45. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION G.R. No.

L-53703 August 19, 1986 LILIA OLIVA WIEGEL, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE ALICIA V. SEMPIO-DIY (as presiding judge of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Caloocan City) and KARL HEINZ WIEGEL, respondents. Dapucanta, Dulay & Associates for petitioner. Siguion Reyna, Montecillo and Ongsiako Law Office for private respondent.

PARAS, J.: In an action (Family Case No. 483) filed before the erstwhile Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Caloocan City, herein respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel (plaintiff therein) asked for the declaration of Nullity of his marriage (celebrated on July, 1978 at the Holy Catholic Apostolic Christian Church Branch in Makati, Metro Manila) with herein petitioner Lilia Oliva Wiegel (Lilia, for short, and defendant therein) on the ground of Lilia's previous existing marriage to one Eduardo A. Maxion, the ceremony having been performed on June 25, 1972 at our Lady of Lourdes Church in Quezon City. Lilia, while admitting the existence of said prior subsisting marriage claimed that said marriage was null and void, she and the first husband Eduardo A. Maxion having been allegedly forced to enter said marital union. In the pre-trial that ensued, the issue agreed upon by both parties was the status of the first marriage (assuming the presence of force exerted against both parties): was said prior marriage void or was it merely voidable? Contesting the validity of the pre-trial order, Lilia asked the respondent court for an opportunity to present evidence(1) that the first marriage was vitiated by force exercised upon both her and the first husband; and (2) that the first husband was at the time of the marriage in 1972 already married to someone else. Respondent judge ruled against the presentation of evidence because the existence of force exerted on both parties of the first marriage had already been agreed upon. Hence, the present petition for certiorari assailing the following Orders of therespondent Judge(1) the Order dated March 17, 1980 in which the parties were compelled to submit the case for resolution based on "agreed facts;" and (2) the Order dated April 14, 1980, denying petitioner's motion to allow her to present evidence in her favor. We find the petition devoid of merit. There is no need for petitioner to prove that her first marriage was vitiated by force committed against both parties because assuming this to be so, the marriage will not be void but merely viodable (Art. 85, Civil Code), and therefore valid until annulled. Since no annulment has yet been made, it is clear that

when she married respondent she was still validly married to her first husband, consequently, her marriage to respondent is VOID (Art. 80, Civil Code). There is likewise no need of introducing evidence about the existing prior marriage of her first husband at the time they married each other, for then such a marriage though void still needs according to this Court 1 a judicial declaration of such fact and for all legal intents and purposes she would still be regarded as a married woman at the time she contracted her marriage with respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel); accordingly, the marriage of petitioner and respondent would be regarded VOID under the law. WHEREFORE, this petition is hereby DISMISSED, for lack of merit, and the Orders complained of are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED. Feria (Chairman), Fernan Alampay and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.

Footnotes 1 Vda. de Consuegra vs. GSIS, 37 SCRA 315. 46. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC

A.C. No. 4431 June 19, 1997 PRISCILLA CASTILLO VDA. DE MIJARES, complainant, vs. JUSTICE ONOFRE A. VILLALUZ (Retired), respondent.

REGALADO, J.: Doubly distressing as the subject of administrative recourse to this Court is the present case where the cause celebre is a star-crossed marriage, and the unlikely protagonists are an incumbent and a retired member of the Judiciary. In a sworn complaint for disbarment filed with this Court on June 6, 1995, complainant Judge Priscilla Castillo Vda. de Mijares charged respondent Onofre A. Villaluz, a retired Justice of the Court of Appeals, 1 with gross immorality and grave misconduct. After an answer and a reply were respectively filed by respondent and complainant, the Court, in its Resolution dated February 27, 1996, resolved to refer the administrative case to Associate Justice Fidel P. Purisima of the Court of Appeals for investigation, report and recommendation.
2 3

On March 4, 1997, Justice Purisima submitted his Report to this Court, with the following recommendation: WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing and without prejudice to the outcome of the aforesaid Criminal Case No. 142481 for Bigamy, it is respectfully recommended that the respondent, former Justice Onofre A. Villaluz, be found guilty of gross misconduct, within the contemplation of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court on removal or suspension of attorneys, and therefor(e), he be suspended from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years, commencing from the finality of the Decision in this case, with a warning that a repetition of the same or any other misconduct will be dealt with more severely. On the bases of the evidence adduced by the parties, Justice Purisima summarized the antecedent facts in his aforestated Report and which we feel should be reproduced hereunder so that his disposition of this case may be duly appreciated: Complainant is the Presiding Judge of Branch 108 of the Regional Trial Court, Pasay City, while respondent former Justice Onofre A. Villaluz is a consultant at the Presidential Anti Crime Commission (PACC) headed by Vice-President Joseph E. Estrada. Widowed by the death of her first husband, Primitivo Mijares, complainant commenced Special Proceeding No. 90-54650 and therein obtained a decree declaring the said Primitivo Mijares presumptively dead, after an absence of sixteen (16) years. Complainant narrated that on January 7, 1994, she got married to respondent in a civil wedding before Judge Myrna Lim Verano, then Presiding Judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Carmona, Cavite and now Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Mandaluyong City. Their marriage was the culmination of a long engagement. They met sometime in 1977, when respondent, as Presiding Judge of the Criminal Circuit Court in Pasig, Metro Manila, was trying a murder case involving the death of a son of Judge Mijares. Since then, respondent became a close family friend of complainant (TSN, p. 14; April 10, 1996). After the wedding, they received their guests at a German restaurant in Makati. With the reception over, the newlywed(s) resumed their usual work and activities. At 6:00 o'clock in the afternoon of the same day, respondent fetched complainant from her house in Project 8, Quezon City, and reached the condominium unit of respondent two hours later at which time, she answered the phone. At the other end of the line was a woman offending her with insulting remarks. Consternated, complainant confronted respondent on the identity of such caller but respondent simply remarked "it would have been just a call at the wrong number". What followed was a heated exchange of harsh words, one word led to another, to a point when respondent called complainant a "nagger", saying "Ayaw ko nang ganyan! Ang gusto ko sa babae, yong sumusunod sa bawa't gusto ko". Get that marriage contract and have it burned." Such unbearable utterances of respondent left complainant no choice but to leave in haste the place of their would-be honeymoon. Since then, the complainant and respondent have been living separately because as complainant rationalized, contrary to her expectation respondent never got in touch with her and did not even bother to apologize for what happened (TSN, p. 13, April 10, 1996. Several months after that fateful encounter of January 7, 1994, in a Bible Study session, the complainant learned from Manila RTC Judge Ramon Makasiar, a member of the Bible Group, that he (Judge Makasiar) solemnized the marriage between former Justice Onofre A. Villaluz and a certain Lydia Geraldez. Infuriated and impelled by the disheartening news, complainant lost no time in gathering evidence against respondent, such that, on June 6, 1995 she filed the instant Complaint for Disbarment against him (Exh. "A").

On August 7, 1995, when she discovered another incriminatory document against respondent, the complainant executed against respondent her "Supplemental Complaint Affidavit for Falsification" (Exhs. "D" and "D-1"). Exhibit "C", marriage contract of respondent and Lydia Geraldez, dated May 10, 1994, was offered by complainant to prove that respondent immorally and bigamously entered into a marriage, and to show that the respondent distorted the truth by stating his civil status as SINGLE, when her married Lydia Geraldez. This, the respondent did, to lead an immoral and indiscreet life. He resorted to falsification to distort the truth, complainant lamented. Also presented for complainant were: Marriage Contract between her and respondent (Exh. "B"); Order declaring her first husband, Primitivo Mijares, presumptively dead (Exh. "E"); and Affidavit of Judge Myrna Lim Verano, who solemnized the marriage between her (complainant) and respondent (Exhs. "F" and "F-1"). Respondent gave a different version. According to him, what he inked with the complainant on January 7, 1994 was merely but a "sham marriage". He explained that he agreed as, in fact, he voluntarily signed the Marriage Contract marked Exh. "B", in an effort to help Judge Mijares in the administrative case for immorality filed against her by her Legal Researcher, Atty. Joseph Gregorio Naval, Jr., sometime in 1993. Respondent theorized that when his marriage with complainant took place before Judge Myrna Lim Verano, his marriage with Librada Pea, his first wife, was subsisting because the Decision declaring the annulment of such marriage had not yet become final and executory, for the reason that said Decision was not yet published as required by the Rules, the service of summons upon Librada Pea having been made by publication, and subject Decision was not yet published. To this effect was the Certification by Mrs. Nelia B. Rosario, Acting Branch Clerk of Court of Branch 37 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Exh. "4"). After a thorough review of the records, the Court finds itself in full accord with the findings and recommendation of Justice Purisima. Herein respondent is undeniably guilty of deceit and grossly immoral conduct. He has made a mockery of marriage which is a sacred institution of demanding respect 4 and dignity. He himself asserts that at the time of his marriage to herein complainant, the decision of the court annulling his marriage to his first wife, Librada Pea, had not yet attained finality. Worse, four months after his marriage to petitioner, respondent married another woman, Lydia Geraldez, in Cavite, after making a false statement in his application for marriage license that his previous marriage had been annulled. Respondent's subterfuge that his marriage to petitioner was just a "sham" marriage will not justify his actuations. Even if the said marriage was just a caper of levity in bad taste, a defense which amazes and befuddles but does not convince, it does not speak well of respondent's sense of social propriety and moral values. This is aggravated by the fact that he is not a layman nor even just an ordinary lawyer, but a former Judge of the Circuit Criminal Court and, thereafter, a Justice of the Court of Appeals who cannot but have been fully aware of the consequences of a marriage celebrated with all the necessary legal 5 requisites. On this score, we rely once again on the perceptive findings and discussion of Investigating Justice Purisima which we quote with approval: That, on January 7, 1994 respondent knowingly and voluntarily entered into and signed a Marriage Contract with complainant before Judge Myrna Lim Verano, then Presiding Judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Carmona, Cavite, competent under the law to solemnize a civil marriage, is beyond cavil. As stated under oath by respondent himself, he could not be forced to do anything not of his liking (TSN, April 2, 1996, p. 15a).

That what complainant and respondent contracted was a valid marriage is borne out by law and the evidence. To be sure, all the essential and formal requisites of a valid marriage under Articles 2 and 3 of the Family Code, i.e., legal capacity of the contracting parties, who must be a male and a female; consent freely given in the presence of the solemnizing officer; authority of the solemnizing officer; a valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of Title I on marriage, Family Code; and a marriage ceremony with the appearance of the contracting parties before the solemnizing officer, and their personal declaration that they take each other as husband and wife, in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age, were satisfied and complied with. The theory of respondent that what (was) solemnized with complainant was nothing but a "sham" marriage is too incredible to deserve serious consideration. According to respondent, he entered into subject marriage in an effort to save the complainant from the charge of immorality against her. But, to repeat: regardless of the intention of respondent in saying "I do" with complainant before a competent authority, all ingredients of a valid marriage were present. His consent thereto was freely given. Judge Myrna Lim Verano was authorized by law to solemnize the civil marriage, and both contracting parties had the legal capacity to contract such marriage. Without in anyway pre-empting whatever the Regional Trial Court of Manila will find in the criminal case of Bigamy against herein respondent, and even assuming for the sake of argument that the judgment in Civil Case No. 93-67048 decreeing the annulment of the marriage between respondent and Librada Pena had not attained complete finality due to non publication of said judgment in a newspaper of general circulation; that circumstance, alone, only made subject marriage voidable and did not necessarily render the marriage between complainant and respondent void. Besides, as stressed upon by complainant, respondent stated under oath that his marriage with Librada Pena had been annulled by a decree of annulment, when he (respondent) took Lydia Geraldez as his wife by third marriage, and therefore, he is precluded, by the principle of estoppel, from claiming that when he took herein complainant as his wife by a second marriage, his first marriage with Librada Pea was subsisting and unannulled. But, anyway, as it is not proper to make here a definitive findings as to whether or not respondent can be adjudged guilty of bigamy under the attendant facts and circumstances, a crucial issue pending determination in Criminal Case No. 142481 before Branch 12 of the Manila Regional Trial Court, even assuming arguendo that what respondent contracted with complainant on January 7, 1994 was a "sham" marriage, as he terms it, the ineluctible conclusion is that what respondent perpetrated was a gross misconduct on his part as a member of the Philippine Bar and as former appellate Justice, at that. Even granting that the immorality charge against herein complainant in the administrative case instituted against her by Atty. Joseph Gregorio Naval, Jr., is unfounded, respondent was not justified in resorting to a "sham" marriage to protect her (complainant) from said immorality charge. Being a lawyer, the respondent is surely conversant with the legal maxim that a wrong cannot be righted by another wrong. If he never had any immoral love affair with Judge Priscilla Castillo Vda. de Mijares and therefore, he felt duty bound to help her in ventilating the whole truth and nothing but the truth, respondent could have testified in her favor in said administrative case, to assure all and sundry that what Atty. Joseph Gregorio Naval, Jr. complained of in said administrative case was without any factual and legal basis. In this only Christian country of the Far East, society cherishes and protects the sanctity of marriage and the family as a social institution. Consequently, no one can make a mockery thereof and perform a sham marriage with impunity. To make fun of and take lightly the sacredness of marriage is to court the wrath of the Creator and mankind. Therefore, the defense of respondent that what was entered into by him and complainant on January 7, 1994 was nothing but a "sham" marriage is unavailing to shield or absolve him from liability for his gross misconduct, nay sacrilege.

From the foregoing, it is evident that respondent dismally fails to meet the standard of moral fitness for continued membership in the legal profession. The nature of the office of an attorney at law requires that he shall be a person of good moral character. This qualification is not only a condition precedent for admission to the practice of law; its continued possession is also essential for remaining in the practice of 6 law. Under Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. The commission of grossly immoral conduct and deceit are 7 grounds for suspension or disbarment of lawyers. However, considering that respondent is in the declining years of his life; that his impulsive conduct during some episodes of the investigation reveal a degree of aberrant reactive behavior probably ascribable to advanced age; and the undeniable fact that he has rendered some years of commendable service in the Judiciary, the Court feels that disbarment would be too harsh a penalty in this peculiar case. Hence, a suspension of two years, as recommended, would suffice as a punitive but compassionate disciplinary measure. WHEREFORE, finding herein respondent, former Justice Onofre A. Villaluz, GUILTY of immoral conduct in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility, he is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years effective upon notice hereof, with the specific WARNING that a more severe penalty shall be imposed should he commit the same or a similar offense hereafter. SO ORDERED. Padilla, Davide, Jr., Romero, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Hermosisima, Jr., Panganiban and Torres, Jr., J.J., concur. Narvasa, C.J., took no part. Bellosillo and Francisco, JJ., are on leave. Footnotes 1 Rollo, 1-2. 2 Ibid., 15-16. 3 Ibid., 19-20. 4 Pangan v. Ramos, Adm. Case No. 1053, August 31, 1981, 107 SCRA 1. 5 See Pomperada vs. Jochico, Bar Matter No. 68, November 21, 1984, 133 SCRA 309. 6 People vs. Tuanda, Adm. Case No. 3360, January 30, 1990, 181 SCRA 682. 7 Section 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court.

47. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila FIRST DIVISION

A.M. No. MTJ-02-1390 April 11, 2002 (Formerly IPI No. 01-1049-MTJ) MERCEDITA MATA ARAES, petitioner, vs. JUDGE SALVADOR M. OCCIANO, respondent. PUNO, J.: Petitioner Mercedita Mata Araes charges respondent judge with Gross Ignorance of the Law via a sworn Letter-Complaint dated 23 May 2001. Respondent is the Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur. Petitioner alleges that on 17 February 2000, respondent judge solemnized her marriage to her late groom Dominador B. Orobia without the requisite marriage license and at Nabua, Camarines Sur which is outside his territorial jurisdiction. They lived together as husband and wife on the strength of this marriage until her husband passed away. However, since the marriage was a nullity, petitioner's right to inherit the "vast properties" left by Orobia was not recognized. She was likewise deprived of receiving the pensions of Orobia, a retired Commodore of the Philippine Navy.1wphi1.nt Petitioner prays that sanctions be imposed against respondent judge for his illegal acts and unethical misrepresentations which allegedly caused her so much hardships, embarrassment and sufferings. On 28 May 2001, the case was referred by the Office of the Chief Justice to then Acting Court Administrator Zenaida N. Elepao for appropriate action. On 8 June 2001, the Office of the Court Administrator required respondent judge to comment. In his Comment dated 5 July 2001, respondent judge averred that he was requested by a certain Juan Arroyo on 15 February 2000 to solemnize the marriage of the parties on 17 February 2000. Having been assured that all the documents to the marriage were complete, he agreed to solemnize the marriage in his sala at the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur. However, on 17 February 2000, Arroyo informed him that Orobia had a difficulty walking and could not stand the rigors of travelling to Balatan which is located almost 25 kilometers from his residence in Nabua. Arroyo then requested if respondent judge could solemnize the marriage in Nabua, to which request he acceded. Respondent judge further avers that before he started the ceremony, he carefully examined the documents submitted to him by petitioner. When he discovered that the parties did not possess the requisite marriage license, he refused to solemnize the marriage and suggested its resetting to another date. However, due to the earnest pleas of the parties, the influx of visitors, and the delivery of provisions for the occasion, he proceeded to solemnize the marriage out of human compassion. He also feared that if he reset the wedding, it might aggravate the physical condition of Orobia who just suffered from a stroke. After the solemnization, he reiterated the necessity for the marriage license and admonished the parties that their failure to give it would render the marriage void. Petitioner and Orobia assured respondent judge that they would give the license to him in the afternoon of that same day. When they failed to comply, respondent judge followed it up with Arroyo but the latter only gave him the same reassurance that the marriage license would be delivered to his sala at the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur. Respondent judge vigorously denies that he told the contracting parties that their marriage is valid despite the absence of a marriage license. He attributes the hardships and embarrassment suffered by the petitioner as due to her own fault and negligence. On 12 September 2001, petitioner filed her Affidavit of Desistance dated 28 August 2001 with the Office of the Court Administrator. She attested that respondent judge initially refused to solemnize her marriage

due to the want of a duly issued marriage license and that it was because of her prodding and reassurances that he eventually solemnized the same. She confessed that she filed this administrative case out of rage. However, after reading the Comment filed by respondent judge, she realized her own shortcomings and is now bothered by her conscience. Reviewing the records of the case, it appears that petitioner and Orobia filed their Application for Marriage License on 5 January 2000. It was stamped in this Application that the marriage license shall be issued on 17 January 2000. However, neither petitioner nor Orobia claimed it. It also appears that the Office of the Civil Registrar General issued a Certification that it has no record of such marriage that allegedly took place on 17 February 2000. Likewise, the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Nabua, Camarines Sur issued another Certification dated 7 May 2001 that it cannot issue a true copy of the Marriage Contract of the parties since it has no record of their marriage. On 8 May 2001, petitioner sought the assistance of respondent judge so the latter could communicate with the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Nabua, Camarines Sur for the issuance of her marriage license. Respondent judge wrote the Local Civil Registrar of Nabua, Camarines Sur. In a letter dated 9 May 2001, a Clerk of said office, Grace T. Escobal, informed respondent judge that their office cannot issue the marriage license due to the failure of Orobia to submit the Death Certificate of his previous spouse. The Office of the Court Administrator, in its Report and Recommendation dated 15 November 2000, found the respondent judge guilty of solemnizing a marriage without a duly issued marriage license and for doing so outside his territorial jurisdiction. A fine of P5,000.00 was recommended to be imposed on respondent judge. We agree. Under the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, or B.P. 129, the authority of the regional trial court judges and judges of inferior courts to solemnize marriages is confined to their territorial jurisdiction as defined by the Supreme Court.1wphi1.nt The case at bar is not without precedent. In Navarro vs. Domagtoy, respondent judge held office and had jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta. Monica-Burgos, Surigao del Norte. However, he solemnized a wedding at his residence in the municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte which did not fall within the jurisdictional area of the municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos. We held that: "A priest who is commissioned and allowed by his local ordinance to marry the faithful is authorized to do so only within the area or diocese or place allowed by his Bishop. An appellate court Justice or a Justice of this Court has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines to solemnize marriages, regardless of the venue, as long as the requisites of the law are complied with. However, judges who are appointed to specific jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings only within said areas and not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his court's jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it may not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject 2 the officiating official to administrative liability." (Emphasis supplied.) In said case, we suspended respondent judge for six (6) months on the ground that his act of solemnizing a marriage outside his jurisdiction constitutes gross ignorance of the law. We further held that: "The judiciary should be composed of persons who, if not experts, are at least, proficient in the law they are sworn to apply, more than the ordinary laymen. They should be skilled and competent in understanding and applying the law. It is imperative that they be conversant with basic legal principles like the ones involved in the instant case. x x x While magistrates may at
1

times make mistakes in judgment, for which they are not penalized, the respondent judge exhibited ignorance of elementary provisions of law, in an area which has greatly prejudiced the 3 status of married persons." In the case at bar, the territorial jurisdiction of respondent judge is limited to the municipality of Balatan, Camarines Sur. His act of solemnizing the marriage of petitioner and Orobia in Nabua, Camarines Sur therefore is contrary to law and subjects him to administrative liability. His act may not amount to gross ignorance of the law for he allegedly solemnized the marriage out of human compassion but nonetheless, he cannot avoid liability for violating the law on marriage. Respondent judge should also be faulted for solemnizing a marriage without the requisite marriage 4 license. InPeople vs. Lara, we held that a marriage which preceded the issuance of the marriage license is void, and that the subsequent issuance of such license cannot render valid or even add an iota of validity to the marriage. Except in cases provided by law, it is the marriage license that gives the solemnizing officer the authority to solemnize a marriage. Respondent judge did not possess such authority when he solemnized the marriage of petitioner. In this respect, respondent judge acted in gross ignorance of the law.1wphi1.nt Respondent judge cannot be exculpated despite the Affidavit of Desistance filed by petitioner. This Court has consistently held in a catena of cases that the withdrawal of the complaint does not necessarily have the legal effect of exonerating respondent from disciplinary action. Otherwise, the prompt and fair 5 administration of justice, as well as the discipline of court personnel, would be undermined. Disciplinary actions of this nature do not involve purely private or personal matters. They can not be made to depend upon the will of every complainant who may, for one reason or another, condone a detestable act. We cannot be bound by the unilateral act of a complainant in a matter which involves the Court's constitutional power to discipline judges. Otherwise, that power may be put to naught, undermine the trust 6 character of a public office and impair the integrity and dignity of this Court as a disciplining authority. WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Salvador M. Occiano, Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur, is fined P5,000.00 pesos with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar offense in the future will be dealt with more severely. SO ORDERED. Davide, Jr., Kapunan, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1

259 SCRA 129 (1996). Id., pp. 135-136. Id., p. 136. C.A. O.G. 4079. Farrales vs. Camarista, 327 SCRA 84 (2000). Sandoval vs. Manalo, 260 SCRA 611 (1996).

48. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 103047 September 2, 1994 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND ANGELINA M. CASTRO, respondents. Parungao, Abesamis, Eleazar & Pulgar Law Offices for private respondent.

PUNO, J.: The case at bench originated from a petition filed by private respondent Angelina M. Castro in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City seeking a judicial declaration of nullity of her marriage to Edwin F. 1 Cardenas. As ground therefor, Castro claims that no marriage license was ever issued to them prior to the solemnization of their marriage. Despite notice, defendant Edwin F. Cardenas failed to file his answer. Consequently, he was declared in default. Trial proceeded in his absence. The controlling facts are undisputed: On June 24, 1970, Angelina M. Castro and Edwin F. Cardenas were married in a civil ceremony performed by Judge Pablo M. Malvar, City Court Judge of Pasay City. The marriage was celebrated without the knowledge of Castro's parents. Defendant Cardenas personally attended to the processing of the documents required for the celebration of the marriage, including the procurement of the marriage, license. In fact, the marriage contract itself states that marriage license no. 3196182 was issued in the name of the contracting parties on June 24, 1970 in Pasig, Metro Manila. The couple did not immediately live together as husband and wife since the marriage was unknown to Castro's parents. Thus, it was only in March 1971, when Castro discovered she was pregnant, that the couple decided to live together. However, their cohabitation lasted only for four (4) months. Thereafter, the couple parted ways. On October 19, 1971, Castro gave birth. The baby was adopted by Castro's brother, with the consent of Cardenas. The baby is now in the United States. Desiring to follow her daughter, Castro wanted to put in order her marital status before leaving for the States. She thus consulted a lawyer, Atty. Frumencio E. Pulgar, regarding the possible annulment of her marriage. Through her lawyer's efforts, they discovered that there was no marriage license issued to Cardenas prior to the celebration of their marriage. As proof, Angelina Castro offered in evidence a certification from the Civil Register of Pasig, Metro Manila. It reads: February 20, 1987

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN: This is to certify that the names EDWIN F. CARDENAS and ANGELINA M. CASTRO who were allegedly married in the Pasay City Court on June 21, 1970 under an alleged (s)upportive marriage license no. 3196182 allegedly issued in the municipality on June 20, 1970 cannot be located as said license no. 3196182 does not appear from our records. Issued upon request of Mr. Ed Atanacio. Castro testified that she did not go to the civil registrar of Pasig on or before June 24, 1970 in order to apply for a license. Neither did she sign any application therefor. She affixed her signature only on the marriage contract on June 24, 1970 in Pasay City. The trial court denied the petition. It held that the above certification was inadequate to establish the alleged non-issuance of a marriage license prior to the celebration of the marriage between the parties. It ruled that the "inability of the certifying official to locate the marriage license is not conclusive to show that there was no marriage license issued." Unsatisfied with the decision, Castro appealed to respondent appellate court. She insisted that the certification from the local civil registrar sufficiently established the absence of a marriage license. As stated earlier, respondent appellate court reversed the Decision of the trial court. It declared the marriage between the contracting parties null and void and directed the Civil Registrar of Pasig to cancel the subject marriage contract. Hence this petition for review on certiorari. Petitioner Republic of the Philippines urges that respondent appellate court erred when it ruled that the certification issued by the civil registrar that marriage license no. 3196182 was not in their record adequately proved that no such license was ever issued. Petitioner also faults the respondent court for relying on the self-serving and uncorroborated testimony of private respondent Castro that she had no part in the procurement of the subject marriage license. Petitioner thus insists that the certification and the uncorroborated testimony of private respondent are insufficient to overthrow the legal presumption regarding the validity of a marriage. Petitioner also points that in declaring the marriage between the parties as null and void, respondent appellate court disregarded the presumption that the solemnizing officer, Judge Pablo M. Malvar, regularly performed his duties when he attested in the marriage contract that marriage license no. 3196182 was duly presented to him before the solemnization of the subject marriage. The issues, being interrelated, shall be discussed jointly. The core issue presented by the case at bench is whether or not the documentary and testimonial evidence presented by private respondent are sufficient to establish that no marriage license was issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig prior to the celebration of the marriage of private respondent to Edwin F. Cardenas. We affirm the impugned Decision. At the time the subject marriage was solemnized on June 24, 1970, the law governing marital relations 4 was the New Civil Code. The law provides that no marriage shall be solemnized without a marriage
3 2

license first issued by a local civil registrar. Being one of the essential requisites of a valid marriage, 5 absence of a license would render the marriage void ab initio. Petitioner posits that the certification of the local civil registrar of due search and inability to find a record or entry to the effect that marriage license no. 3196182 was issued to the parties is not adequate to prove its non-issuance. We hold otherwise. The presentation of such certification in court is sanctioned by Section 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, viz.: Sec. 29. Proof of lack of record. A written statement signed by an officer having custody of an official record or by his deputy, that after diligent search, no record or entry of a specified tenor is found to exist in the records of his office, accompanied by a certificate as above provided, is admissible as evidence that the records of his office contain no such record or entry. The above Rule authorized the custodian of documents to certify that despite diligent search, a particular document does not exist in his office or that a particular entry of a specified tenor was not to be found in a register. As custodians of public documents, civil registrars are public officers charged with the duty, inter alia, of maintaining a register book where they are required to enter all applications for marriage licenses, including the names of the applicants, the date the marriage license was issued and such other relevant 6 data. The certification of "due search and inability to find" issued by the civil registrar of Pasig enjoys probative value, he being the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license. Unaccompanied by any circumstance of suspicion and pursuant to Section 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, a certificate of "due search and inability to find" sufficiently proved that his office did not issue marriage license no. 3196182 to the contracting parties. The fact that private respondent Castro offered only her testimony in support of her petition is, in itself, not a ground to deny her petition. The failure to offer any other witness to corroborate her testimony is mainly due to the peculiar circumstances of the case. It will be remembered that the subject marriage was a civil ceremony performed by a judge of a city court. The subject marriage is one of those commonly known as a "secret marriage" a legally non-existent phrase but ordinarily used to refer to a civil marriage celebrated without the knowledge of the relatives and/or friends of either or both of the contracting parties. The records show that the marriage between Castro and Cardenas was initially unknown to the parents of the former. Surely, the fact that only private respondent Castro testified during the trial cannot be held against her. Her husband, Edwin F. Cardenas, was duly served with notice of the proceedings and a copy of the petition. Despite receipt thereof, he chose to ignore the same. For failure to answer, he was properly declared in default. Private respondent cannot be faulted for her husband's lack of interest to participate in the proceedings. There was absolutely no evidence on record to show that there was collusion between private respondent and her husband Cardenas. It is noteworthy to mention that the finding of the appellate court that the marriage between the contracting parties is null and void for lack of a marriage license does not discount the fact that indeed, a spurious marriage license, purporting to be issued by the civil registrar of Pasig, may have been presented by Cardenas to the solemnizing officer. In fine, we hold that, under the circumstances of the case, the documentary and testimonial evidence presented by private respondent Castro sufficiently established the absence of the subject marriage license.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED there being no showing of any reversible error committed by respondent appellate court. SO ORDERED. Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

#Footnotes

1 Filed on February 19, 1987 and docketed as Civil Case No. Q-50117. 2 Decision dated June 30, 1987, issued by Presiding Judge Antonio P. Solano, Quezon City RTC, Branch LXXXVI; Rollo, pp. 46-48. 3 Sixteenth Division, penned by Mr. Justice Justo P. Torres, with Mr. Justices Ricardo J. Francisco and Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, concurring; Decision dated November 27, 1991, Rollo, pp. 38-42. 4 Articles 53 (4) and 58, New Civil Code. 5 Article 80 (3), New Civil Code. 6 Article 70, New Civil Code. 49. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila FIRST DIVISION G.R. No. 167684 July 31, 2006

