University of Waikato Pols 104 11-B Conflicts and crisis in the Middle East and Asia Essay 1 Luis

Cifuentes SID 1167973

The belligerent path to peace

The constant conflict scenario in the middle-east had for a long time drawn Egypt and Israel into a state of constant confrontation which would paradoxically set the conditions for peace. In a history mined by war, two confrontations were of enough entity to shift the directions of sworn enemies who would come, after a long way, to understand that the best means to achieve each ones goals was through negotiation and understating rather than force. The Six-day War and the Yom Kippur War showed how fragile the balance of power in the Middle East can be, and also how difficult it is to make peace in a land fertile for war. In 1948, the conditions were given to place for the first time the Arab nations and Israel in war. The recognition of Israel as an independent state and its declaration of independence, on may 14 1948, was utterly opposed by the Arabs for whom the existence of such state was unconceivable. Like in every war, each country entered the war with goals tending to be achieved by defeating the enemy; TransJordan, Syria and Lebanon wanted to annex the new Israeli territory to its own and Egypt came into action with the thought of a separate Palestine which would be a profitable client; on the other hand Israel was motivated by survival1. The lack of coordination and the mistaken belief of Israel as a weak country led the Arab nation to defeat and what they saw as dishonour. For Israelis it was the dawn as a free and independent State, but time would demand from them the strength of a titan to keep it that way, due to the disapproval of its neighbours. Again 1956 another crisis endangered the stability of the region. As what is modernly a sovereign act, the new government of Egypt, under presidency of Gamal Abdel Nasser, decided to nationalize the Suez Canal, which had been previously closed (October 1954) to all ships coming to and from Israel, as well as the passage through the strait of Tiran.
1

Ziegler, D.W., 1997, Wars in the Middle East, in Loftus M., (ed), War Peace and International Politics, Washington, Longman, p.63-64

The nationalization posed an affront for the British and the French, whose nationals were the main stockholders of the company that operated the canal, thus they brought troops to defend the Canal; while Israel saw it as the chance to assail terrorist bases in Egyptian territory used to attack them, and be granted the free pass through the Suez Canal2. The war rendered Israel as victor even when the British and French withdrew and did not undergo their part of the plan due to pressures from the U.S government (President Eisenhower). Once again Israel had accomplished its targets, with the presence of a UN force in 1957, providing a buffer zone, and though the Suez Canal was in control of the Egyptians, the war results made them feel powerless once again and hence dishonoured. The outcome of the encounters in 1948 and 1956 had set things in motion for a bigger clash. The apparent military superiority of the Israelis, the Arab discontent with the results, the compromise with the Palestine cause and the presence of foreign interest in the middle-east would unleash yet another time the airs of war. On may 13 1967, with the U.S. heavily engaged in Vietnam, the leaders of the Soviet Union saw an opportunity to alter the balance of power in the Middle East and favour their own client states, including Egypt and Syria3 thus providing a false intelligence report about Israeli troops massing in the border against Syria. The response from Egypt was prompt and as Arab it was a hundred percent behind Syria. On the days following Nasser gave exacerbating speeches about the Pan-Arab cause against the Israelis, often remembering the power of Egypt, as to say it would attack if Israel attacked any Arab country4. The conflict escalated mainly because of Egyptian provocation. The first sign of problems came with the United Nations Emergency force (UNEF) withdrawal from the Sinai peninsula on May 18 1967, now the there was nobody in between; Israel was ready to give a response on any kind of movement from Nasser. With troops massing in the peninsula, Israel did nothing or little, apart from moving its troops and stand by. The chain of events leading to war was much very much orchestrated by the Egyptians. With no buffer zone, Egypt calculated that Israel would stand up and fight, but Israelis premier, Levi Eshkol, was cautious therefore Israel did not react, plus Egypt had done the same move in 1960. (Ziegler, 1997)

Ibdem p.66 Dr. Spencer C. Tucker (ed.), THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT: A Political, Social and Military History, Santa Barbara (CA), ABC CLIO, 2008. Vol. III, p.933 4 W. Laqueur and B. Rubin (eds.), the Israeli Arab Reader: A Documentary History of the Middle Eas, Penguin 1984 (4th revised and updated edition), p. 171
3

