NCPRI Presents an Alternative Approach: Collective and Concurrent Lokpal Basket of Anti-corruption and Grievance Redress Measures.

(Draft Concept notes for widespread consultation) The National Campaign for Peoples Right to Information (NCPRI) presented a critique of the government draft of the Lokpal bill (as released on June 21) and presented an alternate approach in the form of a basket of collective and concurrent Lokpal anti-corruption and grievance redress measures at the Nehru Memorial Museum and Library (NMML) on the 6th of July 2011. On the 5th of July, the NCPRI held a consultation to discuss the alternate approach with various people. The consultations jointly organized by NCPRI, NMML and Inclusive Media for Change were attended by several eminent people including Justice A. P. Shah, Admiral Tahiliani, Wajahat Habibullah, Samar Singh, Vinod Mehta, Ram Bahadur Rai, TCA Srinivasa Raghavan, Neelabh Mishra, Bharat Dogra, Sukumar Muralidharan, PV Rajagopal, Medha Patkar, Kalpana Kannabiran, Yogendra Yadav, Madhu Kishwar, Ravi Chopra, Amitabh Behar, Prashant Bhushan, CV Madhukar, Dipa Sinha, Kiran Shaheen, Yamini Aiyar, Saikat Datta, Prashanto Sen, Subhash Chandra Aggarwal, Harsh Mander, Shekhar Singh, Aruna Roy, Anjali Bhardwaj, and Vipul Mudgul. The NCPRI critique and approach built on the public consultation organized by it on the 16th of April 2011. In the consultation, there was unanimity that all public servants must be held accountable; however, it was felt that no single institution should be made responsible for this mammoth task. A decentralised agency needs to be created to address and redress the spate of grievances of the common citizen. Vesting such all-encompassing power and responsibility in one institution would overload the institution making it difficult for it to carry out any of its tasks. Therefore, a consensus emerged that an approach of providing for a basket of collective and concurrent Lokpal anti corruption and grievance redress measures should be explored. In the consultations on the 5th and 6th of July, the NCPRI presented detailed draft concept notes on enactment/ strengthening of five collective and concurrent anticorruption and grievance redress measures, namely: 1. Rashtriya Bhrashtachar Nivaran Lokpal (National Anti-corruption Lokpal): An institution to tackle corruption of all elected representatives, including the Prime Minister (with some safeguards), Ministers and Members of Parliament and senior bureaucrats (Group A officers) and all other co-accused including those in the private and social sector. The Lokpal will be financially and administratively independent from the government and will have both investigative and prosecution powers.

2. Kendriya Satarkta Lokpal (Central Vigilance Commission): Amending the Central Vigilance Commission Act to remove the single directive and empower the CVC to investigate corruption and take appropriate action against mid-level bureaucracy. 3. Nyayapalika Lokpal (Judicial Standards and Accountability Lokpal): To strengthen the existing Judicial Accountability and Standards Bill, that is currently before the Parliament, to ensure that the judiciary is also made effectively and appropriately accountable, without compromising its independence from the executive or the integrity of its functions. 4. Shikayat Nivaran Lokpal (Public Grievances Lokpal): To set up an effective time-bound system for grievance redress for common citizens to make the government answerable in terms of its functions, duties, commitments and obligations towards citizens. The grievance redress structure would have decentralized institutional mechanisms going right down to each ward/block level, and would ensure a bottom-up, people centric approach so that complaints and grievances can be dealt with speedily and in a decentralized, participatory and transparent manner. It will integrate public vigilance processes like vigilance committees and social audits, and provide for facilitation for the filing of all grievances/complaints through the setting up of block information and facilitation centres in every Block (rural) and ward (urban) in the country. The grievance redress mechanism will be a three-tier structure consisting of grievance redress officers at the local level within the department, independent district level grievance redressal authorities (with power to penalize and provide compensation) and appellate central/State level grievance redressal commission. It will include and rationalize existing structures. 5. Lokrakshak Kanoon (Whistleblower Protection Lokpal): To strengthen the existing Public interest Disclosure and Protection to Persons Making the Disclosure Bill, that is currently before the Parliament, to ensure appropriate protection of whistleblowers. These institutions, where relevant, will also be established at the state level. In addition there will be a common selection process to staff these institutions. The NCPRI feels that all these measures need to be brought in simultaneously to effectively tackle corruption at all levels and provide a mechanism to redress grievances of citizens. The NCPRI hopes that this alternative approach will contribute positively to the anticorruption public discourse at a time when the government has come out with the draft Lokpal Bill. The campaign is committed to substantive public debate on the draft framework and provisions of each of these issues as part of its campaign for a transparent and participative pre-legislative process. Signed:

Nikhil Dey, Venkatesh Nayak and Ramakrishnan Raju Co-conveners, NCPRI Dated: July 7, 2011

Scope and Coverage of the Lokpal Basket of Measures

CORRUPTION

GRIEVANCES

National Anti CorruptionLokp al Rashtriya /RajyaBhrashta charNivaranLok pal

Stronger Central Vigilance Commission KendriyaSatar ktaLokpal

Strong Judicial Accountability and Standards Bill NyayPalikaLok pal

Public Grievances Redress Lokpal ShikayatNivaranL okpal

Whistleblower Protection Bill LokrakshakKanoon

Scope of the Lokpal Basket of Measures

National Anti CorruptionLokpal

Strengthen existing Draft Government Lokpal Bill/with state Lokayuktas

Central Vigilance Commission

Reform and strengthen existing Central Vigilance Commission Act, 2003/state SVCs (see note 2)

Judicial AccountabilityCo mmission

Strengthen existing Judicial Accountability and Standards Bill/similar state institutions (see note 3)

Public Grievances Commission

Creation of a National Law for Public Grievances Redress applicable to the Center and the states (see note 4)

Whistleblower Protection

Strengthen existing Public Interest Disclosure and Protection of Persons making the Disclosure Bill, 2010 (see note 5).

Jurisdiction of proposed Anti-Corruption Measures

Prime Minister Covered under National Anti-Corruption Lokpal

Ministers

Covered under National Anti-Corruption Lokpal

Members of Parliament

Covered under National Anti-Corruption Lokpal

Judges of the Supreme Court and High Court/ lower judiciary judiciary

Covered under National Judicial Standards and Accountability Lokpal/state judicial lokayuktas

Government ServantsGroup A officers

Covered under National Anti-Corruption Lokpal

Government ServantsMiddle Level

Covered under the Central Vigilance Commission

Government ServantsLower Levels

Covered under regular provision with appellate jurisdiction with the CVC

Corporates and govt. funded NGOs

3

Covered under National Anti-Corruption Lokpal as co-accused/ amended PC Act

COLLECTIVE AND CONCURRENT LOKPAL ANTI-CORRUPTION AND GRIEVANCE REDRESS MEASURES The purpose of this exercise is to present to the government a well thought out and widely discussed set of measures that could be simultaneously and collectively adopted to prevent corruption at all levels, especially in high places, and to effectively redress grievances. Such measures could include the enactment of one or more laws in order to create the required institutions and authorities, the amendment of existing laws and practices, and the strengthening of existing institutions. The concerns and issues that need to be kept in mind while formulating the anti-corruption and grievance redress measures include: 1. Anti-corruption institutions must be financially, administratively and legally independent of those whom they are called upon to investigate and prosecute. 2. It is essential to have a multiplicity of decentralized institutions, geographically and across levels, with appropriate accountability mechanisms, to avoid the concentration of too much power, especially unaccountable power, in any one institution or authority. 3. Irrational constraints, like the need to obtain prior sanction, to investigate or prosecute should not be allowed. 4. However, institutions and processes must be fair and impartial to both the complainant and the accused, and ensure that honest persons are not harassed in the process of investigation and prosecution. 5. Each anti-corruption institution must itself be accountable in the same manner that it seeks to make other institutions accountable. 6. Appointments to these institutions must be done transparently and in a participatory manner, so as to minimize the chances of the wrong sorts of people getting in. 7. The functioning of each of these institutions and authorities must also be transparent, while protecting whistle blowers and respecting legitimate privacy and other concerns, as laid out in the RTI Act. Efforts must be made to proactively disclose as much information as possible, complying with and moving beyond section 4 of the RTI Act. 8. Institutions must each be of a manageable size, with no one institution becoming so large that its effective management and control becomes a problem. 9. Similarly, institutions and authorities should not be allowed to be overwhelmed but should be so designed that they can deliver results within a reasonable time frame. 10. If democratic institutions falter or weaken, there is no alternative to repairing and strengthening them. Setting up a parallel regulatory or decision making process is unlikely to help and such a parallel system is likely to itself get corrupted.

11. Consequently, at the very least, initial complaints must lie with each public authority, and they must be given an opportunity of setting their own house in order. Only appeals against what are seen as unsatisfactory responses should come to the proposed independent bodies. 12. The basic framework of the Constitution need not be challenged and solutions could be found that are within the framework of the Constitution. 13. In order to ensure that the proposed institutions and authorities are themselves credible and not prone to mutual back-scratching, circular powers of oversight must be avoided where institutions and authorities oversee each others functioning and integrity. 14. In order to ensure efficacy and independence of an institution, it must be given adequate powers and resources to both investigate complaints and to ensure the effective prosecution of cases. 15. The development, in a bottom up manner, of appropriate citizens charters, as also the codification of a comprehensive set of entitlements for citizens, both in service delivery as well as for democratic rights, should be a pre-requisite to the setting up of a grievance redress mechanism. 16. Lessons need to be learnt from the experience with social audits, especially in relation to the MGNREGA. These lessons should influence the design and practice of social audits for large government expenditures and contracts. Social audits should also be conducted for assessing policies and their impacts. 17. The window of opportunity currently available, because of the widespread public sentiment against corruption, must be respected and fully utilized to bring in these measures as soon as possible. Following from these principles, some of the measures that need to be concurrently and collectively implemented include: 1. Enacting a legislation for the setting up of Lokpal/Lokayukta Anti-Corruption Lokpals (Rashtriya/Rajya Bhrashtachar Nivaran Lokpal) at the Centre and in each of the states, that would receive, investigate and ensure effective prosecution of complaints about corruption relating to all elected representatives, including the Prime minister, Chief Ministers, Central and state Ministers, MPs, MLAs, MLCs, elected councilors, etc, and all class A officers, and to prosecute those against whom sufficient evidence is found. They would also have the power to investigate and prosecute any other person who is a co-accused in any of the cases being investigated or prosecuted by the Lokpal. Please see note no. 1 for detailed amendments suggested by NCPRI to strengthen the Lokpal bill that is currently before the Parliament. 2. Strengthening the institution of the CVC and bringing in under its purview all officers not covered under the Lokpal bill. Towards that end, providing the institution of the CVC with adequate investigative and prosecution powers and resources. Creating similar, independent, State 5

Vigilance Commissions for each of the states, and also strengthening departmental enquiry procedures. Please see note no. 2 for detailed suggestions made by NCPRI to appropriately amend the Central Vigilance Act. 3. Amending the Judicial Accountability and Standards Bill, that is currently before the Parliament, to ensure that the judiciary is also made effectively and appropriately accountable, without compromising its independence from the executive or the integrity of its functions. Please see note no. 3 for detailed suggestions made by NCPRI to strengthen the Judicial Accountability and Standards Bill.

4. Drafting an act that provides for the setting up and functioning of Public Grievances Lokpal (Shikayat Nivaran Lokpal) at the centre and in each of the states. These commissions would have powers to ensure that detailed citizens charters and norms of functioning are prepared for each public authority. They would also ensure that other entitlements and rights are codified, and that the obligations of each public authority are fulfilled. The grievance redress commissions would have decentralized institutional mechanisms going right down to each ward/block level, and would ensure a bottoms up people centric approach so that complaints and grievances could be dealt with speedily and in a decentralized, participatory and transparent manner. The functioning of the grievance redress processes could be linked to the RTI Act and also to recent, time-bound, service delivery laws providing for the imposition of penalty on officials who do not meet the prescribed time frames for providing services to the public. The experience of the Delhi Grievance Redress Commission could also be instructive. Please see note no. 4 for details of the grievance redress mechanism being suggested by NCPRI. 5. An effective legislation to protect whistleblowers will be enacted. In addition, each of these institutions would also have provisions for protecting whistleblowers and their identity. Please see note no. 5 for detailed suggestions made by NCPRI to strengthen the Whistleblowers Protection bill that is currently before the Parliament. Each of these institutions and authorities will function transparently and will have to be accountable to the public for their actions (and inactions) through strong and effective accountability measures. An option that can be considered is that only one law be enacted that would contain all these proposed institutions and measures. However, the institutions must be separate and independent of each other.

Note 1

MAJOR AMENDMENTS SUGGESTED TO THE GOVERNMENTS LOKPAL BILL (As Introduced in Parliament on 4th August 2011) General remarks 1. The proposed bill seems only to cover only the Central government and not the states. We feel that it is crucial that the same law also set up Lokayutkas, with similar powers and functions as the Lokpal, in each of the states. We believe this is within the legislative competence of the Parliament. 2. We have listed below some of the main problems we have with the current bill (as introduced in LokSabha) in so far as it goes. However, we are alarmed to note that while leaving out many categories of public servants and the redress of grievances, there is nothing in the attached note or elsewhere that reassures us about the governments commitment to also cover these gaps through other legislations or institutions. 3. Specifically, at the very least, we think that there should be a grievance redress mechanism, for central institutions and schemes, and separately for each of the states. We also believe that the Judicial Standards and Accountability bill that is currently before Parliament needs to be significantly strengthened so as to cover the higher judiciary effectively.Also required are Judicial Standards and Accountability institutions in each state to assist the High Courts in ensuring standards and probity in the lower courts. 4. To cover public servants other than group A officers, we believe that the institution of the Central Vigilance Commission needs significant strengthening and renewed independence. Similar independent institutions (state vigilance commissions) need to be created in each state and can, we believe, be done by a Central act. 5. The Public Interest Disclosure and Protection to Persons Making the Disclosures bill (WhistleblowersProtectionbill) which is also before Parliament needs to be revamped and made applicable to all the above mentioned institutions and also to all other relevant institutions. 6. A schematic depiction of our proposed collective and concurrent Lokpal measures to control corruption and redress grievances, for all public servants and at all levels, is given in the tables enclosed at the end of the document. Specifically we have the following issues with the draft Lokpal Bill, as introduced in the LokSabha.

Note 1

Exclusion of the Prime Minister Current Provisions in the Governments Bill:Section 2(1)(i) Minister means an Union Minister but does not include the Prime Minister; Our Rationale for Disagreement: We believe there is no legal or moral justification in excluding the Prime Minister from the purview of the Lokpal Bill. However, we do recognise that public and national interest requires some safeguards, and these have been suggested below. Our Recommendations: Replace by: (i)Minister means an Union Minister and includes the Prime Minister; 1. Provided that no investigation would be launched against the Prime Minister unless a reference has been made by a full bench of the Lokpal to the Chief Justice of India and that the Chief Justice of India has constituted a full bench of the Supreme Court which has examined the complaint and the relevant grounds and evidence and come to the conclusion that such an investigation is warranted; 2. Provided further that complaints regarding actions done by others where the Prime Minister is not directly involved but can be held responsible as the head of the government or cabinet would not be entertained (no vicarious liability). 3. Also provided that where the Prime Minister is of the opinion that some information that is asked for by the Lokpal as a part of an investigation is such that its disclosure might compromise national security or other critical national interests, the prime Minster would in confidence brief the CJI, whose decision on whether the information should be disclosed to the Lokpal, and if so, under what conditions, would be final. ______________________ Section 17(1) Subject to the other provisions of this Act, the Lokpal shall inquire into any matter involved in, or arising from, or connected with, any allegation of corruption made in a complaint in respect of the following, namely: (a) a Prime Minister, after he has demitted the office of the Prime Minister; Our Recommendations: Replace by:17(1)(a) a Prime Minister;

Note 1

Qualification for Chairperson Current Provisions in the Governments Bill: Section 3(1) As from the commencement of this Act, there shall be established, for thepurpose of making inquiries in respect of complaints made under this Act, an institution to be called the Lokpal. (2) The Lokpal shall consist of (a) a Chairperson, who is or has been a Chief Justice of India or a Judge of theSupreme Court; Our Rationale for Disagreement: We believe that there is no justification in restricting the position to judges, especially as the law provides for an adequate number of judicial members. Therefore, the eligibility criteria for the chairperson must be widened, as suggested below. Our Recommendations: Replace by: 3(2)(a) A Chairperson, who is or has been a Chief Justice of India or a Judge of the Supreme Court; or is otherwise qualified to be a member of the Lokpal. Selection Committee Current Provisions in the Governments Bill: 4. (1) The Chairperson and Members shall be appointed by the President after obtaining the recommendations of a Selection Committee consisting of (a) the Prime Minister chairperson; (b) the Speaker of the House of the People member; (c) the Leader of Opposition in the House of the Peoplemember; (d) the Leader of Opposition in the Council of States member; (e) a Union Cabinet Minister to be nominated by the Prime Minister member; (f) one sitting Judge of the Supreme Court to be nominated by the Chief Justice of Indiamember; (g) one sitting Chief Justice of a High Court to be nominated by the Chief Justice of Indiamember; (h) one eminent Jurist to be nominated by the Central Government member; (i) one person of eminence in public life with wide knowledge of and experience in anti-corruption policy, public administration, vigilance, policy making, finance including insurance and banking, law, or management to be nominated by the Central Government member. Our Rationale for Disagreement: In this committee five out of nine members: the PM, the Speaker, the cabinet minister and the two eminent persons would all be part of/appointed by the central government, This is not acceptable. Therefore, we suggest that the selection committee be a balance between the government, the opposition and the judiciary, as follows.
3

Note 1

Our Recommendations: Replace by: 4. (1) The Chairperson and Members shall be appointed by the President after obtainingthe recommendations of a Selection Committee consisting of (a) the Prime Minister chairperson; (b) the Leader of Opposition in the House of the Peoplemember; (e) one sitting Judge of the Supreme Court to be nominated by the Chief Justice of Indiamember; Process of Selection Current Provisions in the Governments Bill: Section 4(3) The Selection Committee may, if it considers necessary for the purposes of selecting the Chairperson and Members of the Lokpal and for preparing a panel of persons to be considered for appointment as such, constitute a Search Committee consisting of such persons of standing and having special knowledge and expertise in the matters relating to anti-corruption policy, public administration, vigilance, policy making, finance including insurance and banking, law, and management, or in any other matter which, in the opinion of the Selection Committee, may be useful in making selection of the Chairperson and Members of the Lokpal. Our Rationale for Disagreement: Our experience has been that high powered selection committees do not have the time to search out appropriate candidates. Therefore, the final selection is invariable decided by the dealing department which often puts before the selection committee an inadequate and/or inappropriate set of choices (as seem in the appointments of the CVC and various information commissioners and chief information commissioners). Therefore, we feel that there must be a search committee, as follows: Our Recommendations: Replace by: (3)The selection committee shall select out of a panel of not less than three and not more than five eligible candidates for each vacancy. This panel of eligible candidates shall be finalised by a search committee set up for the purpose; provided that the selection committee can require the search committee to submit up to two additional names for any vacancy, over and above those initially suggested, if they so deem necessary. a) The search committee shall comprise of five members appointed by the selection committee. b) Members of the search committee would be selected from among former: i. ii. iii. iv. v. Chief Justices of India Judges of the Supreme Court of India Comptroller and Auditor Generals of India Chief Election Commissioners of India Chief Information Commissioners of India
4

Note 1

vi. vii.