JAIME O.SEVILLA, petitioner, vs. CARMELITA N. CARDENAS, respondent. DECISION CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks the reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA2 G.R. CV No. 74416 dated 20 December 2004 which set aside the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, in Civil Case No. 94-1285 dated 25 January 2002. In a Complaint dated 28 March 1994 filed by Jaime O. Sevilla before the RTC, he claimed that on 19 May 1969, through machinations, duress and intimidation employed upon him by Carmelita N. Cardenas and the latter's father, retired Colonel Jose Cardenas of the Armed forces of the Philippines, he and Carmelita went to the City Hall of Manila and they were introduced to a certain Reverend Cirilo D. Gonzales, a supposed Minister of the Gospel. On the said date, the father of Carmelita caused him and Carmelita to sign a marriage contract before the said Minister of the Gospel. According to Jaime, he
3 1

never applied for a marriage license for his supposed marriage to Carmelita and never did they obtain any marriage license from any Civil Registry, consequently, no marriage license was presented to the solemnizing officer. For her part, Carmelita refuted these allegations of Jaime, and claims that she and Jaime were married 4 5 civilly on 19 May 1969, and in a church ceremony thereafter on 31 May 1969 at the Most Holy Redeemer Parish in Quezon City. Both marriages were registered with the local civil registry of Manila and the National Statistics Office. He is estopped from invoking the lack of marriage license after having been married to her for 25 years. The trial court made the following findings: In support of his complaint, plaintiff [Jaime] testified that on May 19, 1969, he and defendant [Carmelita] appeared before a certain Rev. Cirilo D. Gonzales, a Minister of the Gospel, at the city hall in Manila where they executed a Marriage Contract (Exh. "A") in civil rites. A certain Godofredo Occena who, plaintiff alleged, was an aide of defendant's father accompanied them, and who, together with another person, stood as witness to the civil wedding. That although marriage license no. 2770792 allegedly issued in San Juan, Rizal on May 19, 1969 was indicated in the marriage contract, the same was fictitious for he never applied for any marriage license, (Ibid., p. 11). Upon verifications made by him through his lawyer, Atty. Jose M. Abola, with the Civil Registry of San Juan, a Certification dated March 11, 1994 (Exh. "E") was issued by Rafael D. Aliscad, Jr., Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, that "no marriage license no. 2770792 was ever issued by said office." On May 31, 1969, he and defendant were again wed, this time in church rites, before Monsignor Juan Velasco at the Most Holy Redeemer Parish Church in Brixton Hills, Quezon City, where they executed another marriage contract (Exh. "F") with the same marriage license no. 2770792 used and indicated. Preparations and expenses for the church wedding and reception were jointly shared by his and defendant's parents. After the church wedding, he and defendant resided in his house at Brixton Hills until their first son, Jose Gabriel, was born in March 1970. As his parents continued to support him financially, he and defendant lived in Spain for some time, for his medical studies. Eventually, their marital relationship turned bad because it became difficult for him to be married he being a medical student at that time. They started living apart in 1976, but they underwent family counseling before they eventually separated in 1978. It was during this time when defendant's second son was born whose paternity plaintiff questioned. Plaintiff obtained a divorce decree against defendant in the United States in 1981 and later secured a judicial separation of their conjugal partnership in 1983. Atty. Jose M. Abola, then counsel for the plaintiff, himself manifested that when his service was engaged by plaintiff, and after the latter narrated to him the circumstances of his marriage, he made inquiries with the Office of Civil Registry of San Juan where the supposed marriage license was obtained and with the Church of the Most Holy Redeemer Parish where the religious wedding ceremony was celebrated. His request letters dated March 3, 1994 (Exh. "J"), March 7, 1994 (Exh. "L"), March 9, 1994 (Exh. "M") and March 11, 1994 (Exh. "K") were all sent to and received by the Civil Registrar of San Juan, who in reply thereto, issued Certifications dated March 4, 1994 (Exh. "I"), and March 11, 1994 (Exh. "E") and September 20, 1994 (Exh. "C"), that "no marriage license no. 2770792 was ever issued by that office." Upon his inquiry, the Holy Redeemer Parish Church issued him a certified copy of the marriage contract of plaintiff and defendant (Exh. "F") and a Certificate of Marriage dated April 11, 1994 (Exh. "G"), wherein it noted that it was a "purely religious ceremony, having been civilly married on May 19, 1969 at the City Hall, Manila, under Marriage License No. 2770792 issued at San Juan, Rizal on May 19, 1969." Perlita Mercader, Registration Officer III of the Local Registry of San Juan, identified the Certificates dated March 4, 1994, March 11, 1994 and September 20, 1994 issued by Rafael Aliscad, Jr., the Local Civil Registrar, and testified that their office failed to locate the book wherein marriage license no. 2770792 may have been registered (TSN, 8-6-96, p. 5).

Defendant Carmelita Cardenas testified that she and plaintiff had a steady romantic relationship after they met and were introduced to each other in October 1968. A model, she was compelled by her family to join the Mutya ng Pilipinas beauty pageant when plaintiff who was afraid to lose her, asked her to run away with him to Baguio. Because she loved plaintiff, she turned back on her family and decided to follow plaintiff in Baguio. When they came back to Manila, she and plaintiff proceeded to the latter's home in Brixton Hills where plaintiff's mother, Mrs. Sevilla, told her not to worry. Her parents were hostile when they learned of the elopement, but Mrs. Sevilla convinced them that she will take care of everything, and promised to support plaintiff and defendant. As plaintiff was still fearful he may lose her, he asked her to marry him in civil rites, without the knowledge of her family, more so her father (TSN, 5-28-98, p. 4) on May 19, 1969, before a minister and where she was made to sign documents. After the civil wedding, they had lunch and later each went home separately. On May 31, 1969, they had the church wedding, which the Sevilla family alone prepared and arranged, since defendant's mother just came from hospital. Her family did not participate in the wedding preparations. Defendant further stated that there was no sexual consummation during their honeymoon and that it was after two months when they finally had sex. She learned from Dr. Escudero, plaintiff's physician and one of their wedding sponsors that plaintiff was undergoing psychiatric therapy since age 12 (TSN, 11-2-98, p. 15) for some traumatic problem compounded by his drug habit. She found out plaintiff has unusual sexual behavior by his obsession over her knees of which he would take endless pictures of. Moreover, plaintiff preferred to have sex with her in between the knees which she called "intrafemural sex," while real sex between them was far and between like 8 months, hence, abnormal. During their marriage, plaintiff exhibited weird sexual behavior which defendant attributed to plaintiff's drug addiction (TSN, 11-5-98, pp. 5-8). A compulsive liar, plaintiff has a bad temper who breaks things when he had tantrums. Plaintiff took drugs like amphetamines, benzedrine and the like, "speed" drugs that kept him from sleep and then would take barbiturates or downers, like "mogadon." Defendant tried very hard to keep plaintiff away from drugs but failed as it has become a habit to him. They had no fixed home since they often moved and partly lived in Spain for about four and a half years, and during all those times, her mother-in-law would send some financial support on and off, while defendant worked as an English teacher. Plaintiff, who was supposed to be studying, did nothing. Their marriage became unbearable, as plaintiff physically and verbally abused her, and this led to a break up in their marriage. Later, she learned that plaintiff married one Angela Garcia in 1991 in the United States. Jose Cardenas, father of defendant, testified that he was not aware of the civil wedding of his daughter with the plaintiff; that his daughter and grandson came to stay with him after they returned home from Spain and have lived with him and his wife ever since. His grandsons practically grew up under his care and guidance, and he has supported his daughter's expenses for medicines and hospital confinements (Exhs. "9" and "10"). Victoria Cardenas Navarro, defendant's sister, testified and corroborated that it was plaintiff's family that attended to all the preparations and arrangements for the church wedding of her sister with plaintiff, and that she didn't know that the couple wed in civil rites some time prior to the church wedding. She also stated that she and her parents were still civil with the plaintiff inspite of the marital differences between plaintiff and defendant. As adverse witness for the defendant, plaintiff testified that because of irreconcilable differences with defendant and in order for them to live their own lives, they agreed to divorce each other; that when he applied for and obtained a divorce decree in the United States on June 14, 1983 (Exh. "13"), it was with the knowledge and consent of defendant who in fact authorized a certain Atty. Quisumbing to represent her (TSN, 12-7-2000, p. 21). During his adverse testimony, plaintiff identified a recent certification dated July 25, 2000 (Exh. "EE") issued by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, that the marriage license no. 2770792, the same marriage license appearing in the 6 marriage contract (Exh. "A"), is inexistent, thus appears to be fictitious.

In its Decision dated 25 January 2002, declaring the nullity of the marriage of the parties, the trial court made the following justifications: Thus, being one of the essential requisites for the validity of the marriage, the lack or absence of a license renders the marriage void ab initio. It was shown under the various certifications (Exhs. "I", "E", and "C") earlier issued by the office of the Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality of San Juan, and the more recent one issued on July 25, 2000 (Exh. "EE") that no marriage license no. 2770792 was ever issued by that office, hence, the marriage license no. 2770792 appearing on the marriage contracts executed on May 19, 1969 (Exh. "A") and on May 31, 1969 (Exh. "F") was fictitious. Such a certification enjoys probative value under the rules on evidence, particularly Section 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, x x x. xxxx WHEREFORE, the Court hereby declares the civil marriage between Jaime O. Sevilla and Carmelita N. Cardenas solemnized by Rev. Cirilo D. Gonzales at the Manila City Hall on May 19, 1969 as well as their contract of marriage solemnized under religious rites by Rev. Juan B. Velasco at the Holy Redeemer Parish on May 31, 1969, NULL and VOID for lack of the requisite marriage license. Let the marriage contract of the parties under Registry No. 601 (e-69) of the registry book of the Local Civil Registry of Manila be cancelled. Let copies of this Decision be duly recorded in the proper civil and property registries in accordance with Article 52 of the Family Code. Likewise, let a copy hereof be forwarded the 7 Office of the Solicitor General for its record and information. Carmelita filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. In a Decision dated 20 December 2004, the Court of Appeals disagreed with the trial court and held: In People v. De Guzman (G.R. No. 106025, February 9, 1994), the Supreme Court explained that: "The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty. The presumption, however, prevails until it is overcome by no less than clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. Thus, unless the presumption is rebutted, it becomes conclusive." In this case, We note that a certain Perlita Mercader of the local civil registry of San Juan testified that they "failed to locate the book wherein marriage license no. 2770792 is registered," for the reason that "the employee handling is already retired." With said testimony We cannot therefore just presume that the marriage license specified in the parties' marriage contract was not issued for in the end the failure of the office of the local civil registrar of San Juan to produce a copy of the marriage license was attributable not to the fact that no such marriage license was issued but rather, because it "failed to locate the book wherein marriage license no. 2770792 is registered." Simply put, if the pertinent book were available for scrutiny, there is a strong possibility that it would have contained an entry on marriage license no. 2720792. xxxx Indeed, this Court is not prepared to annul the parties' marriage on the basis of a mere perception of plaintiff that his union with defendant is defective with respect to an essential requisite of a 8 marriage contract, a perception that ultimately was not substantiated with facts on record. Jaime filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated 6 January 2005 which the Court of Appeals denied in a Resolution dated 6 April 2005.

This denial gave rise to the present Petition filed by Jaime. He raises the following issues for Resolution. 1. Whether or not a valid marriage license was issued in accordance with law to the parties herein prior to the celebration of the marriages in question; 2. Whether or not the Court of Appeals correctly applied and relied on the presumption of regularity of officials acts, particularly the issuance of a marriage license, arising solely from the contents of the marriage contracts in question which show on their face that a marriage license was purportedly issued by the Local Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila, and 3. Whether or not respondent could validly invoke/rely upon the presumption of validity of a 9 marriage arising from the admitted "fact of marriage." At the core of this controversy is the determination of whether or not the certifications from the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan stating that no Marriage License No. 2770792 as appearing in the marriage contract of the parties was issued, are sufficient to declare their marriage as null and void ab initio. We agree with the Court of Appeals and rule in the negative. Pertinent provisions of the Civil Code which was the law in force at the time of the marriage of the parties 10 11 12 are Articles 53, 58 and 80. Based on the foregoing provisions, a marriage license is an essential requisite for the validity of marriage. The marriage between Carmelita and Jaime is of no exception. At first glance, this case can very well be easily dismissed as one involving a marriage that is null and void on the ground of absence of a marriage license based on the certifications issued by the Local Civil 13 Registar of San Juan. As ruled by this Court in the case of Cario v. Cario : [A]s certified by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, their office has no record of such marriage license. In Republic v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that such a certification is adequate to prove the non-issuance of a marriage license. Absent any circumstance of suspicion, as in the present case, the certification issued by the local civil registrar enjoys probative value, he being the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all date relative to the issuance of a marriage license. Such being the case, the presumed validity of the marriage of petitioner and the deceased has been sufficiently overcome. It then became the burden of petitioner to prove that their marriage is valid and that they secured the required marriage license. Although she was declared in default before the trial court, petitioner could have squarely met the issue and explained the absence of a marriage license in her pleadings before the Court of Appeals and this Court. But petitioner conveniently avoided the issue and chose to refrain from pursuing an argument that will put her case in jeopardy. Hence, the presumed validity of their marriage cannot stand. It is beyond cavil, therefore, that the marriage between petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased, having been solemnized without the necessary marriage license, and not being one of the marriages exempt from the marriage license requirement, is undoubtedly void ab initio. The foregoing Decision giving probative value to the certifications issued by the Local Civil Registrar 14 should be read in line with the decision in the earlier case of Republic v. Court of Appeals, where it was held that:

The above Rule authorized the custodian of documents to certify that despite diligent search, a particular document does not exist in his office or that a particular entry of a specified tenor was not to be found in a register. As custodians of public documents, civil registrars are public officers charged with the duty, inter alia, of maintaining a register book where they are required to enter all applications for marriage licenses, including the names of the applicants, the date the marriage license was issued and such other relevant data. (Emphasis supplied.) Thus, the certification to be issued by the Local Civil Registrar must categorically state that the document does not exist in his office or the particular entry could not be found in the register despite diligent search. Such certification shall be sufficient proof of lack or absence of record as stated in Section 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court: SEC. 28. Proof of lack of record. a written statement signed by an officer having the custody of an official record or by his deputy that after diligent search, no record or entry of a specified tenor is found to exist in the records of his office, accompanied by a certificate as above provided, is admissible as evidence that the records of his office contain no such record or entry. We shall now proceed to scrutinize whether the certifications by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan in connection with Marriage License No. 2770792 complied with the foregoing requirements and deserved to be accorded probative value. The first Certification 1994. It reads:
15

issued by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, was dated 11 March

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN: No Marriage License Number 2770792 were (sic) ever issued by this Office. With regards (sic) to 16 Marriage License Number 2880792, we exert all effort but we cannot find the said number. Hope and understand our loaded work cannot give you our full force locating the above problem. San Juan, Metro Manila March 11, 1994 (SGD)RAFAEL D. ALISCAD, JR. Local Civil Registrar The second certification
17

was dated 20 September 1994 and provides:

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN: This is to certify that no marriage license Number 2770792 were ever issued by this Office with regards to Marriage License Number 2880792, we exert all effort but we cannot find the said number. Hope and understand our loaded work cannot give you our full force locating the above problem. San Juan, Metro Manila September 20, 1994

(SGD)RAFAEL D. ALISCAD, JR. Local Civil Registrar The third Certification,

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issued on 25 July 2000, states:

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN: This is to certify that according to the records of this office, no Marriage License Application was filed and no Marriage License No. 2770792 allegedly dated May 19, 1969 was issued by this Office to MR. JAIME O. SEVILLA and MS. CARMELITA CARDENAS-SEVILLA. This is to further certify that the said application and license do not exist in our Local Civil Registry Index and, therefore, appear to be fictitious. This certification is being issued upon the request of the interested party for whatever legal intent it may serve. San Juan, Metro Manila July 25, 2000 (SGD)RAFAEL D. ALISCAD, JR. Local Civil Registrar Note that the first two certifications bear the statement that "hope and understand our loaded work cannot give you our full force locating the above problem." It could be easily implied from the said statement that the Office of the Local Civil Registrar could not exert its best efforts to locate and determine the existence of Marriage License No. 2770792 due to its "loaded work." Likewise, both certifications failed to state with absolute certainty whether or not such license was issued. This implication is confirmed in the testimony of the representative from the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Ms. Perlita Mercader, who stated that they cannot locate the logbook due to the fact that the person in charge of the said logbook had already retired. Further, the testimony of the said person was not presented in evidence. It does not appear on record that the former custodian of the logbook was deceased or missing, or that his testimony could not be secured. This belies the claim that all efforts to locate the logbook or prove the material contents therein, had been exerted. As testified to by Perlita Mercader: Q Under the subpoena duces tecum, you were required to bring to this Court among other things the register of application of/or (sic) for marriage licenses received by the Office of the :Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Province of Rizal, from January 19, 1969 to May 1969. Did you bring with you those records? A I brought may 19, 1969, sir. Q Is that the book requested of you under no. 3 of the request for subpoena? A Meron pang January. I forgot, January . . .

