TORTS AND DAMAGES - Gianna - Ranx.tina - Gi.sam - Katz.alex - Emjo.didy - FINALS REVIEWER - CASIS 1

TORTS AND DAMAGES|gianna.ranx.tina.gi.sam.katz.alex.emjo.
didy| FINALS REVIEWER| CASIS 1

TORTS not defined in the NCC nor in any Philippine Law BUT many scattered provisions on tortuous acts usually defines as: (1) what it is not; (2) remedies granted; (3) social/public policy protected Why not use the concept of tort? It is too broad vis a vis culpa aquiliana. Why the need for tort? to fill the vacuum between delicts and quasi- delicts for expediency (proof beyond reasonable doubt vs preponderance of evidence) a way for the State to allocate risks and payment of damages/restoration cost Damages: much longer treatment in the NCC; more practical importance on damages Practical Legal Relevance: vehicular accidents Intentional tort: not a delict (any act or omission punishable by law) Why? Intentional act causing damage to another, not a crime Act: intentional, voluntary -damage -may or may not violate a criminal law Negligence: any act or omission causing damage to another but w/o intent (only difference w/intentional tort) Strict liability: it doesnt matter if youre negligent or if you intended it as long as sets of circumstances make you liable I. TORT A. Definitions 1. Tort and Quasi-delict a. Tort NAGUIAT v NLRC FACTS: Naguiat is the president and a stockholder of Clark Field Taxi, Inc. (CFT). Due to the phase-out of the US bases in the country, Clark Air Base was closed and the taxi drivers of CFTI were separated from service. The drivers filed a complaint for the payment of sep. pay due to the termination/phase-out. NLRC held Naguiat and the company solidarily liable for the payment of sep. pay. ISSUE: WON Naguait should be held solidarily liable with CFTI. YES. HELD: Under the Corporation Code, Naguait is liable bec: (1) he actively managed the business; (2) there was evidence that CFTI obtained reasonably adequate insurance; and (3) there was a corporate tort in this case. Our jurisprudence is wanting of the definite scope of corporate tort. Essentially, tort consists in the violation of a right given or the omission of a duty imposed by law. Simply stated, it is a breach of legal duty. NOTES: CORPORATE TORT: in regards to liability of President of CFTI: no definition of corporate tort 2 definitions: long and short (legal basis) Short definition: from a law dictionary Whats wrong with the definition in Naguiat? TOO BROAD. Any breach of legal duty becomes a tort so it would include criminal acts, QD, breach of contract. very sloppy definition but its the only case that defines Tort Why SC gave definition of Tort? They had to determine the liability of the officers (Naguiat) for the tortious act. Is it part of the ratio of the case? NO. Obiter. They already found CFTI liable under the Labor Code so SC did not need to establish liability through tort VINZON-CHATO v FORTUNE FACTS: Vinzons-Chato, in her capacity as Commisioner of the Internal Revenue, imposed a 55% ad valorem tax on Fortune. The latter sue for damages based on Article 32 for alleged violation of its constitutional right against deprivation of property without due process of law and the right to equal proetection of law. SC found for Fortune. The Court defined tort in this case as a wrong, a tortious act which has been defined as the commission or omission of an act by one, without right, whereby another receives some injury, directly or indirectly, in person, property or reputation. Presence of good motive, or rather, the absence of an evil motive, does not render lawful an act which is otherwise an invasion of another's legal right.; that is, liability in tort is not precluded by the fact that defendant acted without evil intent. NOTES: Definition is too broad. It may cover criminal acts, but not all criminal acts give rise to damages. Defense of good faith is irrelevant to tort according to this case. No distinction between intentional and non-intentional tort. NOT binding. Obiter dictum. What was discussed about tort was already decided by the Code Commission. AQUINO (pp. 1-2) Tort: taken directly from the French and is derivation of the Latin word torquere meaning to twist common law: An unlawful violation of private right, not created
TORTS AND DAMAGES|gianna.ranx.tina.gi.sam.katz.alex.emjo.didy| FINALS REVIEWER| CASIS 2

by contract, and which gives rise to an action for damages. An act or omission producing an injury to another, without any previous existing lawful relation of which the said act or omission may be said to be a natural outgrowth or incident (other definitions not discussed) no universal formula for torts liability includes intentional tort, negligence, and strict liability Essence of tort: defendants potential for civil liability to the victim for harmful wrongdoing and correspondingly the victims potential for compensation or other relief b. Quasi-delict NOTES: Article 2176 explanation: First sentence refers to ALL CIVIL LIABILITIES. Second sentence qualifies it to QD. BARREDO v GARCIA FACTS: A Head-on collision between a taxi and carretela resulted in the death of a 16-yr old boy who was a passenger of the carretela. The taxi driver was convicted in a crim case but the right to file a sep civil action was reserved. The parents of the boy sued Barredo, the drivers employer for damages. Barredo contends that under the RPC, his liability is only subsidiary, hence he cannot be held liable as no civil action has been filed against the driver. ISSUE: WON the plaintiffs, may bring this separate civil action against Barredo, making him primarily liable as employer under the CC. YES. HELD: Authorities support the proposition that a quasi-delict or "culpa aquiliana" is a separate legal institution under the Civil Code, entirely independent from a delict or crime. A concurrence of scope in regard to negligent acts does not destroy the distinction between the civil liability arising from a crime and the responsibility for cuasi- delitos or culpa extra-contractual. The same negligent act causing damages may produce civil liability arising from a crime under article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, or create an action for cuasi-delito or culpa extra-contractual under articles 19021910 of the Civil Code. Thus, there were 2 liabilities of Barredo: a subsidiary one arising from the drivers crim negligence nd a primary one as employer under the CC. The plaintiffs were free to choose which course to take, and they preferred the second remedy. They were acting within their rights in doing so. NOTES: during that time, culpa aquiliana (QD) doesnt cover acts against law? A1903, old CC expressly exclude acts not punishable by law SC needed to have very strong reason not to follow what the old law says because if A1903 applied literally there would be no culpa aquiliana, if read together with RPC (all acts would be under criminal negligence and imprudence) so in this case, emphasize scope of culpa aquiliana and delict; why needed? Barredo was arguing that he was not solidarily liable and should only be subsidiarily liable if applied today, would the result be the same? YES through stare decisis + QD definition changed, removed phrase not
Intentional tort: Includes conduct where the actor desires to cause the consequences of his act or believes the consequences are substantially certain to result from it. includes assault, batter, false imprisonment, defamation, invasion of privacy and interference of property Negligence: involves voluntary acts or omissions which result in injury to others, without intending to cause the same actor fails to exercise due care in performing such acts or omissions Strict Liability: where the person is made liable independent of fault or negligence upon submission of proof of certain facts DE LEON (pp. 1-3) Tort: common law expression used in French to mean wrong, derived from Latin tortus meaning twisted, as if to say tortuous conduct is twisted conduct or conduct that departs from the existing norm a legal wrong that causes harm for which the violator is subject to civil liability fundamental concept of tort: wrongful act or omission + resulting in breach of a private legal duty (distinguished from a mere breach of contractual duty) + damage from said breach of duty (of such character as to afford a right of redress at law in favor of the injured party against the wrongdoer) Note (explained definition in Naguiat vs. NLRC): the term tort used by SC has same meaning as tort in common law jurisdictions, as it was used in cases involving QD and delicts Tortious act: a wrongful act commission or omission of duty of an act by one, without right, whereby another receives some injury, directly or indirectly, in person, property, or reputation (74 Am. Jur. 2D 620)
Art. 2176, NCC Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of

punishable by law According to this case, culpa aquiliana may include acts or omissions punishable by law. The overlap does not destroy the distinction between crimes and QD, it just gives the injured party a choice of whether to sue based on culpa criminal (where employers are only subsidiarily liable) or culpa aquiliana (where employers are primarily liable). Art. 2176 of the CC is so broad that it includes not only injuries to persons but also damage to property. It makes no distinction bet. Damage to persons and damage to property. NOTES: Relevance: clarified that QD includes damage to property Problem: A2191(2) gave example where QD and damage to property [liability of proprietors of excessive smoke]; but this is a Tort on STRICT LIABILITY, not QD! BAKSH v CA FACTS: Baksh was sued for damages for his breach of promise to marry. CA affirmed TCs award of damages, relying on Art. 21 CC. ISSUE: WON damages may be recovered for a breach of promise to marry based on Art. 21 of the CC. YES. HELD: Art. 21 may be applied in a breach of promise to marry where the woman is a victim of moral seduction. Art. 21 is designed to expand the concept of torts or QD in this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold no. of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in the statute books. Art. 2176 which defined a QD is limited to negligent acts or omissions and excludes the notion of willingness or intent. Torts is much broader than culpa aquiliana bec. it includes not only negligence, but intentional criminal acts as well. NOTES: Include or not to include intentional acts? According to this case, Article 21 has wider scope than Article 2176. The latter is limited to negligent ats or omissions and exludes the notion of wilfullness or intent. BUT Aricle2176 discussion is not necessary (because Article 21 applies anyway) for the disposition of the case (OBITER). THEREFORE, QD still includes intentional acts! ***Issue: WON QD covers intentional acts or not? If it covers intentional acts.. Fr litigation pt of view: it doesnt matter Fr academic pt of view: it matters! COCA-COLA v CA FACTS: Proprietress of school canteen had to close down as a consequence of the big drop in its sales of soft drinks trigerred by the discovery of foreign substances in certain beverages sold by it. ISSUE: WON QD may still exist despite existence of contract?
ELCANO v HILL FACTS: In criminal case where Reginald Hill was charged with the killing of Agapito Elcano, the former was acquitted for lack of intent to kill, coupled with mistake. The deceaseds parents thereafter sued Reginald and his father for damages. CFI dismissed the civil cases on the ground of res judicata. ISSUE: WON the civil action for damages is barred by Hills acquittal in the crim case. NO. HELD: Hills acquittal in the crim case has not extinguished his liability for QD, hence the acquittal is not a bar to the instant civil action. Art. 2176 where it refers to fault or negligence, covers not only acts not punishable by law but also acts criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary or negligent. NOTES: why make intentional acts covered by QD? To make father and son liable Article 2177 expressly points out that theres a separate civil liability from criminal negligence BUT it seems to apply to QD only so court dealt with this limitation by upholding the construction that upholds the spirit that giveth life rather than that which is literal that killeth the intent of the lawmaker (A2176 is not just QD, so A2177 really has no problem) CINCO v CANONOY FACTS: Cincos car and a jeepney collided. Cinco filed a civil action for damage to property against the jeepneys driver and operators. Thereafter, he also filed a criminal case against the jeepney driver. CFI upheld the suspension of the civil case pending the determination of the crim case. ISSUE: WON there can be an independent civil action for damage to property during the pendency of the criminal action. YES. HELD: Liability being predicated on a QD, the civil case may proceed as a separate and independent civil action as specifically provided for in Art. 2177 of the CC.

HELD: YES. While it may be true that the pre-existing contract between the parties may, as a general rule, bar the applicability of the law on quasi-delict, the liability may itself be deemed to arise from quasi-delict,i.e., the act which breaks the contract may also be QD. QD, as defined in Article 2176 is homologous but not identical to tort under the common law, which includes not only negligence, but also intentional criminal acts. 2. Damages AQUINO (pp. 842-843) Reason behind the NCC Title on Damages: to see to it that whenever a right is transgressed, every manner of loss or injury is compensated for in some way or another. A2195, NCC: provisions on damages are applicable to all obligations regardless of source (delict, QD, contract, or quasicontract). A2196: rules under title of damages are w/o prejudice to special provisions on damages provided elsewhere in the Code. A2198: principles of general law on damages are adopted insofar as they are not inconsistent with the NCC. Indemnity has to be proportionate to the fault and to the loss caused thereby. In actions for damages, courts should award an amount (money value) to the winning party and not its equivalent in property. SANGCO, (pp. 940-941) Basis of Law: introduced in NCC mostly from American Law since they were either not expressly recognized or rarely allowed under old code, particularly on subject of moral damages Scope of applicability of provisions on damages: applicable to all obligations arising from sources enumerated in A1157, NCC, without prejudice to special provisions on damages formulated elsewhere in said code. -dont apply to compensation of workmen and other employees in cases of death, injury or illness -in other special laws: same rules observed insofar as not in conflict with Civil Code Concept of damages: Damages: the sum of money which the law awards or imposes as pecuniary compensation, recompense, or satisfaction for an injury done or a wrong sustained as a consequence of a breach of a contractual obligation or a tortious act -pecuniary consequences which law imposes for breach of some duty or violation of some right. Kinds: compensatory, punitive, liquidated damages (damages recoverable upon breach of a contract, as stipulated by the parties), nominal damages (given in vindication of a breach of duty which does not result in any actual or pecuniary damages) Damage, damages, injury: material distinctions Injury: Illegal invasion of a legal right Damage: loss, hurt, or harm which results from an injury; in a popular sense, it is the depreciation in value, regardless if caused by a wrongful or legal act; as defined by statutes providing for damages: actionable loss, injury or harm which results from unlawful act, omission or negligence of another -not synonymous to example, fine, penalty, punishment, revenge, discipline, chastisement Damages: recompense or compensation awarded for damages suffered. Pecuniary loss: loss of money or something by which money or something of money value may be acquired
PEOPLE v BALLESTEROS FACTS: Ballesteros et al were convicted of murder. They were ordered to pay actual, compensatory, and moral damages to the heirs of the deceased. ISSUE: WON damages were correctly awarded. YES HELD: Damages may be defined as the pecuniary compensation, recompense, or satisfaction for an injury sustained, or as otherwise expressed, the pecuniary consequences which the law imposes for the breach of some duty or the violation of some right. Actual or compensatory damages are those awarded in satisfaction of, or in recompense for, loss or injury sustained. The party claiming such must present the best evidence available such as receipts. Moral damages may be invoked when the complainant has experienced mental anguish, serious anxiety, physical suffering, moral shock and so forth, and had furthermore shown that these were the proximate result of the offenders wrongful act or omission. CUSTODIO v CA FACTS: Custodio et al built an adobe fence making the passageway to Mabasas apartment narrower. Mabasa filed a civil action for the grant of easement of right of way against them. CA, aside from granting right of way, awarded damages to Mabasa. ISSUE: WON award of damages was proper. NO HELD: In the case at bar, although there was damage, there was no legal injury. Custodio et als act of constructing a fence within their lot is a valid exercise of their right as owners.

Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right. Damage is the loss, hurt or harm, which results from the injury. Damages are the recompense or compensation awarded fro the damage suffered. Thus, there can be damage without injury in those instances in which the loss or harm was not the result of a violation of a legal duty. These situations are often called damnum absque injuria. In such cases, the consequences must be borne by the injured person alone. Damnum absque injuria AQUINO (pp. 843-845) -There is no liability even if there is damage because there was no injury. Mere damage without injury does not result in liability. -A related maxim is qui jure suo utitir nullum damnum facit one who exercises a right does no injury. CUSTODIO v CA (supra) Thus, there can be damage without injury in those instances in which the loss or harm was not the result of a violation of a legal duty. These situations are often called damnum absque injuria. B. History and Development AQUINO (pp.1-5) Tort provisions in our NCC were derived from Spanish, French and Anglo-American Law. Therefore, RP SC borrows heavily from decisions of the Court in other countries especially Spain and US and relies from annotation of foreign author. Roman Law served as main inspiration of NCC, as quite evident in the field of QD: it added 4 new category of obligations that arise quasi ex delicto (a. liability of a judge who misconducts a case or gives a wrong decision; b. liability of an occupier of a building for double the damage caused by anything thrown or forced out of the building, no matter by whom, on to a public place[A2193]; c. liability of the occupier if he keeps any object suspended from the building which would do damage if it fell; and d. the liability of the shop keeper, innkeeper, or keeper of a stable for any theft or damage caused by slaves or employees, or in case of the innkeepers, of permanent residents [A2000].) -Code Commission initially wanted to adopt the word tort in our NCC but decided later against it because tort in Anglo-American law is much broader (includes negligence, intentional criminal acts, false imprisonment, deceit) than the Spanish-Philippine concept of obligations arising from non-contractual negligence. Intentional acts would be governed by RPC. However, some provisions used tort and therefore recognize it as a source of liability [Sec22 & 100, Corporation Code; Art.68 Child and Youth Welfare Code; Sec. 17(a)(6) of the Ship Mortgage Decree]. Even SC used the term tort in deciding cases involving negligent acts or omissions as well as involving intentional acts. They defined it in Naguiat vs. NLRC. -There is an evident intent to adopt the common law concept of tort and to incorporate the different, intentional and unintentional common law torts in the NCC. Tortious conduct for which civil remedies are available are embodied in different provisions of the code. E.g. Arts. 32, 33, 34, 35, and 36; A2199 on contributory negligence and proximate cause (however, a blending of American and SpanishPhilippine Law) NCC SANGCO (pp. xxxi-xl) Civil Code of the Philippines: based on Civil Code of 1889 (Spanish and French in origin); but many provisions from codes of other countries were adopted. Rules from Anglo-American law were adopted because of element of American culture that has been incorporated into Fil life during US occupation; because economic relations that continue between US and RP; and because US and English Courts have developed certain equitable rules that are not recognized in the 1889 Civil Code 1889 Civil Code 1. Civil Liability Arising From Criminal Offenses A1089: Civil obligations arise only from law, contracts, quasi-contracts, acts or omissions punished by law and quasi-delicts. -civil obligations from crime or misdemeanor was governed only by Penal Code (A1092) so when criminal action was instituted, the civil action arising from the crime is impliedly instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party expressly waives the civil action or reserves his right to institute it separately (A122, Law of CrimPro) -right to recover damages arising from crime is completely dependent on the result of the criminal case. If an earlier civil action is instituted, upon start of criminal case, the civil action is suspended and would be determined by the result of the criminal case. If criminal action is dismissed, civil action is also deemed dismissed, regardless if instituted with the criminal action or separately. Civil liability is treated as purely incidental to the criminal liability of the offender. The cases of Springer vs. Odin, Rakes vs. Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Co., US vs. Guy Sayco, US vs. Bernardo, and Wise & Co. vs. Larion were ruled using this principle. As ruled in rakes, any civil action not predicated on offense committed or charged (based on law, contract, quasi-contract, or QD) cannot be instituted with the criminal action. -When Penal Code revised, RPC retained what is now contained in A100; Rules on CRimPro retained what is contained in Rule 107 (check if still correct) 2. Civil Liability arising from QD A1902: Any person who by an act or omission causes damage to another by his fault or negligence shall be liable fro the damage done In re: A1903: punish wrongful acts or omissions not punishable by law

-said articles are not applicable to acts of negligence which constitute either punishable offenses(delicts) or breach of contract. -thus, the liability of employers, et. al. under now A2180 are only subsidiary (in accordance with penal laws) -QD or culpa aquiliana or extra-contractual culpa: causative act or omission not punished by law and is done ONLY negligently, where civil liability could arise as governed by the Civil Code (not by penal laws), and the party aggrieved could file an ordinary civil action for damages using only preponderance of evidence. It gives rise only to civil liability. Here, the employers liability for his employees NONCRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE is direct and primary and not subsidiary, and he could be directly imputed in an action for recovery of damages. -an act or omission will give rise to civil liability only if it causes damage or injury to another or others. DE LEON (pp.4-8) Tort law emerged out of criminal law; originally concerned principally with violent breaches of the place. (1) Common law tort judges usually define what counts as torts and how compensation is to be measured. Still, a statute or even Consti may make certain conduct legally wrongful and may permit recovery of damages for such conduct. (2) No clear distinction between tort and crime initially, this was the case sine the development of anything like a clearly formulated conception of a tort is comparatively recent. (3) Notion of tort as a specific wrong there was an attempt in 1720 to consider several specific wrongs in a work consolidating them under the general heading of torts. Torts of a specific character have been increasing. (4) Place of torts in the Philippine law even if RP was a civil law country, some of the provisions in the 1889 CC dealth with cases of the nature of torts + with US occupation, a number of laws patterned after Anglo-American models have been passed amplifying the field of torts in Philippine legal system. Functions or goals of tort law Medieval England: discourage violence and revenge Today: compensation of injured persons and deterrence of undesirable behavior: System of thoughts (sorry, no parallelism in the enumeration of de leon): (1) Morality or corrective justice defendants should be liable fro harms they wrongfully caused and no others; liability imposed when and only when it is right to do so (2) Social utility or policy a good-for-all-of-us view: provide a system of rules that works toward the good of society (3) Legal process litigation process is a good to be preserved rather than abstract ideal of justice or social utility (4) potential conflicts between justice and policy outlook and legal process outlook (5) distribution of loss the cost of loss suffered by plaintiff is not simply transferred to the defendant but is distributed through the defendant to a large number of individuals (6) redress of social grievances tort law a popular mechanism that permits ordinary people to put authority on trial (7) a mixed system tort law a mixed set of functions CLASSES OF TORTS: Property torts and Personal torts II. CONCEPT OF QUASI-DELICT A. Elements Art. 2176, NCC Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. PNR v BRUNTY FACTS: The car carrying Rhoda Brunty, her host Juan Garcia and driver Rodolfo Mercelita collided with a PNR train. The collision killed Brunty. The mother of the deceased and Garcia sued PNR for damages. RTC and CA awarded damages. ISSUE: WON the award was proper. HELD: YES. In order to sustain a claim based on QD, the following requisites must concur: 1. damage to the plaintiff 2. negligence, by act or omission, of which defendant, or some person for whose acts he must respond (vicarious liability) was guilty 3. connection of cause and effect between such negligence and damage BPI v LIFETIME Facts: Alice Laurel, an agent of Lifetime Marketing was able to defraud the company by depositing amounts to Lifetime's account with different BPI branches and then requesting to reverse the deposits after the deposit slips have been machine-validated. She would then present these slips to Lifetime which granted her certain privileges or prizes based on the deposits she supposedly made. The fraudulent acts were done because of the alleged negligence of BPI tellers in not retriving the deposit slips. Lifetime sued BPI for damages. RTC and CA awarded damages to Lifetime. SC: Elements of QD 1. fault or negligence of the defendant, or some person for whose acts he must respond

2. damages suffered by the plaintiff 3. connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred by the plaintiff Lifetime incurred damages. BPI was negligent, and such negligence was the proximate cause of the loss GARCIA v SALVADOR FACTS: Because of a wrong medical examination Ranida Salvador lost opportunity to be employed and her father suffered a heart attack upon finding out of the incorrect medical examination result. SC: For health care providers, the test of the existence of negligence is: did the health care provider either fail to do something which a reasonably prudent health care provider would have done, or that he or she did something that a reasonbly prudent health care provider would not have done; and that failure or action caused injury to the patient; if yes, then he is guilty of negligence. The elements of an actionable conduct are: 1) duty, 2) breach, 3) injury, and 4) proximate causation. All are present in the case at bar. NOTES: Sir: This is a poorly crafted decision. The SC did not even cite the basis for the elements. Does this pertain to QD? Maybe not. May be possible elements for Article 20. GREGORIO v CA FACTS: A case for violation of BP22 was filed against Gregorio by Datuin and Sansio. In the complaint the address of Gregorio was wrong so she wasn't able to controvert the charges against her. A warrant of arrest against her was issued. She was arrested and had to post bail for her temporary liberty. The case against her was later dropped when it was found out that the account where the bounced checks were drawn were not hers. She filed a case for damages against Datuin and Sansio. SC: The complaint for damages filed by Gregorio is based on quasidelict under Art 2176 in relation to Art 26 of the Civil Code, rather than malicious prosecution. In every tort case filed under Art 2176, the plaintiff has to prove by preponderance of evidence: (1) the damages suffered by him; (2) the fault or negligence of the defendant or some other person to whose act he must respond; (3) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence and the damages incurred; and (4) that there must be no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties. B. Distinguished 1. Quasi-delict v Delict Art 2177, NCC Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant. Art 365, RPC. Imprudence and Negligence. Reckless imprudence consists in voluntarily, but without malice, doing or failing to do an act from which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to perform such act, taking into consideration his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition and other circumstance regarding persons, time and place. Simple imprudence consists in the lack of precaution displayed in those cases in which the damage impending to be caused is not immediate not he danger clearly manifest. BARREDO v GARCIA (supra) RULE: A QD or culpa aquiliana is a separate legal institution under the CC, with a cause of action substantially all its own, and individuality that is entirely apart and independent from crime. Crime public interest RPC punishes and corrects the act punishes only when there is a penal law covering the act subsidiary liability of employer defense is that employees resources must first be exhausted Quasi-delict private concern CC repairs the damage by indemnification include all acts in which "any kind of fault or negligence intervenes." solidary liability of employer defense is that accused observed due diligence of a good father of a family
ANDAMO v CA FACTS: The Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette caused the construction of waterpaths and contrivances in its compound. This allegedly caused flooding and damage to the adjacent lot, property of the Andamo spouses. The Andamos filed a criminal case for destruction by means of inundation, and later also filed a civil action for damages against respondent corporation. The civil case was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, as the crim case was field ahead of it. ISSUE: WON the dismissal of the civil case was proper. HELD: NO. The civil action was based on QD and may proceed independently of the criminal case. All the elements of QD are present in the complaint, to wit: (1) damages suffered by the plaintiff;

(2) fault or negligence of the defendant, or some other person for whose acts he must respond; and (3) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred by the plaintiff. NOTES: Important: Take note of 3 elements of QD: (1) damages suffered by plaintiff; (2) fault or negligence of defendant; (3) fault of defendant caused damages suffered by plaintiff Sir: it must be injury not damages OCCENA vs ICAMINA FACTS: Occena, a barangay captain, filed a criminal complaint for Grave Oral Defamation against Vegafria for allegedly openly, publicly and maliciously uttering statements which caused great and irreparable damage and injury to his person and honor. RTC convicted Vegafria but did not award damages. Occena argues that the decision is contrary to Art 100 of the RPC providing that every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable, and rt 2219 of the Civil Code providing that moral damages may be recovered in libel, slander or any other form of defamation. SC: Underlying the legal principle that a person who is criminally liable is also civilly liable is the view that from the standpoint of its effects, a crime has a dual character: (1) as an offense against the state because of the disturbance of the social order; and (2) as an offense against against the private person injured by the crime unless it involves the crime of treason, rebellion, espionage, contempt and others wherein no civil liability arises on the part of the offender either because there are no damages to be compensated or there is no private person injured by the crime. What gives rise to the civil liability is really the obligation of everyone to repair or to make whole the damage caused to another by reason of his act or omission, whether done intentionally or negligently and whether or not punishable by law. Art 2219 (7) establishes the right of an offended party in a case for oral defamation to recover from the guilty party damages for injury to his feelings and reputation. LG FOODS CORP v PAGAPONG-AGRAVIADOR Facts: Charles Vallejera, 7 years old, was hit by a Ford Fiera van owned by LG Foods and driven by Vincent Yeneza. He died as a result of the accident. His parents filed complaint against the driver for Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Homicide. The driver committed suicide, hence, the complaint was dismissed. The spouses Vallejera filed case against LG Food for damages for failure to exercise due diligence in the selection and supervision of their employees. Petitioner contends that the complaint is a claim for subsidiary liability against an employer under Art 103 of the RPC. There must first be a judgment conviction against their driver as a condition sine qua non. Since the driver is already deceased the condition was not fulfilled, hence there is a lack of cause of action. SC: Victims of negligence or their heirs have a choice between an action to enforce the civil liability arising from culpa criminal under Art 100 of the RPC, and an action for quasi-delict under Articles 2176 and 2194 of the Civil Code. If, as in this case, the action chosen is for QD, the plaintiff may hold the employer liable for the negligent act of its employee, subject to the employer's defense of the diligence of a good father of the family. On the other hand, if the action is for culpa criminal, the plaintiff can hold the employer subsidiarily liable only upon proof of prior convinction. Here, the compliant sufficiently alleged that the death of the couple's son was caused by the negligent act of the deceased driver; and that LG Foods themselves were civilly liable for the negligence of their driver for failing to exercise the necessary diligence required of a good father of the family in the selection and supervision of their employee, which diligence, if exercised, would have prevented the accident. If the complaint was based on Art 103 of the RPC, they would have alleged that the guilt of the driver had been proved beyond reasonable doubt; that the accused driver is insolvent; that it is the subsidiary liability of the employers to pay the damages done by their employee based on the principle that every person criminally liable is also civilly liable. 2. Quasi-Delict v. Breach of Contract Art. 1170. Those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence, or delay, and those who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof, are liable for damages. Art. 1171. Responsibility arising from fraud is demandable in all obligations. Any waiver of an action for future fraud is void. Art. 1172. Responsibility arising from negligence in the performance of every kind of obligation is also demandable, but such liability may be regulated by the courts, according to the circumstances. Art. 1173. The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the omission of that diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the place. When negligence shows bad faith, the provisions of articles 1171 and 2201, paragraph 2, shall apply. If the law or contract does not state the diligence which is to be

observed in the performance, that which is expected of a good father of a family shall be required. Art. 2178. The provisions of articles 1172 to 1174 are also applicable to a quasi-delict. NOTES: Negligence for BoC and QD are defined in the same way as provided by Art 2178.Therefore, if you sue for negligence, you can base the action on quasi-delict, delict, or contract. CANGCO v MANILA RAILROAD FACTS: Cangcos arm was amputated because he was drawn from under a railroad car. His foot alighted upon a melon at the moment he stepped upon the platform. He sues for negligence in the performance of a contract. MR argues that [1] the breach was due to negligence of servant and [2] it exercised due diligence in selection and supervision. HELD: MR is liable. The contract to transport carries with it the duty to provide safe means of entering and leaving the train. It is unnecessary for plaintiff for BoC to prove the breach was due to negligence. When a contractual relation exists, the obligor may break the contract by means of an act which would have constituted a violation of an extracontractual obligation had no contract existed. DOCTRINE: QD and BoC are concentric, and QDs are broader. Plaintiff with a pre-existing contractual relation may still sue for QD so long as had there been a no contract, there is still a quasi-delict. NOTES: SC held there was a contract of carriage even if Cangco did not pay for a ticket. Also, Sir took note of the 4 main differences of QD and BoC in this case: Under QD Presumptive liability Rebut presumption through proof of the exercise of due care in selection and supervision Created by the wrongful or negligent act/omission itself Defendants fault or negligence Under BoC Direct and immediate Prove performance of contract or contributory negligence Independent the breach of the duty assumed by the parties The contract and its nonperformance. The negligence need not be proven What is the breach of contract committed? Negligence, failure to exercise due care Art. 1903 not applicable in cases where there is preexisting relationship Cangco did not pay for his fare so why is a contract of carriage at issue? It should be a contract of employment. MERALCO was held liable for breach of contract. What was the breach? Failure to exercise due diligence This is a landmark case because there is a glaring statement in Cangco that contradicts the other cases True or False a breach of contract is not a basis for QD: FALSE Court in Cangco said that the circle is CONCENTRIC: QD is larger and that culpa contractual is the yolk So Cangco doesnt say that the two are mutually exclusive and therefore Cangco is consistent with Air France Vinculum juris distinction doesnt matter because here the act & the breach coincided SIR: in culpa aquiliana negligence must be proved, in culpa contractual you only need to prove existence of contrat and the breach of such contract Due diligence is NOT a defense in culpa contractual because it will create an anomalous situation if the case involves juridical entities. The defense will create unfair advantage to such entities since they are only acting through agents so they can forego with the diligence requirement.
1. liability of defendant employer 2. defendant employers defense
3. vinculum (legal tie)
juris
FGU INSURANCE v GP SARMIENTO FACTS: GP Sarmiento Trucking undertook to deliver refrigerators abord one of its truck from the plan site of Concepcion Industries. The truck collided with another truck resulting in damage to the cargoes. FGU, an insurer of the cargoes, paid Concepcion Industries the value of the covered cargoes. It then sought reimbursement from GP Sarmiento which failed to heed the claim. FGU filed case for damages and breach of contract of carriage. SC: In culpa contractual, uppon which the action of FGU rests as being the subrogee of Concepcion Industries, the mere proof of the existence of the contract and the failure of its compliance justify, prima facie, a corresponding right of relief. A breach of contract confers upon the injured party a valis cause for recovering that which may have been lost or suffered Respondent trucking corporation recognizes the existence of a contract of carriage between it and petitioner's assured, and admits that the cargoes it has assumed to deliver have been lost or damaged while in its custody. In such a situation, a default on, or failure of compliance with, the obligation gives rise to a presumption of lack of care and corresponding liability on the part of the contractual obligor the burden on him to establish otherwise.
4. what a plaintiff needs to prove
NOTES:

As to liability of driver: a contract can only bind the parties who have entered into it or their successors and can neither favor nor prejudice a thrid person. The action against the driver can only be based on culpa aquiliana, which, unlike culpa contractual, would require the calimant for damages to prove negligence or fault on the part of the defendant. CALALAS v CA FACTS: Eliza Sunga, a passenger of a jeepney owned by Calalas, was injured when a truck hit the rear end of the jeepney. The jeepeney was filled to the capacity. When the truck hit the jeepney Sunga was giving way to passengers who were alighting the jeepney. Sunga filed complaint for damages against Calalas, alleging violation of the contract of carriage by the latter in failing to exercise the diligence required of him as a common carrier. Calalas on the other hand filed 3rd-party complaint against the owner of the truck. The lower court rendered judgment against the owner of the truck, holding that it was the driver of said truck that was responsible for the accident. It also absolved Calalas. CA reversed the ruling on the ground that Sunga's cause of action was based on a contract of carriage, not quasi-delict, and that the common carrier failed to exercise the diligence required under the Civil Code. SC: Quasi-delict has as its source the negligence of the tortfeasor. Breach of contract is premised on the negligence in the performance of a contractual obligation. In QD, the negligence or fault should be clearly established because it is the basis of the action. In BoC, the action can be prosecuted merely by proving the existence of the contract an the fact that the obligor, in this case the common carrier, failed to transport his passenger safely to his destination. The doctrine of proximate cause is applicable only in actions for QD, not in actions involving breach of contract. The doctrine is a device for imputing liability to a person where there is no relation between him and another party. In such a case, the obligation is created by law itself. But where there is a pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, it is the parties themselves who create the obligation, and the function of the law is merely to regulate the relation thus created. BATAL v SAN PEDRO FACTS: Spouses Luz and Kenichiro contracted the services of Frank Batal to survey the lot they purchased. Based on such survey, they constructed concrete fence on said land. A case was filed against them for alleged encroachment of a designated right of way. They found out that Frank was not the licensed geodetic engineer but his wife, Erlinda. SC: Culpa, or negligence, may be understood in two different senses: either as culpa aquiliana, which is the wrongful or negligent act or omission which creates a vinculum juris and gives rise to an obligation between two persons not formally bound by any other obligation, or as culpa contractual, which is the fault or negligence incident in the performance of an obligation which already existed, and which increases the liability from such already existing obligation. Culpa aquiliana is governed by Art 2176 of the Civil Code and the immediately following articles; while culpa contractual is governed by Articles 1170 to 1174 of the same Code. In the present case, the petitioners, in carrying out their contractual obligations, failed to exercise the requisite diligence in the placement of the markings for the concrete perimeter fence that was later constructed. FORES v MIRANDA FACTS: Miranda was a passenger of a jeep which hit a wall and fractured his right humerus. He sues under contract of carriage. CA awarded him with moral damages. HELD: SC deleted moral damages. Moral damages are not recoverable for actions based on BoC unless there is bad faith. There was no bad faith because: [1] mere carelessness of the driver does not justify the inference of bad faith; and [2] under Art 1756, the presumption is that common carriers acted negligently (and not maliciously) DOCTRINE: Differences between QD and BoC in this case: Under QD Anywhere there are physical injuries (Art 2219[2]) Proof of due diligence in selection and supervision Carriers fault or negligence Under BoC Recoverable only if passenger dies or there is malice or bad faith (proof of due diligence not available) Injury to passenger. No need to prove it was carriers Fault
1. moral damages 2. defendant carriers defense 3. what plaintiff needs to prove
NOTES: Does not say that when there is a contract, you cant sue for QD. A2176 expressly excludes cases where there is a pre-existing contractual relationship. But even if there is a pre-existing contractual relationship, there is still a cause of action for

quasi-delict since it is not expressly prohibited. The ruling on the interpretation of A2176 is not ratio, just obiter. Case is not basis of mutual exclusivity DOCTRINE: The act that breaks a contract may be also a tort. PSBA v. CA (1992) Certainly, no student can absorb the intricacies of physicswhen bullets are flying or grenades exploding in the air A student of PSBA was stabbed by non-students within the schools premises. The parents sued PSBA and its officers under A2180 and A2176. HELD: The school is not liable under A2180 because the assailants are non-PSBA students. It is also not liable under A2176 because it applies only if there is no contractual obligation. The negligence of the school would not be relevant absent a contract. The negligence cannot exist independently of the contract, unless the negligence occurs under the circumstances in A21. The case was remanded to lower court to determine if there was breach of contract by its negligence to provide proper security measures. DOCTRINE: Should the act which breaches a contract be done in bad faith and be violative of A21, then there is a cause to view the act as constituting a QD. SYQUIA v. CA (1993) (Manila Memorial park cemetery) has exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in preventing the accumulation of water inside the vault which would have resulted in the caving in of earth around the grave filling the same with earth O.O Juan Syquias remains were to be transferred to a newly purchased family lot in the cemetery. In the course of the transfer they discovered a hole in the wall of the concrete vault which caused water to sip in and destroy the coffin. The Syquias said that such was either a breach of contract to provide a sealed vault or a negligent act constituting a QD. The trial court and CA dismissed the case. HELD: There is no negligence. Sealed cannot be equated to waterproof. Had there been negligence found, Manila Memorial would be liable not for a QD but for a BoC under A1170. They exercised the due diligence of a GFP in preventing the accumulation of water in the vault which would have resulted in the caving in of earth in the grave. LRT v. NAVIDAD (2003) Navidad (then drunk) entered the LRT after purchasing a token. An altercation between him and Escartin (security guard) ensued which resulted in a fist fight. Navidad fell in the tracks and was struck and killed by the train. The trial court held Escartin and his agency liable and absolved LRTA and the trains driver. CA absolved Escartin and his agency and held LRTA and the driver liable. HELD: LRTAs liability is founded on the contract of carriage and its obligation arises from the breach of that contract by reason of its failure to exercise the high diligence required of the common carrier.
FAR EAST v CA FACTS: Plaintiff Luna got a Far East credit card which was dishonored at a despedida party due to a hotlist policy compelled by the loss of the complementary card. He sues for damages. RTC awarded him moral and exemplary damages. HELD: Complaint is based on contract because without the contract, the act or omission complained of cannot by itself be an actionable tort. Moral damages were deleted because negligence in failing to give personal notice to Luna is not gross as to amount to malice or bad faith. Exemplary damages were deleted because DOCTRINE: The test to determine whether QD can be deemed to underlie the BoC s where, without a pre-existing contract between 2 parties, an act or omission can nonetheless amount to an actionable tort by itself. NOTES: Qualifies Air France case: QD should be independent of BoC Differences between QD and BoC in this case: Unde QD Under BoC 1. award for moral Injury If there was bad faith damages or gross negligence 2. award for Gross negligence as to Act that is wanton, exemplary damages approximate malice fraudulent, reckless, (Art 2231) oppressive or malevolent (Art. 2232) AIR FRANCE v. CARRASCOSO (1966) white man Carrascoso was issued a first class ticket from Manila to Rome. He travelled first class from Manila to Hongkong. But the airline manager in HK told him to vacate his seat because a white man has a better right to it. Commotion ensued and Carrascoso transferred seats against his will. Air France argues that since the action is planted on breach of contract there must be fraud or bad faith to authorize award of moral damages. HELD: There is a contract and it was breached. There was also bad faith when he was told to leave after he was already seated by reason of which he suffered inconvenience and humiliation resulting in moral damages. Passengers have a right to be treated by the carriers employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and due consideration. Any discourteous misconduct on the part of employees toward a passenger gives the latter an action for damages (A21).

