Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION G.R. No.

168328 February 28, 2007

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. LAILA TANYAG-SAN JOSE and MANOLITO SAN JOSE, Respondents. DECISION CARPIO MORALES, J.: Respondents Laila Tanyag-San Jose (Laila) and Manolito San Jose (Manolito) were married on June 12, 1988. Laila was 19 years and 4 months old, while Manolito was 20 years and 10 months old.1 The couple begot two children: Joana Marie who was born on January 3, 1989, 2 and Norman who was born on March 14, 1997.3 For nine years, the couple stayed with Manolitos parents. Manolito was jobless and was hooked to gambling and drugs. As for Laila, she sold fish at the wet market of Taguig.4 On August 20, 1998, Laila left Manolito and transferred to her parents house.5 On March 9, 1999, Laila filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage,6 under Article 367 of the Family Code on the ground of psychological incapacity, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig where it was docketed as JDRC Case No. 4862. Testifying for Laila, Dr. Nedy Tayag, a clinical psychologist at the National Center for Mental Health, declared that from the psychological test and clinical interview she conducted on Laila, she found Manolito, whom she did not personally examine, to be psychologically incapacitated to perform the duties of a husband. Dr. Tayags May 28, 1999 Report on the Psychological Condition of LAILA T. SAN JOSE8 was submitted in evidence. The pertinent portions of the Report read: BACKGROUND DATA & BRIEF MARITAL HISTORY: xxxx . . . [Lailas] association with [Manolito] started with the game of basketball. As a youngster, petitioner often spent her free time seeking fun in the outdoors. She was then beginning to cast her interests on basketball games and eventually became one of the avid spectators when a minor league was staged at their place. Respondent happened to be one of the cagers who, with his hardcourt skills, greatly impressed petitioner. The latter then became a fan of respondent. Eventually acquiring the upper hand, respondent introduced himself personally to his admirers and their initial encounter with petitioner proved to be a milestone for both of their fates. Courtship followed and after a short period, they were already steadies. Savoring the momentum, petitioner and respondent decided to formally seal their union. They entered marriage on June 12, 1989 under religious ceremonies held in Taguig. After the occasion, the

newlyweds then went on to lead a life of their own making. However, contrary to what was expected, their marriage turned out to be rocky right from the very start. Claimed, respondent refused to get himself a job. Instead, he spent most of his available time with his friends drinking intoxicating substances and gambling activities. Petitioner was left without much choice but to flex her muscles and venture on several areas which could be a source of income. She tried to endure the situation with the hope that respondent would change for the better in no time. Their first child, Joana Marie, was born of January 3, 1989. Petitioner was apparently happy with the birth of their first born, thinking that her presence would make a difference in the family, particularly on the part of respondent. Years had passed but no improvement was seen on respondents behavior. He turned out to be worse instead and it was only later that petitioner discovered that he was into drugs. Said, he prefers to be with his friends rather than his own family. He seemed oblivious to the efforts rendered by petitioner just to make ends meet. She was the breadwinner of the family and whenever an argument occurred between her and respondent, she often received the brunt of her husbands irrationality. On one of such incidents, she decided to separate from respondent. The latter however pursued her and pleaded for another chance. He promised that he would change his behavior if only petitioner would give him a son. Seeing his sincerity and unwilling to give up the marriage, petitioner agreed to the compromise. They reconciled and she did gave birth to a son, Norman, on March of 1997. Respondent was happy but his show of good nature was superficial. Briefly after the birth of their second child, respondent resumed his old ways and made them even worse. Still, petitioner remained hopeful that something will turn out right in their union. However, with respondents continuing irresponsibility, she realized that all her efforts proved nonsense to him. On August 20, 1998, respondent went out of their dwelling for his usual late night stints but he never came back the following morning. They never lived together since. Respondent is MANOLITO SAN JOSE, 31 years old with last known address at 14-D Ibayo, Tipas, Taguig, Metro Manila. He is unemployed and stayed in school only to finish his secondary education. He was described to be a happy-go-lucky individual spending most of his time hanging out with friends. Considered to be a bad influence, he was into gambling, drinking sprees and prohibited drugs as well. xxxx REMARKS: Through the evaluation of test data, correlated with clinical interviews and description of their marital plight, it is the opinion of the undersigned that the disintegration of the marriage between petitioner and respondent was caused primarily by the latters psychological incapacity to perform the essential roles and obligations of a married man and a father. His behavioral pattern characterized mainly by constant irresponsibility, lack of concern for the welfare of others, self-centered orientation, absence of remorse, violent tendencies and his involvement in activities defying social and moral ethics; suits under the classification of Anti-Social Personality Disorder. Such disorder is considered to be grave and is deeply [immersed] within the system. It continues to influence the individual until the later stage of life.9 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) Branch 70 of the RTC of Pasig, by Decision of July 17, 2001, citing Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals10 and Leouel Santos v. CA, et al.11 denied Lailas petition in this wise:

In the recent case of Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals and Roridel Olaviano Molina (268 SCRA 198), the Supreme Court, reiterated its ruling [in] the earlier case of [Leouel] Santos vs. Court of Appeals (240 SCRA 20), to the effect that "psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical incapacity x x x) and that there is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorder clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage and that such incapacity "must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability." Viewed in the light of the above guidelines, the present petition must necessarily be denied. Petitioners portrayal of respondent as jobless and irresponsible is not enough. As the Supreme Court said in the Molina case (supra), "(I)t is not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological (not physical) illness." Petitioners case is not in any way enhanced by the psychological evaluation and assessment done by psychologist Nedy Tayag as per her Psychological Report (Exhs. "C" to "C-1"). Although the body of the report mentions that the respondent is affected with "Anti-Social Personality Disorder", the same cannot sway this Court from its above disposition. There is no showing that [Dr.] Tayag was able to interview the respondent or any of his relatives in order to arrive at the above conclusion. Obviously, the data upon which the finding or conclusion was based is inadequate.12 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) Lailas motion for reconsideration of the trial courts decision was, by Order of November 13, 2001,13 denied. Laila thus appealed to the Court of Appeals which docketed it as CA G.R. CV No. 73286, faulting the trial court in holding that she failed to comply with the guidelines enumerated in Molina. By Decision dated February 15, 2005,14 the appellate court, finding Manolito psychologically incapacitated after considering "the totality of the evidence," reversed the decision of the trial court and declared the marriage between him and Laila void ab initio. Thus the appellate court held: . . . We perused the records of the present case and unearthed that the totality of the evidence presented in the present case including the testimony of the petitioner, were enough to sustain a finding that Manolito San Jose is psychologically incapacitated within the contemplation of the Family Code. We believe that his (respondents) defects were already present at the inception of the marriage or that they are incurable. If being jobless (since the commencement of the marriage up to the filing of the present petition) and worse, a gambler, can hardly qualify as being mentally or physically ill what then can We describe such acts? Are these normal manners of a married man? We are not at all swayed that a union affirmed in church rites and subsequently having children, are proofs that either of the spouses is mature and responsible enough to assume marital responsibilities.1awphi1.net Accordingly, We can safely conclude that said deficiency is so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. This Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the parties found themselves trapped in its mire of unfulfilled vows and unconsummated marital obligations, can do no less but to declare the marriage between the herein petitioner and the respondent herein dissolved. While the law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity ([A]rticle 68 of the Family Code), however, what is there to preserve when the other spouse is an unwilling party to the cohesion and creation of a family as an inviolable social institution. In fine, Laila Tanyag-San Jose must be allowed to rise from the ashes and begin a new lifefreed from a marriage which, to Us, was hopeless from the beginning and where the bonding could not have been possible.

xxxx While We may not have strictly adhered to the ruling in the Molina case in arriving at Our present conclusion We have reason to deviate from the same. In view of the peculiar circumstances attendant in this case, We were constrained to take exception from the Molina case. Note that the "(c) ommittee did not give any example of psychological incapacity for the fear that the giving of examples would limit the applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis. Rather, the Committee would like the judge to apply the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decision of Church tribunals which although not binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision was taken from Canon Law." (page 37, Handbook of the Family Code of the Philippines, Sempio-Diy, 1991 reprinted). Hence, whether or not psychological incapacity exists is for Us to establish, as there is no hard and fast rule in the determination of what maybe considered indicia of psychological incapacity. To Our mind there are sufficient grounds for Us to conclude that indeed psychological incapacity exists so as to warrant declaration of the marriage void ab initio.15 (Italics and underscoring in the original; emphasis supplied) Petitioner, Republic of the Philippines, filed a Motion for Reconsideration 16 of the appellate courts decision which was denied, by Resolution dated June 2, 2005, 17 hence, its present Petition for Review,18 positing that: I IT WAS NOT PROVEN THAT MANOLITOS ALLEGED DEFECTS ARE CONSTITUTIVE OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY AS CONTEMPLATED UNDER ARTICLE 36 OF THE FAMILY CODE AND THAT THE SAME HAS JURIDICAL ANTECEDENCE, IS GRAVE AND INCURABLE[, AND] II THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT ADHERING TO THE RULING OF THE MOLINA CASE AND THE DOCTRINE OF STARE DECISIS.19 Petitioner contends that Laila failed to prove that Manolito is psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations as she merely relied on the report of Dr. Tayag; and granted that the psychological examination of Manolito is not a requirement for a declaration of his psychological incapacity, the totality of the evidence presented does not show Manolitos psychological incapacity. Petitioner further contends that the appellate court erred in believing that the "defects" of Manolito already existed at the inception of the marriage or are incurable; and in any event, "belief" cannot substitute for proof which the law and jurisprudence require. Petitioner finally contends that a deviation from the Molina ruling is not proper in the present case. Laila, as petitioner, had the burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage. Psychological incapacity, as a ground for nullity of marriage, has been succinctly expounded in the recent case ofMa. Armida Perez-Ferraris v. Brix Ferraris (Ferraris),20 thus: The term "psychological incapacity" to be a ground for the nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of the awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. As all people may have certain quirks and idiosyncrasies, or isolated characteristics associated with certain personality disorders, there is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly

demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. It is for this reason that the Court relies heavily on psychological experts for its understanding of the human personality. However, the root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature must be fully explained[.] (Italics in the original; emphasis supplied) As the earlier-quoted Report of Dr. Tayag shows, her conclusion about Manolitos psychological incapacity was based on the information supplied by Laila which she found to be "factual." That Laila supplied the basis of her conclusion, Dr. Tayag confirmed at the witness stand: Q [Atty. Revilla, Jr.]: What was your conclusion, what w[ere] your findings with respect to the respondent? A [Dr. Tayag]: Base[d] on the narration made by [Laila], which I found the narration to be factual,regarding her marital relationship with the petitioner (should have been respondent), I came up with a conclusion that respondent is psychologically incapacitated. The one which I found in him is his anti-social personality disorder because of the following overt manipulations: the presence of drug, the absence of remourse [sic], the constant incapacity in terms of maintaining the marital relationship, the lack of concern to his family, his self-centeredness, lack of remourse, in addition to the womanizing, respondent which clearly connotes the defiant of moral and personality disorder, he is tantamount to a person under the level, under our diagnostic criteria labeled as anti-social personality disorder, sir. Q: So you would like to impress this Court that your findings with respect to this case were only base[d] on the information given to you by [Laila], is that correct? A: Yes, wherein I found the narration made by [Laila] to be factual, sir.21 (Emphasis supplied) Undoubtedly, the doctors conclusion is hearsay. It is "unscientific and unreliable," so this Court declared in Choa v. Choa22 where the assessment of the therein party sought to be declared psychologically incapacitated was based merely on the information communicated to the doctor by the therein respondent-spouse: . . . [T]he assessment of petitioner by Dr. Gauzon was based merely on descriptions communicated to him by respondent. The doctor never conducted any psychological examination of her. Neither did he ever claim to have done so. In fact, his Professional Opinion began with the statement "[I]f what Alfonso Choa said about his wife Leni is true, . . ." xxxx Obviously, Dr. Gauzon had no personal knowledge of the facts he testified to, as these had merely been relayed to him by respondent. The former was working on pure suppositions and secondhand information fed to him by one side. Consequently, his testimony can be dismissed as unscientific and unreliable.23 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) Parenthetically, Dr. Tayags Psychological Report does not even show that the alleged anti-social personality disorder of Manolito was already present at the inception of the marriage or that it is incurable. Neither does it explain the incapacitating nature of the alleged disorder nor identify its root cause. It merely states that "[s]uch disorder is considered to be grave and is deeply [immersed] within the system [and] continues to influence the individual until the later stage of life." There is of course no requirement that the person sought to be declared psychologically incapacitated should be personally examined by a physician or psychologist as a condition sine qua non to arrive at such declaration.24 If it can be proven by independent means that one is psychologically incapacitated, there is no reason why the same should not be credited.

In the present case, the only proof which bears on the claim that Manolito is psychologically incapacitated is the following testimony of Laila, in answer to the clarificatory questions propounded by the trial court: Q [Court]: Now, so aside from what you said that your husband is a drug user and that he is jobless and was not able to support your family, what other reasons do you have for saying that your husband is psychologically incapacitated from performing his marital obligations? A [Laila]: He cannot give us a brighter future because he is jobless, your honor. Q: Apart from these two reasons which is for alleged use or possession of drugs and his inability to get a job and support his family you have no other basis to show for the declaration of nullity of your marriage? A: Yes, your honor.25 (Underscoring supplied) Manolitos alleged psychological incapacity is thus premised on his being jobless and a drug user, as well as his inability to support his family and his refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Manolitos state or condition or attitude has not been shown, however, to be a malady or disorder rooted on some incapacitating or debilitating psychological condition. In Molina, where the therein respondent preferred to spend more time with his friends than with his family, this Court found the same to be more of a "difficulty" if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations. In Ferraris,26 this Court held: We find respondents alleged mixed personality disorder, the "leaving-the- house" attitude whenever they quarreled, the violent tendencies during epileptic attacks, the sexual infidelity, the abandonment and lack of support, and his preference to spend more time with his band mates than his family, are not rooted on some debilitating psychological condition but a mere refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage. (Underscoring supplied) Also in Ferraris, this Court held that abandonment, does not by itself psychological incapacity.27 Neither is to meet duties and responsibilities of (not physical) illness.29 habitual alcoholism, just like sexual infidelity or perversion and constitute ground for declaring a marriage void based on emotional immaturity and irresponsibility.28 Or failure or refusal a married man if it is not shown to be due to some psychological

While Molina then is not set in stone,30 the facts and circumstances attendant to this case do not warrant a deviation from it. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The February 15, 2005 Decision and June 2, 2005 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA- G.R. CV No. 73286 are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The July 17, 2001 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City in JDRC Case No. 4862 is REINSTATED. SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 133778

March 14, 2000

ENGRACE NIAL for Herself and as Guardian ad Litem of the minors BABYLINE NIAL, INGRID NIAL, ARCHIE NIAL & PEPITO NIAL, JR., petitioners, vs. NORMA BAYADOG, respondent.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: May the heirs of a deceased person file a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage after his death? Pepito Nial was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out of their marriage were born herein petitioners. Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting in her death on April 24, 1985. One year and 8 months thereafter or on December 11, 1986, Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog got married without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating that they had lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and were thus exempt from securing a marriage license. On February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car accident. After their father's death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of a marriage license. The case was filed under the assumption that the validity or invalidity of the second marriage would affect