Q Did you bring that with you? A No, sir. Q Why not? A I cannot locate the book. This is the only book. Q Will you please state if this is the register of marriage of marriage applications that your office maintains as required by the manual of the office of the Local Civil Registrar? COURT May I see that book and the portion marked by the witness. xxxx COURT Why don't you ask her direct question whether marriage license 2880792 is the number issued by their office while with respect to license no. 2770792 the office of the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan is very definite about it it was never issued. Then ask him how about no. 2880792 if the same was ever issued by their office. Did you ask this 2887092, but you could not find the record? But for the moment you cannot locate the books? Which is which now, was this issued or not? A The employee handling it is already retired, sir.
19

Given the documentary and testimonial evidence to the effect that utmost efforts were not exerted to locate the logbook where Marriage License No. 2770792 may have been entered, the presumption of regularity of performance of official function by the Local Civil Registrar in issuing the certifications, is effectively rebutted. According to Section 3(m), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed is among the disputable presumptions. In one case, it was held: A disputable presumption has been defined as a species of evidence that may be accepted and acted on where there is no other evidence to uphold the contention for which it stands, or one which may be overcome by other evidence. One such disputable/rebuttable presumption is that 21 an official act or duty has been regularly performed. x x x. The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or 22 failure to perform a duty. The presumption of regularity of performance of official duty is disputable and can be overcome by other evidence as in the case at bar where the presumption has been effectively defeated by the tenor of the first and second certifications. Moreover, the absence of the logbook is not conclusive proof of non-issuance of Marriage License No. 2770792. It can also mean, as we believed true in the case at bar, that the logbook just cannot be found.
20

In the absence of showing of diligent efforts to search for the said logbook, we cannot easily accept that absence of the same also means non-existence or falsity of entries therein. Finally, the rule is settled that every intendment of the law or fact leans toward the validity of the marriage, 23 the indissolubility of the marriage bonds. The courts look upon this presumption with great favor. It is not 24 to be lightly repelled; on the contrary, the presumption is of great weight. The Court is mindful of the policy of the 1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as the basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family. Thus, any doubt should 25 be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage. The parties have comported themselves as husband and wife and lived together for several years 26 producing two offsprings, now adults themselves. It took Jaime several years before he filed the petition 27 for declaration of nullity. Admittedly, he married another individual sometime in 1991. We are not ready to reward petitioner by declaring the nullity of his marriage and give him his freedom and in the process 28 allow him to profit from his own deceit and perfidy. Our Constitution is committed to the policy of strengthening the family as a basic social institution. Our family law is based on the policy that marriage is not a mere contract, but a social institution in which the State is vitally interested. The State can find no stronger anchor than on good, solid and happy families. The break-up of families weakens our social and moral fabric; hence, their preservation is not the concern 29 of the family members alone. "The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is x x x marriage. Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an institution in the maintenance of which the public is deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counterpresumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the common order of society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant violation of decency and of law. A presumption established by our Code of Civil Procedure is `that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract 30 of marriage.' Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio Always presume marriage." This jurisprudential attitude towards marriage is based on the prima facie presumption that a man and a 31 woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage. By our failure to come to the succor of Jaime, we are not trifling with his emotion or deepest sentiments. 32 As we have said in Carating-Siayngco v. Siayngco, regrettably, there are situations like this one, where neither law nor society can provide the specific answers to every individual problem. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 20 December 2004 and the Resolution dated 6 April 2005 are AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner. SO ORDERED. Panganiban, C.J., Ynares-Santiago, Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., J.J., concur.

Footnotes

Docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 74416, penned by Associate Justice Vicente S. E. Veloso with Associate Justices Roberto A. Barrios and Amelita G. Tolentino, concurring; Rollo, pp. 20-31.
2

Rollo, p. 46. Penned by Judge Zeus C. Abrogar. Records, Vol. I, pp. 1-4. Id. at 5. Id. at 232. Rollo, pp. 47-50. Id. at 50-52. Id. at 29-31. Id. at 80-81. ART. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are complied with: (1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties; (2) Their consent, freely given; (3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and (4) a marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character.

10

11

ART. 58. Save marriages of an exceptional character authorized in Chapter 2 of this Title, but not those under Article 75, no marriage shall be solemnized without a license first being issued by the local civil registrar of the municipality where either contracting party habitually resides.
12

ART. 80. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning: xxxx (3) Those solemnized without a marriage license, save marriages of exceptional charater.

13

G.R. No. 132529, 2 February 2001, 351 SCRA 127, 133-134. G.R. No. 103047, 2 September 1994, 236 SCRA 257, 262. Records, Vol. I, p. 103.

14

15

16

Atty. Josa Ma. Abola, counsel for Jaime Sevilla testified before the trial court that in his letter requesting for the issuance of a certification, addressed to the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, he mistakenly read the Marriage License No. as 2880792 instead of 2770792. (Records, Vol. II, pp. 725-726.)
17

Id. at 228.

18

Records, Vol. II, p. 888. Id. at 735-737. Rule 131. BURDEN OF PROOF AND PRESUMPTIONS xxxx SEC. 3. Disputable presumptions. The following presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence; xxxx (m) That official duty has been regularly performed;

19

20

21

People v. De Guzman, G.R. No. 106025, 9 February 1994, 229 SCRA 795, 798-799. Mabsucang v. Judge Balgos, 446 Phil. 217, 224 (2003). Article 220 Civil Code, Bobis v. Bobis, 391 Phil. 648, 655 (2000). Ricardo J. Francisco, BASIC EVIDENCE (2nd ed., 1999), p. 77. Republic v. Quintero-Hamano, G.R. No. 149498, 20 May 2004, 428 SCRA 735, 740. Records, Vol. II, p. 413, TSN, 11 April 1996. Id. at p. 414. Ty v. Court of Appeals, 399 Phil. 647, 663 (2000).

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

29

Tuason v. Court of Appeals, 326 Phil. 169, 180-181 (1996) cited in Ancheta v. Ancheta, G.R. No. 145370, 4 March 2004, 424 SCRA 725, 740.
30

Vda. de Jacob v. Court of Appeals, 371 Phil. 693, 709 (1999). Id. G.R. No. 158896, 27 October 2004, 441 SCRA 422, 439. 50. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila FIRST DIVISION

31

32

G.R. No. 133778

March 14, 2000

ENGRACE NIAL for Herself and as Guardian ad Litem of the minors BABYLINE NIAL, INGRID NIAL, ARCHIE NIAL & PEPITO NIAL, JR., petitioners, vs. NORMA BAYADOG, respondent.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: May the heirs of a deceased person file a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage after his death? Pepito Nial was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out of their marriage were born herein petitioners. Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting in her death on April 24, 1985. One year and 8 months thereafter or on December 11, 1986, Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog got married without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating that they had lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and were thus exempt from securing a marriage license. On February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car accident. After their father's death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of a marriage license. The case was filed under the assumption that the validity or invalidity of the second marriage would affect petitioner's successional rights. Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioners have no cause of action since they are not among the persons who could file an action for "annulment of marriage" under Article 47 of the Family Code. Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos of the Regional Trial Court of Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59, dismissed the petition after finding that the Family Code is "rather silent, obscure, insufficient" to resolve the following issues: (1) Whether or not plaintiffs have a cause of action against defendant in asking for the declaration of the nullity of marriage of their deceased father, Pepito G. Nial, with her specially so when at the time of the filing of this instant suit, their father Pepito G. Nial is already dead; (2) Whether or not the second marriage of plaintiffs' deceased father with defendant is null and voidab initio; (3) Whether or not plaintiffs are estopped from assailing the validity of the second 1 marriage after it was dissolved due to their father's death. Thus, the lower court ruled that petitioners should have filed the action to declare null and void their father's marriage to respondent before his death, applying by analogy Article 47 of the Family Code which enumerates the time and the persons who could initiate an action for 2 annulment of marriage. Hence, this petition for review with this Court grounded on a pure question of law. This petition was originally dismissed for non-compliance with Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, and because "the verification failed to state the basis of petitioner's averment that the allegations in the petition are "true and correct"." It was thus treated as an unsigned pleading which 3 produces no legal effect under Section 3, Rule 7, of the 1997 Rules. However, upon motion of 4 petitioners, this Court reconsidered the dismissal and reinstated the petition for review. The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code (FC), the applicable law to determine their validity is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time

of their celebration. A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil 6 7 Code, the absence of which renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3) in relation to 8 Article 58. The requirement and issuance of marriage license is the State's demonstration of its involvement and participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of which the general public is 9 interested. This interest proceeds from the constitutional mandate that the State recognizes the sanctity of family life and of affording protection to the family as a basic "autonomous social 10 institution." Specifically, the Constitution considers marriage as an "inviolable social institution," and is 11 the foundation of family life which shall be protected by the State. This is why the Family Code 12 considers marriage as "a special contract of permanent union" and case law considers it "not just an 13 adventure but a lifetime commitment." However, there are several instances recognized by the Civil Code wherein a marriage license is 14 dispensed with, one of which is that provided in Article 76, referring to the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at least five years before the marriage. The rationale why no license is required in such case is to avoid exposing the parties to humiliation, shame and embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to the publication of every applicant's name for a marriage license. The publicity attending the marriage license may discourage 15 such persons from legitimizing their status. To preserve peace in the family, avoid the peeping and suspicious eye of public exposure and contain the source of gossip arising from the publication of their names, the law deemed it wise to preserve their privacy and exempt them from that requirement. There is no dispute that the marriage of petitioners' father to respondent Norma was celebrated without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, they executed an affidavit stating that "they have attained the age of majority, and, being unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, and that 16 we now desire to marry each other." The only issue that needs to be resolved pertains to what nature of cohabitation is contemplated under Article 76 of the Civil Code to warrant the counting of the five year period in order to exempt the future spouses from securing a marriage license. Should it be a cohabitation wherein both parties are capacitated to marry each other during the entire five-year continuous period or should it be a cohabitation wherein both parties have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife during the entire five-year continuous period regardless of whether there is a legal impediment to their being lawfully married, which impediment may have either disappeared or intervened sometime during the cohabitation period? Working on the assumption that Pepito and Norma have lived together as husband and wife for five years without the benefit of marriage, that five-year period should be computed on the basis of a cohabitation as "husband and wife" where the only missing factor is the special contract of marriage to validate the union. In other words, the five-year common-law cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date of celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of the marriage. This 5-year period should be the years immediately before the day of the marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity meaning no third party was involved at anytime within the 5 years and continuity that is unbroken. Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year cohabitation is computed without any distinction as to whether the parties were capacitated to marry each other during the entire five years, then the law would be sanctioning immorality and encouraging parties to have common law relationships and placing them on the same footing with those who lived faithfully with their spouse. Marriage being a special relationship must be respected as such and its requirements must be strictly observed. The presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife is based on the approximation of the requirements of the law. The parties should not be afforded any excuse to not comply with every single requirement and later use the same missing element as a preconceived escape ground to nullify their marriage. There should be no exemption from securing a marriage license unless the circumstances clearly fall within the ambit of the exception. It should be noted that a license is required in order to notify the public that two persons are about to be united in matrimony and that anyone who is aware or has knowledge of any impediment to the union of the two shall make it 17 known to the local civil registrar. The Civil Code provides:

Art. 63: . . . This notice shall request all persons having knowledge of any impediment to the marriage to advice the local civil registrar thereof. . . . Art. 64: Upon being advised of any alleged impediment to the marriage, the local civil registrar shall forthwith make an investigation, examining persons under oath. . . . This is reiterated in the Family Code thus: Art. 17 provides in part: . . . This notice shall request all persons having knowledge of any impediment to the marriage to advise the local civil registrar thereof. . . . Art. 18 reads in part: . . . In case of any impediment known to the local civil registrar or brought to his attention, he shall note down the particulars thereof and his findings thereon in the application for a marriage license. . . . This is the same reason why our civil laws, past or present, absolutely prohibited the concurrence of multiple marriages by the same person during the same period. Thus, any marriage subsequently 18 contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse shall be illegal and void, subject only to the exception in cases of absence or where the prior marriage was dissolved or annulled. The Revised Penal Code complements the civil law in that the contracting of two or more marriages and the having of extramarital 19 affairs are considered felonies, i.e., bigamy and concubinage and adultery. The law sanctions monogamy. In this case, at the time of Pepito and respondent's marriage, it cannot be said that they have lived with each other as husband and wife for at least five years prior to their wedding day. From the time Pepito's first marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with respondent, only about twenty months had elapsed. Even assuming that Pepito and his first wife had separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and respondent had started living with each other that has already lasted for five years, the fact remains that their five-year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated by law. It should be in the nature of a perfect union that is valid under the law but rendered imperfect only by the absence of the marriage contract. Pepito had a subsisting marriage at the time when he started cohabiting with respondent. It is immaterial that when they lived with each other, Pepito had already been separated in fact from his lawful spouse. The subsistence of the marriage even where there was actual severance of the filial companionship between the spouses cannot make any cohabitation by either spouse with any third party as being one as "husband and wife". Having determined that the second marriage involved in this case is not covered by the exception to the requirement of a marriage license, it is void ab initio because of the absence of such element. The next issue to be resolved is: do petitioners have the personality to file a petition to declare their father's marriage void after his death? Contrary to respondent judge's ruling, Article 47 of the Family Code cannot be applied even by analogy to petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage. The second ground for annulment of marriage relied upon by the trial court, which allows "the sane spouse" to file an annulment suit "at anytime before the death of either party" is inapplicable. Article 47 pertains to the grounds, periods and persons who can file an annulment suit, not a suit for declaration of nullity of marriage. The Code is silent as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of a marriage. Voidable and void marriages are not identical. A marriage that is annulable is valid until otherwise declared by the court; whereas a marriage that is void ab initio is 21 considered as having never to have taken place and cannot be the source of rights. The first can be generally ratified or confirmed by free cohabitation or prescription while the other can never be ratified. A voidable marriage cannot be assailed collaterally except in a direct proceeding while a void marriage can be attacked collaterally. Consequently, void marriages can be questioned even after the death of either party but voidable marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and not after death of
20

either, in which case the parties and their offspring will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly 22 valid. That is why the action or defense for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages where the action prescribes. Only the parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but any proper interested party may attack a void marriage. Void marriages have no legal effects except those declared by law concerning the properties of the alleged spouses, regarding co-ownership or ownership through actual 23 joint contribution, and its effect on the children born to such void marriages as provided in Article 50 in relation to Article 43 and 44 as well as Article 51, 53 and 54 of the Family Code. On the contrary, the property regime governing voidable marriages is generally conjugal partnership and the children conceived before its annulment are legitimate. Contrary to the trial court's ruling, the death of petitioner's father extinguished the alleged marital bond between him and respondent. The conclusion is erroneous and proceeds from a wrong premise that there was a marriage bond that was dissolved between the two. It should be noted that their marriage was void hence it is deemed as if it never existed at all and the death of either extinguished nothing. Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is necessary in order to establish the 24 nullity of a marriage. "A void marriage does not require a judicial decree to restore the parties to their original rights or to make the marriage void but though no sentence of avoidance be absolutely necessary, yet as well for the sake of good order of society as for the peace of mind of all concerned, it is expedient that the nullity of the marriage should be ascertained and declared by the decree of a court of 25 competent jurisdiction." "Under ordinary circumstances, the effect of a void marriage, so far as concerns the conferring of legal rights upon the parties, is as though no marriage had ever taken place. And therefore, being good for no legal purpose, its invalidity can be maintained in any proceeding in which the fact of marriage may be material, either direct or collateral, in any civil court between any parties at any time, whether before or after the death of either or both the husband and the wife, and upon mere proof of the facts rendering such marriage void, it will be disregarded or treated as non-existent by the courts." It is not like a voidable marriage which cannot be collaterally attacked except in direct proceeding instituted during the lifetime of the parties so that on the death of either, the marriage cannot 26 be impeached, and is made good ab initio. But Article 40 of the Family Code expressly provides that there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second 27 28 marriage and such absolute nullity can be based only on a final judgment to that effect. For the same reason, the law makes either the action or defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage 29 imprescriptible. Corollarily, if the death of either party would extinguish the cause of action or the ground for defense, then the same cannot be considered imprescriptible. However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. This is without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The clause "on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void" in Article 40 of the Family Code connotes that such final judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Order of the Regional Trial Court, Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59, dismissing Civil Case No. T-639, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The said case is ordered REINSTATED.1wphi1.nt SO ORDERED. Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno and Kapunan, JJ., concur.