The negligence of Escartin is not proven thus the agency is not liable. The driver is also absolved. The statutory provisions render a common carrier liable for death or injury to passengers (a) through the negligence or willful acts of its employees or (b) an account of willful acts or negligence of other passengers or of strangers if the common carriers employees though the exercise of due diligence could have prevented or stopped the act or omission. CONSOLIDATED BANK v. CA (2003) LC Diaz has an account with Solidbank. It entrusted the passbook to their messenger to make a deposit. The messenger left the passbook to the teller but when he came back the teller said that somebody else took it. That same day there was an unauthorized withdrawal by a certain Tamayo of 300k from the savings account. LC Diaz then filed a criminal complaint against another messenger and a certain Verdazola for estafa but the case was dismissed. LC Diaz filed this complaint for damages against Solidbank. HELD: Solidbank is liable for BoC due to negligence (A1980 deposits in bank is governed by provisions concerning simple loan, RA 8791 sec.2. the State recognizes the fiduciary nature of banking that requires high standard of integrity and performance). Solidbank breached its contractual obligation to return the passbook only to authorized representative of LC Diaz. There is a presumption of negligence and Solidbank must prove otherwise. (There is although contributory negligence on the part LC Diaz for allowing a withdrawal slip to get into the hands of an impostor.) Note: In BoC ones last clear chance or contributory negligence will not exonerate the defendants liability but will only reduce damage. DE LEON (pp.157-160) 1. Requisites of QD: a. An act or omission by defendant b. Fault or negligence by defendant c. Damage or injury to plaintiff d. Direct relation of cause and effect between act or omission and the damage e. No pre-existing contractual relationship 2. Burden of Proof a. Falls on the person claiming damages b. To be established with satisfactory evidence c. Negligence is not presumed. Only under Arts. 2180, 2183, and 2191 is presumed and burden of proof shifts to defendant 3. QD arising from BoC a. the existence of a contract does not preclude the commission of a QD. b. Contractual responsibility and extracontractual liability exclude each other and cannot be cumulated. Tort liability arises from BoC when the is act or omission is in itself wrongful independent of the contract, the breach of which being merely incidental to the commission of the tort. 4. Culpa Aquiliana and Culpa Contractual Distinguished Culpa Aquiliana (QD) Wrongful or negligent act or omission itself the source of the obligation Plaintiff has burden to prove the defendant was at fault or negligent No presumption that defendant was at fault or negligent (except A2180, last par.) Culpa Contractual (BoC) The act or omission is merely an incident in the performance of an obligation Plaintiff need not plead or prove it was defendants fault or negligence Mere proof of existence of a contract and its breach raises presumption of fault or negligence
Governed by Art. 2176; and also Governed by Arts. 1170- 1174 governed by Art.1172-1174 under Art. 2178 Based on voluntary act or omission which has caused damage to another Requires only preponderance of evidence III. NEGLIGENCE A. Concept of Negligence 1. Definition Art. 1173. The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the omission of that diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the place. When negligence shows bad faith, the provisions of Articles 1171 and 2201, paragraph 2, shall apply. If the law or contract does not state the diligence which is to be observed in the performance, that which is expected of a good father of a family shall be required. (1104a)
PICART v. SMITH (1918)

being perturbed by the novelty of the apparition or the rapidity of the approach Picart is riding his pony in the wrong side of a bridge when the car of Smith approached it. Smith blew his horn. Picart didnt move to the other side because he thought he didnt have enough time. The car didnt reduce its speed. It turned to the right to avoid the horse but it was too close to the horse that it got frightened and turned its body towards the railing and across the bridge. It got hit on the hind leg and Picart was thrown off. The horse died and Picart suffered injuries. HELD: Given that Picart is on the wrong side and he cant escape being run down by going to the place of safety the control of the situation passed over to Smith, it was his duty to stop or take the other side upon seeing that nobody else is on the bridge to avoid the danger. The person who has the last fair chance to avoid impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the consequences without reference to the prior negligence of the other party. The negligence of Smith is the immediate and determining cause of the accident. PICART TEST: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent man would have used in the same situation? Negligence in a given case is not determined by reference to the personal judgment of the actor in the situation before him. As to what would constitute the conduct of a prudent man in a given situation must of course be always determined in the light of human experience and in view of the facts involved in the particular case. Conduct is said to be negligent when a prudent man in the position of the tortfeasor would have foreseen that an effect harmful to another was sufficiently probable to warrant his foregoing the conduct or guarding against its consequences. PNR v. BRUNTY (2006) Mercilita overtook a car, not knowing that they were approaching a railroad track, and hit the train, she died instantly. Brunty was among the passengers brought to the hospital but she died after. Bruntys parent sued PNR. HELD: PNR is negligent (under A2176) in not providing adequate warning signs. Railroad companies owe to the public a duty of exercising a reasonable degree of care to avoid injury to persons and property at railroad crossings, which duties pertain both in the operation of trains and in the maintenance of the crossings. NEGLIGENCE is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would do. NEGLIGENCE is want of the care required by the circumstances. (Corliss vs. Manila Raildroad) QD Requisites: 1. Damage to the plaintiff 2. Negligence, by act or omission, of which defendant, or some person for whose acts he must respond was guilty, and 3. Connection of cause and effect between such negligence and damage. SICAM vs. JORGE (2007) Jorge pawned jewelries to Sicams pawnshop. It was robbed and Jorge was informed of the incident. Jorge filed the complaint for recovery of the jewelries. Sicam claims that robbery is force majeure and that it exercised due care and diligence in safekeeping so it cannot be held liable. HELD: Robbery is foreseeable and anticipated. In order to exempt one from liability because of FM, it is necessary that he has not committed negligence or misconduct that may have occasioned the loss. When the effect is found to be partly of the result of a persons participation whether by active intervention, neglect or failure to act the whole occurrence is humanized and removed from the rules applicable to acts of God. There was no showing that there is a security guard and the vault is open at the time of robbery. A2123- pawnshop and other establishments engaged in making loans secured by pledges, the special laws and regulations concerning them shall be observed, and subsidiarily, the provisions on pledge, mortgage and antichresis. A2099-the creditor shall take care of the thing pledged with the diligence of a good father of family. This means that pawnshop must take care of the pawns the way a prudent person would as to his own property. NGELIGENCE is the omission to do something which a reasonable, man guided by the considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do; or the doing if something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do. It is want of care requires by the circumstances. The diligence which the law requires the individual at all times to govern his conduct varies with the nature if the situation in which he us placed and the importance if the act which he is to perform. (Cruz vs. Gangan) 2. Standard of Conduct : Ordinary person PNR vs. CA (Oct. 15, 2007) prudent

Amores was driving his car. He slowed down and came to a full stop when he reached the railroad tracks. When he was crossing, the train hit the car was dragged 10 meters from the crossing. Amores died. HELD: The failure of the PNR to put cross bar, signal light, flagman or switchman, or semaphore is evidence of negligence and disregard of the safety of the public. The train was fast for it dragged the car meters away from the crossing even after the breaks was applied. DOCTRINE: There is no hard and fast rule whereby such degree of care and vigilance is calibrated; it is dependent upon the circumstances in which a person finds himself. All that the law requires is that that care and diligence expected of sensible men under comparable situation. CORINTHIAN GARDENS ASSOC. vs. TANJANGCO (2008) Corinthian referred the Cuasos to Engr. De Dios (geodetic) for the relocation survey of their lot. They constructed their house with C.B Paraz as builder. Every now and then, Corinthian makes an ocular inspection to make sure compliance with the approved plan. Their perimeter fence encroached the adjoining lot owned by the Tanjangcos. HELD: Corinthian is responsible in insuring compliance with the approved plans, inclusive of the construction of the perimeter walls. Its failure to prevent encroachment of the other property despite the inspection constitutes negligence. The case is one for tort under A2176 1. Damage 2. Fault/Negligence 3. Connection of cause and effect between such negligence and damage. DOCTRINE: A negligent act is one from which an ordinary prudent person in the actors position, in the same or similar circumstances, would foresee such an appreciable risk of harm to others as to cause him not to do it in a more careful manner. The law considers what would be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in a man of ordinary intelligence and prudence, and determines liability according to that standard.(Fernando vs. CA) SANGCO (PP. 7-8) STANDARD OF CONDUCT - it is impossible to fix in advance definite rules for all conceivable human conduct because of the infinite variety of situations which may arise - standard of conduct must be: i. external and objective ii. the same for all persons iii. must make allowance for the risk apparent to the act for his capacity to meet it and for the circumstances under which he must act 3. Special Cases a. Children TAYLOR vs. MANILA RAILROAD (1910) Taylor (15), son of mechanical engineer, mature than the average boy his age and having considerable aptitude and training in mechanics went to the power plant in a small island in Pasig river. Together with a boy (12) they walked around the plant to and gathered brass fulminating caps where the plant dumps them together with cinders and ashes from furnaces. The caps are used for exploding charges of dynamite and they have explosive power on their own. They opened a cap and lighted it with a match. The cap exploded and Taylor lost an eye. HELD: In Torpedo cases, records discloses that the plaintiffs (in whose favor judgment have been affirmed) were of such tender years that they were held not to have the capacity to understand the nature or character of the explosive instruments which fell into their hands. In this case, Taylor knew of the explosive character of the caps and yet he willingly, recklessly and knowingly produced the explosion. DOCTRINE: The care and caution required of a child is according to his maturity and capacity only, and this is to be determined in each case by the circumstances of the case. JARCO MARKETING vs. CA (1999) It has been in existence for 15 years. Its structure was safe and wellbalanced. Zhieneth (6) was pinned by the bulk of the department stores giftwrapping counter/structure, brought to the hospital and died after 14 days. When she was rushed to the hospital the girl told the doctor that she didnt even touch the counter. The department store contended that it was the childs own act of climbing into the structure that was the proximate cause of the fall of the counter. HELD: Jarco was negligent because the unstable condition of the counter is known to them (prior to the accident) but they didnt do anything about it. Since negligence may be a felony and a quasi-delict and required discernment as a condition of liability, either criminal or civil, a child under 9 years of age is, by analogy, conclusively presumed to be incapable of negligence; and that the presumption of lack of discernment or incapacity for negligence in the case of a child over 9 but under 15 years of age is rebuttable, under our law. The rule, therefore, is that the child under 9 years of age must be conclusively presumed incapable of contributory negligence as a matter of law. DOCTRINE: A child under 9 years of age must be conclusively presumed incapable of contributory negligence as a matter of law. YLARDE vs. AQUINO (1988)

Edgardo Aquino ordered his students to dig beside a 1 ton concrete block in order to make a hole to bury huge stones. He left four of them to level the loose soil around the open hole but told them not to touch the stone. They, however, playfully jumped into the pit and caused the top of the concrete block to fall towards the opening. Ylarde wasnt able to climb out and he died after 3 days because of the injuries sustained. HELD: Ylarde cannot be charged with reckless imprudence. The degree of care required to be exercised must vary with the capacity of the person engendered to care for himself. A minor should not be held to the same degree of care as an adult, but his conduct should be judged according to the average conduct of persons of his own age and experience. Aquino is negligent for he should have foreseen that bringing children to excavation site and leaving them there may result in an accident. DOCTRINE: The standard of conduct to which a child must conform for his own protection is that degree of care ordinarily exercised by children of the same age, capacity, discretion, knowledge and experience under the same or similar circumstances. SANGCO (pp. 70-74) UNDER 9 YEARS conclusively presumed to have acted without discernment and is exempt from criminal liability OVER 9 BUT UNDER 15 may or may not be guilty of contributory negligence, depending upon his mental development and other circumstances (rebuttable presumption) OVER 15 YEARS presumed to have sufficient capacity and understanding to be sensible of danger with the power to avoid it (STANDARD is still that of a child his age and capacity, and not that of an adult.) STANDARD: ORDINARILY PRUDENT CHILD The standard of conduct which a child must conform for his own protection is that of a reasonable person of like age, intelligence and experience under like or similar circumstances or that degree of care ordinarily exercised by children of the same age, capacity, discretion, knowledge and experience under the same or similar circumstances. TEST as to whether an infant can be subjected to the same standard of care as an adult: 1. type of activity involved is one that is usually engaged in by children 2. one involving the use of potentially dangerous, adultoriented instrument, like a car. WHERE CHILD IS HELD TO THE STANDARD OF CARE OF AN ADULT, his violation of a statute or other enactment entails the same consequences as those of an adult. b. Experts/ Professionals CULION ICE vs. PHILIPPINE MOTORS (1930) Culion wanted to get his motor schooner repaired, he went to PMC. Quest, PMCs manager decided to oversee the repairs. Apparently, the tube connecting the carburetor and the fuel tank was not well-fitted, such that the fuel mixture leaked and dripped down to the engine compartment. Quest attention was called on this but he took it lightly. When the engine was started, there was a backfire and burned the boat. HELD: Ordinarily, a backfire from an engine would not be followed by any disaster, but here the leak along the pipeline and the flooding of the carburetor created a dangerous situation, which a prudent mechanic, versed in repairs of boat engines, would have taken precaution to avoid. When a person holds himself out as being competent to do things requiring professional skill, he will be held liable for negligence if he fails to exhibit the care and skill of one ordinarily skilled in the particular work which he attempts to do. Quest is experienced in fixing car and tractor engines, but not that of boats. A person skilled in dealing with boats would have been sufficiently warned by the circumstances to cause him to take precaution against the danger. Quest did not use the skill that would have been exhibited by one ordinarily expert in repairing gasoline engine on boats. DOCTRINE: When a person holds himself out as being competent to do things requiring professional skill, he will be held liable for negligence if he fails to exhibit the care and skill of one ordinarily skilled in the particular work which he attempts to do. US vs. PINEDA If the victims had been human beings instead of horses, the damage and loss would have been irreparable. Santos bought medicine with prescription from Pineda (pharmacist) to give to his sick horses. He was sold barium chlorate(poisonous) instead of potassium chlorate which poisoned and killed 2 horses. HELD: The profession of pharmacy is one demanding care and skill. The responsibility to use care has been variously qualified as ordinary care, care of a specially high degree, the highest degree of care known to practical men, which is the highest practicable degree of prudence, thoughtfulness, vigilance, and the most exact and reliable safeguards consistent with the reasonable conduct of business, in order that human life may not constantly be exposed to danger flowing from the substitution of deadly poison for harmless medicine. The care required must be commensurate with the danger involved, and the skill employed must correspond with the superior knowledge of the business which the law demands. The question of negligence or ignorance is

irrelevant. The druggist is responsible as an absolute guarantor of what he sells. DOCTRINE: The profession of pharmacy is one demanding care and skill. The responsibility to use care has been variously qualified as ordinary care, care of a specially high degree, the highest degree of care known to practical men. MERCURY DRUG vs. DE LEON (Oct. 17, 2008) Sa isang parmasyutika, ang pagkakamali ay kapabayaan at ang pagkalinga ay hindi angkop na depensa (Judge) De Leon was given a prescription by his doctor friend for his eye. He bought them from Mercury drug but he was given drops for the ears. The sheriff assisted him in applying the drops in his eyes and he felt searing pain. Only then he discovered that he was given the wrong medicine. He returned the medicine. The pharmacist didnt apologize and just told him that she wasnt able to read the prescription properly. It was the supervisor who apologized and told him that they do not have stock of the right one. Mercury says that De Leon was negligent for not looking at the label. HELD: As active players in the field of dispensing medicines to the public, the highest degree of care and diligence is expected of them. In the purchase and sale of drugs, the buyer and seller do not stand at arms length. There is an imperative duty on the seller or the druggist to take the precaution to prevent death or injury to any person who relies on ones absolute honesty and peculiar learning. DOCTRINE: The profession of pharmacy demands care and skill, and druggists must exercise care of a specially high degree, the highest degree known to practical men. In other words, druggist must exercise the highest practicable degree of prudence and vigilance, and the most consistent with the reasonable conduct of business, so that human life may constantly be exposed to the danger flowing from the substitution of deadly poisons for harmless medicines. c. Medical Negligence CRUZ vs. CA (Nov. 18, 1997) Doctors are protected by a special rule of law. They are not guarantors of care. They do not even warrant a good result. They are not insurers against mishaps or unusual consequences. Furthermore they are not liable for honest mistakes of judgment Lydia Umali was found to have myoma in the uterus and underwent surgery under Dr. Ninevetch Cruz wherein the untidy clinic ran out of medicine, blood and oxygen that she had to be transferred to another hospital, where she died. HELD: Whether a physician or surgeon has exercised the requisite degree of skill and care in the treatment of his patient is, in the generality of cases, a matter of expert opinion. The deference of courts to the expert opinion of qualified physicians stems from its realization that the latter possess unusual technical skills which laymen in most instances are capable of intelligently evaluating. Expert testimony should have been offered to prove that the circumstances cited are constitutive of conduct falling below the standard of care employed by other physicians in good standing when performing the same operation. No cogent proof that the circumstances caused petitioners death. Dispositive: acquitted from reckless imprudence but civilly liable DOCTRINE: Whether or not a physician has committed an "inexcusable lack of precaution" in the treatment of his patient is to be determined according to the standard of care observed by other members of the profession in good standing under similar circumstances bearing in mind the advanced state of the profession at the time of treatment or the present state of medical science. In the recent case of Leonila Garcia-Rueda v. Wilfred L. Pascasio, et al., this Court stated that in accepting a case, a doctor in effect represents that, having the needed training and skill possessed by physicians and surgeons practicing in the same field, he will employ such training, care and skill in the treatment of his patients. He therefore has a duty to use at least the same level of care that any other reasonably competent doctor would use to treat a condition under the same circumstances. PROFESSIONAL SERVICES vs. AGANA (Jan. 31, 2007) Agana is diagnosed with cancer of the sigmoid. Dr. Fuentes performed the hysterectomy to remove certain parts of the ovary then Dr. Ampil took over and completed the operation. The attending nurses remarked in record that 2 sponges were missing. Agana complained of pain but was told that it was just a normal consequence of the operation. She went to the US for further treatment and was informed that she is free of cancer. After her return to the Philippines they saw a gauze protruding in her vagina. Dr. Ampil removed this by hand. She went to see another doctor and they detected another gauze in her vagina which infected it. She underwent another operation. Pending the case, Agana died. HELD: leaving sponge and other foreign substance in the wound after the incision has been closed is prima facie negligence. If the surgeon is compelled by necessity to leave a sponge it is his legal duty to inform the patient of what he has been compelled to do so that the patient may seek relief. Dr. Ampil misled Agana to thinking that the pain was normal. What was initially an act of negligence in leaving sponges has ripened to a deliberate wrong in concealing the missing gauzes. DOCTRINE: to successfully pursue a medical negligence case, a patient must prove that a health care provider either failed to do something which a reasonably prudent health care provider would have done, or that he did something that a reasonably prudent provider would not have done; and that failure or action caused injury to patient. (duty, breach, injury, proximate causation)

CANTRE vs. GO (2007) Go gave birth and attended by Dr. Cantre. Cantre used a droplight to warm Nora and her baby while she was massaging Gos uterus to stop the bleeding. Go got a wound in her inner arm which the nurses say was a burn. According to NBI test it was a burn caused by a droplight. The hospital says its because of BP cuff. Go underwent skin grafting at the hospitals expense. HELD: Whether the injury was caused by the droplight or by the blood pressure cuff is of no moment. Both instruments are deemed within the exclusive control of the physician in charge under the "captain of the ship" doctrine. This doctrine holds the surgeon in charge of an operation liable for the negligence of his assistants during the time when those assistants are under the surgeons control. However, the fact that Cantre promptly took care of Gos wound before infection and other complications set in is also indicative of her good intentions. Go was also suffering from a critical condition when the injury happened, such that saving her life became Cantres elemental concern. Nonetheless, it should be stressed that all these could not justify negligence. DOCTRINE: In cases involving medical negligence, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur allows the mere existence of an injury to justify a presumption of negligence on the part of the person who controls the instrument causing the injury. The Hippocratic Oath mandates physicians to give primordial consideration to the well-being of their patients. If a doctor fails to live up to this precept, he is accountable for his acts. This notwithstanding, courts face a unique restraint in adjudicating medical negligence cases because physicians are not guarantors of care and, they never set out to intentionally cause injury to their patients. However, intent is immaterial in negligence cases because where negligence exists and is proven, it automatically gives the injured a right to reparation for the damage caused. CAYAO-LASAM vs. RAMOLETE (2008) Ramolete underwent raspa (D&C procedure ) under Caya0-Lasam and was discharged the following day. She was brought to the hospital again for severe abdominal pains and vomiting. She was informed that there is a dead fetus in her womd. She underwent laparatomy and she was found to have massive intraabdominal hemorrhage and a ruptured uterus. She had to undergo hysterectormy and as a result she cant bear a child anymore. Ramolete says that the hysterectomy is due to the negligence of Cayao-Lasam in performing raspa (not knowing that what she had was an ectopic pregnancy). Cayao-Lasam says that it was because of Ramoletes insistence to be discharged immediately and failing to go to her check up. HELD: Ramolete did not present any expert testimony to support their claim. Cayao-Lasam presented an expert on the subject who stated D&C was not the proximate cause of the rupture of Edithas uterus resulting in her hysterectomy. The D&C was conducted in accordance with the standard practice, with the same level of care that any reasonably competent doctor would use to treat a condition under the same circumstances. Assuming that there was in fact a misdiagnosis, the same would have been rectified if Ramolete followed the order to return for a check-up. She omitted the diligence required by the circumstances which could have avoided the injury. The omission in not returning for a follow-up evaluation played a substantial part in bringing about her injury. Had she returned, Cayao-Lasam could have conducted the proper medical tests and procedure necessary to determine her health condition and applied the corresponding treatment which could have prevented the rupture of her uterus. DOCTRINE: Medical malpractice is a particular form of negligence which consists in the failure of a physician or surgeon to apply use at least the same level of care that any reasonably competent doctor would use to treat a condition under the same circumstances. As to this aspect of medical malpractice, the determination of the reasonable level of care and the breach thereof, expert testimony is essential. Further, inasmuch as the causes of the injuries involved in malpractice actions are determinable only in the light of scientific knowledge, it has been recognized that expert testimony is usually necessary to support the conclusion as to causation. All told, doctors are protected by a special rule of law. They are not guarantors of care. They are not insurers against mishaps or unusual consequences specially so if the patient herself did not exercise the proper diligence required to avoid the injury. LUCAS vs. TUANO (2009) Lucas had a sore eye and used maxitrol (steroid based) for it. He then consulted Dr. Tuano (opthal) on October 1988. He was prescribed a different medicine. The sore eyes was cured but the eye developed EKC (a viral infection) and he was told to use maxitrol. EKC tapered down and Lucas was told gradually reduce the dosage of maxitrol otherwise EKC might recur. His EKC recurred and he was told to resume the orig dosage of maxitrol. Blephamide (also steroid based) was used when maxitrol is unavailable. Lucas discovered that prolonged used of maxitrol is dangerous to the eyes (may develop glaucoma). He told Tuano about it but the doctor just brushed it aside. By December his right eye was blind and he was told to stop the use of maxitrol and was prescribed different medicines. Tuano referred Lucas to another Doctor for the treatment of glaucoma and Tuano treated him according to the advice of that doctor. Lucas consulted Dr. Aquino on his own initiative and was told that his condition needs lifetime med and follow ups. Lucas underwent two operations (1990 and 1991) of laser trabeculoplasty. He said that what he had is steroid-induced glaucoma and sued Tuano. Tuano says that Lucas glaucoma is not steroid induced for if it were, it would disappear with the discontinue of the use of maxitrol.

HELD: No expert testimony was presented. Absent a definitive standard of care or diligence required of the Dr. Tuano under the circumstances, the Court cant determine whether he was able to comply with the same in his diagnosis and treatment of Lucas. There is no causation between use of maxitrol and glaucoma. Lucas failed to prove by preponderance of evidence that Tuani failed to exercise that degree of skill, care and learning possessed by other persons in the same profession; and that as a proximate result if such failure, the patient or his heirs suffered damages. The mere fact that the patient does not get well or that a bad result is not determinative of the performance of the physician and he is not required to be infallible. When a patient engages the services of a physician, a physicianpatient relationship is generated. And in accepting a case, the physician, for all intents and purposes, represents that he has the needed training and skill possessed by physicians and surgeons practicing in the same field; and that he will employ such training, care, and skill in the treatment of the patient. Thus, in treating his patient, a physician is under a duty to [the former] to exercise that degree of care, skill and diligence which physicians in the same general neighborhood and in the same general line of practice ordinarily possess and exercise in like cases. Stated otherwise, the physician has the duty to use at least the same level of care that any other reasonably competent physician would use to treat the condition under similar circumstances. This standard level of care, skill and diligence is a matter best addressed by expert medical testimony, because the standard of care in a medical malpractice case is a matter peculiarly within the knowledge of experts in the field. d. Corporate Negligence PROFESSIONAL SERVICES vs. AGANA (Jan. 31, 2007) HELD: The failure of PSI, despite the attending nurses report, to investigate and inform Natividad regarding the missing gauzes amounts to callous negligence. Not only did PSI breach its duties to oversee or supervise all persons who practice medicine within its walls, it also failed to take an active step in fixing the negligence committed. This renders PSI, not only vicariously liable for the negligence of Dr. Ampil under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, but also directly liable for its own negligence under Article 2176. DOCTRINE: A patient who enters a hospital does so with the reasonable expectation that it will attempt to cure him. The hospital accordingly has the duty to make a reasonable effort to monitor and oversee the treatment prescribed and administered by the physicians practicing in its premises. It has the duty to exercise reasonable care to protect from harm all patients admitted into its facility for medical treatment. With the passage of time, more duties were expected from hospitals, among them: (1) the use of reasonable care in the maintenance of safe and adequate facilities and equipment; (2) the selection and retention of competent physicians; (3) the overseeing or supervision of all persons who practice medicine within its walls; and (4) the formulation, adoption and enforcement of adequate rules and policies that ensure quality care for its patients. e. intoxication f. insanity Art. 2182. If the minor or insane person causing damage has no parents or guardian, the minor or insane person shall be answerable with his own property in an action against him where a guardian ad litem shall be appointed. (n) B. Degrees of Negligence Art. 2231. In quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be granted if the defendant acted with gross negligence. AMEDO vs. RIO (1954) Filomeno Manguit, a seaman, jumped overboard from his ship into the water to retrieve a 2-peso bill that was blown by the breeze to the sea. He drowned. HELD: He failed to exercise even the slightest care and diligence, that he displayed a reckless disregard of the safety of his person, that he could not have been but conscious of the probable consequences of his carelessness and that he was indifferent, or worse, to the danger of his injury. There is more reason to hold that his death was caused by his notorious negligence. If while he was working, his bill merely fell from his pocket, and as he picked it up from the floor something accidentally fell upon him and injured him, he would surely be entitled to compensation, his act being obviously innocent. Jumping into the sea, however, is entirely different, the danger which it entails being clear, potent and obvious. DOCTRINE: Notorious negligence has been held to be tantamount to gross negligence, which is want of even slight care and diligence. By gross negligence is meant 'such entire want of care as to raise a presumption that the person in fault is conscious of the probable consequences of carelessness, and is indifferent, or worse, to the danger of injury to person or property of others.' .The negligence must amount to a reckless disregard of the safety of person or property. NOTE: What determines if an act if negligent is the danger of an act (apparent and imminent). The nature of the act of jumping into the sea involves danger per se. MARINDUQUE IRON MINES v WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION (1954)

FACTS: Mamador hitched a ride together with other laborers on a company-owned truck. When the truck tried to overtake another truck, it collided with a coconut tree, which resulted in his death. There was a company prohibition against laborers riding the haulage trucks. Petitioner claims that such violation was the laborer's notorious negligence which, under the law, precludes recovery. HELD: Mere riding on a haulage truck or stealing a ride thereon is not negligence, ordinarily. Violation of a rule promulgated by a commission or board is not negligence per se; but it may be evidence of negligence. Under the circumstances, the laborer could not be declared to have acted with negligence since the prohibition had nothing to do with the personal safety of riders. Getting or accepting a free ride on the company's haulage truck couldn't be gross negligence, because no danger or risk was apparent. RULE: Violation of a rule promulgated by a commission or board is not negligence per se; but it may be evidence of negligence. NOTES: SIR: the gradation of laws, rules, ordinances, etc. is NOT a settled rule. Theres only an alleged prohibition on part of employer Even if there was indeed a prohibition, violation of policy is not necessarily negligence per se but it may be an evidence of negligence ILAO-ORETA v SPOUSE RONQUILLO (1956) FACTS: Rounquillo spouses decided to take on the services of Dr. IlaoOreta because Eva Ronquillo as having a difficult time while being pregnant. They scheduled Eva for a laparoscopic procedure scheduled om April 5 at 2pm. 7am on the said date, Eva underwent pre-surgery. Dr. Ilao-Oreta did not arrive on the scheduled day and time of the operation. It turns out she was on her honeymoon and was still on a flight from Hawaii and did not arrive until 10pm. She apologized, argued that she did not intentionally mean to miss her operation, and offered to reschedule the procedure. Spouses did not want to reschedule and are now claiming damages from Dr. Ilao-Oreta. ISSUE: WON Dr. was grossly negligent when she missed Evas operation. HELD: NO. She was negligent although not gross. The circumstances of the case: she tried to contact the spouses as soon as she arrived; she apologized and even tried to reschedule the procedure. The Court was sympathetic over the fact that she was on her honeymoon, and human experience dictates that the excitement over this matter would normally cloud ones attention over minute details like time (Dr. IlaoOreta forgot to account for the International Date Line in between Hawaii and the Philippines). NOTES: Might also have something to do with the nature of the procedure the act or omission is not dangerous per se SANGCO (10-12) The amount of care demanded by the standard of reasonable conduct must be proportionate to the apparent risk. DEGREES OF NEGLIGENCE: SLIGHT NEGLIGENCE - an absence of that degree of vigilance which persons of extraordinary prudence and foresight are accustomed to use. (failure to exercise care) GROSS NEGLIGENCE described as failure to exercise even that care which a careless person would use. There is no generally accepted meaning, but the probability is that it signifies more than ordinary inadvertence or inattention, but less than conscious indifference to consequences. (extreme departure from the ordinary standard of care) WILFUL, WANTON, AND RECKLESS quasi-intent, lying between intent to do harm and the mere reasonable risk of harm to another. They apply to conduct which is still merely negligent but which is so far from a proper state of mind that it is treated in many respects as if it were intended (actor has intentionally done an act of unreasonable character in disregard of a risk known to him or so obvious that he must be taken to have been aware of it, and so great as to make it highly probably that harm would follow). There is often NO CLEAR DISTINCTION between the above and gross, and the two have tended to merge and take on the same meaning as an AGGRAVATED form of negligence, differing in QUALITY rather than in DEGREE from ordinary lack of care. C. Proof of Negligence 1. Burden of Proof RULE 131: BURDEN OF PROOF AND PRESUMPTIONS BURDEN OF PROOF AND PRESUMPTIONS Sec. 1. Burden of proof in civil cases. - Each party must prove his own affirmative allegations. Evidence need not be given in support of a negative allegation except when such negative allegation is an essential part of the statement of the right or title on which the cause of action or defense is founded, nor even in such case when the allegation is a denial of the existence of a document the custody of which belongs to the opposite party. The burden of proof lies on the party who would be defeated if no evidence were given on either side. Sec. 2. Burden of proof in criminal cases.

Sec. 3. Conclusive presumptions. Sec. 4. Quasi-conclusive presumptions of legitimacy. Sec. 5. Disputable presumptions. - The following presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence; (a) That a person is innocent of crime or wrong; (b) That an unlawful act was done with an unlawful intent; (c) That a person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary act; (d) That a person takes ordinary care of his concerns; (m) That official duty has been regularly performed; (n) That a court, or judge acting as such , whether in the Philippines or elsewhere, was acting in the lawful exercise of his jurisdiction; (p) That private transactions have been fair and regular; (q) That the ordinary course of business has been followed; ee) That a thing once proved to exist continues as long as is usual with things of that nature; (ff) That the law has been obeyed; Sec. 6. No presumption of legitimacy or illegitimacy. - There is no presumption of legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child born after three hundred days following the dissolution of the marriage or the separation of the spouses. Whoever alleges the legitimacy or illegitimacy of such child must prove his allegation. 2. Presumption (Exemption to Burden of Proof Rule 131) Art. 2184 In motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is solidarily liable with his driver, if the former, who was in the vehicle, could have, by the use of the due diligence, prevented the misfortune. It is disputably presumed that a driver was negligent, if he had been found guilty or reckless driving or violating traffic regulations at least twice within the next preceding two months. If the owner was not in the motor vehicle, the provisions of Article 2180 are applicable. Art. 2185 Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation. Art. 2188 There is prima facie presumption of negligence on the part of the defendant if the death or injury results from his possession of dangerous weapons or substances, such as firearms and poison, except when the possession or use thereof is indispensable in his occupation or business. Art. 1734 Common carriers are responsible for the loss, destruction, or deterioration of the goods, unless the same is due to any of the following causes only: (1) Flood, storm, earthquake, lightning, or other natural disaster or calamity; (2) Act of the public enemy in war, whether international or civil; (3) Act of omission of the shipper or owner of the goods; (4) The character of the goods or defects in the packing or in the containers; (5) Order or act of competent public authority. Art. 1735 In all cases other than those mentioned in Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 of the preceding article, if the goods are lost, destroyed or deteriorated, common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as required in Article 1733. NOTES: Art 2184 CC (Driver) disputable presumption: o 2x w/in the next preceeding 2 mos: guilty of reckless driving / violation of traffic rules if the owner is not in the car, does the disputable presumption apply? o n/a when the owner is not in the car / common carrier
requires conviction SIR doesnt agree with this because you cant get a conviction in 2 months, ticket is acceptable. NOT CLEAR if prior violations need to be connected to recent incidents. cause was the failure of the driver of the parked truck to install an early warning device. IAC concluded that under the doctrine, the plaintiff was negligent. The question is whether the doctrine was applicable. HELD: Res ipsa loquitor (the thing speaks for itself) Where the thing which causes the injury is shown to be under the management of the defendant, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have he management use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of an explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from want of care. It is not rule of substantive law but merely a mode of proof or a mere procedural convenience. It can be involved when and only when, under the circumstances involved, direct evidence is absent and not readily available. It cannot be availed of when the plaintiff has knowledge and testifies or presents evidence as to the specific act of negligence which is the cause of injury complained of or where there is direct evidence as to the precise cause of the accident and all the facts and circumstances attendant to the occurrence appear. The absence of want of care of the driver has been established by clear and convincing evidence. The doctrine does not apply. RULE: Res ipsa can be invoked when and only when, under the circumstances involved, direct evidence is absent and not readily available. NOTES: RIL made a special defense by Isidro to allege negligence of the truck driver and Layugan. IAC ruled RIL as the basis for holding Layugan negligent. RIL N/A because theres direct (clear & convincing) evidence Why? Because the mode of proof only, so when theres evidence, use evidence / facts so that judgment will be based on facts and not presumptions RAMOS v CA FACTS: Ramos, undergoing a gall bladder operation, went comatose because she was incorrectly intubated. HELD: Res ipsa (The thing or transaction speaks for itself) the fact of the occurrence of the injury, taken with the surrounding circumstances, may permit an inference or raise a presumption of negligence, or make out a plaintiffs prima facie case, and present a question of fact for defendant to meet with an explanation. Requisites are: 1. the accident is of a kind that ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someones negligence
Art 2185 CC disputable presumption: violate traffic regulation o no conviction required o however, Sangco says this also requires conviction
** but when is one found guilty of traffic violation? when issued a TICKET
Art 2188 prima facie presumption o injury results from possession of defendant of dangerous weapons/ substances, except when the possession or use thereof is indispensable in his occupation/business Arts 1734 & 1735 common carriers 1734 EXCEPTION: subject to defense of EXTRAORDINARY DILIGENCE; treated as exception to presumptions loss, destroyed, deteriorate presume negligence common carrier o UNLESS prove extraordinary diligence 3. Res Ipsa Loquitor NOTES: No direct proof available Control and management o Access to thing: defendant can present evidence that he was not negligent o Plaintiff does not have such opportunity The very evidence he is required to present to prove the negligence is not with him. Rebuttable o Will not ordinarily have happened o PROVE/SHOW (Burden of Proof) Thing was under the control of the defendant Thing caused the injury LAYUGAN v IAC FACTS: A truck bumped into the plaintiff while he and a companion were repairing the tire of their parked truck along the right side of the highway. He sustained injuries. Defendant contends that the proximate

2. 3. it is caused by an instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant or defendants the possibility of contributing conduct which would make plaintiff responsible is eliminated. negligence (Expert testimony dispensed with in exception; why then allow testimony of Cruz?) o TESTIMONIES (nature) Cruz: demeanor, sound, etc. JAMORA: not as to personal experience but if drug had that effect in the system. in Cruz, they didnt provide expert testimony therefore they lost in Ramos, can use common knowledge medical malpractice domain of medical science: expert needed RIL common knowledge: no need for expert preparation for procedure if theres failure / didnt get the results expected, RIL n/a *question: when is a medical malpractice case common knowledge or in the domain of medical science?* RIL is NA in malpractice suits if the only showing is that the desired result was not accomplished if the problem is based on medical science (Cruz vs. CA). But if common knowledge can be applied, RIL applies.
The fundamental element is control of instrumentality which caused the damage. Generally, expert testimony is relied upon in malpractice suits to prove a physician has done a negligent act or that he has deviated from the standard medical procedure, when the doctrine is availed of by the plaintiff, the need for expert medical testimony is dispensed with because the injury itself provides the proof of negligence. In cases where the doctrine is applicable, the court is permitted to find a physician negligent upon proper proof of injury to patient, without aid of expert testimony, where the court from its common knowledge can determine the proper standard of care. The doctrine is generally restricted to situations in malpractice cases where a layman is able to say, as a matter of common knowledge and observation, that the consequences of professional care were not as such as would ordinarily have followed if due care had been exercised. RULE: In cases where the doctrine is applicable, the court is permitted to find a physician negligent upon proper proof of injury to the patient, without aid of expert testimony, where the court from its fund of common knowledge can determine the proper standard of care. NOTES: CAN ARGUE: pre-op procedure; RTC did not know about it but the SC said it was common knowledge Case covered by RIL but still possible to apply Cruz v CA Cf: Voss v Bridwell: Injury occurred prior to operation (like Ramos). Maybe Cruz v CA will apply if injury was caused by iperation. RIL applicable: No expert testimony Court adjudicated based on common knowledge fund The foundation of RIL is common knowledge evidentiary rule: doesnt do away with presenting evidence must prove these elements: accident doesnt occur w/o persons negligence defendant has exclusive control over the instrumentality no contributory negligence on plaintiffs part RIL & malpractice suits: o Gen rule: expert testimony needed (Cruz v CA) to establish the standard of care required o Exception: If case can be gleaned from common knowledge (Ramos v CA) directly to establish
TAN v JAM TRANSIT FACTS: Petitioner Tan owned a jitney being driven by Alexander Ramirez. It was loaded with balut and salted eggs. Around 5 am, while it was negotiationg a left turn, it collided with a JAM transit bus being driven by Eddie Dimayuga. The jitney turned turtle along the shoulder of the road and the cargo of eggs was destroyed. Ramirez and his helper were injured and hospitalized. ISSUE: WON JAM Transit is solidarily liable with driver Dimayuga HELD: YES, Whenever an employees negligence causes damage or injury to another, there instantly arises a presumption juris tantum that the employer failed to exercise diligentissimi patris families in the selection (culpa in eligiendo) or supervision (culpa in vigilando) of its employees. An employer must overcome the presumption, by presenting convincing proof that he exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his employee In this case, aside from the testimony of Dimayuga, JAM did not present any other evidence, whether documentary or testimonial, in its favor. Inevitably, the presumption of its negligence as Dimayugas employer stands and it is, thus, solidarily liable for the damages sustained by petitioner. NOTES: RIL applies when there is no direct evidence when there is a collision between a delivery jeep and bus.

