry The respondent appealed the decision to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Barotac Viejo, Iloilo City, Branch 66, which rendered judgment on January 28, 2000 affirming the said decision with modification. The fallo of the decision reads: WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from this court is hereby affirmed with a modification that defendant-appellant Jaime Lao is ordered to pay plaintiff-appellee Rudy Lao the sum of P1,000.00 per month as reasonable use of the land subject of the case from January 1997 until possession is turned over to the plaintiff; to pay Rudy Lao the sum of P10,000.00 attorney's fees and P5,000.00 litigation expenses. With cost against the defendant-appellant. SO ORDERED.ry The RTC ruled that under Article 1676 of the New Civil Code, the petitioner was the purchaser of the property and had the right to terminate the lease between Alava and Anita Lao, it appearing that the lease contract was not registered with the Office of the Register of Deeds. Not being the lessee, the respondent could not invoke the same provision. The trial court also held that the respondent, not his mother, was the real party as defendant in the MCTC, since it was he who was in actual possession of the property. The RTC maintained that if Anita Lao was sued as defendant and was ordered evicted, the decision would not be binding on the respondent since he was not impleaded as defendant. The respondent filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals (CA), asserting that ' I. THE HONORABLE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE ERRONEOUS FINDING OF THE MCTC THAT THIS CASE WAS PROPERLY BROUGHT AGAINST THE DEFENDANT WHEN HE IS ONLY AN AGENT OF THE REAL PARTY-IN-INTEREST, ANITA LAO. II. THE HONORABLE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE ERRONEOUS FINDING OF THE MCTC THAT THERE IS NO AGENCY BETWEEN ANITA LAO AND THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANT BECAUSE

THERE WAS NO DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE PRESENTED TO SHOW THE FACT OF AGENCY. III. THE HONORABLE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN IGNORING THE FACT THAT THE MCTC BLATANTLY DISREGARDING (sic) THE PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE ORDER IT ISSUED, ISSUING A DECISION CONTRARY TO THE FACTS ADMITTED BY [THE] PARTIES THEMSELVES ESPECIALLY THE ADMISSION OF THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE THAT HE KNOWS OF THE EXISTENCE OF THE LEASE.y On February 27, 2001, the CA rendered judgment setting aside and reversing the decision of the RTC. The CA ruled that the real party-in-interest as defendant in the MCTC was Anita Lao, the lessee of the property, and not the respondent who was merely the administrator/manager of Anita Lao's building and the occupant of the property. The petitioner's motion for the reconsideration of the decision having been denied by the appellate court, he now comes to this Court for relief via a petition for review on certiorari, claiming that: The Hon. Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it converted petitioner's cause of action against respondent into a cause of action against respondent's mother; and on the basis thereof, dismissed petitioner's complaint for ejectment against respondent under the mistaken finding that said ejectment case should have been filed against respondent's mother. The petitioner avers that the respondent was the real party-in-interest as defendant in the complaint for unlawful detainer because the respondent's possession of the property was in his personal capacity, and not as the caretaker of the property and the business in the building owned by Anita Lao, the lessee thereon. The petitioner argues that, in an ejectment suit, the threshold issue is who has the right to the material or de factopossession of the subject property as distinguished from the de jure possession thereof; hence, the defendant in an ejectment case is the person in actual physical possession of the property. The petitioner insists that the respondent, having admitted in the MCTC that he was in actual possession of the property and that in fact, Anita Lao was no longer staying in the property after her husband died, is the real party-in-interest, as defendant. He posits that if he filed a complaint for ejectment against Anita Lao, it would be dismissed because it was the respondent, and not his mother, who was in actual possession of the property. The petition has no merit. We agree with the petitioner that, in ejectment cases, the word possession means nothing more than actual physical possession, not legal possession, in the sense contemplated in civil law.[10] The only issue in such cases is who is entitled to the physical or material possession of the property involved, independent of any claim of ownership set forth by any of the party-litigants.ry We, likewise, conform to the petitioner's contention that in an action for unlawful detainer, the real party-in-interest as party-defendant is the person who is in possession of the property without the benefit of any contract of lease and only upon the tolerance and generosity of its owner. Such occupant is bound by an implied promise that he will vacate the premises upon demand. This situation is analogous to that of a lessee or tenant whose term has expired, but whose occupancy continued by mere tolerance of the owner. He is the real party-ininterest as defendant.y However, the records in this case show that the respondent has been in possession of the property subject of the complaint not by mere tolerance or generosity of the petitioner, but as the manager of his mother, Anita Lao, who conducted her business in the building/warehouse which stood on a portion of the property leased from Alava, the former owner. Contrary to the petitioner's claim, the respondent's possession of the property was in behalf of his mother, the lessee thereof, and not in his own right, independently of that of his mother.