Pardo, J., on official business abroad.

Footnotes

The dispositive portion of the Order dated March 27, 1998 issued by Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos of Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 59, Toledo City, reads: "WHEREFORE, premises considered, defendant's motion to dismiss is hereby granted and this instant case is hereby ordered dismissed without costs." (p. 6; Rollo, p. 21).
2

Order, p. 4; Rollo, p. 19. Minute Resolution dated July 13, 1998; Rollo, p. 39. Minute Resolution dated October 7, 1998; Rollo, p. 50. Tamano v. Ortiz, 291 SCRA 584 (1998).

Now Article 3, Family Code. Art. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all the requisites are complied with: (1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties; their consent, freely given; (2) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and (3) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character.
7

Now Article 4, Family Code. Art. 80. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning: xxx xxx xxx (3) Those solemnized without a marriage license, save marriages of exceptional character. xxx xxx xxx
8

Art. 58. Save marriages of an exceptional character authorized in Chapter 2 of this Title, but not those under article 75, no marriage shall be solemnized without a license first being issued by the local civil registrar of the municipality where either contracting party habitually resides.
9

Perido v. Perido, 63 SCRA 97 (1975).

10

Sec. 12, Article II, 1987 Constitution; Hernandez v. CA, G.R. No. 126010, December 8, 1999; See also Tuason v. CA, 256 SCRA 158 (1996).
11

Sec. 2, Article XV (The Family), 1987 Constitution.

12

Art. 1, Family Code provides: "Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal or family life. . . .
13

Santos v. CA, 58 SCAD 17 (1995); 310 Phil. 21, 41 (1995).

14

Now Article 34, Family Code. Art. 76. No marriage license shall be necessary when a man and a woman who have attained the age of majority and who, being unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, desire to marry each other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The official, priest or minister who solemnized the marriage shall also state in an affidavit that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the contracting parties and that he found no legal impediment to the marriage.
15

Report of the Code Commission, p. 80. Rollo, p. 29. Art. 63 and 64, Civil Code; Article 17 and 18, Family Code.

16

17

18

Art. 83, Civil Code provides "Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse of such person with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance, unless: (1) the first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or (2) the first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years. . . . Art. 41 of the Family Code reads: "A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years. . ."
19

Arts. 333 and 334, Revised Penal Code.

20

Art. 47. The action for annulment of marriage must be filed by the following persons and within the periods indicated herein: (1) For causes mentioned in number 1 of Article 45 by the party whose parent or guardian did not give his or her consent, within five years after attaining the age of twenty-one; or by the parent or guardian or person having legal charge of the minor, at any time before such party has reached the age of twenty-one; (2) For causes mentioned in number 2 of Article 45, by the sane spouse, who had no knowledge of the other's insanity; or by any relative or guardian or person having legal charge of the insane, at anytime before the death of either party, or by the insane spouse during a lucid interval or after regaining sanity; (3) For causes mentioned in number 3 of Article 45, by the injured party, within five years after the discovery of the fraud;

(4) For causes mentioned in number 4 of Article 45, by the injured party, within five years from the time the force, intimidation or undue influence disappeared or ceased; For causes mentioned in numbers 5 and 6 of Article 45, by the injured party, within five years after the marriage.
21

Suntay v. Cojuanco-Suntay, 300 SCRA 760 (1998); People v. Retirement Board, 272 III. App. 59 cited in I Tolentino, Civil Code, 1990 ed. p. 271.
22

In re Conza's Estate, 176 III. 192; Miller v. Miller, 175 Cal. 797, 167 Pac. 394 cited in I Tolentino, Civil Code, 1990 ed., p. 271.
23

Art. 148-149, Family Code; Article 144, Civil Code.

24

Odayat v. Amante, 77 SCRA 338 (1977); Weigel v. Sempio-Dy, 143 SCRA 499 (1986); People v. Mendoza, 95 Phil. 845 (1954); 50 O.G. (10) 4767 cited in People v. Aragon, 100 Phil. 1033 (1957); 53 O.G. 3749.
25

35 Am. Jur. 219-220. 18 RCL 446-7; 35 Am Jur. 221.

26

27

Apiag v. Cantero, 335 Phil. 511 (1997); 268 SCRA 47 (1997); Atienza v. Judge Brillantes, Jr., 60 SCAD 119; 312 Phil. 939 (1995).
28

Domingo v. CA, 226 SCRA 572 (1993).

29

Art. 39, Family Code as amended by E.O. 209 and 227 s. 1987 and further amended by R.A. No. 8533 dated February 23, 1998. 51. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila FIRST DIVISION A.M. No. MTJ-00-1329 March 8, 2001 (Formerly A.M. No. OCA IPI No. 99-706-MTJ) HERMINIA BORJA-MANZANO, petitioner, vs. JUDGE ROQUE R. SANCHEZ, MTC, Infanta, Pangasinan, respondent. RESOLUTION DAVIDE, JR., C.J.: The solemnization of a marriage between two contracting parties who were both bound by a prior existing marriage is the bone of contention of the instant complaint against respondent Judge Roque R. Sanchez, Municipal Trial Court, Infanta, Pangasinan. For this act, complainant Herminia Borja-Manzano charges respondent Judge with gross ignorance of the law in a sworn Complaint-Affidavit filed with the Office of the Court Administrator on 12 May 1999.

Complainant avers that she was the lawful wife of the late David Manzano, having been married to him on 1 21 May 1966 in San Gabriel Archangel Parish, Araneta Avenue, Caloocan City. Four children were born 2 out of that marriage. On 22 March 1993, however, her husband contracted another marriage with one 3 Luzviminda Payao before respondent Judge. When respondent Judge solemnized said marriage, he knew or ought to know that the same was void and bigamous, as the marriage contract clearly stated that both contracting parties were "separated." Respondent Judge, on the other hand, claims in his Comment that when he officiated the marriage between Manzano and Payao he did not know that Manzano was legally married. What he knew was that the two had been living together as husband and wife for seven years already without the benefit of 4 marriage, as manifested in their joint affidavit. According to him, had he known that the late Manzano was married, he would have advised the latter not to marry again; otherwise, he (Manzano) could be charged with bigamy. He then prayed that the complaint be dismissed for lack of merit and for being designed merely to harass him. After an evaluation of the Complaint and the Comment, the Court Administrator recommended that respondent Judge be found guilty of gross ignorance of the law and be ordered to pay a fine of P2,000, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act would be dealt with more severely. On 25 October 2000, this Court required the parties to manifest whether they were willing to submit the case for resolution on the basis of the pleadings thus filed. Complainant answered in the affirmative. For his part, respondent Judge filed a Manifestation reiterating his plea for the dismissal of the complaint and setting aside his earlier Comment. He therein invites the attention of the Court to two separate 5 affidavits of the late Manzano and of Payao, which were allegedly unearthed by a member of his staff upon his instruction. In those affidavits, both David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao expressly stated that they were married to Herminia Borja and Domingo Relos, respectively; and that since their respective marriages had been marked by constant quarrels, they had both left their families and had never cohabited or communicated with their spouses anymore. Respondent Judge alleges that on the basis of those affidavits, he agreed to solemnize the marriage in question in accordance with Article 34 of the Family Code. We find merit in the complaint. Article 34 of the Family Code provides: No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and without any legal impediment to marry each other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that he ascertained the qualifications of the contracting parties and found no legal impediment to the marriage. For this provision on legal ratification of marital cohabitation to apply, the following requisites must concur: 1. The man and woman must have been living together as husband and wife for at least five years before the marriage; 2. The parties must have no legal impediment to marry each other; 3. The fact of absence of legal impediment between the parties must be present at the time of marriage;

4. The parties must execute an affidavit stating that they have lived together for at least five years [and are without legal impediment to marry each other]; and 5. The solemnizing officer must execute a sworn statement that he had ascertained the 6 qualifications of the parties and that he had found no legal impediment to their marriage. Not all of these requirements are present in the case at bar. It is significant to note that in their separate affidavits executed on 22 March 1993 and sworn to before respondent Judge himself, David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao expressly stated the fact of their prior existing marriage. Also, in their marriage contract, it was indicated that both were "separated." Respondent Judge knew or ought to know that a subsisting previous marriage is a diriment impediment, 7 which would make the subsequent marriage null and void. In fact, in his Comment, he stated that had he known that the late Manzano was married he would have discouraged him from contracting another marriage. And respondent Judge cannot deny knowledge of Manzanos and Payaos subsisting previous marriage, as the same was clearly stated in their separate affidavits which were subscribed and sworn to before him. The fact that Manzano and Payao had been living apart from their respective spouses for a long time already is immaterial. Article 63(1) of the Family Code allows spouses who have obtained a decree of legal separation to live separately from each other, but in such a case the marriage bonds are not severed. Elsewise stated, legal separation does not dissolve the marriage tie, much less authorize the parties to remarry. This holds true all the more when the separation is merely de facto, as in the case at bar. Neither can respondent Judge take refuge on the Joint Affidavit of David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao stating that they had been cohabiting as husband and wife for seven years. Just like separation, free and voluntary cohabitation with another person for at least five years does not severe the tie of a subsisting previous marriage. Marital cohabitation for a long period of time between two individuals who are legally capacitated to marry each other is merely a ground for exemption from marriage license. It could not serve as a justification for respondent Judge to solemnize a subsequent marriage vitiated by the impediment of a prior existing marriage. Clearly, respondent Judge demonstrated gross ignorance of the law when he solemnized a void and bigamous marriage. The maxim "ignorance of the law excuses no one" has special application to 8 judges, who, under Rule 1.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, should be the embodiment of competence, integrity, and independence. It is highly imperative that judges be conversant with the law 9 and basic legal principles. And when the law transgressed is simple and elementary, the failure to know 10 it constitutes gross ignorance of the law. ACCORDINGLY, the recommendation of the Court Administrator is hereby ADOPTED, with the MODIFICATION that the amount of fine to be imposed upon respondent Judge Roque Sanchez is increased to P20,000. SO ORDERED. Puno, Kapunan, Pardo, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1

Annex "A" of Complaint.

Annexes "B" to "E" of Complaint. Annex "F" of Complaint. Attached to the Marriage Contract (Annex "F" of Complaint). Annexes "B" and "C" of Respondent Judges Manifestation. DISIDERIO P. JURADO, CIVIL LAW REVIEWER 63 (1989). Article 41, Family Code.

Espiritu v. Jovellanos, 280 SCRA 579, 589 [1997]; Vercide v. Hernandez, A.M. No. MTJ-001265, 6 April 2000.
9

Macasasa v. Imbing, 312 SCRA 385, 395 [1999].

10

Madredijo v. Loyao, 316 SCRA 544, 568 [1999]; Agunday v. Tresvalles, 319 SCRA 134, 146 [1999]; Villanueva v. Almazan, A.M. No. MTJ-99-1221, 16 March 2000. 52. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION G.R. No. 160172 February 13, 2008

REINEL ANTHONY B. DE CASTRO, petitioner, vs. ANNABELLE ASSIDAO-DE CASTRO, respondent. DECISION TINGA, J.: This is a petition for review of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR CV. No. 69166, declaring that (1) Reianna Tricia A. De Castro is the legitimate child of the petitioner; and (2) that the marriage between petitioner and respondent is valid until properly nullified by a competent court in a proceeding instituted for that purpose. The facts of the case, as culled from the records, follow. Petitioner and respondent met and became sweethearts in 1991. They planned to get married, thus they applied for a marriage license with the Office of the Civil Registrar of Pasig City in September 1994. They had their first sexual relation sometime in October 1994, and had regularly engaged in sex thereafter. When the couple went back to the Office of the Civil Registrar, the marriage license had already expired. Thus, in order to push through with the plan, in lieu of a marriage license, they executed an affidavit dated 13 March 1995 stating that they had been living together as husband and wife for at least five years. The couple got married on the same date, with Judge Jose C. Bernabe, presiding judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, administering the civil rites. Nevertheless, after the ceremony, petitioner and respondent went back to their respective homes and did not live together as husband and wife.
1 2