Former or outgoing Chief Lokpals (after the appointment of the first Chief Lokpal) Former Lokpals (for appointment of Lokpals only)

Provided that not more than two members should belong to any one of the categories listed above. Provided further that the following persons shall not be eligible for becoming members of the search committee: i. ii. iii. Any person who has joined any political party. Any person who is still in the service of the government in any capacity Any person who took up a government assignment after retirement, barring those assignments which are reserved for the post from which the person retired.

c) In addition, the search committee will consist of another five members who would be selected by the five members, appointed under (a) above, from among the civil society and could include activists, academics, journalists, professionals, etc. d) The search committee shall devise its own procedures to develop a short list of names that could be considered for recommending to the selection committee. e) The search committee shall put up on a website the names and relevant details of all the candidates being considered. The public would be given sufficient time (not less than a month) to send in their views, if any, pertinent to the candidature of any one or more of these candidates, along with relevant material, if any. f) The search committee will compile all the comments so received and, wherever it deems necessary, will further investigate the comments about, or credentials of, any of the candidates under consideration. g) Based on all this material, the search committee will recommend not less than three and not more than five names to the selection committee for each vacancy. All the material received or considered by the search committee in order to reach its final recommendation, as well as the details and documents related to its own proceedings, would be available for public scrutiny once the relevant appointments have been made. Treating Employees and Office bearers of NGOs and Peoples Movements, not funded by the government, as Public Servants Current Provisions in the Governments Bill: 2(1) (l) public servant means a person referred to in clauses (a) to (g) of subsection (1) of section 17; 17(1)
5

Note 1

XXX (g) any person who is or has been a director, manager, secretary or other officer of every other society or association of persons or trust (whether registered under any law for the time being in force or not) in receipt of any donation from the public and the annual income of which exceeds such amount as the Central Government may by notification specify: Provided that nothing in this section shall apply in relation to the Prime Minister, in whatever capacity he may be holding an office as a public functionary: Provided further that any person referred to in this clause shall be deemed to be a public servant under clause (c) of section 2 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and the provisions of that Act shall apply accordingly: Provided also that nothing in clauses (e) and (f) and this clause shall apply to any society or association of persons or trust constituted for religious purposes. Relevant Extract from the PC Act 2(c)Public Servant means: XXXXXXX (xii) any person who is an office-bearer or an employee of an educational, scientific, social, cultural or other institution, in whatever manner established, receiving or having received any financial assistance from the Central Government or any State Government, or local or other public authority. Our Rationale for Disagreement: We believe it is a draconian provision to declare office bearers of NGOs and movements that do not receive any government funds as public servants. Not only would this result in a huge amount of harassment but also be impractical as such bodies are not bound by government rules and procedures, and cannot be held accountable to those. If any of these organisations violate the existing laws relating to the management of funds etc., there are adequate provisionto prosecute them. Therefore: Our Recommendations: Delete 17(1)(g) Complaints Against the Chair and Members of the Lokpal Current Provisions in the Governments Bill: Section 8(1) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (3), the Chairperson or any Member shall be removed from his office by order of the President on the grounds of misbehaviour after the Supreme Court, on a reference being made to it (i) by the President, or (ii) by the President on a petition being signed by at least one hundred Members of Parliament,or (iii) by the President on receipt of a petition made by a citizen of India and where the President is satisfied that the petition should be referred, has, on an inquiry held in accordance with the
6

Note 1

procedure prescribed in that behalf, reported that the Chairperson or such Member, as the case may be, ought to be removed on such ground. (2) The President may suspend from office the Chairperson or any Member in respect of whom a reference has been made to the Supreme Court under sub-section (1) until the President has passed orders on receipt of the report of the Supreme Court on such reference. Our Rationale for Disagreement: The current provisions compromise the independence of the Lokpal by giving the Central Government various powers related to complaints against members of the Lokpal. This is not desirable and we propose that these powers and function be given instead to the Supreme Court, as suggested below. Our Recommendations: Replace by:8(1) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (3), the Chairperson or any other Member shall be removed from his office by order of the President on grounds of misbehaviour after the Supreme Court, on a complaint made to it has, on inquiry, held in accordance with the procedure prescribed in that behalf, advised that the Chairperson or such other Member, as the case may be, ought to be removed on such ground. 8(2) The President may suspend from office the Chairperson or any other Member in respect of whom a complaint has been made to the Supreme Court under sub-section (1), if the Chief Justice of India so advises, until the President has passed orders on receipt of the report of the Supreme Court on such a complaint. _____________ 40(2) Any complaint against the Chairperson or Member shall be made by an application by the party aggrieved, to the President. 40(3)The President shall, in case there exists a prima facie case for bias or corruption, make a reference to the Chief Justice of India in such manner as may be prescribed for inquiring into the complaint against the Chairperson or Member. Our Recommendations: Replace by: 40 (2) Any complaint against the Chairperson or Member shall be made by an application by the party aggrieved, to the Chief justice of India. 40 (3) The Chief Justice of India, on receipt of such a complaint, shall constitute a committee which will examine whether there exists a prima facie case for bias or corruption and this committee shall advise the Chief Justice on whether the complaint merits detailed investigation.
7

Note 1

Where the committee advises the Chief Justice of India that an investigation is merited, the CJI may have the matter investigated. Exempting Statements of MPs in Parliament Current Provisions in the Governments Bill: 17(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), the Lokpal shall not inquire into any matter involved in, or arising from, or connected with, any such allegation of corruption against any Member of either House of Parliament in respect of anything said or a vote given by him in Parliament or any committee thereof covered under the provisions contained in clause (2) of article 105 of the Constitution. Our Rationale for Disagreement: This is an unjustified exemption, but as its deletion would involve amendment of the Constitution, it should not be dropped at the moment but there should be a government undertaking that it would appropriately move Parliament with such a proposal for the amendment of the Constitution within a year. For the moment, the Lokpal bill could more faithfully reflect the constitutional position Our Recommendations: Replace by: 17(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), the Lokpal shall not inquire into any matterin respect of any thing said or any vote given by him in Parliament or any committee thereof . Provided that this exemption applies only to the Members of the Parliament while attending Parliament on the floor of the House and/or in Parliament Committees during session. Complaints Against the Lokpal Staff Current Provisions in the Governments Bill: 41. (1) Every complaint of allegation or wrongdoing made against any officer or employee or investigation agency under or associated with the Lokpal for offence punishable under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 shall be dealt with in accordance with the provisions of this section. (2) The Lokpal shall complete the inquiry into the complaint or allegation made, within a period of thirty days from the date of its receipt. Our Rationale for Disagreement: In keeping with the philosophy behind the independent Lokpal that no institution should be solely responsible for investigating and prosecuting its own officers in matters related to
8

Note 1

corruption, we think that it is only appropriate if the Lokpal does not deal with corruption complaints against its own officers. Therefore, an alternate system is being suggested. Our Recommendations: Replace 41(2) by:The Lokpal shall refer the matter to the Ombudsman appointed for the purpose by an independent committee, who will complete the inquiry into the complaint or allegation made, withina period of thirty days from the date of its receipt. Towards this end, the Ombudsman would be empowered to utilise the services of any investigating agency with the central government or that of the Lokpal. In 41(3) and 41(4) replace Lokpal with Ombudsman appropriately. Transfer of Cases Current Provisions in the Governments Bill: 21. On an application for transfer made by the complainant or the public servant, the Chairperson, after giving an opportunity of being heard to the complainant or the public servant, as the case may be, may transfer any case pending before one bench for disposal to any other bench. Our Rationale for Disagreement: This clause would give enormous power to the chairperson, which could be used arbitrarily to the detriment of justice or of members of the Lokpal. We believe this power needs to be qualified, as below: Our Recommendations: Replace by:21. On an application for transfer made by the complainant or the public servant, the Chairperson, after giving an opportunity of being heard to the complainant or the public servant, as the case may be, may transfer any case pending before one bench for disposal to any other bench; provided that no such transfer would be made unless the chairperson is satisfied that there are good reasons to believe that the ends of justice could not be met without such a transfer. Provided, further, that the reasons for such a transfer must be, within a week of the transfer being ordered, put into the public domain. Opportunity to be Heard at the Preliminary Enquiry Stage Current Provisions in the Governments Bill: 23(4) Before the Lokpal comes to the conclusion in the course of a preliminary inquiry and after submission of a report referred to in sub-section (3) that a prima facie case is made out against the public servant pursuant to such a preliminary inquiry, the Lokpal shall afford the public servant an opportunity of being heard.
9

Note 1

Our Rationale for Disagreement: There is no need to provide this right to the accused at this stage, especially as this is not provided under any other criminal procedure. However, there is nothing to stop the Lokpal from hearing an accused at any stage, if the Lokpal feels that this is required in the interest of justice. This need not be a statutory right of the accused. Our Recommendations: Delete 23(4) Inspection of records by accused Current Provisions in the Governments Bill: Section 24 In cases where, an investigation or inquiry into a complaint is proposed to be initiated by the Lokpal, every person against whom such inquiry or investigation is proposed to be conducted, shall be entitled to inspect any record in connection with the commission of any alleged offence and take an extract therefrom, as is considered necessary to defend his case. Our Rationale for Disagreement: It must be ensured that the provision of this right does not compromise the interests of whistleblowers, witnesses and other vulnerable persons connected with the complaint or the investigation. Our Recommendations: Add: Provided that where the complaint involves allegations or information from a whistleblower or a witness who wishes to have his identity protected, the Lokpal shall ensure that advance notice is given to such whistleblower and/or witness and they are given an opportunity of being heard prior to the accused being given access to any records: provided further that in no case would the identity and/or witness be revealed without their prior consent in writing. Contempt Powers Whereas the earlier ministerial draft of the Lokpal bill had given the Lokpal contempt powers in Section 31.This section has been dropped from the bill introduced in the LokSabha. Our Recommendation: Whereas, we were not in favour of giving broad criminal contempt powers to the Lokpal, and we even think that those with the upper judiciary should be significantly curbed, after dropping this section, it is unclear how the Lokpal would ensure that its directions under this Act are complied with. Therefore, some specific provisions should be added for this, in the form of civil contempt powers.
10

Note 1

Time Frame for Conducting Trials Current Provisions in the Governments Bill: Section 38(2) The Special Courts constituted under sub-section (1) shall ensure completion of each trial within a period of one year from the date of filing of the case in the Court: Provided that in case the trial cannot be completed within a period of one year, the Special Court shall record reasons therefor and complete the trial within a further period of not more than three months or such further periods not exceeding three months each, for reasons to be recorded in writing, before the end of each such three months period, but not exceeding a total period of two years. Our Rationale for Disagreement: Whereas there must be a time frame for the trial of cases, the law should not create a situation where if there is a delay that becomes a basis for the case being closed. Also, there must be some adverse consequences on the judge responsible for unreasonable delays. Our Recommendations: Replace by:38 (2) The Special Courts constituted under sub-section (1) shall ensure completion of each trial within a period of one year from the date of filing of the case in the Court: Provided that in case the trial cannot be completed within a period of one year, the Special Court shall record reasons therefor and complete the trial within a further period of not more than three months or such further periods not exceeding three months each, for reasons to be recorded in writing, before the end of each such three month period, but ordinarily not exceeding a total period of two years; provided that no case would be closed on the basis of the trial not having been completed within two years. However, wherever a trial continues beyond two years, a mandatory reference would be made to the High Court which shall examine the matter and pass such directions as it might deem necessary to bring the trial to an early conclusion and, where the High Court thinks it appropriate, pass strictures against the trial judges(s). Penalties Current Provisions in the Governments Bill: 49. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, whoever makes any false and frivolous or vexatious complaint under this Act shall, on conviction, be punished with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than two years but which may extend to five years and with fine which shall not be less than twenty-five thousand rupees but which may extend to two lakh rupees.
11

Note 1

Our Rationale for Disagreement: This is another draconian provision, especially as it is impossible to objectively define frivolous or vexatious. This would strongly discourage most people from making any complaints. Our Recommendations: Replace by: 49(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, whoever makes any malafide and false complaint, with malicious intent, under this Act, shall, on conviction, be punished with fine which shall not be less than five thousand rupees but which may extend to one lakh rupees. Providing legal assistance to the accused Current Provisions in the Governments Bill: 56. The Lokpal shall provide to every person against whom a complaint has been made, before it, under this Act, legal assistance to defend his case before the Lokpal, if such assistance is requested for. Our Rationale for Disagreement: Though this might be fair in order to ensure that the innocent among the accused do not have to spend large amounts of money that they cannot afford to defend themselves against malicious or false allegations, this should not end up subsidising the corrupt on public expense. Our Recommendations: Add: Provided that where the accused is finally found guilty of any of the charges made against him, by the special court provided for in the Act, and subject to further appeals, the accused would be requires to refund the total cost of the assistance so provided. In exceptional circumstances where the Lokpal so determines that the recovery of such dues might result in unwarranted hardship to the accused or his family, the amount can be adjusted against confiscation of property as specified under sections 33 and 34. Covering the Private Sector Our Recommendation: Add: (appropriately amend the PCA to include) Where any private body, corporation or profit seeking entity receives from any public authority any concession or dispensation, including but not restricted to licences, subsidies, contracts, orders, quotas, allocations, clearances, grants, etc, that is in violation of the law or of any prevailing rules, it would be deemed to have indulged in
12

Note 1

corrupt practices unless it can show that it was unreasonable to expect the corporation to know that a law or a rule had been violated.

13

Note 1

Scope and Coverage of the Lokpal Basket of Measures

CORRUPTION

GRIEVANCES

National Anti CorruptionLokp al Rashtriya /RajyaBhrashta charNivaranLok pal

Stronger Central Vigilance Commission KendriyaSatark taLokpal

Strong Judicial Accountability and Standards Bill NyayPalikaLok pal

Public Grievances Redress Lokpal ShikayatNivaranL okpal

Whistleblower Protection Bill LokrakshakKanoon

14

Note 1

Scope of the Lokpal Basket of Measures

National Anti CorruptionLokpal

Strengthen existing Draft Government Lokpal Bill/with state Lokayuktas (see note 1)

Central Vigilance Commission

Reform and strengthen existing Central Vigilance Commission Act, 2003/state SVCs (see note 2)

Judicial AccountabilityCo mmission

Strengthen existing Judicial Accountability and Standards Bill/similar state institutions (see note 3)

Public Grievances Commission

Creation of a National Law for Public Grievances Redress applicable to the Center and the states (see note 4)

Whistleblower Protection

Strengthen existing Public Interest Disclosure and Protection of Persons making the Disclosure Bill, 2010 (see note 5).

15

Note 1

Jurisdiction of proposed Anti-Corruption Measures

Prime Minister Covered under National Anti-Corruption Lokpal

Ministers

Covered under National Anti-Corruption Lokpal

Members of Parliament

Covered under National Anti-Corruption Lokpal

Judges of the Supreme Court and High Court/ lower judiciary judiciary

Covered under National Judicial Standards and Accountability Lokpal/state judicial lokayuktas

Government ServantsGroup A officers

Covered under National Anti-Corruption Lokpal

Government ServantsMiddle Level

Covered under the Central Vigilance Commission

Government ServantsLower Levels

Covered under regular provision with appellate jurisdiction with the CVC

Corporates and govt. funded NGOs

16

Covered under National Anti-Corruption Lokpal as co-accused/ amended PC Act

Note 2

COVERING MIDDLE AND JUNIOR LEVEL PUBLIC SERVANTS Amending the Central Vigilance Commission Act, 2003 1. The Lokpal Bill of the Government, as introduced in Parliament on August 4, 2011, has jurisdiction over only group A public servants of the Central Government, corporations etc. However, there is no mention of how the remaining public servants (other than group A) would be covered. 2. We believe that all public servants should be adequately covered under appropriate anticorruption institutions. Towards that end, we are proposing that a revamped Central Vigilance Commission play a critical role in providing such a cover. This is especially so as, at the moment, the primary function of the CVC is to receive and investigate or have investigated complaints against group A officers of the Central Government. Once the Lokpal is set up, complaints against group A officers would be handled exclusively by the Lokpal, freeing the CVC for other functions. 3. We propose that all Central Government public servants not covered under the Lokpal bill be covered by the CVC as follows: a. Where an offence is alleged under the Prevention of Corruption Act (PCA) that prima facie has caused a loss to the public exchequer of an amount greater than a specified amount (say rupees ten lakh), then a complaint can be directly filed with the CVC, which would be empowered and adequately staffed to conduct a preliminary enquiry, an investigation, and prosecute appropriately. b. Where an offence is alleged under the Prevention of Corruption Act (PCA) that prima facie has resulted in a public servant demanding or receiving illegal gratification of an amount greater than a specified amount (say rupees one lakh), then a complaint can be directly filed with the CVC, which would be empowered and adequately staffed to conduct a preliminary enquiry, an investigation, and prosecute appropriately. c. In all other casesof a complaint under the PCA, the original complaint would be with the police and the CVC would be the first appellate body against faulty or delayed investigation or prosecution. 4. To ensure the proper functioning of the CVC, it would be made independent of the government in a manner similar to that suggested for the Lokpal, and its appointment would also be through the same committee and process as that suggested for the Lokpal. 5. It would be empowered and resourced to set up its own investigation and prosecution wings, and require no permission from anyone to investigate or prosecute a public servant under its jurisdiction. 6. In order to facilitate the appellate functions of the CVC (3c above), a detailed protocol laying out the prescribed procedures for investigating complaints and prosecuting cases under the PCA, including mandatory time frames, would be codified. Any violation of these would entitle the complainant to move the CVC as an appellate authority. 7. The CVC would have all the powers,while investigating complaints or prosecuting cases, as provided to the Lokpal in the proposed Lokpal bill.