The petitioner cannot feign ignorance of the existence of the lease of the subject property by Anita Lao, the existence of the building and her business thereon, and the fact that the respondent managed his mother's building and business. It must be stressed that during the preliminary conference of the parties before the MCTC, the petitioner admitted his knowledge of the foregoing facts. While it is true that the contract of lease between Alava and Anita Lao was not filed in the Office of the Register of Deeds and annotated at the dorsal portion of the petitioner's title over the property, nevertheless, the petitioner was bound by the terms and conditions of the said contract of lease. The lease, in effect, became a part of the contract of sale.y Under Section 2, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, the petitioner, as the vendee of the property, had the right to file an action for unlawful detainer against Anita Lao upon demand, but for breach of the contract of lease: SEC. 2. Lessor to proceed against lessee only after demand. ' Unlessotherwise stipulated, such action by the lessor shall be commenced only after demand to pay or comply with the conditions of the lease and to vacate is made upon the lessee, or by serving written notice of such demand upon the person found on the premises, or by posting such notice on the premises if no person be found thereon, and the lessee fails to comply therewith after fifteen (15) days in the case of land or five (5) days in the case of buildings. If the petitioner had done so and judgment was rendered in his favor, ordering Anita Lao to vacate the property, the respondent herein, who is in possession of the property for and in her behalf, would then have to abide by the decision and vacate the same. This was the ruling of the Court in Oro Cam Enterprises, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, thus: It is well-settled that a judgment in an ejectment suit is binding not only upon the defendants in the suit but also against those not made parties thereto, if they are: a) trespassers, squatters or agents of the defendant fraudulently occupying the property to frustrate the judgment; b) guests or other occupants of the premises with the permission of the defendant; c) transferees pendente lite; d) sublessee; e) co-lessees; or f) members of the family, relatives and other privies of the defendant.ary Apparently, the petitioner believed that it was unfair for Anita Lao to be paying an annual rental of only P120.00 for the portion of the property leased by her, considering that the said lot had already been classified as commercial property. Moreover, it was not Anita Lao who stayed in the leased premises; it was her son. The petitioner had no cause of action for unlawful detainer against Anita Lao because of the subsisting contract of lease; hence, he could not file the complaint against her. What the petitioner had no right to do directly, he did indirectly by filing a complaint for unlawful detainer against her son, the respondent, believing that by so doing, he will be rid of Anita Lao's lease contract. The Court, thus, rules that the CA acted in accord with law when it ordered the dismissal of the complaint. IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIEDfor lack of merit. Costs against the petitioner. SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 128743. November 29, 1999] ORO CAM ENTERPRISES, INC. ,Petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, former Fourth Division and ANGEL CHAVES, INC., Respondents. DECISION MENDOZA,J.:

This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeal,dated November 27, 1996, annulling an injunctive order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 37, Cagayan de Oro City, enjoining the enforcement of the writ of execution in an ejectment case and ordering said court to dismiss the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner for lack of cause of action. For the reasons stated hereunder, the decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. The facts are as follows: Private respondent Angel Chaves, Inc. is the owner of a commercial building in Cagayan de Oro which he leased to several business establishments. On January 15, 1991, private respondent filed a complaint for unlawful detainer in the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Cagayan de Oro City, docketed as Civil Case No. 13040. The complaint alleged inter alia that
2. Plaintiff owns a commercial building with frontage along J.R. Borja and Yacapin Extension Streets, Cagayan de Oro City leased to business establishments, some of whom are defendants herein, for uniform and fixed period of one (1) year since 1986. 3. The latest written contracts of lease for 1 year period between the parties were executed on July 31, 1988, with following particulars: Lessee/Business Name Lease Period Monthly rentals Constancio Manzano July 1, 1988 P7,750.00 Oro Cam Enterprises June 30, 1989 Ernesto/Leody Marcoso July 1, 1988 P3,400.00 Queenies Jewelry June 30, 1989 Fortunato Melodia Sr. July 1, 1988 P3,400.00 Meltrade June 30, 1989 Alfredo/Elena Co July 1, 1988 P3,400.00 Oro Jewelry June 30, 1989

The complaint further alleged that, before the aforementioned leases expired on June 30, 1989, private respondent sent forms for new lease contracts to the lessees, indicating increased rentals for the period July 1, 1989 to June 30, 1990, for their signatures, to wit:
Name New monthly rentals Oro Cam Enterprises P10,000.00 Queenies Jewelry P 4,000.00

Meltrade P 4,000.00 Oro Jetcycle P 4,000.00

Thereafter, private respondent made a demand upon the lessees to pay the increased rent or, otherwise, vacate the premises. The failure of the lessees to comply with the demand of private respondent led to the filing of the suit for unlawful detainer. In his answer to the complaint, defendant Constancio Manzano, through his counsel, Atty. Cesilo Adaza, alleged:
3. That it is not true that in the said contract the monthly rentals of the defendants as stated in paragraph 3 of the complaint are to be paid by the defendants. What was agreed was for the following defendants to pay the following rentals beginning July 1, 1988 and two years thereafter, to wit: a. Constancio Manzano Oro Cam Enterprises P5,000.00

On July 23, 1992, the MTCC rendered a decision dismissing the complaint against three defendants, including petitioner, but ordered the ejectment of the fourth defendant Alfredo Co. The dispositive portion of the MTCC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court hereby renders judgment as follows: 1. Dismissing complaint as against Manzano (Oro Cam), Melodia (Meltrade) and Marcoso (Queenies Jewelry) for lack of cause of action. . SO ORDERED.

On appeal, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 23, Misamis Oriental, Cagayan de Oro City, reversed the MTCC and ordered the four defendants ejected from the premises. The dispositive portion of the RTC decision ordered defendants
1. To vacate and surrender to plaintiff-appellant the premises in question that they respectively occupied; 2. To pay the corresponding reasonable rent of said premises from July 1, 1990 until they have fully vacated the same, at the following rates: a) Constancio Manzano at P12,500.00 per month b) Melodia at P5,000.00 per month c) Ernesto Marcoso at P5,000.00 per month, and 3. To pay jointly and solidarily to plaintiff-appellant the sum of P30, 000.00 as attorneys fees and P10,000.00 as litigants expenses, and the costs of the suit.

Vicente Manzano, brother of Constancio Manzano, then filed a petition for review of the RTC decision with the Court of Appeals (CA-GR Sp. No. 34167), alleging that Constancio Manzano had died in the meantime and informing it of his status as administrator of the estate. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for having been filed beyond the reglamentary period. The dismissal was subsequently affirmed by this Court in a resolution issued on September 26, 1994 in G.R. No. 116933. On January 9, 1995, private respondent filed with the MTCC a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution specifically against Constancio Manzano and petitioner Oro Cam Enterprises. Petitioner opposed the motion on the ground that it was never impleaded nor included as party-defendant in the ejectment case (Civil Case No. 13040). It appears that petitioner later filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition, with an application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 37, Cagayan de Oro City, where the case was docketed as Sp. Civil

Case No. 95-560, entitled Oro Cam Enterprises, Inc. v. Hon. Antonio A. Orcullo and Angel Chaves, Inc. On December 7, 1995, the trial court issued an order granting the application for preliminary injunction, viz.:
WHEREFORE, petitioners application for preliminary injunction, being meritorious, is hereby GRANTED, and, accordingly, respondents, their agents or representatives or all persons acting on their behalf, are hereby ordered during the pendency of this case to cease and desist and refrain from issuing, implementing, enforcing or carrying out any writ of execution or similar order in Civil Case No. 13040 entitled Angel Chaves, Inc. v. Constancio Manzano, et al. to execute the Decision dated December 27, 1993 rendered by branch 25 of this Court, or from doing or performing other acts prejudicial to the rights of petitioner.

