SDR: New Chapter Study (March 2002) Dr.

Jeffrey Peter Bradford

New Chapter for the Strategic Defence Review

March 2002

Submission by Dr. Jeffrey Peter Bradford

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SDR: New Chapter Study (March 2002) Dr. Jeffrey Peter Bradford

1.0 Introduction
Following the 14th February 2002 release of the public discussion paper for the New
Chapter of the SDR this document contains the authors response to the invitation to
respond to the questions raised both within the public discussion paper and its more
detailed counterpart “The Strategic Defence Review: A New Chapter” published on
the Ministry of Defence website. Opinions reflected in this submission do not reflect
any corporate affiliation – they are solely those of the author.

This submission differs from my earlier contribution to the original SDR process
which sought to apply systems thinking to four key issues - R&D, recruitment &
retention, and the interplay between doctrine and strategy 1 In this submission I have
taken the approach of building a clear reasoning structure which approaches the key
strategic choices you face from a top down grand strategy viewpoint (the future) as
well as a bottom up capability assessment (the past, and present). By taking this route
I hope to at the very least validate some of the many decisions you are contemplating
with a view to pin-pointing those which are critical.

1.1 Model overview

I have developed a model to encompass analytical issues surrounding the key issues
raised in your document as well as indicated some of the challenges which require
resolution. This model is structured within a tool based framework known as a
‘reasoning architecture’ or RA. This RA shows the process flow and the steps which
need to be thought through in order to arrive at meaningful answers to your strategic
conundrum.

Figure 1.0: Reasoning Architecture - SDR "New Chapter"

The Architecture should be viewed logically from left to right. The icons in the left
side of each box relate to a particular tool used to support analysis or thinking around
decision-making.

This submission will consider each step in turn, in order to build from the ground up
a logical analysis towards the question of how British defence policy should be
adjusted to take account of the events of 2001. Prior to this, a brief summary of each
step is indicated overleaf:

1
Dr J P Bradford, Submission to the Strategic Defence Review (London: House of Commons Library
1998).

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Step Title Icon Icon description Detail

2.0 Reasoning The hub for the process (and electronically the
Reasoning Architecture resources comprising this exercise).
architecture
2.1 Support Various Miscellaneous To ensure transparency, a clear indication of
Materials materials drawn-upon in creating the model.
2.2 Strategic Systemic Analysis The use of influence diagramming to consider
priorities in devoting scarce resources to threat
analysis.
2.3 Policy Goals Considering the goals of UK defence policy over
Framework multiple time-frames.

2.4 Legacy Goals Questions capability change since SDR and the
Forces readiness of those forces for their military tasks.
2.5 Regional Scenario Planning Applying thinking from ‘strategic’ step to
Analysis construct a model for a hypothetical region.
2.6 Military Scenario Planning Constructing a strategy space looking at current
Tasks military tasks.
2.7 Force Scenario Planning Scenarios around key force multiplier and
Elements strategic options for enhancing capability.

2.8 Region / Scenario Planning Merging the three scenario/strategy efforts above
MT / FE (merged) to consider the most logical force structure given
the military tasks most consistent with the future.
2.9 Strategic Synoptic evaluation Where force development strategies from the
Choices above effort are rated against performance goals
over three time periods to identify best choices
for capability development.
2.10 Goals Goals Those goals informing strategic choice above.
for choice
2.11 Hotspot Scanning 3D graphing tool depicting resource allocation
Resources within defence.
2.12 Support Various Miscellaneous Various sources of supporting data.
materials
2.13 Success Risk Assessment Following the choice of strategy to pursue, this
tool assists in identifying implementation risks.

1.0 Reasoning Architecture

The reasoning architecture can be configured in any number of steps, iterations etc.
using the tools encompassed within. This particular configuration places an accent on
the challenge of what capabilities must be developed in order to ensure the correct
force structure for the tasks envisaged of it, in the most likely operating environment.
Figure 2.0.1 Reasoning Architecture for UK MoD "New Chapter" study.

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In image 2.0.1 on the previous page note the use of colour for the arrows from support
materials – this indicates that these steps are not part of the process (linked with Royal
Blue lines), but rather supporting evidence and analysis. In each subsequent step the
above figure will be replicated with a highlight on the specific step to ensure that the
reader understands their current position in the process.