Note 2

8. There would be set up, in each state, a State Vigilance Commission (SVC), which would play a similar role as the CVC in relation to the public servants of the state not covered by the proposed state lokayuktas. 9. The state vigilance commissions would be selected through a process similar to that being proposed for the CVC, with central functionaries being replaced by corresponding state functionaries. 10. The SVCs would also have all the powers and appropriate resources, as proposed for the CVC and would be independent of the state government in the same way as the revamped CVC.

Strengthening The Judicial Standards and Accountability Bill, 2010

A Note for Discussion1 This note seeks to critique the Judicial Standards and Accountability Bill, 2010, as introduced in Parliament. It highlights four broad areas of disagreement: composition and selection of the Judicial Oversight Committee, structure of the oversight mechanism, transparency provisions, and frivolous and vexatious complaints. The details and specific recommendations are given below. 1. Composition of the National Judicial Oversight Committee and the selection Process Clause 18 of the Bill tabled in Parliament envisages a 5-member Oversight Committee that will handle complaints against judges received directly from citizens or look into the materials received from Parliament, pursuant to a motion regarding the removal of a judge initiated in either House: 18. (1) The National Judicial Oversight Committee shall consist of the following, namely: (a) a retired Chief Justice of India appointed by the President after ascertaining the views of the Chief Justice of India Chairperson; (b) a Judge of the Supreme Court nominated by the Chief Justice of India Member; (c) the Chief Justice of a High Court nominated by the Chief Justice of India Member ex officio; (d) the Attorney-General for India ex officio Member; (e) an eminent person nominated by the PresidentMember: Replace by: 18. (1) The National Judicial Oversight Committee shall consist of the following, namely: (a) a retired Chief Justice of India appointed by the President after ascertaining the views of the Chief Justice of India Chairperson; (b) a serving or retired Judge of the Supreme Court selected by a collegium comprising of all puisne judges of the Supreme Court. Member; (c) A serving or retired Chief Justice of a High Court selected by the collegium of all Chief Justices of the High Courts. Member; (d) one eminent jurist Member
1

This note is based on a previous that was prepared by Justice A P Shah and Venkatesh Nayak. Some ideas have been further refined from the previous note and new recommendations have been included in this note.

(e) one eminent person - Member Members appointed under clauses (d) and (e) of this sub-section shall be selected by a committee chaired by the Prime Minister, with the Chief Justice of India and the Leader of the Opposition in the Lok Sabha being the other members. 18(1A) (i) Serving judges, including serving chief justices, when appointed to the Oversight Committee, must serve as full time members for a period not exceeding two years and should not take up any other work other than that assigned by the Oversight Committee; (ii) the eminent jurist and eminent person appointed to the Oversight Committee shall serve for a period of three years; (iii) The Chairperson and the members of the Oversight Committee shall not be eligible for reappointment; 18(1B) The remuneration and privileges of the members appointed under clauses (d) and (e) of sub-section (1) shall be the same as that of a Supreme Court Judge and other terms and service conditions of such members shall be as may be prescribed. Rationale: The composition proposed in the Governments Bill does not adequately provide for the independence of the Oversight Committee for two reasons. First, the judicial members will be appointed by the Chief Justice of India at his/her discretion while the sole non-judicial member and the Chairperson will be appointed by the President at the recommendation of the Central Government, in other words by the ruling party or alliance. This is not a very objective and transparent process of selection of the members of the committee. Second, the inclusion of the Attorney General in this committee is flawed on grounds of conflict of interests. The Attorney General being the first Law Officer of the Central Government may be required to appear before a judge against whom a complaint has been filed before the Oversight Committee of which he/she happens to be a member. So it is not advisable to have the Attorney General on the Oversight Committee. Further, the Bill does not define the terms and conditions of service of those members of the committee who are not serving judges. This lacuna must be addressed as well by clearly defining their terms and conditions in the Rules. Members who are sitting judges may serve only for a period of two years without being eligible for reappointment. 2. Refining the structure of the judicial oversight mechanism The Bill currently envisages a three-tiered structure for dealing with complaints against judges. The National Judicial Oversight Committee (Clause 17, quoted above) receives complaints and the materials relating to the motion for the removal of a judge initiated in Parliament. This is the topmost tier. The second tier is the scrutiny panels (Clauses 9, 10, 11 quoted below) 2

which will examine the complaint or the materials received. These panels are to be constituted in the Supreme Court and every High Court. Judges serving in the same High Court will scrutinize a complaint against their own colleague. The Oversight Committee may constitute an Investigation Committee (Clause 22 quoted below) for the purpose of investigating the charges against a judge based on a report of the scrutiny panel. This is the third tier. The Bill is silent about eligibility criteria for the membership of this committee. Each tier of the oversight structure is required to work according to a time limit specified in the Bill. The relevant sections from the draft Bill are given below. 9. Save as otherwise provided under this Act, the Oversight Committee shall refer all such complaints to the appropriate Scrutiny Panel constituted under Chapter V for scrutiny. 10. There shall be constituted a panel to be called Complaints Scrutiny Panel in the Supreme Court and in every High Court to scrutinise the complaints against a Judge received under this Act. 11. (1) The Scrutiny Panel in the Supreme Court shall consist of a former Chief Justice of India and two Judges of the Supreme Court to be nominated by the Chief Justice of India. (2) The Scrutiny Panel in every High Court shall consist of a former Chief Justice of that High Court and two Judges of that High Court to be nominated by the Chief Justice of that High Court. _____________ 22. (1) The Oversight Committee, shall for the purpose of inquiry for misbehaviour by a Judge, constitute an investigation committee (by whatever name called) to investigate into the complaint in respect of which the Scrutiny Panel has recommended in its report under clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 12 for making inquiry against the Judge in accordance with the provisions of this Act. (2) The composition and tenure of the investigation committee shall be such as may be decided by the Oversight Committee: Delete: Clauses 9 to 16 Replace by: 9(1) The procedure for scrutiny or preliminary investigation in respect of a complaint made under this Act shall be such as the Judicial Oversight Committee deems appropriate in the circumstances of the case and in particular, the Committee shall call for the comments of the Judge complained against. (2) Any scrutiny or preliminary investigation under this Section will be done in camera.

(3) The committee constituted for the purpose of conducting a scrutiny or a preliminary investigation under sub-section (1) shall consist of at least two members of the Judicial Oversight Committee of which at least one member shall be a sitting judge. 10. (1) If the Oversight Committee, after scrutiny or preliminary investigation of the complaint taken up by it for scrutiny under section 9, as it deems appropriate, is satisfied that (a) there are sufficient grounds for proceeding against the Judge, it shall, after recording reasons therefor, initiate an inquiry against the Judge in accordance with the provisions of this Act; (b) the complaint is frivolous or vexatious, or, is not made in good faith, or there are not sufficient grounds for inquiring into the complaint, or the complaint relates only to the merits of the judgment or a procedural order, and, then, it shall after recording reasons therefor will not proceed with the complaint and treat the matter as closed. (2) The Oversight Committee shall carry out scrutiny or preliminary investigation under section 9 within a maximum period of three months from the date of receipt of the complaint. 11 Save as otherwise provided in this Act, the Oversight Committee shall have power to regulate its own procedure in examining the complaints taken up for scrutiny or preliminary investigation under section 9. 12. The Oversight Committee shall, while examining the complaints taken up for scrutiny or preliminary investigation under section 9, have all the powers of a civil court trying a suit under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and in particular, in respect of the following matters, namely: (a) summoning and enforcing the attendance of any person from any part of India and examining him on oath; (b) requiring the discovery and production of any document; (c) receiving evidence on affidavits; (d) requisitioning any public record or copy thereof from any court or office; (e) issuing commissions for the examination of witnesses or other documents; and (f) any other matter which may be prescribed. ________________________ 22. (1) The Oversight Committee, shall for the purpose of inquiry for misbehaviour by a Judge, constitute an investigation committee (by whatever name called) to investigate into 4

the complaint in respect of which the Oversight Committee has determined under clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 10 that there are enough grounds for making inquiry against the Judge in accordance with the provisions of this Act. (2) The composition and tenure of the investigation committee shall be such as may be decided by the Oversight Committee; Provided that it must comprise of at least two serving members of the Oversight Committee. If the accused is a High Court judge at least one of these members must be or have been the Chief Justice of a High Court. If the accused is a judge of the Supreme Court, then a least one member must be or have been a Supreme Court Judge: Rationale: It seems undesirable that sitting judges of the same High Court scrutinise complaints against their colleagues. Instead, the Oversight Committee must be established as a permanently functioning committee that will look into complaints received against all judges of the Supreme Court and the High Courts. This will ensure uniformity of treatment of all complaints and references from Parliament. All serving judges appointed to this committee must serve fulltime. They may not undertake any other duties for the duration of their membership of this committee. The Oversight Committee itself must scrutinize the complaints against judges by evolving its own procedures. If there are adequate grounds for launching an investigation, postscrutiny, the Oversight Committee may constitute an Investigation Committee which must comprise of at least two serving members of the Oversight Committee. 3. Transparency in the conduct of investigations: The Bill requires the Investigation Committee to conduct its proceedings in camera (Clause 29(2) quoted below) and imposes various other restrictions on transparency (Clauses 39 and 43 also quoted below). 29. (1) The investigation committee shall frame definite charges against the Judge on the basis of which the inquiry is proposed to be held. (2) Every such inquiry shall be conducted in camera by the investigation committee. 39. Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, the complainant and every person who participates in the scrutiny or investigation or inquiry as a witness or as a legal practitioner or in any other capacity, whether or not he seeks confidentiality about his name, shall undertake to the Oversight Committee or Scrutiny Panel or investigation committee that he shall not reveal his own name, the name of the Judge complained against, the contents of the complaint or any of the documents or proceedings to anybody else including the media without the prior written 5

approval of the Oversight Committee. 43. Notwithstanding anything contained in the Right to Information Act, 2005 or any other law for the time being in force, all papers, documents and records of proceedings related to a complaint, preliminary investigation and inquiry shall be confidential and shall not be disclosed by any person in any proceeding except as directed by the Oversight Committee: Delete: Clauses 29(2) and 43 Replace Clause 39 by: 39. Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, the complainant and every person who participates in the scrutiny, under section 9, as a witness or as a legal practitioner or in any other capacity, whether or not he seeks confidentiality about his name, shall undertake to the Oversight Committee that he shall not reveal his own name, the name of the Judge complained against, the contents of the complaint or any of the documents or proceedings to anybody else including the media without the prior written approval of the Oversight Committee; Rationale: Clauses 29(2), 39 and 43 of the bill are retrograde sections. The Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968 which this Bill seeks to replace does not require proceedings of investigation to be conducted behind closed doors. This transparent procedure must be continued in the interests of justice under the proposed law as well. However the process of scrutinizing a complaint may be undertaken in camera as the complaint would be only in the form of allegation which may have been received without any proof or supporting evidence (This has been provided for in the revised Clause 9 above). There is a need to balance this process with other important public interests such as protecting the reputation of the accused and prevention of defamation or trial by the media. The accused if exonerated must be in a position to command the respect of the public upon resumption of his/her official duties. In the ultimate analysis the degree of transparency and/or confidentiality chosen for the entire process must be such that it inspires confidence amongst the people about the credibility of the process while at the same time having regard to the reputation of the accused person. 4. Dealing with frivolous and vexatious complaints The Bill prescribes very harsh penalties for filing false and vexatious complaints against a judge. The complainant is liable to be sentenced to a rigorous prison term of up to five years with or without fine which may extend up to five lakh rupees (Clause 53 quoted below). 6

53. (1) Any person who makes a complaint which is found, after following the procedure under this Act to be frivolous or vexatious or made with an intent to scandalise or intimidate the Judge against whom such complaint is filed, shall be punishable with rigorous imprisonment for a term which may extend to five years and also to fine which may extend to five lakh rupees. (2) The provisions of this section shall have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. Replace by: 53. (1) Any person who makes a complaint which is found, after following the procedure under this Act, to be false and made with malicious intent to scandalise or intimidate the Judge against whom such complaint is filed, shall be punishable with a fine which may extend to one lakh rupees. (2) The provisions of this section shall have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. Rationale: We believe such draconian penalties are undesirable. Instead the prison term should be dropped and the maximum penalty amount also reduced to one lakh. The punishment should be imposed only when the allegations against a judge are disproved and it can be shown that the allegations were made with malicious intent. The terms vexatious and frivolous are impossible to objectively define. 5. Investigative staff of Judicial Oversight Committee The Bill does not provide for staff that specialise the inquiring into complaints against judges. 32.(4) The Oversight Committee shall provide such number of its officers and other employees to assist the investigation committee as the Oversight Committee considers appropriate having regard to the nature of investigation in a case. Replace by: (4) The Oversight Committee shall take such steps as may be necessary to develop a team of experts drawn from its staff that are capable of conducting investigations in an efficient and timely manner for the purpose of assisting the investigation committee. (5) The Oversight Committee shall provide such number of experts from the team mentioned in sub-section (1) to assist the investigation committee as the Oversight Committee considers appropriate having regard to the nature of investigation in a case. 7

Rationale: It is necessary to empower the Judicial Oversight Committee to develop a team of specialists capable of inquiring into complaints and references received against judges after the scrutiny has established sufficient cause to proceed with a full scale inquiry. 6. Laying down of Judicial Standards Clause 3 of the Bill lays down standards of conduct for the members of the higher judiciary.

Replace by: 3. (1) The National Judicial Oversight Committee constituted under Section 17 of this Act shall, in the interests of administration of justice, issue from time to time, a Code of Conduct containing guidelines for the conduct and behaviour of Judges. (2) Till the Code of Conduct referred to in sub-section (1) is issued, The Restatement of Values of Judicial Life adopted by the Chief Justices Conference of India, 1999, shall be the Code of Conduct for the purposes of this Act. (3) The Code of Conduct shall be published in the Official Gazette and the Council shall in the like manner amend the said Code from time to time.

Rationale: Clause 3 of the Bill lays down standards of conduct for the members of the higher judiciary. However Article 124(5) of the Constitution empowers Parliament to make laws only to regulate the procedure for: a) The presentation of an address to the President seeking the removal of a judge; and b) The investigation and proof of misbehavior or incapacity of a judge. The Constitution is silent on the issue as to who is competent to define standards of behavior for members of the higher judiciary. Given this grey area it is important for any legislative proposal for dealing with complaints of misbehavior to be in accordance with the principle of the independence of the judiciary. So the National Judicial Oversight Committee proposed to be set up under this Bill may be vested with the responsibility of refining standards of judicial behavior and conduct. Until such time as it refines the standards the existing Restatement of Values of Judicial Life adopted by the Chief Justices Conference of India, 1999 shall apply to all judges of the Supreme Court and the High Courts. 7. Code of Conduct The Bill does not provide for any code of behaviour that applies to a judge after retirement. Insert a provision as follows: A retired judge of the High Court or the Supreme Court shall not be eligible for any official assignment or appointment to a statutory commission or body under the Central or State Governments until his or her completion of one year from the date of superannuation. Rationale: It is also necessary to lay down a code of conduct for judges post-retirement in order to prevent situations where a Government may lure them with plum postings after they have demitted office. A cooling off period of one year may stipulated in the law. 8. Minor Measures Clause 34(b) provides for the imposition of minor measures against a Judge if the inquiry establishes that the misbehavior occurred but it is not serious enough to warrant his or her removal. An inquiry against a judge may continue even after his or her retirement but only if the charges are serious enough.