Private respondent then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals which, on November 27, 1996, rendered a decision declaring the writ of injunction as null and void, and ordering the trial court to dismiss Sp. Civil Case no. 95-560. Hence, this petition where petitioner submits the following issues:
1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in holding that [petitioner] Oro Cam Enterprises Inc. is privy to the contract of lease between [private respondent] and defendant Constancio Manzano. 2. Whether or not the Court of Appeals acted without or in excess of jurisdiction with grave abuse of discretion in declaring null and void the order granting the writ of preliminary injunction as an interlocutory order issued by the RTC.

The petition has no merit. Petitioner contends that Oro Cam Enterprises is a corporation with a personality separate and distinct from the latter and that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that petitioner is privy to the lease agreement between private respondent and Constancio Manzano. The argument is untenable. As the Court of Appeals pointed out in the appealed decision:
1. In the complaint for unlawful detainer filed by petitioner ACI with the MTCC of Cagayan de Oro City, docketed as Civil Case No. 13040, it is specifically alleged that: 2. Plaintiff owns a commercial building with frontage along J.R. Borja and Yacapin Extension Streets, Cagayan de Oro City, leased to business establishments, some of whom are defendants herein, for uniform and fixed period of one (1) year since 1986: 3. The latest written contracts of lease for 1-year periods between the parties were executed on July 31, 1988, with the following particulars: Lessee/Business Name Lease Period Monthly Rental Constancio Manzano July 1, 1988 to P7,750.00 Oro Cam Enterprises June 30, 1989 2. In the Answer dated March 12, 1991 filed by defendant Constancio A. Manzano through his counsel, Atty. Cesilo Adaza, he did not deny that he/Oro Cam is a lessee of petitioner ACI, thus: 3. That it is not true that in the said contract the monthly rentals of the defendants as stated in paragraph 3 of the complaint are to be paid by the defendants. What was agreed was for the following defendants to pay the following rentals beginning July 1, 1988 and tow year thereafter to: a. Constancio Manzano Oro Cam Enterprises P5,000.00

xxx
3.The dispositive portion of the decision rendered by MTCC reads: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court hereby renders judgment as follows: 1. Dismissing complaint as against Manzano (Oro Cam), Melodia (Meltrade) and Marcoso (Queenies Jewelry) for lack of cause of action.