On 13 November 1995, respondent gave birth to a child named Reinna Tricia A. De Castro. Since the childs birth, respondent has been the one supporting her out of her income as a government dentist and from her private practice. On 4 June 1998, respondent filed a complaint for support against petitioner before the Regional Trial 3 Court of Pasig City (trial court. In her complaint, respondent alleged that she is married to petitioner and that the latter has "reneged on his responsibility/obligation to financially support her "as his wife and 4 Reinna Tricia as his child." Petitioner denied that he is married to respondent, claiming that their marriage is void ab initio since the marriage was facilitated by a fake affidavit; and that he was merely prevailed upon by respondent to sign the marriage contract to save her from embarrassment and possible administrative prosecution due to her pregnant state; and that he was not able to get parental advice from his parents before he got married. He also averred that they never lived together as husband and wife and that he has never seen nor acknowledged the child. In its Decision dated 16 October 2000, the trial court ruled that the marriage between petitioner and respondent is not valid because it was solemnized without a marriage license. However, it declared petitioner as the natural father of the child, and thus obliged to give her support. Petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, arguing that the lower court committed grave abuse of discretion when, on the basis of mere belief and conjecture, it ordered him to provide support to the child when the latter is not, and could not have been, his own child. The Court of Appeals denied the appeal. Prompted by the rule that a marriage is presumed to be subsisting until a judicial declaration of nullity has been made, the appellate court declared that the child was born during the subsistence and validity of the parties marriage. In addition, the Court of Appeals frowned upon petitioners refusal to undergo DNA testing to prove the paternity and filiation, as well as his refusal to state with certainty the last time he had carnal knowledge with respondent, saying that petitioners "forgetfulness should not be used as a vehicle to relieve him of his obligation and reward him 6 of his being irresponsible." Moreover, the Court of Appeals noted the affidavit dated 7 April 1998 executed by petitioner, wherein he voluntarily admitted that he is the legitimate father of the child. The appellate court also ruled that since this case is an action for support, it was improper for the trial court to declare the marriage of petitioner and respondent as null and void in the very same case. There was no participation of the State, through the prosecuting attorney or fiscal, to see to it that there is no collusion between the parties, as required by the Family Code in actions for declaration of nullity of a marriage. The burden of proof to show that the marriage is void rests upon petitioner, but it is a matter that can be raised in an action for declaration of nullity, and not in the instant proceedings. The proceedings before the trial court should have been limited to the obligation of petitioner to support the child and his wife on the basis of the marriage apparently and voluntarily entered into by petitioner and 7 respondent. The dispositive portion of the decision reads: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated 16 October 2000, of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, National Capital Judicial Region, Brach 70, in JDRC No. 4626, is AFFIRMED with theMODIFICATIONS (1) declaring Reianna Tricia A. De Castro, as the legitimate child of the appellant and the appellee and (2) declaring the marriage on 13 March 1995 between the appellant and the appellee valid until properly annulled by a competent court in 8 a proceeding instituted for that purpose. Costs against the appellant. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the motion was denied by the Court of Appeals. Hence this petition. Before us, petitioner contends that the trial court properly annulled his marriage with respondent because as shown by the evidence and admissions of the parties, the marriage was celebrated without a marriage
9 5

license. He stresses that the affidavit they executed, in lieu of a marriage license, contained a false narration of facts, the truth being that he and respondent never lived together as husband and wife. The false affidavit should never be allowed or admitted as a substitute to fill the absence of a marriage 10 license. Petitioner additionally argues that there was no need for the appearance of a prosecuting attorney in this case because it is only an ordinary action for support and not an action for annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage. In any case, petitioner argues that the trial court had jurisdiction to determine the invalidity of their marriage since it was validly invoked as an affirmative 11 defense in the instant action for support. Citing several authorities, petitioner claims that a void marriage can be the subject of a collateral attack. Thus, there is no necessity to institute another independent proceeding for the declaration of nullity of the marriage between the parties. The refiling of another case for declaration of nullity where the same evidence and parties would be presented would entail enormous expenses and anxieties, would be time-consuming for the parties, and would increase the burden of the 12 courts. Finally, petitioner claims that in view of the nullity of his marriage with respondent and his vigorous denial of the childs paternity and filiation, the Court of Appeals gravely erred in declaring the child as his legitimate child. In a resolution dated 16 February 2004, the Court required respondent and the Office of the Solicitor 13 General (OSG) to file their respective comments on the petition. In her Comment, respondent claims that the instant petition is a mere dilatory tactic to thwart the finality of the decision of the Court of Appeals. Echoing the findings and rulings of the appellate court, she argues that the legitimacy of their marriage cannot be attacked collaterally, but can only be repudiated or contested in a direct suit specifically brought for that purpose. With regard to the filiation of her child, she pointed out that compared to her candid and straightforward testimony, petitioner was uncertain, if not evasive in answering questions about their sexual encounters. Moreover, she adds that despite the challenge from her and from the trial court, petitioner strongly objected to being subjected to DNA testing 15 to prove paternity and filiation. For its part, the OSG avers that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that it was improper for the trial court to declare null and void the marriage of petitioner and respondent in the action for support. Citing 16 the case of Nial v. Bayadog, it states that courts may pass upon the validity of a marriage in an action for support, since the right to support from petitioner hinges on the existence of a valid marriage. Moreover, the evidence presented during the proceedings in the trial court showed that the marriage between petitioner and respondent was solemnized without a marriage license, and that their affidavit (of a man and woman who have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife for at least five years) was false. Thus, it concludes the trial court correctly held that the marriage between 17 petitioner and respondent is not valid. In addition, the OSG agrees with the findings of the trial court that 18 the child is an illegitimate child of petitioner and thus entitled to support. Two key issues are presented before us. First, whether the trial court had the jurisdiction to determine the validity of the marriage between petitioner and respondent in an action for support and second, whether the child is the daughter of petitioner. Anent the first issue, the Court holds that the trial court had jurisdiction to determine the validity of the marriage between petitioner and respondent. The validity of a void marriage may be collaterally 19 attacked. Thus, in Nial v. Bayadog, we held: However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. This is without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The clause "on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void" in Article 40
14

of the Family Code connotes that such final judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of 20 remarriage. Likewise, in Nicdao Cario v. Yee Cario, the Court ruled that it is clothed with sufficient authority to pass upon the validity of two marriages despite the main case being a claim for death benefits. Reiterating Nial, we held that the Court may pass upon the validity of a marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. However, evidence must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of 22 grounds rendering such a marriage an absolute nullity. Under the Family Code, the absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage 23 void ab initio, whereas a defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable. In the instant case, it is clear from the evidence presented that petitioner and respondent did not have a marriage license when they contracted their marriage. Instead, they presented an affidavit stating that 24 they had been living together for more than five years. However, respondent herself in effect admitted the falsity of the affidavit when she was asked during cross-examination, thus ATTY. CARPIO: Q But despite of (sic) the fact that you have not been living together as husband and wife for the last five years on or before March 13, 1995, you signed the Affidavit, is that correct? A Yes, sir.
25 21

The falsity of the affidavit cannot be considered as a mere irregularity in the formal requisites of marriage. The law dispenses with the marriage license requirement for a man and a woman who have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at least five years before the marriage. The aim of this provision is to avoid exposing the parties to humiliation, shame and embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous cohabitation of persons outside 26 a valid marriage due to the publication of every applicants name for a marriage license. In the instant case, there was no "scandalous cohabitation" to protect; in fact, there was no cohabitation at all. The false affidavit which petitioner and respondent executed so they could push through with the marriage has no value whatsoever; it is a mere scrap of paper. They were not exempt from the marriage license requirement. Their failure to obtain and present a marriage license renders their marriage void ab initio. Anent the second issue, we find that the child is petitioners illegitimate daughter, and therefore entitled to support. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as 27 legitimate children. Thus, one can prove illegitimate filiation through the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment, an admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned, or the open and continuous possession of 28 the status of a legitimate child, or any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. The Certificate of Live Birth of the child lists petitioner as the father. In addition, petitioner, in an affidavit waiving additional tax exemption in favor of respondent, admitted that he is the father of the child, thus stating: 1. I am the legitimate father of REIANNA TRICIA A. DE CASTRO who was born on November 3, 30 1995 at Better Living, Paraaque, Metro Manila; We are likewise inclined to agree with the following findings of the trial court:
29

That Reinna Tricia is the child of the respondent with the petitioner is supported not only by the testimony of the latter, but also by respondents own admission in the course of his testimony wherein he conceded that petitioner was his former girlfriend. While they were sweethearts, he used to visit petitioner at the latters house or clinic. At times, they would go to a motel to have sex. As a result of their sexual dalliances, petitioner became pregnant which ultimately led to their marriage, though invalid, as earlier ruled. While respondent claims that he was merely forced to undergo the marriage ceremony, the pictures taken of the occasion reveal otherwise (Exhs. "B," "B-1," to "B-3," "C," "C-1" and "C-2," "D," "D-1" and "D-2," "E," "E-1" and "E-2," "F," "F-1" and "F2," "G," "G-1" and "G-2" and "H," "H-1" to "H-3"). In one of the pictures (Exhs. "D," "D-1" and "D2"), defendant is seen putting the wedding ring on petitioners finger and in another picture (Exhs. 31 "E," "E-1" and "E-2") respondent is seen in the act of kissing the petitioner. WHEREFORE, the petition is granted in part. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR CV No. 69166 are SET ASIDE and the decision of the Regional Trial Court Branch 70 of Pasig City in JDRC No. 4626 dated 16 October 2000 is hereby REINSTATED. SO ORDERED. DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice

WE CONCUR: LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice Chairperson ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice

ATTESTATION I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division. LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice Chairperson, Second Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairpersons Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division. REYNATO S. PUNO Chief Justice

Footnotes
1

Rollo, pp. 31-41. Captioned Annabelle AssidaoDe Castro v. Reinel Anthony B. De Castro.

The case was eventually raffled to Branch 70 of the Pasig RTC, presided by Judge Pablito M. Rojas.
4

Records, p. 3, Complaint. Rollo, pp. 92-94. Id. at 37. Id. at 40. Rollo, p. 41. Id. at 43-44; Resolution dated 1 October 2003. Id. at 15-20.

10

11

Nial v. Bayadog, 384 Phil. 661 (2000). TOLENTINO, CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Vol. I, 1990 Ed. and SEMPIO-DIY, HANDBOOK ON THE FAMILY CODE, 1991 Ed.
12

Rollo, pp. 25-26. Id. at 135. Id. at 119-126. Id. at 139-144. 384 Phil. 661, 673 (2000). Rollo, pp. 174-182. Id. at 183-185.

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

Vda. de Jacob v. Court of Appeals, 371 Phil. 693, 704 (1999), citing TOLENTINO, CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES:COMMENTARIES AND JURISPRUDENCE, Vol. I, 1987 ed., p. 265.

20

Nial v. Bayadog, 384 Phil. 661, 675 (2000). Cario v. Cario, 403 Phil. 861 (2001). Id. at 132. Family Code, Art. 4. Purportedly complying with Art. 34 of the Family Code, which provides:

21

22

23

24

Art. 34. No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and woman who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and without any legal impediment to marry each other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that he ascertained the qualifications of the contracting parties and found no legal impediment to the marriage.
25

TSN, 18 February 2000, p. 20.

26

Nial v. Bayadog, 384 Phil. 661, 669 (2000), citing THE REPORT OF THE CODE COMMISSION, p. 80.
27

Family Code, Art. 175. Family Code, Art. 172.

28

In the book Handbook on the Family Code of the Philippines by Alicia V. Sempio-Diy, p. 246 (1988), the following were given as examples of "other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws:" (a) the baptismal certificate of the child ; (b) a judicial admission; (c) the family bible wherein the name of the child is entered; (d) common reputation respecting pedigree; (e) admission by silence; (f) testimonies of witnesses; and (g) other kinds of proof admissible under Rule 130.
29

Records, p.6. Id. at 160. Rollo, pp. 93-94 53. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION

30

31

G.R. No. 145226

February 06, 2004

LUCIO MORIGO y CACHO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.: This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse the decision dated October 21, 1999 of the Court of 2 Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, which affirmed the judgment dated August 5, 1996 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bohol, Branch 4, in Criminal Case No. 8688. The trial court found herein petitioner Lucio Morigo y Cacho guilty beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy and sentenced him to a prison term of seven (7) months of prision correccional as minimum to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as 3 maximum. Also assailed in this petition is the resolution of the appellate court, dated September 25, 2000, denying Morigos motion for reconsideration. The facts of this case, as found by the court a quo, are as follows: Appellant Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates at the house of Catalina Tortor at Tagbilaran City, Province of Bohol, for a period of four (4) years (from 1974-1978). After school year 1977-78, Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete lost contact with each other. In 1984, Lucio Morigo was surprised to receive a card from Lucia Barrete from Singapore. The former replied and after an exchange of letters, they became sweethearts. In 1986, Lucia returned to the Philippines but left again for Canada to work there. While in Canada, they maintained constant communication. In 1990, Lucia came back to the Philippines and proposed to petition appellant to join her in Canada. Both agreed to get married, thus they were married on August 30, 1990 at the Iglesia de Filipina Nacional at Catagdaan, Pilar, Bohol. On September 8, 1990, Lucia reported back to her work in Canada leaving appellant Lucio behind. On August 19, 1991, Lucia filed with the Ontario Court (General Division) a petition for divorce against appellant which was granted by the court on January 17, 1992 and to take effect on February 17, 1992. On October 4, 1992, appellant Lucio Morigo married Maria Jececha Lumbago at the Virgen sa Barangay Parish, Tagbilaran City, Bohol. On September 21, 1993, accused filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity of marriage in the Regional Trial Court of Bohol, docketed as Civil Case No. 6020. The complaint seek (sic) among others, the declaration of nullity of accuseds marriage with Lucia, on the ground that no marriage ceremony actually took place. On October 19, 1993, appellant was charged with Bigamy in an Information filed by the City 6 Prosecutor of Tagbilaran [City], with the Regional Trial Court of Bohol. The petitioner moved for suspension of the arraignment on the ground that the civil case for judicial nullification of his marriage with Lucia posed a prejudicial question in the bigamy case. His motion was granted, but subsequently denied upon motion for reconsideration by the prosecution. When arraigned in
5 4 1

the bigamy case, which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 8688, herein petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial thereafter ensued. On August 5, 1996, the RTC of Bohol handed down its judgment in Criminal Case No. 8688, as follows: WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Court finds accused Lucio Morigo y Cacho guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Bigamy and sentences him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from Seven (7) Months of Prision Correccional as minimum to Six (6) Years and One (1) Day of Prision Mayor as maximum. SO ORDERED.
7

In convicting herein petitioner, the trial court discounted petitioners claim that his first marriage to Lucia 8 was null and void ab initio. Following Domingo v. Court of Appeals, the trial court ruled that want of a valid marriage ceremony is not a defense in a charge of bigamy. The parties to a marriage should not be allowed to assume that their marriage is void even if such be the fact but must first secure a judicial declaration of the nullity of their marriage before they can be allowed to marry again. Anent the Canadian divorce obtained by Lucia, the trial court cited Ramirez v. Gmur, which held that the court of a country in which neither of the spouses is domiciled and in which one or both spouses may resort merely for the purpose of obtaining a divorce, has no jurisdiction to determine the matrimonial status of the parties. As such, a divorce granted by said court is not entitled to recognition anywhere. Debunking Lucios defense of good faith in contracting the second marriage, the trial court stressed that 10 following People v. Bitdu, everyone is presumed to know the law, and the fact that one does not know that his act constitutes a violation of the law does not exempt him from the consequences thereof. Seasonably, petitioner filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 20700. Meanwhile, on October 23, 1997, or while CA-G.R. CR No. 20700 was pending before the appellate court, the trial court rendered a decision in Civil Case No. 6020 declaring the marriage between Lucio and Lucia void ab initiosince no marriage ceremony actually took place. No appeal was taken from this decision, which then became final and executory. On October 21, 1999, the appellate court decided CA-G.R. CR No. 20700 as follows: WHEREFORE, finding no error in the appealed decision, the same is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. SO ORDERED.
11 9

In affirming the assailed judgment of conviction, the appellate court stressed that the subsequent declaration of nullity of Lucios marriage to Lucia in Civil Case No. 6020 could not acquit Lucio. The 12 reason is that what is sought to be punished by Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code is the act of contracting a second marriage before the first marriage had been dissolved. Hence, the CA held, the fact that the first marriage was void from the beginning is not a valid defense in a bigamy case. The Court of Appeals also pointed out that the divorce decree obtained by Lucia from the Canadian court 13 could not be accorded validity in the Philippines, pursuant to Article 15 of the Civil Code and given the 14 fact that it is contrary to public policy in this jurisdiction. Under Article 17 of the Civil Code, a declaration of public policy cannot be rendered ineffectual by a judgment promulgated in a foreign jurisdiction. Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the appellate courts decision, contending that the doctrine 15 in Mendiola v. People, allows mistake upon a difficult question of law (such as the effect of a foreign divorce decree) to be a basis for good faith.