CANTRE v GO FACTS: Mrs. Go gave birth to her 4th child. There were some parts of the placenta that were not completely expelled from her womb after delivery. This caused Mrs. Go to suffer hypovolemic shock resulting in the drop of her blood pressure. Dr. Cantre performed numerous medical procedures to stop the bleeding. After the procedure, Mrs. Go had a wound on her which looked like a burn mark from the droplight. Dr. Cantre claims the wound was from the blood pressure cuff which was used to monitor the heartbeat of Mrs. Go during the procedure. ISSUE: WON Dr. Cantre is liable for the injuries suffered by Mrs. Go. HELD: YES. The Hippocratic method mandates physicians to give primordial concern to the well-being of their patients. In cases involving MEDICAL NEGLIGENCE, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur allows the mere existence of an injury to justify a presumption of negligence on the part of the person who controls the instruments causing the injury. Requisites: a. The accident is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someones negligence the wound on Noras arm is not an ordinary occurrence in the act of delivering a baby. b. It is caused by an instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant or defendants Both a droplight and a blood pressure apparatus are deemed to be within the exclusive control of the physician in charge under the captain ship doctrine. c. The possibility of contributing conduct which would make the plaintiff responsible is eliminated the wound on Noras arm could only be caused by something external to her. Even if petitioners contentions are true, that the wound was not caused by a droplight but by the blood pressure cuff, petitioner is not exempt from liability. BATIGUIN v CA Positive Testimony v Negative Testimony FACTS: Dr. Batiquin performed a caesarian operation on a patient. Afterwards, she was found to be feverish. When the patient submitted herself to another surgery, she was found to have an ovarian cyst on the left and right side of the ovaries and a piece of rubber material was embedded on the right side of the uterus. HELD: Res ipsa Where the thing which causes the injury is shown to under the management of the defendant, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have the management used proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of an explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from ordinary want of care. All the requisites are present in this case. (1) The entire proceedings of the caesarian were under the exclusive control of Dr. Batiquin. (2) The patient underwent no other operation which could habe caused the offending piece of rubber to appear in her uterus, it stands to reason that it could habe only been a by-product of the caesarian section. RULE: Res ipsa Where the thing which causes injury is shown to be under the management of the Defendant, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have the management use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of an explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from want of ordinary care. NOTES: RIL applies; all elements present: o entire C-section under control & management of doctor o no other operation after C-section o would not have happened ordinarily although there is no proof directly linking Dr. Batiquin to the rubber, applying RIL, Dr. is liable Theoretical basis for RIL: The proof should come from the defendant (RIL is the bridge which allows the plaintiff to reach the defendant). PROBLEM: there was evidence (testimony, piece of rubber). Arguably, not direct evidence? PROFESSIONAL SERVICES v AGANA FACTS: Natividad Agana was rushed to the Medical City Hospital (Owned by PSI) because of difficulty of bowel movement and bloody anal discharge. Dr. Ampil diagnosed her as having cancer of the sigmoid. During surgery Dr. Ampil performed an anterior resection surgery and found that the malignancy has spread to her left ovary necessitating a hysterectomy. After which, Dr. Ampil took over, completed the operation and closed the incision. One of the nurses included in her notes that the sponge count was lacking (missing 2 sponges) but still Dr. Ampil proceeded with closing the incision. Mrs. Agana complained of pains but was reassured by the doctors that it is normal after her procedure. The Aganas also consulted an oncologist in the US affirming that she no longer has cancer. 3 months after the operation, the daughter of Mrs. Agana found gauze protruding from her vagina. ISSUE: WON RIL applies to Dr. Fuentes. HELD: NO

The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur does not apply to Dr. Fuentes . Requisites: (1) occurrence of an injury; (2) the thing which caused the injury was under the exclusive control and management of the defendant; (3) in the ordinary course of things the injury wouldnt have happened if the person in control used proper care; and (4) absence of explanation by the person at fault. The 2nd requirement is wanting because Dr. Ampil, not Dr. Fuentes was the lead surgeon (Captain of the Ship rule). DM CONSUNJI v CA FACTS: A construction worker fell from the 14th floor when the platform assembly he was standing on fell down. HELD: The theoretical basis for the doctrine is its necessity, i.e., that the necessary evidence is not available. The defendant in charge of the instrumentality which causes the injury either knows the cause of the accident or has the best opportunity of ascertaining it and the plaintiff has no such knowledge. It furnishes a bridge by which the plaintiff, without knowledge of the cause, reaches over to defendant who knows or should know the cause, for any explanation of care exercised by the defendant in respect of the matter of which the plaintiff complains. It is a rule of necessity. RULE: The theoretical basis for the doctrine is its necessity. NOTES: RIL applies theoretical basis: o proof is in exclusive control of defendant o bridge that connects plaintiff to the proof Prof. Casiss problem: theres evidence (police report, testimony & affidavit). It is like saying that even if there is evidence, one could still argue RIL to win the case. Prof. Casis thinks that it is the victims fault for falling off the platform. Due care defense comes into play only after the circumstances for the application of the doctrine has been established. COLLEGE ASSURANCE v BELFRANLT FACTS: Belfranlt leased several unit of a building to CAP and comprehensive annuity Plans and Pension Corporation (CAPP). However, as fire occurred which destroyed portions of the building including the units they leased. An investigation report found out that the origin of the fire was from CAPs storeroom due to an overheated coffee percolator. ISSUE: WON RIL applies. HELD: YES. The requisites of RIL are present The accident is of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent fire that damaged the building was not a spontaneous natural occurrence but the outcome of a human act or omission b. The cause of the injury was under the exclusive control of the person in charge originated in the storeroom which CAP had possession and control of c. The injury suffered must have been due to any voluntary action of contribution on the part of the person injured = Belfranlt had no hand in the incident CAP alone, having knowledge of the cause of the fire or the best opportunity to ascertain it; and Belfranlt having no means to find out for itself, it is sufficient for the latter to merely allege that the cause of the fire was negligence of the former and to rely on the occurrence of the fire as proof of such negligence. It was all up to CAP to dispel such inference of negligence, but their bare denial only left the matter unanswered. SANCO (27-32) RES IPSA LOQUITOR the facts or circumstances attending an injury may be such as to raise a presumption, or permit an inference, of negligence on the part of the defendant, or some other person who is charged with negligence. It relates to the MODE rather than the BURDEN of establishing negligence. It is NOT an exception to the rule of initial presumption of negligence, but is DESCRIPTIVE of a class of cases wherein the initial presumption is overcome by evidence inherently carrying with it implications of negligence without the necessity of proof of specific facts or conduct. WHEN DOES IT APPLY? Upon the satisfaction of 3 conditions: 1. The accident was of a kind which ordinarily does not occur unless someone is negligent 2. The instrumentality or agency which caused the injury was under the exclusive control of the person charged with negligence 3. The injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person injured COURTS ADD A FURTHER CONDITION: 4. Plaintiff had no knowledge or means of knowledge as to the cause of the accident D. Defenses 1. Plaintiffs Negligence 2) INJURY (legal question damnum absque injuria) or DAMAGE 3) NEGLIGENCE a.

a) Picart Test b) Standard Care 4) PROXIMATE CAUSE 5) PLAINTIFFS NEGLIGENCE a) PROXIMATE CAUSE Cannot recover b) CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE can recover but mitigated Art. 2179, NCC When the plaintiffs own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause being the defendants lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the court shall mitigate the damages to be awarded. NOTES: Applies only when both parties are negligent. Cf. Astudillo public place, should be stricter Cf. Last Clear Chance Does not apply if civil liability arises from crime MANILA ELECTRIC v REMONQUILLO FACTS: Magno was repairing the media agua when he was electrocuted to death. The galvanized iron sheet he was holding came in contact with the electric wire. HELD: Court said Meralco was not negligent. But assuming it was Magnos heirs still cant recover because the proximate cause of the electrocution was not the electric wire but the reckless and negligent act of Magno in turning around and swinging the galvanized iron sheet without precaution. It is assumed that due to his age and experience, he was qualified to do the job. SC: assumed he was a tinsmith higher standard of care NOTES: proximate cause: negligence of repairman in turning with GI sheet difference between this & Astudillo v. Manila Electric Co.: o Meralco wouldve had to have been more careful if public place * The son could have sued stepbrother of his father for building the house so close to the wire* BERNARDO v LEGASPI (If both negligent cannot recover from each other) FACTS: CFI dismissed the complaint filed in an action to recover damages for injuries sustained by plaintiffs automobile by reason of defendants negligence in causing a collision. Court also dismissed a cross-complaint filed by the defendant, praying for damages on the ground that the injuries sustained by his automobile, and those to the plaintiffs car were caused by plaintiffs own negligence. HELD: Court found that both plaintiff and defendant were negligent in handling their automobile so both cannot recover. Where plaintiff in a negligence action by his own carelessness contributes to the principal occurrence as one of the determining causes thereof, he cannot recover. RULE: When the negligence of both the plaintiff and the defendant is the proximate cause of the accident, they cannot recover from each other. NOTES: Determining Cause of Principal Incident: A. CASE: Act/Omission of A as the Proximate Cause + Act/Omission of B as the Proximate Cause = Principal Incident B. SIR (proper way): Act/Omission of A + Act/Omission of B = Proximate Cause Principal Incident BERNAL v HOUSE (Before NCC) FACTS: Mother and child were walking along a street, with the child a few steps ahead. She got startled by an automobile and ran back to her mother. She fell into a ditch with hot water and later died. CFI denied damages to parents because they were negligent. HELD: SC held they were not. Mother and child had a right to be on that street. There was nothing abnormal in letting a child run along a few paces ahead of the mother. Contributory negligence of the child and her mother, if any, does not operate as a bar to recovery but could only result in reduction of damages. NOTES: No contributory negligence of mother & kid Even if they did have contributory negligence, it is not a bar to recovery; only mitigates PLDT v CA (Mound of Earth) FACTS: Antonio and Gloria Estebans jeep ran over a mound of earth and fell into an open trench, an excavation allegedly undertaken by PLDT for the installation of its underground conduit system. HELD: The accident was due to the lack of diligence of Antonio. His jeep was running along the inside lane of the street but it swerved abruptly, causing the jeep to hit the mound. Proximate cause was the

unexplained and abrupt swerving of the jeep. Court also found that the jeep was running too fast. The negligence of Antonio was not only contributory to his injuries and those of his wife, but goes to the very cause of the occurrence of the accident and thereby precludes their right to recover damages. NOTES: negligence imputed included knowledge of the place The Estebans passed that mound several times. Cause/Condition 2. Contributory Negligence NPC v HEIRS OFCASIONAN FACTS: Noble and his co-pocket miner, Melchor Jimenez, were at Dalicno. They cut two bamboo poles for their pocket mining. One was 18 to 19 feet long and the other was 14 feet long. Each man carried one pole horizontally on his shoulder. As Noble was going uphill and turning left on a curve, the tip of the bamboo pole he was carrying touched one of the dangling high tension wires. Melchor, who was walking behind him, narrated that he heard a buzzing sound when the tip of Nobles pole touched the wire for only about one or two seconds. Thereafter, he saw Noble fall to the ground. Melchor rushed to Noble and shook him but the latter was already dead. Their coworkers heard Melchors shout for help and together they brought the body of Noble to their camp. ISSUE: WON there was contributory negligence on the part of the victim? HELD: Yes Negligence is the failure to observe, for the protection of the interest of another person, that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury. On the other hand, contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party, contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls below the standard which he is required to conform for his own protection. The underlying precept on contributory negligence is that a plaintiff who is partly responsible for his own injury should not be entitled to recover damages in full but must bear the consequences of his own negligence. If indeed there was contributory negligence on the part of the victim, then it is proper to reduce the award for damages. In this case, the trail where Noble was electrocuted was regularly used by members of the community. There were no warning signs to inform passersby of the impending danger to their lives should they accidentally touch the high tension wires. Also, the trail was the only viable way from Dalicon to Itogon. Hence, Noble should not be faulted for simply doing what was ordinary routine to other workers in the area. NOTES: No contributory negligence Proximate Cause = NOCs sagging lines If PLDT was followed, he should have known about the wires; both without warning signs NPC v MERALCO o SIR agrees more with NPC = contributory negligence NPCs definition contradictory to Art. 2179 Art. 2214, NCC In quasi-delicts, the contributory negligence of the plaintiff shall reduce the damages that he may recover. NOTES: Contributory negligence is a mitigating factor in awarding damages. GENOBIAGON v CA FACTS: Rig (imagine Optimus Prime ) driven by appellant bumped an 81 y.o. lady who was crossing the street. His defense was that it was the old lady who bumped his car. TC and CA found him guilty of homicide through reckless imprudence. HELD: Court said that the alleged contributory negligence of the victim, if any, does not exonerate accused. The defense of contributory negligence does not apply in criminal cases committed through reckless imprudence since one cannot allege the negligence of another to evade the effects of his own negligence. RAKES v ATLANTIC FACTS: The truck plaintiff was riding fell because the track sagged. The rails that they were transporting slid off the truck and caught his lag. Later, his leg was amputated. Company said Rakes was negligent because: (1) he continued his work despite having noticed the depression in the track, and (2) he walked on the ends of the ties at the side of the car instead of along the boards. HELD: As to the first, Court held that Rakes had been working for less than 2 days. He could not have known that one rail was lower than the other or that the stringers and rails joined in the same place. As to the second, Court found that there was a general prohibition against walking by the side of the car. The disobedience of the plaintiff in placing himself in danger contributed in some degree to the injury as a proximate, although not its primary cause. The Court made a distinction between the accident and the injury. If the plaintiffs negligence contributed to the accident, he cannot recover. But if his negligence only contributed to his injury, he may recover the amount that the defendant responsible for the accident should pay fpr the injury, less a sum deemed an equitable equivalent for his own imprudence.

NOTES: 1) not following orders; 2) should have known (only a bit because hes new on the job; Foreman should have repaired)
Contributory negligence? YES! (50% explanation look at previous cases)
damages;
50%
no
accident v. injury (RAKES TEST) o accident: cant recover contrib. to primary event o injury: may recover Defendants contrib. Plaintiffs contrib. = Recovery American Common Law: Draconian Contributory: negligence policy even if little = Barred from recovery PROPORTIONAL DAMAGES = Relaxation of Draconian o Comparative Negligence and Contributory Negligence if defendant contributed more, plaintiff allowed to recover PHILIPPINES: Comparative and Proportional Problem, what if its equal? Apply BERNARDO? 2 kinds of contribution: (1) contribution to the principal event; (2) contribution to his own injury
3. Fortuitous Event Art. 1174, NCC Except in cases expressly specified by the law, or when it is otherwise declared by stipulation, or when the nature of the obligation requires the assumption of risk, no person shall be responsible for those events which could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, were inevitable.
NOTES: ** Is this really a defense? ** theres only one case cited because in Transpo course, Court was not always consistent whether a tire blowout is a fortuitous event or not *how different is a tire blowout from a fire?* *memorize elements of Fortuitous Event* JUNTILLA v FUNTANAR FACTS: Plaintiff was seated in the front passenger seat of a public utility jeepney when the right tire blew up. He was thrown out of the jeep and suffered injuries. He also lost his omega watch. HELD: SC said that there are specific acts of negligence on the part of the respondents. Jeep was running at a very fast speed and was overloaded. In this case, the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence was not independent of human will. It was caused either through the negligence of the driver or because of the mechanical defects in the tire. CHARACTERISTICS OF CASO FORTUITO: 1. Cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence, or of the failure of the debtor to comply with his obligation must be independent of human will. 2. It must be impossible to foresee the event which constitutes the caso fortuito, or if it can be foreseen, it is impossible to avoid. 3. The occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner 4. Obligor must be free from participation in the aggravation of the injury resulting to the creditor. NOTES: Many possibilities were proposed by the Court to justify that the tire blowing up was not a fortuitous event. Important: memorize characteristics of caso fortuito
LAMBERT v HEIRS OF CASTILLON FACTS: On Jan. 13, 1991, Ray Castilln visited the house of his brother Joel in Iligan City and borrowed his motorcycle. He then invited his friend, Sergio Labang to roam around the city. Ray drove the motorcycle with Sergio on the rear. ISSUE: WON a greater reduction in the award of damages to the heirs of Castilln is proper HELD: : YES. While the Court agrees with the trial court that Ray was contributorily negligent under Art. 2179 of the Civil Code, they also find it equitable to increase the ratio of apportionment of damages on account of his negligence. Castilln was driving the motorcycle at a high speed, drank one or two bottles of beer and was not wearing a protective helmet. Although Gamot was also negligent in not checking whether the road behind him was clear before making a sharp left turn, it cannot be denied that Castillns actuations have also led to the same effect. His heirs shall only recover damages of up to only 50% of the award. The 50% will be borne by them while Lambert shall be only liable to pay 50% of the damages. NOTES: SIR: borrowed motorcycle, assumed not to have a license Proximate cause = negligence of Tamaraw driver
Caso Fortuito is HUMANIZED even if only contributory Art. 2179 applies only to plaintiff Mechanical defect: carrier still liable because its part of the contract of carriage Not enough that there was Fortuitous Event, there should be NO negligence on person charged SICAM v JORGE FACTS: Lulu Jorge pawned her jewelry with Agencia de R.C. Sicam, a pawnshop in Paraaque, in October 1987 to secure a loan in the amount of P59,500.00. On October 19, 1987, armed men entered the pawnshop and took away whatever cash and jewelry were found in the vault. On the same day, Sicam notified Jorge of the robbery incident and that consequently all here jewelry is gone. Jorge did not believe him. ISSUE: WON the robbery is a fortuituous event which can absolve Sicam from liabilty. HELD: NO - Fortuitous events by definition are extraordinary events not foreseeable or avoidable. It is therefore, not enough that the event should not have been foreseen or anticipated, as is commonly believed but it must be one impossible to foresee or to avoid. The mere difficulty to foresee the happening is not impossibility to foresee the same. 22 - The burden of proving that the loss was due to a fortuitous event rests on him who invokes it. And, in order for a fortuitous event to exempt one from liability, it is necessary that one has committed no negligence or misconduct that may have occasioned the loss. Robbery per se, just like carnapping, is not a fortuitous event. It does not foreclose the possibility of negligence on the part of herein petitioners NOTES: Austria Abad: social situation NOT prevalent: 1961 v 1987 Hernandez: public utility (no control) jeep v Pawnshop can screen people Cruz: rode train exerted enough effort COLLEGE ASSURANCE v BELRANLT FACTS: Belfranlt leased several unit of a building to CAP and comprehensive annuity Plans and Pension Corporation (CAPP). However, as fire occurred which destroyed portions of the building including the units they leased. An investigation report found out that the origin of the fire was from CAPs storeroom due to an overheated coffee percolator. ISSUE: W/N the fire was a fortuitous event. HELD: NO.
SOUTHEASTERN COLLEGE v CA FACTS: During a typhoon, schools roof was partly ripped off and blown away, landing on and destroying portions of the roofing of respondents house. A team of engineers conducted an ocular inspection and found that the causes may have been the U-shaped formation of the building and the improper anchorage of the trusses to the roof beams. HELD: Court found that other than the report submitted by the engineers, no investigation was conducted to determine the real cause of the incident. Respondents did not even show that the plans, specs and design of the school building were defective. On the other hand, city building official testified that the school obtained both building permit and certificate of occupancy; same official gave go signal for repairs of damage of typhoon and subsequently authorized the use of the entire 4th floor of the building; annual maintenance inspection and repair of the school building was regularly undertaken; and that no complaints have been lodged in the past. Therefore, petitioner has not been shown negligent or at fault regarding the construction and maintenance of the school building. Typhoon was the proximate cause. CASO FORTUITO event which takes place by accident and could not have been reasonably foreseen, it is an unexpected event or act of God which could neither be foreseen nor resisted. 2 GENERAL CAUSES: 1. By nature- earthquakes, storms, floods, etc. 2. By the act of man- armed invasion, attack by bandits, governmental prohibition, etc. NOTES: typhoon is FE: only issue is whether there was negligence on part of Southern flying roof is FE typhoon was proximate cause of damage to neighboring house *take this case for definition of force majeur* *credibility of ocular inspection discredited so this is strange because this runs counter to Gotesco* *they could have used RIL*: might have done better? But there is evidence of diligence.

Article 1174 of the Civil Code defines a fortuitous event as that which could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, was inevitable. - Whether an act of god or an act of man, to constitute a fortuitous event, it must be shown that: a) the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence or of the failure of the obligor to comply with its obligations was independent of human will; b) it was impossible to foresee the event or, if it could have been foreseen, to avoid it; c) the occurrence rendered it impossible for the obligor to fulfill its obligations in a normal manner; and d) said obligor was free from any participation in the aggravation of the injury or loss. If the negligence or fault of the obligor coincided with the occurrence of the fortuitous event, and caused the loss or damage or the aggravation thereof, the fortuitous event cannot shield the obligor from liability for his negligence. In the present case, it was fire that caused the damage to the units being occupied by petitioners. The legal presumption therefore is that petitioners were responsible for the damage. NOTES: Fire is not always a fortuitous event; in this case, it was caused by CAPs negligence when one of its employees left the percolator on. EVIDENCE: could not have been fortuitous event (Arson investigators report, testimony, etc.) Negligence was established first, RIL was secondary to testimonial evidence 4. Assumption of Risk AFIALDA v HISOLE (Fun Fact: Hisoles referred to as spouses in the case even though theyre both males) FACTS: Caretaker of carabaos was gored by a carabao and he later died as a consequence of his injuries. Action was predicated on Art 1905 CC. HELD: Court said A1905 makes possessory user of animal liable for any damages it may cause. In this case, the animal was under the control of the caretaker. It was his business to try to prevent the animal from causing injury to anyone, including himself. Being injured by the animal under these circumstances was one of the risks of the occupation which he had voluntarily assumed and for which he must take the consequences. NOTES: inherent risks voluntarily & knowingly assumed by caretaker when he agreed to be caretaker SIR: part of the job applied to cases where a person has to work with animals, like Congress. ILOCOS NORTE v CA FACTS: After a 2-day typhoon, Isabel went out of her house to check on her grocery store. She waded in waist-deep flood and got electrocuted. According to the NPC Engr, there were no INELCO linemen who were going around. HELD: Court said that contrary to petitioners claim, the maxim violenti non fit injuria does not apply here. Isabel should not be punished for exercising her right to protect her property from the floods by imputing upon her the unfavorable presumption that she assumed the risk of personal in injury. A person is excused from the force of the rule, that when he voluntarily assents to a known danger, he must abide by the consequence, if an emergency is found to exist, or if the life or property of another is in peril or when he seeks to rescue his endangered property. NOTES: Exemption to Violenti Non Fit Injuria: A person is excused from the force of the assumption of risk rule, that when he voluntarily assents to a known danger he must abide by the consequences: o if an emergency is found to exist o if the life or property of another is in peril o when he seeks to rescue his endangered property. To which a person ascends to be injured, he cannot recover damages NIKKO HOTEL v ROBERTO REYES FACTS: this is the case of Amay Bisaya who claimed that he was invited to a birthday party at said hotel but who was then asked to leave by the hotels executive Secretary, Ruby Lim, who on the other hand claimed that Reyes was uninvited. HELD: The doctrine of volenti non fit injuria (to which a person assents is not esteemed in law as injuryrefers to self-inflicted injury or to the consent to injury which precludes the recovery of damages by one who has knowingly and voluntarily exposed himself to danger, even if he is not negligent in doing so. As formulated by petitioners, however, this doctrine does not find application to the case at bar because even if respondent Reyes assumed the risk of being asked to leave the party, petitioners, under Articles 19 and 21 of the New Civil Code, were still under obligation to treat him fairly in order not to expose him to unnecessary ridicule and shame. In the case at bar, Ruby was close enough to kiss him as testified by Reyes when she asked him to leave, showing that she did not want to

cause him any embarrassment. There was also no evidence that she was driven by animosity against Reyes. At most she may only be guilty of bad judgment, done with good intentions, thus not amounting to bad faith. SANGCO (pp.81-84) NOTES: VIOLENTI NON FIT INJURIA: applies to non-contractual relations; 3 requisites: (1) plaintiff had actual knowledge of the damage; (2) he understood an appreciated the risk from danger; (3) he voluntarily exposed himself to such risk. 5. Prescription KRAMER v CA FACTS: 1976: 2 vessels collided - 1981: Phil Coast Guard concluded that the collision was due to M/V Asias negligence -1982: Coast Guard suspended 2nd mate of M/V Asia. -1985: Petitioners instituted complaint for damages against respondent. Motion to dismiss was filed on the basis of prescription. HELD: SC dismissed the case, saying that according to Art. 1146, action based on quasi-delict must be instituted within 4 yrs. Prescriptive period begins from the day the quasi-delict was committed. IV CAUSATION A. Proximate cause NOTES: Usually its the shorter definition thats being cited in the other cases. So for our purpose-shorter version The longer version can be shortened by removing sufficient intervening cause *memorize definition of proximate cause* 1. Definition BATACLAN v MEDINA FACTS: A bus speeding on its way to Pasay City at 2am when one of its front tires burst, as a result of which the vehicle zigzagged, fell into a canal or ditch, and turned turtle. 4 passengers were unable to get out of the bus. Calls and shouts for help were made in the neighborhood. At 2:30am, 10 men came, one of them carrying a lighted torch made of bamboo with a wick fueled with petroleum. When they approached the bus, a fierce fire started, burning the bus and the 4 passengers. It appears that as the bus overturned, the gasoline began to leak and escape from the gasoline tank, spreading over the bus and the ground under it, and that the lighted torch set it on fire. ISSUE: What was the proximate cause of the accident? HELD: The overturning of the bus, and not the fire that burned the bus, is the proximate cause. The coming of the men with the torch was to be expected and was a natural sequence of the overturning of the bus, the trapping of the passengers and the call for outside help. NOTES: Definition #1 of proximate cause according to Bataclan v. Medina: Proximate cause is that cause which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.
Definition #2 of proximate cause according to Bataclan vs. Medina: More comprehensively, the proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an in jury to some person might probably result therefrom. SIR: being burned is not part of the foreseeable consequences of riding a bus
MERCURY DRUG v BAKING FACTS: R got into a car accident because he fell asleep while driving. It was found out that. Prior to the accident, R bought several medications for his blood sugar and triglyceride at Mercury Drug,Alabang. However, the saleslady misread Diamicron and instead gave him Dormicum, a potent sleeping tablet. He took Dormicum for three consecutive days. HELD: Proximate cause is defined as any cause that produces injury in a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, such that the result would not have occurred otherwise. Proximate cause is determined from the facts of each case, upon a combined consideration of logic, common sense, policy, and precedent.

In this case, the car accident could not have happened if the saleslady carefullly and correctly read Dr. Sys prescription since it was unlikley that Baking would fall asleep while driving. NOTES: SIR: the court attributed a high degree of diligence to pharmacists PILIPINAS BANKING v CA FACTS: Florencio Reyes issued two post-dated checks. To cover the face value of the checks, he requested PCIB to effect a withdrawal from his savings account there and have it deposited with his current account with Pilipinas Bank. Santos, who made the deposit, wrote the wrong account number on the deposit slip, but wrote the name of Florencio Reyes as the depositors name. The Current Account Bookkeeper of Pilipinas Bank, seeing that the account number coincided with the name Florencio, deposited the amount in the account of Florencio Amador. ISSUE: What was the proximate cause of the injury to Reyes? HELD: The proximate cause of the injury is the negligence of Pilipinas Banks employee in erroneously positing the cash deposit of Reyes in the name of another depositor who had a similar first name. The employee should have continuously gone beyond mere assumption. Proximate cause is any cause which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the result complained of and without which would not have occurred and from which it ought to have been foreseen or reasonably anticipated by a person of ordinary care that the injury complained of or some similar injury, would result therefrom as a natural and probable cause. Note: Different definition of PC from Bataclan case. This case adds the element of foreseeability. Prof. Casiss opinion: Theres no basis for this additional element. Under Art. 2202, foreseeability should not be a factor.Sir said that there is a problem with foreseeability as an element. So as a solution, if theres a case similar to Pilipinas Bank, apply Pilipinas Bank definition* Bank employees are required to exercise a high degree of diligence because of the fiduciary nature of the job Pagnaya pulled the reins to take it away from Aranetas control, as a result of which, the bit came off the horses mouth. Pagnaya fixed the bridle on the curb. The horse, free form the control of the bit, moved away, causing the carromata to hit a telephone booth and caused it to crash. This frightened the horse and caused it to run up the street with Gayetano still inside the carromata. Gayetano jumped or fell from the rig, causing injuries from which he soon died. ISSUE: WON Araneta is liable for Gayetanos death. ---NO. HELD: Aranetas act of stopping the rig was too remote from the accident to be considered the legal or proximate cause thereof. After Pagnaya alighted, the horse was conducted to the curb and an appreciable interval of time elapsed before the horse started to career up to the street. Moreover, by getting out and taking his post at the head of the horse, the driver was the person primarily responsible for the control of the animal, and Araneta cannot be charged with liability for the accident resulting from the action of the horse thereafter. NOTES: Classical description of remote cause with series of events. It is not the counting of the time but the SERIES b. Concurrent FAR EASTERN SHIPPING COMPANY v CA FACTS: A ship owned by FESC rammed into the apron of the pier. Kavankov was the master of the vessel. Gavino was the compulsory pilot. ISSUE: Who was negligent --- Gavino or Kvankov? ---BOTH. HELD: Both Gavino (compulsory pilot) and Kavankov (master of the vessel) were concurrently negligent. Gavino was negligent for failing to react on time; Kavankov was negligent in leaving the entire docking procedure up to Gavino instead of being vigilant. Negligence, in order to render a person liable need not be the sole cause of an injury. Where several causes combine to produce injuries, a person is not relieved from liability because he is responsible for only one of them, it being sufficient that the negligence of the person charged with injury is an efficient cause without which the injury would not have resulted to as great an extent, and that such cause is not attributable to the person injured. Each wrongdoer is responsible for the entire result and is liable as though his acts were the sole cause of the injury. There is no contribution between joint tortfeasors whose liability is solidary since both of them are liable for the whole damage. Reason: It is impossible to determine in what proportion each contributed to the injury and either of them is responsible for the whole injury. Note: Liability of concurrent negligence = solidary.
2. Distinguished from other kinds a. Remote GABETO v ARANETA FACTS: Gayetano (husband of plaintiff) and Ilano took a carromata to go to a cockpit. When the carromata was about to move, Araneta held the reins of the horse, saying he hailed the carromata first. Driver

NOTES: If the concurrent act was the proximate cause, the degree of participation does not matter. What is the rule on liability? liability is impossible to determine in what proportion each contributed to the injury Those who are responsible for concurrent causes are jointly and severally liable o Creates the impression that concurrent causes are the proximate cause SIR: Concurrent proximate cause o Liability is not dependent on amount of physical damage but on the nature of the act o In a situation where 4 vehicles rammed into a traffic enforcer in an intersection, each driver is liable as the other, regardless of size and impact Problem: can you have a situation where there is more than one proximate cause? 2 things are the effect of concurrent causes: o liability is not dependent on amount of physical damage but on the nature of the act o plaintiff can recover the entire amount from anybody c. Cause and Condition PHOENIX v CA FACTS: A dump truck, owned by Phoenix, was parked askew on the right hand side of the street, in such a manner as to stick out onto General Lacuna Street, partly blocking the way of oncoming traffic. There were no early warning devices placed near the truck. At 1:30 am, Dionisio was on his way home when his car headlights allegedly suddenly failed. He switched his headlights on bright and saw the truck looming 2 meters away from his car. His car smashed into the dump truck. HELD: The distinctions between cause and condition have already been ALMOST ENTIRELY DISCREDITED. Posser and Keeton: So far as the fact of causation is concerned, in the sense of necessary antecedents which have played an important part in producing the result, it is quite impossible to distinguish between active forces and passive situations, particularly since the latter are the result of other active forces which have gone before. Even the lapse of a considerable time during which the condition remains static will not necessarily affect liability. It is not the distinction which is important, but the nature of the risk and the character of the intervening cause. NOTES: The cause is the active aspect whereas the condition is the passive action that may produce the injury. It is difficult to distinguish between a cause and a condition because of the time element. A condition was a cause at some point in time. It cannot be cited in saying that cause and condition are no longer applicable in our jurisdiction because it only said that it is discredited.
DY TEBAN v JOSE CHING FACTS: A three-way vehicular collision occurred along a national highwa as a result of the improper parking of the prime mover on the national highway and the absence of an early warning device on the vehicle. A Nissan van operated by P was one of the vehicles involved in the accident when it hit the front of the stationary mover while trying to avoid a passenger bus which swerved to the vans lane upon trying to avoid the mover. The said bus also collided with the rear portion of the mover. HELD: The parked mover is the proximate cause of the collision. Proximate cause is defined as that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred. Even granting that the passenger bus was at fault, its fault will not necessarily absolve private respondents from liability. If at fault, the passenger bus will be a joint tortfeasor along with private respondents. The liability of joint tortfeasors is joint and solidary. It is said that where the concurrent or successive negligent acts or omission of two or more persons, although acting independently of each other, are, in combination, the direct and proximate cause of a single injury to a third person and it is impossible to determine in what proportion each contributed to the injury, either is responsible for the whole injury, even though his act alone might not have caused the entire injury. NOTES: Consistent with Phoenix o Proximate cause would be the wrongly parked vehicle RODRIGUEZA v MANILA RAILROAD FACTS: The house of Rodrigueza and 3 others were burned when a passing train emitted a great quantity of sparks from its smokestack. Rodriguezas house was partly within the property of the Manila Railroad. ISSUE: WON Manila Railroads negligence was the proximate cause of the fire HELD: Yes. The fact that Rodriguezas house was partly on the defendants property is an antecedent condition that may have made the fire possible but cannot be imputed as contributory negligence

because: (1) that condition was not created by himself; (2) his house remained on this ground by the tolerance, and thus consent of the train company; (3) even supposing the house to be improperly there, this fact would not justify the defendant in negligently destroying it. Rodriguezas house was built on the same spot before the defendant laid its tracks over the land. Note: Condition = plaintiffs house was partly within the defendants property. Cause = the sparks on the train which was the negligent act of the defendant. A case where rule on condition is applied The house is the condition which made the injury possible but not the cuase SIR: as a question of policy, this is a good ruling o People lost their homes o If Meralco was nto liable, the owners would have ran after Rodrigueza who also lost his house MANILA ELECTRIC v REMONQUILLO FACTS: Efren Magno repaired the media agua below Pealozas 3storey house. In the course of the repair, the end of the iron sheet he was holding came into contact with an uninsulated electric wire of Manila Electric, causing his death by electrocution. The distance from the electric wire to the media agua was only 2 feet, in violation of the regulation of the City of Manila requiring 3 feet. ISSUE: What was the cause and condition of the accident? HELD: The cause was Magnos own negligence. The condition was the too close proximity of the media agua, or rather, its edge, to the electrical wire of the company by reason of the violation of the original permit given by the city and the subsequent approval of said illegal construction of media agua. 3. Efficient Intervening cause NOTES: The efficient intervening cause destroys the link between the negligent act and injury. It should occur after the purported proximate cause because it would then be a condition. Negligence of the defendant if pre-empted by the negligence of the plaintiff. The efficient intervening cause is actually a proximate cause. Although there is still lack of a definite ruling by the Court, any violation of administrative ordinances and the like would either be seen as 1) negligence per se or 2) prima facie evidence of negligence. It is not an efficient intervening cause when it is already in existence during the happening of the proximate cause. URBANO v IAC FACTS: On October 23, 1980, Urbano hacked Javier in his right palm. Javier was brought to a doctor who issued a certificate stating the incapacitation is from 7-9 days. On November 5, Javier was seen catching fish in dirty shallow irrigation canals after a typhoon. ON November 14, he died of tetanus. ISSUE: WON there was efficient intervening cause YES. HELD: The death must be the direct, natural, and logical consequence of the wounds inflicted upon him by the accused. The medical findings, in the case at bar, show that the infection of the wound by the tetanus was an effacing intervening cause later or between the time Javier was wounded to the time of death. NOTES: The court adopted the Bataclan definition of proximate cause. There is a likelihood that the wound was but the remote cause and its subsequent infection, for failure to take necessary precautions, with tetanus may have been the proximate cause of Javiers death with which Urbano had nothing to do. Citing Manila Electric v. Remoquillo: A prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis of an action if such remote cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by which the injury was made possible, if there intervened between such prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct, successive, unrelated and efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury would not have happened except but for such condition or occasion. The remote cause was noted to be the wound of Urbano. MCKEE v IAC FACTS: A cargo truck and a Ford Escort were traveling in opposite directions. When the car was 10 meters away from the bridge, 2 boys suddenly darted into the cars lane. The car driver blew the horn, swerved to the left and entered the trucks lane. He then switched on the headlights, braked, and attempted to return to his lane. Before he could do so, his car collided with the truck. ISSUE: WON there was an efficient intervening cause YES. HELD: Although it may be said that the act of the car driver, if at all negligent, was the initial act in the chain of events, it cannot be said that the same caused the eventual injuries and deaths because of the occurrence of a sufficient intervening event, the negligent act of the truck driver, which was the actual cause of the tragedy. It was the truck drivers subsequent negligence in failing to take the proper measure and degree of care necessary to avoid the collision, which was the proximate cause of the tragedy. MANILA ELECTRIC v REMONQUILLO FACTS: Efren Magno repaired the media agua below Penalozas 3story house. In the course of the repair, the end of the iron sheet he was holding came into contact with an uninsulated electric wire of

Manila Electric, causing his death by electrocution. The distance from the electric wire to the media agua was only 2 feet, in violation of the regulation of the City of Manila requiring 3 feet. ISSUE: WON there was an efficient intervening cause YES. HELD: Efficient intervening cause: the negligent and reckless act of MAgno in turning around and swinging the galvanized iron sheet without taking any precaution, such as looking back toward the street and at the wire to avoid its contacting the said iron sheet, considering the latters length of 6 feet. NOTES: The IC here was the turning What could have been the IC now becomes the remote cause TEAGUE v FERNANDEZ FACTS: A vocational school for hair and beauty culture had only one stairway, in violation of an ordinance requiring 2 stairways. A fire broke out in a nearby store and the students panicked and caused a stampede. Four students died. ISSUE: WON there was an independent intervening cause NO. HELD: the violation of a stature or ordinance is not rendered remote as the cause of an injury by the intervention of another agency if the occurrence of the accident, in the manner in which it happened, was the very thing which the stature or ordinance was intended to prevent. In the present case, the violation was a continuing violation in that the ordinance was a measure of safety designed to prevent the specific situation of undue crowding in case of evacuation. NOTE: The PC of the deaths is the overcrowding brought about by the violation. However, the court did not specifically identify the violation itself as the PC. Rule: if the injury was caused by an act which the statute violated tended to prevent, the violation of the statute can be considered negligence per se and is the proximate cause. But this is only of limited application and is not yet settled. Effects of violation of statute is not settled. It can be: a) negligence per se, b) prima facie proof of negligence, c) rebuttable proof of negligence, d) proof of negligence *Limited application because its municipal ordinance. Can you apply this if what is involved is a national statute?- You might be able to use argument by analogy* 4. Tests a. But for b. Substantial Factor PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES v IAC FACTS: A jeep was carrying passengers to Pangasinan when its right rear wheel became detached, causing it to be unbalanced. The driver stepped on the brake, which made the jeep turn around, encroaching on the opposite lane. A Philippine Rabbit Bus from the opposite lane bumped the rear portion of the jeep. Three passengers of the jeep died as a result. The Court of Appeals ruled that the bus driver was negligent. It applied the substantial factor test: It is a rule under this test that if the actors conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about the harm to another, the fact that the actor neither foresaw nor should have foreseen the extent of the harm or the manner in which it occurred does not prevent him from being liable. ISSUE: Who is liable?-Jeep. HELD: The Supreme Court was not convinced by the application of the substantial factor test. Even though the bus was driving at 80-90 kph, it was still within the speed limit allowed in highways. The bus driver had little time to react and had no options available: it could not swerve to the right (western shoulder was narrow and had tall grasses; already near the canal) or to the left (it would have it the jeep headon). NOTE: The substantial factor test contains no element of foreseeability. Prof. Casis thinks that this case should not be cited for the substantial factor test because the SC did not apply the test; only the CA did. Substantial factor = Main cause, not the only cause Important : memorize the test *This is the only case that defines substantial factor test* *Also see Pilipinas Bank* 5. Last Clear Chance NOTES: Elements: o Both parties must be negligent o Appreciable interval of time o When it is impossible to determine whose fault or negligence should be attributed to the incident Important to allege that there is a prior and existing negligence Cannot apply in: o Common carrier against passenger o Concurrent negligence o Joint tortfeasors o Emergency rule no LCC at all o Proximate cause Take note of the definition of last clear chance in all the cases. PICART v SMITH

*Provides for the classic definition of Last Clear Chance: the person who has the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the consequences, without reference to the prior negligence of the other party. FACTS: Picart riding his pony was on the wrong side of the road. Smith driving his car stayed on his right lane and so both Picart and Smith were on the same lane. Smith stayed on his lane and swerved to the other lane quickly, thereby almost hitting the pony. Pony became frightened and lost control and Picart was thrown out of the pony and got injured. Picart then filed a case against Smith RATIO: The negligent acts of both parties were NOT contemporaneous. Negligence of Smith succeeded the negligence of Picart by an appreciable interval. th saw the pony when he was still far and he had control of the situation. was his duty to avoid the threatened harm by bringing the car to a stop or taking the other lane to avoid the collision. t take into consideration the NATURE OF HORSES and the ANIMAL NOT BEING ACQUAINTED TO CARS. ligence of Smith: when it exposed Picart and pony to danger. This negligence of Smith was the immediate and determining cause of the accident and the antecedent negligence of Picart was a more remote factor -Applied the LCCD and made the defendant liable NOTES: Important: there should be a sequence of events BUSTAMANTE v CA - Practical importance of LCCD The negligent defendant is held liable to a negligent plaintiff, or even to a plaintiff who has been grossly negligent in placing himself in peril, if he, aware of the plaintiffs peril, or should have been aware of it in the reasonable exercise of due care, had in fact had an opportunity later than that of the plaintiff to avoid an accident FACTS: Collision between a truck and a bus when the bus tried to overtake a hand tractor. Bus saw that the trucks wheels were wiggling and that truck was heading towards his lane. Still, bus driver did not mind and instead applied more speed. Thus, many were killed and injured. Victims heirs filed this case to claim damages from bus and truck RATIO: Last Clear Chance Doctrine: negligence of the plaintiff does not preclude a recovery for the negligence of the defendant where it appears that the defendant, by exercising reasonable care and prudence, might have avoided injurious consequences to the plaintiff notwithstanding the plaintiffs negligence. The practical import (stated above) provides that negligent defendant shall be liable to negligent plaintiff. Thus, the LCCD does not arise where the passenger demands responsibility from the carrier to enforce its contractual obligations. The doctrine also cannot be extended into the field of joint tortfeasors as a test whether one of them should be liable to the injured person. So, the doctrine cannot apply in this case because this is NOT a suit between owners and drivers but a suit brought by the heirs of the deceased passengers against both owners and drivers of the colliding vehicles - did not apply LCCD NOTES: Last clear chance contemplates a series of negligent acts. The definition of last clear chance in the case of Bustamante is deemed to be the common definition (from the point of view of recovery of plaintiff) and is defined as an exception to a rule. The doctrine of last clear chance would apply even if the plaintiff is grossly negligent. Exceptions, however, include joint tortfeasors (according to Americn Jurisprudence). Last clear chance cannot apply when there are: 1) contractual relations, 2) joint tortfeasors, 3) concurrent negligence CASIS: cant use LCC to avoid liability by pointing to another person since suit was between heirs of the passenger and bus PHOENIX CONSTRUCTION v IAC - basis for saying that there is doubt in the application of the Last Clear Chance Doctrine because of Art. 2179. However, the statements made on the Last Clear Chance Doctrine were merely obiter FACTS: Dionisio was on his way home from a cocktails and dinnermeeting when he collided with the dumptruck of Phoenix which was parked askew at the side of the road. Thus, Dionisio filed an action for damages against Phoenix. Phoenix invoked the Last Clear Chance Doctrine: Dionisio had the Last Clear Chance of avoiding the accident and so Dionisio, having failed to take the last clear chance, must bear his own injuries alone RATIO: The Last Clear Chance doctrine of the Common Law was imported into our jurisdiction by Picart vs. Smith but it is still a matter of debate whether, or to what extent, it has found its way into the Civil Code of the Philippines. The doctrine was applied by Common Law because they had a rule that contributory negligence prevented any recovery at all by a negligent plaintiff. BUT in the Philippines we have Article 2179 of the Civil Code which rejects the Common Law doctrine of contributory negligence. Thus, the court in this case stated that it does not believe so that the general concept of Last Clear Chance has been utilized in our jurisdiction. Article 2179 on contributory negligence is not an exercise in chronology or physics but what is important is the negligent act or omission of each party and the character and gravity of the risks created by such act or omission for the rest of the community. To say that Phoenix should be absolved from liability would come close to wiping out the fundamental law that

a man must respond for the foreseeable consequences of his own negligent act or omission. -LCCD was not applied because the court thinks that it is not applicable in our jurisdiction NOTES: The issue on the element of foreseeability: There is no general concept of last clear chance. Rather, what is more important is the nature, not the order of events. In last clear chance, timing is of the essence. In the case at hand, the truck drivers parking askew led to an increased diligence for the driver of the car. court should allocate risks (policy of consideration) Historical function of last clear chance: mitigate harshness of doctrine of contributory negligence Nature of negligent act should determine liability, not sequence of events Does the last clear chance doctrine still stand? Yes, because it was still used in later cases o HOWEVER, Phoenix says that purpose behind contributory negligence no longer exists therefore A2179 which is irreconcilable with LCC o But in subsequent cases, the SC stil used LCC Phoenix-1987, PBC-1997: appreciably later in time PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMERCE v CA - apply the last Clear Chance Doctrine when fault or negligence is difficult to attribute FACTS: RMC had an account in PBC and Secretary of RMC was tasked to deposit its money. However, it turns out that the Secretary would leave blank the duplicate copy of the deposit slip where the banks teller would validate it. Instead of writing the account number of the company in the original copy retained by the bank, Secretary would write the account number of husband. Thus, RMCs funds were now in Secretarys husbands account. RMC discovered this after 7 yers and then filed a case against PBC to return its money RATIO: PBC was negligent when its employee, teller, validated a blank duplicate copy of the deposit slip. PBC was also lackadaisical in its selection and supervision on the teller since it never knew that blank deposit slips were validated until this incident . Court also applied Last Clear Chance Doctrine in saying that PBC was really negligent. LAST CLEAR CHANCE Aka supervening negligence or discovered peril Where both parties are negligent, but the negligent act of one is appreciably later in time than that of the other, or when it is impossible to determine whose fault or negligence should be attributed to the incident, the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the impending harm and failed to do so is chargeable with the consequence thereof The bank had the last clear opportunity to avert the injury incurred by its client, simply by faithfully observing their self-imposed validation procedure. Still, court said that RMC was also negligent in not checking its monthly statements of account. Applied 2179 of CC on contributory negligence. 60-40 ratio! 40% of the damages shall be borne by RMC; 60% by PBC -applied LCCD in knowing whether PBC was negligent NOTES: Elements: 1) 2 parties negligent, 2) appreciable time bet. 2 negligent acts and it is impossible to determine whose fault or negligence caused injury Problem: overlaps with doctrine of concurrent negligence CASIS: this is a queer case o SC first established the existence of a Proximate Cuase the went on to establish LCC o The court then went on into contributory negligence (inconsistent) A. GLAN PEOPLES LUMBER & HARDWARE V IAC - may be used as basis against the ruling made on Last Clear Chance Doctrine in the case of Phoenix FACTS jeep and cargo truck collided jeepney driver came from a beach party jeep was zigzagging cargo truck was staying on his lane because the line in the road was wrongly painted case filed by heirs of the driver of the jeep who died as a result of the collision RATIO: - The truck driver was not negligent and so cannot be held liable. Furthermore, the doctrine of Last Clear Chance also cannot apply because there is no negligence of the other party - Even assuming that the truck driver was negligent, the doctrine of Last Clear Chance would still absolve him from any actionable responsibility for the accident because both drivers had full view of each others vehicle. The truck stopped 30 m away from the jeep and so by this time, the jeep should have stopped or swerved Jeep driver had the last clear chance to avoid the accident