xxx

SO ORDERED. Cagayan de Oro City, July 23, 1992 4. On appeal to the Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental (Branch 23), Cagayan de Oro City, docketed as Civil Case No. 92-486, Oro Cam is undeniably interlinked with defendant-appellee Manzano, to wit: In consequence, there [are] subsisting and binding oral lease contracts between appellant and the respective appellees during the period July 1, 1989 up to June 30, 1990; which were at the agreed monthly rates of P10,000.00 for three (3) doors of appellants building in the case of Constancio Manzano (Oro Cam) and P4,000.00 each for Appellees Melodia (Meltrade) and the Marcoso (Queenies Jewelry). Indeed, this agreed rate of rentals is borne out by the evidence on record and affirmed by the rebuttal evidences: a) O.R. No. 2755 (Exh. 16) issued in the name of Oro Cam Ent. Inc. for the declared sum of P5,000.00 for the month of December, 1989, b) Again O.R. No. 2716, (Exh. 15) in the name of Oro Cam Ent. Inc. for the declared sum of P5,000.00 as rental for October 1989, x And the dispositive portion of the decision of said RTC reads: SETTING ASIDE the part dealing with the rest of the defendants-appellees and a new one entered, ORDERING Defendants-appellees Constancio Manzano, FORTUNATO MELODIA, SR. and ERNESTO MARCOSO, their heirs, assigns and representatives: 1. To vacate and surrender to plaintiff-appellant the permission question that they respectively occupied; 2. To pay the corresponding reasonable rent of said premises from July 1, 1990, until they have fully vacated the same, at the following rates: a) Constancio Manzano at P12,500.00 per month; b) Melodia at P5,000.00 per month; c) Ernesto Marcoso at P5,000.00 per month, and 3. To pay jointly and solidarily to plaintiff-appellant the sum of P30,00.00 as attorneys fees and P10,000.00 as litigation expenses; and the costs of the suit. SO ORDERED. Cagayan de Oro City, December 27, 1993. 5. Upon the above decision having become final and executory, herein petitioner ACI filed a motion for issuance of writ of execution specifically against defendants Constancio Manzano, Jr. and Oro Cam Enterprises, represented by administrator/general manager Vicente Manzano, their heirs, assigns and representatives. 6. In its Opposition to Motion for Execution, Etc., private respondent Oro Cam posited that if the motion for execution is granted, it would be deprived of the possession of the premises in question without due process as it has never been impleaded nor included as party-defendant in ejectment case (Civil Case No. 13040). Oro Cam further contended that: 4. The Oro Cam Enterprises Inc., being an indispensable party considering the fact that said corporation as a separate entity, is the actual possessor and occupant of the three doors portion of the subject building should have been impleaded as party defendant and of which the plaintiff have failed to do, therefore, the Honorable Court has no jurisdiction over said Corporation (Sene versus Mangubal, 156 SCRA 113 and National Development Co. versus Court of Appeals, 211 SCRA 422). 5. The Oro Cam Enterprises Inc. has been paying religiously its rental of the three doors portion of the subject building to Constancio Manzano and later to the estate of Constancio Manzano by virtue of a verbal agreement thereof. 7. The letter dated May 30, 1991 addressed to the Clerk of Court of the RTC for consignation of monthly rental of Oro Cam in the light of the refusal of collector of the lessor to accept the same was sent by Atty. Cesilo A. Adaza as counsel for Oro Cam. Atty. Adaza himself filed the Answer of defendant Constancio A. Manzano in the ejectment case (Civil Case No. 13040). 8. In its motion for reconsideration filed in Civil Case No. 92-456, Oro Cam referred to itself as defendant-appellee. While it prayed to set aside the decision of the RTC ordering defendant Manzano, his heirs, assigns and representatives to vacate the leased premises, it did not deny being a privy to said defendant Manzano.

It is noteworthy that the existence of the lease agreement was never denied in the answer filed on behalf of Constancio Manzano and petitioner. What the answer questioned was amount of monthly rentals. Throughout the proceedings in the MTCC, RTC, and in this Court in G.R. No. 116933, petitioner never questioned the jurisdiction of the court over it. Only when the order of ejectment was sought to be executed did petitioner raise this argument. As noted by the Court of Appeals:
Contrary to the findings of respondent court, the MTCC had jurisdiction over Oro Cam against which the writ of execution was correctly issued. The claim of Oro that it is a corporation with a personality separate and distinct from Manzano is irrelevant. The judicial admission of Oro Cam that it paid the monthly rentals to Constancio Manzano, the undisputed lessee of herein petitioner, indubitably shows, without need of any further presentation of evidence, that it is privy with defendant Manzano insofar as the leasing of the premises in question is concerned.

Petitioner is thus estopped from asserting that the MTCC had not acquired jurisdiction over it. It did not question the failure of private respondent to implead it as a party defendant. On the contrary, evidence clearly showed that petitioner had knowledge of the existence and the pendency of the unlawful detainer suit filed against Constancio Manzano. It would be unjust to private respondent to allow petitioner to put in issue at this late stage the jurisdiction of the court over it. In Korean Airlines Co., Ltd. v. Court of Appeals, we held:
While it is a rule that jurisdictional question may be raised at any time, this however, admits of an exception where, as in this case, estoppel has supervened. This Court has time and again frowned upon the undesirable practice of a party submitting his case for a decision and then accepting the judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction when adverse.