2.1 Support Materials

This step contains the electronic hard copies of resources drawn on in the process.
However it is distinct from support materials (2.12) which is focused more on the
financial resources and UK defence policy goals issues. This step enables knowledge
management (i.e. the addition of further sources) as to with which information and
knowledge the problem was approached:

- The Strategic Defence Review (1997), Ch.2. (from MoD website).

- The Defence mission (from MoD website).
- SDR Annex Force levels (from MoD website).
- SDR Annex Future Capability (from MoD website).
- Details of “New Chapter” study (from MoD website).
- British Military Doctrine (DG, D&D).
- The future strategic context (DG, D&D).

2.2 Strategic

Step 2.2 seeks to apply systemic thinking in a limited manner to the question of threat
assessment and associated scenario planning for various theatres of possible
operations 2 As can be seen in the miniature reasoning architecture above, this step is
informed by the supporting materials and informs step 2.5 Regional Analysis.

As a starting point this systemic analysis takes the seven dimensions used as a
framework for strategic analysis by the armed forces and examines their
interrelationships in order to identify where to focus effort. As a reminder for those
who are less familiar, systemic analysis draws upon classic influence diagramming
which at its simplest seeks to illustrate the relationship between ‘A’ and ‘B’ using an

2
Source: JWP 0-01, British Defence Doctrine, 2nd Edition (JDCC October 2001). Sections 2-1 / 2-3.

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arrow. In the diagram overleaf this thinking is taken a step further using both
coloured and varied thickness of arrows (colour – red negative, blue positive and
thickness indicating the strength of relationship).

Figure 2.2.1: Systemic Analysis looking at ‘7 dimensions’ for strategic analysis

I have considered this step a necessary pre-cursor to scenario planning (strategic

analysis), as currently there is no differentiation explicit in the Joint doctrine manual.
It would appear that each dimension requires equal effort and has equal impact on the
final assessment. I would posit that given that there are always ‘unknowns’ in terms
of intelligence accuracy and availability in a timely manner that some form of
prioritisation is necessary.

The approach taken above shows the relationships as seen by the author of the seven
dimensions of strategic analysis. From the point of view of the New Chapter study
there appear to be three principal conclusions:

a) Military effectiveness although a dimension in itself is actually the output of a

socio-economic / political assessment. Although of relevance to the armed
forces below ‘grand strategy level’ planning clearly it is not of first order
importance in assessing potential threat. Q: Does asymmetric warfare render
this obsolete when thinking of unconventional warfare ?
b) Terrain has more importance strategically than is immediately obvious in a
pure listing of dimensions. Terrain shapes economic development (stock of
raw materials, access to resources, access to trading partners) but also social
cohesiveness. When thinking of current events in Asia, a mountainous
country, with regions cut off due to weather for varying periods is bound to
adopt a clannish, disparate culture which is going to be harder to fight both
with and/or against due to cultural differences and approach to war fighting.

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c) The legal, and moral component is often given lip service to, but appears
critical in shaping the political dimension, propensity to use military force, and
the moral approach to conduct in a conflict situation.
d) The political interface also emerges as being vital – which begs the question as
to the quality and frequency of exchanges between the Foreign &
Commonwealth Office, the intelligence agencies – MI5, MI6, & GCHQ and
the Defence Intelligence Staff, as well as with their foreign counterparts.

In order to use these insights usefully in section 2.5 Regional Analysis, I have applied
a further tool – the portfolio analysis, which looks at the elements (within figure
2.2.1) and positions them in a 2 x 2 matrix locating them by the strength of flow into
and out from each element of the systemic analysis.

Figure 2.2.2: Portfolio Analysis applied to '7 Dimensions' in Figure 2.2.1

The above 2D image positions each element in terms of the Passive and Active axis.
From this image we can observe very passive elements (such as No.4 which is the
outcome of inputs from other elements), more active elements (such as No.5 which
both influence and are significantly influenced by the system) up to No.3 (legal,
ethical and moral influences which has a high active impact on the system and which
is influenced by relatively few elements).

This analysis assists us in thinking about the weighting applied to each dimension in
building scenarios in step 2.5 of this model (regional analysis).

