INDANAO

REPORT

DIVISION

RON RECORD WATERS

RECORDS D I N A R S .

SDRPUS

V-5 OPERATION

I 7 April 1945 30 June

PHILIPPINE- LIBERATION
C l a s s i f i c a t i o n cancelled changed t ^ ^ ^ ^ ^

f e - ' ^ 1 * * * . * *fjw?r"

Classification cancelled changd t j p ^ f

(Name and Grade)

C l a s s i f i c a t i o n cancelled of changed to

by authority C. G. Eighti)

Date

Chain of Conraand

Prefix $% w ittpocltia* of Mmf f m n (CMI Itinat Prior to i d ) Prefix #f * Sfeetoh Map from Vmrikg Prefix ^3 3keteh Map of th Dinaiwi** ftrtf* Oowiana PoH toeationt and Hamtlra #f Operation* Campaign Aaaex #1 0.1 Report Annex #t - 0*2 Report A&nex #S 0-3 He port Annex #4 > ! Report Annex If Artillerr Report Annex #6 Signal Report Annex #? * Onemieal Varfire Report Annex # * fsgineer Report As*& ## Ordnance Report Aanex #t$ Quartermoter Report Anaex fU-Medieal Report Indiridoal Award* aad Deoration Roster of Offieere ae of 17 April 1943 Wistorleal Baek^nmA of the U*h Infaatrr Dirieion

The CHAIN OF COMMAND

for the
MINDANAO OPERATION
Commanding General United States Army Forces, Pacific
General DOUGLAS MacARTHUR
Commanding General Eighth Army
Lieutenant General ROBERT L. EICHELBERGER
Commanding; General X Corps
Major General FRANKLIN C. SIBERT
Commanding General 24th Infantry Division
Major General RGSCCE B. WOODRUFF
Commanding General 24-th Division Artillery
Brigadier General HUGH CCRT
Assistant division Commander 24th Infantry Division
Brigadier General KENNETH F. CIui^K
Infantry Commanders
Infantry Col. THOMAS E. CLIFF , Jr. (17 Apr to 24 June 45) Lt. Col. WALTER C. WICKBCLDT (after 25 June 45)
21st Infantry
Col, WILLIAM J. VERB2CK (17 Apr to 3 July 45)
Col. GEORGE C. HEBRON (after 4 July 45)
34th Infantry
Col. WILLIAM W. JENNA (17 Apr to 15 Kay 45)
Lt. Col. CHESTER 3. DAELEN (16 May to 3 June 45)
Lt. Col. LESTER L. ?ffiEELR (after 4 June 45)
list Battalion
Maj. CARL E. MANN (l7"Tpr~"to 6 June 45)
Maj. JACK 3. MATTHEWS (after 7 June 45)

1st Battalion
1st Battalion
Lt.^Col. JCI K. VALLKRY (1? Apr ia 13 June 45)
Maj. NICHOLAS E. SLOAN (17 Apr to 30 Apr 45)
.J. JAM3S Y, WILSON (14 June to 22 July 45)
Lt. Col. FRANKLIN C. SIBERT, Jr. (l May to 9 May 45)
Capt. ADRIAN A. D1ESMOND (after 23 July 45)
Maj. NICHOLAS E. SLOAN (after 10 May 45)
2nd Battalion
Maj. WILL G. ATWCOD (17 Apr to 3 May 45)
Lt. Col. LESTER L. WHEELER (4 May to 2 June 45)
Maj. WILL G. ATW00D (3 June to 11 June 45)
Lt, Col. JAMES J. STOVALL (after 12 June 45)
2nd Battalion
Lt. Col. ROY W. MARCY (17 Apr to 24 June 45)
Maj. JACK H. KELLEY (after 25 June 45)

2nd, Battalion
j. HARRY L. SNA7ELX (17 Apr to 19 Apr IS)
Maj. THOMAS CATHCART (20 Apr to 2 May 45)
Maj. HARRY L. SN^VELY (3 May to 4 June 45)
Maj. THOMAS CATHCART (5 June to 18 June 45)
Maj. WIL^ G. ATWOOD (19 June to 24 July 45)
Maj. THOMAS CATHCART (after 25 July 45)
3rd Battalion
Maj. GEORGE B. WILLETS

3, Battalion
Lt. Col. Ei\LPH L. DilTGN (17 Apr to 24 June 45)
Maj. LOUIS M. SZYlkSZSK (25 June to 25 July 45)
Maj. JAMES B. JONES (after 26 July 45)

3rd Battalion
Lt. Col. TOM W. SUBER (17 Apr to 25 May 45)
Maj. JOHN H. GIRARDEAU (26 May to 16 June 45)
Maj. FRANCIS R. DICE (17 June to 22 July 45)
Maj. JAMES H. THOMPSON (after 23 July 45)
Artillery

JLttiii i4'.i A * # a t t a l i o n

Lt. Col. JOSEPH H. HODGES, Jr.

g , Lt. Col. HAROLD E. LIEBE Maj. WILLIAM D. GKAU

p
i (17 Apr~to 25 June 45)
(after 26 June 45)

f?2nd F. A. Battalion
it. Col. MAX L. PITNEY

63rd F^A., Battalion

Maj. CiiRL W. SCHAAD
2.4th Cavalry Re connaiss ance Tr0op
Capt. RICHARD V. COLLOPY
Commanding Officer Special Troops
Maj. ROBERT J. DANIELS (17 Apr to 11 May 45)
Maj. HUGH B. TAYLOR (after 12 May 45)
24th Kedical Battalion
Lt. Col. JOHN K. FALKER (17 Apr to 27 Hay 45)
Maj. LEWIS J. WELLER (28 May to 24 July 45)
j. ALLAN L. HAYNES (after 25 July 45)
2Ath Signal Company Capt. HARLEY S. CLAYTON 724-th Ordnance Company 1st Lt. FRANK J. HADDON, Jr."* (17 Apr to 23 July 45) Capt. MAURICE E. TILTOK (after 24 July 45)

3rd Engineer Battalion

Lt. Col. ROBERT C. LEWIS

24th Quartermaster Company

Capt. JCHN P. ROWLAND (17 Apr to 24 May 45)
1st Lt. JOHN S. WELLS (after 25 May 45)

General Douglas MacArthur

Commander in Chief
United States Army Forces, Pacific

Lt. Gen. Robert L. Eichelberger Commanding General Eighth Army

Maj. Gen. Franklin C. Sibert

Commanding General
X Corps

Maj, Gen. Roscoe B. Woodruff

Commanding General
Infantry Division

Brig. Gen. Kenneth F, Cramer Assistant Division -Commander 24th Infantry Division

Brig. Gen. Hugh Cort

Commanding General
24th Division Artillery

IHFANTBY DIVISIUH STAFF

Chief of Staff

Col. HUGH CORT (17 Apr to 2 May )

Col. AUBRSX S. SEWMAII (3 May to 10 July
Lt. Col. GCRDON B. P j f g (Acting)
Afi (11 July to 26 J W y 45)
U . Col. AUOOST f. SaMSMACHER (Acting)
(aftar 27 July
H. COMPERE
Col* LfiUND F. MAIBACH
WILLIAM . CRUMP,

U . Ool. 0@tt9@i B. PAOE (17 Apr to 16 Jly 45) MaJ. RICHARD Bi m&* (aftar 17 July ) Sp^fliml Staff

AC of S G - 1 A $ 0*2 C AC of S 0*3 AC of S 0-4

Lt. Col. HALTER CUBKIRQHAM

Chaplain Officer

Lt. Col, PAUL J.