10

_____________

Replace 34(b) by: (3) all or any of the charges in regard to misbehaviour or incapacity have been proved and the Oversight Committee is of the opinion that the charges proved do not warrant removal of the Judge, it may impose all or any of the following minor measures, namely: (i) issuing advisories; (ii) issuing warnings; (iii) withdrawal of judicial work for a limited time including cases already assigned; (iv) request that the Judge may voluntarily retire; (v) censure or admonition, public or private. Insert new sub-clauses after 34(3) as follows: (4) Any inquiry or investigation initiated against a Judge under this Act shall not be discontinued on the ground that the Judge has demitted office. (5) Where the Oversight Committee concludes after any inquiry into a complaint against a judge who has demitted office during the course of the inquiry, that all or any of the charges have been proved it shall forward its findings to the Central Government to take further action in the matter under relevant law for the time being in force. (6) The Oversight Committee may in its findings recorded under sub-section (4) recommend stoppage of or reduction in the amount of pension and other benefits that 11

the person concerned may be entitled to or declare such person ineligible for appointment to any public office or both; (7) Any recommendation or declaration made by the Oversight Committee under subsection(5) shall be binding on the Central Government. Rationale: An inquiry into any complaint made under this Act must be taken to its logical conclusion. If the findings establish that the complaint was not proved or disproved there will be no consequences for the judge concerned. However retirement or demitting office should not be a ground for stopping the inquiry. The truth must be discovered and if the Judge is found guilty he or she must face some consequence for the misbehavior. This can include stoppage or reduction of pension and ensuring that the person is not appointed to any public office in future. The recommendation of the Judicial Oversight Committee should be binding on the Central Government. These recommendations are sourced from the 195th Report of the Law Commission on the Judges (Inquiry) Bill 2005. *****

12

Measures for Fighting Corruption and Ensuring Better Governance Note for discussion on the Lokshikayat Grievance Redress Commission The purpose of the paper is to discuss mechanisms which would allow the public to directly and on an ongoing basis make the government accountable in terms of the functions it is supposed to perform, specifically with relation to its duties to the nation, and obligations and commitments to the people of India. This paper presents some of the important general principles that would underlie these mechanisms, as an element of the Measures for fighting corruption and ensuring better governance. The paper proposes that Grievance Redress Commissions be set up at the Centre and in the states to develop an institutional capacity to receive, enquire into and redress any complaints relating to deficiencies in the functioning of the government. Annexed is a flow chart that describes the functioning of the proposed mechanism. Objectives To create a system whereby common citizens can make the government answerable interms of its functions, specifically with relation to its duties, commitments and obligations towards citizens. 1. Develop a clear and tangible statement of obligations of all public authorities, offices and public servants1 2. Develop systems to ensure that the people of India are appropriately made aware of these statements of obligations and are also made aware of their rights and entitlements in relation to these. 3. To build on the existing structures of grievance redress set up under various laws such as NREGA or are envisioned to be set up under proposed entitlements laws like the National Food Security Act. 4. Develop institutional capacity to receive, enquire into and redress complaints regarding any grievance in terms of: a. Any deficiency in the functioning of a public authority/office in relation to its defined statement of obligations. b. Violation by a public authority/office, of any timeline, service, obligation, commitment etc. laid out in any other law, rule, policy, guideline, order etc. c. Failure to provide any service or obligation in a manner that would be reasonable to expect of the public authority/office. Creation of statement of obligations The statement of obligations of each public authority/ office in terms of its duties, obligations and commitments towards citizens, should include but not necessarily be restricted toa. Defining the services and goods that the particular public authority/office provides directly (or indirectly through any other agency/contractor).
1

Though there are various documents including citizens charters which lay down the statement of obligations of various departments, however, the functions, obligations, duties and commitments of elected representatives do not appear to be specified in a similar manner. Even for public authorities and officials, very often the citizens charters and other documents are inadequate, unclear, and vague. Taskforces would be set up which would help pubic authorities evolve and codify their statement of obligations. These task forces should hold wide public consultations.

b. Detailing and describing the processes by which the public can access and/or receive the goods and services that they are entitled to from the public authority/office. c. Describing the conditions under which a person becomes eligible for the goods and services, and consequently the categories of people who are entitled to receive the goods and services. d. Defining the quantitative and tangible parameters, (weight, size, frequency etc,) and timelines, that are applicable to the goods and services that are accessible to the public. e. Defining the qualitative and quantitative outcomes that each public authority/office had undertaken to achieve through the goods and services that it was obligated to provide. (For example- level of cleanliness for sanitation services, incidence of vector based diseases for health care services etc.) f. Laying down individual responsibility for providing the goods and services (who is responsible for delivery/implementation and who is responsible for supervision). Section 4 of the RTI Act requires each public authority to put its obligations in the public domain. The statement of obligations should become a part of the required suo motu disclosures under section 4(1)(b) of the RTI Act, where required, by invoking the power to add topics, as provided for in subsection xvii. Making people aware of the statement of obligations of public authorities/offices 5. It would be the obligation of each public authority/office to ensure that the statement of its obligations is widely disseminated in all appropriate manners, is verified to be correct, and is updated in keeping with the timeline specified.

Essential features of the grievance redress system 6. Every public authority/office would have a designated Grievance Redress Officer (GRO) for receiving2 and disposing of complaints about any deficiency by an officer/functionary, in a specified timeframe3. The GRO should have adequate authority and power to ensure that: a. the deficiency is redressed in a reasonable timeframe b. responsibility is fixed for the deficiency occurring in the first place and, where thought necessary, the errant functionary is reprimanded or punished 7. Facilitation centres would be set up at the block level which would register grievances of citizens and forward these to the appropriate GRO. These centres would also function as information centres and would proactively provide information to citizens about the schemes and programs of the government and would also assist citizens in filing grievances and in tracking their applications and entitlements. These facilitation centres would be under the administration of the Grievance Redress Commission. Rajiv Gandhi Sewa Kendras and Common Service Centres that already exist in several states could be equipped and mandated to function as facilitation and information centers.

Grievances could be received in multiple ways, on paper, through emails, SMS, website, telephonically, etc, and for each complaint a dated receipt must be issued. 3 The timeframe could be specified in relation to the nature of the complaint. For examplecomplaints of an immediate nature (non delivery of ration, drinking water, emergency medical services etc.) would have to be redressed within 48 hours; complaints which are not of an immediate nature (example- no response to an application for a ration card or any certificate within the specified time frame etc.) would have to be redressed within 15 days and other complaints (example- non availability of a flyover) would have to be redressed within 100 days.

8. Where a complaint is not redressed by the GRO in the time specified, or a person is aggrieved by the action taken by the GRO to redress the complaint, the complainant could approach the District Grievance Redress Authority of the Grievance Redress Commission set up for the purpose, which shall in a time-bound manner, enquire into the grievance and into the action taken, if any, by the GRO. For the purpose of inquiring into complaints, the District Grievance Redress Authority shall ordinarily hold open court hearings in different parts of the district, close to the location of the complainant, and visit the site of the complaint, as required. 9. An appeal against the order (or lack of order) of the District Grievance Redress Authority will lie with the state commission in each state, and with the Central Commission for central government authorities. 10. Where the Commission, or the District Grievance Redress Authority, determines that the complaint was genuine and that no action or no sufficient action was taken on it, or taken within the required time frame, by the GRO, it would: a. order redress of the grievance in an appropriate time frame; b. order, if it felt necessary, compensation4 to any person(s) adversely affected by the deficiency5; c. penalise the GRO in keeping with the gravity of the deficiency and, where there is a delay, penalise the GRO as per the quantum of delay. 11. Where the Commission determines that though the GRO had taken appropriate and adequate action in order to redress the grievance, however, further required action by some other public servant or authority was not taken, or delayed, then the Commission shall penalise this authority/public servant. 12. In every complaint, received by the Commission, where it is either alleged by the complainant or the Commission feels that there is prima facie grounds for believing that there is a prima facie case of violation of the Prevention of Corruption Act to the deficiency, the Commission may apart from issuing the necessary orders relating to the redress of grievance, also refer the matter for further enquiry and/or investigation to the appropriate authority. 13. The Commission would also receive complaints from the public regarding the absence or inadequacy of a statement of obligations of any public authority/office and/or ineffective dissemination of the same. Where such a complaint is received or where suo motu cognisance is taken by the Commission of such deficiencies, the Commission may issue directions to the concerned public authority/office to rectify the deficiency in the time frame specified. 14. If the public authority/office fails to comply with these directions, without any good reasons, then the Commission may impose a penalty on the concerned official. Where there is repeated non compliance of the directions of the commission, the Commission may direct the disciplining authority of the concerned public servant to initiate departmental proceedings against the concerned person. 15. Adequate measures and powers would be provided to the Commission to ensure that its directions are invariably complied with. 16. The functioning of the commission shall be transparent in keeping with the letter and spirit of the RTI Act, 2005. 17. The Commission may direct a public authority/office to make necessary changes to its structure, and mechanisms for training and sensitization of officials, to better handle the grievances of citizens or any other related matter. The Commission may also recommend to any public authority/office any such changes in its policy/guideline/order etc. as it deems fit, if in the
District Grievance Redress Authority would be less than that of the state/central commission. 5 An appeal against the level of compensation awarded by the District Grievance Redress Authority can be made to the commission. However, no appeal against the order of the commission would lie with any court of law or other body/tribunal. Where appeal, or a writ petition, is to be filed by the GRO/another accused, at least 50% of the compensation will have to be paid prior to any such appeal/writ being entertained.
4 The financial powers for penalising and awarding compensation of the

18. 19. 20.

21.

opinion of the Commission, citizens grievances are emanating from such policy/guideline/order etc. For the purposes of performing these and other functions, the Commission would be given all the powers and facilities, deemed necessary. The Commission will follow principles of natural justice and provide right of hearing to all parties involved, especially before imposing a penalty or dismissing a complaint. The Commission, if it considers it desirable, could have organised through the proposed directorates of social audits, periodically or when the need arises, social audits by which the systemic functioning of specific public authorities/offices could be assessed in a participatory and transparent manner. Such social audits should have the status of a preliminary enquiry on the basis of which the Commission could either pass orders or, where it thinks it necessary, hold a more detailed enquiry. Any vigilance matter that might emerge in such a social audit would be dealt with as specified in point 10. The report of any social audit or monitoring committee, set up under any other law, in so far as it reveals a prime facie grievance, either individual or systemic, could be referred to the commission which shall treat it as a grievance and dispose it as per the steps defined in point 10 above.

Flowchart Stage 1: Within the public authority GRO receives a complaint from an individual/organisation or from the block level facilitation centre Block level facilitation centre receives grievance from citizen

x x x x

GRO rejects the complaint GRO does not take adequate or appropriate action GRO delays the response, beyond the specified time period The orders of the GRO are not effective

GRO hears and redresses the complaint within the specified time period. x Orders removal of deficiency in service x Fixes responsibility x Reprimands/penalises departmentally, as required

Stage 2: Grievance Redress Commission

A person files a complaint with the district grievance redressal authority of the Commission OR The district grievance redressal authority of the Commission takes suo motu cognisance of any deficiency in the functioning of a public authority/office

District grievance redressal authority will enquire into the complaint/ deficiency

If complaint is genuine and sufficient action was not taken on it by the GRO, in the required time frame: a. order redress of the grievance in an appropriate time frame b. order, if it felt necessary, compensation to any person(s) adversely affected by the deficiency c. penalise the GRO in keeping with the gravity of the deficiency and, where there is a delay, penalise the GRO as per the quantum of delay.

If the GRO had taken appropriate and adequate action in order to redress the grievance, however, further required action by some other public servant or authority was not taken, or delayed, then the district grievance redressal authority of the Commission shall penalise this authority/public servant.

If it is alleged by the complainant or the district grievance redressal authority feels that there is prima facie grounds for believing that there is a vigilance angle to the deficiency, the Commission may apart from issuing the necessary orders relating to the redress of grievance, also refer the matter for further enquiry and/or investigation to the appropriate authority.

If either the original complaint or the complaint against the GRO is found baseless, the complaint would be dismissed.

Complainant files appeal with the State/Central Grievance Redress Commission respectively, against the order (or the lack of it) of the district grievance redressal authority OR Commission takes suo motu cognisance of any deficiency

THE DRAFT NATIONAL GRIEVANCE REDRESS BILL, 2011 RASHTRIYA SHIKAYAT NIVARAN KANOON, 2011 *Submitted to the Ministry of Rural Development (MoRD). This Bill draws heavily from the grievance redress experience of MGNREGA,
but it provides a generic grievance redress mechanism which would be applicable in rural and urban areas.

An Act to provide for the effectiveand time-bound redress of grievances of citizens.To provide for the effective delivery of services to the citizens within the stipulated time limit, including liabilities of the government servants, in case of default and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. To create a system whereby common citizens can make the government answerable in terms of its functions, specifically with relation to its duties, commitments and obligations towards citizens. To develop clear and tangible statement of obligations for all public authorities, offices and public servants. To develop systems to ensure that the people of India are appropriately made aware of these statement of obligations and are also made aware of their rights and entitlements in relation to these. To build on the existing structures of grievance redress set up under various laws such as National Rural Employement Guarantee Act, Right to Education Act, Forest Rights Act and nationallysponsored schemes& programs like National Rural Health Mission, Integrated Child Development Scheme, Public Distribution System and those envisioned to be set up under proposed entitlements laws like the National Food Security Act. To develop institutional capacity to receive, enquire into and redress complaints regarding any grievance. CHAPTER I Preliminary Short title, extent and commencement 1. (1) This Act may be called the National Grievance Redress Bill, 2011. (2) It extends to the whole of India. (3) It shall come into force on such date as the Government may, by notification, appoint. (4) This Act shall apply to government servants appointed substantively to any civil services or posts in connection with the affairs of the Central Government and to the servants of local bodies and authorities which are owned, controlled or substantially financed by that Government and to the servants of entities administered in partnership between the government and private entities. The Act shall not apply topersons appointed on casual or daily rates basis. Definitions 2. In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires, (a) "appropriate Government" means a public authority which is established, constituted, owned, controlled or substantially financed by funds provided directly or indirectly by the Central Government or the Union territory administration, the Central Government; (b) "Central Public Grievance Commission" means the Central Public Grievance Commissionconstituted under Chapter VIII of this Act; (c) "Central Grievance Redress Officer" means the Central Grievance Redress Officer designated under section 5;

(d) "ChiefGrievance Redress Commissioner" and "Central Grievance Redress Commissioner" mean the Central ChiefGrievance Redress Commissioner and Central Grievance Redress Commissioner appointed under Chapter VIII under this Act; (e) Complaint means a complaint filed by a citizen regarding any grievance including but not restricted to the following: a. Any deficiency in the functioning of a public authority/office in relation to its defined statement of obligations including those as defined by the Public Authority under Section 4 of the RTI Act. b. Violation by a public authority/office, of any timeline, service, obligation, commitment etc. laid out in any other law, rule, policy, guideline, order, citizen charters etc. c. Failure to provide any service or obligation in a manner that would be reasonable to expect of the public authority/office including those as laid out by the public authority under Section 4 of the RTI Act. (f) "District Public Grievance Authority means the District Grievance Authority constituted underchapter VI of the Act; (g) District Grievance Redress Commissioner and Assistant District Grievance Redress Commissioners means the District Grievance Redress Commissioner and Assistant District Grievance Redress Commissioners appointed under chapter VI of the Act; (g)"Peoples Support Centre (JantaSahita Kendra) means a Peoples Support Centre set up under Chapter IV of the Act; (h) "prescribed" means prescribed by rules made under this Act by the appropriate Government; (i) "public authority" means any authority or body or institution of self- government established or constituted (a) by or under the Constitution; (b) by any other law made by Parliament; (c) by any other law made by State Legislature; (d) by notification issued or order made by the appropriate Government, and includes any (i) body owned, controlled or substantially financed; (ii) non-Government organisation substantially financed, directly or indirectly by funds provided by the appropriate Government; (iii) an organization or body corporate in its capacity as an instrumentality of State as defined under article 12 of the Constitution and rendering services of public utility in India; (e ) by an agreement/ MoU between the government and any private entity (PublicPrivate Partnership).

(j) Search Committee means a committee constituted under Chapter VII and VIII of the Act. (k) "State Public Grievance Commission" means the State Public Grievance Commission constituted under chapter VII of this Act;

(l) "State Grievance Redress Officer" means the State Grievance Redress Officer designated under section 5; (m) "State Chief Grievance Redress Commissioner" and "State Grievance Redress Commissioner" mean the State Chief Grievance Redress Commissioner and State Grievance Redress Commissioner appointed under chapter VII of the Act; (n) "Statement of obligations" means the Statement of obligations of public authorities as defined in sub-section (1) of section 4; CHAPTER II Statement of obligations of public authorities and the obligation of public authorities to create awareness about these 3. Subject to the provisions of this Act, all persons shall have the right to time bound redress of grievances. Statement of obligations 4. (1) It shall be the duty of every Head of Department in every public authority topublish within 50 days of the enactment of this Act, a statement of its obligations in terms of its duties, obligations and commitments towards citizens including those under Section 4 of the RTI Act. This should include but not necessarily be restricted toa. Defining the services and goods that the particular public authority/office provides directly (or indirectly through any other agency/contractor or through any publicprivate partnership). b. Detailing and describing the processes by which the public can access and/or receive the goods and services that they are entitled to from the public authority/office. c. Describing the conditions under which a person becomes eligible for the goods and services, and consequently the categories of people who are entitled to receive the goods and services. d. Defining the quantitative and tangible parameters, (weight, size, frequency etc,) and timelines, that are applicable to the goods and services that are accessible to the public. e. Defining the qualitative and quantitative outcomes that each public authority/office had undertaken to achieve through the goods and services that it was obligated to provide. (For example- level of cleanliness for sanitation services, incidence of vector based diseases for health care services etc.) f. Laying down individual responsibility for providing the goods and services (who is responsible for delivery/implementation and who is responsible for supervision). g. Defining the time-frame within which the public authority shall dispose complaints.