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2.3 Policy Framework

This stage seeks to analyse the policy framework using a tool to supporting thinking
about interests, goals and priorities. Note from the miniature architecture above that
this stage is informed by the supporting materials, and seeks to support a subsequent
analysis of military tasks in step 2.6. This use of the Goals and Priorities Mapping
tool seeks to identify key political drivers influencing roles and missions of the armed
forces over three time periods - +5, 15, and 25 years 3

Figure 2.3.1 below shows three pie charts representing from top down, the 5, 15 and
25 year perspective. The pie charts themselves represent the relevance placed against
each defence objective (leading to the width of the arc) and the likelihood based on
current capabilities of fulfilling this objective in each time frame (the depth of the arc
– the outer edge of the circle indicating 100%, the centre 0%).

Figure 2.3.1: UK Defence Priorities +5, +15, +25 years

Note: The hierarchy of goals is scored at the

sub-goal level, with results being aggregated
for the three key priorities – Promote European
security, enable economic stability and lastly
engender positive foreign relations.

3
Source: Original data and supporting notes from Strategic Defence Review Ch.2. (London HMSO: 1997).

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Observations from figure 2.3.1 based on the author’s assessment are as follows:

a) European security retains its relative importance, but the likelihood of

fulfilling this goal falls. The current difficulties faced by the NATO
Secretary-General in raising defence spending in Europe are compounded by
continuing long procurement lead times and delays to important projects (such
as the Hercules medium transport aircraft replacement Airbus 400M) by
Germany. In the New Chapter is this priority no longer relevant ? The author
would assert that it clearly is, but possibly the accent is more upon external
rather than internal threats (such as the Balkans commitment which pre-
occupied planners at the time of SDR).
b) Little change occurs to both economic stability and engendering foreign
relations given the linkage between the two historically for the UK. It is
assumed that based on today’s capabilities that activities to ensure oil flow
from the Middle East producers and defence diplomacy activities will
continue.

In thinking about military tasks in step 2.7 this analysis helps to make sense of the
tangle of military tasks which the UK pursues with the objective of identify over-lap
and making coherent rationalisation.

2.4 Legacy forces

The last of the preliminary steps, legacy forces applies the tool used in previous step
to consider the impact of SDR on force structure and what capabilities are in place
today. This step forms the basis of input into step 2.7 ‘Force Elements’ - which aims
to develop strategic options for capability management and enhancement.

The figure below shows pre- and post- SDR numbers of force elements and takes a
view on their readiness. Colouring is as follows; olive drab – Army, light blue –
Royal Air Force, dark blue – Royal Navy. Interpret as step 2.3 earlier.

Figure 2.4.1: Composition and readiness of UK Armed forces elements (1997 & 2001).

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Analysed at a macro level it is difficult to discern anything beyond imperceptible

change in terms of force elements (aggregate numbers) and their operational
readiness. With a view to the New Chapter effort to match the appropriate forces to
tasks in the most likely operating environment, the author has broken out this analysis
by service.

Figure 2.4.2: Composition and readiness of British Army force elements (1997 & 2001).

Note: Colour key for force elements

Above corresponds with segments
on the right.

Considering the emerging strategic environment are force elements balanced

appropriately ? with sufficient readiness levels ? I have possibly been over-generous
in rating the readiness levels of armoured units, and the newly formed NBC
battalions. With regard to Engineer regiments I assume that private sector
opportunities continue to affect their establishment, and to a lesser extent hospitals
and infantry battalions. This analysis would clearly benefit from access to internal
information.

One observation on force elements is that special forces are not included as a force
element – one can only assume that they exist within infantry etc. Possibly there is an
administrative need to clearly have at ‘purple’ level within the Ministry an equivalent
to the US Special Operations Command (SOCOM) which can pursue funding to
ensure maintenance and extension of operational capability.

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Figure 2.4.3: Composition and readiness of Royal Navy force elements (1997 & 2001).

Key issues to note here are that for the RN, aircraft carrier capability has declined
since the SDR which emphasised ‘out-of-area’ commitments. My knowledge of the
availability of RN nuclear attack submarines is not perfect, and the numbers reflect a
best guess. I believe also that given the lack of investment in recapitalising the fleet,
that readiness figures for destroyers and frigates is excessively generous.

Figure2.4.4: Composition and readiness of Royal Air Force elements (1997 & 2001).

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Given events of the past few months I assume that readiness figures for transport,
tanker and offensive air support have increased due to wartime flying and operational
use. However, once the current emergency has passed, clearly readiness levels will
fall, with the additional impact of greater wear and tear on the airframes.

In an emerging strategic environment where warning times will be essential is the

reduction in maritime and reconnaissance aircraft linked to greater reliance on
satellite borne systems ?