Capt. J H E. iABP (17 Apr to 22 Hay 45) QK 1st Lt, aAMSKL 4 , RUSE* (23 May to 21 *to 45) Maj. WJ LA A. KAIS ( a f U r 22 Jnn 45) IU I M Lt. G1. L O B, HDfAW, J r . BM K B R J . DANISLS (17 Apr to U ay 45) QBT H Q B* TAILta ( * m r 12 Bay 45) BH

ftata** Officer

Haadquartere teapi&gr apt. CRARUS Dl

iinwaiirttnf OfflMr

3U * B
Adroeat*

MaJ. WALTER W. HOWITT

U . Col. WALTER C. RATHBONE

l a ^ JtlLBM J . MASGB L t . C o l . KESWOOD ROSS l t L t . JOSEPH A. GAISI

Officer
Postal OfffMT
r****t Marshall
Fubllo Jfclaticme
OffI***
Qaartraat*r

Capt. BRKNETH 0 UHIXE

Capt. LLOID H. PWCK (1? Apr to 20 JTily 45)
1st Lt. ALAi* BSAUMOHT bftw 21 July 45)
Lt* Col. AOQ0ST f SCHSBMAGHER
(17 Apr to 26 July 45)
Capt. CLYDE . SCHOLTZ (after 27 July 45)
Lt. Col. JAMES SU PURCKLL Maj. BILLI J. STEVENS
Lt. Ool. JAMES B. WALLER (17 Apr to 28 Hay 45)
Lt, Col. JOBS M, FALXER (29 Kay to 23 Jialy 45)
LEWIS J. MLLSR (after 24 J*Xf 45)
iii

Slgsal Officer
Special Senrice
Officer

SUE/GAO

VALENCIA MARAMAG
III

74 v

i 0

M0R0 GULF.
ZAMBOANGO

NO JAPS)
'3k

4J\t

DAVAO
GULF

*te o end
O M M Y DISPOSITION ROAD NET
3.0

SMALL GARRISON

45UP PT5 ALONG

STATUTE MILES

MINDANAO
6-2 ESTIMATE OF ENEMY SITUATION
" PKIOE TO LANDING

17 23
APRIL COTABATO

APO MOUHTAIN5
6

JJ.ULY \MAHlDoqJ ir-24

SAMAU SEE DETAILED SKETCH OF THIS AfcfLA TUGBOK MINTAAL D ISLAND

ZZ-Z& APRIL 26 3 MAY

BUtATUKAN

DAVAO
GULF

/
\ )

lo.ooo

id,ooo

3o,coo

4.0.000

60.000
Y R S A D

g ^ = a

8lcth Hut # tfe* *t*lil* 8*if*

MOUNT MONOY I8JUN[

CALINAN

162

14-la
JUNE

WANGAN

5OO

SCALE
IOOO

2.000

3000

4OOO

TAGAKPAN

9 JUNE Zl

2.

NAMING

9KAY-I3JUN

MONTEREY

SHAJ NGHAI
31 MAY 2JUNE

TUGBOK
MINTAL

MANAM&ULAN TAN KELAN

O ALAMBRE

4 MAY HILLB550

AIRDROME

DAVAO
MATIN A . AIRDROME

DALIAO AIRDROME

DAVAO GULF

5AYABA5

The HN A A O K A I N which* together with the

I D N G P S TO P % in the worda of General Douglas MacArtnur 0WBplefced
liberation of the ffilUmNES,,.", i e concluded.
Considering i t was to be a major operation, &% was m , Before the first wave touched the beach on * #
a l l thought i t mm to b "Just another #te t * l e t , while the
i i mm s t i l l on the high seas, the operation began to %$&* em
which were to mark i t a one of the aost unusual i a the Southwest Pacific* Just thirty**** hour* before tern 2na> M I to take plaos, order* were received that gmarrilla JUt-sat ti:on M U A G D C K the original target, and th* INI Wld ABN RW, test Snatead at f W ^ Pivielcm took the change in i t s atride mm a
organiisfcion, i&tdtm Pangea were to be regarded a*
^
wm$ti Since FKAHL HAEBGfi, the 24th had eoae a lon ed autii,, After long aontha of A tactioal defenait* aKsion
accelerated training in AUSTEAUA, ataging at
snd the waraing up* operation at
opened the long awaited oa^neign for the
SPIKES, landing on mm WBm* of LKITJU The
were technical^ well-trained, phyeioall^ f i t , $a& peyhoioglal
% prepared for the bitter struggle which followed* Wita t
tory, and eubeequeat eueoesaee OR U \ tinder it belt, the 24th wed the lemma wiaely and thoroughly in staging on lOHDCfeO for J J on KINDAKAO, Hit narrative which follows will t e l l atoh of the ttoiyt ttul i landing lit POUOC HAfflOBi which saught the mm? l t f the lightning drive of 140 ailea in 17 day wfci^ afffcalanee j the attack on FOfiX fUlt by watr# Misg
d *gttnboat8 j the oapture of DA?A^ key to the eiie^** d
of the islandi the gruelling Bopping-^ap operation wfeKsh
- tejg ftfter the caapaign was officially closed. I t will be sewn how th baek door" landing rendered useleas a l ^ g n pert df the Jap dfene system. Us wsre expected to sake a oostl^ $mm& to AA l^Mi .% the D V O OUUPt where during several years ^ # m#B& bid built intrieate defense works, including large naval eaid mimte* l^ry guns, tank obstacles, nine fields, and piUbenoos*,^sJtl joint ing m the gulf. But w did dot do the expeetedf our rftpid dvanoe over t^e route planned by the ^aps as an avenue of retreat &ad nseaiermai pillboxea uselesa to the *&*y becatise they fflted H i ' W&m i f i Soaething will be said also of the heavy rains m* tortuotis trails that sapped our streagthf advance* ifitd mm&: t0pm air supply? the fighting la terrain never before 6d in the Pacific, from dense abaea grovee where visibility was te n i l , to mountain wilds never before explored! Hie heareie
displayed by our soldiers in bringing suiiOiee t& tbs
y g
and carrying out wounded j the indispensible offorts of
Quarterfflaeter, Engineer, Artillery, jftwliiwi^ Air Fores,
mid Ordinance units. ., ... . . .
there i s another part o? the story which written, word can , the story of the lead scout and the mm mm M l the of the infantry team*.*who hated Wie war but f e l t a t h r i l l m*m$mg the' deaths of those who had gone before, who were afraid b l but took another deep breath and went on i n , liio ^eaised of pmem and fought harder to hasten the day, wtio aet m& donated . ^i ^^^ superior in numbers and artillery power* in the final analysis, s t i l l wins wars* .;- - x

DiTieion Coaaand Post Locations and Dates

PiRANG TO BilVAO

17 22

PAHANG

(1100

3BAWDOAW

2 b KAB&KAS

26

KI3ANT0

38

TALOiSO

Narrative of Operationa

rea^^atiagui^Msd mmrd of the 2i*6i alTi^ioi^ tb g*oud of fcia 01m chooaiag and ha* opened &m wap i i a tl f tfe d t t l f th J f % wufwat ooagrata&aUoa* to tl ^tto Ittfantry sioa poa th attaimwat of this

22 ) '
Tlw dlstanee and pam of th Slith infantiy

destroyed bridges, raadWLo^cs^ aa^tuibesf awl inaoaeraKl the infmtJpy spoaiiseads t r s w s K i liiO nmd Uea in I f
t i l e #fftfli#% Mft.ii. iad,tll i ^ i JWBfyftttiWB ft

in
M/F^^THHWUFWB"

TffSWWspt ^f

W^W

T(HJPI V H X

'^^

^ K j F .JPF^^^W(^

^WflP^BTiiF

WMpw^pp^fl^lWwHiPwp'Ww*

^pWi^TWWIMIi^^pJ'w'