(2) The Head of Office in each public authority shall be responsible for updating and verifying the statement of obligations every year and sending a compliance report to Head of Department. Dissemination of & creating awareness about the Statement of Obligations (3) The Head of Office shall be responsible for widely disseminating the statement of obligations of that public authority and creating awareness about the same. (4) Each public authority shall ensure that its statement of obligations is widely disseminated in all appropriate manners, is verified to be correct, and is updated in keeping with the timeline

specified.It shall be the constant endeavour of every public authority to take steps in accordance with the requirements of clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 4 of the RTI Act2005 to provide as much information about the statement of obligations suomotu to the public at regular intervals through various means of communications, including internet. (5) Statement of obligations shall be disseminated widely and in such form and manner which is easily accessible to the public. All materials shall be disseminated taking into consideration the cost effectiveness, local language and the most effective method of communication in that local area and the information should be easily accessible, to the extent possible in electronic format with the Head of Office, and shall be available free or at such cost of the medium or the print cost price as may be prescribed. ExplanationFor the purposes of sub-sections (3), (4) and (5), "disseminated" means making known or communicated the information to the public through notice boards, newspapers, public announcements, media broadcasts, the internet or any other means, including inspection of offices of any public authority. (6) The statement of obligations shall be submitted to the Central Public Grievance Commission every time that it is updated. CHAPTER III Appointment and obligations of Grievance Redress Officers 5. (1) Every public authority shall, within fifty days of the enactment of this Act, designate as many officers as the Central Grievance Redress Officersor State Grievance Redress Officers, as the case may be, in alladministrative units or offices at the district and sub-district level under it, as may be necessary, to receive, enquire into and redress any complaints from citizens in the specified timeframe. Where the grievance lies against a officer at the sub-district/ district level the next senior Grievance Redress Officer shall enquire into the complaint. The Central Grievance Redress Officer or State Grievance Redress Officers, as the case may be, shall be an officer at the block level in rural areas and at the sub-district level in urban areas. The Central Grievance Redress Officer or State Grievance Redress Officers, as the case may be, shall be an officer who has adequate authority and power to ensure that: a. the deficiency is redressed in a reasonable timeframe b. responsibility is fixed for the deficiency occurring in the first place and, where thought necessary, the errant functionary is reprimanded or punished as per the laid down procedures (2) Every Central Grievance Redress Officer or State Grievance Redress Officers, as the case may be, shall deal with complaints from persons seeking redress of grievances and render reasonable assistance to the persons seeking such complaint. (3) The Central Grievance Redress Officer or State Grievance Redress Officers, as the case may be, may seek the assistance of any other officer as he or she considers it necessary for the proper discharge of his or her duties and/or may direct any other officer to take action to redress a complaint. (4) Any officer, whose assistance has been sought under sub-section (3), shall render all assistance to the Central Grievance Redress Officer or State Grievance Redress Officers, as the case may be, seeking his or her assistance and for the purposes of any contravention of the provisions of this Act,

such other officer shall be treated as a Central Grievance Redress Officer or State Grievance Redress Officers, as the case may be. Chapter IV Setting up of Peoples Support Centre 6.(1) Without prejudice to the provisions of Chapter III, Peoples Support Centres would be set up by theDistrict Public Grievance Authorityat the block level,all over the country, which would register grievances of citizens and forward these to the appropriate Central Grievance Redress Officer or State Grievance Redress Officer, as the case may be. These centres would also function as information centres and would proactively provide information to citizens about the schemes and programs of the government, statement of obligations of relevant public authorities and would also assist citizens in filing complaints and in tracking their applications and entitlements. Provided that where a complaint is given to a Peoples Support Centre, the Centre shall at the time of receiving the complaint,and in any case within the same day, forward the complaint to the appropriate Central Grievance Redress Officer or State Grievance Redress Officer, as the case may be electronically. The Peoples Support Centre shall within 2 days of receiving a complaint, send a notification through e-mail, SMS, any other means, to the complainant giving details of the Grievance Redress Officer to whom the complaint has been forwarded. (2) The Peoples Support Centre shall be equipped with computers and telephones to register and forward the complaints of people. The Centre shall be appropriately staffed by telephone and computer operators and shall be managed by a Support Centre co-ordinator. (3) The staff and the coordinator of the Peoples Support Centre shall be appointed by the District Public Grievance Authority in accordance with rules laid down on this behalf. (4) Any complaints regarding non-registration of complaint or any violation of the provisions of the Act by the Peoples Support Centre shall lie with the District Public Grievance Authority. An appeal against the order of the District Public Grievance Authority shall lie with the Central Public Grievance Commission or the State Public Grievance Commission, as the case may be.

Chapter V Making a complaint 7. (1) A person, who desires to make a complaint under this Act, shall make a request in writing, through electronic means, through SMS, through telephone or through any other such means, as may be prescribed, in English or Hindi or in the official language of the area in which the complaint is being made, to the Central Grievance Redress Officer or State Grievance Redress Officer, as the case may be, of the concerned public authority or the Peoples Support Centre of the concerned block specifying the particulars of the grievance: Provided that where such request cannot be made in writing, the Central Grievance Redress Officer or State Grievance Redress Officer and the Peoples Support Centre shall render all reasonable assistance to the person making the request orally to reduce thesame in writing. (2) All complaints shall be acknowledged by a receipt, issued in writing, through electronic means, through SMS, through telephone or through any other such means, as may be prescribed, specifying the date, time, place, unique complaintnumber and particulars of receiver of complaint. It shall also specify the stipulated time-frame in accordance with its statement of obligations within which the complaint will be redressed.

(3) Where a complaint is made to a public authority, the subject matter of which is more closely connected with the functions of another public authority, the public authority, to which such complaint is made, shall electronically transfer the complaint or such part of it as may be appropriate to that other public authority and inform the complainant immediately about such transfer. Provided that the transfer of a complaint pursuant to this sub-section shall be made as soon as practicable but in no case later than one day from the date of receipt of the complaint. (4) Every public authority shall create a mechanism by which citizens can track their complaints in real time, as far as possible, through internet, telephone, SMS, or other electronic means, using the unique complaint number. Every Peoples Support Centre shall assist citizens in tracking their complaint. 8. (1) Subject to the proviso to sub-section (1) of section 6 or the proviso to sub-section (3) of section 7, Central Grievance Redress Officer or State Grievance Redress Officer, as the case may be, on receipt of a complaint undersection 7 shall, as expeditiously as possible, and in any case within the time period specified, redress the complaint. (a) Complaints of an urgent and/ immediate nature or where the complaint concerns the life or liberty of a person, shall be disposed of within 5 days of the receipt of the complaint. (b) Complaints other than those specified in sub-section (a) shall be disposed of within 30 days of the receipt of the complaint. (2) If the Central Grievance Redress Officer or State Grievance Redress Officer, as the case may be, fails to give redress the complaint within the period specified under sub-section (1), the Central Grievance Redress Officer or State Grievance Redress Officer, as the case may be, shall be deemed to have refused the complaint. (3) Where afterexamination, the Central Grievance Redress Officer or State Grievance Redress Officer, as the case may be, is of the opinion that the complaint does not have merit and should be closed, the Central Grievance Redress Officer or State Grievance Redress Officer, as the case may be, shall communicate to the person making the complaint, (i) the reasons for such closure; (ii) the period within which an appeal against such closure may be preferred; and (iii) the particulars of the District Public Grievance Authority. (4) The Central Grievance Redress Officer or State Grievance Redress Officer, as the case may be, shall on all communication/correspondence, provide the unique complaint number, particulars of the District Public Grievance Authority, time limit, process and any other forms.

CHAPTER VI The District Public Grievance Authority Appointment and composition 9. (1) Every district shall have a District Public Grievance Authority to exercise the powers conferred on, and to perform the functions assigned to it under this Act.

(2) The District Public Grievance Authority shall consist of:(a) a District Grievance Redress Commissioner (b) such number of Assistant District Grievance Redress Commissioners, not exceeding five, as may be deemed necessary. (3) The District Grievance Redress Commissioner and Assistant District Grievance Redress Commissioners, shall be appointed by the UPSC. (4) Every District Public Grievance Authority shall hold office for a term of five years from the date on which he enters upon his office or till he attains the age of sixty-five years, whichever is earlier, and shall not be eligible for reappointment as such. (5) The general superintendence, direction and management of the affairs of the District Grievance Redress shall vest in the District Grievance Redress Commissioner who shall be assisted by the Assistant District Grievance Redress Commissioners and may exercise all such powers and do all such acts and things which may be exercised or done by the District Public Grievance Authority as provided in this Act. (6) The District Grievance Redress Commissioner and Assistant District Grievance Redress Commissionersshall not be a Member of Parliament or Member of the Legislature of any State or Union territory, as the case may be, or hold any other office of profit or connected with any political party or carrying on any business or pursuing any profession. (7) The headquarters of theDistrict Public Grievance Authority shall be located in the District headquarter. (8) The District Public Grievance Authority shall have technical staff, as prescribed in the rules of theAct,to carry out enquires of appeals. The salary and allowances payable to and the terms and conditions of service of the District Public Grievance Authority will be Removal of District Grievance Redress Commissioner

Powers and functions 10 (1)Any person whose complaint is not disposed within the time specified in section 8, or is unable to submit a complaint to the Central Grievance Redress Officer or the State Grievance Redress Officer or the Peoples Support Centre, as the case may be, or is aggrieved by a decision of the Central Grievance Redress Officer or the State Grievance Redress Officer, as the case may be, may within thirty days from the expiry of such period or from the receipt of such the decision prefer an appeal to the District Public Grievance Authority. Provided that such Authority may admit the appeal after the expiry of the period of thirty days if he or she is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the appeal in time. (2) An appeal under sub-section (1) shall be disposed of within the time frame, specified: (a) Appeals of an urgent and/ immediate nature or where the complaint concerns the life or liberty of a person, shall be disposed of within 15 days of the receipt of the appeal.

(b) Appeals other than those specified in sub-section (a) shall be disposed of within 30 days of the receipt of the appeal. (3) For the purpose of inquiring into appeals, the District Public Grievance Authority shall ordinarily hold open court hearings in different parts of the district, close to the location of the complainant, and visit the site of the complaint, as required. Provided that penalty hearings may be held at the District office. (4) The District Public Grievance Authority shall, while inquiring into any matter under this Act, have the powers as specified in rules prescribed for the purpose. (5) In its decision in relation to an appeal, the District Public Grievance Authority has the power to (a) require the public authority to take any such steps as may be necessary to secure compliance with the provisions of this Act, including (i) by redressing the complaint; (ii) by appointing a Central Grievance Redress Officer or a State Grievance Redress Officer, as the case may be; (iii) by ensuring timely creation, updation and wide dissemination of the statement of obligations of the public authority (b) require the public authority to compensate the complainant for any loss or other detriment suffered in terms of; (i) any financial loss suffered by the complainant as a result of his grievance not being redressed in a time-bound manner. For any other loss, the District Grievance Redress Authority shall fix the quantum of compensation taking into account the monetary value of the loss. (ii)any delay experienced by the complainant in getting the complaint redressed if the Central Grievance Redress Officer or State Grievance Redress Officer, as the case may be, has not redressed the complaint in the time specified in the Act, the District Grievance Redress Authority shall require the public authority to compensate the complainant an amount of Rs. 100 for each day of delay till such time that the complaint is disposed. (iii) cost incurred by complainant in filing and pursuing the appeal. (c) impose any of the penalties on the Central Grievance Redress Officer or the State Grievance Redress Officer or the coordinator of the Peoples Support Centre, as the case may be. Where the District Public Grievance Authority, at the time of deciding any appeal is of the opinion that the Central Grievance Redress Officer or the State Grievance Redress Officer or the coordinator of the Peoples Support Centre, as the case may be, has, without any reasonable cause, refused to receive a complaint or has not redressed the complaint within the time specified or malafidely rejected the complaint or destroyed information which was related to the complaint or violated any provision of this Act, it shall impose a penalty of one hundred rupees each day till complaint is received or complaint is adequately redressed in keeping with the provisions of this Act, so however, the total amount of such penalty shall not exceed twenty-five thousand rupees. Provided that the Central Grievance Redress Officer or the State Grievance Redress Officer or the coordinator of the Peoples Support Centre, as the case may be, shall be given a reasonable opportunity of being heard before any penalty is imposed on him:

Provided further that the burden of proving that he acted reasonably and diligently shall be on the Central Grievance Redress Officer or the State Grievance Redress Officer or the coordinator of the Peoples Support Centre, as the case may b,. (d) reject the appeal, reasons for which must be provided to the appellant. (6) The District Grievance Redress Commission shall give notice of its decision, including any right of appeal, to the complainant/appellant and the public authority. (7) The District Grievance Redress Authority, shall decide the appeal in accordance with such procedure as may be prescribed. (8) The District Grievance Redress Authority will follow principles of natural justice and provide right of hearing to all parties involved, especially before imposing a penalty or dismissing a complaint. (9) In every complaint/appeal, received by the District Grievance Redress Authority, where it is either alleged by the complainant or the Commission feels that there is prima facie grounds for believing that there is a prima facie case of violation of the Prevention of Corruption Act to the deficiency, the Authority may apart from issuing the necessary orders relating to the redress of grievance, also refer the matter for further enquiry and/or investigation to the appropriate authority. (10) The District Grievance Redress Authority, if it considers it desirable, could have organised through the proposed directorates of social audits, periodically or when the need arises, social audits by which the systemic functioning of specific public authorities/offices could be assessed in a participatory and transparent manner. Such social audits should have the status of a preliminary enquiry on the basis of which the Authority could either pass orders or, where it thinks it necessary, hold a more detailed enquiry. The report of any social audit or monitoring committee, set up under any other law, in so far as it reveals a prime facie grievance, either individual or systemic, could be referred to the Authority which shall treat it as a grievance and dispose it as specified in this Act. (11) The functioning of the District Grievance Redress Authority shall be transparent in keeping with the letter and spirit of the RTI Act, 2005.

CHAPTER VII The State Public Grievance Commission Selection and composition 11. (1) Every State Government shall, by notification in the Official Gazette, constitute a body to be known as the ......... (name of the State) Public Grievance Commission to exercise the powers conferred on, and to perform the functions assigned to, it under this Act. (2)The State Public Grievance Commissionshall consist of (a) theState Chief Grievance Redress Commissioner; and (b) such number of State Grievance Redress Commissioners, not exceeding five, as may be deemed necessary. (3) The State Chief Grievance Redress Commissioner and State Grievance Redress Commissioners shall be appointed by the Governor on the recommendation of a committee consisting of

(i) the Chief Minister, who shall be the Chairperson of the committee; (ii) the Leader of Opposition in the Legislative Assembly; and (iii) a Cabinet Minister to be nominated by the Chief Minister Explanation.For the purposes of removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that where the Leader of Opposition in the Legislative Assembly has not been recognised as such, the Leader of the single largest group in opposition of the Government in the Legislative Assembly shall be deemed to be the Leader of Opposition. (4) The selection committee shall select out of a panel of not less than three and not more than five eligible candidates for each vacancy. This panel of eligible candidates shall be finalised by a search committee set up for the purpose; provided that the selection committee can require the search committee to submit up to two additional names for any vacancy, over and above those initially suggested, if they so deem necessary. (5) The search committee shall comprise of five members appointed by the selection committee. (6)Members of the search committee would be selected from among former: i. ii. iii. iv. v. vi. vii. Chief Justices of India Judges of the Supreme Court of India Comptroller and Auditor Generals of India Chief Election Commissioners of India Former or outgoing Chief Grievance Redress Commissioners of India(after the appointment of the first Chief Grievance Redress Commissioner) Former or outgoing Chief Lokpals (after the appointment of the first Chief Lokpal) Former Grievance Redress Commissioners (for appointment of Grievance Redress Commissioners only)

Provided that not more than two members should belong to any one of the categories listed above. Provided further that the following persons shall not be eligible for becoming members of the search committee: i. ii. iii. Any person who has joined any political party. Any person who is still in the service of the government in any capacity Any person who took up a government assignment after retirement, barring those assignments which are reserved for the post from which the person retired.

(7) In addition the search committee will consist of another five members who would be selected by the five members, appointed under (g) above, from among the civil society and could include activists, academics, journalists, professionals, etc. (8)The search committee shall devise its own procedures to develop a short list of names that could be considered for recommending to the selection committee. (9) The search committee shall put up on a website the names and relevant details of all the candidates being considered. The public would be given sufficient time (not less than a month) to

send in their views, if any, pertinent to the candidature of any one or more of these candidates, along with relevant material, if any. (10) The search committee will compile all the comments so received and, wherever it deems necessary, will further investigate the comments about, or credentials of, any of the candidates under consideration. (11) Based on all this material, the search committee will recommend not less than three and not more than five names to the selection committee for each vacancy. (12) All the material received or considered by the search committee in order to reach its final recommendation, as well as the details and documents related to its own proceedings, would be available for public scrutiny once the relevant appointments have been made. (13) The general superintendence, direction and management of the affairs of the State Public Grievance Commission shall vest in the State Chief Grievance Redress Commissioner who shall be assisted by the State Grievance Redress Commissioners and may exercise all such powers and do all such acts and things which may be exercised or done by the State Public Grievance Commission autonomously as provided for under this Act. (14) The State Chief Grievance Redress Commissioner and State Grievance Redress Commissioners shall be persons of eminence in public life with wide knowledge and experience in law, science and technology, social service, management, journalism, mass media or administration and governance. (15) The State Chief Grievance Redress Commissioner or a State Grievance Redress Commissioner shall not be a Member of Parliament or Member of the Legislature of any State or Union territory, as the case may be, or hold any other office of profit or connected with any political party or carrying on any business or pursuing any profession. (16) The headquarters of the State Public Grievance Commission shall be at such place in the State as the State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, specify and the State Information Commission may, with the previous approval of the State Government, establish offices at other places in the State. (17) The State Public Grievance Commission Commission shall have video conferencing links with every district headquarter in the State so that the complainant and the respondent can participate in a hearing from the nearest district headquarter. 12. (1) The Chief State Grievance Redress Commissioner shall hold office for a term of five years from the date on which he enters upon his office and shall not be eligible for reappointment: Provided that no Chief State Grievance Redress Commissioner shall hold office as such after he has attained the age of sixty-five years. (2) Every State Grievance Redress Commissioner shall hold office for a term of five years from the date on which he enters upon his office or till he attains the age of sixty-five years, whichever is earlier, and shall not be eligible for reappointment as such State Grievance Redress Commissioner: Provided that every State Grievance Redress Commissioner shall, on vacating his office under this sub-section be eligible for appointment as the Chief State Grievance Redress Commissioner in the manner specified in sub-section (3) of section 13:

Provided further that where the State Grievance Redress Commissioner is appointed as the Chief State Grievance Redress Commissioner, his term of office shall not be more than five years in aggregate as the State Grievance RedressCommissioner. (3) The Chief State Grievance Redress Commissioner or a State Grievance Redress Commissioner shall before he enters upon his office make and subscribe before the President or some other person appointed by him in that behalf, an oath or affirmation, as specified. (4) The Chief State Grievance Redress Commissioner or a State Grievance Redress Commissioner may, at any time, by writing under his hand addressed to the President, resign from his office: Provided that the Chief State Grievance Redress Commissioner or a State Grievance Redress Commissioner may be removed in the manner specified under as specified. (5) The salaries and allowances payable to and other terms and conditions of service of (a) theChiefState Grievance Redress Commissioner shall be the same as that of an Election Commissioner; (b) a State Grievance Redress Commissioner shall be the same as that Commissioner shall be the same as that Commissioner shall be the same as that of a Chief Secretary to the State government. Provided that if the State Chief Grievance Redress Commissioner or a State Grievance Redress Commissioner, at the time of his appointment is, in receipt of a pension, other than a disability or wound pension, in respect of any previous service under the Government of India or under the Government of a State, his salary in respect of the service as the State Chief Grievance Redress Commissioner or a State Grievance Redress Commissioner shall be reduced by the amount of that pension including any portion of pension which was commuted and pension equivalent of other forms of retirement benefits excluding pension equivalent of retirement gratuity: Provided further that if the State Chief Grievance Redress Commissioner or a State Grievance Redress Commissioner if, at the time of his appointment is, in receipt of retirement benefits in respect of any previous service rendered in a Corporation established by or under any Central Act or State Act or a Government company owned or controlled by the Central Government or the State Government, his salary in respect of the service as the Chief Grievance Redress Commissioner or an Grievance Redress Commissioner shall be reduced by the amount of pension equivalent to the retirement benefits: Provided also that the salaries, allowances and other conditions of service of the State Chief Grievance Redress Commissioner and the State Grievance Redress Commissioners shall not be varied to their disadvantage after their appointment. (6) The State Government shall provide the State Chief Grievance Redress Commissioner and the State Grievance Redress Commissioner s with such officers and employees as may be necessary for the efficient performance of their functions under this Act, and the salaries and allowances payable to and the terms and conditions of service of the officers and other employees appointed for the purpose of this Act shall be such as may be prescribed. 13. (1) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (3), the State Chief Grievance Redress Commissioner or State Grievance Redress Commissioner shall be removed from his office only by order of the