In summary this step and the two previous have built up foundations of the current
posture of Britain’s defence, identifying objectives, means of strategic analysis and
considering force elements provides an understanding of the means which are
available to be moulded and developed in the emerging strategic environment of the
‘New Chapter’ study.

2.5 Regional Analysis

This is the first of three steps, which together build an analytical engine, drawing
upon the foundation stages previously to generate strategic options for UK defence.
This and the next steps utilise a concept of scenario planning called the morphological
box. For those unfamiliar with its operation, the concept the drivers of a scenario are
at the top of a series of columns. Each column contains a number of mutually
exclusive possibilities for each driver atop the column. Choosing one possibility from
each column yields a scenario (or if being used in this manner a strategic option).

The technique deployed in this contribution has a slight variation. Once the sequence
above is performed, a consistency matrix has to be completed ‘behind’ the
morphological box. This matrix enables a pair-wise comparison of every alternative
with every other relevant alternative. From this a basic algorithm sorts the scenario
and strategic option spaces to provide a ranking of alternative scenarios or strategies
based upon the consistency values assigned.

This step in the model created a scenario space drawing upon the systemic analysis of
the ‘7 dimensions’ of strategic analysis discussed in step 2.2. Figure 2.5.1 depicts a
scenario space for a region, for the purposes of this analysis called Blue over a period
to 2025. Note the grey boxes atop each column containing the drivers – these are
ordered in terms of importance from step 2.2. Note also the mutually exclusive
options beneath each driver.

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Figure 2.5.1: Scenario space - Regional analysis Blue (2025).

The possibilities in each yellow box conceal considerable information which informs
their meaning. In this case, the yellow boxes are knowledge management reference
points to which data and information explaining each in turn is stored.

Behind the morphological box representation lies the consistency matrix. Figure
2.5.2. shows an element of this matrix to illustrate the thinking process.

Figure 2.5.2: Consistency matrix for Regional analysis scenario Blue (2025).

Having built the morphological box, the consistency matrix is completed by assessing
each alternative (yellow box) with the ones in other columns (other yellow boxes). In
figure 2.5.2 above the bold blue titles on the left and top correspond to the grey
drivers atop columns in figure 2.5.1. and the options below their respective yellow
boxes. Consistency is scored from deep red (negative) to bright green (positive).

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Having completed this exercise, it is possible to run the algorithm and look at the
possibilities created on the basis of consistency. In figure 2.5.3 below the most
consistent expected future scenario for region blue is shown. The possibility chosen
in each column is represented by the light blue shading assigned. The consistency
between each variable selected and all the others is depicted by the height of the green
bar atop the column – the longer the more consistent fit.

Figure 2.5.3: Most consistent outcome for Regional analysis scenario Blue (2025).

With a view to resolving the challenge of the ‘New Chapter’ there is a need to create
sophisticated scenarios for all key regions and indeed non-state actors to whom the
armed forces need to consider. The example above is based upon Europe and serves
to explain both the method and the logical fit with the next steps.

2.6 Military Tasks

Drawing on the existing information concerning UK defence goals and projecting

them through time, this stage aims to assess the most consistent military tasks to be
performed. The method used is identical to that in section 2.5 previously. Figure
2.6.1 overleaf illustrates the Military Tasks as described in the Strategic Defence
Review using the morphological box:

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Figure 2.6.1: UK armed forces Military Tasks strategy space.

However, it is at this point that possible flaws in the development of military tasks
come to light. Applying the Minto principle – that of each element being MECE
(both mutually exclusive to other elements and simultaneously comprehensively
exhaustive) difficulties in the definition of Military Tasks arise. Simply put, it is
difficult to see the true difference between tasks such as MT19 and MT20 ? Also
MT8-9 and MT 26.

From the point of view of the ‘New Chapter’, a consideration of genuine military
tasks appears in order. In terms of additions, the author would be inclined to avoid
adding new tasks – after all many elements are already captured, albeit in a flawed
structure – which could be as much a result of bottom up ‘push’ from the services and
political ‘pull’.

Figure 2.6.2. overleaf illustrates the resulting most consistent set of military tasks on
the basis of consistency scoring for the UK armed forces

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Figure 2.6.2: Most consistent UK armed forces Military Tasks.