petitioner's successional rights. Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioners have no cause of action since they are not among the persons who could file an action for "annulment of marriage" under Article 47 of the Family Code. Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos of the Regional Trial Court of Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59, dismissed the petition after finding that the Family Code is "rather silent, obscure, insufficient" to resolve the following issues: (1) Whether or not plaintiffs have a cause of action against defendant in asking for the declaration of the nullity of marriage of their deceased father, Pepito G. Nial, with her specially so when at the time of the filing of this instant suit, their father Pepito G. Nial is already dead; (2) Whether or not the second marriage of plaintiffs' deceased father with defendant is null and voidab initio; (3) Whether or not plaintiffs are estopped from assailing the validity of the second marriage after it was dissolved due to their father's death. 1 Thus, the lower court ruled that petitioners should have filed the action to declare null and void their father's marriage to respondent before his death, applying by analogy Article 47 of the Family Code which enumerates the time and the persons who could initiate an action for annulment of marriage. 2 Hence, this petition for review with this Court grounded on a pure question of law. This petition was originally dismissed for non-compliance with Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, and because "the verification failed to state the basis of petitioner's averment that the allegations in the petition are "true and correct"." It was thus treated as an unsigned pleading which produces no legal effect under Section 3, Rule 7, of the 1997 Rules. 3 However, upon motion of petitioners, this Court reconsidered the dismissal and reinstated the petition for review. 4 The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code (FC), the applicable law to determine their validity is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of their celebration. 5 A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code, 6 the absence of which renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3) 7 in relation to Article 58. 8 The requirement and issuance of marriage license is the State's demonstration of its involvement and participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of which the general public is interested. 9 This interest proceeds from the constitutional mandate that the State recognizes the sanctity of family life and of affording protection to the family as a basic "autonomous social institution." 10 Specifically, the Constitution considers marriage as an "inviolable social institution," and is the foundation of family life which shall be protected by the State. 11 This is why the Family Code considers marriage as "a special contract of permanent union" 12 and case law considers it "not just an adventure but a lifetime commitment." 13 However, there are several instances recognized by the Civil Code wherein a marriage license is dispensed with, one of which is that provided in Article 76, 14 referring to the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at least five years before the marriage. The rationale why no license is required in such case is to avoid exposing the parties to humiliation, shame and embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to the publication of every applicant's name for a marriage license. The publicity attending the marriage license may discourage such persons from legitimizing their status. 15 To preserve peace in the family, avoid the peeping and suspicious eye of public exposure and contain the source of gossip arising from the publication of their names, the law deemed it wise to preserve their privacy and exempt them from that requirement.

There is no dispute that the marriage of petitioners' father to respondent Norma was celebrated without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, they executed an affidavit stating that "they have attained the age of majority, and, being unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, and that we now desire to marry each other." 16 The only issue that needs to be resolved pertains to what nature of cohabitation is contemplated under Article 76 of the Civil Code to warrant the counting of the five year period in order to exempt the future spouses from securing a marriage license. Should it be a cohabitation wherein both parties are capacitated to marry each other during the entire five-year continuous period or should it be a cohabitation wherein both parties have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife during the entire five-year continuous period regardless of whether there is a legal impediment to their being lawfully married, which impediment may have either disappeared or intervened sometime during the cohabitation period? Working on the assumption that Pepito and Norma have lived together as husband and wife for five years without the benefit of marriage, that five-year period should be computed on the basis of a cohabitation as "husband and wife" where the only missing factor is the special contract of marriage to validate the union. In other words, the five-year common-law cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date of celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of the marriage. This 5-year period should be the years immediately before the day of the marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity meaning no third party was involved at anytime within the 5 years and continuity that is unbroken. Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year cohabitation is computed without any distinction as to whether the parties were capacitated to marry each other during the entire five years, then the law would be sanctioning immorality and encouraging parties to have common law relationships and placing them on the same footing with those who lived faithfully with their spouse. Marriage being a special relationship must be respected as such and its requirements must be strictly observed. The presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife is based on the approximation of the requirements of the law. The parties should not be afforded any excuse to not comply with every single requirement and later use the same missing element as a pre-conceived escape ground to nullify their marriage. There should be no exemption from securing a marriage license unless the circumstances clearly fall within the ambit of the exception. It should be noted that a license is required in order to notify the public that two persons are about to be united in matrimony and that anyone who is aware or has knowledge of any impediment to the union of the two shall make it known to the local civil registrar. 17 The Civil Code provides: Art. 63: . . . This notice shall request all persons having knowledge of any impediment to the marriage to advice the local civil registrar thereof. . . . Art. 64: Upon being advised of any alleged impediment to the marriage, the local civil registrar shall forthwith make an investigation, examining persons under oath. . . . This is reiterated in the Family Code thus: Art. 17 provides in part: . . . This notice shall request all persons having knowledge of any impediment to the marriage to advise the local civil registrar thereof. . . . Art. 18 reads in part: . . . In case of any impediment known to the local civil registrar or brought to his attention, he shall note down the particulars thereof and his findings thereon in the application for a marriage license. . . . This is the same reason why our civil laws, past or present, absolutely prohibited the concurrence of multiple marriages by the same person during the same period. Thus, any marriage subsequently contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse shall be illegal and void, 18 subject only to the exception in cases of absence or where the prior marriage was dissolved or annulled. The Revised Penal Code complements the civil law in that the contracting of two or more marriages and the having of extramarital affairs are considered felonies, i.e., bigamy and concubinage and adultery. 19 The law sanctions monogamy.