Nassers second action was to close the Strait of Tiran again on May 22 1967; this would provoke an inevitable clash with Israel, for it was forced to react militarily5 in order to secure its economic stability6. Israel was clear about signalling they would keep the strait open and yet tried to resolve the issue in international scenario but U.S. help was far from supportive and had not much to offer, due to its involvement in Vietnam.7 On May 30 King Hussein of Jordan completed the tripartite alliance among Egypt, Jordan and Syria. In Nassers words: with the basic objective of destroying Israel8. For some time both sides sat, waited for the other to act. But Israel was not willing to lose so it launched a pre-emptive strike at dawn, on June 5 1967. The low-flight missions neutralized 60% of Egyptian aircrafts while still on the ground, as well as other strategic ground targets, this bold first action opened the timeframe for one of the major wars in the Middle East, the Six-day War or an-Naksah (The Setback) for the Arabs.9 The air supremacy gained by the Israeli Air Force (IAF) was decisive for the outcome of the war. But once again, Israeli military supremacy, Arabs lack of coordination and preparation won the war; so much that it only took Israel six days to defeat his enemies; one by one like in the past10. Then on June 10 1967 another cease-fire was signed. Defeated one more time the Arabs felt dishonour, they did not only lose while possessing a larger army and enough technology to win the war but were defeated and lost territorial control over strategic and wide portions of land, which were to be returned according to UN resolution 24211. The west bank of Jordan River and parts of Jerusalem were taken from Jordan; Syria lost to Israel the Golan Heights, a crucial position to protect the settlement around the Sea of Galilee. For Egypt the loss was a major one, the war cost it the Sinai Peninsula and its revenues, now on Israeli hands. After the war, Nasser tried to resign but he enjoyed popular support so he managed to stay in power until Sep 28 1970, when he died of a heart attack and

Dr. Spencer C. Tucker (ed.), THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT: A Political, Social and Military History, Santa Barbara (CA), ABC CLIO, 2008. Vol. III p. 933 6 W. Laqueur and B. Rubin (eds.), the Israeli Arab Reader: A Documentary History of the Middle Eas, Penguin 2001 (6th revised edition), p. 100-102 7 Ibidem (5) p. 953 8 Ibidem 9 Taken from: http://www.sixdaywar.co.uk/ Aug 21 2011 10 Ziegler, D.W., 1997, Wars in the Middle East, in Loftus M., (ed), War Peace and International Politics, Washington, Longman, p.67 11 W. Laqueur and B. Rubin (eds.), the Israeli Arab Reader: A Documentary History of the Middle Eas, Penguin 1984 (4th revised and updated edition), p. 365

was later succeeded by his vice-president Anwar al-Sadat who was seen as a more moderate character than Nasser12 In the gap between the Six-day war and the next major confrontation, the Arab nations and Israel drew their armies in a series of skirmishes, causing constant casualties in both sides, and a bigger interference on the Soviets in the region, to the point where there was direct participation in combat. Such period of time, between July 1967 and August 1970 was known as the War of Attrition13 The aftermath of the Six-day war gave Israel dominance over new territories; this meant more men to protect these areas. Israel was overconfident in both thinking it was military superior, thus the Arabs wouldnt dare again and also because it saw the lands taken as a bargaining chip to peace negotiations. But peace was distant and there was yet another war to be fought. The Israeli position was off course to negotiate peace but the Arab nations were still resented due to the chain of military setbacks suffered since 1948. Evidence of the above are the Khartoum resolutions (Arab countries) containing the three NOs (No peace with Israel, No recognition of Israel and No negotiations with Israel)14. On the Israeli side Abba Ebans nine-point peace plan15 makes their intentions clear: the occupied territories in exchange for peace and recognition, is logical alright that such proposal didnt find Arab reciprocity. To the Arabs, mainly Egypt, the only way to recover the territories was through arms, seen for them as the most appropriate manner to re-claim their honour as well. Now, the Arabs planned the hit together and the Egyptian initial approach was a lot more thoughtful and conservative, it wanted to exploit its soldiers ability to defend a position16. They were going to go across the canal, secure a few kilometres and dig in, while the position was sheltered by anti-air fire.17 This tactic aimed to prolong the confrontation, weaken the Israeli force in a day to day wearing combat, without the possibility to use its air-force as easy as in the past, and in this way force the Israeli to give up the territory18; though the plan only succeeded at first. So in October 6 1973 at 1400H, the Arab armies of Egypt and Syria and contingents from Iraq and Jordan attacked Israel, whose unreadiness gave leverage to the Arabs and allowed them to accomplish one of their strategic goals:
12

Ziegler, D.W., 1997, Wars in the Middle East, in Loftus M., (ed), War Peace and International Politics, Washington, Longman, p.69 13 Attrition (noun): .../3: the act of weakening or exhausting by constant harassment, abuse, or attack <a war of attrition> Obtained from http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/attrition Aug 21 2011 14 Dr. Spencer C. Tucker (ed.), THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT: A Political, Social and Military History, Santa Barbara (CA), ABC CLIO, 2008. Vol. IV p. 1287 Doc. 55 15 Ibidem p. 1290 Doc. 59 16 Ibidem Vol III p.1109 17 Ziegler, D.W., 1997, Wars in the Middle East, in Loftus M., (ed), War Peace and International Politics, Washington, Longman, p.70 18 Ibidem