This analysis begs the following questions in seeking to adjust military tasks for a
post SDR policy;

1. Columns D, F, and H. Are they duplicating activities already present in other

areas ? Are they a useful means for justifying obsolescent capabilities ? Are
they genuinely valuable categorisations of defence effort ? If the latter answer
is ‘yes’ then it could be suggested that they need to be fleshed out as at present
they offer no choice – “you either have task H for example or not” – which
appears unrealistic.
2. Column A possibly needs to be re-cast in terms of a “homeland defence” e.g.
national integrity tasks and “civil-support tasks” e.g. search and rescue,
nuclear accident response. Column A appears too much like an intellectual
bucket for all manner of tasks.

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2.7 Force Elements

This third scenario space seeks to build on the earlier consideration of force elements
comprising the capabilities of the UK armed forces in section 2.4. The morphological
box in this instance has been built to consider possible development / upgrade paths
for capabilities in light of the changing strategic circumstances. Figure 2.7.1 below
illustrates the strategic option space constructed. Note: there could be more or less
capabilities analysed in this manner – this sample was based on the author’s own
knowledge.

Figure 2.7.1: Strategy space considering future military capability development.

The above options around land systems, power projection capabilities, air dominance
and space systems bring together many of the no-doubt ongoing debates on force
element design, for example:

a) In the land systems field what is the ‘right’ emergent balance between
firepower, protection and ability to deploy rapidly ?
b) Repeating earlier Whitehall decisions in the mid-1960s what is the balance
between sea based amphibious task groups and air transport ?

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c) Has Afghanistan hastened the introduction and re-balancing of air forces

increasing the percentage of unmanned platforms ?
d) Can Britain successfully access force protection mechanisms for its future
structure ? Lighter forces will depend even more on intelligence, and real-
time, high availability ISTAR assets to maintain agility.

2.8 Region / MT / FE

This stage integrates the three streams – grand strategic scenario planning for a region
(2.2 & 2.5), with policy goals articulated through military tasks (2.3 & 2.6) and lastly
possible capability development from its roots in the force element structure of the
British armed forces (2.4 & 2.7).

The conceptual ability to link these three spaces enables us to rapidly consider the
most consistent set of capabilities to develop which support execution of likely
military tasks in what is viewed as the likely operating environment.

Figure 2.8.1 illustrates the highly granular nature of the model, and its roots from
previous efforts.

Figure 2.8.1: Integrated strategy space for region Blue / Military Tasks / New capabilities.

Conceptually if content is not a problem it is conceivable to map multiple regions,

coupled with areas such as possible doctrinal developments to build strategies with a
larger ‘footprint’ in terms of impact than the one shown above in figure 2.8.1.

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From applying the algorithm, the following insights emerged from the most consistent
outcome;

a) For region Blue there is some likelihood of a more hawkish attitude to defence
and a propensity to use military power. A decade ago Newsnight on BBC
television was dramatising scenarios from the leading think tanks positing
European preparedness to use force to protect access to raw materials and
prevent immigrants entering Europe, culminating in a Cuba-esque
confrontation with the United States. A more cohesive Europe seeking to flex
its muscles may be more inclined to use force – Europeans are becoming more
used following the Balkans and Afghanistan to seeing their armed forces
overseas.
b) In terms of military tasks, given the island geography of the UK, the emphasis
appears to be on evacuating British (and Allied) nationals from emergencies
elsewhere in the world. This would seem to justify good quality ISTAR and
rapid deployment capability –esp. given the rise in citizens working in remote,
sometimes politically unstable regions for Multi-National Corporations.
c) From a capability management point of view highly mobile infantry supported
by a mix of unmanned aerial vehicles and a ‘super’ JSTARS ISTAR system
offered the most consistent mix for challenges in the blue environment
through 2025.

Section 2.9 which follows emerges from two distinct activities. Firstly there is the
stage just analysed which has resulted in the creation of strategy options – the one
described above was the most consistent (not necessarily plausible). Others can be
identified rapidly – and a sub-set of these strategic responses provides the content for
choice in the next stage.

2.9 Strategic Choices

As can be seen in the miniature of the reasoning architecture above, this stage is
informed from two directions. The first as indicated in the summary of stage 2.8 is
the scenario/ tasks / capabilities modelling effort to create options. The second stream
is detailed further in sections 2.10 – 2.12 which follow this stage.

These three steps provide the goals against which the strategies will be judged across
three time periods (+5, +15, and +25 years).