SIB^PJ(S'Pr

were rtsparted i n the Et A area , the lrt t3ng fV O f ^a|>aaMise f<sr^s l a th fh&tppijm** ft* mm& had

had t&zw yftawi i u t^ieii to p?n$&m against the iziwit^ Ha was m i l jafo|>ard* Ha aaqpecfced the invasion to ooae free sea, dirUy on D4VA0* liost of Ms guna faced tha EA7A0 Our Girerliflffid baotedoor attack aaaghfe hjs *witli his paztt dowoa followed jaored thsrou^i owfy IdLad of laroj^Ual terrains

ridge~sfctidded $m$*G$ mtmp* and tortuts maintain 3&ft flowing rivr*3 exrantey populated ^f a oongloraeration of

luarge auctions of MIHIAM0*3 rain for^srfcs haare y irfjlte am, Mauntain <^ains# dgaainatod ty Iff* A O P

f e e t ) , follow a gonraOL irtlv*outh eourao thrtw^i the The broad loaor cqurosa of the MBWMW HIVSE proved upper mfl0 and TAL0M3 RIV^S in the Ud Mnto-lnnd of the oat difficult fIgbfclng ter3rain of the T @ Invasion plan oallfid for a landing tn foro on th h OD AAA Q O Shores of M H GBLF md the 9iau of M L B N AXH3TRIP, O B of the largest and best <m the iflELand| then for a bold drlv a Into the oentjrat vs&lm' of $tim- ialmd via Highway #1, the S H eould b md# to DIQ03 on M A GtLF, tb^ioe iwrth alOTg tho VO ooast to E l d <3TTt# TMrtr^aix boors before tbe sohaduled aaault, Infonaatlon ieodvi9d the* Mltliam mom had 1mm ftsiftsd by Hajosr Qe w E k Ftw^.%1 SttiNtertf,fff^w^fi^^ifgtbs X ta a ^ l tharofore dlsefcd that the i n i t i a l landiug bo sade i t P R H AAO I M J f^oi3pd a u^iangd i n tin* J^9isJ*iMi pl^ixis ^bdUye the s t i l l on tba high seas*

pr-lactdlag asvidl teteNtoa^ began at dawn on 17

For over two hours our rulsors and doertrocrers poondsd

Fourteen ta^id high esploalv ifoalla w t hurled
against tbe narrow landing area, f olloswd fy a rooket barrage*
W&IQ

18m JlttJi infantry m^m$& mm&md a ^floating r

aervo", th^ 3d mttallon # gyn lafontry, landed m 0300 at BAR43 ani amr^ 15AL^aWG 3TRIP and town* Patralo isr* sent north toward MKS IAHAO, which was reached m X9 April, and south toward PAEAfja* C i 20 April, tills $&m& mm w t ty a patrol of the ^ l a t Battalion, ?ast lBfantryf wfelch had 9detid to the ncrth

trm PAR&ftU Ho mm& aoatocts **** aad@ At 0900, I f \p~Ll, the first wavs of the 19th Infaatxy Segiment hit tbs beach at PAS%sa* faa landing mm *m$* i a column of Battalions in tha orderi 2d, 1st* ai 3d Battalions*

IteginentaL Soabat Teaa drow rapidly inland t seifia aod soouz^ til towi of F R M and the high ground ncrth and sottUi of P R N AA 5 AAG

tho i n i t i a l bea<*toad seourwi, the H T started i t s O sooth cai Hl^hwagr | | to liaise HOflMfOy The f i r s t Battalion morod ctff rapid3y aisd Igr 1^00 had MD Jfordd ths IOT0&H and A B L HVSS3 am 9ifod the high gwoad four mQ&a southeast &t fkMm* fh atjO-foot bridg

ths A B L RITSH had been biujnwU AH mapons aai Md had to be carried through theflfeoultteivdaepfiver* At
f

the | 4 Bfc passed thevp^h l t Bat poaltiooa and oot^inaad tho Ihe Division O was set up 1m P R N shortly before F AAG At 1230# the f i r s t Battalion* 21st Infantiy, lanced aaad 2d Bn, 19th Inf, of socority of the i n i t i a l tachheadU ims cta^lotad at 16U^ and the 2d Bn 19th aovd denm Highs?ay n to poaiti<m one oila acmth of PARANG, fh* m Ba 2lst Xnf came aolwre at 1330, faUowad ^ U 13th Fi^Ld. Artillery ^ t t a l i o n t which want iirto position to support tbs advance of ths 19th Infantiy# Ofenrater ra^onnadssanoe fsroa Ht? % TinAPANOAK POIOT aal St froB PAR^G past P L O OL C to the ostuaay of Hie MIHEASIO HIVKa f a i l to Hie 2U^i Bacosnaiasan< IV )csp# % tho end of the firat day a atrip of the ooaat nas in our ha^la,' the QLviaion Ooaaand^r stepped into a epid^r hole and eaaorgod with crafted riba, Ooloael HHiaa Jf Vrbeokf in cctamand of the 21st Infantry, bacaa the f i r s t oaaaalty of taa The OolonaL isas washing Ma faoa in a helsat and a final *3mm ^hm a sniper firad# ' Ths alug toro across his baok# h btirst frtas the auk-macMm g^ of an alert toppled tha lap out of a txiilding twenty-fiva yards

m& third and l a s t Jap killed cluriir that day*

Ap*i3* tk* l ^ h W ociamonoefl tits drivs t o w d l^aportant pmtaHriheftw junetica of F R HOT* aw old OT installation. The third Battalion, in the Vsad,

reacted tha a m i IlWfc at approximate 0930. The bridge had bm de^ro^ed and tho aattalion was dela^/dd. I t sad a crossing ei* narrow p3Unk, posbod on aouthp the road jimetlan of fEgtefars i a s l l ^ a ^ 2^500 yards route hud bft

aotioa to our
made f t ii^>osiJ3ie for organie traapo3?tfcloii to iMg? up with 1st BftttaSlicsi, 19th Iiofmtry, was relieved i a i t posi- Uon four Lies 3E of PAHTO t 1000 Ip Oo^>aj^ 0 of the d Bn t l l e t Bn 19th lurched until

oomunication, incaading the 300 radio, was oat # fir@d ^ar sh^la at 20 imite iiitervala*

Si ardor

mm&, oontacta i?r laada daring tbo night* At f J ^ 3 aapportad t^ sartar and ^ o ^ ^ the partooter of tfce 3d 3o*d road bloak detaohaeot yards watt of the i&gtagr ^inotioo, Tl asaaiilt

dead Japa mrt ooontad at suorieft, The vms ordered to proooed eaat to eeis and secure FT. PIKIT* C . Wm mm date, IB April t tho a s t acr eobarked for H PK E? by ^.^ of tl^e HII?0\HAO RI\^^ If ucoe*3ful this mnt around tho ri^ht flank of the adTOndr^ 19th nould oat off a l l Jqpa bQtwwn ff # FIKIT and PAHAM5. The plan for the tlao MII3AIIA0 n m n i alao to dctraim i t s suitability as a mipriy m ^ % Thou^i no mm wm mm that

tho river was entirely navlgahle, i t offorad the strategy of t^ie iaan effort dcwn the highmjgr, at least as far a Duo to lateral roala oonnoctinr ^ .un m&mw $1$

troops could ba Hovod to arp/ threatened area fro* tho flank* And aborts a U f i t ndr^t prove to be tha <jiioket stbod i f aupplia* to ff # PIKr^^bttr than i i road along nfelflb

Absmrd t,O& and aapportd by gim boats of tbe Boat and Shore Battalion, the M M f e ^ L w , th* 2d Battalion Ctasca* &ap6$f} of the tbo stuaiy of th M t A A aiVB8 After a BB H O fi^a mx&et bosfett tilt profiaoial e^^al of O T B T OAAO at litre M & otit north aai aooth oa Hl^saa^ | $ froa t i toim* f G^apair (reinforcod) posted of Wm ICEHBiHAO EIVSU % ^p Atl70QtFa

w l f OOfAM^ d i m 4 | f t and took wm?m9 22 nll

>

but i t U beUerod that the rootogj b:fi*wli ^

to tbe assault dram tboo froa tho tcwm^ 1*e Cteapa^r In f or blvxmao Jii tb vtoinity of IOS<)POQ# In tb aantlaso^ S Co^enTji Tf^iffh had a^>aratd f t a t BattaHon tOH M % aoved to t i itamtk lfflefe ^ ^ 0 rtww

toward OOTASAfO, A relfflforewl platoon ored up-riTmr and t ootsotdi F Ooopany at tha ^olnt iib@r. tlie MINmHftO HlfSH into tho north aid touth |ja?an<!feefl#