take over a portion of land in the Sinai. During three weeks the armies fought bravely and relentlessly despite the casualties in both sides. The lack of readiness from the Israeli forces had been explained as the result of the Yom Kippur (Day of Atonement), religious celebration during which the Jewish people gather in families and reflex. But that was not the only reason, the Israelis were overconfident and thought a new Arab incursion as improbable due to what in 1967 Kissinger (U.S. National Security Adviser) would call an overwhelming victory19 The outcome of the war is seen for many as ambiguous and atypical because it was possible for both sides to claim victory or to have achieved goals. The surprise attack on the Sinai and the west bank shocked Israel but it recovered quickly and fought gallantly a war in two fronts, outnumbered and without the initiative in combat which had been an Arab victory. Despite the disparity and the surprise factor, Israel managed to overcome its enemies and secure yet another military victory.20 Egypt felt its honour restored in spite of the loss for it had been able to strike Israel by surprise; moreover after the cease-fire with UN resolution 338 on October 22 197321 calling for peace and demanding both sides to fully implement resolution 242 of 1967. With this last war between Egypt and Israel the road to peace was finally seen as likely. By restoring pride to Egypt and a sense of proportion to Israel, it opened the way to Camp David peace agreement in 197922 Both sides, at the end of the, judged the responsible of the unfavourable results. Many had died and war seemed now an inappropriate way of settling. Prove of this is the Inform by the Agranat commission23 in Israel, the destitution on high rank officers in Egypt and the execution of Generals in Syria.24 After the Yom Kippur war (October War for Arabs) ended in 1973 everything aimed to the creation of a non-belligerency pact, but it was Anwar Sadats unexpected visit to Israel in 1977 what made it possible to think in a normalization and diplomatic relation.

19

Ziegler, D.W., 1997, Wars in the Middle East, in Loftus M., (ed), War Peace and International Politics, Washington, Longman, p.71 20 Rabinovich, Abraham. Yom Kippur War: The Epic Encounter That transformed the middle east, Westminister, MD, USA; Knopf Publishing group, 2004 p. 499-516 21 Dr. Spencer C. Tucker (ed.), THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT: A Political, Social and Military History, Santa Barbara (CA), ABC CLIO, 2008. p.1301 Doc. 64 22 Rabinovich, Abraham. Yom Kippur War: The Epic Encounter That transformed the middle east, Westminister, MD, USA; Knopf Publishing group, 2004, p.512 23 Israeli Commission in charge of investigating the facts clarifying the Yom Kippur war outcome and punish those found guilty 24 Ibidem (22) p. 499-516

Now with the U.S. and other western countries strongly affected by the energy shortages because of the embargo imposed by the Arab countries due to its support towards Israel, peace seemed like a very good option and the U.S. president, Jimmy Carter would broker a successful peace agreement during 1978 in Camp David which would later on take to an Egypt-Israeli rapprochement with the peace treaty signed on March 26 1979. This was also claimed as victory for the US against his cold war enemy; they, unlike the Soviets had not only provided weapons supplies, the also showed the desire for peace in the region. Before, in 1974 and 1975 with UN mediation after the cease-fire the two countries signed the Sinai accords which would allow Egypt to regain control over a portion of the Sinai Peninsula and permitted the presence of United Nations Emergency Force25. This first formal encounter, even when under the premises of a mere cease-fire, showed the willingness of the two states to settle things peacefully. Even though Israel only abandoned the Sinai Peninsula completely until 1982 and the death of Sadat to hands of Arab extremists, 1979s Peace Treaty set thing in motion for the rapprochement of an Arab State an Israel for the first time in history. Total peace in the middle-east is for many a distant dream but history demonstrates us that war is indeed a calamity that no people wish to endure for a long time. The Six-day war and the Yom Kippur are clear evidence on how war creates balances in power and how its disastrous results make the rulers opt often for a negotiated exit to the conflicts, which at the end deliver even economic fruit. Finally, it is better to be equals in peace than to be different in war no matter if you are on the winning side; wars always bring misery to a nation.

25

Dr. Spencer C. Tucker (ed.), THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT: A Political, Social and Military History, Santa Barbara (CA), ABC CLIO, 2008. p.1322 Doc. 74

References

W. Laqueur and B. Rubin (eds.), the Israeli Arab Reader: A Documentary History of the Middle Eas, Penguin 1984 (4th revised and updated edition) W. Laqueur and B. Rubin (eds.), the Israeli Arab Reader: A Documentary History of the Middle Eas, Penguin 2001 (6th revised edition) Herzog, Chaim; 1982, The Arab-Israeli War: War and Peace in the Middle East, New York, Random House New York Inc., (Book IV) Ziegler, D.W., 1997, Wars in the Middle East, in Loftus M., (ed), War Peace and International Politics, Washington, Longman. Rabinovich, Abraham. Yom Kippur War: The Epic Encounter That transformed the middle east, Westminister, MD, USA; Knopf Publishing group, 2004 Dr. Spencer C. Tucker (ed.), THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT: A Political, Social and Military History, Santa Barbara (CA), ABC CLIO, 2008. Definitions on footnotes taken from: http://www.sixdaywar.co.uk/ http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/attrition