From the previous step 2.8, four particular strategic options have been identified and
fleshed out by applying an umbrella description – Incremental strategy, Limited
development, Utopian viewpoint and nightmare scenario. These are then scored
against the goals identified in the next section – the figure overleaf (9.2.1) illustrates
this activity clearly;

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Figure 2.9.1: Synoptic evaluation - UK armed forces development options.

Note: the four strategic options on the left, along the top are the criteria (drawn from
the British defence mission), with the grey row immediately beneath them,
comprising the weightings assigned in stage 2.10 to the goals. Under each criteria are
Three columns representing the value assigned in each time frame.

Therefore, in order to understand the three red sliders immediately to the right of the
red strategy “incremental strategy” we would ask, “how do you perceive the
incremental strategy to perform against the criteria of transparency in defence over the
+5, +15, +25 year timeframe”.

The output of this scoring effort is a series of bar graphs illustrated below. The bar
graphs for each time period show a ranking of the four strategies by calculating the
weighting, by score aggregated for each time period.

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Looking to the results we see that the incremental strategy could be the ideal to follow
for the next time two time periods, but although it scores closely – the limited
development strategy (yellow) offers a marginally more effective option.

In terms of the ‘New Chapter’ study strategy yellow – that of defining a niche set of
development goals and investing wisely to pursue them is going to be essential. If
British forces intend never to go into battle without the USA maybe certain traditional
capabilities can be foregone – maybe we should look to their thinking about key
systems so as to not have mismatched forces ?

2.10 Goals for choice

Using the goals and priorities tool described and used in earlier stages, it is now
applied using the criteria stated in the defence mission as a basis upon which to judge
the success of any adaptation of UK defence policy.

Figure 2.10.1 below illustrates the visual output of considering the defence mission
across three time periods simultaneously:

Figure 2.10.1: UK Defence mission goals viewed from multiple time frame perspective.

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To consider the outputs of the goals exercise with a view to the ‘New Chapter’ study,
the following assumptions have been made:

a) Through technological and doctrinal developments the battlespace will become a

more heavily co-ordinated ‘purple’ sphere. Individual service may not disappear but
the emphasis could change significantly from what we see today. For example the US
formation of a ‘space command’ in the USAF looked somewhat odd at the time of the
‘star wars’ proposals which lacked the technology behind the presentation, but now is
an example of ‘good forward thinking’.
b) Value for money will remain a holy mantra into which the ‘New chapter’ must fit.
I assume that only the most minimal additional resources (unlike the US situation)
will be provided to the Ministry of Defence in coming years.
c) The need will become increasingly pressing for the UK armed forces to become
involved in the community – as the era of mass warfare temporarily recedes, a
generation is emerging which has fought its wars in first-person perspective via video-
games. If the armed forces are unable to maintain their place at the back of the public
mind, they will find themselves with a personnel shortage which no amount of smart,
capital investment can offset.

2.11 Resources
This step is if anything more of a guide and reminder of the need to consider the
resource question and attempt more creative (positive) thinking about the effective
use of existing resources. The ‘New Chapter’ is unlikely to leverage significant new
resources, but given how difficult it is to understand where the resources are
deployed. It could well be to the advantage of the Ministry to go back over its
accounts from 1988 to convert them to resource accounting standards to understand
where it has been deploying its resources with a historical perspective through the
cold war draw down (and hot war activities) of the 1990s.

Using the MoD expenditure reports I have constructed a simple model looking at
where the resources have been deployed historically.

Figure 2.11.1: Ministry of Defence resource allocation 1995-2001.

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Clearly this form of analysis at the top level indicates the large sums deployed to the
top operational commanders of the services. However a breakdown might be more
illuminating when trying to establish where useful economies can be made which
feedback directly into a capability investment programme. I personally doubt from
my knowledge of serving officers that further significant direct (budget) and indirect
(programme delays) can be sustained without the services facing a greater
haemorrhaging of their best future commanders.

2.12 Supporting materials

This step contains the electronic hard copies of resources drawn on in the process.
This step is distinct from the support materials (2.1) which is focused more on the
doctrinal and policy issues. This step enables instant knowledge management (i.e. the
addition of further sources) as to with which information and knowledge the problem
was approached:

- Ministry of Defence expenditure plans 00-01, and 01-02

- National Audit Office, major projects report 2001

2.13 Success
This final stage in the process seeks to assess the barriers to implementing a chosen
strategy for the ‘New Chapter’. The tool used to illustrate this challenge can be
imagined as a probability weighted, critical-path assessment. Risks are identified in a
top-down, sequential manner, and the links from risk ‘a’ to risk ‘b’ are assigned a
probability of success. This approach tends to lead to pessimistic responses at first
from participants, however this approach does enable a quality discussion about what
will mitigate the risk of failure.