On September 25, 2000, the appellate court denied the motion for lack of merit. However, the denial was by a split vote. The ponente of the appellate courts original decision in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, Justice Eugenio S. Labitoria, joined in the opinion prepared by Justice Bernardo P. Abesamis. The dissent observed that as the first marriage was validly declared void ab initio, then there was no first marriage to speak of. Since the date of the nullity retroacts to the date of the first marriage and since herein petitioner was, in the eyes of the law, never married, he cannot be convicted beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy. The present petition raises the following issues for our resolution: A. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY THE RULE THAT IN CRIMES PENALIZED UNDER THE REVISED PENAL CODE, CRIMINAL INTENT IS AN INDISPENSABLE REQUISITE. COROLLARILY, WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE [THE] PETITIONERS LACK OF CRIMINAL INTENT WHEN HE CONTRACTED THE SECOND MARRIAGE. B. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE RULING IN PEOPLE VS. BITDU (58 PHIL. 817) IS APPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT BAR. C. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY THE RULE THAT EACH AND EVERY CIRCUMSTANCE FAVORING THE INNOCENCE OF THE 17 ACCUSED MUST BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT. To our mind, the primordial issue should be whether or not petitioner committed bigamy and if so, whether his defense of good faith is valid. The petitioner submits that he should not be faulted for relying in good faith upon the divorce decree of the Ontario court. He highlights the fact that he contracted the second marriage openly and publicly, which a person intent upon bigamy would not be doing. The petitioner further argues that his lack of criminal intent is material to a conviction or acquittal in the instant case. The crime of bigamy, just like other felonies punished under the Revised Penal Code, is mala in se, and hence, good faith and lack of criminal intent are allowed as a complete defense. He stresses that there is a difference between the intent to commit the crime and the intent to perpetrate the act. Hence, it does not necessarily follow that his intention to contract a second marriage is tantamount to an intent to commit bigamy. For the respondent, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) submits that good faith in the instant case is a convenient but flimsy excuse. The Solicitor General relies upon our ruling in Marbella-Bobis v. 18 Bobis, which held that bigamy can be successfully prosecuted provided all the elements concur, 19 stressing that under Article 40 of the Family Code, a judicial declaration of nullity is a must before a party may re-marry. Whether or not the petitioner was aware of said Article 40 is of no account as everyone is presumed to know the law. The OSG counters that petitioners contention that he was in good faith because he relied on the divorce decree of the Ontario court is negated by his act of filing Civil Case No. 6020, seeking a judicial declaration of nullity of his marriage to Lucia. Before we delve into petitioners defense of good faith and lack of criminal intent, we must first determine 20 whether all the elements of bigamy are present in this case. In Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis, we laid down the elements of bigamy thus:

16

(1) the offender has been legally married; (2) the first marriage has not been legally dissolved, or in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse has not been judicially declared presumptively dead; (3) he contracts a subsequent marriage; and (4) the subsequent marriage would have been valid had it not been for the existence of the first. Applying the foregoing test to the instant case, we note that during the pendency of CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, the RTC of Bohol Branch 1, handed down the following decision in Civil Case No. 6020, to wit: WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered decreeing the annulment of the marriage entered into by petitioner Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete on August 23, 1990 in Pilar, Bohol and further directing the Local Civil Registrar of Pilar, Bohol to effect the cancellation of the marriage contract. SO ORDERED.
21

The trial court found that there was no actual marriage ceremony performed between Lucio and Lucia by a solemnizing officer. Instead, what transpired was a mere signing of the marriage contract by the two, without the presence of a solemnizing officer. The trial court thus held that the marriage is void ab initio, in 22 23 accordance with Articles 3 and 4 of the Family Code. As the dissenting opinion in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, correctly puts it, "This simply means that there was no marriage to begin with; and that such declaration of nullity retroacts to the date of the first marriage. In other words, for all intents and purposes, reckoned from the date of the declaration of the first marriage as void ab initio to the date of the 24 celebration of the first marriage, the accused was, under the eyes of the law, never married." The records show that no appeal was taken from the decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. 6020, hence, the decision had long become final and executory. The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the accused must have been legally married. But in this case, legally speaking, the petitioner was never married to Lucia Barrete. Thus, there is no first marriage to speak of. Under the principle of retroactivity of a marriage being declared void ab initio, the two were never married "from the beginning." The contract of marriage is null; it bears no legal effect. Taking this argument to its logical conclusion, for legal purposes, petitioner was not married to Lucia at the time he contracted the marriage with Maria Jececha. The existence and the validity of the first marriage being an essential element of the crime of bigamy, it is but logical that a conviction for said offense cannot be sustained where there is no first marriage to speak of. The petitioner, must, perforce be acquitted of the instant charge. The present case is analogous to, but must be distinguished from Mercado v. Tan. In the latter case, the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage was likewise obtained after the second marriage was already celebrated. We held therein that: A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a subsequent one can be legally contracted. One who enters into a subsequent marriage without first obtaining such judicial declaration is guilty of bigamy. This principle applies even if the earlier union is 26 characterized by statutes as "void." It bears stressing though that in Mercado, the first marriage was actually solemnized not just once, but twice: first before a judge where a marriage certificate was duly issued and then again six months later before a priest in religious rites. Ostensibly, at least, the first marriage appeared to have transpired, although later declared void ab initio.
25

In the instant case, however, no marriage ceremony at all was performed by a duly authorized solemnizing officer. Petitioner and Lucia Barrete merely signed a marriage contract on their own. The mere private act of signing a marriage contract bears no semblance to a valid marriage and thus, needs no judicial declaration of nullity. Such act alone, without more, cannot be deemed to constitute an ostensibly valid marriage for which petitioner might be held liable for bigamy unless he first secures a judicial declaration of nullity before he contracts a subsequent marriage. The law abhors an injustice and the Court is mandated to liberally construe a penal statute in favor of an accused and weigh every circumstance in favor of the presumption of innocence to ensure that justice is done. Under the circumstances of the present case, we held that petitioner has not committed bigamy. Further, we also find that we need not tarry on the issue of the validity of his defense of good faith or lack of criminal intent, which is now moot and academic. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision, dated October 21, 1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, as well as the resolution of the appellate court dated September 25, 2000, denying herein petitioners motion for reconsideration, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petitioner Lucio Morigo y Cacho is ACQUITTED from the charge of BIGAMY on the ground that his guilt has not been proven with moral certainty. SO ORDERED. Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Tinga, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1

Rollo, pp. 38-44. Penned by Associate Justice Eugenio S. Labitoria and concurred in by Associate Justices Marina L. Buzon and Edgardo P. Cruz.
2

Records, pp. 114-119.

Rollo, pp. 46-58. Per Associate Justice Edgardo P. Cruz, with Associate Justices Cancio C. Garcia and Marina L. Buzon, concurring and Eugenio S. Labitoria and Bernardo P. Abesamis, dissenting.
4

Her correct name is Maria Jececha Limbago (Italics for emphasis). See Exh. "B," the copy of their marriage contract. Records, p. 10.
5

The accusatory portion of the charge sheet found in Records, p. 1, reads: "That, on or about the 4 day of October, 1992, in the City of Tagbilaran, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused being previously united in lawful marriage with Lucia Barrete on August 23, 1990 and without the said marriage having been legally dissolved, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second marriage with Maria Jececha Limbago to the damage and prejudice of Lucia Barrete in the amount to be proved during trial. "Acts committed contrary to the provisions of Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code."
th

Rollo, pp. 38-40. Records, p. 119.

G.R. No. 104818, 17 September 1993, 226 SCRA 572. 42 Phil. 855, 863 (1918). 58 Phil. 817 (1933). Rollo, p. 43.

10

11

12

ART. 349. Bigamy. The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.
13

Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.
14

Art. 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public instruments shall be governed by the laws of the country in which they are executed. When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or consular officials of the Republic of the Philippines in a foreign country, the solemnities established by Philippine laws shall be observed in their execution. Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.
15

G.R. Nos. 89983-84, 6 March 1992, 207 SCRA 85. Rollo, p. 51. Id. at 20-21. G.R. No. 138509, 31 July 2000, 336 SCRA 747, 752-753.

16

17

18

19

Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
20

Supra. CA Rollo, p. 38. Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are: (1) Authority of the solemnizing officer; (2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of this Title; and (3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the contracting parties before the solemnizing officer and their personal declaration that they take each other as husband and wife in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age.

21

22

23

Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio,except as stated in Article 35 (2). A defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable as provided in Article 45. An irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable.
24

Rollo, p. 54. G.R. No. 137110, 1 August 2000, 337 SCRA 122. Id. at 124. 54. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC

25

26

G.R. No. 150758

February 18, 2004

VERONICO TENEBRO, petitioner vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondent. DECISION YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: We are called on to decide the novel issue concerning the effect of the judicial declaration of the nullity of a second or subsequent marriage, on the ground of psychological incapacity, on an individuals criminal liability for bigamy. We hold that the subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity does not retroact to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the Philippines penal laws are concerned. As such, an individual who contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage is criminally liable for bigamy, notwithstanding the subsequent declaration that the second marriage is void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity. Petitioner in this case, Veronico Tenebro, contracted marriage with private complainant Leticia Ancajas on April 10, 1990. The two were wed by Judge Alfredo B. Perez, Jr. of the City Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City. Tenebro and Ancajas lived together continuously and without interruption until the latter part of 1991, when Tenebro informed Ancajas that he had been previously married to a certain Hilda Villareyes on November 10, 1986. Tenebro showed Ancajas a photocopy of a marriage contract between him and Villareyes. Invoking this previous marriage, petitioner thereafter left the conjugal dwelling which he shared 1 with Ancajas, stating that he was going to cohabit with Villareyes. On January 25, 1993, petitioner contracted yet another marriage, this one with a certain Nilda Villegas, 2 before Judge German Lee, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 15. When Ancajas learned of this third marriage, she verified from Villareyes whether the latter was indeed married to

petitioner. In a handwritten letter, Villareyes confirmed that petitioner, Veronico Tenebro, was indeed her husband. Ancajas thereafter filed a complaint for bigamy against petitioner. The Information, which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 013095-L, reads: That on the 10th day of April 1990, in the City of Lapu-lapu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the aforenamed accused, having been previously united in lawful marriage with Hilda Villareyes, and without the said marriage having been legally dissolved, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second marriage with LETICIA ANCAJAS, which second or subsequent marriage of the accused has all the essential requisites for validity were it not for the subsisting first marriage. CONTRARY TO LAW. When arraigned, petitioner entered a plea of "not guilty".
6 4 5

During the trial, petitioner admitted having cohabited with Villareyes from 1984-1988, with whom he sired two children. However, he denied that he and Villareyes were validly married to each other, claiming that 7 no marriage ceremony took place to solemnize their union. He alleged that he signed a marriage contract merely to enable her to get the allotment from his office in connection with his work as a 8 seaman. He further testified that he requested his brother to verify from the Civil Register in Manila whether there was any marriage at all between him and Villareyes, but there was no record of said 9 marriage. On November 10, 1997, the Regional Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City, Branch 54, rendered a decision finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, and sentencing him to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as 10 minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied for lack of merit. Hence, the instant petition for review on the following assignment of errors: I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED, AND THIS ERROR IS CORRECTIBLE IN THIS APPEAL WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE COURT A QUO CONVICTING THE ACCUSED FOR (sic) THE CRIME OF BIGAMY, DESPITE THE NON-EXISTENCE OF THE FIRST MARRIAGE AND INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE. II. THE COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED FOR (sic) THE CRIME OF BIGAMY DESPITE CLEAR PROOF THAT THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN THE ACCUSED AND PRIVATE COMPLAINANT HAD BEEN DECLARED NULL AND VOID AB INITIO AND WITHOUT LEGAL 11 FORCE AND EFFECT. After a careful review of the evidence on record, we find no cogent reason to disturb the assailed judgment. Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, the elements of the crime of Bigamy are: (1) that the offender has been legally married;

(2) that the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code; (3) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and (4) that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.
12

Petitioners assignment of errors presents a two-tiered defense, in which he (1) denies the existence of his first marriage to Villareyes, and (2) argues that the declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity, which is an alleged indicator that his marriage to Ancajas lacks the essential requisites for validity, retroacts to the date on which the second marriage was 13 celebrated. Hence, petitioner argues that all four of the elements of the crime of bigamy are absent, and 14 prays for his acquittal. Petitioners defense must fail on both counts. First, the prosecution presented sufficient evidence, both documentary and oral, to prove the existence of the first marriage between petitioner and Villareyes. Documentary evidence presented was in the form of: (1) a copy of a marriage contract between Tenebro and Villareyes, dated November 10, 1986, which, as seen on the document, was solemnized at the Manila City Hall before Rev. Julieto Torres, a Minister of 15 the Gospel, and certified to by the Office of the Civil Registrar of Manila; and (2) a handwritten letter from Villareyes to Ancajas dated July 12, 1994, informing Ancajas that Villareyes and Tenebro were 16 legally married. To assail the veracity of the marriage contract, petitioner presented (1) a certification issued by the 17 National Statistics Office dated October 7, 1995; and (2) a certification issued by the City Civil Registry 18 of Manila, dated February 3, 1997. Both these documents attest that the respective issuing offices have no record of a marriage celebrated between Veronico B. Tenebro and Hilda B. Villareyes on November 10, 1986. To our mind, the documents presented by the defense cannot adequately assail the marriage contract, which in itself would already have been sufficient to establish the existence of a marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes. All three of these documents fall in the category of public documents, and the Rules of Court provisions relevant to public documents are applicable to all. Pertinent to the marriage contract, Section 7 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court reads as follows: Sec. 7. Evidence admissible when original document is a public record. When the original of a document is in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office, its contents may be proved by a certified copy issued by the public officer in custody thereof (Emphasis ours). This being the case, the certified copy of the marriage contract, issued by a public officer in custody thereof, was admissible as the best evidence of its contents. The marriage contract plainly indicates that a marriage was celebrated between petitioner and Villareyes on November 10, 1986, and it should be accorded the full faith and credence given to public documents. Moreover, an examination of the wordings of the certification issued by the National Statistics Office on October 7, 1995 and that issued by the City Civil Registry of Manila on February 3, 1997 would plainly show that neither document attests as a positive fact that there was no marriage celebrated between Veronico B. Tenebro and Hilda B. Villareyes on November 10, 1986. Rather, the documents merely attest that the respective issuing offices have no record of such a marriage. Documentary evidence as to the

absence of a record is quite different from documentary evidence as to the absence of a marriage ceremony, or documentary evidence as to the invalidity of the marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes. The marriage contract presented by the prosecution serves as positive evidence as to the existence of the marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes, which should be given greater credence than documents testifying merely as to absence of any record of the marriage, especially considering that there is absolutely no requirement in the law that a marriage contract needs to be submitted to the civil registrar as a condition precedent for the validity of a marriage. The mere fact that no record of a marriage exists 19 does not invalidate the marriage, provided all requisites for its validity are present. There is no evidence presented by the defense that would indicate that the marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes lacked any requisite for validity, apart from the self-serving testimony of the accused himself. Balanced against this testimony are Villareyes letter, Ancajas testimony that petitioner informed her of the existence of the valid first marriage, and petitioners own conduct, which would all tend to indicate that the first marriage had all the requisites for validity. Finally, although the accused claims that he took steps to verify the non-existence of the first marriage to Villareyes by requesting his brother to validate such purported non-existence, it is significant to note that the certifications issued by the National Statistics Office and the City Civil Registry of Manila are dated October 7, 1995 and February 3, 1997, respectively. Both documents, therefore, are dated after the accuseds marriage to his second wife, private respondent in this case. As such, this Court rules that there was sufficient evidence presented by the prosecution to prove the first and second requisites for the crime of bigamy. The second tier of petitioners defense hinges on the effects of the subsequent judicial declaration nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity.
20

of the

Petitioner argues that this subsequent judicial declaration retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage to Ancajas. As such, he argues that, since his marriage to Ancajas was subsequently declared 21 void ab initio, the crime of bigamy was not committed. This argument is not impressed with merit. Petitioner makes much of the judicial declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity, invoking Article 36 of the Family Code. What petitioner fails to realize is that a declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is of absolutely no moment insofar as the States penal laws are concerned. As a second or subsequent marriage contracted during the subsistence of petitioners valid marriage to Villareyes, petitioners marriage to Ancajas would be null and void ab initio completely regardless of 22 petitioners psychological capacity or incapacity. Since a marriage contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this second marriage is not per se an argument for the avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy. Pertinently, Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code criminalizes "any person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings". A plain reading of the law, therefore, would indicate that the provision penalizes the mere act of contracting a second or a subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage. Thus, as soon as the second marriage to Ancajas was celebrated on April 10, 1990, during the subsistence of the valid first marriage, the crime of bigamy had already been consummated. To our mind, there is no cogent reason for distinguishing between a subsequent marriage that is null and void purely because it is a second or subsequent marriage, and a subsequent marriage that is null and void on the ground of psychological incapacity, at least insofar as criminal liability for bigamy is concerned. The