Governor on the ground of proved misbehaviour or incapacity after the Supreme Court, on a reference made to it by the Governor, has, on inquiry, reported that the State Chief Grievance Redress Commissioner or any StateGrievance Redress Commissioner , as the case may be, ought on such ground be removed. (2) The Governor may suspend from office, and if deemed necessary prohibit also from attending the office during inquiry, the Chief StateGrievance Redress Commissioner orStateGrievance Redress Commissioner in respect of whom a reference has been made to the Supreme Court under subsection (1) until the President has passed orders on receipt of the report of the Supreme Court on such reference. (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), the Governor may by order remove from office the Chief StateGrievance Redress Commissioner or any StateGrievance Redress Commissioner if the Chief StateGrievance Redress Commissioner or a StateGrievance Redress Commissioner , as the case may be, (a) is adjudged an insolvent; or (b) has been convicted of an offence which, in the opinion of the President, involves moral turpitude; or (c) engages during his term of office in any paid employment outside the duties of his office; or (d) is, in the opinion of the Governor, unfit to continue in office by reason of infirmity of mind or body; or (e) has acquired such financial or other interest as is likely to affect prejudicially his functions as the Chief StateGrievance Redress Commissioner or a StateGrievance Redress Commissioner. (4) If the Chief StateGrievance Redress Commissioner or a StateGrievance Redress Commissioner in any way, concerned or interested in any contract or agreement made by or on behalf of the Government of India or participates in any way in the profit thereof or in any benefit or emolument arising therefrom otherwise than as a member and in common with the other members of an incorporated company, he shall, for the purposes of sub-section (1), be deemed to be guilty of misbehaviour. Powers and functions 14. (1) Any person who, does not receive a decision within the time specified in Chapter VI , or is aggrieved by a decision of the District Grievance Redress Authority, may within thirty days from the expiry of such period or from the receipt of such a decision prefer an appeal to the State Public Grievance Commission. Provided that such Commission may admit the appeal after the expiry of the period of thirty days if he or she is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the appeal in time. (2) In any appeal proceedings, the onus to prove that a denial of a request was justified shall be on the Central Grievance Redress Officer who denied the request. (3) An appeal under sub-section (1) shall be disposed of within the time frame, specified: (a) Appeals of an urgent and/ immediate nature or where the complaint concerns the life or liberty of a person, shall be disposed of within 30 days of the receipt of the appeal.

(b) Appeals other than those specified in sub-section (a) shall be disposed of within 60 days of the receipt of the appeal. (4) Subject to the provisions of this Act, it shall be the duty of the State Public Grievance Commission, as the case may be, to receive and inquire into a complaint from any person, (a) who has been unable to submit a an appeal to the District Public Grievance Authority; (b) who has been refused redress of grievance under this Act; (c) whose complaint has not been disposed within the time limit specified; (d) who has been denied access to the statement of obligations of the public authority either because the statement was not created by the Public Authority or is inadequate in any regard or it is not widely disseminated to make people aware of it. (e) in respect of any other matter relating to registering and redressing of a complaint or appeal under this Act. (4) Where the State Public Grievance Commission, is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to inquire into the matter, it may initiate an inquiry in respect thereof. (5) The State Public Grievance Commission, shall, while inquiring into any matter under this Act, have the same powers as are vested in a civil court while trying a suit under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, in respect of the following matters, namely: (a) summoning and enforcing the attendance of persons and compel them to give oral or written evidence on oath and to produce the documents or things; (b) requiring the discovery and inspection of documents; (c) receiving evidence on affidavit; (d) requisitioning any public record or copies thereof from any court or office; (e) issuing summons for examination of witnesses or documents; and (f) any other matter which may be prescribed.

(6) Notwithstanding anything inconsistent contained in any other Act of Parliament or State Legislature, as the case may be, the State Public Grievance Commission, may, during the inquiry of any complaint under this Act, examine any record to which this Act applies which is under the control of the public authority, and no such record may be withheld from it on any grounds. (7) In its decision in relation to an appeal or a complaint, as the case may be, the State Public Grievance Commission, has the power to (a) require the public authority to take any such steps as may be necessary to secure compliance with the provisions of this Act, including (i) by redressing the complaint; (ii) by appointing a Central Grievance Redress Officer or State Grievance Redress Officer, as the case may be; (iii) by ensuring timely creation, updation and wide dissemination of the statement of obligations of the public authority

(iv) by making necessary changes to its structure, and mechanisms for training and sensitization of officials, to better handle the grievances of citizens or any other related matter. (v) by recommending any such changes in its policy/guideline/order etc. as it deems fit, if in the opinion of the Commission, citizens grievances are emanating from such policy/guideline/order etc. (vi) by providing it with an annual report in compliance with this Act; (b) require the public authority to compensate the complainant for any loss or other detriment suffered in terms of; (i) any financial loss suffered by the complainant as a result of his grievance not being redressed in a time-bound manner. For any other loss, the State Public Grievance Commission shall fix the quantum of compensation taking into account the monetary value of the loss. (ii)any delay experienced by the complainant in getting the complaint redressed if the Central Grievance Redress Officer or State Grievance Redress Officer, as the case may be, has not redressed the complaint in the time specified in the Act, the District Grievance Redress Authority shall require the public authority to compensate the complainant an amount of Rs. 100 for each day of delay till such time that the complaint is disposed. (iii) cost incurred by complainant in filing and pursuing the appeal. (c) impose any of the penalties on the Central Grievance Redress Officer or the State Grievance Redress Officer or the coordinator of the Peoples Support Centre, as the case may be. Where the District Public Grievance Authority, at the time of deciding any appeal is of the opinion that the Central Grievance Redress Officer or the State Grievance Redress Officer or the coordinator of the Peoples Support Centre, as the case may be, has, without any reasonable cause, refused to receive a complaint or has not redressed the complaint within the time specified or malafidely rejected the complaint or destroyed information which was related to the complaint or violated any provision of this Act, it shall impose a penalty of one hundred rupees each day till complaint is received or complaint is adequately redressed in keeping with the provisions of this Act, so however, the total amount of such penalty shall not exceed twenty-five thousand rupees. Provided that the Central Grievance Redress Officer or the State Grievance Redress Officer or the coordinator of the Peoples Support Centre, as the case may be, shall be given a reasonable opportunity of being heard before any penalty is imposed on him: Provided further that the burden of proving that he acted reasonably and diligently shall be on the Central Grievance Redress Officer or the State Grievance Redress Officer or the coordinator of the Peoples Support Centre, as the case may b,. (d) reject the appeal. (8) Where the State Public Grievance Commission, as the case may be, at the time of deciding any complaint or appeal is of the opinion that the Central Grievance Redress Officer or the State Grievance Redress Officer or the coordinator of the Peoples Support Centre, as the case may be, has, without any reasonable cause and persistently, refused to receive a complaint or has not redressed the complaint within the time specified or malafidely rejected the complaint or destroyed information which was related to the complaint or violated any provision of this Act, it shall recommend for disciplinary action against the Central Grievance Redress Officer under the service rules applicable to him.

(9) The State Public Grievance Commission, as the case may be, shall give notice of its decision, including any right of appeal, to the complainant/appellant and the public authority.

(10) The State Public Grievance Commission, as the case may be, shall decide the appeal in accordance with such procedure as may be prescribed. (11) The Commission will follow principles of natural justice and provide right of hearing to all parties involved, especially before imposing a penalty or dismissing a complaint. (12) In every complaint/appeal, received by the State Public Grievance Commission, where it is either alleged by the complainant or the Commission feels that there is prima facie grounds for believing that there is a prima facie case of violation of the Prevention of Corruption Act to the deficiency, the Commission may apart from issuing the necessary orders relating to the redress of grievance, also refer the matter for further enquiry and/or investigation to the appropriate authority. (13) The State Public Grievance Commission will follow principles of natural justice and provide right of hearing to all parties involved, especially before imposing a penalty or dismissing a complaint. (13) The functioning of the commission shall be transparent in keeping with the letter and spirit of the RTI Act, 2005.

CHAPTER VIII The Central Public Grievance Commission

Selection and Composition 15. (1) The Central Government shall, by notification in the Official Gazette, constitute a body known as the Central Public Grievance Commissionto exercise the powers conferred on, and to perform the functions assigned to it under this Act. (2) The Central Public Grievance Commissionshall consist of (a) the Chief Grievance Redress Commissioner; and (b) such number of Central Grievance Redress Commissioners, not exceeding ten, as may be deemed necessary. (3) The Chief Grievance Redress Commissioner and Central Grievance Redress Commissioners shall be appointed by the President on the recommendation of a committee consisting of (i) the Prime Minister, who shall be the Chairperson of the committee; (ii) the Leader of Opposition in the LokSabha; and (iii) a Union Cabinet Minister to be nominated by the Prime Minister. Explanation.For the purposes of removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that wherethe Leader of Opposition in the House of the People has not been recognised as such, the Leader of the single largest group in opposition of the Government in the House of the People shall be deemed to be the Leader of Opposition. (4) The selection committee shall select out of a panel of not less than three and not more than five eligible candidates for each vacancy. This panel of eligible candidates shall be finalised by a search committee set up for the purpose; provided that the selection committee can require the search committee to submit up to two additional names for any vacancy, over and above those initially suggested, if they so deem necessary.

(5) The search committee shall comprise of five members appointed by the selection committee. (6)Members of the search committee would be selected from among former: i. ii. iii. iv. v. vi. vii. Chief Justices of India Judges of the Supreme Court of India Comptroller and Auditor Generals of India Chief Election Commissioners of India Former or outgoing Chief Grievance Redress Commissioners of India ((after the appointment of the first Chief Grievance Redress Commissioner) Former or outgoing Chief Lokpals (after the appointment of the first Chief Lokpal) Former Grievance Redress Commissioners (for appointment of Grievance Redress Commissioners only)

Provided that not more than two members should belong to any one of the categories listed above. Provided further that the following persons shall not be eligible for becoming members of the search committee: i. ii. iii. Any person who has joined any political party. Any person who is still in the service of the government in any capacity Any person who took up a government assignment after retirement, barring those assignments which are reserved for the post from which the person retired.

(7) In addition the search committee will consist of another five members who would be selected by the five members, appointed under (g) above, from among the civil society and could include activists, academics, journalists, professionals, etc. (8)The search committee shall devise its own procedures to develop a short list of names that could be considered for recommending to the selection committee. (9) The search committee shall put up on a website the names and relevant details of all the candidates being considered. The public would be given sufficient time (not less than a month) to send in their views, if any, pertinent to the candidature of any one or more of these candidates, along with relevant material, if any. (10) The search committee will compile all the comments so received and, wherever it deems necessary, will further investigate the comments about, or credentials of, any of the candidates under consideration. (11) Based on all this material, the search committee will recommend not less than three and not more than five names to the selection committee for each vacancy. (12) All the material received or considered by the search committee in order to reach its final recommendation, as well as the details and documents related to its own proceedings, would be available for public scrutiny once the relevant appointments have been made.

(13) The general superintendence, direction and management of the affairs of the Central Public Grievance Commission shall vest in the Chief Grievance Redress Commissioner who shall be assisted by the Central Grievance Redress Commissioners and may exercise all such powers and do all such acts and things which may be exercised or done by the Central Public Grievance Commission autonomously without being subjected to directions by any other authority under this Act. (14) The Chief Grievance Redress Commissioner and Grievance Redress Commissioners shall be persons of eminence in public life with wide knowledge and experience in law, science and technology, social service, management, journalism, mass media oradministration and governance. (15) The Chief Grievance Redress Commissioner or an Grievance Redress Commissioner shall not be a Member of Parliament or Member of the Legislature of any State or Union territory, as the case may be, or hold any other office of profit or connected with any political party or carrying on any business or pursuing any profession. (16) The headquarters of the Central Public Grievance Commission shall be at Delhi and the Central Public Grievance Commission may, establish offices at other places in India. (17) The Commission shall have video conferencing links with every district headquarter in the country so that the complainant and/or a respondent can participate in a hearing from the nearest district headquarter.

16. (1) The Chief Grievance Redress Commissioner shall hold office for a term of five years from the date on which he enters upon his office and shall not be eligible for reappointment: Provided that no Chief Grievance Redress Commissioner shall hold office as such after he has attained the age of sixty-five years. (2) Every Grievance Redress Commissioner shall hold office for a term of five years from the date on which he enters upon his office or till he attains the age of sixty-five years, whichever is earlier, and shall not be eligible for reappointment as such Grievance Redress Commissioner: Provided that every Grievance Redress Commissioner shall, on vacating his office under this subsection be eligible for appointment as the Chief Grievance Redress Commissioner in the manner specified in sub-section (3) of section 12: Provided further that where the Grievance Redress Commissioner is appointed as the Chief Grievance Redress Commissioner, his term of office shall not be more than five years in aggregate as the Grievance RedressCommissioner. (3) Every District Public Grievance Authority shall hold office for a term of five years from the date on which he enters upon his office or till he attains the age of sixty-five years, whichever is earlier, and shall not be eligible for reappointment as such. (4) The Chief Grievance Redress Commissioner or an Grievance Redress Commissioner shall before he enters upon his office make and subscribe before the President or some other person appointed by him in that behalf, an oath or affirmation, as specified. (5) The Chief Grievance Redress Commissioner or a Grievance Redress Commissioner may, at any time, by writing under his hand addressed to the President, resign from his office:

Provided that the Chief Grievance Redress Commissioner or an Grievance Redress Commissioner may be removed in the manner specified under section 10 (1). (6) The salaries and allowances payable to and other terms and conditions of service of (a) the Chief Grievance Redress Commissioner shall be the same as that of the Chief Election Commissioner; (b) an Grievance Redress Commissioner shall be the same as that Commissioner shall be the same as that Commissioner shall be the same as that of an Election Commissioner: Provided that if the Chief Grievance Redress Commissioner or an Grievance Redress Commissioner, at the time of his appointment is, in receipt of a pension, other than a disability or wound pension, in respect of any previous service under the Government of India or under the Government of a State, his salary in respect of the service as the Chief Grievance Redress Commissioner or an Grievance Redress Commissioner shall be reduced by the amount of that pension including any portion of pension which was commuted and pensionequivalent of other forms of retirement benefits excluding pension equivalent of retirement gratuity: Provided further that if the Chief Grievance Redress Commissioner or an Grievance Redress Commissioner if, at the time of his appointment is, in receipt of retirement benefits in respect of any previous service rendered in a Corporation established by or under any Central Act or State Act or a Government company owned or controlled by the Central Government or the State Government, his salary in respect of the service as the Chief Grievance Redress Commissioner or an Grievance Redress Commissioner shall be reduced by the amount of pension equivalent to the retirement benefits: Provided also that the salaries, allowances and other conditions of service of the Chief Grievance Redress Commissioner and the Grievance Redress Commissioners shall not be varied to their disadvantage after their appointment. (7) The Central Government shall provide the Chief Grievance Redress Commissioner and the Grievance Redress Commissioner s with such officers and employees as may be necessary for the efficient performance of their functions under this Act, and the salaries and allowances payable to and the terms and conditions of service of the officers and other employees appointed for the purpose of this Act shall be such as may be prescribed.

17. (1) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (3), the Chief Grievance Redress Commissioner or Grievance Redress Commissioner shall be removed from his office only by order of the President onthe ground of proved misbehaviour or incapacity after the Supreme Court, on a reference made to it by the President, has, on inquiry, reported that the Chief Grievance Redress Commissioner or any Central Grievance Redress Commissioner , as the case may be, ought on such ground be removed. (2) The President may suspend from office, and if deemed necessary prohibit also from attending the office during inquiry, the Chief Grievance Redress Commissioner orCentral Grievance Redress Commissioner in respect of whom a reference has been made to the Supreme Court under subsection (1) until the President has passed orders on receipt of the report of the Supreme Court on such reference.

(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), the President may by order remove from office the Chief Grievance Redress Commissioner or any Central Grievance Redress Commissioner if the Chief Grievance Redress Commissioner or a Grievance Redress Commissioner , as the case may be, (a) is adjudged an insolvent; or (b) has been convicted of an offence which, in the opinion of the President, involves moral turpitude; or (c) engages during his term of office in any paid employment outside the duties of his office; or (d) is, in the opinion of the President, unfit to continue in office by reason of infirmity of mind or body; or (e) has acquired such financial or other interest as is likely to affect prejudicially his functions as the Chief Grievance Redress Commissioner or a Grievance Redress Commissioner. (4) If the Chief Grievance Redress Commissioner or a CentralGrievance Redress Commissioner in any way, concerned or interested in any contract or agreement made by or on behalf of the Government of India or participates in any way in the profit thereof or in any benefit or emolument arising therefrom otherwise than as a member and in common with the other members of an incorporated company, he shall, for the purposes of sub-section (1), be deemed to be guilty of misbehaviour.