It was the jeeps driver who had the duty to seize the opportunity of avoidance and not merely rely on a supposed right to expect that the truck would swerve and leave him a clear path - The doctrine of Last Clear Chance provides a valid and complete defense to accident liability today as it did when invoked and applied in the 1918 case of Picart vs. Smith, which involved a similar state of facts - Thus, this ruling would clearly apply to exonerate truck driver - did not apply the doctrine of last clear chance because the other party was not negligent NOTES: In this case, Pantranco bus was speeding and at the speed of the approaching bus prevented jeepney driver from swerving to avoid collision Jeepney driver had NO opportunity to avoid it - Sole and proximate cause of the accident: Pantrancos driver in encroaching into the lane of the incoming jeepney and in failing to return the bus to its own lane immediately upon seeing the jeepney coming from the opposite direction - did not apply LCC because there was no opportunity to avoid the accident and the jeepney driver was not aware of the peril. NOTES: Do not apply last clear chance under the emergency rule Important: memorize emergency rule CASIS: SC declared that the jeepney had a right to assume that the bus will veer away o this is contrary to other rulings o SC ruled on equity (family was traveling to celebrate an anniversary) -Last Clear transactions Chance CANLAS v CA Doctrine can [was] apply in commercial
How did the case of Glan Peoples Lumber affect the case of Phoeix? In the case of Glan, last clear chance was deemed to be a valid defense.
B. PANTRANCO NORTH EXPRESS INC v BAESA - awareness and opportunity FACTS: Passenger jeepney and Pantranco bus collided when Pantranco bus encroached on the jeepneys lane Heirs of passengers in jeepney who died filed this case against Pantranco Pantranco wants the court to apply the doctrine of Last Clear Chance against the jeepney driver saying that the jeepney driver had the last clear chance in avoiding the collision. RATIO: - Generally, the last clear chance doctrine is invoked for the purpose of making a defendant liable to a plaintiff who was guilty of prior or antecedent negligence, although it may also be raised as a defense to defeat claim for damages - Thus, Pantranco raises the doctrine in order to escape liability - However, the court said that the doctrine of last clear chance cannot be applied in this case! - For the doctrine to be applicable, it is necessary to show that the person who allegedlty had the last opportunity to avert the accident was aware of the existence of the peril or should, with exercise of due care, have been aware of it In this case, jeepney driver did not know of the impending danger because he must have assumed that the bus driver will return to its own lane upon seeing the jeepney approaching from the opposite direction - Court said that the doctrine can never apply where the party charged is required to act instantaneously and if the injury cannot be avoided by the application of all means at hand after the peril is or should have been discovered
FACTS: 2 parcels of land owned by Canlas were sold to Manosca Manosca issued 2 check that bounced Manosca was then granted a loan by Asian Savings Bank with the 2 parcels of land as security 2 impostors used who introduced themselves as the spouses Canlas mortgage was foreclosed Canlas wrote to Asian Savings Bank regarding the mortgage of Manosca of the 2 properties without their consent Canlas filed this case for annulment of the deed of real estate mortgage against ASB RATIO: ASB was negligent in not exerting more effort to verify the identity of the sps Canlas The Bank should have required additional proof of the true identity of the impostor aside from their residence certificate Applied the doctrine of Last Clear Chance which states that: Where both parties are negligent but the negligent act of one is appreciable later in a point of time that that of the other, or where it is impossible to determine whose fault or negligence brought about the occurrence of the incident, the one who had the

last clear opportunity to avoid the impending harm but failed to do so, is chargeable with the consequences arising therefrom In this case, ASB had the last clear chance to prevent fraud, by simple expedient of faithfully complying with the requirements of banks to ascertain the identity of the persons transacting with them For not observing the degree of diligence required of banking institutions, ASB has to bear the loss sued upon -applied the LCCD NOTES: The Canlas sps. were negligent in giving their title to the property to Maosca. With regard to the special power of attorney: the SPA given to Maosca was to mortgage so the presence of the Canlas sps. was actually not a requirement. Was there really negligence on the part of the bank even if Manosca had an SPA and the land title? In Canlas, the Court talked about 2 definitions-short and long: take note of these CONSOLIDATED BANK & TRUST CORPORATION v CA - Last Clear Chance Doctrine is NOT applicable in culpa contractual FACTS: LC Diaz had a savings account with Solidbank. After messenger of LC Diaz deposited amount, it took so long so he had to leave the passbook Turns out that the passbook was given to somebody else (not the messenger or any employee of LC Diaz) and was able to withdraw P300,000.00 from its account. Thus, LC Diaz filed this case for the recovery of sum of money against Solidbank CA: found that Solidbank was negligent and it had the last clear chance to avoid the injury if it had only called up LC Diaz to verify the withdrawal RATIO: In this case, Solidbank is liable for breach of contract due to negligence or culpa contractual The bank is under the obligation to treat the accounts of its depositors with meticulous care, always having in mind the fiduciary nature of their relationship. However, in this case, they failed to do this. Solidbank was supposed to return the passbook only to the depositor or his authorized representative, but here, Solidbank through teller gave it to someone else Solidbank breached its contractual obligation to return the passbook only to the authorized representative of LC Diaz
Thus, Solidbank was negligent in not returning the passbook to
messenger of LC Diaz proximate cause CA wrongly applied the doctrine of last clear chance Last Clear Chance Doctrine is not applied in this case because Solidbank is liable for breach of contract due to negligence in the performance of contractual obligation to LC Diaz This case of culpa contractual, where neither the contributory negligence of plaintiff nor his last clear chance to avoid the loss, would exonerate the defendant from liability Such contributory negligence or last clear chance by the plaintiff merely serves to reduce the recovery of damages by the plaintiff but does not exculpate the defendant from his breach of contract LC Diaz guilty of contributory negligence in allowing withdrawal slip signed by its authorized signatories to fall into the hands of an impostor and so liability of Solidbank should be reduced.40-60 - LCCD not applied NOTES: Last clear chance is applied in order to establish proximate cause. However in culpa contractual, what needs to be established is the breach in contract not the presence of proximate cause thus the last clear chance doctrine is not applicable to culpa contractual. Compared with PBC v CA last clear chance doctrine was applied since they based their cause on culpa aquilana. ENGADA v CA FACTS Iran driving a tamaraw jeepney In the other lane was an isuzu pick-up that was speeding. Right signal light was flashing but swerved to the left and encroached on the lane of tamaraw jeepney Tamaraw jeepney tried to avoid the Isuzu pick-up but Isuzu pick-ip swerved to where tamaraw jeepney was going and so they collided Information was then filed against the driver of the Isuzu pick-up charging him with serious physical injuries and damage to property through reckless imprudence RATIO: It was the Isuzu pick-up trucks negligence that was the proximate cause of the collision - Isuzu abandoned his lane and did not first see to it that the opposite lane was free from on-coming traffic and was available for safe passage. - After seeing the tamaraw, Isuzu did not slow down Iran, tamaraw driver, could not be faulted when he swerved to the lane of Isuzu to the lane of Isuzu to avoid collision

Isuzu drivers acts had put tamaraw driver in an emergency situation which forced him to act quickly EMERGENCY RULE: an individual who suddenly finds himself in a situation of danger and is required to act without much time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, it not guilty of negligence if he fails to undertake what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to be a better solution, unless the emergency was brought by his own negligence Defense of Isuzu: invoked Last Clear Chance Doctrine SC: The doctrine of last clear chance states that a person who has the last clear chance or opportunity of avoiding the accident, notwithstanding the negligent acts of his opponent, is considered in law solely responsible for the consequences of the accident - However, no convincing evidence was adduced to support this defense - Furthermore, the doctrine cannot be applied because there was no time or opportunity to ponder the situation at all. There was no clear chance to speak of Thus, driver of Isuzu guilty! did not apply LCCD because no clear chance NOTES: - Last Clear Chance Doctrine was not applied; instead applied the emergency rule. Last Clear Chance Doctrine was not applied because there was no clear chance emergency situation. - RULE: dont apply the emergency rule if your own negligence brought about the emergency. In this case, the Tamaraw driver could invoke the emergency rule since he didnt create the emergency. PNR v BRUNTY FACTS: Rhonda Brunty together with host, Juan Garcia was riding a Mercedes Benz driven by Rodolfo L. Mercelita on the way to Baguio. At a rate of 70 km/hr they collided with a train. Mercelita died instantly, while Brunty was declared dead ten minutes after arriving in the hospital. Garcia sustained serious injuries. Ethel Brunty, Rhondas mother, thus instituted a case against PNR, the railroad company In this case, the last clear chance doctrine is inapplicable because PNR is the proximate cause of the accident. Railroad companies owe to the public a duty of exercising a reasonable degree of care to avoid injury to persons and property at railroad crossings. PNR was negligent when it failed to provide the necessary safety device to ensure the safety of motorists in crossing the railroad track
NOTES: TEST to determine application of last clear chance: If proximate cause is already established there is NO NEED to apply the LCC doctrine. LAPANDAY v ANGALA FACTS: A Datsun crewcab drien by Apolinio Deocampo and owned by Lapanday Corporation (petitioner) collided with a Chevy pickup owned by Michael Raymond Angala (respondent) and driven by Bernulfo Borres. Angala instituted an action for damages alleging that his pickup was slowing down to about five to ten kph and was making a left turn preparatory to turning south when it was bumped from behind by the crewcab which was running at around 60 to 70 kph. Deocampo on the other hand said they were both running at 40 kph when the pick-up was about 10 meters away when it made a U-turn towards the left. He did not see any signal from the pick-up. He tried to avoid the pick-up but he was unable to avoid the collision and did not apply the brakes until after the collision. RATIO: Both parties were found by the SC to be negligent thus last clear chance doctrine was applied. It was declared that Deocampo had the last clear chance to avoid the collision since he was driving the rear vehicle and had full control of the situation as he was in a position to observe the vehicle in front of him. He could have avoided the pick-up if he wasnt driving very fast and if he applied the brakes at the right time NOTES: The facts are ambivalent enough that Angala could have been declared as the party at fault. Proximate cause is where the court exercises the greatest latitude. So if facts are similar to a case that was already decided, cite the case! SANGCO, (pp. 74-81) The Doctrine of Last Clear Chance
RATIO: The last clear chance doctrine may only be applied when the negligent act of one is appreciably later than that of the other, or where it is impossible to determine whose fault or negligence caused the loss, the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the loss but failed to do so, is chargeable with the loss.

Also known as the doctrine of discovered peril, doctrine of supervening negligence, humanitarian doctrine, doctrine of gross negligence The negligence of the plaintiff does not preclude a recovery for the negligence of the defendant where it appears that the defendant, by exercising reasonable care and prudence, might have avoided injurious consequences to the plaintiff notwithstanding the plaintiffs negligence. A negligent defendant is held liable to a negligent plaintiff or even to a plaintiff who has been grossly negligent in placing himself in peril, if he, aware of the plaintiffs peril, or according to some authorities, should have been aware of it in the reasonable exercise of due care, had in fact an opportunity later than that of the plaintiff to avoid an accident. Many courts take the view that the doctrine of last clear chance is not available to defendant. LCC can only be invoked in favor of the person injured, since it implies contributory negligence on his part, and is, generally speaking, only operative in those cases where, notwithstanding the injured persons want of care, another person wantonly, or with knowledge of the perilous situation of the person injured carelessly or recklessly injured him. The doctrine embraces successive acts of negligence: primary negligence on the part of the defendant then contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff which creates a situation of inextricable peril to him and then becomes passive or static followed by the subsequent negligence of the defendant in failing to avoid injury to the plaintiff. Although the defendant may not invoke the doctrine, it does not preclude him from proving that the plaintiff had the last clear opportunity to avert the injury complained of and thus establish that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence which proximately caused the accident and consequently bars plaintiffs recovery. Between the defendants, the doctrine cannot be extended into the field of joint tortfeasors as a test of whether only one of them should be held liable to the injured person by reason of his discovery of the latters peril and it cannot be invoked as between defendants concurrently negligent. LCC applies in a suit between the owners and drivers of colliding vehicles. It does not arise where a passenger demands responsibility from the carrier to enforce its contractual obligations.
1. As a phase of proximate cause principle The doctrine of last clear chance negatives an essential element of the defense of contributory negligence by rendering plaintiffs negligence a mere condition or remote cause of the accident. The failure to avoid injuring a person occupying a position of peril may be a supervening cause. 2. Elements and conditions of doctrine Facts required: o That the plaintiff was in a position of danger and by his own negligence became unable to escape from such position by the use of ordinary care, either because it became physically impossible for him to do so or because he was totally unaware of the danger. o The defendant knew that the plaintiff was in a position of danger and further knew, or in the exercise of ordinary care should have known that the plaintiff was unable to escape therefrom o That thereafter the defendant had the last clear chance to avoid the accident by the exercise of ordinary care but failed to exercise such last clear chance and the accident occurred as a proximate result of such failure To state a cause of action, the pleader must disclose: o The exposed condition brought about by the negligence of plaintiff or the injured party o The actual discovery by the defendant of the perilous situation of the person or property injured in time to avert injury o Defendants failure thereafter to exercise ordinary care to avert the injury 3. Parties who invoke doctrine
Summary on Last Clear Chance The Last Clear Chance Doctrine renders plaintiffs contributory negligence as a mere condition Invoked by the plaintiff Cannot be invoked by joint tortfeasors Case Picart vs. Smith Plaintiff Picart (one of the parties who caused the collision) Passengers Picart (one of the parties who caused the collision) Passengers of the WON applied the LCCD YES Why? Smith had a clear opportunity to avoid the accident No Smith had clear opportunity to avoid the accident No negligent
Bustamante Picart v Smith
NO Yes
Bustamante v CA
No

bus plaintiff because the plaintiff in the case are the passengers of the bus who are asking for damages Doctrine was not carried over to the CC Just to know if PBC was negligent but damages were divided 40-60 Truck driver (other party in the collision) was not negligent There was no opportunity to avoid the accident and driver was not aware of the peril Defendant was not negligent There was contractual relation Defendant bank had the last clear chance to prevent the fraud Note: there was no contractual relation between Canlas and Consolidated Bank v CA LC Diaz for the recovery of the sum of money No the bank Liability of bank arose from culpa contractual and so doctrine cannot be applied There was no clear chance in avoiding the accident because it was an emergency situation Last clear chance was inapplicable because PNRs negligence was already established as the proximate cause Last clear chance was applied because both parties were found to be negligent. Decision was based on circumstance s of incident
Phoenix v IAC
Philippine Bank of Commerce v CA
Phoenix (one of the parties who caused the collision) RMC (one of the parties who caused the accident) Heirs of the driver of the jeep (one of the parties who caused the collision) Heirs of the passengers of jeepney (no contract)
No
Engada v CA
Inured party (owner of the Tamaraw)
No
Yes
PNR v BRUNTY
Glan v IAC
No
Brunty (mother of passenger who died)
No
Pantranco v Baesa
No
LAPANDAY ANGALA
Ong v Metropolitan Anuran v Buno
Parents of deceased
the
No No
Lapanday (driver of one of the cars involved in the accident)
Yes
Canlas v CA
Heirs of the passengers of jeep (with contract) Canals (one of the parties who caused the incident) for the annulment of the deed
Yes
NOTES: According to Sangco, the last clear chance doctrine is a phase of contributory negligence. It is considered in determining proximate cause and should only apply when there is a time sequence. Other names: doctrine of discovered peril, doctrine of supervening negligence, doctrine of gross negligence, humanitarian doctrine.

Last clear chance doctrine considered to determine the proximate cause. Last clear chance doctrine should not apply when there is a time sequence. The elements of the doctrine of last clear chance: a) the plaintiff is in danger b) the defendant knew of plaintiffs state c) the defendant had the last clear chance to avoid the accident Who may invoke? Solely for plaintiffs benefit a private person and as a government official as the editorial obviously referred to him. Worcester alleged that he was likened to birds of prey in the following manner: Such are the characteristics of the man who is at the same time an eagle who surprises and devours, a vulture who gorges himself on the dead and putrid meats, an owl who affects a petulant omniscience and a vampire who silently sucks the blood of the victim until he leaves it bloodless. TC: In favor of Worcester; Defendants jointly and severally liable for the P60k total damages. ISSUE: WON the defendants individual properties can be made jointly and severally liable for the damages under the civil and commercial codes, HELD: Yes. TC modified. Damages reduced, Santos absolved. The present action is a tort. Universal doctrine: each joint tortfeasor is not only individually liable for the tort in which he participates, but is also jointly liable with his tortfeasors. If several persons commit a tort, the plaintiff or person injured, has his election to sue all or some of the parties jointly, or one of them separately, because the TORT IS IN ITS NATURE A SEPARATE ACT OF EACH INDIVIDUAL. It is not necessary that cooperation should be a direct, corporal acte.g. assault and battery committed by various persons, under the common law, they are all principals. Under common law, he who aided or counseled, in any way, the commission of a crime, was as much a principal as he who inflicted or committed the actual tort. General Rule: Joint tortfeasors are all the persons who command, instigate, promote, encourage, advise, countenance, cooperate in, aid or abet the commission of a tort, or who approve of it after it is done, if done for their benefit. They are each liable as principals, to the same extent and in the same manner as if they had performed the wrongful act themselves. Joint tortfeasors are jointly and severally liable for the tort which they commit. Joint tortfeasors are not liable pro rata. The damages can not be apportioned among them, except among themselves. They cannot
VI. PERSONS LIABLE A. The Tortfeasor Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. (1902a) Art. 2181. Whoever pays for the damage caused by his dependents or employees may recover from the latter what he has paid or delivered in satisfaction of the claim. (1904) Art. 2194. The responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for quasi-delict is solidary. (n) NOTES: There can be more than one tortfeasor and they are called JOINT TORTFEASORS Are you suppose to sue all of them? NO because you can get relief from one of them. Do they have to act in concert? NO, as long as they all contributed to the act. WORCESTER v OCAMPO February 27, 1912 FACTS: Dean Worcester filed an action to recover damages resulting from an alleged libelous publication against Martin Ocampo, Teodoro M. Kalaw, Lope K. Santos, Fidel A. Reyes, Faustino Aguilar, et al, as the owners, directors, writers, editors and administrators of the daily newspaper El Renacimiento (Spanish version) and Muling Pagsilang (tagalong version). Worcester alleged that the defendants have been maliciously persecuting and attacking him in the newspapers for a long time and they published an editorial entitled Birds of Prey with the malicious intent of injuring Worcester, both as

insist upon an apportionment, for the purpose of each paying an aliquot part. They are jointly and severally liable for the full amount. A payment in full of the damage done by one tortfeasor satisfies any claim which might exist against the others. The release of one of the joint tortfeasors by agreement generally operates to discharge all. The court however may make findings as to which of the alleged joint tortfeasors are liable and which are not, even if they are charged jointly and severally. Art. 2184*. In motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is solidarily liable with his driver, if the former, who was in the vehicle, could have, by the use of the due diligence, prevented the misfortune. It is disputably presumed that a driver was negligent, if he had been found guilty or reckless driving or violating traffic regulations at least twice within the next preceding two months. *this was drafted with Chapman v. Underwood in mind. NOTES: Sir highlighted that Tort is in its nature a separate act of each individual so no need to sue all of the tortfeasors! The Case defines a joint totfeasor which is taken from the point of view of the actor. CHAPMAN v UNDERWOOD March 28, 1914 FACTS: J.H. Chapman was trying to board a San Marcelino car trough the rear platform when he was struck by Mr. James Underwoords automobile, which was at that time driven by his chauffer. Underwoods driver was guilty of negligence because he was passing an oncoming car upon the wrong side when he ran over Chapman. Chapman, was not obliged for his own protection to observe whether a car was coming upon him from where he was because according to the law, no automobile or other vehicle coming from his left should pass upon his side of the car. TC: In favor of Underwood ISSUE: WON Underwood is responsible for the negligence of his driver. HELD: No. TC affirmed. The interval between unlawful act and the accident was so small as not to be sufficient to charge Underwood with the negligence of the driver. The driver does not fall within the list of persons in Art. 1903 (now 2180) for whose acts Underwood would be responsible. This rule applies even if the owner of the vehicle was present at the time of the accident, unless THE NEGLIGENT ACTS OF THE DRIVER ARE
CONTINUED FOR SUCH A LENGTH OF TIME AS TO GIVE THE OWNER A REASONABLE OPPORTUNITY TO OBSERVE AND TO DIRECT HIS DRIVER TO DESIST THEREFROM .
When will the owner be liable?- An owner who sits in his vehicle, and permits his driver to continue in a violation of the law by the performance of his negligent acts, after he had A REASONABLE OPPORTUNITY TO OBSERVE THEM AND TO DIRECT THAT THE DRIVER CEASE THEREFROM, BECOMES HIMSELF RESPONSIBLE FOR SUCH ACTS. When will the owner be NOT liable?-if the driver by a sudden act of negligence, and without the owner having reasonable opportunity to prevent the act or its continuance, injures a person or violates the criminal law, the owner of the vehicle, present therein at the time the act was committed, is not responsible, etiher civilly or criminally, therefor. The act complained of must be continued in the presence of the owner for such a length of time that the owner, by his acquiescence, makes his drivers act his own. RULE: Underwood is not liable for his drivers act even if he was inside the car at the time of the accident (unless he let the negligence continue for a long time without correcting it) because the driver is not listed in 1903 (now 2180) as one of the persons whose acts Underwood would be responsible for. NOTES: An owner is liable for a drivers negligence if he is able to see the danger and was capable of preventing the driver so that the accident could have been averted Sir gave questions to ponder: what if you were riding a taxi? What if the passenger was a minor? What if owner was disabled? What if he was deaf, or mute, or blind? (HMM) CAEDO v YU KHE THAI December 18, 1968 FACTS: Marcial Caedo, with his family, was driving his Mercury car on EDSA. On the opposite direction was the Cadillac of Yu Khe Thai, driven by Rafael Bernardo. They were both traveling at moderate speeds and the headlights were mutually noticeable from a distance. Ahead of the Cadillac was a carretela. Bernardo testified that he saw the carretela only when it was already only 8 meters away from him (This is the 1st sign of negligence because the carretela was lighted-hence shouldve given him sufficient warning). But Bernardo, instead of slowing down or stopping, tried to overtake the carretela by veering to the left. The

cars right rear bumper caught the wheel of the carretela and collided with the Mercury. Caedo in the meantime, slowed down, and thought that the Cadillac would wait behind the carretela. He tried to avoid the collision at the last moment by going farther to the right but was unsuccessful. TC: Bernardo and Thai jointly and severally liable for damages ISSUE: WON Yu Khe Thai, as the owner of the Cadillac, is solidarily liable with his driver. HELD: No. TC modified. Thai not solidarily liable with Bernardo. Art. 2184 applies: In motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is solidarily liable with his driver, if the former, who was in the vehicle, could have, by the use of the due diligence, prevented the misfortune. It is disputably presumed that a driver was negligent, if he had been found guilty or reckless driving or violating traffic regulations at least twice within the next preceding two months. Under Art. 2184, if the causative factor was the drivers negligence, the owner of the vehicle who was present is likewise held liable if he could have prevented the mishap by the exercise of due diligence. This rule is not new, although formulated as a law for the first time in the new Civil Code. It was expressed in Chapman v. Underwood. Basis of masters liability in civil law: NOT respondeat superior but paterfamilias. The theory is that ultimately, the negligence of the servant, if known to the master and susceptible of timely correction by him, reflects his own negligence if he fails to correct it in order to prevent injury or damage. Bernardo was a pretty good driver and had no record. No negligence for having employed him may be imputed to Thai. The only negligence that can be imputed to Bernardo was when he tried to overtake the carretela instead of stopping or waiting-and this cannot be imputed to Thai because there were no signs for him to be in any special state of alert. He could not have anticipated his drivers sudden decision to pass the carretela. The time element was such that there was no reasonable opportunity for Thai to assess the risks involved and warn the driver accordingly. Test of imputed negligence under 2184: -to a great degree, necessarily subjective. Car owners are not held to a uniform and inflexible standard of diligence as are professional drivers. The law does not require that a person must possess a certain measure of skill or proficiency either in the mechanic of driving or in the observance of traffic rules before they can own a motor vehicle. Test of negligence within the meaning of 2184: -his omission to do that which the evidence of his own senses tells him he should do in order to avoid the accident. RULE: negligence must be sought in the immediate setting and circumstance of the accident, i.e. in his failure to detain the driver form pursuing a course which not only gave him clear notice of the danger but also sufficient time to act upon it. NOTES: Art. 2184 is based on Chapman. Unless the owner couldve prevented the negligence, or he was negligent in selection and supervision, he cannot be held liable. Art. 2184: owner can be held solidarily liable with the driver only if the owner is IN the car. Courts test: 1. senses of owner 2. circumstances The standard set in this case is still REASONABLE OPPORTUNITY. Art. 2184 is based on Chapman. Unless the owner couldve prevented the negligence, or he was negligent in selection and supervision, he cannot be held liable. Pater familias is the basis for the quasi-delict and NOT respondeat superior (command responsibility). Difference between respondeat superior vs. paterfamilias: o Respondeat superior: acts under orders (1 negligent the one who gave the orders) o Paterfamilias: acts under guidance (2 negligent both the owner and the driver) Differentiated 2180 and 2184. IN 2180, an employer is guilty for lack of supervision PRIOR to the occurrence of the incident. In 2184, the employer is guilty at the time of the incident There is no one standard of care for owners who are riding with their drivers since there are different reasons why hired the driver in the first place VICARIOUS LIABILITY: found in Article 2180 (but use the term tortfeasors instead of one -a tortfeasor would be liable not only for his own acts or omissions but also for those of persons for whom he is responsible Take note of difference between NCC and FC: under the NCC: the father, and in cases of his death or incapacity, the mother, will be responsible for the damages caused by their minor children who live in their company under the FC: parents and other persons exercising parental authority shall be civilly liable for the injuries and damages caused

by the acts or omissions of their unemancipated children living in their company and under their parental authority subject to the appropriate defenses provided by law. Portions of 2180modified by FC Does RA9344 affect the liability of parents and guardians? NO Basis of liability of parents and minor children: PARENTAL AUTHORITY How does the FC affect 2180? Is the person below 21 still liable? For those above 15 but below 18 who acted with discernment basis to use is 2180 B. Vicarious Liability aka Imputed Negligence NOTES: In this section, a person is held liable for acts not his own but because of the existence of a relationship. A person Is not only liable for quasi-delicts he committed but also when he has a relationship of responsibility with the person who caused the quasidelict There is no direct link between the injury and the person vicariously liable 2180 is the primary law on vicarious liability. However, the relationship enumerated in 2180 does not limit the application of 2180. 2176 is what limits vicarious liability. The question therefore arises as to what is actually covered. Can a tort give a ground for vicarious liability? (NO ANSWER ) The respective liabilities of those referred to in the preceding paragraph shall not apply if it is proved that they exercised the proper diligence required under the particular circumstances. All other cases not covered by this and the preceding articles shall be governed by the provisions of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts. (n) Art. 221. Parents and other persons exercising parental authority shall be civilly liable for the injuries and damages caused by the acts or omissions of their unemancipated children living in their company and under their parental authority subject to the appropriate defenses provided by law. (2180(2)a and (4)a ) Art. 236. Emancipation for any cause shall terminate parental authority over the person and property of the child who shall then be qualified and responsible for all acts of civil life. (412a) Revised Penal Code Title Five-Civil Liability Chapter One-Person Civilly Liable for Felonies Art. 100. Civil liability of a person guilty of felony. Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. Art. 101. Rules regarding civil liability in certain cases. The exemption from criminal liability established in subdivisions 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6 of Article 12 and in subdivision 4 of Article 11 of this Code does not include exemption from civil liability, which shall be enforced subject to the following rules: First. In cases of subdivisions 1, 2, and 3 of Article 12, the civil liability for acts committed by an imbecile or insane person, and by a person under nine years of age, or by one over nine but under fifteen years of age, who has acted without discernment, shall devolve upon those having such person under their legal authority or control, unless it appears that there was no fault or negligence on their part. Should there be no person having such insane, imbecile or minor under his authority, legal guardianship or control, or if such person be insolvent, said insane, imbecile, or minor shall respond with their own property, excepting property exempt from execution, in accordance with the civil law. Second. In cases falling within subdivision 4 of Article 11, the persons for whose benefit the harm has been prevented shall be civilly liable in proportion to the benefit which they may have received.
Family Code Art. 218. The school, its administrators and teachers, or the individual, entity or institution engaged in child are shall have special parental authority and responsibility over the minor child while under their supervision, instruction or custody. Authority and responsibility shall apply to all authorized activities whether inside or outside the premises of the school, entity or institution. (349a) Art. 219. Those given the authority and responsibility under the preceding Article shall be principally and solidarily liable for damages caused by the acts or omissions of the unemancipated minor. The parents, judicial guardians or the persons exercising substitute parental authority over said minor shall be subsidiarily liable.

The courts shall determine, in sound discretion, the proportionate amount for which each one shall be liable. When the respective shares cannot be equitably determined, even approximately, or when the liability also attaches to the Government, or to the majority of the inhabitants of the town, and, in all events, whenever the damages have been caused with the consent of the authorities or their agents, indemnification shall be made in the manner prescribed by special laws or regulations. Third. In cases falling within subdivisions 5 and 6 of Article 12, the persons using violence or causing the fears shall be primarily liable and secondarily, or, if there be no such persons, those doing the act shall be liable, saving always to the latter that part of their property exempt from execution. Art. 102. Subsidiary civil liability of innkeepers, tavernkeepers and proprietors of establishments. In default of the persons criminally liable, innkeepers, tavernkeepers, and any other persons or corporations shall be civilly liable for crimes committed in their establishments, in all cases where a violation of municipal ordinances or some general or special police regulation shall have been committed by them or their employees. Innkeepers are also subsidiarily liable for the restitution of goods taken by robbery or theft within their houses from guests lodging therein, or for the payment of the value thereof, provided that such guests shall have notified in advance the innkeeper himself, or the person representing him, of the deposit of such goods within the inn; and shall furthermore have followed the directions which such innkeeper or his representative may have given them with respect to the care and vigilance over such goods. No liability shall attach in case of robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons unless committed by the innkeeper's employees. Art. 103. Subsidiary civil liability of other persons. The subsidiary liability established in the next preceding article shall also apply to employers, teachers, persons, and corporations engaged in any kind of industry for felonies committed by their servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or employees in the discharge of their duties. RA 9344 Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006 April 23, 2006 Sec. 6. Minimum Age of Criminal responsibility- A child fifteen (15) years of age or under at the time of the commission of the offense shall be exempt from criminal liability. However, the child shall be subjected to an intervention program pursuant to Sec. 20 of this Act. A child above fifteen (15) but below eighteen (18) years of age shall likewise be exempt from criminal liability and be subjected to an intervention program, unless he/she has acted with discernment, in which case such child will be subjected to the appropriate proceedings in accordance with this Act. The Exemption from criminal liability herein established does not include exemption from civil liability, which shall be enforced in accordance with existing laws. Civil Code Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their company. Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or incapacitated persons who are under their authority and live in their company. The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions. Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry. The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent; but not when the damage has been caused by the official to whom the task done properly pertains, in which case what is provided in Article 2176 shall be applicable. Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.

The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. (1903a) Art. 2181. Whoever pays for the damage caused by his dependents or employees may recover from the latter what he has paid or delivered in satisfaction of the claim. (1904) NOTES: Basis: parental authority Laws applicable o Civil Code,2180 father or in case of death, mother of children who live in their company guardians, of children under their authority o Family Code, 221 Parents and other persons of unemacipated children who are living in their company and under their parental authority Age of emancipation: 18 No more emancipation by marriage Are the parents still liable for if above 18 but below 21? Yes. Legal basis: PD 603 1. Parents (see table after cases) EXCONDE v CAPUNO June 29, 1957 FACTS: Dante Capuno, 15 years old, a student of the Balintawak Elementary School, was instructed by the city schools supervisor to attend a parade in honor of Rizal in San Pablo City. From the school, the students boarded a jeep, and when it started to run, Dante took hold of the wheel, while the driver sat on his left side (remember that the steering wheel is at the LEFT side). The jeep turned turtle and 2 passengers died. Delfin Capuno, the father, was not with Dante at the time of the accident, nor did he know that Dante was going to attend a parade. He only found out after the accident when Dante told him about it. Criminal case: TC: Dante was convicted for Double homicide through reckless imprudence. CA: affirmed Civil case: against Delfin and Dante Capuno (reserved by Sabina Exconde, mother of one of the deceased): TC: Convicted ONLY Dante to pay the damages. CA: certified to SC ISSUE: WON Delfin Capuno can be held civilly liable, jointly and severally with his son for damages. HELD: Yes. TC Modified. Delfin and Dante are jointly and severally liable for the damages. Art. 19031 applies: The obligation imposed by the next preceding articles is enforceable not only for personal acts and omissions, but also for those persons for whom another is responsible. The father, and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are liable for any damages caused by the minor children who live with them. Xxx Finally, teachers or directors of arts and trades are liable for any damages caused by their pupils or apprentices while they are under their custody. 1. School is NOT liable Art. 1903 (now 2180) about teachers applies only to institutions of arts and trades and not to any academic educational institution. Balintawak Elementary School is an academic institution, hence neither the teacher nor the head can be held liable. Even if Dante was on the jeep pursuant to the city school supervisors instruction, neither the head of the school nor the city schools supervisor could be held liable because Dante was not a student of an institution of arts and trades. 2. Delfin, as the father IS liable. He failed to prove that he exercised all the diligence of a good father of the family to prevent the damage. The civil liability which the law impose upon the father, or the mother as the case may be is a necessary consequence of the parental authority they exercise over them. This parental authority imposes
12180 now: The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for
whom one is responsible.
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their company.
Xxx
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.

upon the parents the duty to support and instruct them in proportion to their means and gives them the right to correct and punish them in moderation. How to avoid liability: prove that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage, DISSENT: Reyes He wants TC affirmed (relieving Delfin of liability): There is no sound reason for limiting Art. 1903 to teachers of arts and trades and not to academic institutions. The phrase teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades does not qualify teachers but only heads of establishments. If the basis of presumption of negligence in Art. 1903 is some culpa in vigilando that the parents, teachers, etc. are supposed to have incurred in the exercise of their authority, hence, when the parent places the child under the effective authority of the teacher, the teacher, and not the parent should be the one answerable for the torts committed while under his custody. Why? for the very reason that the parent is not supposed to interfere with the discipline of the school nor with the authority and supervision of the teacher while the child is under instruction. If there is no authority, there can be no responsibility. Hence, Delfin should not be made liable for a tort that he was in no way able to prevent, and which he had every right to assume the school authorities would. He rebutted the presumption of negligence under 1903 when he proved that he entrusted custody of Dante to the school authorities. RULES: Majority: Liability of teachers or directors are limited to institutions of arts and trades. Dissent: 1. Art. 1903 interpretation too limited. Teacher, master, or in the absence of, school authorities should be liable for the negligence. 2. Once the parent entrusts custody to the school authorities, presumption is rebutted and burden of proof is shifted to claimant to show actual negligence on the part of the parent in order to render him liable. NOTES: This case is cited as basis of liability arising from parental authority. SALEN AND SALBANERA v BALCE April 27, 1960. FACTS: Carlos Salen (single) died due to wounds caused by Gumersindo Balce, 18, single and living with Jose Balce, his father. Gumersindo was convicted of homicide and was sentenced to imprisonment and to pay Carlos heirs indemnity. But Gumersindo was insolvent, hence Severino Salen and Elena Salbanera (Salens), the parents (and heirs) of Carlos, demanded from Jose to pay but he refused. Hence the suit. TC: dismissed. Sustained Joses theory that the civil liability of Gumersindo arises from his criminal liability and therefore must be determined under the RPC, and not under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code, which only applies to obligations arising form QDs. There is no law which holds the father either primarily or subsidiarily liable for the civil liability incurred by the son who is a minor of 18 years. ISSUE: WON Jose Balce can be held SUBSIDIARILY liable to pay the indemnity his son was sentenced to pay in the criminal case against him (the son). HELD: Yes. Jose Balce is ordered to pay the indemnity. TC reversed. As a rule, the civil liability arising form a crime shall be governed by the RPC. But since the RPC is silent as to the subsidiary liability of parents for a minor over 15, who acts with discernment, resort should be made to the general law which is the Civil Code. And Art. 2180 is the law that applies. To hold that Art. 2180 applies only to QDs will result in an absurdity that while for an act where mere negligence intervenes, the father or mother may be held subsidiarily liable, no liability would attach if the damage is caused with criminal intent. The void that apparently exists in the RPC is subserved by 2180 of the Civil Code as may be gleaned from some recent SC decisions: Exconde v. Capuno-where the father was held solidarily liable for the crime his son committed. Araneta v. Arreglado-(where Arreglado fired at Araneta because he resented the remarks Araneta made about his leaving Ateneo and enrolling in La Salle. The court convicted Arreglado but suspended his sentence because he was only 14.) The court held the father, the mother and the son to pay the Aranetas damages. NOTES: In this case, the liability of father was deemed to be subsidiary. The subsidiary liability of the parent is based on the New Civil Code, than on the Revised Pneal Code due to the vacuum that the parent cant be subsidiary liable in the RPC.

o Under Art 101 of the RPC HELD: Yes. Libis are primarily liable CA affirmed. The Libis were grossly negligent from preventing Wendell from having access to the key to the safety deposit box where the gun was stored. Diligence required is that of instruction and supervision of the kid. BUT, liability is not subsidiary, it is PRIMARY Rule on parents liability is correct but characterization of their nature must be given a second look (coz SC held in some cases that the liability of parents is subsidiary). If the liability of the parents for crimes or QDs of their minor children is subsidiary, then they can neither invoke nor be absolved of civil liability on the defense that they acted with the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damages. But if the liability is direct and primary, the diligence would constitute a valid and substantial defense. Hence, the liability of parents for QDs of their minor kids as contemplated in 2180 is PRIMARY and not subsidiary. In fact, applying 2194 (solidary liability of join tortfeasors) the parent is also solidarily liable with the child. The liability of parents for felonies is likewise PRIMARY & not subsidiary. Art. 101, RPC says so. For both QDs and crimes, the parents primarily respond for such damages is buttressed by the corresponding provisions in both the RPC and CC that the minor transgressor shall be answerable or shall respond with his own property only in the absence or in case of the insolvency of the parents. Arts. 21822, CC and 1013, RPC support this. RULES: ELCANO v HILL FACTS: Reginald Hill was a married minor living and getting subsistence from his father, co-defendant Marvin. He killed Agapito Elcano, son of petitioners, for which he was criminally prosecuted. However, he was acquitted on the ground that his act was not criminal because of "lack of intent to kill, coupled with mistake." Subsequently, petitioners filed a civil action for recovery of damages against defendants, which the latter countered by a motion to dismiss. ISSUE: W/N there is a cause of action against Reginalds father, Marvin HELD: Marvin Hill is vicariously liable. However, since Reginald has come of age, as a matter of equity, the formers liability is now merely subsidiary. Under Art. 2180, the father and in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their company. Applied in this case, Reginald, although married, was living with his father and getting subsistence from him at the time of the killing. The joint and solidary liability of parents with their offending children is in view of the parental obligation to supervise minor children in order to prevent damage to third persons NOTES: Ruling that father has become only subsidiary liable since he has come of age was wrong since they based his age at time of the decision and not at the time of the offense.
LIBI v IAC September 18, 1992 FACTS: Julie and Wendell were sweethearts for 2 years when Julie broke it off due to Wendells sadistic and irresponsible nature. A month after their break-up, Julie and Wendell died each from a single gunshot wound traced to the gun licensed in the name of Cresencio Libi, the father of Wendell. There were 2 versions of the story: Libis: another man shot the 2 Gotiong: Wendell shot Julie and then committed suicide. The Gotiongs (julies parents) fiuled for damages against the Livis under Art. 2180. TC: dismissed for insufficiency of evidence IAC: Set aside TC and found the Libis subsidiarily liable. ISSUE: WON Art. 2180 was correctly applied to hold the Libis liable.
2 Art. 2182. If the minor or insane person causing damage has no parents or guardian, the minor or insane person shall be answerable with
his own property in an action against him where a guardian ad litem shall be appointed. (n)
3 Art. 101. Rules regarding civil liability in certain cases.
xxx
Should there be no person having such insane, imbecile or minor under his authority, legal guardianship or control, or if such person be insolvent, said insane, imbecile, or minor shall respond with their own property, excepting property exempt from execution, in accordance with the civil law.