On 19 April* the 1st Battalion, 2Lfc ^ifaatay t oootimd to 3iare t^e b<wffhhiaad and patrol gtongiv*%y i P. air?tiow i a th^ iOMil area^ * j e ^ patarol to t ^ aarth towtfd tb 3d AA S Battalion waoh^d a pola* about balf way Iftetwwa P R M aadt

idth t&B 3d JMrt-ffiiii.ffi ruttr^l on the nazt day* ' 3 (~ 1 pUtcwn) l e f t ft road block dta^Bjent at TAH0G4 and 3cdad tb 2d Battalion at GOTABATO, An S Gaspvty patrol tactod the l^th lofantiy at the Sanction of Hl2imaor #3.

at
ttowgh 3 R H Y to th* aaln road l a front f the l?tfe* Th SKAA O OO riitforcd j&atooa $wm I .tagyttor (la the L M P G area) $*** traUoct up-riwr to tJLANm^JG, seitd north smd aoutii e & road* then pushed on up to f*X9ff FEUBGI* It patrolled wp the roi toward FT* fSEff for 4 distance of about two B & * S and tfaaa are* On this day, f CcB^wBiy gf the 3bt&

wae in the proess of dtoarkatla and a&vtag lato

i s %lit Tlcinltsr of P4EMKI, .>

On 20 April* a &oro earae Into the p3?tnBtr f P

He reported that a .lap offloar had ooate t MM t&mk

to the rlv^r oroaslng at UIAHmsaf It 1

tb daselEnfiss andffi&dkiI d s WSBT t o
. . . . . : . / . . ' X

H not C y described tb@ Jy M a aboat cL mM of PDBK^OG, |^t led t i w to the plao fli

fiea?c banzai attack atrocA: the flaidt* 1J ^ 3 sttotod

flis wa^jany fill, back toward the river, leaving out p a i to oomr $m witbdras?al mm mmmmMi W ^ %

Crouchad l a t i l l sword graaa* tb .Miam%;%l# saw b*ld tfedir 09a

. , . . . . . ; (

<^ o^bat^ Oat o tiiB l e f t flank of tba oaaijafly te htfld Ills fof1? ^jf^tiigf Itad isltli^awsi aad tfeaife be uss

he decided to sljoot hla way oitt# , Be tCPad ti * ' move JspB aa h staggorod toward tha rlvw MLa raAsad Id* s<soi to 13* ;. t friendly native in a oaaoo paddled hla t Hie astoonded oapoBsr lHMid the

todk owr the ilvwr *oad KLoeile* fNa 1st Battalia**, closed at L F & *' daak* TS point of the O )O ious column reached fftXftt Fm^S% Battiy A of the 63d Fild th 1st Battalion, 3Utii Isfaafcry* Oft a AprU,ftlaraeaxtsof the ^33d Boat and mm* Battalion f heir inprovlwid L 3 CM

eapturod f f t PHIT i n a surprise thruat,

off PIKIT, and soon afterward, thlr radio Hoisted Tho 1st Battalion* 3btfe lafaafcry* l e f t proceeded via iratar to P^IIXJ P L thence verlacd ft
\ ' .

toffiffiffijlj^ dl69Q@7lt8 (BSjtii|3^0di f p t ' *@yt 3 t XoD^

Tfl0: QyMi

JarfctHy followed the saae jrmstfty as did of the 3^t& BST# Eighteen haur i w e requlyod for a

April, The 2d Bttalion follovTwl )# the 1 s t ^ t t a l i o a passed tbe 3d Battalion on NUI,im RimS and

of tfe rod Jomtioa aid: aaidbag <afeaefc with t l patreil fro 1 Coa^aay, 2lst Ihfaotry, ^B^Lh had oa ns>rth oa #< fixa M m i ' T 3 firaft alsa3b b g

tff the litadii^ elwents of the 2d Bs^talioa i s fflilefl mm #1 and 0

t

^&ta Jfapa wor ldlld aaid of f

^3 next dagr the 1st Battalion ld tlwi driv twaJ Three ^ tiukf stores of rid** s*d a standard !<iadfltiiig t gtMTCMGAH, id at 130f a torm of 30 tbr@ s l l e s east of
figljt^ t*be Japs Y&thdr*3Wj takiag t i w i r ' f f i a u n l t i ^ L^i %H B f W ^

foroe iaa reported moviag aoutfa tw^rd

the l e f t flank of the RCT, The l a t Battalion M rah8d * point approxlaatelj one Kilo asi of the jsagtlM of Higfewapt -& af 4Mb Passing tiarewgh ti*U point, itara&i of the f Battal aad a ni^ht Ml <a^raarefato seise andttLookthe road Hear aLsaents of the K T prepared to move Tia isatwr from C

wae attached to tha 19th Rtfr and prepared to ^oin by from 'fftjftltd to G T B T , tfa^ioa by OAAG l i ApHa t t e 2d aai 3d M t i l i c M pasaod throng tht wad near OIUP aod tomot w twaml ?IKK# $!& aovieai as oontiawd dufing the 22d aad 23d of Jjfccll with only laor troa the eoaeyi I^e i t Battalion toolc the 2*ad im

coiafcacted and fUini4 elBts of tfct and took $vr the awourity of IftST PIKE?#

sarefe of &&%*%* nil* under ^m mmt had mmmmm thi

p&rt&tloxt had put the b^rt^u of told ossmyixg ott tb*

for the Qtttir aitffiiae# aloag the wagr# fbe l a t Tber^e mm waoy ha*
Ba^talioa Ktde the ^hcOa mnfo m

Five e&fltty- trad, three of iMfib mm bodaywtrsqK>ed,

grtruction crewa of the Third Ooobftt Sngiiwor Battalion toiled and a i ^ to rebuild bridg aad to aooop outtos?wpasisto divialon au^illifr &* lep pao idth the KH of the aldXIful iagwmity of the TMrd the ooatini0Uo of a eal&e draoa raft to feriy >seps satd the 30O-foot LIBOmAIJ 8HSR* Th p^jeat i3 the vd.nch line frm a heavy truck ^ ^ dragf^ aopoas river aai fastemd to a tree on the oppoit bank* FroB two blocfca msm$m m this oabl# ropes n ^ i attaclied to either m& f tl they constructed nit& htevy planks* Lieut, ttrif nho
' - v 8 - . . ' ' '

ma In charge of tim ooastmction *nad t took iiia own jeep pullocl the raft across ths <iw all through His M% wading waist deep, pushed the raft baete each tine for the next load. and te&l**ra tswt art aoroaa* Airing tlwt nl^ht, 39 loaid jeeps ^

laoveaent of the 21t HIT up^var fro acliievod in LC3I<s. It was a riaky a^loitation of mtiM bars and hairpin tutraa* o ss&eg&ng foUag f w o th

th@ rlvor iu negotiating tli tight baida, QB <a the pm of 4 navaa. 2tft cteteetod oo-^aent asaoaog a projcti; promoatoiy aaci promptly c^nadl flr% bend, an Aasr L M gua boat isms surp?ia&d % th G to-ats md qiaictOy r e l i e d iaa kind. Tb duel nded when th roaaiod the b3d <H 22 %^JL the 2d B a t t a l i a , 21t Infantry (F

mi aasessl&ed prsparitwy to iaoring fsgwNL to I Battalion i n M4IAMK5 ami tin lsrt> BattaflLioQ in