States penal laws protecting the institution of marriage are in recognition of the sacrosanct character of this special contract between spouses, and punish an individuals deliberate disregard of the permanent character of the special bond between spouses, which petitioner has undoubtedly done. Moreover, the declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is not an indicator that petitioners marriage to Ancajas lacks the essential requisites for validity. The requisites for the validity of a marriage are classified by the Family Code into essential (legal capacity of 23 the contracting parties and their consent freely given in the presence of the solemnizing officer) and formal (authority of the solemnizing officer, marriage license, and marriage ceremony wherein the parties personally declare their agreement to marry before the solemnizing officer in the presence of at least two 24 witnesses). Under Article 5 of the Family Code, any male or female of the age of eighteen years or 25 26 27 upwards not under any of the impediments mentioned in Articles 37 and 38 may contract marriage. In this case, all the essential and formal requisites for the validity of marriage were satisfied by petitioner and Ancajas. Both were over eighteen years of age, and they voluntarily contracted the second marriage with the required license before Judge Alfredo B. Perez, Jr. of the City Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City, in the presence of at least two witnesses. Although the judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is concerned, it is significant to note that said marriage is not without legal effects. Among these effects is that children conceived or born before the judgment of absolute nullity of the marriage shall be considered 28 legitimate. There is therefore a recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage, although void ab initio, may still produce legal consequences. Among these legal consequences is incurring criminal liability for bigamy. To hold otherwise would render the States penal laws on bigamy completely nugatory, and allow individuals to deliberately ensure that each marital contract be flawed in some manner, and to thus escape the consequences of contracting multiple marriages, while beguiling throngs of hapless women with the promise of futurity and commitment. As such, we rule that the third and fourth requisites for the crime of bigamy are present in this case, and affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. As a final point, we note that based on the evidence on record, petitioner contracted marriage a third time, while his marriages to Villareyes and Ancajas were both still subsisting. Although this is irrelevant in the determination of the accuseds guilt for purposes of this particular case, the act of the accused displays a deliberate disregard for the sanctity of marriage, and the State does not look kindly on such activities. Marriage is a special contract, the key characteristic of which is its permanence. When an individual manifests a deliberate pattern of flouting the foundation of the States basic social institution, the States criminal laws on bigamy step in. Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the penalty for the crime of bigamy is prision mayor, which has a duration of six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years. There being neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstance, the same shall be imposed in its medium period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, petitioner shall be entitled to a minimum term, to be taken from the penalty next lower in degree, i.e., prision correccional which has a duration of six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years. Hence, the Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the decision of the trial court which sentenced petitioner to suffer an indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum. WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant petition for review is DENIED. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 21636, convicting petitioner Veronico Tenebro of the crime of Bigamy and sentencing him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, is AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED. Davide, Jr., C.J. (Chairman), Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, and Azcuna, JJ., concur. Puno, J., join the opinion of J. Vitug. Vitug, J., see separate opinion. Quisumbing, J., join the dissent in view of void nuptia. Carpio, J., see dissenting opinion. Austria-Martinez, J., join the dissent of J. Carpio. Carpio-Morales, J., join the dissent of J. Carpio. Tinga, J., join the dissent of J. Carpio. Callejo, Sr., J., see separate dissent.

SEPARATE OPINION> VITUG, J.: Veronico Tenebro has been charged with bigamy for contracting, while still being married to Hilda Villareyes, a second marriage with private complainant Leticia Ancajas. Tenebro argues that since his second marriage with Ancajas has ultimately been declared void ab initio on the ground of the latters psychological incapacity, he should be acquitted for the crime of bigamy. The offense of bigamy is committed when one contracts "a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared 1 presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings". Bigamy presupposes a valid prior marriage and a subsequent marriage, contracted during the subsistence of the prior union, which would have been binding were it not for its being bigamous. Would the absolute nullity of either the first or the second marriage, prior to its judicial declaration as being void, constitute a valid defense in a criminal action for bigamy? I believe that, except for a void marriage on account of the psychological incapacity of a party or both parties to the marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code (as so hereinafter explained), the answer must be in the affirmative. Void marriages are inexistent from the very beginning, and no judicial decree is 2 3 required to establish their nullity. As early as the case of People vs. Aragon this Court has underscored the fact that the Revised Penal Code itself does not, unlike the rule then prevailing in Spain, require the judicial declaration of nullity of a prior void marriage before it can be raised by way of a defense in a criminal case for bigamy. Had the law contemplated otherwise, said the Court, " an express provision to that effect would or should have been inserted in the law, (but that in) its absence, (the courts) are bound by (the) rule of strict interpretation" of penal statutes. In contrast to a voidable marriage which legally exists until judicially annulled (and, therefore, not a defense in a bigamy charge if the second marriage 4 were contracted prior to the decree of annulment) the complete nullity, however, of a previously contracted marriage, being void ab initio and legally inexistent, can outrightly be defense in an indictment of bigamy. It has been held that, by virtue of Article 40 of the Family Code, a person may be convicted of bigamy although the first marriage is ultimately adjudged void ab initio if, at the time the second marriage is 5 contracted, there has as yet no judicial declaration of nullity of the prior marriage. I maintain strong reservations to this ruling. Article 40 of the Family Code reads: "Article 40. The absolute nullity of the previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of the final judgment declaring such previous marriage void."

It is only "for purpose of remarriage" that the law has expressed that the absolute nullity of the previous marriage may be invoked "on the basis solely of the final judgment declaring such previous marriage void." It may not be amiss to state that under the regime of the Civil Code of 1950, the Supreme Court, in 6 Wiegel vs. Judge Sempio-Diy, has held that a subsequent marriage of one of the spouses of a prior void marriage is itself (the subsequent marriage) void if it were contracted before a judicial declaration of nullity of the previous marriage. Although this pronouncement has been abandoned in a later decision of the 7 court in Yap vs. Court of Appeals, the Family Code, however has seen it fit to adopt the Wiegel rule but only for purpose of remarriage which is just to say that the subsequent marriage shall itself be considered void. There is no clear indication to conclude that the Family Code has amended or intended to amend 8 the Revised penal Code or to abandon the settled and prevailing jurisprudence on the matter. A void marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code is a class by itself. The provision has been from Canon law primarily to reconcile the grounds for nullity of marriage under civil law with those of church 9 laws. The "psychological incapacity to comply" with the essential marital obligations of the spouses is completely distinct from other grounds for nullity which are confined to the essential or formal requisites of a marriage, such as lack of legal capacity or disqualification of the contracting parties, want of consent, absence of a marriage license, or the like. The effects of a marriage attended by psychological incapacity of a party or the parties thereto may be said to have the earmarks of a voidable, more than a void, marriage, remaining to be valid until it is judicially decreed to be a nullity. Thus, Article 54 of the Family Code considers children conceived or born of such a void marriage before its judicial declaration of nullity to be legitimate similar to the rule on a voidable marriage. It is expected, even as I believe it safe to assume, that the spouses rights and obligations, property regime and successional rights would continue unaffected, as if it were a voidable marriage, unless and until the marriage is judicially declared void for basically two reasons: First, psychological incapacity, a newly-added ground for the nullity of a marriage under the Family Code, 10 breaches neither the essential nor the formal requisites of a valid marriages; and second, unlike the other grounds for nullity of marriage (i.e., relationship, minority of the parties, lack of license, mistake in the identity of the parties) which are capable of relatively easy demonstration, psychological incapacity, 11 however, being a mental state, may not so readily be as evident. It would have been logical for the Family Code to consider such a marriage explicitly voidable rather than void if it were not for apparent attempt to make it closely coincide with the Canon Law rules and nomenclature. Indeed, a void marriage due to psychological incapacity appears to merely differ from a voidable marriage in that, unlike the latter, it is not convalidated by either cohabitation or prescription. It might be recalled that prior to republic Act No. 8533, further amending the Family Code, an action or defense of absolute nullity of marriage falling under Article 36, celebrated before the effectivity of the Code, could prescribe in ten years following the effectivity of the Family Code. The initial provision of the ten-year period of prescription seems to betray a real consciousness by the framers that marriages falling under Article 36 are truly meant to be inexistent. Considerations, both logical and practical, would point to the fact that a "void" marriage due to psychological incapacity remains, for all intents and purposes, to be binding and efficacious until judicially declared otherwise. Without such marriage having first been declared a nullity (or otherwise dissolved), a subsequent marriage could constitute bigamy. Thus, a civil case questioning the validity of the first marriage would not be a prejudicial issue much in the same way that a civil case assailing a prior "voidable" marriage (being valid until annulled) would not be a prejudicial question to the prosecution of a criminal offense for bigamy. In cases where the second marriage is void on grounds other than the existence of the first marriage, this 12 Court has declared in a line of cases that no crime of bigamy is committed. The Court has explained that for a person to be held guilty of bigamy, it must, even as it needs only, be shown that the subsequent marriage has all the essential elements of a valid marriage, were it not for the subsisting first union. Hence, where it is established that the second marriage has been contracted without the necessary 13 license and thus void, or that the accused is merely forced to enter into the second (voidable)

marriage, no criminal liability for the crime of bigamy can attach. In both and like instances, however, the lapses refers to the elements required for contracting a valid marriage. If, then, all the requisites for the perfection of the contract marriage, freely and voluntarily entered into, are shown to be extant, the criminal liability for bigamy can unassailably arise. Since psychological incapacity, upon the other hand, does not relate to an infirmity in the elements, either essential or formal, in contacting a valid marriage, the declaration of nullity subsequent to the bigamous marriage due to that ground, without more, would be inconsequential in a criminal charge for bigamy. The judicial declaration of nullity of a bigamous marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity merely nullifies the effects of the marriage but it does not negate the fact of perfection of the bigamous marriage. Its subsequent declaration of nullity dissolves the relationship of the spouses but, being alien to the requisite conditions for the perfection of the marriage, the judgment of the court is no defense on the part of the offender who had entered into it. Accordingly, I vote to dismiss the petition.

14

Footnotes
1

TSN, 24 July 1995, pp. 4-11. Record, p. 78. Record, p. 84. TSN, 24 July 1995, pp. 11-12; TSN, 13 September 1995, pp. 6-9. Record, pp. 1-2. Id., p. 66. TSN, 11 December 1996, p. 6. Id., pp. 6-7. Id., pp. 7-8. Penned by Judge Rumoldo F. Fernandez, Rollo, pp. 156-162. Rollo, p. 7. Reyes, L.B., THE REVISED PENAL CODE. Book Two, 14th ed., 1998, p. 907. Rollo, pp. 7-16. Id., pp. 16-18. Record, p. 85. Record, p. 84.

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

Record, p. 148. Record, p. 149.

18

19

Mariategui v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 57062, 24 January 1992, 205 SCRA 337, 343, citing People v. Borromeo, 218 Phil. 122, 126.
20

Decision dated November 20, 1995, penned by Judge Epifanio C. Llano of the Regional Trial Court of Argao, Cebu, Branch 26, in Civil Case No. AV-885 (Annex "C", Rollo, p. 43).
21

Record, pp. 16-18. Family Code, Art. 41. Family Code, Art. 2.

22

23

24

Family Code, Art. 3; Vitug, Civil Law and Jurisprudence, 1993 Edition, pp. 119-120, citing the Family Code, Articles 2 and 3.
25

Art. 37. Marriages between the following are incestuous and void from the beginning, whether the relationship between the parties be legitimate or illegitimate: (1) Between ascendants and descendants of any degree; and (2) Between brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half-blood.
26

Art. 38. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning for reasons of public policy: (1) Between collateral blood relatives; whether legitimate or illegitimate, up to the fourth civil degree; (2) Between step-parents and stepchildren; (3) Between parents-in-law and children-in-law; (4) Between the adopting parent and the adopted child; (5) Between the surviving spouse of the adopting parent and the adopted child; (6) Between the surviving spouse of the adopted child and the adopter; (7) Between an adopted child and a legitimate child of the adopter; (8) Between adopted children of the same adopter; and (9) Between parties where one, with the intention to marry the other, killed that other persons spouse or his or her own spouse.

27

Valdez v. Regional Trial Court, Branch 102, Quezon City, G.R. No. 122749, 31 July 1996. Family Code, Art. 54.

28

VITUG,
1

Article 349, Revised Penal Code. Odayat vs. Amante, 77 SCRA 338; see also People vs Aragon, 100 Phil. 1033. 100 Phil 1033. See People vs. Mendoza, 50 O.G. 4767. Mercado vs. Tan, 337 SCRA 122; Te vs. Court of Appeals, 346 SCRA 327. 143 SCRA 499. 145 SCRA 229.

I might add, parenthetically, that the necessity of a judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage even for purposes of remarriage should refer merely to cases when it can be said that the marriage, at least ostensibly, has taken place. For instance, no such judicial declaration of nullity would yet be required when either or both parties have not at all given consent thereto that verily results in a "no" marriage situation or when the prior "marriage" is between persons of the same sex.
9

Deliberations of the family Code Revision Committee, 9 August 1996. Art. 2. No marriage shall be valid, unless these essential requisites are present: (1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male and a female; and (2) Consent freely given in the presence of the solemnizing officer. (53a) Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are: (1) Authority of the solemnizing officer; (2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of this Title; and (3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the contracting parties before the solemnizing officer and their personal declaration that they take other as husband and wife in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age. (53a, 55a) Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article 35(2). A defect in any of the essential requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable. (n)

10

11

One might observe that insanity, which could be worse than psychological incapacity merely renders a marriage voidable, not void.
12

De la cruz vs. Hon. Ejercito, G.R. No. L-40895, 6 November 1975, 68 SCRA 1; Merced vs. Hon. Diez, et. Al., 109 Phil 155; Zapanta vs. hon. Montessa, et. al., 144 Phil. 1227; People vs. Mora Dumpo, 62 Phil 246; People vs. Lara, 51 O. G. 4079.
13

People vs. Lara, supra. De la Cruz vs. Hon. Ejercito, supra; Merced vs. Hon. Diez, supra.

14

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