1. For civil liability from crimes committed by minors under the legal authority or control or who live in the company of the parents: PRIMARY -Premised on Art. 101, RPC with respect to damages ex delicto by kids 9 or under, or 9-15 but without discernment -Premised on Art. 2180, CC for kids 9-15 with discernment, or 15-21 (now 18) 2. Liability effected against father or mother? BOTH PARENTS AND THOSE WHO EXERCISE PARENTAL AUTHORITY OVER THE MINOR. Under 2180, the liability shall be effected against the father, and in case of his death or incapacity the mother-which rule was amplified by the Youth and Welfare Code. BUT, under the Family Code, this civil liability is now, without such alternative qualification, the responsibility of the parents and those who exercise parental authority over the minor offender. 3. For civil liability arising from QDs committed by minors: same rules in accordance with 2180 and 2182, as so modified. NOTES: This case cleared up the issue on whether the parents liability is primary or subsidiary. What is the basis of the doctrine that liability of parents is primary and not solidary? Why? o 2 legal bases: 101 RPC and 2182 CC Why?-provisions provide for such defenseliability of parents is primary Why primary liability? 1. law provides a defense; 2. property of minor only liable when parents are insolvent Subsidiary liability is automatic and without any defense. In parental liability arising from crime, when a minor acted with discernment the parents are subsidiary liable, if the child acted without discernment, the parents are primarily liable. criminal complaint for homicide through reckless imprudence but Adelberto was acquitted and exempted from criminal liability on the ground that he had acted without discernment. civil complaint against the Bundocs, the natural parents of Adelberto.
The Bundocs claimed that the Rapisuras should be held liable instead, that they are indispensable parties because parental authority had already shifter to them the moment the successful petition for adoption was filed. TC: dismissed the complaint. The Bundocs are not indispensable parties to the action. CA: dismissed petition. Tamargos lost their right to appeal. ISSUE: Who are the indispensable parties? The Bundocs or the Rapisuras? HELD: The natural parents, the Bundocs, are the indispensable parties. CA reversed and set aside, complaint reinstated and case remanded. When Adelberto shot Jennifer, parental authority was still lodged in the Bundocs, his natural parents. Hence, they who had actual custody of Adelberto, are the indispensable parties to the suit for damages. Ratio: The act of Adelberto gave rise to a cause of action on QD, under 2176 against him. On the other hand, the law imposes civil liability upon the father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, for any damages that may be caused by a minor child who lives with them. The principle of parental liability is a species of what is frequently designated as vicarious liability, or the doctrine of imputed negligence, where a person is not only liable for the torts committed by himself, but also for torts committed by others with whom he has a certain relationship and for whom he is responsible. Thus, parental liability is made a natural or logical consequence of the duties and responsibilities of parentstheir parental authoritywhich includes the instructing, controlling and disciplining of the child. The basis for the doctrine of vicarious liability was explained in Cangco v. Manila Raildroad: With respect to extra contractual obligations arising from negligence, whether of act or omission, the legislature has elected to limit such liability to cases in which the person upon whom such an obligation is imposed is morally culpable, or on the contrary, for
TAMARGO v CA June 3, 1992 FACTS: Adelberto Bundoc, 10 years old, shot Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle, causing injuries which resulted in her death. Adelbertos natural parents for damages. Adelberto was living with his natural parents at the time of the accident but a petition for his adoption has already been filed by the Rapisura spouses. This petition was granted after the shooting of Jennifer. The Tamargos filed:

reasons of public policy, to extend that liability, without regard to the lack of moral culpability, so as to include responsibility for the negligence of those persons whose acts or omissions are imputable, by legal fiction, to others who are in a position to exercise an absolute or limited control over them. The legislature which adopted our civil code elected to limit extra contractual liabilitywith certain well-defined exceptionsto cases in which moral culpabilityu can be directly imputed to the persons to be charged. This moral responsibility may consist in having failed to exercise due care in ones own acts, or in having failed to exercise due care in the selection and control of ones own agents or servants, or in the control of persons who, by reasons of their status, occupy a position of dependency with respect to the person liable for their conduct. Basis of civil liability imposed on parents for torts of their minor kids living with them: PARENTAL AUTHORITY vested by the civil code. In other words, parental liability is anchored upon parental authority coupled with presumed parental dereliction in the discharge of the duties accompanying such authority. Parental dereliction is only a PRESUMPTION which can be overturned under 2180 by proof of all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage. The basis of parental liability for the torts of a minor child is the relationship existing between the parents and the minor child living with them and over whom, the law presumes, the parents exercise supervision and control. Art 58 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code: responsibility for child under parental authority Art. 221, FC: child (tortfeasor) must be in the actual custody of the parents sought to be held liable Anent the retroactivity of parental authority to the time of filing of the petition for adoption: Retroactive effect may perhaps be given where such is essential to permit the accrual of some benefit or advantage in favor of the child. Here, no presumption of parental dereliction on the Rapisuras could have arisen since Adelberto was not in fact subject to their control at the time the tort was committed. RULE: Parents must have actual or physical custody over the minor to be held liable. NOTES: Only benefits retroact to the time of filing of the petition for adoption, not parental authority Parental Authority: Control and supervision over children. Hence, no PA, no parental liability. Case Exconde vs. Capuno (BSP asked by school head to go to the parade) Action for Civil action for damages (father and son impleaded ) Criminal case with civil liability arising from it Criminal action vs. Rico for Serious Physical Injuries Civil action vs Agapito (the father) only Civil action vs. Manuel Guitierrez (the father) only (+ bus driver and owner) Civil action vs. pa and son Who held liable TC: only son liable SC: Pa and son jointly and severally liable -not the school because not a school of arts and trades SC: Father liable subsidiarily -child above 15, below 18 SC: Pa liable Basis for liability A1903 (now 2180): FATHER liable for acts of MINOR SON -civil liability is a necessary consequence of parental authority they exercise over their MINOR children A101 RPC incomplete so resort to A2180 of NCC (apply Exclusio Unus, Exclucio Ulterus) MINOR son LIVING in their company A2176 an A2180 (not based on RPC) -even if son caused injuries with deliberate intent (and not merely negligence) -note: not subsidiary liable as mentioned under Libi vs. IAC
Salen and Salbanera vs. Balce (son above 15 but below 18 killed 18 yr old) Fuellas vs. Cadano (stole pencil and had the nerve to be mad by breaking classmates arm!)
Guitierrez vs. Guitierrez (bus collision, family except pa in the car driven by minor) RodriguezLuna vs. IAC (go-cart vs. Toyota)
SC: The father, bus driver and owner jointly and severally liable
A2180, common law, master and servant (not paterfamilias) ma not liable even if present during time of incident
SC: Pa made primarily liable for the injury caused by son (son already of
A2180, strict law -dont apply Elcano v. Hill where court allowed only subsidiary liability because it will not serve

age, said to be insolvent but in Madrid!) SC: Libis are primarily and directly liable ends of justice Art 221, FC; Art 2180, NCC; Art 101, RPC Why primarily liable: 1. If liability of the parents for crimes or QDs of their minor children is subsidiary, then they can neither invoke nor be absolved of civil liability on the defense that they acted with the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damages. 2. The liability of parents for felonies is likewise Primary and not subsidiary under A101 of RPC: minor only liable if parents are insolvent (A101 par3) Art. 2176, parental authority coupled with presumed parental dereliction in the discharge of duties accompanying such authority, doctrine of vicarious liability as explained in CANGCO VS. MANILA RAILROAD *IMPORTANT: PARENTS MUST HAVE ACTUAL OR PHYSICAL CUSTODY OVER THE
MINOR TO BE HELD LIABLE
2. Guardians Family Code Art. 216. In default of parents or a judicially appointed guardian, the following person shall exercise substitute parental authority over the child in the order indicated: (1)The surviving grandparent, as provided in Art. 2144; (2) The oldest brother or sister, over twenty-one years of age, unless unfit or disqualified; and (3) The child's actual custodian, over twenty-one years of age, unless unfit or disqualified. Whenever the appointment or a judicial guardian over the property of the child becomes necessary, the same order of preference shall be observed. (349a, 351a, 354a)
Libi vs. IAC (Suicide or homicide?)
Civil action vs. parents
Tamargo vs. CA (adopted child still with parents at time of incident)
Criminal complaint Civil complaint vs. Natural parents of child
SC: Bundocs (natural parents) are indispensable parties -the adopting parents had no actual custody yet
Art. 217. In case of foundlings, abandoned neglected or abused children and other children similarly situated, parental authority shall be entrusted in summary judicial proceedings to heads of children's homes, orphanages and similar institutions duly accredited by the proper government agency. (314a) NOTES: What is a foundling? A baby deserted by unknown parents. (e.g. those left at the doorstep) Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their company. Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or incapacitated persons who are under their authority and live in their company.
4 Art. 214. In case of death, absence or unsuitability of the parents, substitute parental authority shall be exercised by the surviving
grandparent. In case several survive, the one designated by the court, taking into account the same consideration mentioned in the preceding article, shall exercise the authority. (355a)
Elcano v Hill (married child who still lives with parents at time of incident
Civil action for damages against the father
SC: the father is liable but only subsidiarily (wrong decision though should have been vicariously liable)
Art 2180 since the child was stlll in his company.

The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions. Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry. The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent; but not when the damage has been caused by the official to whom the task done properly pertains, in which case what is provided in Article 2176 shall be applicable. Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody. The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. (1903a) Art. 2181. Whoever pays for the damage caused by his dependents or employees may recover from the latter what he has paid or delivered in satisfaction of the claim. (1904) 3. Teachers and Heads of Institutions Family Code Art. 218. The school, its administrators and teachers, or the individual, entity or institution engaged in child are shall have special parental authority and responsibility over the minor child while under their supervision, instruction or custody. Authority and responsibility shall apply to all authorized activities whether inside or outside the premises of the school, entity or institution. (349a) Art. 219. Those given the authority and responsibility under the preceding Article shall be principally and solidarily liable for damages caused by the acts or omissions of the unemancipated minor. The parents, judicial guardians or the persons exercising substitute parental authority over said minor shall be subsidiarily liable. The respective liabilities of those referred to in the preceding paragraph shall not apply if it is proved that they exercised the proper diligence required under the particular circumstances. All other cases not covered by this and the preceding articles shall be governed by the provisions of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts. (n) Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their company. Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or incapacitated persons who are under their authority and live in their company. The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions. Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry. The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent; but not when the damage has been caused by the official to whom the task done properly pertains, in which case what is provided in Article 2176 shall be applicable. Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody. The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. (1903a) MERCADO v CA, et al May 30, 1960 FACTS: Augusto, 9 years old, lent his pitogo to Benedicto who lent it to Renato. When Augusto tried to retrieve his pitogo, Manuel Jr, thinking it was Benedictos, interfered and told Augusto not to get it from Renato as Renato was better at putting the chain into the holes of the pitogo. Augusto resented this remark and aggressively poushed him. A fight ensued and Augusto wounded Manuel Jr. on the right cheek with a piece of razor.

The doctor who testified did not declare the amount he collected as fees and Manuel Jr. was not hospitalized. TC: dismissed the complaint filed by Manuel Jr. and his father CA: Ordered Ciriaco Mercado (the father) to pay for the medical expenses and MD, but no MD for the parents. ISSUE: WON the teacher or head of the school should be held responsible (instead of the father) since the fight happened during recess time in school (Lourdes Catholic School). HELD: No. The pupils were not in the custody of the school. Reversed as to MD but affirmed the award of medical expenses. CA 2. even if this is a QD within the meaning of Art. - Art. 2219, par 26, the facts show that Augustos act was occasioned by the fact that Manuel Jr. tired to intervene or interfere with Augustos attempt to recover his pitogo. Hence, the proximate cause of Manuel Jrs injury is his own fault or negligence for having interfered. Hence, no MD coz the cases in Art. 2219 were not shown to exist. RULE: 1. exconde v. capuno doctrine7: academic institutions not included in Art. 2180 2. exconde v. capuno doctrine: responsibility passes from parents to teachers or heads of ONLY institutions of arts and trades 3. Lourdes is not liable because they dont retain custody (custody=living with the teachers or heads) of their pupils. 4. Ciriaco Mercado is not responsible even under Art. 2180 par. 2probably because Manuel Jr. did not die nor was he incapacitated. 5. No moral damages because cases in Art. 2219 were not shown to exist. 6. Augusto was only 9 and was not shown to act with discernment 7. Even if there was a QD on Augustos part, the proximate cause of the injury was Manuel Jrs own act of interference. DOCTRINE: what Art. 2180 means by custody PALISOC v BRILLANTES October 4, 1971 FACTS: Dominador Palisoc, 16 years old and Virgilio Daffon, of age, were classmates at the Manila Technical Institute. During recess, while working on a machine, Daffon made a remark that Palisoc was like a foreman because he was merely watching them. Irked, Palisoc bitchslapped Daffon. In retaliation, Daffon gave Palisoc a strong flat blow on the face, followed by fist blows on the stomach. Palisoc tried to retreat, but Daffon followed him. They exchanged fist blows until Palsioc stumbled on an engine block which caused him to fall face downward. He fainted and never regained consciousness. The autopsy report said he died of broken ribs and hemorrhage on the brain caused probably by strong fist blows. TC: Daffon liable for QD under 2176. Absolved the following because 2180 is not applicable: It applied Mercado v. CAs definition of custody 1. Brillantes-member of the board of directors of MTI 2. Valenton, president of MTI
6Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases: 5 The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in
their company. (2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;
This was answered in Exconde v. Capuno through Justice Bautista: we find merit in this claim. It is true that under the law, teachers or directors of arts and trades are liable for any damage caused by their pupils or apprentices while they are under their custody. But this provision only applies to an institution of arts and trades and not to any academic educational institution. Custody (memorize!): SO
THE PARENTS. LONG AS THEY REMAIN IN THEIR CUSTODYCONTEMPLATES A SITUATION WHERE THE PUPIL LIVES AND BOARDS WITH THE TEACHER, SUCH THAT THE CONTROL DIRECTION AND INFLUENCE ON THE PUPIL SUPERSEDES THOSE OF
In these circumstances the control or the influence over the conduct and actions of the pupil would pass from the father and mother to the teacher; and so would the responsibility for the torts of the pupil. Such a situation does not appear in the case at bar. The pupils go to school during school hours and go back home to their parents after. The situated contemplated in the last par. of art. 2180 (I think he meant 2nd to the last par) does not apply, nor does par 25 which makes the father or mother responsible for the damages caused by their minor children. Hence, the claim of Mercado that responsibility should pass to the school, must be held to be without merit. Anent the MD: Only possible circumstance in which MD may be granted is if a felony or QD has been committed. 1. no criminal action for physical injuries has been presented
7 Although later cases say this is a mere obiter because the issue was won the father had civil liability

3. Quibulue, instructor of the class. ISSUE: WON the other defendants (board member, president and instructor) should be held solidarily liable with Daffon HELD: Yes. TC Modified. Daffon, Valenton and Quibulue are solidarily liable for damages. Under 2180, the president and instructor are liable solidarily for damages. Brillantes is not liable because he is a mere member of the board (he could have been liable if not for the incorporation of the school, making a corporation the owner of the school and not him anymore). The school cannot be held liable as it was not impleaded as a party defendant. The TC based its decision on Mercado v. CA, which in turn was based on a dictum in Exconde v. Capuno. The case here was instituted directly against the defendants (as against the cited cases where the father was the defendant). The parents here are not involved since Daffon was already of age at the time of the incident. MTI is unquestionably a non-academic school. 1. custody The TC erred in absolving the defendants on the ground that they can only be held liable if they lived and boarded with his teacher or the other defendants-school officials. The phrase so long as (the students) remain in their custody means THE PROTECTIVE AND SUPERVISORY CUSTODY THAT THE SCHOOL AND ITS
HEADS AND TEACHERS EXERCISE OVER THE PUPILS AND STUDENTS FOR AS LONG AS THEY ARE AT ATTENDANCE IN THE SCHOOL, INCLUDING RECESS TIME.
precautions to protect the students in their custody from dangers and hazards that would reasonably be anticipated, including injuries that some students themselves may inflict willfully or through negligence on their fellow students. 4. Mercado overturned. Reyes dissent rules! Adheres to Reyes dissent in Exconde: If the basis of presumption of negligence in Art. 1903 is some culpa in vigilando that the parents, teachers, etc. are supposed to have incurred in the exercise of their authority, hence, when the parent places the child under the effective authority of the teacher, the teacher, and not the parent should be the one answerable for the torts committed while under his custody. Why? for the very reason that the parent is not supposed to interfere with the discipline of the school nor with the authority and supervision of the teacher while the child is under instruction. If there is no authority, there can be no responsibility. Hence, the president and instructor must be held solidarily liable unless they prove that they observed the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage-which they failed to do. Dissent: Makalintal Wants Mercado sustained. Its unfair to hold teachers and/or administrative heads responsible for tortuous acts of their students considering the high number of enrollment. It would demand responsibility without the commensurate authority. Moreover, since the responsibility stems from loco parentis, then it follows that 1. custody= live in company (like for parents and guardians) and 2. responsibility limited to minors only (like for parents and guardians) Concurring: Reyes Concurs with majority but dissents with the dissent. Makalintals interpretation not in accord with the law. 1. Only the guardians and parents are exempt once the child reaches majority 2. The authority and custodial supervision (of the teachers and heads) over the pupil exists regardless of the pupils age. RULE: 1. Mercado doctrine abandoned/overturned 2. Wants to overturn Exconde (to include academic institutions in the scope of 2180) but has no chance because MTI is anonacademic institution. 3. Definition of custody= the protective and supervisory custody that the school and its heads and teachers exercise over the pupils
(MEMORIZE)
NOTHING
IN THE LAW REQUIRES THAT FOR SUCH LIABILITY TO ATTACH, THE PUPIL-
TORTFEASOR MUST LIVE AND BOARD IN THE SCHOOL.
2. Rationale of the liability The rationale of the liability of school heads and teachers is that they stand to a certain extent, as to their pupils and students, in loco parentis, and are called upon to exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of the child. 3. Governing Principle in law of torts In the law of torts, the governing principle is that the protective custody of the school heads and teachers is mandatorily substituted for that of the parents, and hence it becomes their obligation as well as that of the school itself to provide proper supervision of the students activities during the whole time that they are at attendance in the school, including recess time, as well as to take the necessary

and students for as long as they are at attendance in the school, including recess time. (MEMORIZE) AMADORA v CA April 15, 1988 FACTS: Alfredo Amadora, 17 yrs old, was shot by his classmate Pablito Daffon, 3 days before his high school graduation, while he was at the auditorium of the Colegio de San Jose-Recolectos either to finish a Physics experiment or to submit a Physics report. Daffon was convicted of homicide thru reckless imprudence. The Amadoras sued for damages against the School (Colegio), the dean of boys and, the physics teacher and Daffon. TC: defendants are liable for damages CA: All the defendants were absolved. Colegio is not a school of arts and trades and Daffon was not in custody since the semester already ended. ISSUE: Interpretation of Art. 2180 HELD: Petition denied. None are liable. The SC summarized 3 cases which have been decided in connection with 2180: Exconde-school not liable because it is not a school of arts and trades -Reyes dissent-rule was imposed on teachers in general and heads OF establishments of arts and trades. Mercado-reiterated Exconde. School not liable because it is not an establishment of arts and trades -Defined custody as living and boarding with the teacher Palisoc- Set aside/abandoned the doctrines in Exconde and Mercado. -Defined custody to mean that the protective and supervisory custody of the school and its heads and teachers over the students are in force so long as they remain in school including recess time. -in a footnote, Tehankee (the ponente) said that he agreed with Reyes in his Exconde dissent to include academic schools but had no chance because the school involed is a non-academic one. Amadora is the case! 1. Art. 2180 applies to both academic and non-academic schools Reddendo Singula Singulis8 (5) if academic- teacher is liable for the pupils and students (General Rule) (6) if non-academic- head is liable for the apprentices (Exception) *But same vigilance is required! Reason for disparity: historically the heads of arts and trades exercised a closer tutelage over his pupils than the head of an academic school.9
There is no substantial distinction between an academic and a nonacademic school insofar as torts committed by their students are concerned. The same vigilance is expected from the teacher over the students under his control and supervision, whatever the nature of the school he is teaching. 2. Art. 2180 applies so long as the student is under the control and custody and within the school premises, regardless of whether the semester has not yet begun or has already ended (Duration of Responsibility) (MEMORIZE
LONG AS STANDARD): CAN BE
CUSTODY
THAT
IS NOT CO-TERMINOUS WITH THE SEMESTER. THE STUDENT IS IN THE SCHOOL PREMISES
AS
IN
IT
SHOWN
PURSUANCE OF A LEGITIMATE STUDENT OBJECTIVE, IN THE EXERCISE OF A LEGITIMATE STUDENT RIGHT, AND EVEN IN THE ENJOYMENT OF A LEGITIMATE STUDENT PRIVILEGE, THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE SCHOOL AUTHORITIES OVER THE STUDENT CONTINUES.
Even if the student should be doing nothing more than relaxing in the campus in the company of his classmates and friends and enjoying the ambience and atmosphere in the school, he is still within the custody and subject to the discipline of the school authorities under the provisions of Art. 2180. Custody does not connote immediate and actual physical control but refers more to the influence exerted on the child and the discipline instilled in him as a result of such influence. 3. Liability imposed not on the school itself It should be noted that the liability imposed is supposed to fall directly on the teacher or the head of the school of arts and trades and not on the school itself. If at all, the school, whatever its nature may be held to answer for the acts of its teachers and heads under the general principle of respondeat superior, it may exculpate itself by proof of exercise of
8 Referring each to each; referring each phrase or expression to its appropriate object or let each be put in its proper place, i.e. the words
should be taken distributively
9 This disparity no longer exist in view of the increase in enrollment. But thats a task for the legislature.

diligence of bonus paterfamilias.defense which is also available to the teacher or the head. 4. Pupil not required to be a minor to hold teacher liable Unlike the parent who will be liable only for his minor child, the teacher is answerable for torts of his students regardless of the students age. Hence: 1. Alfredo Amadora was still in the schools custody when the incident happened 2. rector, high school principal and dean of boys NOT liable because none of them were the teacher-in charge (they only exercised a general authority and not the direct control and influence exerted by the teacher-in-charge) Dean of boys not liable although he earlier confiscated a gun because it was not shown that the gun he confiscated and the gun that was used in the shooting were the same. 3. Physics teacher not liable because there was no showing that he was negligent in his duties. His absence cannot be taken against him as he was not required to report to school that day. 4. Colegio not liable because 2180 does not apply to school but only to its teachers and heads. CONCURRING & DISSENTING: Melencio-Herrera -teacher in 2180 should not be limited to the teacher-in-charge -the school may be held responsible under 2180 as the employer of the teachers and heads CONCURRING: Gutierrez, Jr. -reiterates the need for an amendment due to the non-existent disparity between teachers of academic schools and heads of arts and trades RULE: 1. Custody definition 2. application of 2180 to both academic and non-academic schools 3. teachers is to pupils and students as heads is to apprentices 4. school not directly liable under 2180 par 7. NOTES: dangerous definition of custody because it is so broad (even if just walking around school enjoying its ambience and atmosphere) CLASS NOTE facts: in Academic school, by student of the school, after sem ends A2180 applies to both ACADEMIC and NONACADEMIC schools Academic: teacher-in-charge:: Institute of Arts and Trades: Heads Custody does not connote INFLUENCE exerted on the child and the DISCIPLINE instilled in him as a result of such influence pupil is not required to be a minor for the teacher to be liable! (A2180 doesnt require minority) Applicability to academic institutions WAS an issue prior to this casesee Exconde Despite the broadness of the definition of custody, NO ONE was held liable in Amadora!
SALVOSA v. IAC October 5, 1988 FACTS: Jimmy Abon, was a student of the BCF and an employee of AFP (as an armorer for the BCF-ROTC unit) with work premises inside the BCF. Abon shot Napoleon Castro, a commerce student of BCF with an unlicensed gun from the ROTC armory, at the BCF parking lot at around 8pm. He was convicted of Homicide. Napoleons heirs (Castros) sued for damages impleading Abon, The ROTC Commandant, B. Salvosa-president and chairman of BCF board, J. Salvosa-the EVP of BCF, the dean and BCF. TC: Solidary liability of Abon, B. Salvosa and BCF Absolved other defendants IAC: Affirmed but modified award ISSUE: WON Salvosa and BCF can be held solidarily liable with Abon for damages under 2180. HELD: No. Abon was not in the custody of BCF at the time of the incident. IAC Reversed in so far as it holds Salvosa and BCF solidarily liable with Abon. 1. Rationale for liability Reiterated Palisoc: The rationale of the liability of school heads and teachers is that they stand to a certain extent, as to their pupils and students, in loco parentis, and are called upon to exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of the child. 2. Abon was not in the custody of BCF when he shot Napoleon DEFINITION
RECESS TIME. OF
CUSTODY (MEMORIZE!)-- THE
PROTECTIVE AND SUPERVISORY
CUSTODY THAT THE SCHOOL AND ITS HEADS AND TEACHERS EXERCISE OVER THE PUPILS AND STUDENTS FOR AS LONG AS THEY ARE AT ATTENDANCE IN THE SCHOOL, INCLUDING
Qualifying custody

OF
In line with Palisoc, RECESS IS A TEMPORARY ADJOURNMENT EMBRACED IN THE AT ATTENDANCE IN THE SCHOOL. IT IS A SITUATION WHERE THE STUDENT STILL
CONCEPT REMAINS
3. James was absolved due to his minority. 4. Villanueva was likewise absolved. CA: Affirmed but reduced AD. ISSUE: WON St Marys is liable HELD: No. CA reversed and set aside. Case remanded determination of liability of defendants excluding St. Marys. for
WITHIN THE CALL OF HIS MENTOR AND IS NOT PERMITTED TO LEAVE THE SCHOOL PREMISES OR THE AREA WITHIN WHICH THE SCHOOL ACTIVITY IS CONDUCTED. INCLUDE DISMISSAL.
RECESS BY ITS NATURE DOES NOT Plus, the mere fact of being enrolled or being in the premises of a school without more does not constitute attending school or being in the protective and supervisory custody of the school, as contemplated in the law. Abon cannot be considered to have been in attendance in the school, or in the custody of BCF when he shot Napoleon. Plus, he was supposed to be working when the incident happened. RULE: Defines recess Qualified Custody NOTE: Salvosa mitigates the effects of Amadora-but this was not cited in Salvosa. School: ACAD + Institute of Arts and Trade time: dismissal, where: in parking lot of school, against who: student of University of Baguio Memorize: recess and custody Amadora: legitimate student objectiveVictim is own student Salvosa: applied Palisoc, definition of custodyVictim is student of another school Ponente forgot Amadoradecided 6 months earlier. So to reconcile both cases: If victim is a student of schoolAmadora; If victim is NOT a student of school-Salvosa ST. MARYS ACADEMY v CARPITANOS February 6, 2002 FACTS: St. Marys Academy conducted an enrollment drive for the incoming school year. This involved visitation of schools. Sherwin Carpitanos, who was part of the campaigning group rode the jeep, along with other HS students. The jeep was owned by Villanueva and was driven by James Daniel II, a 15 year old student. They were on their way to an elementary school when the jeep turned turtle due to James reckless driving. Sherwin sustained injuries which caused his death. The Carpitanos sued St. Marys, James, the Daniels (parents of James) and Villanueva. TC: 1. St. Marys is liable for damages under 218 & 21910, FC 2. The Daniels were held subsidiarily liable in the event of St. Marys insolvency.
10 Art. 218. The school, its administrators and teachers, or the individual, entity or institution engaged in child are shall have special
parental authority and responsibility over the minor child while under their supervision, instruction or custody.
1. St. Marys is not liable The special parental authority under 218, FC applies to: the school, its administrators and teachers the individual, entity or institution engaged in child care This special parental authority and responsibility applies to all authorized activities, whether inside or outside the premises of the school, entity or institution. Such authority and responsibility applies to field trips, excursions, and other affairs of the pupils and students outside the school premises whenever authorized by the school or its teachers. Under 219, FC, if the person under custody is a minor, those exercising special parental authority are principally and solidarily liable for damages caused by the acts or omissions of the unemancipated minor under their supervision, instruction or custody. But, for St. Marys to be held liable, there must be a finding that the act or omission considered a s negligent was the proximate cause of the injury caused because the negligence, must have a causal connection to the accident. a. The proximate cause of the accident was not the negligence nor the reckless driving of James, but the mechanical defect of the jeep. The steering wheel guide was detached while the jeep was running.
Authority and responsibility shall apply to all authorized activities whether inside or outside the premises of the school, entity or institution. (349a)
Art. 219. Those given the authority and responsibility under the preceding Article shall be principally and solidarily liable for damages caused by the acts or omissions of the unemancipated minor. The parents, judicial guardians or the persons exercising substitute parental authority over said minor shall be subsidiarily liable.
The respective liabilities of those referred to in the preceding paragraph shall not apply if it is proved that they exercised the proper diligence required under the particular circumstances.
All other cases not covered by this and the preceding articles shall be governed by the provisions of the Civil Code on quasidelicts. (n)

b. Theres no evidence that St. Marys allowed the minor James to drive the jeep. It was the grandson of Villanueva, who had control and possession of the jeep who allowed James to drive. 2. Parents are Primarily liable Whether the accident was due to James negligence or the mechanical failure, the parents must be held primarily liable. St. Marys negligence was only a remote cause, and either the Daniels negligence or the mechanical failure was the intervening cause. 3. Villanueva, as the registered owner of the jeep is liable for damages Overwhelming evidence that the accident was due to the detachment of the steering wheel guide. NOTES: applied FC-this seems to imply strict liability but SC here allowed defense of diligence. school liable if Proximate Cause of the injury is their negligence special parental authority applies as long as the activity was approved by an office of the school Who liable FC A218: school, its administrators and teachers, or the individual, entity or institution engaged in child have special parental authority and responsibility to all authorized activities whether inside or outside the premises of the school, entity or institution Minor child while under their supervision, instruction or custody A219: unemancipated minor Principally and solidarily liable schools Subsidiarily liable parents, judicial guardians, persons exercising substitute parental authority NCC A2180, par7: teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades *In St. Francis Case, activity should be inside school premises Under the FC, no distinction is made WON School is ACADEMIC or NONACADEMIC Incident happened WITHIN OR OUTSIDE school premises. 2180 not limited to minors and liability of teacher is only when academic and not arts and trades Summary of cases: 1. Exconde: Primary liability of parent 2180 applies only to arts and trades 2. Salen: subsidiary liability of parent 3. Libi: Primary liability of parent-CLEARED UP ISSUE ON PRIMARY OR SUBSIDIARY LIABILITY 4. Mercado: Custody=living and boarding with teacher or head 5. Palisoc: custody-protective and supervisory custody. Does not have to live or board with teacher or head Overturned Mercado. No chance to Overturn Exconde. 6. Amadora: 2180 applies to all schools. Overturned Exconde -Academic school-teacher-pupil -Arts & trades-head-apprentice Broad definition of custody 7. Salvosa: defines recess; qualifies custody (mitigates amadoras effects) 8. St. Marys; Who may be liable under special parental authority. 4. Owners and Managers of Establishments *Rationale of employers being liable: policy considerationallocating risks PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC. v PHIL-AMERICAN FORWARDERS, INC March 25, 1975 FACTS: Fernando Pineda, driver of a Philippine American Forwarders freight truck hit a Philippine Rabbit Bus along a national highway. The bus driver suffered injuries and the bus was unusable for 79 days resulting in loss of income. Balingit, as the manager of PAF and Pineda were sued based on a QD. (Balingits defense was that he was not the employer of Pineda)
For damages caused by
Their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody Primarily and directly
Liability
Important to note that:

TC: Dismissed complaint against Balingit as he is not the manger contemplated under 2180. ISSUE: WON Balingit is liable under 2180. (WON employers/owners/managers of an establishment/enterprise includes managers of corporations) HELD: No. 1. Balingit is not the manager contemplated in 2180 The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions. The terms employers and establishment or enterprise DOES THE
TERM MANAGER IS NOT
HELD: YES. The action is an action for damages for QD under Art 2176 and 2180. The Court has considered the liability of a registered owner of a public service vehicle for damages arising from tortuous acts of the driver as primary, direct and joint and several or solidary with the driver (Art 2194)11. The employers only recourse is to recover what it has paid from the employee who committed the fault or negligence (Art 2181)12. NOTES: Employers liable because of paterfamilias Manager = employer (director) as found in intent of framers in Spanish text. 5. Employers LAMPESA v DE VERA Feb 2008 FACTS: De Vera was a passenger in a jeep which halted in order to let a truck pass by. However the truck suddenly started to slide back and hit the jeepney. Upon the collision, De Vera lost his middle finger. Lampesa, the employer of the truck driver, denied liability since before hiring the driver he asked if he had a drivers license. ISSUE: WON Lampesa as the employer is liable with his driver HELD: YES. Once negligence on the part of the employee is established, a presumption instantly arises that the employer was negligent in the selection and/or supervision of the said employee. To rebut this presumption, the employer must allege and show that he has practiced the diligence of a bonus paterfamilias. In this case there was no showing that Lampesa did his duties as a good father of a family in employing Copsiyat. There was no showing that Lampesa exercised supervision over Copsiyat after his selection. As an employer, Lampesa was duty-bound to do more than just ascertain if Copsiyat had a professional drivers license. SPOUSES JAYME v APOSTOL Nov 2009 FACTS: Mayor Miguel of Koronadal, South Cotabato was on board the Isuzu pick-up truck driven by Fidel Lozano, an employee of the Municipality of Koronadal. The pick-up truck was registered under the name of Rodrigo Apostol, but it was then in the possession of Ernesto Simbulan. Lozano borrowed the pick-up truck from Simbulan to bring
11 Art. 2194. The responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for quasi-delict is solidary. (n) 12 Art. 2181. Whoever pays for the damage caused by his dependents or employees may recover from the latter what he has paid or
delivered in satisfaction of the claim. (1904)
owners
and
managers
of
an
NOT INCLUDE THE MANAGER OF A CORPORATION . VERSION ) IS USED IN THE SENSE OF EMPLOYER A CORPORATION WHO IS ALSO AN EMPLOYEE
(DIRECTOR
TO A
IN
SPANISH
WHICH
EQUAL
MANAGER
OF
(DEPENDIENTE)
OF THE CORPORATION .
2. PAF is a corporation with a personality separate and distinct from that of Balingit (this was not alleged in the complaint). The argument that PAF is a mere business conduit of the Balingit spouses implies the piercing of the veil of corporate fiction. Since this was not raised in the lower court, it cannot be countenanced in this appeal. 5. Employers NOTES: JURIS TANTUM (REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION) WHY?-coz hard for victim to prove that employer was not negligent (similar to res ipsa), hence employer should prove diligences as a defense WHY OWNER?-deeper prockets PHILTRANCO v CA June 1997 FACTS: A Philtranco bus, driven by Manhilig was being pushed and jumpstarted along a perpendicular street. It started suddenly and ran over Acuesta, a biker. The driver didnt stop, but was forced to by a cop who saw the accident and boarded the bus. Acuestas heirs sued Manhilig and Philtranco for QD. Philtranco argues it exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees, saying Manhilig had an excellent record and exercised the diligence of a very cautious person. ISSUE: WON Philtranco may be held liable for the act of Manhilig

Miguel to Buayan Airport at General Santos City to catch his Manila flight. The truck hit a minor, Marvin C Jayme, who was crossing the highway who died. Complaint for damages was filed. Apostol and Simbulan (the registered owner and possessor) claimed that Lozano took pick up truck without consent. Mayor Miguel, Lozano ( passenger and driver), and the Municipality of Korondal said that Marvins sudden sprint was impossible to avoid. Miguel also said he wasnt in the car at the time. ISSUES: WON Miguel as an employer should be solidarily liable with the driver Lozano? WON Municipality of Korondal as employer is liable? HELD/RULES: To sustain claims against employers for the acts of their employees under Art 2180, the following requisites must be established: (1) That the employee was chosen by the employer personally or through another; (2) That the service to be rendered in accordance with orders which the employer has the authority to give at all times; (3) That the illicit act of the employee was on the occasion or by reason of the functions entrusted to him (4) injurious or tortuous act was committed at the time the employee was performing his functions AN EM-ER relationship must first be established by plaintiff through the ff: (1) the employer's power of selection; (2) payment of wages or other remuneration; (3) the employer's right to control the method of doing the work; and (4) the employer's right of suspension or dismissal APPLICATION: (1) NO, Mayor Miguel was neither Lozano's employer nor the vehicle's registered owner. There existed no causal relationship between him and Lozano or the vehicle used that will make him accountable for Marvin's death. Mayor Miguel was a mere passenger at the time of the accident. Drivers duty is not one that may be delegated to others. (2) YES, municipality is the employer but it cannot be sued. Municipality of Korondal is the employer since an employeremployee relationship still exists even if the employee was loaned by the employer to another person or entity because control over the employee subsists However, the municipality cannot be sued because it is an agency of the State engaged in governmental functions and, hence, immune from suit. A municipality may only be liable if it can be shown that they were acting in proprietary capacity. NOTES: the case may have been ruled differently if the mayor was the owner and not just the passenger applying Caedo v Yu Khe Thai Also Sir raised the issue if the mayor can actually be considered as the employer of the municipality.
TAN v JAM TRANSIT Nov 2009 FACTS: Petitioner Tan owned a jitney being driven by Alexander Ramirez. It was loaded with balut and salted eggs. Around 5 am, while it was negotiationg a left turn, it collided with a JAM transit bus being driven by Eddie Dimayuga. The jitney turned turtle along the shoulder of the road and the cargo of eggs was destroyed. Ramirez and his helper were injured and hospitalized. ISSUE: WON JAM Transit is solidarily liable with driver Dimayuga HELD: YES, Whenever an employees negligence causes damage or injury to another, there instantly arises a presumption juris tantum that the employer failed to exercise diligentissimi patris families in the selection (culpa in eligiendo) or supervision (culpa in vigilando) of its employees. An employer must overcome the presumption, by presenting convincing proof that he exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his employee In this case, aside from the testimony of Dimayuga, JAM did not present any other evidence, whether documentary or testimonial, in its favor. Inevitably, the presumption of its negligence as Dimayugas employer stands and it is, thus, solidarily liable for the damages sustained by petitioner. NOTES: Unclear on whether it based liability under par 4 or 5 of 2180 EM-ER relationship must be proven by employee
SALUDAGA v FEU April 2008 FACTS: Petitioner Joseph Saludaga was a sophomore law student of respondent Far Eastern University (FEU) when he was shot by Alejandro Rosete (Rosete), one of the security guards on duty at the school premises. Saludaga filed a complaint for damages against FEU on the ground that they breached their obligation to provide students with a safe and secure environment and an atmosphere conducive to learning. FEU, in turn, filed a Third-Party Complaint against Galaxy Development and Management Corporation, the agency contracted by respondent FEU

to provide security services within its premises and Mariano D. Imperial, Galaxy's President, to indemnify them for whatever would be adjudged in favor of Saludaga ISSUES: (1) WON FEU is Liable under contractual obligation? (2) WON FEU is liable as the employer of the guards? (3) WON FEUs president is solidarily liable with FEU? HELD: (1) YES, liable under Art 1170. As held in PSBA v CA, there is a contract between the school and student for the school to provide an environment conducive to studying and for the student to abide by the school's academic requirements and observe its rules and regulations. Applied in this case, it was proven that a contractual obligation existed between Saludaga and FEU, Saludaga being a 2nd year law student. He was shot by the security guard hired to maintain peace and secure the premises, a prima facie showing that respondents failed to comply with its obligation to provide a safe and secure environment to its students. FEU failed to show it exercised the required diligence of ascertaining whether the security guards are actually capable of providing the services they required and merely relied on the agency. (2) NO, the security guard was employed by Galaxy. The instructions issued by respondents' Security Consultant to Galaxy and its security guards are requests commonly envisaged in the contract for services entered into by a principal and a security agency. They cannot be construed as the element of control as to treat respondents as the employers of the security guard. (3) NO, A corporate director may only be liable if: (1) he assents to a patently unlawful act of the corporation, or when he is guilty of bad faith or gross negligence in directing its affairs, or when there is a conflict of interest resulting in damages to the corporation, its stockholders or other persons; (2) he consents to the issuance of watered down stocks or who, having knowledge thereof, does not forthwith file with the corporate secretary his written objection thereto; (3) he agrees to hold himself personally and solidarily liable with the corporation; or (4) he is made by a specific provision of law personally answerable for his corporate action. NOTES: Galaxy cannot be liable under 2180 since lack of diligence in supervision should be prior to the incident. In this case, the evidence presented was after the accident occurred CASTILEX vVASQUEZ FACTS: Abad, a production manager of Castilex, was driving his company-issued vehicle after office hours. He took a short cut in the rotunda and went against the flow of traffic. As a result, he hit Vasquez, who had a students permit, and on a motorcycle. Abad brought him to the hospital, but he died anyway. The criminal case did not prosper for failure to prosecute. The civil case for damages was filed by Vasquezs parents. TC and Ca ruled for Vasquezs.CA held the liability of Castilex was vicarious not solidary contrary to TCs ruling. ISSUE 1: WON CA erred in applying par 5 and not par 4 of Art 2180 HELD: NO. SC ruled that the 5th par merely says being engaged in a business is not necessary for the paragraph to apply. The Court made distinctions between the 2 paragraphs. 4th paragraph Owners and managers Covers negligent acts or employees committed either in the service of the branches or on occasion of their functions 5th paragraph Employers, in general, WON engaged in a business or industry Encompasses negligent acts of employees as long as they were acting within the scope of their assigned tasks
*par 5 is an expansion of par 4 ISSUE 2: WON Castilex has the burden of proving that Abad was not working within the scope of his assigned tasks HELD: NO. The plaintiffs have the burden. He who alleges must prove. ISSUE 3: WON Abad was working within the scope of his assigned tasks, making Castilex liable HELD: NO. The fact that Abad was a manager and driving a companyissued vehicle is not sufficient to charge Castilex with liability. He was working beyond office hours and was coming from a place where he had snacks. He was carrying out personal affairs. The Court cited principles in American Jurisprudence even if the relationship is respondeat superior, not pater familias. Operation of Employers Motor Vehicle in Going to and From Meals The employer is liable if the vehicle is used to reduce his time-off and devote more time to the performance of his duties. Operation of Employers Vehicle in Going to and From Work The employer is liable if he derives some special benefit such as more time for the performance of duties or that such duties require the employee to circulate in a general area for work. The latter is called the special errand or roving commission rule. Use of Employers Vehicle Outside Regular Working Hours