a s s a i l e d , boarded 1,01% isovd ^ t^s M H M H& & (X:f ^\mfO and MvouacfeBd i n tl iricinitsr of BJ ^l & ^
t o aas^bUng at ra$ P3SIT* di 2U April, t

samt eeabai%9d at OOTAMIt) *or tba BKire to PIS!?*

f tha m ^ M RlV^i greatly faallltatad

of a awpply base at PISIT, Goastruotion cm Urn
agnifIceiit abeal brid^ across the PULAmi RlVSt at
tbaree yara ^30 utei tho Js^s took ovor^
spans had been coEplotodOTIthe PIKIT ide

and f tliosQ, the second had tem 4mte$<&&k Ferries workl around t i e aloblc to overone the traffic aoagsti<t at

often lao ore than a mtted, eratar-atudded* om la&i track* vdth ta3-l cogon grass actually s e e t l ^ over -Use road emtw* G Utfe H ? >*ic4i &so aoatfca earlier had stcsraed COft from the ooa new \mwm tbe leading aXeamt f t l divisica^ ' %on arri'9^ at FIKIT, tto 2)i1ih Osvaliy a^coi^' uadAanc9 Troop was relleTred of attaeisaent to the 19th and i*as atta^iod to the 3itth* . ' ' <

Th 3d Battalion, 3Uth Infantry^ &ea**t F R PIKIT at OT 220800 for i'vABAKAft, At I3-0, tlie battalion had mmm& tha luaportant r<d jtmaUoa of the 3ATHS HO FA and Hiainax ,^1# I HI Y At 1710, i t reported that a aotoriaed patrol to K B K K had AA A contacted J^NI tait had not detmiid t ^ i r Btrength or iM plamed to attadc tha neact & B K H i s the junctlcm of tl^i AA A and north-*th hf];ha5rst I t s aeisure, i n the nords of ISa<j4rtJbitr# "cut the Ja|>anos f&r&m in MH & A l J O KO Battery & of tbe 63d Held ArtiTUry m079d t the east aid* of the fMHtMi ferry, about ox ad one half
B&13
#

dosn-rtvwr fro the PXSIT croaing closing in firiaag

position at l00 # At 1730, C Battay odowd at the mm . During tbe night, the road t^cfc detaoiinfc at HJ w^r ?fl and #3 teUld U Jap 3oatlad Ja^woaeae aaall tar fire waa received in tba battalion peritr I AA A vaaoed oa K B O H at 0630 on 23 Apxil, and pased throng the tswn id-tbout oppodtioi% UMI conpaEer, iaim one lft to aeouro the ferry crossing of the Mtm %mm&X m& $XVm$ two arri mm quarter^ ailoa north of KJ tha oa platoon was i n position to ftrnxre the road: A aotorised patrol from the battalion drove adles tm&mt og ins,|0r tha i^ght At 1630, an estiBafcd 6t000 ratioat

dropped in t! battalion area. The 1st Battalion, wMch had beon aeeurir^t Ft>3T piKJT and

' 1 0

"

the air sti*p t was rolievwi by the 19th IniSantiy, and the 3d Battalion* The Raslroctaa

aftf It iStm. M M m& g%

'

During the stgsfe of 33 April, oar night borty banwd and strafed % flaro at 0010 a ealtaan of 30 Jap truoki # miles north of K E S N on 3 T K HiaifvAr. Ooedi results re r e p o r t s A ^A AR tootlwr

strafing misaicm at 1730 hit $ trucks In tho v-ilnity of th

of tha 3Hh wre OR the mm* at dawn on Battalion (-F 0o) aarohed frea th* wist &* of th PAGA 2Z13iff ferry alonr; KLglssasr J i and <U>sd at th road O O p Hsree hours lateiy they- t out ^a foot and l^r ^O ?Mh$ ^ilch ins neaohed at 1700* B Oofflp^r reXlavod I shuttled to HIM?* The 3d Battoliont t i l l leading the achmieed into SAatJim, only 30 M i s s froa rjO3 m The 2lith (^al3?y Haconnaisaance Ti-oop was now

the 6na^' f or trh lagr w s attwa^afei@piidl #tt the vieinlty of the B^AWKAH telag point, lAom a fscaroa f to fifigr dlay^ the aias5o ^r gun s ^ rifle fire* fl BMwy ae frwdi to Th Rseoiuiaisaanoe Troop raBaiaed *t that potUoa uasb!3L f t procaded the l a t Battalion i a aootbr thxufc t l Kdlla from th gulf* The 3d Battalioa mcmd to
...

"

in security of the bridge and hig^ grottod oonwfiivttjig tlit

to D/aAFUAT* The 634 Field Artillearr

of mLAFUAY at tba end of the

\pril t ofti onfer tvo or item h&un a&u&d a m?

11

held tap the otonaod eaansufc* of tbft

tb* Xits BattaXion, prseetited Ijy tlse CJavalry led off from B IA I A at G3O^# A rear ^ard of the A' FT T to aOlow i3re advance sevwal adles a*t at noon* :. A the iafmtiy roundted a bend i a the road aod proaohod a fcuraiflg bridge, two m#4it guns opened up, tbs lead scc^t and iwsiading anotJhar with *^0 oaiiber iaacfcira pm% bat ffftceiv^d Jay rtam fIro

fire was iapdiate3y placed out t^ie Jap poaitloot* inc0caarl03 set the wxKis on flp# the area* The aapamse abandoned their f^ei and Afeywpassnae ooastmetedi ani t l 1st Battalion MTOiaokod at the next destroyed bridge* Battalion, mm Mm the 3Le% and tibidkbaA roausfced this polttt >, 500 yards fartfaar east* . Thn a patrol pj?esed on to Halfutaraotoj

f rard agaio undea* eovor of tho aiortar barwage and

bridge aTter bridge s U U

toiling.

At the l a . t point

the reconnaiasan^ balf-tracka Ml just rounded t l approa<^ when the fl<ad^ Hips

groups a t t e s t e d t aroas #1 froai south to north gii9r ower of daa?kaee3# 3ffllght raids upcm rep^drsd badges bcwa^ a c^waoa oeoaraaea# On this dagr, g6 April# the Dififldo # displaced A stubborn Jzp detmm of mriQS and to B/iVAO uas anticipated* ?o smu*e artillery ypporif the 6jd Artillery oeeapied positions sine v&lm from the gedf# ' d

April had set out tram FT. P3KIT bound for the east aeaet, was known to bava been m imported* mvmy air and naval

Japanese disorganisation became Br and more apparent along the road to DG S Fifteen Jap tmoka ware found abandoned along I OU the highway, SOKG c^ouflaged with branches so froahly oat that sap s t i l l ran free thea*
:

The fleeing Hips had abandoned quantities of eqaipaent and food, Msay truck* r loaded with rice, Biwiac areas shorod

aigna of hasty avaouation* Hoast chlokeno and rioo on ta3aile# ware s t i l l i^arau Tb 3Uth E ^ advance guard 09wn?a the boua- . darias of & maps on three ocoal<mf and additional maps* along utth rations, were dropped from the air* The wroHg*wsQr8

useless booasjae the fire lanes pointed aat#

In ffet # t i t

division* a offenalra prciaeeiddt aloaig a route ^feldi ths Japa had Intended for a fighting retreat. > for one Japsnene plan which tt^>td to boaib ths thefiDByair f oro was ntn>-oi8tant l i t tl

'

" \tfiah tb Sipe ^ l d tand aM fight o n could get X

i i l i x x x z x x i x x x x xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

neerao

April 26,

x x *
x

&

j shewing the official % S# desire to divert . x hssoefront attention from thair toga lowes In the t i l l th C4d t war t h t theater, partiaularly i d the C4djaai^ aeotor. oa AprU 20, one division of American troops ma landed l a Cotabat , 3cnrevry furious attacks ^r our armsr and mvy g are oheeklng enao^ iufiltratioB attaiapts towards the aortfe ^id 3E, according to f roatlin dispatohee reoeived hare fro ^>rU 20 to 23. ^ The enee^ f oroo i s trying to nie ue of tl Cotabato ^ Biver, bat our close-range fighters are checking the enea^r M a t t e s t s , especially i n Parang* On il other hand, enemy boabinga and ahelHng are % beiGg answered furiously fcy our artillery forcea.