Moreover, petitioner admits that it has been the actual occupant of the leased premises since 1980 and it has authorized Constancio Manzano to pay the rents for and in its behalf. In fact, it claims to have been paying the rent religiously, effectively implying that it is a co-lessee or sub-lessee of the property. Thus, it is still bound by the ejectment suit even if it was not named a party thereto. It is well-settled that a judgment in an ejectment suit is binding not only upon the defendants in the suit but also against those not made parties thereto, if they are:
a) trespassers, squatters or agents of the defendant fraudulently occupying the property to frustrate the judgment; b) guests or other occupants of the premises with the permission of the defendant; c) transferees pendente lite; d) sublessee; e) co-lessee; or f) members of the family, relatives and other privies of the defendant.

Consequently, the appellate court did not act with grave abuse of discretion in annulling the trial courts order granting the writ of preliminary injunction. The order granting a writ of preliminary injunction is an interlocutory order; as such, it cannot by itself be subject of an appeal or a petition for review on certiorari. The proper remedy of a party aggrieved by such an order is to bring an ordinary appeal from an adverse judgment in the main case, citing therein the grounds for assailing the interlocutory order. However, the party concerned may file a petition for certiorari where the assailed order is patently erroneous and appeal would not afford adequate and expeditious relief. In the instant case, the trial court issued as writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the execution of the judgment in Civil Case No. 13040, in spite of the fact that the right of petitioner to occupy the leased premises has been declared by final judgment to be inexistent. Having no clear legal right, petitioners plea should not have merited the favorable action of the trial court. The order granting the writ of

preliminary injunction was thus clearly erroneous and must be set aside. As the appellate court succinctly explained:
We are mindful of the ruling of the Supreme Court that where the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter, the orders or decisions pertaining to the cause are orders or decisions within its jurisdiction and however erroneous they may be, they cannot be corrected by certiorari. However, while certiorari is generally not available to challenge an interlocutory order of a trial court, the Supreme Court allows certiorari as a mode of redress where the assailed order is patently erroneous and appeal would not afford adequate and expeditious relief. Petitioner would be made to suffer unnecessary waste of time before it could proceed with the ejectment of its lessees and all persons, including private respondent Oro Cam claiming under them if we opt to dismiss the petition and ignore the patently erroneous granting of the writ of preliminary injunction and unduly impose upon petitioner the burden of going through the proceedings with respondent court which had evidently taken a patently erroneous view against herein petitioners valid stand.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.

RULE 70 FORCIBLE ENTRY AND UNLAWFUL DETAINER

Section 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when. Subject to the provisions of the next succeeding section, a person deprived of the possession of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied, or the legal representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person, may, at any time within one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an action in the proper Municipal Trial Court against the person or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession, or any person or persons claiming under them, for the restitution of such possession, together with damages and costs. Sec. 2. Lessor to proceed against lessee only after demand. Unless otherwise stipulated, such action by the lessor shall be commenced only after demand to pay or comply with the conditions of the lease and to vacate is made upon the lessee, or by serving written notice of such demand upon the person found on the premises, or by posting such notice on the premises if no person be found thereon, and the lessee fails to comply therewith after fifteen (15) days in the case of land or five (5) days in the case of buildings. Sec. 3. Summary procedure. Except in cases covered by the agricultural tenancy laws or when the law otherwise expressly provides, all actions for forcible entry and unlawful detainer, irrespective of the amount of damages or unpaid rentals sought to be recovered, shall be governed by the summary procedure hereunder provided. Sec. 4. Pleadings allowed. The only pleadings allowed to be filed are the complaint, compulsory counterclaim and cross-claim pleaded in the answer, and the answers thereto. All pleadings shall be verified. Sec. 5. Action on complaint. The court may, from an examination of the allegations in the complaint and such evidence as may be attached thereto, dismiss the case outright on any of the grounds for the dismissal of a civil action which are apparent therein. If no ground for dismissal is found, it shall forthwith issue summons. Sec. 6. Answer. Within ten (10) days from service of summons, the defendant shall file his answer to the complaint and serve a copy thereof on the plaintiff. Affirmative and negative defenses not pleaded therein shall be deemed waived, except lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. Cross-claims and compulsory counterclaims not asserted in the answer shall be considered barred. The answer to counterclaims or cross-claims shall be served and filed within ten (10) days from service of the answer in which they are pleaded. Sec. 7. Effect of failure to answer. Should the defendant fail to answer the complaint within the period above provided, the court, motu proprio or on motion of