The employer is liable if he derives some incidental benefit. The employer is not liable when the vehicle is used for a personal benefit and returned to where it is normally kept. Notes: This seems to contradict with Valenzuela v CA. Sir says there is no contradiction. The place where the employee is coming from is material. Castilex is the more conservative application while Valenzuela is more liberal but is beyond the scope of the Code. These cases are decided based on the prevailing practices on that time. Whats the rule if we combine 2180 (4) and (5) as regards the liability of employer for the acts or omissions of employees? Requisites to hold the employer liable for torts under 2180: 1. ER-EE relationship 2. Employee must be acting within the scope of his assigned task FILAMER v IAC FACTS: Funtecha is a part-time janitor and scholar of Filamer. Having a drivers license, he requested Masa, driver and son of school president, to let him drive them home where Funtecha also lives. Masa yielded and on the way they hit a pedestrian, Kapunan, because Funtecha swerved right to avoid a fast-moving truck. It appears that Agustin Masa, school president, knew of the license. ISSUE: WON Filamer is liable HELD: YES. The clause within the scope of their by assigned tasks for the purpose of raising the presumption of liability of an employer includes any act done by the employee, in furtherance of the interests of the employer or for the account of the employer at the time of the infliction of the injury. It is applicable even if the employee derives some benefit from the act. In this case, Funtecha drove the jeep not for his enjoyment but for the service of Filamer. The fact that he was not the school driver is insignificant. Besides, Filamer did not exercise the diligence of a good father of the family. Presumptive liability of employer (when employee is driving a company vehicle) is determined by answering The question Does the servant at the time of the accident performing any act in furtherance of his masters business? Section 14, Rule X, Book III of the Rules implementing the Labor Code, provides guidelines on the exclusion of working scholars from the employment coverage as far as compliance with the substantive labor provisions on working conditions, rest periods, and wages, is concerned. It is merely a guide to the enforcement of the substantive law on labor. The Court, thus, makes the distinction and so holds that Section 14, Rule X, Book III of the Rules is not the decisive law in a civil suit for damages instituted by an injured person during a vehicular accident against a working student of a school and against the school itself. Hence, the reliance on the implementing rule on labor to disregard the primary liability of an employer under Article 2180 of the Civil Code is misplaced. Supervision includes the formulation of suitable rules and regulations for the guidance of its employees and the issuance of proper instructions intended for the protection of the public and persons with whom the employer has relations through his employees. NOTES: To make the employer liable, you have to establish: 1. employee is negligence 2. ER-EE relationship exists 3. employee is carrying out an act within the scope of his functions Sir thinks this is a dangerous doctrine because even if the activity is far removed from the business/institution, the employer may be held liable if it is in furtherance of the latters interests. NPC v CA FACTS: A dump truck driven by Ilumba and owned by NPC collided with a Toyota Tamaraw, resulting in the death of 3 persons in the Tamaraw and injuries to 17 passengers. PHESCO supplied Ilumba as a driver to NPC. NPC and PHESCO are pointing fingers, each claiming Ilumba is the employee of the other. ISSUE: Who is the employer of Ilumba, and therefore, liable with him HELD: NPC. PHESCO is a labor-only contractor because it does not carry on an independent business and does not have substantial capital. It is merely an agent of NPC. The Civil Code and NOT the Labor Code applies to determine NPCs liability because the action here is based on the recovery of damages as a result of a quasi-delict. The Labor Code applies only to liability caused by non-compliance with substantive labor standards on working conditions, etc. In this case, the Labor Code is only applied to determine if an ER-EE relationship exists. NOTES: In Filamer, Labor Code provisions do not apply even n the determination of an employer-employee relationship. Sir says there is a policy considerations. The Court tries to utilize doctrine to support their cause. VALENZUELA v CA FACTS: Valenzuela had a flat tire and had to park her midnight blue Mitsubishi lancer on the side of the road. While standing on the left

rear side of the car, watching someone changed her tire, she was bumped by Li (allegedly drunk). The car of the latter was registered to Alexander Commercial. She had lost her left leg (only some skin and muscle connected to the rest of her body) and had to be fitted with a prosthetic leg. ISSUE: WON Alexander was liable HELD: YES. The relationship between Li and Alexander is Pater familias not Respondeat superior, in which the ultimate liability falls upon the employer. In this case, the Court averred the privilege of using a company car serves 2 purposes: 1) Image of success; and 2) Practical and utilitarian reasons (to reach clients conveniently). Thus, the use of the car principally serves the business, the private purposes and the goodwill of the company and only incidentally the private purposes of the employee who uses the car. Li, an Asst. Manager of the company, uses the car to facilitate meetings with clients. At the time of the accident, he came from a co-employees place. The presumption is they came from a company function or discussed work-related matters. NOTES: not liable simply because of company car but because of bonus pater familias standard in 2180 did not prove diligence and under 2nd instance discussed in Castilex juris tantum presumption (rebuttable) vs. juris et jure (conclusive) cf with Castilex: compare the place where Abad and Li came from along with the nature of Lis job which required him to have a car. This case is more of a roving commission PROFESSIONAL SERVICES v AGANA I FACTS: Two pieces of gauze were found inside Natividads body and this badly infected her vaginal vault (made her secrete stool through her vagina). Nurse announced to the surgeon that sponge count was lacking 2 but Dr. Ampil did not inform Natividad of the missing gauzes and even told her that the pain was normal. ISSUE: WON PSI is liable HELD: YES. In Ramos v CA, it was held that hospitals exercise significant control in hiring and firing and exercise real control over a physicians conduct. Hence, an ER-EE relationship exists. Furthermore, the court held that the hospital is liable for corporate negligence. Corporate negligence happens because corporate entities are only capable of acting thru individuals. PSIs failure to conduct an investigation of the matter reported in the nota bene of the count nurse makes them directly liable. PROFESSIONAL SERVICES v AGANA II FACTS: PSI filed an MFR alleging that Ramos v CA was already overturned; hence, the ruling in Agana I shall also be reversed. ISSUE: WON the ruling shall be reversed HELD: NO. Although the ruling in Ramos v CA was reversed, the doctrine stayed. It was only found that the hospital in that case had no control over the physician, amounting to the absence of an ER-EE relationship. PSI argues that Dr. Ampils negligence is the proximate cause and their corporate negligence was merely a remote cause. However, the Court still held that PSI failed to supervise Dr. Ampil and further failed to investigate. PROFESSIONAL SERVICES v AGANA III FACTS: Other hospitals intervened due to the rulings adverse effect to the financial viability of private hospitals. PSI also contends that there is no ER-EE relationship as Dr. Ampil was merely a consultant and an independent contractor. ISSUE: WON PSI is liable HELD: YES. The Court held that it was already declared at no ER-EE relationship exists at the RTC and CA level and to this, Agana did not appeal. Hence, said ruling is final. However, PSI is held liable for corporate negligence and not under 2180. Yet, the Court also said that this case is pro hac vice or on a case to case basis. Consequently, the ruling in this case cannot be applied to other cases. Still in the end, the Court (making things worse), declared that PSI is solidarily liable with Dr. Ampil. This declaration of liability has an unknown basis because 2180, which provides for solidary liability, not longer applies. MERCURY DRUG v HUANG FACTS: Stephen Huang was paralyzed due to the collision of his car and Mercury Drugs 6 wheeler truck driven by del Rosario. Mercury Drug presented testimonial evidence on its hiring procedure. The Recruitment and Training Manager testified that applicants are required to take a theoretical, actual and psychological exam. ISSUE: WON Mercury Drug is liable under 2180 HELD: YES. The Court found that del Rosario took an exam for delivery man, not as truck driver. Furthermore, he used a Galant for the test and not a truck. There were also no tests on motor skills, etc, and no NBI and police clearances asked for. Mercury Drug also did not provide for a backup driver for long trips. Also, at the time of the collision, del Rosario had no license but Mercury Drug neither did suspended nor reprimanded him for this. NOTES: General Rule in Hiring

1. Look for license 2. Look at experiences and qualifications 3. Look into the aptness General Rule in Supervision 1. Come up with rules, guidelines and policies 2. Enforce said rules, guidelines and policies There must be another law to hold the state liable and in this case, it is 1903 (2180)
6. State -not liable for acts of its officers, agents and employees (unless special agent; and except when state acts as a juridical person capable of acquiring rights and contracting obligations) MERRIT v GOVERNMENT FACTS: Plaintiff Merritt suffered severe injuries as his motorcycle collided with a PGH ambulance due to the negligence of the latters vehicles driver. The Government passed an Act authorizing Merritt to sue the Government. ISSUE: WON the State is liable for damages HELD: NO. Though the State waived its immunity from suit, it did not concede liability to Merritt. The State is not liable for torts, except when it acts through a special agent. In this case, the driver is not a special agent within the contemplation of the law. Although the accident was caused by a government employee, the State did not undertake to guarantee to third persons the acts of all its employees for that would subject the State to countless suits, which is subversive to public interest. The State is not responsible for the damages suffered by private individuals in consequence of the acts performed by its employees pertaining to their office because neither fault nor negligence can be presumed on the part of the State in the organization of branches of public service and appointment of its agents. MEMORIZE: Short version: A special agent is one who receives a definite and fixed order or commission, foreign to the exercise of the duties of his office if he is a special official. Long version: A special agent is one duly empowered by a definite order or commission to perform some act or charged with some definite purpose which gives rise to the claim, and not where the claim is based o n acts or omissions imputable to a public official charged with some administrative or technical office who can be held to the proper responsibility in the manner laid down by the law of civil responsibility. NOTES: In this case the chauffeur still was acting within his duty as a driver when he hit Merritt
ROSETE v AUDITOR GENERAL FACTS: Employees of the Emergency Control Administration had gasoline stored in their warehouse. Such storage was contrary to a Manila ordinance. Frayno negligently lit a cigarette 5 meters from a gas drum. Rosetes building were damaged. ISSUE: WON the Government should pay damages HELD: NO. There is no showing that whatever negligence may be imputed to the ECA or its officers was not done by any special agent, because the officers of the said institution did not act as special agents within the contemplation of Art 1903 in storing gasoline in the warehouse. In a case for damages, the responsibility of the State is limited to that which it contracts through a special agent is one duly empowered by a definite order or commission to perform some act or charged with some definite purpose which gives rise to the claim, and not where the claim is based o n acts or omissions imputable to a public official charged with some administrative or technical office who can be held to the proper responsibility in the manner laid down by the law of civil responsibility. RULE: OFFICIALS: comprises all officials and employees of the government who exercise duties of their respective public officers SPECIAL AGENTS: all others who are acting by commission of the government, whether individual or juridical bodies. NOTES: Perfecto dissent: all persons and entities acting by commission of the Government, such as government enterprises and other organs of government created for activities ordinarily of ungovernmental nature, are special agents. The state is not responsible for the damages suffered by private individuals in consequence of acts performed by its employees in the discharge of the functions pertaining to their office, because neither fault nor even negligence can be presumed on the part of the state in the organization of branches of the public service and in the appointment of its agents. A regular official is liable under Art 2176 for the damage he causes. MENDOZA v DE LEON FACTS: This is an action for damages against the individual members of the municipal council of Villasis, Pangasinan. The council revoked a lease for an exclusive ferry privilege, which was awarded to Mendoza and gave it to someone else.

ISSUE: WON the individual members of the council are liable HELD: YES. There is no justifiable reason for revoking the lease awarded to Mendoza. The municipality has 2 functions: governmental and proprietary/corporate. The award of the lease was a proprietary function. In such a case, the tortfeasors may be sued in capacities such as those in private corporations. Respondeat superior applies. FONTANILLA v MALIAMAN FACTS: National Irrigation Administration was created for the purpose of constructing, improving, rehabilitating and administering all national irrigation systems of the Philippines. NIAs driver caused the death of Fontanilla due to the fault and/or negligence. His parents fled a suit for damages. ISSUE: WON NIA is liable HELD: YES. NIAs functions are basically proprietary and incidentally governmental. RA 3601 and PD 552 provide that NIA is a body corporate invested with a corporate personality and distinct from the government. So, it may be sued. At the time, the driver was an agent. Where a private individual is commissioned to do a special task, he may be considered a special agent within the contemplation of the provision. NOTES: The state agencies or subdivisions, in the pursuance of proprietary functions, are akin to any other private corporation. They may be sued for: - torts committed by them (art 2176) or - torts committed by their employees (art 2180). As long as it is performing proprietary functions, it can be held liable for the acts of its employees, both regular and special. Feliciano: State refers to judicial persons meaning the government of the Philippines; hence it excludes GOCCs with original functions. The dichotomy makes the law unstable! VII. TORTS WITH INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION A. Violation of Civil and Political Rights Art 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages: 1.Freedom of religion 2.Freedom of speech 3.Freedom to write for the press or to maintain a periodical publication 4.Freedom from arbitrary or illegal detention 5.Freedom of suffrage 6.The right against deprivation of property without due process of law 7.The right to just compensation when property is taken for public use 8.The right to equal protection of the laws 9.The right to be secure in ones person, house, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures 10. The liberty of abode and of changing the same 11. The right to privacy of communication and correspondence 12. The right to become a member of associations and societies for purposes not contrary to law 13. The right to take part in a peaceable assembly and petition the government for redress of grievances 14. The right to be free from involuntary servitude in any form 15. The right of the accused against excessive bail 16. The right of the accused to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and the cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses on is behalf; 17. Freedom form being compelled to be a witness against ones self, or from being forced to confess his guilt, or from being induced by a promise of immunity or reward to make such confession, except when the person confessing becomes a State witness. 18. Freedom from excessive fines, or cruel and unusual punishment, unless the same is imposed or inflicted in accordance with a statute which has not been judicially declared unconstitutional; 19. Freedom of access to the courts In any of the cases referred to in this article, whether or not the defendants act or omission constitutes a criminal offense, the aggrieved party has a right to commence an entirely separate and distinct civil action for damages, and for other relief. Such civil action shall proceed independently of any criminal prosecution (if the latter be instituted) and may be proved by a preponderance of evidence. The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages may also be adjudicated. The responsibility herein set forth is not demandable from a judge unless his act or omission constitutes a violation of the Penal code or any other penal statute. MHP GARMENTS v CA FACTS: MHP was awarded the exclusive franchise to sell and distribute official uniforms and supplies of the Boy Scouts of the Philippines. They were informed that Cruz, Lugatiman and Gonzales were selling BSP uniforms without authority. They sought the aid of the Philippine Constabulary. Constabulary men and De Guzman, representative of MHP, went to the stalls, seized the goods and caused a commotion, all without warrant. ISSUE: WON MHP and De Guzman may be held liable

HELD: YES. The Constitution protects people against unreasonable searches and seizures. The evidence presented did not justify the treatment of the respondents. MHP was indirectly involved. They instigated the raid which was conducted with the active participation of De Guzman. The proper method would have been to report the matter and secure a warrant. NOTES: Innocence of persons being searched does not matter Art 32 applies to direct and indirect participants SILAHIS v SOLUTA FACTS: Hotel employers of Silahis Intenational Hotel barged in the unions office and allegedly found drugs. The hote employers pose the defense that the constitutional protection against illegal searches and seizures cannot be invoked against private individuals. ISSUE: WON Silahis may be held liable HELD: YES. The basis of the action is Article 32 of the Civil Code. It may be invoked against a private individual who violated a constitutional right of another. It is not even necessary that the defendant under this article should have acted with malice or bad faith, otherwise, it would defeat it main purpose, which is the effective protection of individual rights. It suffices that there is a violation of the constitutional right of the plaintiff. VINZONS-CHATO v FORTUNE I FACTS: Vinzons-Chato as Commissioner of BIR declared Fortune Tobacco brands as foreign brands subject to a higher tax rate. The Courts found that her order falls short of the requirements for a valid administrative issuance. Fortune filed a complaint for damages against Vinzons-Chato in her private capacity. She argues that what is applicable to her is Art 38 of the Admin Code, where bad faith must be proven. ISSUE: WON Art 32 may be applied HELD: YES. The rule is that a public officer may be validly sued in her private capacity for acts done in the course of the performance of the functions of the office where the said public officer: 1) acted with malice, bad faith, or negligence (Art 38); or 2) where the public officer violated a constitutional right of the plaintiff (Art 32). Fortune has a valid cause of action under Art 32 for violation of right to property and equal protection of the law. It is not necessary that the defendant under Art 32 should have acted with malice or bad faith. VINZONS-CHATO v FORTUNE II FACTS: Vinzons-Chato filed for a motion to refer to the court en banc. She alleged that her duty was directed to the public hence, she cannot be liable under Art 32. ISSUE: WON Vinzons-Chato shall be liable HELD: NO. The Court distinguished the two duties of a public official: 1) its duty to the public; and 2) its duty to a private individual. The Court held that public officers that are liable under Art 32 are only those whose duty is directed to a private individual (in essence, only notary publics). The Court was in effect saying that there must first be a determination of the constitutionality of the issuance to determine if there was a violation of the constitutional rights of Fortune. NOTES: Sir said this was a stupid ruling Sir would take the case to not overturn the doctrine on bad faith SANGCO 228-233 Code Commission: The creation of an absolutely separate and independent civil action for the violation of civil liberties is essential to the effective maintenance of democracy, for these reasons: (1) In most case, the threat to freedom originates from abuse of power by government officials and peace officers (2) The requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt often prevented the appropriate punishment (3) Direct and open violations of the Penal code trampling upon the freedoms named are not so frequent as those subtle, clever and indirect ways which do not come within the pale of penal law. A violation of any of the individual rights and liberties enumerated in Art. 32 may or may not constitute a criminal offense If act constitutes a criminal offense, the victim may opt between a civil action under Art. 100 of the RPC and an independent civil action under Art. 32. If act is not a criminal offense, the civil action to enforce liability for damages is governed by the provisions of the Civil Code according to Art. 1162 thereof, and the Rules on Civil Procedure. The right to institute an independent civil action under Arts. 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code is a substantive right intended as an exception to and held as an amendment of the general rule in Sec. 1 of Rule 107 of the 1940 Rules of Court ( Sec. 1 Rule 111 of the 1964 Revised rules of Court) These independent actions should not be deemed instituted with the criminal action and the right to institute them should not be made subject to their prior reservation. B. Defamation, Fraud and Physical Injuries Art 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action

for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. MADEJA v CARO FACTS: A criminal action was filed against Dr. Japzon for the death of Madeja after an appendectomy. Pending the criminal case, his widow filed a civil action for damages, alleging gross negligence, but this was dismissed. ISSUE: WON Judge Caro erred in dismissing the civil action HELD: YES. Under the Rules of Court and Art 33, a separate civil action may be instituted. The civil action is ex-delicto and aimed to allow the offended party to enforce his rights in a private action. Physical injuries is used in the generic sense, meaning bodily injury not the crime in the RPC. To be liable under Art 33, the damage should arise from a crime. This case also says that Corpus v Paje, saying reckess imprudence is not included in Art 33, is not authoritative. NOTES: Madeja v Caro is a division case. It cannot overturn an en banc decision. Criminal negligence is covered by Art 33 ARAFILES v PHIL. JOURNALISTS FACTS: Despuig filed a complaint against Arafiles for forcible abduction with rape and forcible abduction with attempted rape. She executed a sworn statement to that effect witnessed by Morales. The latter interviewed the former and wrote an article about the incident. Arafiles filed a complaint for damages against Morales, his editor and the president of the publisher, saying his reputation was ruined by the story. ISSUE: WON the accused were liable for damages HELD: NO. In actions for libel, the published work must be examined and viewed as a whole. It depends on the scope, spirit and motive of the piece. It must be read in the sense readers to whom it is addressed would ordinarily understand it. Morales could have used better words, but he did state that his story was based on the account of Despuig at the station. Notes: According to Sir, the point of this case is that one may file a criminal complaint and a civil one in one court and both could proceed independently of each other. Criminal case and civil case (for the same act) may proceed independently of each other 1. Defamation MVRS v ISLAMIC FACTS: This is a class suit instituted by the respondent on behalf of all Muslims who were allegedly defamed by an article of the petitioner which said that Muslims in Mindanao do not eat pigs and all other animals because these are sacred to them and are worshiped like Gods. ISSUE: WON MVRS may be held liable HELD: NO. 1) THE BASIC CONCEPT OF DEFAMATION AND ITS ELEMENTS-Defamation, which includes libel and slander, means the offense of injuring a persons character, fame or reputation through false and malicious statements. It is that which tends to injure reputation or to diminish the esteem, respect, good will or confidence in the plaintiff or to excite derogatory feelings or opinions about the plaintiff. Words which are merely insulting or offensive are not actionable. There must be a presence of allegations as to special damages suffered by the plaintiff. (2) SIZE OF THE GROUP SUBJECT OF THE DEFAMATIONWhere the defamation is alleged to have been directed at a group or class, it is essential that the statement must be so sweeping or all-embracing as to apply to every individual in that group o class. Each reputation is personal in character to every person. Together, the Muslims do not have a single common reputation that will give them a common or general interest in the subject matter of he controversy. Puno, J.If the defamatory statements were directed at a small, restricted group of persons, they applied to any member of the group, and an individual member could maintain an action for defamation. When the defamatory language was used toward a small group or class, including every member, it has been held that the defamatory language referred to each member so that each could maintain an action. If the defamatory words are used broadly in respect of a large class or group of persons, and there is nothing that points, or by proper colloquium or innuendo can be made to apply, to a particular member of the class or group, no member has a right of action for libel or slander. NOTES: In defamation, the important criterion is the view of the public, not the feelings of the offended party cf Worcester - in that case, the defamatory statements are directed to one person alone 2. Fraud

3. Physical Injuries CAPUNO v PEPSI FACTS: A Pepsi delivery truck driven by Elordi collided with a private car driven by Capuno. Capuno and his passengers, Buan spouses, died. Elordi was charged with triple homicide through reckless imprudence. While the case was pending, the estate and heirs of the Buan spouses filed a separate complaint for damages against Pepsi and Elordi. The parties in the latter case compromised so the case was dismissed. Later, Capuno heirs filed a similar complaint. ISSUE: WON the action is barred by the Statute of Limitations HELD: YES. The case for recovery under a quasi-delict must be instituted within 4 years from the accrual of the right of action. Contrary to the Capunos assertion, the prescriptive period was not interrupted by the filing of the criminal action inasmuch as they never waived nor reserved to file the civil action separately. Anent Art. 33, The Court said that it included bodily injury resulting in death. NOTES: This case demonstrates a literal reading of A33 The action filed was based on A31 and A33 On A33: civil action for damages could have been commenced by Capunos immediately upon death of Cipriano Capuno INTERNATIONAL FLAVORS v ARGOS FACTS: Costa, the Spaniard managing director of International Flavors, issued a personnel announcement which described respondents as persona non grata and urged employees not to have further dealings with them. The respondents sued Costa for libel and impleaded International Flavors based on subsidiary liability under Art 33. ISSUE: WON International Flavors may be sued under Art 33 HELD: NO. Art 33 contemplates an action against the employee in his primary civil liability. It does not apply to an action against the employer to enforce its subsidiary civil liability, because such liability arises only after conviction of the employee in the criminal case. CORPUS v PAJE FACTS: Victory Liner bus driven by Paje collided with a jeep driven by Marcia. Marcia died and 2 other were seriously injured. An information for homicide and double serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence was filed against Paje. Heirs of Maria reserved the right to file a civil action separately and later did. ISSUE: WON the acquittal of Paje in the criminal case bars the civil action HELD: YES. The acquittal was based on the ground that the reckless imprudence or criminal negligence charged did not exist and the collision was pure accident. Criminal negligence is no one of the crimes mentioned in article 33, hence no separate civil action may be brought on the basis of the same article. NOTES: Law punishes the negligent act Action has also already prescribed According to Sangco, reckless imprudence is included in A365 Rule: RI is not included in Art. 33 hence there is NO independent civil action. Art. 100 will apply with respect to civil liability In Criminal negligence, act punished is the negligent/careless act, not the result BONITE v ZOSA FACTS: Bonite, a caminero of the Bureau of Public Highways was hit by a truck driven by Abamonga. Heirs filed a criminal complaint for Homicide thru Recless Imprudence where Abamonga was subsequently acquitted. The heirs then filed an action for recovery of damages but it was dismissed because they did not reserve the right to file an independent civil action. ISSUE: WON the heirs may file a separate civil action HELD: YES. The action was based on a quasi-delict. Art 29 does not include any requirement that there must be an express reservation to file a separate civil action.
Case Title (Year)
Facts
Issue(s)/Hel d
Ratio
Doctrine

Jervoso v. People (1990) (1) Pamaus saw Marcelo Jervoso, in the presence of his spouse and co-appellant Norma Closa, stab victim Rogelio Jervoso, with a pisao while the latter's back was turned on the assailant. Was the award of damages against Marcelo was proper? NO Sec. 1, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court ordain that the offended party may reserve his right to institute a civil action separately from the criminal action, provided that no double recovery of damages from the same act or omission of the accused may not be had. "Physical injuries" as contemplated in CC33 includes homicide committed in the consummated, attempted or frustrated degrees. Also: Thou shalt not recover damages more than once for the same act or omission complained of.
(2) Marcelo and Norma pleaded selfdefense which was not given credence (3) The courts found Marcelo guilty and ordered him to pay P30,000 civil indemnity to the heirs of Rogelio. (4) Marcelo avers that the award against him was not proper since Rogelio's heirs reserved their right to file a separate action against him. (1) Atty. Napoleon Dulay and Benigno Torzuela went into a fight, until Torzuela shot Dulay to death.
Dulay v. Court of Appeals (1995)
Will the independent civil action against Superguard prosper? YES
(2) Maria Dulay, widow of Napoleon, filed a case against Torzuela and his security agency, Superguard.
In this case, Maria Dulay invokes her right to recover damages from Superguard via vicarious liability (CC2180) for Torzuela's act of shooting. Superguard's contention that CC33 only applies to intentionally committed injuries cant prosper since Torzuela is not charged with reckless imprudence but homicide which falls under physical injuries under CC33.
CC33 only applies to intentional acts. The act complained of here being ex-delicto, a separate action based on CC33 lies.
VIII. HUMAN RELATIONS TORTS Case Title (Year) Velayo v. Shell (1956) Facts (1) Commercial Air Lines (CALI) purchased supplies from the Shell Co. of the P.I. ever since the former began operations. Issue(s)/Hel d (1) Did Shell Philippines betray the trust of CALI? YES Ratio Shell's transfer of its aforementioned credit would have been justified only if Mr. Fitzgerald (of Shell) had declined to take part in the Working Committee Doctrine CC19's provision, while it may only be a mere declaration of principle, such is implemeted by CC21. A moral wrong or injury, even if it does not constitute a

(2) Shell Philippines believed CALI was insolvent and will be unable to pay what the latter has bought from the former. (2) By reason of this betrayal, is Shell Philippines liable to answer for damages? YES and frankly and honestly informed the other creditors present that he had no authority to bind his principal and that the latter was to be left free to collect its credit from CALI by whatever means his principal deemed wise and were available to it. Shell is liable for damages under CC21 in relation to CC19. violation of a statute law, should be compensated by damages. Moral damages (CC2217) may be recovered (CC2219). In CC20, the liability for damages arises from a willful or negligent act contrary to law. In this article, the act is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy.
Globe Mackay v. Court of Appeals (1989)
(3) Creditors of CALI convened about the financial status of CALI and how to settle debts with said creditors with the agreement that they will not go to court to sue for collection. (4) At the date of said meeting Shell Philippines effected a telegraphic transfer of its credit to its U.S. counterpart, the Shell Union Co., which sued for attachment of CALI's properties in California. (1) Tobias was accused of his boss, Globe Mackay General Manager and EVP Herbert Hendry of being privy to various fictitious purchases and fraudulent transactions in the company. (2) Tobias was forced to take a leave, and when he returned Hendry called him a 'crook' and a 'swindler.' (3) The police investigators cleared Tobias of liability. Despite this, Globe Mackay lodged 6 criminal complaints against Tobias. (4) Unemployed, Tobias sought employment at RETELCO; Hendry, at his own behest, wrote RETELCO a letter stating that Tobias was dismissed by Globe Mackay for dishonesty.
Was there an abuse of rights by Hendry? YES
Globe Mackay claims that it did not violate any provision of law since it was merely exercising its legal right to dismiss Tobias. This does not, however, leave Tobias with no relief. CC21 provides: 'Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.' This article, adopted to remedy the "countless gaps in the statutes, which leave so many victims of moral wrongs helpless, even though they have actually suffered material and moral injury" should "vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold number of moral wrongs which it is impossible for human foresight to provide for specifically in the statutes."
CC19 sets certain standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of one's rights but also in the performance of one's duties: (1) to act with justice, (2) to give everyone his due and (3) to observe honesty and good faith. The law recognizes a primordial limitation to all rights.

Albenson Enterprises v. Court of Appeals (1993) Albenson sued the wrong Eugenio Baltao for violation of B.P. 22. Was there an abuse of rights or malicious prosecution? NEITHER This was a case of mistaken identity, for the records of the case reveal that Albenson took the effort to check with the SEC and the DTI who the person they were dealing with. Thus, no bad faith can be imputed against Albenson that will warrant a cause of action under CC19-21. There is also no malicious prosecution here because Albenson has acted with probable cause. There is a common element under CC19 and 21 and that is, the act must be intentional. However, CC20 does not distinguish: the act may be done either "willfully", or "negligently".
Amonoy v. Gutierrez (2001)
(1) Amonoy was counsel in a case where parcels of land were adjudicated to his clients and eventually, to Angela Gutierrez. On these lots was the residence of Gutierrez. As security for the payment of Amonoy's attorney's fees, a chattel mortgage was executed over the property. Upon foreclosure, Amonoy began demolition of the house.
Is Amonoy liable for damages to the Gutierrezes? YES
Amonoy did not heed the TRO issued by the court against the writ of demolition. He proceeded nonetheless. The principle of damnum absque injuria finds no application in this case, there being abuse of right by Amonoy.
(2) Amonoy proceeded with demolition even with a TRO from the lower court. Eventually, the TRO was made permanent by the Supreme Court.
Albeson v. Court of Appeals: Concept of Abuse of Rights: CC19 is known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, sets certain standards which may be observed not only in the exercise of one's rights but also in the performance of one's duties. These standards are the following: to act with justice; to give everyone his due; recognizes the primordial limitation on all rights: that in their exercise, the norms of human conduct set forth in CC19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible.

University of the East v. Jader (2000) Jader was enrolled at the U.E. College of Law, took a Practice Court class and did not know that he incurred a grade of 5.0 until after he was allowed to graduate from law school. Can an educational institution may be held liable for damages for misleading a student into believing that the latter had satisfied all the requirements for graduation when such is not the case? YES (1) Was there an abuse of rights here by Phelps? NO U.E. is under a contractual obligation to inform the student of his status in the school. U.E.'s not informing Jader of his status is indicative of bad faith in the part of U.E. Absence of good faith must be sufficiently established for a successful prosecution by the aggrieved party in a suit for abuse of right under CC19. Good faith connotes an honest intention to abstain from taking undue advantage of another, even though the forms and technicalities of the law, together with the absence of all information or belief of facts, would render the transaction unconscientious.
Barons Marketing v. Court of Appeals (1998)
Barons dealt with Phelps Dodge for its wire and cable needs. Barons had an unpaid account with Phelps. Barons requested to settle the amount through payment by installments, but instead Phelps filed a collection suit against Barons. Now Barons contends that Phelps abused its right to collect payment when it ignored Barons' request to settle the amounnt via installment payments.
There was no abuse of rights where there is no bad faith.
(2) Is Barons liable to pay interest and attorney's fees? YES
This being a breach of contract and the contract containing a penal clause in case of breach, Barons is liable to pay interest and attorney's fees on the finding of breach.
To constitute abuse of rights, there must be bad faith or intent to prejudice the plaintiff. Citing Tolentino: There is undoubtedly an abuse of right when it is exercised for the only purpose of prejudicing or injuring another. When the objective of the actor is illegitimate, the illicit act cannot be concealed under the guise of exercising a right. xxx The exercise of a right must be in accordance with the purpose for which it was established, and must not be excessive or unduly harsh; there must be no intention to injure another.

Diaz v. Davao Light & Power Corp. (2007) Diaz unilaterally installed a meter to replace another one. There was a notice of disconnection and eventually, the connection was cut. There was a notice of disconnection and eventually, the connection was cut. There was a petition for mandatory injunction to restore connection. It was however settled by way of a compromise agreement where the parties agreed to reduce the DLPCs claim and to waive the counterclaim and to install the electric service. There was no agreement to bar the institution of other action. Is Diaz entitled to damages under CC19, 20, 21 and 2217? NO There was no malice or bad faith. Petitioner himself alleged in his complaint that he unilaterally installed a meter after it was removed by DLPC. No less than the Court, admonished petitioner and reminded him that connections of electrical service and installations of electric meters should always be upon mutual contract of the parties, and that payments for electrical consumption should also be made promptly whenever due. Based on these established facts, petitioner has not shown that the acts of respondent were done with the sole intent of prejudicing and injuring him. Good faith refers to the state of the mind which is manifested by the acts of the individual concerned. In consists of the intention to abstain from taking an unconscionable and unscrupulous advantage of another. Good faith is presumed and he who alleges bad faith has the duty to prove the same. Bad faith, on the other hand, does not simply connote bad judgment to simple negligence, dishonest purpose or some moral obloquy and conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of known duty due to some motives or interest or ill-will that partakes of the nature of fraud. Malice connotes ill-will or spite and speaks not in response to duty. It implies an intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable harm. Malice is bad faith or bad motive. While mere breach of contract is not an actionable wrong, CC21 provides that when the person willfully causes loss or injury contrary to good custom, he shall compensate the latter for damages. It is the abuse of right which can be a cause for moral and material damages.
Wassmer v. Velez (1964)
Velez and Wassmer decided to get married. Many preparations were already made. Two days before the wedding, Velez went away, leaving a note that said his mother disapproved of the wedding. He promised to return soon, but he did not.
Is Velez liable for the cost of wedding preparations by Wassmer? YES
This is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry. To formally set a wedding and go through all the above-described preparation and publicity, only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which defendant must be held answerable in damages in accordance with CC21. There can be no seduction in this case because there was voluntariness and passion from Santos. For a whole year from 1958 to 1959, Santos maintained sexual relations with Tanjanco. Such a fact negates seduction.
Tanjanco v. Santos (1966)
(1) Tanjanco paid court to Santos. Both were adults. (2) Regularly until December 1959, through his profession of love and promises of marriage, Tanjanco succeeded in having sex with Santos, as a result of which Santos bore a child. (3) Pregnant and embarrassed, Santos resigned from her job. She sued Tanjanco for damages, claiming that she had been seduced.
Does CC21 apply here? NO
If a girl above 18 years old is seduced, she can file an action based on CC21, but since there is no seduction here, there can be no cause of action under the said provision.

Baksh v. Court of Appeals (1993) Marilou Gonzales sues Gashem Shookat Baksh, an Iranian medical student in Pangasinan for various abuses committed by the latter against her: She was maltreated, injured and forced to cohabit with him. All this happened after he promised to marry her. Does CC21 apply here? YES Baksh's "fraudulent and deceptive protestations of love for and promise to marry plaintiff that made her surrender her virtue and womanhood to him and to live with him on the honest and sincere belief that he would keep said promise, and it was likewise these fraud and deception on appellant's part that made plaintiff's parents agree to their daughter's living-in with him preparatory to their supposed marriage." Where a man's promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in a sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of damages pursuant to CC21 not because of such promise to marry but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury to her honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential, however, that such injury should have been committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy. The wrong he had caused her and her family is indeed immeasurable considering the fact that he is a married man. Verily, he has committed an injury to Lolitas family in a manner contrary to morals, good customs and public policy as contemplated in CC21. (But, why was the family even allowed locus standi here when they were not really the aggrieved party?) One cannot be held liable in damages for maliciously instituting a prosecution where he acted with probable cause. A suit will lie only in cases where a legal prosecution has been
Pe v. Pe (1962)
Pe, a married man, visited Lolita Pe on the pretext that he wanted her to teach him to pray the rosary. They fell in love and conducted clandestine trysts. When the parents learned about this, they prohibited defendant from going to their house. The affair continued just the same.
Can the defendant be held liable under CC21? YES
Que v. Intermediate Appellate Court (1989)
(1) Nicolas ordered from Que canvas strollers for P7,600. (2) Nicolas gave Que 5 checks in payment therefor.
Was Que guilty of malicious prosecution? NO
The defendant employed an ingenious scheme to make Lolita fall in love with him. The frequent visits on the pretext of learning the rosary was proof of this. From this chain of events than that the defendant not only deliberately, but through a clever strategy, succeeded in winning the affection and love of Lolita to the extent of having illicit relations with her. Que had probable cause to institute the estafa case against Nicolas: the dishonor of the checks despite Que's protests, Que filed the case because of his own anxiety to protect his rights

(3) Unable to encash said checks, Que filed an estafa complaint against Nicolas. Nicolas ordered to stop payment on the checks because the articles delivered to him were defective. Nicolas in return filed an action for malicious prosecution against Que.
due to Nicolas actions of simply cutting short a mutually profitable association. Did the RTC judge err in ruling that a sufficient cause of action for malicious prosecution exists? YES The three elements of malicious prosecution were absent in this case.
Drilon v. Court of Appeals (2001)
Adaza was suing petitioners for malicious experimentation by filing against him a charge of rebellion complexed with murder and frustrated murder when petitioners, according to Adaza, were fully aware of the non-existence of such crime in the statute books.
Magbanua v. Junsay (2007)
(1) Magbanua and Junsay were charged with robbery.
(2) RTC acquitted Magbanua for insufficiency of evidence.
(3) Magbanua filed action for malicious prosecution against Junsay, her employer, Ibarra Lopez and members of the police force
Was the filing of the criminal complaint against Magbanua malicious prosecution? NO
There was probable cause present in her case based from her own confession. o Probable cause: such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief, in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief. Thus, a finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction.
carried on without probable cause. If the charge, although false, was made with an honest belief in its truth and justice, and there were reasonable grounds on Elements of malicious prosecution: (1) the fact of the prosecution and the further fact that the defendant was himself the prosecutor and that the action finally terminated with an acquittal; (2) that in bringing the action, the prosecutor acted without probable cause; (3) that the prosecutor was actuated or impelled by legal malice, that is by improper or sinister motive. The gravamen of malicious prosecution is not the filing of a complaint based on the wrong provision of law, but the deliberate initiation of an action with the knowledge that the charges were false and groundless.