At 2000 on 26 A|srilt two Japs attea$)*ed to demolish a brldg owr nich the advance elements had passed* Thy oar

rid heavy eaplosiTO charges bat mmm. ktUad before tiy could #1 any damage. From hero on into 31003 the mum? ained the road extn3ivly# Mines nero staggered along th road at ^0 yard intrvaia taterouis 2GQ~pound aeriaX bombs ?w set to dato nate isben attached ropes wore polled* Others, noee up$ wsre . at to detonate uadr preaaure, Two thousand yards wast of DIQ03 TD'tfH, Highway ^ turns at % right angle for 300 yards, acroaa th DIQ03 RIVSR, and thonee aat to SIHAUILAH and nortiHaat up i&m ooant* fhe 2d Battalion found the IEOOS RIYSR bridga 03%>liely destroyedii i Goiapany patrolled adong the higlmay north of th*

river for about ^00 yardu ishisre i t enoountarad & group of Japs and teLUod two# At 0^20# Ootapanlee 0 and H aerod S5 along th rosd to ! 0D S 3( O i The moat *f*&&m wmy atand thus far enoountorad was aade at the crossroad in DB0S fOUfH, The advancing troops mum . under lntne Jap m china gun and riflo fir # plus m$ki$m shfiUs of undetermined naturo After a aortar preparation, a second attack failed in the tarn of strong Jap positions, consis ting of iBuiaaU^r supporting p i l l boaeas and entrenoifflQnts i a bashes and hi^i grass* 1mm& advmea, prscodod % rtiUaiy s t i l l mat atrong resistance* FttUowiog an air strika, a fourth

attempt failed -^in the battalion was unafcLe to advance after reaching th road crosaing, and a withdrawal was ffoels4 for the night* ..;

The 1st Battalion l e f t im \&m&m &*m& 0700 idth i t s objective tha seisuro of SIMUILA^ It eOoaed on the 2d Battalion at 1100, then following Highw #1, crossed the DIGOS HIVSR and turned east. The battalion halted to ttToid caadng into

tits danger area of the artillery concentration being fired In support of the 2d Battalion at 1220, At 12l&, tha battalion proceeded along the higbway to the junction with the northsouth road whiah f orns the onooslng l a DI003, Tto bttalioB

halted at this posiUon to recoimoit^r t ^ high ipround aboat 200 yards to ths north* Jap aaofcin gun and r i f l e fire *** received* Since a l t strafing, artillery, and mortar fire failed to mats any appreciable affact oa the fortifioaticaaa, and alnee tba battalion did not hold eoflaaanding ground, I t withdraw a abort to The 3d Battalion came up to the r E G RIVSR crossing area* SO S the 2iith Hocomsaiasanc Troop advanced to T P S DIQ03* At J PK 1100, one platoon, reinforced by one 8$I$E! of riflewm, &stf*& south ^.th the niaion of reconnoitering the trail m far south as P&MM AIRmoME, By 1600, the patrol had reached the dross and found i t deserted It returned to the troop on

fm batteries of the 63d Field Artillry fird for the l i t aid 2d Battalion* dariqg the entire noon. The platoon of the 80th Chemical Hortar Bftttalioa into position mar the 01003 KIVM road junetion, prepared to the acfctaolc of th 2d Battalion* It rogiatered night fires and ooneentrationa to support %h attack Wm

The air strike jNteSiod for 230700 # 4 not matarialiae* Aftr an a r t i l l ^ y and k*2 aortar barrage, th 3d BattaflJloa 2O motod i n and secured th road janction $M Q Q 3 V 0830* S real oppoaitioa waa anoounterad* Tha battalion pa^ied o SS along the road to the baaoh, halting only long ^xough to plaoe one in position to assist th 1st Battalion attack on At 1020, the 3d Battalion, 3Uth Infantry, stood on tba baoh, looldLng out oror the Wm fttr of DfcfAQ The 1st Battalion laughed i t s attack toward at O73O* Snen^ ma<Mne gim fire froa high ground north of the road wm eliminated by a concentration of U2 aortara# Caae oompaxw m sent in a flanking mov to the high %#wsdk. The battalion made 110 farther enea^r eontact, aad at 100$ was in 3HIAUILAH* Aerial bombs along tile road wore disaraed m the battalion proo0ed0d. Two *^0 #atitef. machine guns and tiro 6* in

Htft 2d Battalion spent the &gr destroying aad aaking a thorough aearA of th* a3pea# ?^^

f Company, reinforced, led fey a platoon of the 2ltth && Wf HconnaissanQe Troop, agfted tiy aotor to secure P 3 B AIB A& & % WDM. Ho enesgr contacts were sade* 4 1700, f Goa^ao^ re ported extensive fortificationa eonsistiag of concrete and oocoaiat log apilaoeja9Bts dofOTKJII^tho droiw nts but too extmwiTO to b destroyed t$r do01tlon aatrlala to tha% ^ CSos^jai^r soon ^oiaad t Company ta the dfw sad ** caiity of the airdrcme. .

H*e ^apans had prepared lutrioate beaob dfiae at CMOS* For the banefit of Aaarlean reooimalasano planes, thoro <lnra^r gfinfny aadUi of lo^s* faille t x ^ sflfly*IKKI"IMKI t^Um wctflffHti aloog tJw beaohea* Strong pHlboac* d^ffflided against beaeh' Wooden, undanmtor pilinge along tha placed i a aiagle row spaced at $foot intervals to prwmnt piling* mm imrisible at hi^i tide bot above t! watr at %m tlde # fsio strands of barbed wire

%|p "to|* Two 2*)a aotiairei*aft gmiSf aorrouitdad trapa and eatrewthaents irer fotajd cm tbe aa hUl the two 6 guns near 3IHA0HAH* ; Othsr aflW*aft garni mm ^aBfUisr stou^t on ttee beachf : SewiPaX wtnglAyMi guns of * tjfp* aot previoaifly anoountered b*r the reglaBnt were fouod.
' . . ' ! '

There

mm M mw twin-prc>peller torpedoa, Bat^r aerial bobsf' aboa* dant supplies, md eq>iipeent of a l l t|pes were

moat aadaoicwa and rapid infantry .m&mmm T t&ft N ^ t f i l Wm$ Qeneral Woodruff eaidt I am rry proud of wp mn and officers* 1 thiiflc tile

division has aecoa^ilisb&d a feat whioh, X frantOy thought i a %be begiaaaing t be vary nearly mm thromgh JStet*. W refaoed to *ee J^ps beMnd ' e every tree, '' 1 eaaght them expecting aa attack fro* the other dlaorganized thoe and tept them that

stiffened as t l 2Uth OtrUion gggfe 15) tb ooaet of mi? toward the erter of mV&O, oenfcer c Ss&mm* ou3bur and influea^ to the inkOipjxtoas aino the tum of the

l a frcot of the tamope of tho 19th

\slmka oonsioted of large troos f^llad aeros coastal i-oadt covered t$rffiaohinegan and wm%m lr9+ On ^#2631 aM 27 April, the 19th infantsy ^trmd tyr mbor m<X foot M i n i the aclvmclng 3fctfet MP Qtt 2B 3?*S5.iKBat passed through aid to^c up