With this in mind the author would make the following assertions regarding
implementation risks;

Figure 2.13.1 Strategy Yellow - implementation risk assessment.

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Traditionally, failing to succeed with a strategic agenda tends to lead to it being

relegated to life-support funding rather than it being removed from play completely.
A good example familiar to us all is that of the Royal Navy’s carrier programme.
Despite the RN being forbade to think about carriers following the CVA-01
cancellation in the 1960s – today new carriers are on the drawing board. In terms of
the ‘New Chapter’ is it time to genuinely question sacred cows – and if necessary slay
them once and for all ?

The issue of political support in the fourth and last tier appears most problematic
Given ministerial turnover, and life of parliaments against excessively long
procurement lead time. A ‘New chapter’ would appear to require committed funds to
enable accelerated procurement beyond wartime emergencies (such as upgrading
armour on the Challenger 1 and Warrior in 1990).

Further the MoD needs to balance technical specifications versus commercial

development in the field of defence electronic procurement – I am reliably informed
that the laptop this document is being composed on, has greater , and more reliable
processing power than the system supporting a Type 45 air defence destroyer in
service today with the RN. If the future is going to see longer platform life – then
more easily upgraded (and regular) electronics refits are going to be absolutely crucial
to maintaining an edge over potential adversaries in terms of reaction times.

SUMMARY
Having taken the reader through a consideration of force elements, scenario planning,
goals, decisions, and implementation issues – what lessons can we offer to the
planners drawing up the ‘New Chapter’ ?

I think that there a five points:

a) Resist the temptation to develop a policy which over-balances UK forces

towards a passive anti-terrorist role. There are many other pressures, and
positive ways in which the UK armed forces can contribute to peace and
stability. By positioning this review in the context of last September’s activity
risks allowing one incident to skew thinking is akin to reducing car insurance
from a ‘comprehensive’ policy to a ‘fire’ policy after your own vehicle catches
fire.
b) Do not neglect history, due to immediate pressure to act. The events of 2001
offer differing lessons depending on the speaker. The attack on the US was
essentially an intelligence failure not vastly dissimilar to that of the Yom
Kippur War in the Middle East in 1973. In interview later with intelligence
officers it was acknowledged that it had become an institutional myth that
their opponents could not draw up and execute an intelligence plan for war. I
believe that the ‘third rate opponent’ myth has been removed in the current
situation – where relatively low-tech vehicles become weapons. Conversely
the US intervention in Somalia in the early 1990s demonstrated how
asymmetric warfare could see high-tech push button weapons being used with
no concern as to how they work.
c) If the capability cannot be delivered to where it is needed – it is useless. It is
probably time to accelerate funding for airmobile and cavalry (medium
weight) units over ‘heavy armour’.

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SDR: New Chapter Study (March 2002) Dr. Jeffrey Peter Bradford

d) Investment into more personnel efficient combat systems is vital. The UK

population is expected to shrink for the foreseeable future, and therefore the
pool of quality potential personnel will shrink. The Royal Navy especially is
in need of a rethink as to the type of platforms it develops for the next half-
century of service.
e) The New York attack was not war – but a terrorist attack. It seems many see
this event as a declaration of war. Whilst a heinous act, many such acts of
smaller scale have happened over the past century or so. Therefore any ‘New
Chapter’ response is as much about better coordination of intelligence and
policing activities as it is about using the military. The UK has always
enjoyed a beneficial effect from the world-wide coverage of the Iranian
Embassy Siege and the employment of military force to rescue hostages.

Methodology
Given the complexity involved in discussions of this type the author has chosen to use
a software based strategic decision support toolset to assist in managing complexity
and offering ways of thinking about some of the questions raised in the
aforementioned documents.

Think Tools is the product of research in the 1980s by the Max Planck Institute of
Germany into human cognition and visualization of complex issues. Today Think
Tools AG, listed on the Swiss stock exchange is a leader in providing decision
making solutions and strategy consulting to major companies and governments. For
more details please see the company website (http://www.thinktools.com).

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