Grand Union Supermarket v. Espino (1979) Jose L. Espino, civil engineer and executive at Procter & Gamble went to Grand Union's grocery where he was accused of shoplifting when he inadvertently carried on his way out a rat file without paying for it first. In the process he was humiliated in front of other grocers and in the presence of his family. Are damages properly awarded against Grand Union? YES The evidence sustains the court's finding that the plaintiff had absolutely no intention to steal the file." The totality of the facts and circumstances as found by the Court of Appeals unerringly points to the conclusion that private respondent did not intend to steal the file and that is act of picking up the file from the open shelf was not criminal nor done with malice or criminal intent for on the contrary, he took the item with the intention of buying and paying for it. There was sufficient evidence on record to show that Carpios act was done with malice and in bad faith. In the sphere of our law on human relations, the victim of a wrongful act or omission, whether done willfully or negligently, is not left without any remedy or recourse to obtain relief for the damage or injury he sustained. Incorporated into our civil law are not only principles of equity but also universal moral precepts which are designed to indicate certain norms that spring from the fountain of good conscience and which are meant to serve as guides for human conduct. Quisaba's complaint was grounded not on his dismissal per se as in fact he does not ask for reinstatement or backwages, but on the manner of his dismissal and the consequent effects of such dismissal. It is against morals, good customs and public policy to humiliate, embarrass and degrade the dignity of a person. Everyone must respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons (CC26). And one must act with justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith (CC19). Also: Note here the importance of social standing in the award of damages. When a right is exercised in a manner which discards these norms resulting in damage to another, a legal wrong is committed for which the actor can be held accountable. In other words, a finding of bad faith in one's actions negates the defense of damnum absque injuria.
Carpio v. Valmonte (2004)
Leonora Valmonte is a wedding coordinator. At the wedding day of one of her clients, she was accused by Soledad Carpio of stealing her jewelry. Valmonte was bodily searched, and had a security detail following her around for the rest of the night, causing Valmonte social humiliation.
Are Carpio's imputations against Valmonte damna absque injuriaethat would bar Valmonte's recovery for damages? NO
Quisaba v. Sta. Ines-Melale Veneer and Plywood (1974)
(1) Quisaba filed a complaint against Sta. Ines-Melale for illegal termination. The complaint does not pray for reinstatement or payment of backwages. (2) Quisaba was temporarily relieved as internal auditor so that he could carry out immediately the instructions thus given, and he was warned that his failure to comply would be considered a ground for his dismissal.
Is Quisaba's complaint based on an employeremployee relationship which brings his case under the coverage of the jurisdiction of the NLRC?
The "right" of the respondents to dismiss Quisaba should not be confused with the manner in which the right was exercised and the effects flowing therefrom. If the dismissal was done antisocially or oppressively, as the complaint alleges, then the respondents violated CC1701which prohibits acts of oppression by either capital or labor against the other, and CC21, which makes a person

(3) Sta. Ines moved to dismiss the complaint on ground of lack of jurisdiction of the Davao CFI, asserting that the proper forum is the National Labor Relations Commission. The NLRC representative in Davao said, however, that actions for damages arising from an employer-employee relationship are beyond the jurisdiction of the NLRC. Garcia v. Salvador (2007) (1) Ranida D. Salvador started working as a trainee in the Accounting Department of Limay Bulk Handling Terminal, Inc. (the Company). As a prerequisite for regular employment, she underwent a medical examination at the Community Diagnostic Center (CDC). (2) When Ranida submitted the test result to Dr. Sto. Domingo, the Company physician, the latter apprised her that the findings indicated that she is suffering from Hepatitis B, a liver disease. She was consequently terminated from her job. When Ranida informed her father, Ramon, about her ailment, the latter suffered a heart attack and was hospitalized. (3) Ranida underwent other tests and indicated that she tested negative for Hepatitis B. (4) Ranida and her father now claim damages against Garcia for the erroneous test results. (1) St. Louis Realty caused to be published with the permission of Arcadio (but without the permission of Dr. Aramil) in an issue of the Sunday Times an advertisement which misrepresented that the house of Dr. Conrado Aramil belonged to Arcadio. (2) The advertisement showed the house of Dr. Aramil and the Arcadio family.
NO
Is Garcia liable for damages? YES
Ranida suffered injury as a direct consequence of Garcias failure to comply with the mandate of the laws and rules aforequoted. She was terminated from the service for failing the physical examination; suffered anxiety because of the diagnosis; and was compelled to undergo several more tests. All these could have been avoided had the proper safeguards been scrupulously followed in conducting the clinical examination and releasing the clinical report. The basis for the award of damages is CC20.
liable for damages if he wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy, the sanction for which, by way ofprovides: Every person CC20 moral damages, is who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same. The foregoing provision provides the legal basis for the award of damages to a party who suffers damage whenever one commits an act in violation of some legal provision. This was incorporated by the Code Commission to provide relief to a person who suffers damage because another has violated some legal provision.
St. Louis Realty Corp. v. Court of Appeals (1984)
Is St. Louis Realty liable for damages? YES
St. Louis Realty's employee was grossly negligent in mixing up the Aramil and Arcadio residences in a widely circulated publication like the Sunday Times. To suit its purpose, it never made any written apology and explanation of the mix-up. It just contented itself with a cavalier "rectification
"Prying into the privacy of another's residence" and "meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relations of another" and "similar acts", "though they may not constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action for damages, prevention and other relief" under

(3) When Dr. Aramil noticed the mistake he wrote St. Louis telling them that the advertisement was done without any permission or authority from him. He also said in the letter that the unauthorized use of his house and the distortions therein are not only transgressions of his private property but also damaging to his prestige in the medical profession. He mentioned that people are making remarks that he is merely renting or leasing the house form the Arcadios. Gregorio filed a complaint for damages against Sansio and Datuin for filing a criminal complaint for B.P. 22 against her. Sansio and Datuin even desisted from said complaint, realizing that Gregorio was not even a signatory to the dishonored checks subject of this case. Gregorio now claims that incalculable damage has been inflicted on the plaintiff on account of the defendants wanton, callous and reckless disregard of the fundamental legal precept that "every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons" (CC26).
".
CC26.
Gregorio v. Court of Appeals (2009)
Is Gregorio's complaint based on quasi-delict or malicious prosecution? Quasi-delict
Sansio and Datuin did not exercise diligent efforts to ascertain the true identity of the person who delivered to them insufficiently funded checks as payment for the various appliances purchased. Sansio and Datuin never gave Gregorio the opportunity to controvert the charges against her, because they stated an incorrect address in the criminal complaint. Gregorio claimed damages for the embarrassment and humiliation she suffered when she was suddenly arrested at her city residence in Quezon City while visiting her family.
CC26 grants a cause of action for damages, prevention, and other relief in cases of breach, though not necessarily constituting a criminal offense, of the following rights: (1) right to personal dignity; (2) right to personal security; (3) right to family relations; (4) right to social intercourse; (5) right to privacy; and (6) right to peace of mind. Gregorios rights to personal dignity, personal security, privacy, and peace of mind were infringed by Sansio and Datuin when they failed to exercise the requisite diligence in determining the identity of the person they should rightfully accuse of tendering insufficiently funded checks. This fault was compounded when they failed to ascertain the correct address of petitioner, thus depriving her of the opportunity to controvert the charges, because she was not given proper notice.
IX. STRICT LIABILITY BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY DEFINITION: Liability does not depend on actual negligence or intent to harm, but that is based on the breach of an absolute duty to make something safe. It most often applies either to ultra hazardous activities or in product liability cases. It is also known as absolute liability or liability without fault. NOTES: Test: when the conditions provided in the law exist, you are already liable
A. Possessor of animals Art. 2183, NCC The possessor of an animal or whoever may make use of the same is responsible for the damage which it may cause, although it may escape or be lost. This responsibility shall cease only in case the damage should come from force majeure or from the fault of the person who has suffered damage.
VESTIL v IAC

FACTS: Theness Uy was bitten by Andoy, the dog of Vestils father, when the victim was playing with Vestils child in their compound. Theness, who was only 3 yrs old, was brought to the hospital and was later discharged, but after 9 days she was readmitted for exhibiting signs of hydrophobia and vomiting of saliva. The next day she died of broncho-pneumonia. -Uys sued Vestil for being the possessor of Andoy. Vestils claimed that they dont own the dog, that it was a tame animal, and that Theness provoked the dog so it bit her. HELD: The obligation imposed by Article 2183 of the Civil Code is not based on the negligence or on the presumed lack of vigilance of the possessor or user of the animal causing the damage. It is based on natural equity and on the principle of social interest that he who possesses animals for his utility, pleasure or service must answer for the damage which such animal may cause. - While it is true that she is not really the owner of the house, which was still part of Vicente Miranda's estate, there is no doubt that she and her husband were its possessors at the time of the incident in question. - It does not matter that the dog was tame and was merely provoked by the child into biting her. The law does not speak only of vicious animals but covers even tame ones as long as they cause injury. As for the alleged provocation, the petitioners forget that Theness was only three years old at the time she was attacked and can hardly be faulted for whatever she might have done to the animal. NOTES: Ownership is immaterial. Remote control argument does not lie. This is a strict liability case. Does it matter if the dog is tamed or provoked? No. Law covers even tamed or provoked animals as long as they produce injury Dog follows the house: accessory follows the principal (so would a rat living in the house make the house owners liable if the rat bites a guest and causes the latters death?) Reaffirms the rule that children are incapable of negligence B. Things thrown or falling from a building Art. 2193 The head of a family that lives in a building or a part thereof, is responsible for damages caused by things thrown or falling from the same. NOTES: FACTS: -The Dingcongs rented a house and established Central Hotel. Kanaan, et.al. rented the ground floor of house where they established the American Bazaar. Echeverria rented room in the hotel. -One night, Echevarria, carelessly left the faucet open when retiring to bed, causing the water to run off and spill to the ground, wetting the articles and merchandise of the Kanaan's "American Bazaar" in the ground floor. Kanaans filed complaint for damages against Echevarria and Dingcongs. HELD: -Echevarria is liable for being the one who directly, by his negligence in leaving open the faucet, caused the water to spill to the ground and wet the articles and merchandise of the plaintiffs. -Dingcong, being a co-tenant and manager of the hotel, with complete possession of the house, must also be responsible for the damages caused. He failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of the family to prevent these damages, despite his power and authority to cause the repair of the pipes. NOTES: Is A2193,CC applicable in this case? Prof. Casis seems to believe otherwise since A2193 speaks of the liability of a head of family when a structure or similar object falls off the balcony or second storey of his building. Dingcong is not the head of a family but a lessee. Can water be considered as a thing thrown or falling? In this case, yes. C. Death/Injuries in the course of employment Art. 1711 Owners of enterprises and other employers are obliged to pay compensation for the death of or injuries to their laborers, workmen, mechanics or other employees, even though the event may have been purely accidental or entirely due to a fortuitous cause, if the death or personal injury arose out of and in the course of the employment. The employer is also liable for compensation if the employee contracts any illness or disease caused by such employment or as the result of the nature of the employment. If the mishap was due to the employee's own notorious negligence, or voluntary act, or drunkenness, the employer shall not be liable for compensation. When the employee's lack of due care contributed to his death or injury, the compensation shall be equitably reduced.
This provision applies regardless of how things fell from the house. DINGCONG v KANAAN
NOTES: Who is liable? Employers, owners of establishment Who are they liable to? Laborers, employees

Under what conditions? Death or illness arising out of the course of employment Sunday, he did not do so in pursuance of his employment, and his employer is not liable for any injury sustained by him. NOTES: Defenses available to an employer: a) notorious negligence, b) voluntary act of the employee and c) drunkenness. Case distinguishes arising out of and in the course of. The first refers to the origin or cause of the accident. The latter refers to the time, place, and circumstances under which the accident takes place. It is not inconsistent with Castilex because Castilex is actually not applicable for it refers to a different matter: Liability of the employer to a third person, and not to the employee himself. ALARCON v. ALARCON Facts: School teacher hired two people to dig a well on his land. One died while being lowered into the dug hole because of an obnoxious odor and hot air that caused asphyxia. Held: Teacher is not liable because 1711 applies only to owners of enterprises and other employers operating businesses or engaged in a particular industry or trade which requires the contracting of laborers services. 1711 excludes purely casual employees and for acts performed not for the purposes of occupation or business of the employer. NOTES: Why differentiate between 1711 and 2180 where latter requires only the control test but the former requires control and industry and business? Because purpose of 1711 is to limit the application to those kinds of employer and contemplates injuries particular to the business D. Product liability Art. 2187 Manufacturers and processors of foodstuffs, drinks, toilet articles and similar goods shall be liable for death or injuries caused by any noxious or harmful substances used, although no contractual relation exists between them and the consumers. NOTES: Who is liable? Manufacturers and processors of foodstuffs, drinks, toilet articles Under what circumstances? Death or injuries caused by noxious or harmful substances Who are they liable to? Anyone who consumed goods (even if goods were stolen)
Art. 1712 If the death or injury is due to the negligence of a fellow worker, the latter and the employer shall be solidarily liable for compensation. If a fellow worker's intentional malicious act is the only cause of the death or injury, the employer shall not be answerable, unless it should be shown that the latter did not exercise due diligence in the selection or supervision of the plaintiff's fellow worker.
AFABLE v SINGER SEWING MACHINE FACTS: -One Sunday afternoon, Leopoldo Madlangbayan, a collector for the Singer Sewing Machine Company, while riding his bicycle was run over and killed by a truck. At the time of his death he was returning home after making some collections. -The widow and children of Madlangbayan brought an action to recover from the defendant corporation under Act No. 3428, as amended by Act. No. 3812. The complaint was subsequently amended, and they sought to recover under sections 8 and 10 of Act No. 3428. RATIO: -The phrase "due to and in the pursuance of" used in section 2 of Act No. 3428 was changed in Act No. 3812 to "arising out of and in the course of". -The words "arising out of" refer to the origin or cause of the accident, and are descriptive of its character, while the words "in the course of" refer to the time, place, and circumstances under which the accident takes place. By the use of these words it was not the intention of the legislature to make the employer an insurer against all accidental injuries which might happen to an employee while in the course of the employment, but only for such injuries arising from or growing out of the risks peculiar to the nature of the work in the scope of the workman's employment of incidental to such employment, and accidents in which it is possible to trace the injury to some risk or hazard to which the employee is exposed in a special degree by reason of such employment. Risks to which all persons similarly situated are equally exposed and not traceable in some special degree to the particular employment are excluded. -As a general rule an employee is not entitled to recover from personal injuries resulting from an accident that befalls him while going to or returning from his place of employment, because such an accident does no arise out of and in the course of his employment. -If the deceased saw fit to change his residence from San Francisco del Monte to Manila and to make use a bicycle in going back and forth, he did so at his own risk, as the defendant company did not furnish him a bicycle or require him to use one; and if he made collections on

(b) that the consumer or third party is solely at fault. Consumer Act Art. 97. Liability for the Defective Products. - Any Filipino or foreign manufacturer, producer, and any importer, shall be liable for redress, independently of fault, for damages caused to consumers by defects resulting from design, manufacture, construction, assembly and erection, formulas and handling and making up, presentation or packing of their products, as well as for the insufficient or inadequate information on the use and hazards thereof. A product is defective when it does not offer the safety rightfully expected of it, taking relevant circumstances into consideration, including but not limited to: (a) presentation of product; (b) use and hazards reasonably expected of it; (c) the time it was put into circulation. A product is not considered defective because another better quality product has been placed in the market. The manufacturer, builder, producer or importer shall not be held liable when it evidences: (a) that it did not place the product on the market; (b) that although it did place the product on the such product has no defect; (c) that the consumer or a third party is solely at fault. Art. 106. Prohibition in Contractual Stipulation. The stipulation in a contract of a clause preventing, exonerating or reducing the obligation to indemnify for damages effected, as provided for in this and in the preceding Articles, is hereby prohibited, if there is more than one person responsible for the cause of the damage, they shall be jointly liable for the redress established in the pertinent provisions of this Act. However, if the damage is caused by a component or part incorporated in the product or service, its manufacturer, builder or importer and the person who incorporated the component or part are jointly liable. Art. 107. Penalties. Any person who shall violate any provision of this Chapter or its implementing rules and regulations with respect to any consumer product which is not food, cosmetic, or hazardous substance shall upon conviction, be subject to a fine of not less than Five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) and by imprisonment of not more that one (1) year or both upon the discretion of the court. In case of judicial persons, the penalty shall be imposed upon its president, manager or head. If the offender is an alien, he shall, after payment of fine and service of sentence, be deported without further deportation proceedings.
market
Art. 99. Liability for Defective Services. - The service supplier is liable for redress, independently of fault, for damages caused to consumers by defects relating to the rendering of the services, as well as for insufficient or inadequate information on the fruition and hazards thereof. The service is defective when it does not provide the safety the consumer may rightfully expect of it, taking the relevant circumstances into consideration, including but not limited to: (a) the manner in which it is provided; (b) the result of hazards which may reasonably be expected of it; (c) the time when it was provided. A service is not considered defective because of the use or introduction of new techniques. The supplier of the services shall not be held liable when it is proven: (a) that there is no defect in the service rendered;
CHAPTER VI. Prohibited Acts and Penalties (RA3720 Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act) Sec. 11. The following acts and the causing thereof are hereby prohibited: (a) The manufacture, sale, offering for sale or transfer of any food, drug, device or cosmetic that is adulterated or misbranded. (b) The adulteration or misbranding of any food, drug, device, or cosmetic. (c) The refusal to permit entry or inspection as authorized by Section twenty-seven hereof or to allow samples to be collected. (d) The giving of a guaranty or undertaking referred to in Section twelve (b) hereof which guaranty or undertaking is false, except by a person who relied upon a guaranty or undertaking to the same effect signed by, and containing the name and address of, the person residing in the Philippines from whom he received in good faith the food, drug, device, or cosmetic or the giving of a guaranty or undertaking referred to in Section twelve (b) which guaranty or undertaking is false. (e) Forging, counterfeiting, simulating, or falsely representing or without proper authority using any mark, stamp, tag label, or other

identification device authorized or required by regulations promulgated under the provisions of this Act. ( f ) The using by any person to his own advantage, or revealing, other than to the Secretary or officers or employees of the Department or to the courts when relevant in any judicial proceeding under this Act, any information acquired under authority of Section nine, or concerning any method or process which as a trade secret is entitled to protection. (g) The alteration, mutilation, destruction, obliteration, or removal of the whole or any part of the labeling of, or the doing of any other act with respect to, a food, drug, device, or cosmetic, if such act is done while such article is held for sale (whether or not the first sale) and results in such article being adulterated or misbranded. (h) The use, on the labeling of any drug or in any advertising relating to such drug, of any representation or suggestion that an application with respect to such drug is effective under Section twenty-one hereof, or that such drug complies with the provisions of such section. (i) The use, in labeling, advertising or other sales promotion of any reference to any report or analysis furnished in compliance with Section twenty-six hereof. NOTES: Is a restaurant owner a seller or a processor? Could the company stipulate limited liability? No. A106 of the Consumer Act. If basis is not Consumer Act, you can use 2187 on strict liability which is a powerful provision except against sellers (law on SALES will be the basis in this case) Elements of 2187: 1) causal link 2) manufacturers, processors What do you mean by similar goods?-Sangco-consumed by humans. Question: What about those consumed by animals? Do you apply strict liability even if defendant exercised due diligence? Yes. Precisely why it is called strict liability Can RES IPSA LOQUITUR apply? Only if the defect in the items is of such nature and character that do not change. COCA-COLA v CA FACTS: Geronimo sold food and softdrinks in a school canteen. A group of parents complained that fibrous materials were found in the softdrink bottles bought by their children. Upon inspection by the DOH, the bottles were found to be adulterated. The sales of Geronimo drastically dropped and she was forced to close shop. She brought an action for damages against Coca-cola and the trial court ruled that the complaint was based on a contract, not quasi-delict and should have been filed within 6 months from the delivery of the softdrinks. Geronimo argues that her case is based on quasi-delict and should prescribe in 4 years. HELD: The Court sided with Geronimo. The vendees remedies against a vendor with respect to the warranties against hidden defects or encumbrances upon the thing sold are not limited to those prescribed in A1567. The vendee may also ask for the annulment of the contract upon proof of error or fraud in which case the ordinary rule on obligations shall be applicable. NOTES: Requisites of 2187: 1) death or injury caused by noxious substance and 2) by manufacturer or processor What is similar goods? Anything intended to be consumed by humans. What if the person who consumed the goods did not buy them but stole them? The manufacturer/processor may still be held liable. II SANGCO (p. 714-734) Product Liability 1. Governing law: Art. 2187, NCC The elimination in this article of both fault or negligence and contract as the basis of liability thereunder are the essence of strict liability. The consumers cause of action does not depend upon the validity of his contract with the person from whom he acquires the product, and it is not affected by any disclaimer or other agreement. However, Art. 2187 does not preclude an action based on negligence for the same act of using noxious or harmful substance in the manufacture or processing of the foodstuff, drinks, toilet articles, or similar goods which caused the death or injury complained of, if the injured party opts to recover on that theory. Neither does this article preclude an action for breach of contract and warranty. 2. Requisites of liability under Art. 2187, Civil Code (1) Defendant is a manufacturer or processor of foodstuff, drinks, toilet articles and similar goods; (2) He use noxious or harmful substances in the manufacture or processing of the foodstuff, drinks, toilet articles consumed or used by the plaintiff; (3) Plaintiffs death or injury was caused by the product so consumed or used; and (4) The damages sustained and claimed by the plaintiff and the amount thereof.
The burden of proof that the product was in a defective condition at the time it left the hands of the manufacturer and particular seller is upon the injured plaintiff.

3. Persons who may be held liable, and for what products Manufacturers and processors who used noxious or harmful substances may be held liable. -sellers of the enumerated goods which turn out to be injuriously defective CANNOT be held liable for the obvious reason that they have nothing to do either with the defect or with the manufacture of such product Products: limited to foodstuffs, drinks, toilet articles and similar goods 4. Proof that food product was defective or unwholesome The one seeking to recover is under the duty of proving with reasonable certainty that the food eaten was in fact deleterious. Proof of a defect in the product may not be supplied by the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, unless the product is one whose character and content must necessarily have remained unchanged since it left the manufacturers possession. Expert testimony is generally necessary to prove the defect in the product. It must appear that the unwholesome or unsound quality of the food product in question existed at the time the defendant sold it, and did not come into existence thereafter. 5. Proof of causation One seeking recovery has the burden of proof that the resulting illness was caused by the deleterious food. A manufacturers strict liability in tort should be defined in terms of the safety of the product in normal and proper use. The plaintiff must allege and prove that he was using the product in the way it was intended to be used. 6. Who may recover A purchasing and non-purchasing consumer or user of a defective food product or toilet article is entitled to recover damages for physical injuries caused thereby. 7. Compensable Damages Expressly limited to death or injuries caused by any noxious or harmful substance used by manufacturers and processors of foodstuffs, drinks, toilet articles and similar goods. Applicable only to personal injuries, which includes death, and only damages arising therefrom. This precludes claims for purely pecuniary or commercial losses in absence of personal injuries. 8. Unavoidably unsafe product The seller of unavoidably unsafe products, with qualification that they are properly prepared and marketed, and proper warning is given, where the situation calls for it, is not to be held to strict liability for unfortunate consequences attending their use, merely because he has undertaken to supply the public with apparently reasonable risk. Liability for negligence in food products. To constitute negligence an act must be one from which a reasonably careful person would foresee such an appreciable risk of harm to others as to cause him to forego the act or to do it in a more careful manner. Whether recovery is sought under strict liability or on fault or negligence, it would seem contributory negligence would diminish recovery. a. Duty of care of manufacturer or processor of food. The duty owed to the consumer by the manufacturer of food products intended for human consumption is commensurate with the danger and the possible and probable result of a lack of care. A high degree of care is required of the producer of foods (in the production of such product, advertising, inspecting the ingredients and warning the consumers of possible injury from consumption of a food). b. Duty of care of restaurant operator A restaurateur has no duty to serve perfect products. But the law of negligence requires him to exercise a care proportionate to the serious consequences that may follow from a want of care. c. Duty of seller other than restaurant operator. A vendor of provisions selected, sold, and delivered to the purchaser for his immediate use is bound to know the peril that the provisions are sound and wholesome and fit for immediate use, and if they turn out to be unsound and not wholesome, and the purchaser is injured thereby, the vendor is liable to him. d. Duty of warning; inspecting; testing. A manufacturer or seller of a product which, to his actual or constructive knowledge, involves danger to users has a duty to give warning of such danger. As a matter of elementary logic, no duty to warn arises with respect to a product which is not in fact dangerous. The vendor of food should indemnify his vendee against latent defects contained in the product which the vendee, by inspection or taste, could not have discovered himself. The test of commodities required is no more than that commonly or usually practised by careful dealers under the same conditions and circumstances, which is at least as high a duty of care as the consumer expects or has the right to expect of his groceryman or food dealer.

NOTE: The seller is not liable when he delivers the product in a safe condition and subsequent mishandling or other causes makes it harmful by the time it is consumed. Important: Requisites of 2187 in Sangco If it falls under A2187, can you still sue for breach of contract? Sangco says, yes. E. Interference with contractual relations Art. 1314 Any third person who induces another to violate his contract shall be liable for damages to the other contracting party. No damages were due from Espejo because no malice was proven (the motive was only to make profit). Is malice an element of tortuous interference? Court does not say that it is. Justifications for Interference: Competition and Equal/Superior right.
GILCHRIST v CUDDY FACTS: Cuddy was the owner of the film Zigomar. Gilchrist was the owner of a theatre in Iloilo. They entered into a contract whereby Cuddy leased to Gilchrist the Zigomar for exhibition in his theatre for a week for P125. -Days before the delivery date, Cuddy returned the money already paid by Gilchrist so that he can lease the film to Espejo and Zaldarriaga instead and receive P350 for the film for the same period. -Gilchrist filed a case for specific performance against Cuddy, Espejo and Zaldarriaga. He also prayed for damages against Espejo and Zaldarriaga for interfering with the contract between Gilchrist and Cuddy. ISSUE: WON Espejo and Zaldarriaga are liable for interfering with the contract between Gilchrist and Cuddy, they not knowing at the time the identity of the parties HELD: YES, Appellants have the legal liability for interfering with the contract and causing its breach. This liability arises from unlawful acts and not from contractual obligations to induce Cuddy to violate his contract with Gilchrist. -ART 1902 CC provides that a person who, by act or omission causes damage to another when there is fault or negligence, shall be obliged to pay for the damage done. There is nothing in this article which requires as a condition precedent to the liability of the tortfeasor that he must know the identity of a person to whom he causes damage. No such knowledge is required in order that the injured party may recover for the damages suffered. NOTES: Had legal liability but not under A1314. There is tortuous interference because business interest is interference. Is malice required to apply A1314?
SO PING BUN v CA FACTS: Tek Hua Trading originally entered into a lease agreement with DC Chuan covering stalls in Binondo. The contracts were initially for 1 year but were continued on month to month basis upon expiration of the 1 yr. Tek Hua was dissolved, original members of Tek Hua formed Tek Hua Enterprises (THE) with Manuel Tiong as one of the incorporators. However, the stalls were occupied by the grandson (So Ping Bun) of one of the original incorporators of Tek Hua under business name Trendsetter Marketing. -new lease contracts with increase in rent were sent to THE, although not signed. -THE through Tiong asked So Ping Bun to vacate the stalls so THE would be able to go back to business BUT instead, SO PING BUN SECURED A NEW LEASE AGEEMENT WITH DC CHUAN. ISSUE: WON So Ping Bun was guilty of tortuous interference of contract HELD: Yes. A duty which the law on torts is concerned with is respect for the property of others, and a cause of action ex delicto may be predicated upon an unlawful interference by one party of the enjoyment of the other of his private property. In the case at bar, petitioner, Trendsetter asked DC Chuan to execute lease contracts in its favor, and as a result petitioner deprived respondent of the latters property right. - Damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from injury, and damages are the recompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered. - One becomes liable in an action for damages for a nontrespassory invasion of anothers interest in the private use and enjoyment of asset if: a) the other has property rights and privileges with respect to the use or enjoyment interfered with; b) the invasion is substantial; c) the defendants conduct is a legal cause of the invasion; d) the invasion is either intentional and unreasonable or unintentional and actionable under the general negligence rules. - elements of tort interference: a) existence of a valid contract b) knowledge on the part of the third party of its existence c) interference of the third party is without legal justification or excuse - Since there were existing lease contracts between Tek Hua and DC Chuan, Tek Hua in fact had property rights over the leased stalls. The

action of Trendsetter in asking DC Chuan to execute the contracts in their favor was unlawful interference. - The SC handled the question of whether the interference may be justified considering that So acted solely for the purpose of furthering his own financial or economic interest. It stated that it is sufficient that the impetus of his conduct lies in a proper business interest rather than in wrongful motives to conclude that So was not a malicious interferer. Nothing on the record imputes deliberate wrongful motives or malice on the part of So. Hence the lack of malice precludes the award of damages. - The provision in the Civil Code with regard tortuous interference is Article 1314. NOTES: Did not include malice as one of the elements under A1314. Then discussed Gilchrist in saying that to award damages, there should be malice but it was never mentioned in Gilchrist in the first place. Implied malice as an element. De Leon included malice as an element. Sir said as guidance: If we apply Gilchrist and So Ping Bun, we need malice in 1314. But if question is just on the elements, just answer the three elements given by So Ping Bun. So Ping Bun was okay had it not cited Gilchrist Sir said that it seems this is the case right now: You can compete in Business Contracts as long as intention is financial interest and there is no malice. If this is the case, then one cannot recover from 1314 as against the third party. A. Statutory provision and rationale: Under Article 1314 of the Civil Code, a third party may sue a third party not for breach of contract but for inducing another to commit such breach. This tort is known as interference with contractual relations. Such interference is considered tortious because it violates the rights of the contacting parties to fulfill the contract and to have it fulfilled, to reap the profits resulting therefrom, and to compel the performance by the other party. The theory is that a right derived from a contract is a property right that entitles each party to protection against all the world and any damage to said property should be compensated. B. History: This particular tort started in the UK in Lumley vs, Gye in 1853 and was first adopted in the Philippines in 1915 in Gilchrist vs Cuddy. C. Elements: 1. Existence of a valid contract: This existence is necessary and the breach must occur because of the alleged act of interference. No tort is committed if the party had already broken the contract. Neither can action be maintained if the contract is void. However, there is authority for the view that an action for interference can be maintained even if the contract is unenforceable. The view is that inducement, if reprehensible in an enforceable contracts, is equally reprehensible in an unenforceable one. 2. Knowledge on the part of the third party of the existence of the contract: The elements do not include malice as a necessary act in interference. However, the Supreme Court in its various rulings have held that the aggrieved party will only be entitled to damages if malice was present in the commission of the tortious act. It was held that mere competition is not sufficient unless it is considered unfair competition or the dominant purpose is to inflict harm or injury. 3. Interference of the third party without legal justification or excuse: In general, social policy permits a privilege or justification to intentionally invade the legally protected interests of others only if the defendant acts to promote the interests of others or himself if the interest which he seeks to advance is superior to the interest invaded in social importance. Competition in business also affords a privilege to interfere provided that the defendants purpose is a justifiable one and the defendant does not employ fraud or deception which are regarded as unfair. D. Extent of liability: The rule is that the defendant found guilty of interference with contractual relations cannot be held liable for more than the amount for which the party who was induced to break the contract can be held liable. This is consistent with Article 2202 if the contracting party who was induced to break the contract was in bad faith. However, when there is good faith, the party who breached the contract is only liable for consequence that can be foreseen. In fact, it is possible for the contracting party to be not liable at all, as in the
LAGON v. CA FACTS: there was a contract of lease between Sepi and Lapuz where latter is to construct commercial buildings, sublease it and pay the lease via his collection. However, while said lease was in force, Sepi sold the land to Lagon. Lapuz sued Lagon for interfering with his leasehold rights. HELD: Lagon is not liable. Elements of tortuous interference are absent. Lagon had no knowledge of the renewed lease because the owners did not tell him and the title had no indication of lease. There was no inducement on the part of Lagon because the heirs sold in on their own volition. There was also no malice because it was merely for the advancement of Lagons financial interests, thus precluding recovery of damages. AQUINO, (pp. 795-801) Interference with contracts:

case where the defendant prevented him from performing his obligation through force or fraud. F. Liability of local government units Art. 2189 Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of, or injuries suffered by, any person by reason of the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public works under their control or supervision. G. Liability of proprietors of buildings and engineers and architects of collapsed building Art. 2190. The proprietor of a building or structure is responsible for the damages resulting from its total or partial collapse, if it should be due to the lack of necessary repairs. (1907) Art. 2191. Proprietors shall also be responsible for damages caused: (1) By the explosion of machinery which has not been taken care of with due diligence, and the inflammation of explosive substances which have not been kept in a safe and adequate place; (2) By excessive smoke, which may be harmful to persons or property; (3) By the falling of trees situated at or near highways or lanes, if not caused by force majeure; (4) By emanations from tubes, canals, sewers or deposits of infectious matter, constructed without precautions suitable to the place. (1908) Art. 2192. If damage referred to in the two preceding articles should be the result of any defect in the construction mentioned in Article 1723, the third person suffering damages may proceed only against the engineer or architect or contractor in accordance with said article, within the period therein fixed. (1909) Art. 1723. The engineer or architect who drew up the plans and specifications for a building is liable for damages if within fifteen years from the completion of the structure, the same should collapse by reason of a defect in those plans and specifications, or due to the defects in the ground. The contractor is likewise responsible for the damages if the edifice falls, within the same period, on account of defects in the construction or the use of materials of inferior quality furnished by him, or due to any violation of the terms of the contract. If the engineer or architect supervises the construction, he shall be solidarily liable with the contractor. Acceptance of the building, after completion, does not imply waiver of any of the cause of action by reason of any defect mentioned in the preceding paragraph. The action must be brought within ten years following the collapse of the building. (n) X. DAMAGES
GUILATCO v CITY OF DAGUPAN FACTS: Guilatco, a court interpreter, fell into a manhole at Perez Blvd. which is owned by the national Government. She fractured her right leg, thus was hospitalized, operated on, and confined. City Engineer testified that he supervises the maintenance of said manholes and sees to it that they are properly covered. City Charter of Dagupan also says that the city supervises and manages National roads and national sidewalks. HELD: City liable - The liability of private corporations for damages arising from injuries suffered by pedestrians from the defective condition of roads is expressed in the Civil Code as follows: Article 2189. Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of, or injuries suffered by, any person by reason of the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public works under their control or supervision. - It is not even necessary for the defective road or street to belong to the province, city or municipality for liability to attach. The article only requires that either control or supervision is exercised over the defective road or street. - In this case, control or supervision is provided for in the charter of Dagupan and is exercised through the City Engineer. The charter only lays down general rules regulating that liability of the city. On the other hand, article 2189 applies in particular to the liability arising from defective streets, public buildings and other public works. NOTES: Can last clear chance apply? Wasnt it Guilatcos fault that she was negligent in alighting a tricycle? No because it is under strict liability. Sir said it is wise to apply this to the case of PLDT and the accident mound case (DACARA)

NOTES: Damages is not limited to quasi-delicts (also includes contracts, quasi-contracts and delicts). I. Definition and Concept Art. 2195. The provisions of this Title shall be respectively applicable to all obligations mentioned in Article 1157. Art. 2197. Damages may be: (1) Actual or compensatory; (2) Moral; (3) Nominal; (4) Temperate or moderate; (5) Liquidated; or (6) Exemplary or corrective. *DAMAGES may be defined as SATISFACTION FOR AN INJURY SUSTAINED,
SOME RIGHT. THE PECUNIARY COMPENSATION, RECOMPENSE , OR OR AS OTHERWISE EXPRESSED, THE PECUNIARY
Art. 2200. Indemnification for damages shall comprehend not only the value of the loss suffered, but also that of the profits which the obligee failed to obtain. Art. 2205. Damages may be recovered: (1) For loss or impairment of earning capacity in cases of temporary or permanent personal injury; (2) For injury to the plaintiff's business standing or commercial credit. NOTES: It is expressly provided for in Art. 2199 that there should be proof of pecuniary damages for AD or CD Take note of what indemnity is included in Art. 2200 Art. 2205 provides for the kinds of AD which the plaintiff may recover 1. Kinds PNOC v. CA FACTS: The M/V Ma. Efigenia XV, owned by respondent Ma. Efigenia Fishing Corp. collided with the vessel Petroparcel which at the time was owned by the Luzon Stevedoring Co. The Board of Marine Inquiry rendered a decision finding the Petroparcel at fault and thus the respondent filed an action for damages against Luzon Stevedoring and the Petroparcels captain. During the pendency of the case, petitioner PNOC acquired the Petroparcel and was substituted in place of Luzon Stevedoring in the complaint. HELD: ACTUAL OR COMPENSATORY OF, OR IN RECOMPENSE FOR LOSS OR
DAMAGES ARE THOSE AWARDED IN SATISFACTION INJURY SUSTAINED.
CONSEQUENCES WHICH THE LAW IMPOSES FOR THE BREACH OF SOME DUTY OR THE VIOLATION OF
Actual or compensatory damages are those awarded in satisfaction of, or in recompense for, loss or injury sustained, whereas moral damages may be invoked when the complainant has experienced mental anguish, serious anxiety, physical suffering, moral shock, and so forth, and had furthermore shown that these were the proximate result of the offenders wrongful act or omission. NOTES: Important for the definition of damages For actual damages, the party making claim must present best evidence (original documents). II. Kinds of Damages A. Actual or compensatory Art. 2216. No proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in order that moral, nominal, temperate, liquidated or exemplary damages, may be adjudicated. The assessment of such damages, except liquidated ones, is left to the discretion of the court, according to the circumstances of each case. Art. 2199. Except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled to an adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved. Such compensation is referred to as actual or compensatory damages.
THEY
PROCEED FROM A SENSE
OF NATURAL JUSTICE AND ARE DESIGNED TO REPAIR THE WRONG THAT HAS BEEN DONE, TO COMPENSATE FOR THE INJURY INFLICTED AND NOT TO IMPOSE A PENALTY.
In actions based on QD-AD include all the natural and probable consequences of the act or omission complained of. 2 kinds of AD or CD: 1. The loss of what a person already possesses (dao emergente) 2. the failure to receive as a benefit that which would have pertained to him (lucro cesante) On Nominal Damages: When awarded: in the absence of competent proof on the AD suffered-entitled to ND, which the law says is adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by the defendant may be vindicated and recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered.

-awarded in every obligation arising from law, contracts, quasicontracts, acts or omissions punished by law and QDs, or in every case where property right has been invaded. ND are damages in NAME only and NOT IN FACT. Where these are allowed, they are not treated as an equivalent of a wrong inflicted but simply in recognition of the existence of a technical injury. The amount to be awarded as ND shall be equal or at least commensurate to the injury sustained considering the concept and purpose of such damages. NOTES: The basic rule in recovering AD: it is sufficient that damages are capable of proof in order to recover (AD) There should be a record to serve as proof presented before the Court There are cases which say that providing a list of expenses is not enoughthere has to be receipts, etc.PROOF SHOULD BE VERY FACTUAL Proof required: reasonable certainty upon competent proof Two (2) kinds of AD or CD: 1. Dano emergente-actual 2. Lucro cesante-loss of profit 2. Extent Art. 2201, CC - In contracts and quasi-contracts, the damages for which the obligor who acted in good faith is liable shall be those that are the natural and probable consequences of the breach of the obligation, and which the parties have foreseen or could have reasonably foreseen at the time the obligation was constituted. In case of fraud, bad faith, malice or wanton attitude, the obligor shall be responsible for all damages which may be reasonably attributed to the non-performance of the obligation. Art. 2202, CC - In crimes and quasi-delicts, the defendant shall be liable for all damages which are the natural and probable consequences of the act or omission complained of. It is not necessary that such damages have been foreseen or could have reasonably been foreseen by the defendant. NOTES: Art. 2201 lays down the distinction between good faith and bad faith (in bad faithwhatever damage happens) Last sentence of Art. 2202 problematicsome cases use forseeability as an element of QD Forseeability: In elements: may be required In damages: not required Reasonable certainty required: allege specific facts, Present best evidence Quantum of evidence required: preponderance of evidence
3. Certainty -possible that the exact value (peso) is not known. PNOC v. CA FACTS: Collision of 2 vessels Certainty: to enable an injured party to recover AD or CD, he is required to prove the actual amount of loss with reasonable degree of certainty premised upon competent proof and on the best evidence available. Burden of Proof: on the party who would be defeated if no evidence would be presented on either side. Evidence Required: He must establish his evidence by PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE, which means that the evidence, as a whole, adduced by one side is superior to that of the other. Damages are not presumed: damages cannot be presumed and courts, in making an award must point out specific facts that could afford a basis for measuring whatever CD or AD are borne. NOTES: Problem here with preponderance of evidence is that it became COMPARATIVEall things being equal, the person who has more pieces of evidence wins What should be the basis: admissibility issue aside: number and quality of evidence presented and this is what makes it preponderant you should also prove your allegations though not necessarily beyond reasonable doubt 4. Damage to property PNOC v. CA Where goods are destroyed by the wrongful act of the defendant the plaintiff is entitled to their value at the time of destruction, that is, normally, the sum of money which he would have to pay in the market for identical or essentially similar goods, plus in a proper case damages for the loss of use during the period before replacement. In other words, in the case of profit-earning chattel s, what has to be assessed is the value of the chattel to its owner as a going concern at

the time and place of the loss, and this means, at least in the case of ships, that regard must be had to existing and pending engagements. In the instant case, the pieces of documentary evidence proffered by private respondent with respect to the items and equipment lost show similar items and equipment with corresponding prices approximately ten years after the collision. NOTES: Rule: amount at the time of the loss. cf Gatchalian v. Delim (where the girl was given 15k for plastic surgery) NOTES: o PNOC gives guidance as to how actual damages are computed: 1. Price (fair market value) at the time of loss, not what the price is at the time of the ruling 2. In PNOC, inflation was taken into account. 3. If fair market value already includes the possible contracts, then that is the value to be used. YU v. NGO YET TE Held: Actual damages may be recovered from wrongful attachment of property but not automatically. There must be proof of the nature and extent of the loss or injury concerned, of the fact of loss suffered. There need not be malice proved. 5. Personal Injury and Death Art. 2206. The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict shall be at least three thousand pesos, even though there may have been mitigating circumstances. In addition: (1) The defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning capacity of the deceased, and the indemnity shall be paid to the heirs of the latter; such indemnity shall in every case be assessed and awarded by the court, unless the deceased on account of permanent physical disability not caused by the defendant, had no earning capacity at the time of his death; (2) If the deceased was obliged to give support according to the provisions of Article 291, the recipient who is not an heir called to the decedent's inheritance by the law of testate or intestate succession, may demand support from the person causing the death, for a period not exceeding five years, the exact duration to be fixed by the court; (3) The spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the deceased may demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased. NOTES: Art. 2206 provides for earning capacity which is NOT equal to actual income GATCHALIAN v. DELIM October 21, 1991 FACTS: Reynalda Gatchalian boarded, as a paying passenger, a minibus owned by the Delim spouses, respondents in this case. She was allegedly on her way to confer with the district supervisor of public schools for a substitute teachers job. Later, while the bus was running along the highway, a snapping sound was suddenly heard and shortly thereafter, the vehicle bumped a cement flower pot on the side of the road, went off the road, turned turtle and fell into a ditch. Several passengers, including Gatchalian, were injured and were promptly taken to a hospital for medical treatment. The aforementioned events led Gatchalian to file an action extra contractu to recover compensatory and moral damages. She alleged in her complaint that her injuries had left her with a conspicuous white scar on her forehead, generating mental suffering and feeling of inferiority on her part. She also alleged that the scar diminished her facial beauty and deprived her of opportunities for employment. ISSUE: WON the Delims are liable for the cost of plastic surgery to remove the scar on Gatchalians forehead. HELD: Yes. A
ACTUAL PERSON IS ENTITLED TO THE PHYSICAL INTEGRITY OF HIS OR HER BODY; IF THAT INTEGRITY IS VIOLATED OR DIMINISHED, ACTUAL INJURY IS SUFFERED FOR WHICH AND COMPENSATORY DAMAGES ARE DUE AND ASSESSABLE. Petitioner Gatchalian is entitled to be placed as nearly as possible in the condition that she was in before the mishap.
SCAR, ESPECIALLY ONE ON THE FACE OF A WOMAN, RESULTING FROM THE INFLICTION OF INJURY
UPON HER, IS A VIOLATION OF BODILY INTEGRITY, GIVING RISE TO A LEGITIMATE CLAIM FOR RESTORATION TO HER CONDITION ANTE.
NOTES: This case is always cited to support that plastic surgery can be the subject of AD. Nature of action here: breach of contract of common carrier Sir: is there a health risk if you have a scar? So purely aesthetic? What was the proof offered for the scar? Expert testimony: alleged cost of 5-10k

Yet SC granted 15k based on a presumption that plastic surgery would cost more after several years (SO AD became speculative AND NOT PROVEN). Sir: technology makes things cheaper but SC here gave a presumption Most intriguing is the language of the Courtthe longer the scar has been, the more difficult it is to remove Gatchalian ruling is OK but the reasoning is funny This is still law so women can take advantage of this The case also cited Araneta vs. Areglado where a young boy sued for costs of surgery for removal of his scar on his face which caused a degenerative process and inferiority complex to the boy. Therefore since in this case it was just a boy, it was easier to remove the scar. In Reynaldas case, she was older so SC ASSUMED that removing scar would be harder Skewed in favor of the beautiful Relevance nung snapping sound accdg to sir: baka naman may turtle kaya nag-turn turtle ung bus! Art. 2208. In the absence of stipulation, attorney's fees and expenses of litigation, other than judicial costs, cannot be recovered, except: (1) When exemplary damages are awarded; (2) When the defendant's act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his interest; (3) In criminal cases of malicious prosecution against the plaintiff; (4) In case of a clearly unfounded civil action or proceeding against the plaintiff; (5) Where the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy the plaintiff's plainly valid, just and demandable claim; (6) In actions for legal support; (7) In actions for the recovery of wages of household helpers, laborers and skilled workers; (8) In actions for indemnity under workmen's compensation and employer's liability laws; (9) In a separate civil action to recover civil liability arising from a crime; (10) When at least double judicial costs are awarded; (11) In any other case where the court deems it just and equitable that attorney's fees and expenses of litigation should be recovered. In all cases, the attorney's fees and expenses of litigation must be reasonable. NOTES: Attorneys fees are in the form of damages (nasa title on damages) Also in the form of AD MEMORIZE THIS ARTICLE! You cant recover outside the listing of 2008 unless there is a stipulation
CANDANAO SHIPPING LINES v. SUGATA-ON Held: Compensation under the workmens compensation act serves to mitigate the harshness of industrial life for the workingman and his family. On the other hand, damages under the NCC serves as a vindication of wrongful invasion of rights. The latter is in the concept of an award. The formula for computing for net earning capacity: Net Earning Capacity = Life Expectancy [2/3 (80 Age of Deceased at time of death)] x [Gross Annual Income Reasonable and Necessary Living Expenses which is pegged at 50% absent proof to the contrary] PEOPLE v. BUBAN HELD: Civil indemnity due to a crime (murder) is in the nature of actual damages and is mandatorily granted to the heirs upon proving of the fact of the crime. It is granted without any need of proof other than the commission of the crime. NOTES: Civil Indemnity for Death is normally P75k and for Rape, P50k PEOPLE v. ASTROLOGO HELD: Civil indemnity due to a crime (rape) is in the nature of actual damages and is mandatorily granted to upon proving of the fact of the crime. It is granted without any need of proof other than the commission of the crime. NOTES: Civil Indemnity for Simple Rape is P50k, while P75k for Qualified Rape. 6. Attorneys Fees

AS regards the gen rule and exception, sir said it can be BOTH Why may one recover attorneys fees under those listed? person is forced to protect his interest and for at least double judicial costs, the person must have done something really bad AND be liable for a greater degree Why ED only? Why not for other damages as well? What is the rationale for the enumeration? A person is free to litigate. (Except 2208) Here, the petitioners claims are based on an alleged contract for professional services, with them as the creditors and the private respondents as the debtors. NOTES: Attorneys fees referred to by Quirante not the same as attorneys fees in 2208 What the difference?Attys fees in 2208 are a form of AD and hence need to be proven. This is not something that goes to the attorney but to the litigant GOMEZ v. GOMEZ-SAMSON FACTS: No attorneys fees because the suit filed was not an unfounded civil action. FRIAS v. SAN DIEGO-SISON FACTS: Attorneys Fees cannot be granted without basis, where it is mentioned only in the dispositive portion. 7. Interest Art. 2209. If the obligation consists in the payment of a sum of money, and the debtor incurs in delay, the indemnity for damages, there being no stipulation to the contrary, shall be the payment of the interest agreed upon, and in the absence of stipulation, the legal interest, which is six per cent per annum. Art. 2210. Interest may, in the discretion of the court, be allowed upon damages awarded for breach of contract. Art. 2211. In crimes and quasi-delicts, interest as a part of the damages may, in a proper case, be adjudicated in the discretion of the court. Art. 2212. Interest due shall earn legal interest from the time it is judicially demanded, although the obligation may be silent upon this point. Art. 2213. Interest cannot be recovered upon unliquidated claims or damages, except when the demand can be established with reasonably certainty. 8. Mitigation of Liability Doctrine of Avoidable Consequences: -if the plaintiff does not try to reduce damages, he might not be able to recover -plaintiff must try to avoid further damage
QUIRANTE v. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT January 31, 1989 FACTS: Dr. Indalecio Casasola had a contract with a building contractor named Norman Guerrero. The Philippine American General Assurance Co. Inc. (PHILAMGEN) acted as bondsman for Guerrero. In view of Guerreros failure to perform his part of the contract within the period specified, Dr. Casasola, through his counsel, Atty. John Quirante, sued both Guerrero and PHILAMGEN. The trial court found for Dr. Casasola and aside from awards of actual, moral, and exemplary damages, ordered PHILAMGEN to pay the plaintiff the amount of the surety bond equivalent to P120, 000. PHILAMGEN filed a notice of appeal but the same was not given due course because it was supposedly filed out of time. The trial court thereafter issued a writ of execution. A petition was filed before the IAC to compel the trial court to give due course to the appeal. However, the petition was dismissed and so the case was elevated to the Supreme Court. In the meantime, Dr. Casasola died leaving his widow and several children. After Casasolas death, Quirante filed a motion in the trial court for the confirmation of his attorneys fees alleging that there was an oral agreement between him and the late Dr. Casasola with regard to the said fees and allegedly confirmed by his widow in writing. The trial court granted the motion despite opposition thereto hence the instant petition before the Supreme Court. ISSUE: WON the attorneys fees being claimed are the same attorneys fees contemplated in article 2208 of the Civil Code. HELD: No. What is being claimed here as attorneys fees is different from attorneys fees as an item of damages provided under Article 2208 of the Civil Code, wherein the award is made in favor of the litigant, not of his counsel, and the litigant, not his counsel, is the judgment creditor who may enforce the judgment for attorneys fees by execution.