Powers and Functions 18.(1) Any person who, does not receive a decision within the time specified in Chapter VII , or is aggrieved by a decision of the State Public Grievance Commission, may within thirty days from the expiry of such period or from the receipt of such a decision prefer an appeal to the Central Public Grievance Commission. Provided that such Commission may admit the appeal after the expiry of the period of thirty days if he or she is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the appeal in time. (2) In any appeal proceedings, the onus to prove that a denial of a request was justified shall be on the Central Grievance Redress Officer who denied the request. (3) An appeal under sub-section (1) shall be disposed of within the time frame, specified: (a) Appeals of an urgent and/ immediate nature or where the complaint concerns the life or liberty of a person, shall be disposed of within 30 days of the receipt of the appeal. (b) Appeals other than those specified in sub-section (a) shall be disposed of within 60 days of the receipt of the appeal. (4) Subject to the provisions of this Act, it shall be the duty of the Central Public Grievance Commission, as the case may be, to receive and inquire into a complaint from any person, (a) who has been unable to submit a an appeal to theState Public Grievance Commission.; (b) who has been refused redress of grievance under this Act;

(c) whose complaint has not been disposed within the time limit specified; (d) who has been denied access to the statement of obligations of the public authority either because the statement was not created by the Public Authority or is inadequate in any regard or it is not widely disseminated to make people aware of it. (e) in respect of any other matter relating to registering and redressing of a complaint or appeal under this Act. (4) Where the Central Public Grievance Commission, is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to inquire into the matter, it may initiate an inquiry in respect thereof. (5) The Central Public Grievance Commission, shall, while inquiring into any matter under this Act, have the same powers as are vested in a civil court while trying a suit under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, in respect of the following matters, namely: (a) summoning and enforcing the attendance of persons and compel them to give oral or written evidence on oath and to produce the documents or things; (b) requiring the discovery and inspection of documents; (c) receiving evidence on affidavit; (d) requisitioning any public record or copies thereof from any court or office; (e) issuing summons for examination of witnesses or documents; and (f) any other matter which may be prescribed.

(6) Notwithstanding anything inconsistent contained in any other Act of Parliament or State Legislature, as the case may be, the Central Public Grievance Commission, may, during the inquiry of any complaint under this Act, examine any record to which this Act applies which is under the control of the public authority, and no such record may be withheld from it on any grounds. (7) In its decision in relation to an appeal or a complaint, as the case may be, the Central Public Grievance Commission, has the power to (a) require the public authority to take any such steps as may be necessary to secure compliance with the provisions of this Act, including (i) by redressing the complaint; (ii) by appointing a Central Grievance Redress Officer or State Grievance Redress Officer, as the case may be; (iii) by ensuring timely creation, updation and wide dissemination of the statement of obligations of the public authority (iv) by making necessary changes to its structure, and mechanisms for training and sensitization of officials, to better handle the grievances of citizens or any other related matter. (v) by recommending any such changes in its policy/guideline/order etc. as it deems fit, if in the opinion of the Commission, citizens grievances are emanating from such policy/guideline/order etc. (vi) by providing it with an annual report in compliance with this Act; (b) require the public authority to compensate the complainant for any loss or other detriment suffered in terms of;

(i) any financial loss suffered by the complainant as a result of his grievance not being redressed in a time-bound manner. For any other loss, the Central Public Grievance Commission shall fix the quantum of compensation taking into account the monetary value of the loss. (ii)any delay experienced by the complainant in getting the complaint redressed if the Central Grievance Redress Officer or State Grievance Redress Officer, as the case may be, has not redressed the complaint in the time specified in the Act, the District Grievance Redress Authority shall require the public authority to compensate the complainant an amount of Rs. 100 for each day of delay till such time that the complaint is disposed. (iii) cost incurred by complainant in filing and pursuing the appeal. (c) impose any of the penalties on the Central Grievance Redress Officer or the State Grievance Redress Officer or the coordinator of the Peoples Support Centre, as the case may be. Where the District Public Grievance Authority, at the time of deciding any appeal is of the opinion that the Central Grievance Redress Officer or the State Grievance Redress Officer or the coordinator of the Peoples Support Centre, as the case may be, has, without any reasonable cause, refused to receive a complaint or has not redressed the complaint within the time specified or malafidely rejected the complaint or destroyed information which was related to the complaint or violated any provision of this Act, it shall impose a penalty of one hundred rupees each day till complaint is received or complaint is adequately redressed in keeping with the provisions of this Act, so however, the total amount of such penalty shall not exceed twenty-five thousand rupees. Provided that the Central Grievance Redress Officer or the State Grievance Redress Officer or the coordinator of the Peoples Support Centre, as the case may be, shall be given a reasonable opportunity of being heard before any penalty is imposed on him: Provided further that the burden of proving that he acted reasonably and diligently shall be on the Central Grievance Redress Officer or the State Grievance Redress Officer or the coordinator of the Peoples Support Centre, as the case may b,. (d) reject the appeal. (8) Where the Central Public Grievance Commission, as the case may be, at the time of deciding any complaint or appeal is of the opinion that the Central Grievance Redress Officer or the State Grievance Redress Officer or the coordinator of the Peoples Support Centre, as the case may be, has, without any reasonable cause and persistently, refused to receive a complaint or has not redressed the complaint within the time specified or malafidely rejected the complaint or destroyed information which was related to the complaint or violated any provision of this Act, it shall recommend for disciplinary action against the Central Grievance Redress Officer under the service rules applicable to him.

(9) The Central Public Grievance Commission, as the case may be, shall give notice of its decision, to the complainant/appellant and the public authority. (10) The Central Public Grievance Commission, as the case may be, shall decide the appeal in accordance with such procedure as may be prescribed. (11) The Commission will follow principles of natural justice and provide right of hearing to all parties involved, especially before imposing a penalty or dismissing a complaint.

(12) In every complaint/appeal, received by the Central Public Grievance Commission, where it is either alleged by the complainant or the Commission feels that there is prima facie grounds for believing that there is a prima facie case of violation of the Prevention of Corruption Act to the deficiency, the Commission may apart from issuing the necessary orders relating to the redress of grievance, also refer the matter for further enquiry and/or investigation to the appropriate authority. (13) The Central Public Grievance Commission will follow principles of natural justice and provide right of hearing to all parties involved, especially before imposing a penalty or dismissing a complaint. (13) The functioning of the commission shall be transparent in keeping with the letter and spirit of the RTI Act, 2005.

Chapter IX Miscellaneous 19. No suit, prosecution or other legal proceeding shall lie against any person for anything which is in good faith done or intended to be done under this Act or any rule made thereunder. 20. The provisions of this Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in the Time-bound services Acts of Delhi, Madhya Pradesh and Bihar, and any other law for the time being in force or in any instrument having effect by virtue of any law other than this Act. 21. (1) The Central Public Grievance Commission, State Public Grievance Commissionand the District Grievance Redress Authorities, as the case maybe, shall, within 11 months after the end of each year, prepare a report on the implementation of the provisions of this Act during that year and forward a copy thereof to the appropriate Government. (2) Each Ministry or Department shall, in relation to the public authorities within their jurisdiction, collect and provide such information to the Central Public Grievance Commission or State Public Grievance Commission as is required to prepare the report under this section and comply with the requirements concerning the furnishing of that information and keeping of records for the purposes of this section. (3) Each report shall state in respect of the year to which the report relates, (a) the number of complaints made to each public authority; (b) the number of decisions where complaints were refused after enquiry and the reasons thereof (c) the number of appeals referred to the Central Public Grievance Commission, State Public Grievance Commission and the District Grievance Redress Authorities, as the case may be, for review, the nature of the appeals and the outcome of the appeals; (d) particulars of any disciplinary action taken against any officer in respect of the administration of this Act; (e ) the number of officials against whom penalty has been levied and the quantum of penalty (f) the number of officials required to compensate the complainant and the quantum of compensation (g) the amount of penalty and compensation which is outstanding (h) the latest version of the statement of obligations of the public authority as specified in section 4;

(i) any facts which indicate an effort by the public authorities to administer and implement the spirit and intention of this Act; (j) recommendations for reform, including recommendations in respect of the particular public authorities, for the development, improvement, modernisation, reform or amendment to this Act or other legislation or common law or any other matter relevant foroperationalising the right of citizens to time bound delivery of services and redress of grievances. (4) The Central Governmentor the State Government, as the case may be, may, as soon as practicable after the end of each year, cause a copy of the report of the Central Public Grievance Commission or the State Public Grievance Commission, referred to in sub-section (1) to be laid before each House of Parliament or, as the case may be, before each House of the State Legislature, where there are two Houses, and where there is one House of the State Legislature before that House. (5) If it appears to the Central Public Grievance Commission or the State Public Grievance Commission, as the case may be, that the practice of a public authority in relation to the exercise of its functions under this Act does not conform with the provisions or spirit of this Act, it may give to the authority a recommendation specifying the steps which ought in its opinion to be taken for promoting such conformity. 22. (1) The appropriate Government may, to the extent of availability of financial and other resources, (a) develop and organise educational programmes to advance the understanding of the public, in particular of disadvantaged communities as to how to exercise the rights contemplated under this Act; (b) encourage public authorities to participate in the development and organisation of programmes referred to in clause (a) and to undertake such programmes themselves; (c) promote timely and effective dissemination of accurate information by public authorities about their activities; and (d) trainPeoples Support Centre and Central Grievance Redress Officers or State Grievance Redress Officers, as the case may be, of public authorities and produce relevant training materials for use by the public authorities themselves. (2) The appropriate Government shall, within eighteen months from the commencement of this Act, compile in its official language a guide containing such information, in an easily comprehensible form and manner, as may reasonably be required by a person who wishes to exercise any right specified in this Act. (3) The appropriate Government shall, if necessary, update and publish the guidelines referred to in sub-section (2) at regular intervals which shall, in particular and without prejudice to the generality of sub-section (2), include (a) the objects of this Act; (b) the postal and street address, the phone and fax number and, if available, electronic mail address of the Central Grievance Redress Officers or State Grievance Redress Officers, as the case may be, of every public authority and of the Facilitation Centre (c) the manner and the form in which a complaint / appeal shall be made under the Act;

(d) the assistance available from and the duties of the Central Grievance Redress Officers or State Grievance Redress Officers, as the case may be, of every public authority and of the Facilitation Centreunder this Act; (e) the assistance available from the Central Public Grievance Commission, the State Public Grievance Commission or the District Public Grievance Authority, as the case may be; (f) all remedies in law available regarding an act or failure to act in respect of a right or duty conferred or imposed by this Act including the manner of filing an appeal to the Commission; (g) the provisions providing for the voluntary disclosure of categories of records in accordance with section 4; (h) the notices regarding fees to be paid in relation to requests for access to an information; and (i) any additional regulations or circulars made or issued in relation to providing time bound services to citizens and redressing grievances in accordance with this Act. (4) The appropriate Government must, if necessary, update and publish the guidelines at regular intervals. 23. (1) The appropriate Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, make rules to carry out the provisions of this Act. (2) In particular, and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power, such rules may provide for all or any of the following matters, namely: (a) the salaries and allowances payable to and the terms and conditions of service of the officers and other employees under sub-section (7) of section 9. (b) the procedure to be adopted by the Central Public Grievance Commission, the State Public Grievance Commission or the District Public Grievance Authority, as the case may be, in deciding the appeals this Act; and (c) any other matter which is required to be, or may be, prescribed. 24. (1) The competent authority may, by notification in the Official Gazette, make rules to carry out the provisions of this Act. 25. (1) Every rule made by the Central Government under this Act shall be laid, as soon as may be after it is made, before each House of Parliament, while it is in session, for a total period of thirty days which may be comprised in one session or in two or more successive sessions, and if, before the expiry of the session immediately following the session or the successive sessions aforesaid, both Houses agree in making any modification in the rule or both Houses agree that the rule should not be made, the rule shall thereafter have effect only in such modified form or be of no effect, as the case may be; so, however, that any such modification or annulment shall be without prejudice to the validity of anything previously done under that rule. (2) Every rule made under this Act by a State Government shall be laid, as soon as may be after it is notified, before the State Legislature. 26. (1) If any difficulty arises in giving effect to the provisions of this Act, the Central Government may, by order published in the Official Gazette, make such provisions not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act as appear to it to be necessary or expedient for removal of the difficulty: Provided that no such order shall be made after the expiry of a period of two years from the date of the commencement of this Act. (2) Every order made under this section shall, as soon as may be after it is made, be laid before each House of Parliament.

Note 5
Measures for Fighting Corruption and Ensuring Better Governance Note for discussion on the Loksuraksha Whistleblower Protection Bill This paper highlights the deficiencies of the Public interest Disclosure and Protection to Persons Making the Disclosure Bill 2010 (whistleblowers). This paper is an element of the Collective and Concurrent Lokpal Measures for fighting corruption and ensuring better governance. Definition of a whistleblower 1. There are three major issues relating to thisa. Whether people not working within an organisation would be considered whistleblowers if they expose wrongdoing in the organisation (or by individuals within the organisation) b. Whether Right to Information Act users by virtue of their filing applications under the RTI Act, with the purpose of exposing or preventing wrongdoing, as defined in this act, would be considered whistleblowers c. Whether employees of non government organisations (private sector companies, NGOs etc.) who expose wrongdoings within their organisations would be considered whistleblowers 2. Inclusion of each of these categories presents different problemsa. Whereas traditionally, a whistleblower is usually a person who exposes intended or actual wrongdoing in her own organisation, there is obviously a need to give outsiders protection, both to encourage them to blow the whistle and to safeguard their interests. b. The Whistleblower Protection Act should deal with only two aspects, namely, (1) where called upon, protecting the whistleblowers identity, and/or (2) ensuring that the whistleblower is not intimidated or otherwise harmed by the organisation she has exposed. However, as there are other laws that cover threats and violence, strictly speaking, whistleblower protection should be limited to those aspects that are not illegal and are within the discretionary administrative powers of the organisation (transfers, holding up promotions, holding back benefits and other types of discriminatory behaviour). Where the Whistleblower Protection Act also seeks to take cognisance of actions (or inactions) that are already covered under other laws, a justification for the same would have to be built up. Perhaps in some cases it could be argued that if we want to encourage people to blow the whistle, then they must be given protection that goes beyond normal levels. c. If this is accepted, then one can also include under the definition of a whistleblower, individuals who do not work for the organisation they are seeking to expose, and therefore that organisation has no authority over them. d. However, it would still be difficult to envisage the protection being extended to whistleblowers in the private sector. In other words, do we empower the government, through this law, to interfere with the internal functioning of a private sector company or an NGO and prohibit them from transferring, punishing, or even sacking one of their employees? Perhaps appropriate provisions could be made in company and labour laws. e. In all this, safeguards need to be built to ensure that whistle blowing does not become a strategy to protect oneself from deserved admonishments or punishment, or unwanted actions. Of relevance here is Section 5(4) of the government bill which gives immunity to any bonafide action or discretion. This should be retained at the very least. Perhaps it should also be clarified that no action against a whistleblower, unless it is illegal, would be prohibited or questioned, under this act if it has been initiated prior to the whistle being blown, or can be demonstrated to be in keeping with generally followed rules or policy. f. There is broad agreement that where an RTI application has been filed in order to expose some wrongdoing (as defined under this Act) and the applicant is attacked, resulting in grievous injury or death, then it would be the legal responsibility of the government to ensure that the information that was being sought, subject to section 8 of the RTI Act and other legal

Note 5
restrictions, is speedily put into the public domain. This would ensure that any attack to prevent information from becoming public would be counter productive. There is also a suggestion that, in the event of an attack, a special audit may be initiated to closely examine the subject matter of the RTI application. The Department related Standing Committee on Personnel, Public Grievances, Law and Justice in its report presented on June 9, 2011 has recommended that these and some other suggestions be examined. Offences covered under the Act 3. It is important to broaden the scope of whistleblowing to cover not just offences related to corruption, criminal actions and/or misuse of powers or discretion etc. {Section 2(d)} but to other actions which have an impact on society (for example environmental destruction, threats to public safety or health). This has also been recommended by the Department related Standing Committee on Personnel, Public Grievances, Law and Justice in its report presented on June 9, 2011. 4. Considering the widening of the scope of offences covered under the Act, it is not enough to restrict whistle blowing to only wrongdoing by employees and/or organisations. It would have to include any individual who, is either in a position of power or otherwise wields political, institutional or financial powers, provided there is reasonable apprehension that this individual has the capacity to harm the whistleblower in one or more of the measures covered under this bill. However, safeguards would have to be built in to ensure that this act is not invoked every time any complaint is made about anyone who could be abusive or could collectively threaten you. Obligation to report wrongdoing 5. Perhaps the bill, apart from spelling out the rights of whistleblowers should also make it obligatory for people, especially those working within organisations, to blow the whistle every time they became aware of a potential or actual wrongdoing. Perhaps the relevant laws could be amended to make those who knew of potential or actual wrongdoings culpable, perhaps as abettors, if they did not do what was required to prevent/expose the same. Protecting whistleblowers in armed forces and other organisations 6. Protection must be accorded to whistleblowers from the armed forces and other organisations mentioned in Section 3 (1) (armed forces, forces charged with the maintenance of public order and organisation established by the State for purposes of intelligence or counter intelligence etc.). However, perhaps separate institutions need to be identified to provide the required anonymity/protection to such whistleblowers and safeguards need to be built in to prevent the compromise of national security. This has also been recommended by the Department related Standing Committee on Personnel, Public Grievances, Law and Justice in its report presented on June 9, 2011. Protecting the identity of a whistleblower and protecting the whistleblower from victimization/harm 7. Where a whistleblower seeks the protection of her identity, her name and other details would be removed from the complaint and an alias (like a roll number) could be given, with the identity of the whistleblower being kept secret from all, but one or two officers. This would not only help protect the identity of the whistleblower but would also make it easier to fix responsibility for any leaks. This has also been recommended by the Department related Standing Committee on Personnel, Public Grievances, Law and Justice in its report presented on June 9, 2011. The Committee has strongly recommended that the Ministry should envisage a fool-proof mechanism in every respect which would ensure that the identity of the complainant is not compromised with, at any cost and at any level. 8. Regarding the possibility of revealing the identity of a whistleblower {Section 4(4)}, as a part of the enquiry/investigative process, this should be only done:

Note 5
a. when the competent authority is convinced that this is essential for a proper conduct of the enquiry/investigation; b. when adequate advance notice is given to the whistleblower and she is given an opportunity to be heard before a final decision is taken; c. where all measures to protect the whistleblower are put into position prior to revealing her identity, so as to minimise adverse consequences. If the identity of a whistleblower is revealed (in violation of the Act) and it results in an attack on the whistleblower, then the person who revealed the identity shall be treated as an abettor/accessory to the attack/crime. Protection should not be provided only to whistleblower who makes a complaint but also to those who provide additional information or become witnesses to the case. This might also require the setting up of a witness protection program. This has also been recommended by the Department related Standing Committee on Personnel, Public Grievances, Law and Justice in its report presented on June 9, 2011. What constitutes victimization of a whistleblower should be clearly defined in the Act. This has also been recommended by the Department related Standing Committee on Personnel, Public Grievances, Law and Justice in its report presented on June 9, 2011. In order to deter victimization of whistleblowers, through actions which might not be punishable under any other existing law, some penalty should be prescribed for such actions in this act. This penalty could be in the form of a fine and/or in the form of administrative action including dismissal from service. Where there is a threat to a whistleblower, all possible and required action would be taken within an appropriate time frame to ensure that the threat does not actualize and where harm has already occurred, no further harm occurs. Perhaps an indicative frame work could be made to suggest the optimal timeframe within which various measures and actions must occur.