In this case, at the time of Pepito and respondent's marriage, it cannot be said that they have lived with each other as husband and wife for at least five years prior to their wedding day. From the time Pepito's first marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with respondent, only about twenty months had elapsed. Even assuming that Pepito and his first wife had separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and respondent had started living with each other that has already lasted for five years, the fact remains that their five-year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated by law. It should be in the nature of a perfect union that is valid under the law but rendered imperfect only by the absence of the marriage contract. Pepito had a subsisting marriage at the time when he started cohabiting with respondent. It is immaterial that when they lived with each other, Pepito had already been separated in fact from his lawful spouse. The subsistence of the marriage even where there was actual severance of the filial companionship between the spouses cannot make any cohabitation by either spouse with any third party as being one as "husband and wife". Having determined that the second marriage involved in this case is not covered by the exception to the requirement of a marriage license, it is void ab initio because of the absence of such element. The next issue to be resolved is: do petitioners have the personality to file a petition to declare their father's marriage void after his death? Contrary to respondent judge's ruling, Article 47 of the Family Code 20 cannot be applied even by analogy to petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage. The second ground for annulment of marriage relied upon by the trial court, which allows "the sane spouse" to file an annulment suit "at anytime before the death of either party" is inapplicable. Article 47 pertains to the grounds, periods and persons who can file an annulment suit, not a suit for declaration of nullity of marriage. The Code is silent as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of a marriage. Voidable and void marriages are not identical. A marriage that is annulable is valid until otherwise declared by the court; whereas a marriage that is void ab initio is considered as having never to have taken place21 and cannot be the source of rights. The first can be generally ratified or confirmed by free cohabitation or prescription while the other can never be ratified. A voidable marriage cannot be assailed collaterally except in a direct proceeding while a void marriage can be attacked collaterally. Consequently, void marriages can be questioned even after the death of either party but voidable marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and not after death of either, in which case the parties and their offspring will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid. 22 That is why the action or defense for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages where the action prescribes. Only the parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but any proper interested party may attack a void marriage. Void marriages have no legal effects except those declared by law concerning the properties of the alleged spouses, regarding co-ownership or ownership through actual joint contribution, 23 and its effect on the children born to such void marriages as provided in Article 50 in relation to Article 43 and 44 as well as Article 51, 53 and 54 of the Family Code. On the contrary, the property regime governing voidable marriages is generally conjugal partnership and the children conceived before its annulment are legitimate. Contrary to the trial court's ruling, the death of petitioner's father extinguished the alleged marital bond between him and respondent. The conclusion is erroneous and proceeds from a wrong premise that there was a marriage bond that was dissolved between the two. It should be noted that their marriage was void hence it is deemed as if it never existed at all and the death of either extinguished nothing. Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is necessary in order to establish the nullity of a marriage. 24 "A void marriage does not require a judicial decree to restore the parties to their original rights or to make the marriage void but though no sentence of avoidance be absolutely necessary, yet as well for the sake of good order of society as for the peace of mind of all concerned, it is expedient that the nullity of the marriage should be ascertained and declared by the decree of a court of competent jurisdiction." 25 "Under ordinary circumstances, the effect of a void marriage, so far as concerns the conferring of legal rights upon the parties, is as though no marriage had ever taken place. And therefore, being good for no legal purpose, its invalidity can be maintained in any proceeding in which the fact of marriage may be material, either direct or collateral, in any civil court between any parties at any time, whether before or after the death of either or both the husband and

the wife, and upon mere proof of the facts rendering such marriage void, it will be disregarded or treated as non-existent by the courts." It is not like a voidable marriage which cannot be collaterally attacked except in direct proceeding instituted during the lifetime of the parties so that on the death of either, the marriage cannot be impeached, and is made good ab initio. 26 But Article 40 of the Family Code expressly provides that there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second marriage 27 and such absolute nullity can be based only on a final judgment to that effect. 28 For the same reason, the law makes either the action or defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage imprescriptible. 29 Corollarily, if the death of either party would extinguish the cause of action or the ground for defense, then the same cannot be considered imprescriptible. However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. This is without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The clause "on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void" in Article 40 of the Family Code connotes that such final judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Order of the Regional Trial Court, Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59, dismissing Civil Case No. T-639, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The said case is ordered REINSTATED.1wphi1.nt SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION [G.R. No. 167523, June 27, 2008]

NILDA V. NAVALES, PETITIONER, VS. REYNALDO NAVALES, RESPONDENT. DECISION AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.: Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 76624 promulgated on February 16, 2005 which affirmed the Judgment[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 59 of Toledo City, in Civil Case No. T-799 dated January 2, 2002, declaring the nullity of the marriage of Reynaldo and Nilda Navales on the ground of psychological incapacity. The facts are as follows:

Reynaldo Navales (Reynaldo) and Nilda Navales (Nilda) met in 1986 in a local bar where Nilda worked as a waitress. The two became lovers and Nilda quit her job, managed a boarding house owned by her uncle and studied Health Aide financed by Reynaldo. Upon learning that Nilda's uncle was prodding her to marry an American, Reynaldo, not wanting to lose her, asked her to marry him. This, despite his knowledge that Nilda was writing her penpals and was asking money from them and that she had an illegitimate son by a man whose identity she did not reveal to him. [3]The two got married on December 29, 1988, before the Municipal Trial Court Judge of San Fernando, Cebu. [4] Reynaldo claims that during the first year of their marriage, their relationship went well. Problems arose, however, when Nilda started selling RTWs and cosmetics, since she could no longer take care of him and attend to household chores.[5] Things worsened when she started working as an aerobics instructor at the YMCA, where, according to Reynaldo, Nilda's flirtatiousness and promiscuity recurred. She wore tight-fitting outfits, allowed male clients to touch her body, and introduced herself as single. Reynaldo received phone calls from different men looking for Nilda. There was also a time when Nilda chose to ride with another man instead of Reynaldo; and another when Nilda went home late, riding in the car of the man who kissed her. Reynaldo also claims that Nilda refused to have a child with him, as it would destroy her figure.[6] On June 18, 1992, Reynaldo left Nilda and never reconciled with her again.[7] On August 30, 1999, Reynaldo filed a Petition for Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Marriage and Damages before the RTC, Toledo City, Cebu, docketed as Civil Case No. T-799 claiming that his marriage with Nilda did not cure Nilda's flirtatiousness and sexual promiscuity, and that her behavior indicates her lack of understanding and appreciation of the meaning of marriage, rendering the same void under Article 36 of the Family Code. [8] Reynaldo testified in support of his petition and presented telephone directories showing that Nilda used her maiden name "Bacon" instead of "Navales."[9] Reynaldo also presented Josefino Ramos, who testified that he was with Reynaldo when Reynaldo first met Nilda at the bar called "Appetizer," and that he (Ramos) himself was attracted to Nilda since she was sexy, beautiful, and jolly to talk with. [10] Reynaldo also presented Violeta Abales, his cousin, who testified that she was a vendor at the YMCA where Nilda worked and was known by her maiden name; that she knows Nilda is sexy and wears tight fitting clothes; that her companions are mostly males and she flirts with them; and that there was one time that Reynaldo fetched Nilda at YMCA but Nilda went with another man, which angered Reynaldo.[11] Finally, Reynaldo presented Leticia Vatanagul, a Clinical Psychologist and Social Worker who drafted a Psychological Assessment of Marriage dated March 28, 2001.[12] In said Assessment, Vatanagul concluded that Nilda is a nymphomaniac, who has a borderline personality, a social deviant, an alcoholic, and suffering from anti-social personality disorder, among others, which illnesses are

incurable and are the causes of Nilda's psychological incapacity to perform her marital role as wife to Reynaldo.[13] Nilda, for her part, claims that Reynaldo knew that she had a child before she met him, yet Reynaldo continued courting her; thus, their eventual marriage.[14] She claims that it was actually Reynaldo who was linked with several women, who went home very late, kept his earnings for himself, and subjected her to physical harm whenever she called his attention to his vices. She worked at the YMCA to cope with the needs of life, and she taught only female students. Reynaldo abandoned her for other women, the latest of whom was Liberty Lim whom she charged, together with Reynaldo, with concubinage.[15] Nilda presented a certification from the YMCA dated October 17, 2001 stating that she was an aerobics instructress for a program that was exclusively for ladies,[16] as well as a statement of accounts from PLDT showing that she used her married name, Nilda B. Navales.[17] On January 2, 2002, the RTC rendered its Decision disposing as follows: WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in the above-entitled case declaring defendant Nilda B. Navales as psychologically incapacitated to fulfill her marital obligations with plaintiff Reynaldo V. Navales and further declaring their marriage contracted on December 29, 1988, before the Municipal Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of San Fernando, Cebu, as null and void.[18] The RTC held that: x x x From the testimonies and evidences x x x adduced, it was clearly established that the defendant had no full understanding of [the] effects of marriage and had no appreciation of [the] consequences of marriage as shown by her x x x act of concealing her marital status by using her maiden name "Nilda T. Bacon", augmenting her pretense of being still single through the telephone directories; by her refusal to accompany with [sic] her husband despite of the latter's insistence, but rather opted to ride other man's jeep, whose name her husband did not even know; by her act of allowing a man other than her husband to touch her legs even in her husband's presence; by allowing another man to kiss her even in the full view of her husband; by preferring to loss [sic] her husband rather than losing her job as aerobic instructress and on top of all, by refusing to bear a child fathered by her husband because it will destroy her figure, is a clear indication of the herein defendant's psychological incapacity.[19] Nilda filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the RTC denied on April 10, 2002.[20] The CA dismissed Nilda's appeal, ruling that the RTC correctly held that Nilda concealed her marital status, as shown by the telephone listings in which Nilda used her maiden name; that nymphomania, the condition which the expert said Nilda was afflicted with, was a ground for psychological incapacity; and that the RTC correctly gave weight to the four pieces of testimonial evidence presented by Reynaldo vis-a-vis the lone testimony of Nilda.[21] Nilda now comes before the Court alleging that: I The petitioner is not psychologically incapacitated to comply [with] her marital obligations as a wife. II Psychological incapacity, if ever existing, of the wife is NOT PERMAMENT or INCURABLE and was NEVER EXISTING AT THE TIME OF THE CELEBRATION OF MARRIAGE. III The petitioner is not a nymphomaniac.