Art. 2203. The party suffering loss or injury must exercise the diligence of a good father of a family to minimize the damages resulting from the act or omission in question. Art. 2204. In crimes, the damages to be adjudicated may be respectively increased or lessened according to the aggravating or mitigating circumstances. Art. 2214. In quasi-delicts, the contributory negligence of the plaintiff shall reduce the damages that he may recover. Art. 2215. In contracts, quasi-contracts, and quasi-delicts, the court may equitably mitigate the damages under circumstances other than the case referred to in the preceding article, as in the following instances: (1) That the plaintiff himself has contravened the terms of the contract; (2) That the plaintiff has derived some benefit as a result of the contract; (3) In cases where exemplary damages are to be awarded, that the defendant acted upon the advice of counsel; (4) That the loss would have resulted in any event; (5) That since the filing of the action, the defendant has done his best to lessen the plaintiff's loss or injury. NOTES: 2203 is known as the Doctrine of Avoidable Consequences which is different from the Doctrine of Contributory Negligence DOCTRINE OF AVOIDABLE CONSEQUENCES, the party has to minimize the damages; in CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE, the damages to be paid would be diminished if you contributed to the damage incurred! There is an obligation on the part of the party suffering to mitigate the loss. B. Moral 1. Concept Art. 2217. Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendant's wrongful act for omission. NOTES: If the professor allowed you to stand for three (3) hours, you cant claim moral damages because there was an intervening causeyour inability to answer the questions KIERULF v. CA March 13, 1997 FACTS: One of Pantrancos buses was traveling along EDSA when the driver lost control of the bus, causing it to swerve to the left, and then to fly over the center island, ending up on the wrong side of the road. The front of the bus bumped the front portion of an Isuzu pickup driven Porfirio Legaspi, causing damage to both vehicles and injuries to both Legaspi and his passenger Lucila Kierulf, wife of Victor Kierulf, owner of the pickup and employer of Legaspi. As a consequence of the incident, Lucila suffered injuries which required major surgery and prolonged treatment by specialists. Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found for Legaspi and the Kierulfs. The spouses Kierulf, however, averred that the disfigurement of Lucilas physical appearance due to the accident could not but affect their marital right of consortium and asked that the moral damages awarded be increased from P100, 000 to one million pesos, not only for Lucila, but also for her husband. They also averred that the social and financial standing of Lucila should also be considered in fixing the award of moral damages. ISSUE: WON an increase in the amount awarded as moral damages is warranted given the circumstances. HELD: The Court increased the moral damages awarded but ruled against awarding moral damages based on loss of consortium or considerations of social and financial standing. In order that moral damages may be awarded, there must be pleading and proof of moral suffering, mental anguish, fright and the like. While no proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in order that moral damages may be awarded, it is nevertheless essential that THE CLAIMANT SHOW THE
EXISTENCE OF THE FACTUAL BASIS FOR DAMAGES AND ITS CAUSAL CONNECTION TO THE DEFENDANTS ACTS.

In Francisco vs. GSIS, the Court held that there must be clear testimony on the anguish and other forms of mental suffering. Thus, if the plaintiff fails to take the witness stand and testify as to his/her social humiliation, wounded feelings and anxiety, moral damages cannot be awarded. In Cocoland Development Corporation vs. National Labor Relations Commission, the Court held that "additional facts must be pleaded and proven to warrant the grant of moral damages under the Civil Code, these being, x x x social humiliation, wounded feelings, grave anxiety, etc., that resulted therefrom." *MORAL
DAMAGES ARE AWARDED TO ENABLE THE INJURED PARTY TO OBTAIN MEANS, DIVERSIONS OR AMUSEMENTS THAT WILL SERVE TO ALLEVIATE THE MORAL SUFFERING HE/SHE HAS UNDERGONE, BY REASON OF THE DEFENDANT'S CULPABLE ACTION .
His wife might have been badly disfigured, but he had not testified that, in consequence thereof, his right to marital consortium was affected. Clearly, Victor (and for that matter, Lucila) had failed to make out a case for loss of consortium, unlike the Rodriguez spouse. The social and financial standing of Lucila cannot be considered in awarding moral damages. The factual circumstances prior to the accident show that no "rude and rough" reception, no "menacing attitude," no "supercilious manner," no "abusive language and highly scornful reference" was given her. The social and financial standing of a claimant of moral damages may be considered in awarding moral damages only if he or she was subjected to contemptuous conduct despite the offender's knowledge of his or her social and financial standing. Be that as it may, it is still proper to award moral damages to Petitioner Lucila for her physical sufferings, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety and wounded feelings. She sustained multiple injuries on the scalp, limbs and ribs. She lost all her teeth. She had to undergo several corrective operations and treatments. Despite treatment and surgery, her chin was still numb and thick. She felt that she has not fully recovered from her injuries. She even had to undergo a second operation on her gums for her dentures to fit. She suffered sleepless nights and shock as a consequence of the vehicular accident. RULES: When social & financial standing may be considered in awarding MD: only if he or she was subjected to contemptuous conduct despite the offenders knowledge of his or her social and financial standing. On Exemplary Damages: -designed to permit the courts to mould behavior that has socially deleterious consequences, and its imposition is required by public policy to suppress the wanton acts of an offender. However, it cannot be recovered as a matter of rightit is based entirely on the discretion of the court. Requirements before ED may be awarded: 1. by way of example or correction in addition to CD 2. claimant must 1st establish his right to moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages; & 3. the wrongful act must be accompanied by BF, and the award would be allowed only if the guilty party acted in a wanton, fraudulent, oppressive or malevolent manner. On Moral Damages:
ITS
AWARD IS AIMED AT RESTORATION, AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE, OF THE SPIRITUAL STATUS QUO
ANTE; THUS, IT MUST BE PROPORTIONATE TO THE SUFFERING INFLICTED. GOVERNED BY ITS OWN PECULIAR DETERMINING THE PROPER AMOUNT.
SINCE
EACH CASE MUST BE
CIRCUMSTANCES, THERE IS NO HARD AND FAST RULE IN
The yardstick should be that the amount awarded should not be so palpably and scandalously excessive as to indicate that it was the result of passion, prejudice or corruption on the part of the trial judge. Neither should it be so little or so paltry that it rubs salt to the injury already inflicted on plaintiffs. In the instant petition, a California case, Rodriguez v. Bethlehem was cited as authority for the claim of damages based on loss of marital consortium. The Court noted that the Rodriguez case clearly reversed the original common law view first enunciated in the case of Deshotel vs. Atchison, that a wife could not recover for the loss of her husband's services by the act of a third party. Rodriguez ruled that when a person is injured to the extent that he/she is no longer capable of giving love, affection, comfort and sexual relations to his or her spouse, that spouse has suffered a direct and real personal loss. The loss is immediate and consequential rather than remote and unforeseeable; it is personal to the spouse and separate and distinct from that of the injured person. However, Victor's claim for deprivation of his right to consortium, although argued before Respondent Court, was not supported by the evidence on record.

-MD, though incapable of pecuniary estimation, are in the category of an award designed to compensate the claimant at the expense of the defendant. -awarded to enable the injured party to obtain means, diversity or amusement that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering he/she has undergone, by reason of the defendants culpable action. Its award is aimed at restoration, as much as possible, of the spiritual status quo ante; thus it must be proportionate to the suffering inflicted. There is no hard and fast rule in determining the proper amount since each case must be governed by its own peculiar circumstances. NOTES: Rodriguez case-different from what happened to Lucila (there was nothing wrong with possible performance. Equipment was not damaged.) Sir: what kind of evidence will you present without embarrassing yourself to prove loss of consortium? This case can be used in the futureeven if reason is only lack of visual stimulation Another factor to determine amount of moral damages: social and financial standing (but wouldnt it be discriminating since you only award damages to those who are rich?) Epilogue by ponente: there should be: Factual basis of mental anguish, etc. Causal connection between factual basis and defendants wrongful act or omission 2. Cases where allowed (MEMORIZE!) Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases: (1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries; (2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries; (3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts; (4) Adultery or concubinage; (5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest; (6) Illegal search; (7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation; (8) Malicious prosecution; (9) Acts mentioned in Article 309; (10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and 35. The parents of the female seduced, abducted, raped, or abused, referred to in No. 3 of this article, may also recover moral damages. The spouse, descendants, ascendants, and brothers and sisters may bring the action mentioned in No. 9 of this article, in the order named. Art. 2220, CC - Willful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral damages if the court should find that, under the circumstances, such damages are justly due. The same rule applies to breaches of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith. SULPICIO LINES v. CURSO HELD: NCC 2206.3 excludes siblings in recovery for death due to breach of carriage contract. Though siblings succeed the estate of a deceased without issue, 2219 does not include succession in the collateral line as source of a right. It not an analogous case under 2219 because it refers to situations held similar to those expressly enumerated. Article 1003 in stipulating that collateral relatives succeed to the estate is not concerned with recovery of moral damages. NOTES: Analogous cases refers to similar cases, not similar relatives. HELD: 1. 2. 3. 4. B.F. METAL v. LOMOTAN Conditions for the Award of Moral Damages: Evidence of physical/mental/psychological suffering Culpable act/omission factually established Proof that wrongful act/omission is PC of damages sustained Predicated on any of the instances expressed by 2219 and 2220
NOTES: Sir: Only refers to QD and it does not apply to delict and culpacontractual EXPERTRAVEL AND TOURS, INC. v. CA June 25, 1999 FACTS: Expertravel issued to respondent Ricardo Lo (Ricky Lo! Showbiz!) four round-trip plane tickets to Hong Kong, together with hotel accommodations and transfers for a total cost of P39, 677.20. Alleging that Lo had failed to pay the amount due, Expertravel caused several demands to be made. Since the demands were ignored by Lo, Expertravel filed a complaint for recovery of the amount. Respondent Lo answered that his account with Expertravel had already been fully paid. The account had been remitted to Expertravel through its then Chairperson Ma. Rocio de Vega who was theretofore authorized to deal with the respondents clients.

The trial court found for the respondent and held that the amount claimed by Expertravel had already been paid. ISSUE: WON damages can be recovered by reason of a clearly unfounded suit. HELD: Although the institution of a clearly unfounded civil suit can at times be a legal justification for an award of attorney's fees (Enervida vs. Dela Torre), such filing, however, has almost invariably been held not to be a ground for an award of moral damages. *Rationale for the rule: THE LAW COULD NOT HAVE MEANT TO IMPOSE A PENALTY ON THE RIGHT TO LITIGATE. THE ANGUISH SUFFERED BY A PERSON FOR HAVING BEEN MADE A
DEFENDANT IN A CIVIL SUIT WOULD BE NO DIFFERENT FROM THE USUAL WORRY AND ANXIETY SUFFERED BY ANYONE WHO IS HALED TO COURT, A SITUATION THAT CANNOT BY ITSELF BE A COGENT REASON FOR THE AWARD OF MORAL DAMAGES.
special rule: e. in Art. 1746 in relation to Art. 2206: when death results from a breach of carriage
2. in Culpa Aquiliana or QD:

a. b.
3.
If the rule were otherwise, then moral damages must every time be awarded in favor of the prevailing defendant against an unsuccessful plaintiff. Nature of MD: not punitive, but are designed to compensate and alleviate in some way the physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury unjustly caused to a person. Amount of MD: though incapable of pecuniary estimation, must be PROPORTIONAL TO AND IN APPROXIMATION OF THE SUFFERING INFLICTED. *REQUISITES
OF
4. 5.
when an act or omission causes P where the defendant is guilty of an intentional tort (casis: Arts. 19, 20, 21, 26-huma relations torts) -also applies to contracts when breached by tort In Culpa Criminal: when accused is found guilty of a. PI b. Lascivious acts c. Adultery or concubinage d. Illegal detention e. Illegal arrest f. Illegal search; or g. Defamation Malicious Prosecution The term analogous causes in Art. 2219, following the ejusdem generis rule must be held similar to those expressly enumerated by the law.
MD:
1. 2. 3. 4.
THERE MUST BE AN INJURY, WHETHER PHYSICAL, MENTAL OR PSYCHOLOGICAL THERE MUST BE A CULPABLE ACT OR OMISSION FACTUALLY ESTABLISHED THE WRONGFUL ACT OR OMISSION IS THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE INJURY THE AWARD OF DAMAGES IS PREDICATED ON ANY OF THE CASES STATED IN
ART.
2219 (CASIS:
PENDING ISSUE)
When MD allowed: must be the proximate result of a wrongful act or omission, the factual basis for which is satisfactorily established by the aggrieved party. 1. Under Culpa contractual or breach of contract: when the defendant acted in: a. BF; or b. was guilty of gross negligence (amounting to BF); or c. in wanton disregard of his contractual obligation; & exceptionally: d. when the act of breach of contract itself is constitutive of torts resulting in physical injuries (PI).
MIJARES v. CA 271 SCRA 558 - Metro Drug went after Mijares demanding full redemption of the dishonored check and full payment even if they do not own the drugstore anymore. - Mijares spouses failed to show that private respondent was motivated by bad faith when it instituted the action for collection. -In China Banking Corporation vs. Court of Appeals it was held that Malicious prosecution, both in criminal and civil cases, requires the presence of two elements, to wit: a) malice; and b) absence of probable cause. Moreover, there must be proof that the prosecution was prompted by a sinister design to vex and humiliate a person, and that it was initiated deliberately knowing that the charge was false and baseless (Manila Gas Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 100 SCRA 602 [1980]). -Mere filing of a suit does not render a person liable for malicious prosecution should he be unsuccessful, for the law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate (Ponce v. Legaspi, 208 SCRA 377 [1992]; Saba v. Court of Appeals, 189 SCRA 50 [1990]); Rubio v. Court of Appeals, 141 SCRA 488 [1986]). -WHEN IT CANNOT BE RECOVERED: Moral damages cannot be recovered from a person who has filed a complaint against another in good faith, or without malice or bad faith (Philippine National Bank v. Court of Appeals, 159 SCRA 433 [1988]; R & B Surety and Insurance v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 129 SCRA 736 [1984]). If damage results from the filing of the complaint, it is damnum absque injuria (Ilocos Norte Electrical Company v. Court of Appeals, 179 SCRA 5 [1989]).

In unfounded civil suits, can you award moral damages? YES, but bad faith is required INDUSTRIAL INSURANCE V. BONDAD GR NO 136722 (2000) -insurance co sued Bondads even if they claimed that at the time of the accident, their jeepney was on full stop on the right shoulder of the road because of the flat tire. And that there was therefore no fault or negligence on their part. - WHEN CAN MORAL DAMAGES BE CLAIMED: it must be shown that (1) the claimant suffered injury, and (2) such injury sprung from any of the cases listed in Articles 2219 and 2220 of the Civil Code. (3) bad faith or ill motive It is not enough that the claimant alleges mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings, social humiliation, and the like as a result of the acts of the other party. It is necessary that such acts be shown to have been tainted with bad faith or ill motive. Unfounded civil suit; awarded moral damages TRIPLE EIGHT V. NLRC 299 SCRA 608 -illegal dismissal -moral damages are recoverable where the dismissal of the employee was attended by bad faith or fraud or constituted an act oppressive to labor, or was done in a manner contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy. Likewise, exemplary damages may be awarded if the dismissal was effected in a wanton, oppressive or malevolent manner. PEOPLE V. PIRAME 327 SCRA (2000) - The award of P50,000.00 from each accused as moral and exemplary damages, however, is unsupported. The widow of the victim did not testify on any mental anguish or emotional distress, which she suffered as a result of her husbands death. CARLOS ARCONA Y MOBAN V. CA GR NO 134784 (2002) - As borne out by human nature and experience, a violent death invariably and necessarily brings about emotional pain and anguish on the part of the victims family. It is inherently human to suffer sorrow, torment, pain and anger when a loved one becomes the victim of a violent or brutal killing. Such violent death or brutal killing not only steals from the family of the deceased his precious life, deprives them forever of his love, affection and support, but often leaves them with the gnawing feeling that an injustice has been done to them. -For this reason, moral damages must be awarded even in the absence of any allegation and proof of the heirs emotional suffering. VALENZUELA V. CA, SUPRA -moral damages are not intended to enrich the plaintiff at the expense of the defendant, the award should nonetheless be commensurate to the suffering inflicted -court took into consideration the traumatic amputation, physical and occupational rehabilitation, anxiety, sleeplessness, psychological injury etc. -increased moral damages to 1M LOPEZ V. PAN AMERICAN 16 SCRA 431 -moral damages are recoverable in breach of contracts where defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith -his prestige does not leave his office - SEN. LOPEZ awarded 100k o Was the Senate President, former VP of Philippines, and was expected by well-wishers to be first to disembark from the plane as a first class passenger o o Suffered social humiliation, wounded feelings, serious anxiety, and mental anguish Was compelled to travel as a tourist passenger
MARIA LOPEZ, Senators wife awarded 50k o As wife, shared in his prestige and thus his humilitation o Was sick when she boarded the flight and had to undergo the physical suffering of a 13-hour flight in narrows seats with little space since she was deprived of a more suitable space in first class MR AND MRS MONTELIBANO, traveling companions 25k each o As part of Senators party, also shared in his prestige and humiliation o While they asked for tourist class seats first which were already booked, they afterwards expected and were deprived of their first-class accomodations. o Different to CHOOSE to be a tourist passenger, than to be COMPELLED to be one.
PEOPLE V. LIZANO G.R. NO. 174470 APRIL 27 2007 -moral damages are automatically granted in rape cases without the need of further proof other than the commission of the crime because it is assumed that a rape victim has actually suffered moral injuries entitling her to such award STREBEL V. FIGUEROS 96 PHIL 321 -General rule: the right of recovery for mental suffering resulting from bodily injuries is restricted to the person who has suffered the bodily

hurt, and there can be no recovery for distress caused by sympathy for another's suffering, or for fright due to a wrong against a third person. So the anguish of mind arising as to the safety of others who may be in personal peril from the same cause cannot be taken into consideration . . . damages are not recoverable for fright or shock even when sustained as a result of wilful act, unless such act was directed toward person or property or person seeking recovery; hence plaintiff is not entitled to recover against administratrix of sister's murderer for fright or shock caused by viewing mutilated body of murdered sister. (Koontz v. Keller, 3 N.E., 2d 694, 52 Ohio App., 265) (25 C.J.S. s 67 and footnote p. 554.) American Jurisprudence: Injury or Wrong to Another. In law mental anguish is restricted as a rule, to such mental pain or suffering as arises from an injury or wrong to the person himself, as distinguished from that form of mental suffering which is the accompaniment of sympathy or sorrow for another's suffering or which arises from a contemplation of wrongs committed on the person of another. Pursuant to the rule stated, a husband or wife cannot recover for mental suffering caused by his or her sympathy for the other's suffering. (15 Am. Jur., pp. 597-598) (emphasis supplied.) -By specific mandate of Article 2219 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, however, moral damages may not be recovered in cases of crime or tort, unless either results or causes "physical injuries," which are lacking in the case at bar. ABSCBN v. CA G.R. No. 128690 -As to moral damages the law is Section 1, Chapter 3, Title XVIII, Book IV of the Civil Code. Article 2217 thereof defines what are included in moral damages, while Article 2219 enumerates the cases where they may be recovered, Article 2220 provides that moral damages may be recovered in breaches of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith. RBS's claim for moral damages could possibly fall only under item (10) of Article 2219, thereof which reads: (10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and 35. -Moral damages are in the category of an award designed to compensate the claimant for actual injury suffered, and not to impose a penalty on the wrongdoer. The award is not meant to enrich the complainant at the expense of the defendant, but to enable the injured party to obtain means, diversion, or amusements that will serve to obviate then moral suffering he has undergone. It is aimed at the restoration, within the limits of the possible, of the spiritual status quo ante, and should be proportionate to the suffering inflicted. Trial courts must then guard against the award of exorbitant damages; they should exercise balanced restrained and measured objectivity to avoid suspicion that it was due to passion, prejudice, or corruption on the part of the trial court. -The award of moral damages cannot be granted in favor of a corporation because, being an artificial person and having existence only in legal contemplation, it has no feelings, no emotions, no senses, It cannot, therefore, experience physical suffering and mental anguish, which call be experienced only by one having a nervous system. The statement in People v. Manero and Mambulao Lumber Co. v. PNB that a corporation may recover moral damages if it "has a good reputation that is debased, resulting in social humiliation" is an obiter dictum. On this score alone the award for damages must be set aside, since RBS is a corporation. -It may be reiterated that the claim of RBS against ABS-CBN is not based on contract, quasi-contract, delict, or quasi-delict, Hence, the claims for moral and exemplary damages can only be based on Articles 19, 20, and 21 of the Civil Code. REPUBLIC V. TUVERA G.R. NO. 148246. FEBRUARY 16, 2007 -The claimant in this case is the Republic of the Philippines, a juridical person. We explained in Filipinas Broadcasting v. Ago Medical & Educational Center-Bicol Christian College of Medicine (AMEC-BCCM): -GENERAL RULE: A juridical person is generally not entitled to moral damages because, unlike a natural person, it cannot experience physical suffering or such sentiments as wounded feelings, serious anxiety, mental anguish or moral shock. -the Court's statement in Mambulao that "a corporation may have a good reputation which, if besmirched, may also be a ground for the award of moral damages" is an obiter dictum. -EXCEPTION: Nevertheless, AMEC's claim for moral damages falls under item 7 of Article 2219 of the Civil Code. This provision expressly authorizes the recovery of moral damages in cases of libel, slander or any other form of defamation. Article 2219(7) does not qualify whether the plaintiff is a natural or juridical person. Therefore, a juridical person such as a corporation can validly complain for libel or any other form of defamation and claim for moral damages. - GENERAL RULE: A juridical person is not entitled to moral damages under Article 2217 of the Civil Code. -EXCEPTION: It may avail of moral damages under the analogous cases listed in Article 2219, such as for libel, slander or any other form of defamation. Suffice it to say that the action at bar does not involve any of the analogous cases under Article 2219, and indeed upon an intelligent reading of Article 2219, it is difficult to see how the Republic could sustain any of the injuries contemplated therein. SPS VALENZUELA VS SPS MANO JULY 9, 2010 -person claiming moral damages must prove bad faith -willfully done in bad faith or with ill motive -allege and prove 2217+ bad faith

C. Nominal Damages -like a fine; vindicates a right; symbolic Article 2221. Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him. Article 2222. The court may award nominal damages in every obligation arising from any source enumerated in article 1157, or in every case where any property right has been invaded. Article 2223. The adjudication of nominal damages shall preclude further contest upon the right involved and all accessory questions, as between the parties to the suit, or their respective heirs and assigns. ROBESFRANCISCO V. CFI 86 SCRA 59 -Corporation failed to cause issuance of TCT because title was included among properties of corp mortgaged to GSIS to secure an obligation. Hence, a complaint for specific performance and damages. -Nominal damages are not intended for indemnification of loss suffered but for the vindication or recognition of a right violated or invaded. They are recoverable where some injury has been done the amount of which the evidence fails to show, the assessment of damages being left to the discretion of the court according to the circumstances of the case. Under American jurisprudence nominal damages by their very nature are small sums fixed by the court without regard to the extent of the harm done to the injured party: It is generally held that a nominal damage is a substantial claim, if based upon the violation of a legal right; in such case, the law presumes a damage, although actual or compensatory damages are not proven; in truth nominal damages are damages in name only and not in fact, and are allowed, not as an equivalent of a wrong inflicted, but simply in recognition of the existence of a technical injury. (Fouraker v. Kidd Springs Boating and Fishing Club, 65 S. W. 2d 796797, citing 17 C.J. 720, and a number of authorities). -nominal damages cannot coexist with compensatory damages compensatory damages means that a right has been violated; it would be sufficient. -In case of breach of contract, exemplary damages may be awarded if the guilty party acted in wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner. Furthermore, exemplary or corrective damages are to be imposed by way of example or correction for the public good, only if the injured party has shown that he is entitled to recover moral, temperate or compensatory damages." -4% is not a penal clause because under 2209 he is still entitled to a legal interest which is 6% per annum FRANCISCO V. FERRER GR. NO. 142029 - wedding cake ordered was not delivered; delivered a two layered cake instead. -To warrant the award of exemplary damages, "[t]he wrongful act must be accompanied by bad faith, and an award of damages would be allowed only if the guilty party acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless or malevolent manner." -REQUIREMENTS OF THE AWARD OF EXEMPLARY DAMAGES: (1) they may be imposed by way of example in addition to compensatory damages, and only after the claimant's right to them has been established; (2) that they can not be recovered as a matter of right, their determination depending upon the amount of compensatory damages that may be awarded to the claimant; (3) the act must be accompanied by bad faith or done in a wanton, fraudulent, oppressive or malevolent manner." - "Nominal damages are 'recoverable where a legal right is technically violated and must be vindicated against an invasion that has produced no actual present loss of any kind or where there has been a breach of contract and no substantial injury or actual damages whatsoever have been or can be shown.'"27 -Nominal damages may be awarded "to a plaintiff whose right has been violated or invaded by the defendant, for the purpose of vindicating or recognizing that right, not for indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered."28 GONZALES V. PEOPLE G.R. NO. 159950. FEBRUARY 12, 2007 -Gonzales set fire on a building. He was charged with arson -no proof of actual damages by each witness; however, nominal and temperate damages were awarded -The assessment of nominal damages is left to the discretion of the trial court according to the circumstances of the case. -Generally, nominal damages by their nature are small sums fixed by the court without regard to the extent of the harm done to the injured party. However, it is generally held that a nominal damage is a substantial claim, if based upon the violation of a legal right; in such a case, the law presumes damage although actual or compensatory damages are not proven. In truth, nominal damages are damages in name only and not in fact, and are allowed, not as an equivalent of wrong inflicted, but simply in recognition of the existence of a technical injury.14 -Temperate damages may be recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot from the nature of the case be proved with certainty -only temperate damages were awarded

D. Temperate or Moderate Damages Article 2224. Temperate or moderate damages, which are more than nominal but less than compensatory damages, may be recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount can not, from the nature of the case, be provided with certainty. Article 2225. Temperate damages must be reasonable under the circumstances. PLENO V. CA G.R. NO. 56505 (1988) -delivery truck hit delivery van and ran away. Passengers suffered injuries -both actual and temperate damages were awarded -actual: medical expenses - Temperate damages are included within the context of compensatory damages (Radio Communications of the Philippines, Inc. (RCPI) v. Court of Appeals, supra.). In arriving at a reasonable level of temperate damages to be awarded, trial courts are guided by our ruling that: ... There are cases where from the nature of the case, defenite proof of pecuniary loss cannot be offered, although the court is convinced that there has been such loss. For instance, injury to one's commercial credit or to the goodwill of a business firm is often hard to show certainty in terms of money. Should damages be denied for that reason? The judge should be empowered to calculate moderate damages in such cases, rather than that the plaintiff should suffer, without redress from the defendant's wrongful act. (Araneta v. Bank of America, 40 SCRA 144,145) -His actual income was not sufficiently established but an award of temperate or moderate damages may be made on loss or impairment of earning capacity - Pleno is also entitled to exemplary damages since it appears that gross negligence was committed in the hiring of driver de Luna. In spite of his past record, he was still hired by the corporation. As regards de Luna, the very fact that he left the scene of the incident without assisting the victims and without reporting to the authorities entitles an award of exemplary damages, so as to serve as an example that in cases of accidents of this kind, the drivers involved should not leave their victims behind but should stop to assist the victims or if this is not possible, to report the matter immediately to the authorities. That the corporation did not also report the matter to the authorities and that their lawyer would attempt to bribe the police officers in order that the incident would be kept a secret shows that the corporation ratified the act of their employees and such act also shows bad faith. Hence, Id corporation is able to pay exemplary damages. RAMOS V. CA, SUPRA -wrong intubation, commatose -temperate damages were awarded on top of actual damages - the amount of damages which should be awarded, if they are to adequately and correctly respond to the injury caused, should be one which compensates for pecuniary loss incurred and proved, up to the time of trial (ACTUAL DAMAGES); and one which would meet pecuniary loss certain to be suffered but which could not, from the nature of the case, be made with certainty (TEMPERATE). In other words, temperate damages can and should be awarded on top of actual or compensatory damages in instances where the injury is chronic and continuing. And because of the unique nature of such cases, no incompatibility arises when both actual and temperate damages are provided for. The reason is that these damages cover two distinct phases. -As it would not be equitable and certainly not in the best interests of the administration of justice for the victim in such cases to constantly come before the courts and invoke their aid in seeking adjustments to the compensatory damages previously awarded temperate damages are appropriate. The amount given as temperate damages, though to a certain extent speculative, should take into account the cost of proper care. -Value awarded for temperate damages should allow petitioners to provide optimal care for their loved one in a facility which generally specializes in such care. -They should not be compelled by dire circumstances to provide substandard care at home without the aid of professionals, for anything less would be grossly inadequate. -Finally, by way of example, exemplary damages in the amount of P100,000.00 are hereby awarded. Considering the length and nature of the instant suit we are of the opinion that attorney's fees valued at P100,000.00 are likewise proper. PNR V. ETHEL BRUNTY, SUPRA -car was hit by a train, Brunty died - Respondents, however, failed to present evidence for such damages; hence, the award of actual damages cannot be sustained. However, as the heirs of Rhonda Brunty undeniably incurred expenses for the wake and burial of the latter, we deem it proper to award temperate damages in the amount of P25,000.00 pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence. This is in lieu of actual damages as it would be unfair for the victims heirs to get nothing, despite the death of their kin, for the reason alone that they cannot produce receipts. REPUBLIC V. TUVERA, SUPRA

- Temperate or moderate damages avail when "the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot from the nature of the case, be proved with certainty." -The textual language might betray an intent that temperate damages do not avail when the case, by its nature, is susceptible to proof of pecuniary loss; and certainly the Republic could have proved pecuniary loss herein. Still, jurisprudence applying Article 2224 is clear that temperate damages may be awarded even in instances where pecuniary loss could theoretically have been proved with certainty. -SC cannot discount the heavy influence of common law and its reliance on judicial precedents in our law on tort and damages. -if the doctrine can be justified to answer for the unlawful damage to a cargo truck, it is a compounded wrath if it cannot answer for the unlawful exploitation for our forests, to the injury of the Filipino people. - The allowance of temperate damages also paves the way for the award of exemplary damages. Under Article 2234 of the Civil Code, a showing that the Republic is entitled to temperate damages allows for the award of exemplary damages. Even as exemplary damages cannot be recovered as a matter of right, the courts are empowered to decide whether or not they should be adjudicated. Ill-gotten wealth cases are hornbook demonstrations where damages by way of example or correction for the public good should be awarded. Fewer causes of action deserve the stigma left by exemplary damages, which "serve as a deterrent against or as a negative incentive to curb socially deleterious actions." E. Liquidated Damages Article 2226. Liquidated damages are those agreed upon by the parties to a contract, to be paid in case of breach thereof. Article 2227. Liquidated damages, whether intended as an indemnity or a penalty, shall be equitably reduced if they are iniquitous or unconscionable. Article 2228. When the breach of the contract committed by the defendant is not the one contemplated by the parties in agreeing upon the liquidated damages, the law shall determine the measure of damages, and not the stipulation. TITAN V. UNIFIELD G.R. NO. 153874. MARCH 1, 2007 -complaint for collection of sum of money with damages - The law also allows parties to a contract to stipulate on liquidated damages to be paid in case of breach. A stipulation on liquidated damages is a penalty clause where the obligor assumes a greater liability in case of breach of an obligation. The obligor is bound to pay the stipulated amount without need for proof on the existence and on the measure of damages caused by the breach. -in this case, the nature of attys fees were liquidated damages. F. Exemplary or Corrective Damages Article 2229. Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed, by way of example or correction for the public good, in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages. Article 2230. In criminal offenses, exemplary damages as a part of the civil liability may be imposed when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. Such damages are separate and distinct from fines and shall be paid to the offended party. Article 2231. In quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be granted if the defendant acted with gross negligence. Article 2232. In contracts and quasi-contracts, the court may award exemplary damages if the defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner. Article 2233. Exemplary damages cannot be recovered as a matter of right; the court will decide whether or not they should be adjudicated. Article 2234. While the amount of the exemplary damages need not be proved, the plaintiff must show that he is entitled to moral, temperate or compensatory damages before the court may consider the question of whether or not exemplary damages should be awarded. In case liquidated damages have been agreed upon, although no proof of loss is necessary in order that such liquidated damages may be recovered, nevertheless, before the court may consider the question of granting exemplary in addition to the liquidated damages, the plaintiff must show that he would be entitled to moral, temperate or compensatory damages were it not for the stipulation for liquidated damages. Article 2235. A stipulation whereby exemplary damages are renounced in advance shall be null and void. PEOPLE V. DALISAY G.R. NO. 188106. NOVEMBER 25, 2009 -rape case -People vs Catubig: exemplary damages can still be awarded even if aggravating circumstances was not alleged but proved. The retroactive application of the revised rules should not adversely affect the vested rights of the private offended party -Also known as "punitive" or "vindictive" damages, exemplary or corrective damages are intended to serve as a deterrent to serious wrong doings, and as a vindication of undue sufferings and wanton invasion of the rights of an injured or a punishment for those guilty of

outrageous conduct. These terms are generally, but not always, used interchangeably. In common law, there is preference in the use of exemplary damages when the award is to account for injury to feelings and for the sense of indignity and humiliation suffered by a person as a result of an injury that has been maliciously and wantonly inflicted, the theory being that there should be compensation for the hurt caused by the highly reprehensible conduct of the defendantassociated with such circumstances as willfulness, wantonness, malice, gross negligence or recklessness, oppression, insult or fraud or gross fraud that intensifies the injury. The terms punitive or vindictive damages are often used to refer to those species of damages that may be awarded against a person to punish him for his outrageous conduct. In either case, these damages are intended in good measure to deter the wrongdoer and others like him from similar conduct in the future -Being corrective in nature, exemplary damages, therefore, can be awarded, not only in the presence of an aggravating circumstance, but also where the circumstances of the case show the highly reprehensible or outrageous conduct of the offender. In much the same way as Article 2230 prescribes an instance when exemplary damages may be awarded, Article 2229, the main provision, lays down the very basis of the award. PNB V. CA 256 SCRA 44 - Tan wanted to claim the payment for the expropriation of his land. PNB released the check for P32,480 to one Sonia Gonzaga without Tans knowledge and consent. Gonzaga deposited the said amount to her own personal account. - Under CC2232, exemplary damages are to be awarded if a party acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner. Exemplary damages cannot be recovered as a matter of right because the courts will decide if the award of said damages is proper. Requisites for the award of exemplary damages: Here, while there was breach, there was no wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent conduct to be imputed against PNB. There is no award of compensatory damages which is a prerequisite to the award of exemplary damages. Thus, the RTC award of exemplary damages of P5,000 is baseless. PEOPLE V. DIUNSAYJALANDONI G.R. NO. 174277. FEBRUARY 8, 2007. -rape case - People vs Catubig: the presence of an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying, entitles the offended party to an award of exemplary damages. Further, we noted in that case that the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which took effect on December 1, 2000, now requires that aggravating circumstances must be alleged in the information in order to be validly appreciated by the court. However, the retroactive application of these procedural rules cannot adversely affect the rights of a private offended party that have become vested where the offense was committed prior to the effectivity of said rules24 as is the case here. -Consequently, aggravating circumstances which were not alleged in the information but proved during the trial may be appreciated for the limited purpose of determining appellants liability for exemplary damages. - In the instant case, the presence of the qualifying circumstance of knowledge by the offender of the offended partys mental disability, although not alleged in the information, was proved during trial, which justifies the award of exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.00 in consonance with current rulings NOTES: Serrano vs People GR 175023 -actual less than 25K, temperate damages worth 25K was given in lieu of actual. GR 182460 -same as above Penta capital -attys fees are considered as liquidated damages -contracts usually dont state that they are liquidated damages
a. b. c.
It must be imposed by way of example in addition to compensatory damages and only after the claimants right to them has been established; Exemplary damages cannot be recovered as a matter of right and is to be determined depending on the amount of compensatory damages; The act complained of should be done in bad faith or in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner.

TORTS AND DAMAGES - Gianna - Ranx.tina - Gi.sam - Katz.alex - Emjo.didy - FINALS REVIEWER - CASIS 1

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didy| FINALS REVIEWER| CASIS 1

TORTS AND DAMAGES|gianna.ranx.tina.gi.sam.katz.alex.emjo.didy| FINALS REVIEWER| CASIS 2

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1. liability of defendant employer 2. defendant employers defense

3. vinculum (legal tie)

4. what a plaintiff needs to prove

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1. moral damages 2. defendant carriers defense 3. what plaintiff needs to prove

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PICART v. SMITH (1918)

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Contributory negligence? YES! (50% explanation look at previous cases)

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Thus, Solidbank was negligent in not returning the passbook to

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Bustamante Picart v Smith

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Philippine Bank of Commerce v CA

Inured party (owner of the Tamaraw)

Brunty (mother of passenger who died)

Ong v Metropolitan Anuran v Buno

Lapanday (driver of one of the cars involved in the accident)

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