the plaintiff, shall render judgment as may be warranted by the facts alleged in the complaint and limited to what is prayed for therein. The court may in its discretion reduce the amount of damages and attorneys fees claimed for being excessive or otherwise unconscionable, without prejudice to the applicability of section 3 (c), Rule 9 if there are two or more defendants. Sec. 8. Preliminary conference; appearance of parties. Not later than thirty (30) days after the last answer is filed, a preliminary conference shall be held. The provisions of Rule 18 on pre-trial shall be applicable to the preliminary conference unless inconsistent with the provisions of this Rule. The failure of the plaintiff to appear in the preliminary conference shall be cause for the dismissal of his complaint. The defendant who appears in the absence of the plaintiff shall be entitled to judgment on his counterclaim in accordance with the next preceding section. All cross-claims shall be dismissed. If a sole defendant shall fail to appear, the plaintiff shall likewise be entitled to judgment in accordance with the next preceding section. This procedure shall not apply where one of two or more defendants sued under a common cause of action who had pleaded a common defense shall appear at the preliminary conference. No postponement of the preliminary conference shall be granted except for highly meritorious grounds and without prejudice to such sanctions as the court in the exercise of sound discretion may impose on the movant. Sec. 9. Record of preliminary conference. Within five (5) days after the termination of the preliminary conference, the court shall issue an order stating the matters taken up therein, including but not limited to: 1. Whether the parties have arrived at an amicable settlement, and if so, the terms thereof; 2. The stipulations or admissions entered into by the parties; 3. Whether, on the basis of the pleadings and the stipulations and admissions made by the parties, judgment may be rendered without the need of further proceedings, in which event the judgment shall be rendered within thirty (30) days from issuance of the order; 4. A clear specification controverted; and of material facts which remain

5. Such other matters intended to expedite the disposition of the case. Sec. 10. Submission of affidavits and position papers. Within ten (10) days from receipt of the order mentioned in the next preceding section, the parties shall submit the affidavits of their witnesses and other evidence on the factual issues defined in the order, together with their position papers setting forth the law and the facts relied upon by them. Sec. 11. Period for rendition of judgment. Within thirty (30) days after receipt of the affidavits and position papers, or the expiration of the period for filing the same, the court shall render judgment.

However, should the court find it necessary to clarify certain material facts, it may, during the said period, issue an order specifying the matters to be clarified, and require the parties to submit affidavits or other evidence on the said matters within ten (10) days from receipt of said order. Judgment shall be rendered within fifteen (15) days after the receipt of the last affidavit or the expiration of the period for filing the same. The court shall not resort to the foregoing procedure just to gain time for the rendition of the judgment. Sec. 12. Referral for conciliation. Cases requiring referral for conciliation, where there is no showing of compliance with such requirement, shall be dismissed without prejudice, and may be revived only after that requirement shall have been complied with. Sec. 13. Prohibited pleadings and motions. The following petitions, motions, or pleadings shall not be allowed: 1. Motion to dismiss the complaint except on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, or failure to comply with section 12; 2. Motion for a bill of particulars; 3. Motion for new trial, or for reconsideration of a judgment, or for reopening of trial; 4. Petition for relief from judgment; 5. Motion for extension of time to file pleadings, affidavits or any other paper; 6. Memoranda; 7. Petition for certiorari, mandamus, or prohibition against any interlocutory order issued by the court; 8. Motion to declare the defendant in default; 9. Dilatory motions for postponement; 10. Reply; 11. Third-party complaints; 12. Interventions. Sec. 14. Affidavits. The affidavits required to state only facts of direct which are admissible in competence to testify to the be submitted under this Rule shall personal knowledge of the affiants evidence, and shall show their matters stated therein.