9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

Scope of the Whistleblower Protection Act 14. The Whistleblower Act need not get into detailing the process of dealing with complaints, as these are already laid down under the other various relevant laws. Time limit beyond which cases can not be taken cognisance of 15. There is no logic for prescribing the time limit of 5 years beyond which cases can not be taken cognisance of {Section 5(3)}. This should be deleted. This has also been recommended by the Department related Standing Committee on Personnel, Public Grievances, Law and Justice in its report presented on June 9, 2011. Transparency 16. It would be the responsibility of the investigating agency to keep the whistleblower informed of the details and progress of action on the complaint, including reasons and grounds for closing the complaint, if this happens. This has also been recommended by the Department related Standing Committee on Personnel, Public Grievances, Law and Justice in its report presented on June 9, 2011. 17. All provisions of RTI Act should apply to this Act. Public Servant {Section 2(i)} 18. The definition needs to be expanded to cover other public servants like members of the judiciary, legislature, council of ministers etc. This has also been recommended by the Department related Standing Committee on Personnel, Public Grievances, Law and Justice in its report presented on June 9, 2011. Competent Authority (Definition and powers) 19. As the scope of the Act is proposed to be expanded to cover areas other than corruption, clearly it would not be appropriate to designate only the anti-corruption agencies as competent authorities for

Note 5
receiving requests for anonymity and protection and complaints of threat from whistleblowers. Also, as it is proposed that the bill be extended to cover public servants other than those who are covered by the CVC, multiple bodies will needs to be made competent authorities under the Act. Each institution set up as a part of the collective and concurrent anti-corruption and grievance redress measures and all existing commissions like the NHRC, Womens Commission etc. would have a provision and an obligation to protect whistle blowers, both from within and outside the government, using this Act. The Department related Standing Committee on Personnel, Public Grievances, Law and Justice in its report presented on June 9, 2011 has recommended that multiple points be made for receipt of public disclosure complaints. 20. Adequate provisions should be put in to ensure that the directions issued by the competent authority are complied with in a time-bound manner. This has also been recommended by the Department related Standing Committee on Personnel, Public Grievances, Law and Justice in its report presented on June 9, 2011.

Punishment for false or frivolous disclosure (Section 16) 21. The current bill provides for punishment for imprisonment for up to 2 years and a fine up to thirty thousand rupees. Punishment should be limited to a fine and the terms false and frivolous should be clearly defined to prevent misuse of this provision. The Department related Standing Committee on Personnel, Public Grievances, Law and Justice in its report presented on June 9, 2011 has recommended reducing the quantum of punishment. No action on anonymous complaints 22. The bill states that the competent authority will not act upon a complaint if the identity of the complainant is not provided. If a complaint is accompanied with adequate supporting documents reveal a prima facie case, the competent authority should not reject the complaint merely on the basis that it is anonymous. This has also been recommended by the Department related Standing Committee on Personnel, Public Grievances, Law and Justice in its report presented on June 9, 2011.

FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS Q. What is the National Campaign for Peoples Right to Information (NCPRI)? The NCPRI was formed in 1996, essentially to fight for greater transparency in governance by getting state and national RTI laws enacted. It was involved in the drafting and passing of various state RTI laws and in the national RTI Act. Its founding members included Aruna Roy, Prabhash Joshi, Ajit Bhattacharjea, Prashant Bhushan, S.R. Sankaran, Prakash Kardaley, Shekhar Singh, K. G. Kannabiran, Bharat Dogra. For more details see www.righttoninformation.info .

Q. What is the NCPRIs approach to fighting corruption? The NCPRI feels that every public servant including the Prime Minister, all ministers, elected representatives, judges etc. should be covered by strong anti-corruption laws. In order to ensure that no one institution is overwhelmed by numbers, becomes unmanageably large, and uncomfortably powerful, the NCPRI believes that there should be 3 different institutions at the central level and corresponding appropriate institutions at the state level. a. A Rashtriya Bhrashtachar Nivaran Lokpal (National Anti-corruption Commission), to tackle corruption of all elected representatives- Prime Minister (with some safeguards), Ministers and Members of Parliament, and senior bureaucrats (Group A officers), and all other co-accused. Please see note no. 1 for detailed suggestions made by NCPRI to strengthen the Lokpal bill that is currently before the Parliament. b. The strengthening of the Kendriya Satarkta Lokpal (Central Vigilance Commission), to be an investigative, prosecution and appellate authority for the remaining categories of civil servants. Please see note no. 2 for detailed suggestions made by NCPRI to appropriately amend the Central Vigilance Act. c. The setting up of a NyayapalikaLokpal (Judicial Accountability Commission) by strengthening the Judicial Accountability and Standards Bill that is currently before the Parliament, to investigate charges of corruption and misconduct against sitting judges. Please see note no. 3 for detailed suggestions made by NCPRI to strengthen the Judicial Accountability and Standards Bill. In addition, the NCPRI also believes that there should be a strong Whistleblowers Protection bill applicable to these and all other institutions. Please see note no. 5 for detailed suggestions made by NCPRI to strengthen the Whistleblowers Protection bill that is currently before the Parliament. For more details see-http://righttoinformation.info/ncpri-public-consultations-on-the-lok-palbill/public-consultations-on-collective-and-concurrent-lokpal-anti-corruption-and-grievance-redressmeasures-by-the-ncpri-nehru-memorial-museum-and-library-and-inclusive-media-4-change-csds/

Q. Why should the anti-corruption Lokpal not be involved in grievance redress? The NCPRI feels this is undesirable and impractical, especially given the numbers that would be involved and the need to tackle grievances in a decentralised manner. It, therefore, suggests the setting up of an independent, specialised and professional Shikayat Nivaran Lokpal (Grievance Redress Commission) to effectively redress grievances in a decentralized and time-bound manner. This commission would have representatives at the rural block and urban ward level and could also become a single-window gateway for grievance redress for various central and centrally sponsored schemes like the MGNREGS, NRHM, RTE, etc. Please see note no. 4 for details of the grievance redress mechanism being suggested by NCPRI.

Q. Why is the Judiciary not included in your anti-corruption Lokpal? The NCPRI is of the view that the judiciary should be made accountable through an institution set up under the Judicial Standards and Accountability Bill. This bill is already pending in Parliament but needs to be improved and strengthened. The Judiciary should be accountable to an independent institution as: 1. There is a widespread view among many experts that the inclusion of the higher judiciary within the purview of the anti-corruption Lokpal would require a Constitutional amendment, as it goes against the basic tenets of the independence of judiciary enshrined in the Indian Constitution. There is a further view that even if it was decided that it is worth amending the Constitution, that might be easier said than done. It has been argued that such an amendment would amount to changing the basic structure of the Constitution, and the Supreme Court has held that the legislature does not have the power to do so (KesavanandaBharati v. State of Kerala, AIR 1973 SC 1461). 2. There is also the problem that as the Supreme Court is the authority to hear complaints against the members of the Lokpals, it would be undesirable to have the Lokpals hear complaints against Supreme Court judges. 3. Also, it is likely that if the higher judiciary was included, the bill might itself be challenged in a high court or in the Supreme Court and might get stuck for a long period of time.

Q. Is the NCPRI opposed to the Lokpal bill as introduced in LokSabha? Yes. The NCPRI feels that the government Lokpalbill, as introduced in the Parliament is grossly inadequate in many ways and also draconian in some. Specifically: 1. The draft bill only covers the central government and not the state governments . 2. The draft bill does not indicate how members of the higher judiciary and civil servants other than group A would be dealt with in matters of corruption. 3. It also does not cover the issue of grievance redress. 4. It leaves out the PM who the NCPRI believes should be included, though perhaps with a few safeguards. 5. It has a selection process for the Lokpal which is dominated by the government and does not have a mandatory search committee, which the NCPRI thinks is essential. 6. It undermines the independence of the Lokpal by giving the power to initiate an enquiry against the Chairman or member of the Lokpal to the government. 7. It selectively covers all peoples movements and NGOs, declaring their office bearers as public servants, something that the NCPRI thinks is uncalled for. 8. It has draconian penalty provisions against those who might make false, vexatious or frivolous complaints, threatening them with imprisonment and thereby discouraging complainants. 9. It conveniently leaves out the corporate sector from its purview even though they are perhaps the most imp factors in promoting large scale corruption.

Q. NCPRI approach requires so many new laws. Even getting one law is so difficult. It might seem as if the NCPRI proposal is to set up five new bodies, or have five new laws. In fact, three of the laws are already Bills in parliament- Lokpal bill, Judicial Accountability and Standards bills and Whistleblower protection bill. The fourth, is the Central Vigilance Commission, which is an existing independent body and the Act would require to be amended.

The Grievance Redress Act is the only new law that will be required. This also relies on rationalising the grievance redress mechanisms in various schemes by strengthening it and building a common grievance redress architecture at the sub district level, with grievance redress authorities that can hear appeals, dispose off matters within a fixed time frame , compensate, and penalise at the District and State/Central level. So, the NCPRI approach required strengthening existing bills which have already been introduced in Parliament, strengthening an existing institution and bringing in one new legislation.

Q. Are you engaging with the government? The NCPRI had written to the chairperson of the Joint Drafting Committee requesting for an opportunity to present their views before the committee. Though the chairperson responded assuring that such an opportunity would be provided it seems that the committee was wound up before this could be done. Subsequently, the NCPRI sent its views to various government ministers and have also had meeting with some of them. The NCPRI will send its recommendation to the Standing Committee, and request a hearing with the Standing Committee.

Q. How will you ensure accountability of all the proposed institutions? Each of the proposed institutions will have in-built accountability measures. For example, complaints against members of the anti-corruption Lokpal would lie with the Chief Justice of India, as would complaints against members of the proposed grievance redress commission. In addition, each of the proposed institutions would function transparently and be concurrently accountable to the people.

Q. You are proposing multiple institutes, how will a person decide where to file a complaint? Ordinarily, where a complainant is making an accusation against a specific public servant, the complaint will lie with the appropriate body. For example, if it is against a group A officer, elected representative or Minister, it would be with the Lokpal at the Centre or Lokayukt in the state. Complaints against other officials would lie with theCentral Vigilance Commission and against the higher judiciary with the National Judicial Commission. Where the complaint is not sure of the identity or the rank of the accused official, the law will provide (similarly to the RTI Act), for the transfer of the complaint by the institute which has received it to the appropriate institution, once that is clear.

Q. If your institutions are segmented, wont people get excluded? The National Anti-Corruption Commission bill (RashtriyaBhrashtacharNivaranLokpal) proposed by the NCPRI provides for simultaneous coverage of all co-accused, even if by themselves they would not have been covered by the institution. So, for instance in a land deal where a member of the cabinet might be involved along with people down the line, right till the patwari at the village level, all the lower functionaries would also be investigated by the National Lokpal as co-accused.

Q. Where would CBI and similar investigative agencies come under the purview in the proposed model? The NCPRI proposes that each of the anti-corruption institutions have the authority and staff to investigate and prosecute complaints. Consequently, they would be expected to set up their investigative wings where personnel could be drawn from the CBI and other existing investigative agencies.

As the CBI has functions other than investigation of corruption cases, for these other functions, it would remain under the government. Q. How will speed and correctness of investigation and justice be ensured? Each of the proposed institution lays down mandatory timeframes for enquiry, investigation and trial. It is also proposed that a protocol laying down the elements of good and timely investigation be codified and its violation be considered an offence. Q. How would the composition of these bodies look like and how would members be selected The NCPRI envisages these bodies to have a diversity of expertise including former judges and eminent persons from different walks of life. The identification and selection of members of these bodies would be done by committees which comprise a multiplicity of interests, each balancing the other, in order to achieve objectivity. Therefore, typically there would be representatives of the government, the opposition party, the judiciary, and from among eminent people from various fields.

Q. Why is the NCPRI proposal such a complex articulation? It is true that the formulation- or suggested "collective and concurrent anti-corruption and grievance redress measures" of the NCPRI is more complex than a single institution like the Jan Lokpal that covers all corruption, maladministration, and misgovernance. However, corruption and the arbitrary use of power itself is complex, and misgovernance and grievance redress even more so.

Q. Dont you think by presenting a different view point from IAC, you are weakening civil society? The problem of corruption is too important to be left to just one group in civil society. Besides, diversity and plurality of viewpoints, are healthy process of discussion and consultation, and are a pre-condition to an effective set of anti-corruption measures. If it wasnt for the unwillingness of the IAC to continue the dialogue with the NCPRI and other civil society groups, it is quite possible that a consensus could have developed after extensive discussions among most, if not all of civil society.

Q. Why is the NCPRI not working with Team Anna/ India Against Corruption (IAC)? The NCPRI had organised various meetings in the last few months to discuss anti-corruption and grievance redress measures, including the proposed Lokpal bill and various members of IAC attended these meetings. This dialogue continued till such point that IAC took a public stand that their version of the Jan Lokpalk bill was final and warranted no change. Statements were made that anybody that disagreed with their bill was either corrupt or supported the corrupt. In the light of this, it was no longer possible to constructively and meaningfully work or interact with IAC. However, more recently, members of the IAC, some of whom are also members of the NCPRI, have again started discussing the different approaches to addressing corruption and grievances.

Q. Why are you stratifying institutions to look at different levels of corruption? Is this done in any existing institution? Currently there are nearly 42 lakh people under regular employment of the Central Government. It would be physically and logistically impossible for one organization like the National Anti-Corruption Commission (RashtriyaBhrashtacharNivaranLokpal) to deal with complaints regarding all these employees. It would also seem to be a misuse of the unique ability and strengths of the Lokpal to divert them to thousands of complaints of routine and petty corruption. Therefore, clearly there is a need to limit the scope of the Lokpal, otherwise it would soon degenerate either into an

organization with backlogs running into millions (like our court system), or become so large and unwieldy that not only would it become impossible to effectively manage and ensure its integrity (like the Income Tax Department), but it would also consume huge public resources without being cost effective. The main reasons why the National Anti-Corruption Commission (RashtriyaBhrashtacharNivaranLokpal) is being focused on just the political leadership and group A officers (and all co-accused) are: a) They are the ones who have, in the current dispensation, the least amount of checks and balances. b) Often the scams that they are involved with are very complex and need great effort and ability to unravel, and enormous resources to follow through (like the recent 2G, Karnataka/Andhra Pradesh mining, and the CWG scams, just to name a few). These sorts of abilities and resources would be available with the Lokpal Commission, and it would be a pity, and also not cost effective, to waste them on cases which could easily be investigated by other existing institutions. c) These are also the category of people who have vast influence and money power, and an institution with the stature and independence of the proposed Lokpal Commission is essential to neutralize this influence and power and to ensure that a proper investigation is conducted. d) Invariably, scams involving senior politicians, ministers and senior civil servants involve huge amounts of public resources and the enormous cost involved in maintaining the Lokpal and its complement of officers can be best justified if they concentrate on these large scams, whose prevention and detection would lead to the saving or recovery of large amounts of public resources that could be given back to the general public, to whom they rightfully belong. e) Considering the PM, Ministers and senior civil servants are individually supervisory authorities, and the MPs collectively so, as the corrupt are exposed and weeded out the overall tone of governance is bound to improve, making it more difficult and risky for the subordinate officers to continue to be corrupt. A positive message will also go out that even the most powerful are not beyond the reach of the law. It would also go a long way in removing the widespread cynicism that prevails today about how only the small fry get caught while the big fish always escape! f) Undoubtedly, the ideal situation would have been if corruption at all levels could be given the type of attention that the Lokpal promises to give corruption in high places. However, given the size of the problem, that does not seem to be possible at this stage. Any effort to significantly increase the scope of the Lokpal will invariably result in it becoming as ineffective and overburdened as most of our other anti-corruption institutions. Perhaps the correct way is to start small and then to expand in phases, as the capacity of the Lokpal Commission develops, it gains experience, and it succeeds in controlling corruption at high places. In India atleast 9 State Lokayuktas (out of 12 looked at) have stratified systems, wherein junior public servants are looked at by Up-lokayuktas and senior public servants are investigated by the Lokayuktas. Q. Where can I send my comments/suggestions on the NCPRI's proposal? Please send all feedback and comments to ncpri.india@gmail.com Q. Can I see the NCPRI draft? The NCPRI has suggested detailed amendments to the current Lokpal bill (as introduced in Lok Sabha). These can be seen at www.righttoinformation.info

Q. Is this not the government's version since it is associated with the NAC, a government body? There are 28 members in the NCPRI working committee of which only two (Aruna Roy and Harsh Mander) are members of the NAC. The NCPRI is an independent, autonomous network of transparency and accountability advocates. The NCPRIs involvement with the legislative process to deal with corruption and arbitrary use of power began with the demand for an RTI law in 1996. Some members of NCPRI also happen to be members of the NAC. The NCPRI is not in any manner affiliated to or supported by the NAC.