IV The effort of herein petitioner into the case shows that she is consciously and nobly preserving and continue to believe that marriage is inviolable rather [sic]. V The guidelines of Molina case in the application of Article 36 of the New Family Code has not been strictly complied with. [22] Nilda claims that she did not fail in her duty to observe mutual love, respect and fidelity; that she never had any illicit relationship with any man; that no case for inchastity was initiated by Reynaldo against her, and that it was actually Reynaldo who had a pending case for concubinage.[23] She questions the lower courts' finding that she is a nymphomaniac, since she was never interviewed by the expert witness to verify the truth of Reynaldo's allegations. There is also not a single evidence to show that she had sexual intercourse with a man other than her husband while they were still living together.[24] Nilda also avers that the guidelines in Republic of the Phillippines. v. Molina[25] were not complied with. The RTC resolved the doubt on her motive for using her maiden name in the telephone directory in favor of the dissolution of the marriage instead of its preservation. The expert opinion was given weight, even though it was baseless to establish that petitioner had psychological incapacity to comply with her marital obligations as a wife; and that, assuming that such incapacity existed, it was already existing at the time of the marriage; and that such incapacity was incurable and grave enough to bring about the disability of the wife to assume the essential obligations of marriage.[26] Reynaldo, for his part, argues that while the petition is captioned as one under Rule 45, it is actually a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, since it impleads the CA as respondent and alleges that the CA acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or excess of jurisdiction.[27] Reynaldo also claims that the issues raised by Nilda necessarily require a review of the factual findings of the lower courts, which matters have already been decided and passed upon, and factual findings of the courts a quo are binding on this Court; that only questions of law may be raised before this Court; that the RTC, in reaching its decision, complied with the requirements of Molina; that the Solicitor General was represented by the City Prosecutor of Toledo City; and that Reynaldo discharged the burden of proof to show the nullity of his marriage to Nilda. Reynaldo further averred that he testified on his behalf; presented corroborating witnesses, one of whom is an expert clinical psychologist, as well as documentary evidence in support of his cause of action; that Molina did not require that the psychologist examine the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated; that Nilda did not rebut the psychologist's findings and did not present her own expert to disprove the findings of Vatanagul; that Nilda's psychological incapacity, caused by nymphomania, was duly proven to have been existing prior to and at the time of her marriage to Reynaldo and to have become manifest during her marriage, based on the testimonies of Reynaldo and his witnesses; and that such incapacity was proven to be incurable, as shown by the report of Vatanagul.[28] Nilda filed a Reply, and both parties filed their respective memoranda reiterating their arguments. [29] Simply stated, the issue posed before the Court is whether the marriage between Reynaldo and Nilda is null and void on the ground of Nilda's psychological incapacity. The answer, contrary to the findings of the RTC and the CA, is in the negative.

Preliminarily, let it be stressed that it is the policy of our Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as the basic autonomous social institution, and marriage as the foundation of the family.[30] The Constitution decrees marriage as legally inviolable and protects it from dissolution at the whim of the

parties.[31] The Family Code under Article 48 [32] therefore requires courts to order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned, in cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, to appear on behalf of the State in order to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that the evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. Indeed, only the active participation of the Public Prosecutor or the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) will ensure that the interest of the State is represented and protected in proceedings for annulment and declarations of nullity of marriage by preventing collusion between the parties, or the fabrication or suppression of evidence. [33] While the guidelines in Molina requiring the OSG to issue a certification on whether or not it is agreeing or objecting to the petition for annulment has been dispensed with by A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the Rule on the Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages,[34] still, Article 48 mandates the appearance and active participation of the State through the fiscal or the prosecuting attorney.[35] In this case, contrary to the assertion of the RTC that the OSG actively participated in the case through the Office of the City Prosecutor, records show that the State's participation consists only of the Report dated November 29, 1999 by Assistant City Prosecutor Gabriel L. Trocio, Jr. stating that no collusion exists between the parties;[36] the OSG's Opposition to the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage dated June 2, 2000;[37] and the cross-examination conducted by Prosecutor Trocio on Reynaldo[38] and his witness Abales.[39] There were no other pleadings, motions, or position papers filed by the Public Prosecutor or OSG; and no controverting evidence presented by them before the judgment was rendered. Considering the interest sought to be protected by the aforestated rules, the Court finds the State's participation in this case to be wanting. [40] But even on the merits, the Court finds that the totality of evidence presented by Reynaldo, contrary to its appreciation by the RTC and the CA, is insufficient to sustain a finding that Nilda is psychologically incapacitated. Generally, factual findings of trial courts, when affirmed by the CA, are binding on this Court. Such principle however is not absolute, such as when the findings of the appellate court go beyond the issues of the case; run contrary to the admissions of the parties; fail to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly considered, will justify a different conclusion; or when there is a misappreciation of facts.[41] Such is the case at bar. Psychological incapacity, in order to be a ground for the nullity of marriage under Article 36 [42] of the Family Code, refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of marriage. It is a malady that is so grave and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. As all people may have certain quirks and idiosyncrasies, or isolated traits associated with certain personality disorders, there is hardly any doubt that the intention of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.[43] In Santos v. Court of Appeals,[44] the Court held that psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. [45] InRepublic of the Philippines v. Molina, [46] the Court further set forth guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code, thus: 1. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. x x x

2. The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified,
(b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological --not physical, although its manifestation and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known that obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists. 3. The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's". The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

4. Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent orincurable. Such
incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. x x x.

5. Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage. 6. The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.

7. Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in
the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. x x x.[47] In this case, Reynaldo and his witnesses sought to establish that Nilda was a flirt before the marriage, which flirtatiousness recurred when she started working as an aerobics instructress. The instances alleged by Reynaldo, i.e., the occasion when Nilda chose to ride home with another man instead of him, that he saw Nilda being kissed by another man while in a car, and that Nilda allowed other men to touch her body, if true, would understandably hurt and embarrass him. Still, these acts by themselves are insufficient to establish a psychological or mental defect that is serious, incurable or grave as contemplated by Article 36 of the Family Code. Article 36 contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic marital obligations.[48] Mere "difficulty," "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of marital obligations or "ill will" on the part of the spouse is different from "incapacity" rooted on some debilitating psychological condition or illness.[49]Indeed, irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or perversion,

emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, and the like, do not by themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under Article 36, as the same may only be due to a person's refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage and not due to some psychological illness that is contemplated by said rule.[50] As admitted by Reynaldo, his marriage with Nilda was not all that bad; in fact, it went well in the first year of their marriage. As in other cases, an admission of a good and harmonious relationship during the early part of the marriage weakens the assertion of psychological defect existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage which deprived the party of the ability to assume the essential duties of marriage and its concomitant responsibilities.[51] In determining the import of "psychological incapacity" under Article 36, the same must be read in conjunction with, although to be taken as distinct from, Articles 35,[52] 37,[53] 38[54] and 41[55] of the Family Code that would likewise, but for different reasons, render the marriage void ab initio; or Article 45 that would make the marriage merely voidable; or Article 55 that could justify a petition for legal separation.[56] These various circumstances are not applied so indiscriminately as if the law were indifferent on the matter.[57] Indeed, Article 36 should not be equated with legal separation, in which the grounds need not be rooted in psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral pressure, moral corruption, civil interdiction, drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment and the like.[58] Reynaldo presented telephone directories in which Nilda used her maiden name "Bacon" to prove that Nilda represented herself as single. As noted by the CA, however, the telephone listings presented by Reynaldo were for the years 1993 to 1995, [59] after Reynaldo admittedly left Nilda on June 18, 1992. Apart from Reynaldo and Abalales's testimony, therefore, Reynaldo has no proof that Nilda represented herself as single while they were still living ogether. The Court cannot agree with the RTC, therefore, that said telephone listings show that Nilda represented herself to be single, which in turn manifests her lack of understanding of the consequences of marriage. Reynaldo also presented Clinical Psychologist Vatanagul to bolster his claim that Nilda is psychologically incapacitated. While it is true that the Court relies heavily on psychological experts for its understanding of the human personality,[60] and that there is no requirement that the defendant spouse be personally examined by a physician or psychologist before the nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity may be declared,[61] still, the root cause of the psychological incapacity must be identified as a psychological illness, its incapacitating nature fully explained,[62] and said incapacity established by the totality of the evidence presented during trial. [63] The Court finds that the psychological report presented in this case is insufficient to establish Nilda's psychological incapacity. In her report, Vatanagul concluded that Nilda is a nymphomaniac, an emotionally immature individual, has a borderline personality, has strong sexual urges which are incurable, has complete denial of her actual role as a wife, has a very weak conscience or superego, emotionally immature, a social deviant, not a good wife as seen in her infidelity on several occasions, an alcoholic, suffers from anti-social personality disorder, fails to conform to social norms, deceitful, impulsive, irritable and aggresive, irresponsible and vain.[64] She further defined "nymphomia" as a psychiatric disorder that involves a disturbance in motor behavior as shown by her sexual relationship with various men other than her husband.[65] The report failed to specify, however, the names of the men Nilda had sexual relationship with or the circumstances surrounding the same. As pointed out by Nilda, there is not even a single proof that she was ever involved in an illicit relationship with a man other than her husband. Vatanagul claims, during her testimony, that in coming out with the report, she interviewed not only Reynaldo but also Jojo Caballes, Dorothy and Lesley who were Reynaldo's sister-in-law and sister, respectively, a certain Marvin and a certain Susan.[66] Vatanagul however, did not specify the identities of these persons, which information were supplied by whom, and how they came upon their respective informations.

Indeed, the conclusions drawn by the report are vague, sweeping and lack sufficient factual bases. As the report lacked specificity, it failed to show the root cause of Nilda's psychological incapacity; and failed to demonstrate that there was a "natal or supervening disabling factor" or an "adverse integral element" in Nilda's character that effectively incapacitated her from accepting, and thereby complying with, the essential marital obligations, and that her psychological or mental malady existed even before the marriage.[67] Hence, the Court cannot give weight to said assessment. The standards used by the Court in assessing the sufficiency of psychological reports may be deemed very strict, but that is only proper in view of the principle that any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage and the indissolubility of the marital vinculum. [68] Reynaldo also claims that Nilda does not want to get pregnant which allegation was upheld by the trial court. A review of the records shows, however, that apart from the testimony of Reynaldo, no other proof was presented to support such claim. Mere allegation and nothing more is insufficient to support such proposition. As petitioner before the trial court, it devolves upon Reynaldo to discharge the burden of establishing the grounds that would justify the nullification of the marriage. [69] While Reynaldo and Nilda's marriage failed and appears to be without hope of reconciliation, the remedy, however, is not always to have it declared void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity. A marriage, no matter how unsatisfactory, is not a null and void marriage. [70] And this Court, even as the highest one, can only apply the letter and spirit of the law, no matter how harsh it may be.[71] WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 76624 promulgated on February 16, 2005 and the Decision dated January 2, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 59 of Toledo City, in Civil Case No. T-799 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage and damages, docketed as Civil Case No. T-799, is DISMISSED. Costs SO ORDERED. against respondent.