A violation of this requirement may subject the party or the counsel who submits the same to disciplinary action, and shall be cause to expunge the inadmissible affidavit or portion thereof from the record. Sec. 15. Preliminary injunction.

The court may grant preliminary injunction, in accordance with the provisions of Rule 58 hereof, to prevent the defendant from committing further acts of dispossession against the plaintiff. A possessor deprived of his possession through forcible entry or unlawful detainer may, within five (5) days from the filing of the complaint, present a motion in the action for forcible entry or unlawful detainer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction to restore him in his possession. The court shall decide the motion within thirty (30) days from the filing thereof. Sec. 16. Resolving defense of ownership. When the defendant raises the defense of ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of possession. Sec. 17. Judgment. If after trial the court finds that the allegations of the complaint are true, it shall render judgment in favor of the plaintiff for the restitution of the premises, the sum justly due as arrears of rent or as reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the premises, attorneys fees and costs. If it finds that said allegations are not true, it shall render judgment for the defendant to recover his costs. If a counterclaim is established, the court shall render judgment for the sum found in arrears from either party and award costs as justice requires. Sec. 18. Judgment conclusive only on possession; not conclusive in actions involving title or ownership. The judgment rendered in an action for forcible entry or detainer shall be conclusive with respect to the possession only and shall in no wise bind the title or affect the ownership of the land or building. Such judgment shall not bar an action between the same parties respecting title to the land or building. The judgment or final order shall be appealable to the appropriate Regional Trial Court which shall decide the same on the basis of the entire record of the proceedings had in the court of origin and such memoranda and/or briefs as may be submitted by the parties or required by the Regional Trial Court. Sec. 19. Immediate execution of judgment; how to stay same. If judgment is rendered against the defendant, execution shall issue immediately upon motion, unless an appeal has been perfected and the defendant to stay execution files a sufficient supersedeas bond, approved by the Municipal Trial Court and executed in favor of the plaintiff to pay the rents, damages, and costs accruing down to the time of the judgment appealed from, and unless, during the pendency of the appeal, he deposits with the appellate court the amount of rent due from time to time under the contract, if any, as determined by the judgment of the Municipal Trial Court. In the absence of a contract, he shall deposit with the Regional Trial Court the reasonable value of the use and occupation of the premises for the preceding month or period at the rate determined by the judgment of the lower court on or before the tenth day of each succeeding month or period. The supersedeas bond shall be transmitted by the Municipal Trial Court, with the other papers, to the clerk of the Regional Trial Court to which the action is appealed.

All amounts so paid to the appellate court shall be deposited with said court or authorized government depositary bank, and shall be held there until the final disposition of the appeal, unless the court, by agreement of the interested parties, or in the absence of reasonable grounds of opposition to a motion to withdraw, or for justifiable reasons, shall decree otherwise. Should the defendant fail to make the payments above prescribed from time to time during the pendency of the appeal, the appellate court, upon motion of the plaintiff, and upon proof of such failure, shall order the execution of the judgment appealed from with respect to the restoration of possession, but such execution shall not be a bar to the appeal taking its course until the final disposition thereof on the merits. After the case is decided by the Regional Trial Court, any money paid to the court by the defendant for purposes of the stay of execution shall be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of the judgment of the Regional Trial Court. In any case wherein it appears that the defendant has been deprived of the lawful possession of land or building pending the appeal by virtue of the execution of the judgment of the Municipal Trial Court, damages for such deprivation of possession and restoration of possession may be allowed the defendant in the judgment of the Regional Trial Court disposing of the appeal. Sec. 20. Preliminary mandatory injunction in case of appeal. Upon motion of the plaintiff, within ten (10) days from the perfection of the appeal to the Regional Trial Court, the latter may issue a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction to restore the plaintiff in possession if the court is satisfied that the defendants appeal is frivolous or dilatory, or that the appeal of the plaintiff is prima facie meritorious. Sec. 21. Immediate execution on appeal to Court of Appeals or Supreme Court. The judgment of the Regional Trial Court against the defendant shall be immediately executory, without prejudice to a further appeal that may be taken therefrom.