2mXLm t o ^10 north, T*11 the 3d Battaliaei aovdl mm**

l a at laaaeuror to pa?otaot ths Hardt ^af tho l e t ^ X andi

t l saHfel^f the 1st BiHyUil had pushed on to 3 H A AT

&t jB$ft^N% T& 3d: B&ttoEli8& wnffl 3999994 ^

#

jB^ffiy

cOlosijag at 1900*

Qscpany 0

ssr^h t o is^aault acid tatoi At a^jx^aataay aldnigj^ tfe* short af tli objective* Ajftsr % brief axoha&ge ^ f i r s , t l #sg i n fear tli t^maiadm'of tl night, 3ttaflLl furt^r roal destruoticm ^r th@ eneo^ in tiiia

4% 0?00 on 29 April, Gospaay Q moved north through

and A3T0HQAfee##*being stopped tgr heavy aaehia gun aid mortar
fire at a road block approximately l|200 yards north of tfcda town*
0 Coffipany mneuvered into position to develop the situation prior
to the arrival of the rest of the battalion* Upon joining Q
0cxspar&9 the battalion engaged the enea$r but was unable to break
through the resistancat Artillery, mortars, and an air strike
were placed on the enemy pooition with sxosllent results* Again
the ^aps withdrew, evacuating their oaanalties as they went*
S Company flanked the mmqr position while one platoon of Goapany
B f 3d Sh^inoers cleared away the heavy road block* The CSavalry
Reconnaiaaanca Troop prooe$<tod9 tellomod tgr the 2d Battalion
to a point 2 miles north of ASTOaaA, not far froo the lowsr
of the Q4H0HQ AIHFISLa,
The lat Battalion remined at SAIfTA HUZ as a reserve
battalion*
f3i 2d Battalion had advanced so rapicQy that It had gone
far beyond the effective flank protection of the 3d Battalion,
which was moving laboriously overland throucfc incredibly rough
terrain, this battalion t herefore tamed south-east and naade
a difficult march to fOBAM,
gfaouation of the six iiouadad m m was aocoaq^liahed isith
difficulty* The battalion was confronted with % 2#>*foot
with alaoat perpendicular aides* Infantrymen could climb
up and down, but litter bearers had absolutely no chance of
negotiating the w a U s nith a load* ~
Major Balt0 oojsnanding the battalion, poted 300 aen at
short intervals down thm sides of the oanyon in a long human
chain* Carefully the wounded men mmm pissed trm hand te
hand down to the bottom and up the opposite side.
It was noticeable that day ami night advances had been
30 rapid that the eneu$r hast not been able to destroy all th
bridges ijmasdiately north of 3AHTA CRUZ.
Shortly after Q6QQ next morning, 31 April, the let Battalion
aotorized at SANTA OHOZ, moved north* and paused through the
2d and 3d Battalions. Near 3IRAWAN the battalion was hold up

was defended ty nai^ine goj^ rifle* and aoartwar fire, ArtUXety reduced %tos obstacle and the battalion piiaa

aggressively onward* BALIQ AIRBUS u *esod at XU2O# A AO O sharp fight marked tba taking of T L H iteelf ;}u*t at dfciatc. : Hiring the night, the Japaneae sade several harraesiag attack* on the diri^on 1 a lina of oeramiHieatioaa* Oai Ittp ran into the kitchen of the 13th Field Artillery and 4mm n botype miaa* It did not e^plodo* Anoth raiding party attacked a bridge budldlug uait of tb 3d iRgi00 aad managed to blow the Wjvte olf & lwndoar m l b^Pore they *%* drtifwa
The vita TAI,<3 BITSR

^potidd iar the b*id O o iap lma attting nonffhAlant^r In ao the oontr of the bridge* with hla rlflo aittjag, m i f
AMHHL^SIMI

injii afatffrfpylffiil#ffmffl^# ftos xaoliljae gtm

dashed to the head of the oos^aiy aiti went into aotloa tth oj>wJ* It was evident that tht 1| n> bridge* Sflrvor^L 4aps www kU4 and

;; The na^ine gun aootion mat into position to proteet bridg through the ni#it#' Jfaat anp te% a Jap ti?u$ loadtd i^roattMd th bridg0f i t # Js41lht gTari^ga Tl opd fire the ^twi^si^ld shattered,

oaeae to a stop i n the <Jit<^ ftlsoet on the #4g* of the 1^9 Japs i M war abift Jui^od out i a a l l direotioxiB bfor truek stopped rolling, M^r nwr m% ton before they reached the cover of the # M t roadatcte growttu 4 few ijtee later another truck oaae into rim* I t joined the other in %h& ditch*

that night, a Jap orept across the bridge irith baronet h lieutenant hot M i with his piatol* The Sip sprawled dead alaoat on top of one of the oaohine gwia# & second iadl viduai f i^o ran across, ffiet the saae fate* liearly a aoore of dead J^>s ere oomnted the neat morning* ' , '

torn M Wammm M & * thro ocefeafc patrols & md ptoowdad to oontacU Following after ths

ti l$th Infantry m i
foor tdles of mVAO, Gafaaxy mmmmAmmmm aooafcod
Infantry adVEeaoed ad fmmd

at tis g^a o m$m

the ^ t i laiasisr tai beB aotlv^ l a steotor. 4t 1-,<X) 29 Apzll, t l 1st Battalion ^9^1 Infentsy, In the o^ijunter of tba ?AL1\3I,I tlw ;M BafctalioB ( - F aodl G OpattUa ) a o w i to

F oaiit fbot patrols daring the 4m &

T^PW^Tt^^l^J*. "^(Wr^lKPiWSpBfePljiwip ^ i ^ iBflBfw^^Bii^SpB^f JBt^B^Wr ^jJ^Gp i^B(P'SFT(WHBi^HflPBIHp|p Tl^^iPflp^ppp^B^^fc %^WHHF vfiffptJn0^3lr VHK^SHWm

11 tUNi vtmtiidfy ol* t t e

boa^i, but w r e ropulsod* i& 0^30, 29 Aportlf S to W$M 3KK)% ftaiot l y traU aorth^aot #Afecwt t^o tfjytts ftp tba ^pscL3. I t noa(Uilb4C9d a ataall gEttup of Japa and &&*& f i w A J^j iitiimn1 WJ.1 was Idlled

to mmro t l 031003 ta^% tab&a t

aowad to mmm t ^ cross roada In ranrB toa o r^sorta I ^ R air

looatad aloajg tiio <a3t ^erth of UAL/O^O* Wbrtoan meoA^ v&tk a t m i l loadli^ to a poiafc on eoaet i t a m aoteirines ^92? s^prteef l a good of 30 |ti@fe of n^or at i t s end*

20

The principal aotivity oft 3Q *&?S1 wa i a tha mm

<ta4w><tate..

<iteg eonnaitr tmahed farthfls* QD t h a t r a i l and #aattt3rad

ool^ra^ oC J$|Mi. <i#feiiaa?NHi at. loop nor 9Mit

At tiie <&*& of the day, the 63d field A r t i l l r was

mm

leading not froa the DIOOS-UAI.AUa road

f ound to be heavilj ialnod* 4 Hiili|pli Awy Oaptalu svportati 2t7OO of 3^000 la^s nwre Pdtari t IVAO froa t ^ s ar^a ^ ^ B ti Aa3Ploaii landing to aany cat the &s4m$ this f oro ww sow diapoaed in ; about five and or half alLoo of M L 3 U ai rufioii^ some 3*000 yard* somth-wnt froa that point* A AJ }
WI ^19 mm?, r^poptad to be i n poor health bat wall amad, T M

aswitiug dewalopiaantff i n th ara*

Oa 28 April, th Zlsrt Infantry I^g4jBt i*frtad ft Corps Eerro to the control of tha 2l*tli atvisioo, and at at AA A free K B K H to juln i s th tenadflning front of th Bjr 30 April, the l a t aad 2d Battalioxa aud Canaan asoerablod in tha vicinity of TINOCOL, near t i mmm AIRFISLQ,

for thd line of oowainioatiOB* along

Oa X May, 1^ l a t Battalion, 3Uth lafantiy# as ordtorad to pppait for aovaaexit l p traok to th LI33ST AIRBBOiBS aiva* - a battalion af?d out at O O O to an a3mbi^r area i n the R 27O vicinity of the BALIAO mwm$ l*tr in the day the battalion

ralievvl elements of the 2d Battalion, 19th Infantry, at ti * oath end of LIB0T J H E M ^ I I The 3d Battalion ( - I

t h e i$&Si$ fti*tHii,

aotioo daring the tdgfefc of J ^>rll

contact*, iar^^

4 patrol to the northwwt cxmtaeted a At

.^

|Kaitio% protaotad ^ aeroral aaohine gaot and 3 knee Mortar*, the patrol at this position zofteived 30 rotmde of ooo^r estimated WlMt 7$-raa f i e &3d Field ArtiUry placed fire (ma loeatioa potted |@r an artillery liaieoii pOaef b^ieved to be the position of ^i magr pioo# th terv owumd while the hib was l a tb air* At 1600, the il% thff d^SHae #f the day* t$Mi
;

s&dbad gaas pea4y to issgiattri .:

''

Appreadmat^y 2t50O yards north of t l ooa^aay lo<sated a Jap sapply ta^ OB 2 Sa^% The position had wry i^caatly evaeoated. Th# patrol fond a

ne

' At G&Q on 1 Ha * sai taftiiaated 30 Japa attatewl t l I p@riaet@r* . T^e attach was rajwlaedn. klllsdU 0k ^ t Ftv of the

the Saqpsditionary Battalioe of

the 103th Infantry lUvisioa (P 1.) ratLieved the 3d Battalion, n the 0I(K> located 3 ews aad p4HJbeBee% aad deetroywi Jap ? been billed oa f Uay . ^ 6 N K aortar fir f*om K Gaapa^r^ On CRI 5 Sfe^-, tfee 3d Battalion ass#1^d ad moved to the (HSift. area, Oa^ai^r* ^ tti miaeion t e twroh thoroughly tile asea and to the c>rt^ ^ ^ aa^or deetrflBT a l l or s e a t t ^ all Fbr the poip^e of <aariiy i a the aspositl&a* the
ad aetlvltiie^ of t l v a v l ^ i e&OMtt&s of tlie d l i
Iw tamated siMaltaue<mly i a a %
iene to a poi&fc feest 3tited for a kreak ^ ^ eMft to

NJ

Japanoao foreo* oppoaing tho 24th DiTiaioo ia Pfotinlo of B V O w o nuaorlaally oqual, i f aot anpoftor, in AA atrongtho Froa tho boginning i t appoarod that tho would not bo auffidont for a auoooaafvl tho bulK of tho onoay atrongta* It *

(X) th LIBBI-MIHTAL-TALC8IO RIfBI

. ' . . . * . .

ft HILL 550, an4 (3) iwrth f D V O U lslU IUB i i w tht AA thinly a i d i n g the intironing triift# poi&ts, th atajr uX4 thn b t t* p l t i i i i t or prsad bade i * U savago and

Japan itoatii y although hplat ia th Xmg b oalltd **a* 30 April. f th My.

* -

MMPX

Mi t w a i n mmm In

Prir t ur arrtfal at T L M , a gr*t dtai. *f MM? i AO O waa o#Uct#d *a* MiJNUUiUd by th Staff, f to* 178th Unguagt DtaehB*iit, ada up f AAtfia # xtraotian, had aaia this pMibl, QpwatiW ffcft mek

fti diarias wr tranalattd and ioUrpratad* iNNHP f BUX Mtiattd in th ldntlflatioa %t any unit* atiod, tarlli * ting t Q-2'a kn<wladg of tha idantifiatio #
* . . . . : ' . . . . . . . : . . . . . , . . . * . .

d loatlon f JtopaaMi fweaa in tn# araa. iaUd 4 Jon* waa diatraaaingly aoaorata aa ta Aaarioaa "Tha fiay*a (19th fiCT) Una af CaMuoiaaUaAa la and ia waakiy gaardad i a tha cflfcwa pMltlaa, 7brfm# a U suioida partiaa ah*ld ba aaat *t t it th9 LlaM f Ciniiicatlna> Should alaa mtm guonrill* Utl# U a*p tho

ilt

*
tho oth of lla* th* aoralo of tft japaaaa*

fighting man wa higp* Thia waa tha pri*d ia th* diTiaion aurfored lt hi#*t *aaaaltl#a, fagt ita
23
' " \

bitterest actions, ma.de progress in terms of yards nad not in

miles. One prisoner, captured May, stated that the phySi
A month, later,

cai condition of the troops was excellent.

&fter a steady pounding, there was no longer the same optimism,

but little lessening of the will to resist.
fitte actual disposition of the Japanese forces suffered
from one weakness. There was no unification of the staff func

tion-between the .Army"and the Navy.

, '

At the time of the'American invasion of the Philippines,

the command of all forces in the lower group of islands was
vested in Lt. General Morozumi, Commander oftthe 30th Division.
Rear-Admiral Shiroya was in strategic command of the 32d Naval
Bast force in the DAVAO area.
Because of some puestionable circumstance, Admir'sil Shiroya
was relieved of his coifimand and was replaced by Vice Admiral
Napji Doi.. The ultimate fate of Admiral Shiroya is & matter

of conjecture (as is now also thut of Admiral Doi.)

As a result of the reduction of the 30th Division and the
annihilation of its 4lst Infantry Regiment (-3d Battalion) and
the 77th Infantry Regiment (-1st Battalion), by our forces on
LSYIE, the command of Japanese forces passed to Lt. General
Jiro Hirada of the luuth Division This investiture of au

thority was viewed with displeasure by Admiral Doi, who was now
in command of the composite Naval forces, comprised of N<avl
Co*t>t Battalions, Anti-aircraft units, plus miscellaneous air-
ground liaison groups. After some discussion, the two officers
Doi would

decided, to partition the DAVAO area between them.

defend the ground east of the DAVAO.RIVER, Harada the ground

to the west. Doi set up his headquarters at HANDOG. ' Harad&'s
.

command post was at BUMALANG.

This reorganization of the Japanese forces had occured

in February and was known by the Division G-^i on 1 May from

by th 19th SCT* fit* 324 ***! Baas ?** was rfaniisd iat 5 BatWOiaa fit. lot and 24 Battalisea war* dssltaattd * ocaprlsing th* l*f% Bank d*t*r Fr$u Ths 34 and 4th BattaUsaa iftit up t*wT Right Band* Sector Fros. Th 5th Battalion *as iaditatsd as th DI0Q3 Dsfsnss 3sotr Ftros. ?& organization f tho 100th Diviaion brlgftdt th* 75th ouMtndd bj Mftjv Q^ir 76th oootfmdd by UJ<w 0wri Xao fhli ith fr InIhfantry SftilalitM *ch 165th, and Ib6th Indpndnt Infantry BatUUtos; !%! , 352d, and 3534 Iadpendent Infantry B*tUU*w. 1**r* M N

th 100th DiTialn ArtiUtry, KWth DlTil4D , 30th Qttlio ArUUry, 100th Dlvii#n Sigma ttolt, Garrison Unit, a* ! ! as tmur Air Flld ittUM f tfa 13th Air Setr By 1 toy, th dlviln wa dlprMd t* tfr tM rftds leading nrth fHTBThl, TU8B0K, and Q H L R , I U AAG ff ir 34th Infantry had alr#ady BM int oUt ultb tlM IIBn In tn Q M ftr. thii i thought i t bt tlw wup $mm UA had iftratd fr*i DIQOS and
th control f thi 163d itBn was
/ the DIG03 Dfen 3otor Fre, which withdraw wiUi th try battftlionc Slwnt3 ot th 164th IBn wtv* at BUIIAWAi,

165th IIBn waa tm<juatin th M H O - I O ai^a # laaYin* i t t th A D OBA Havy, Tha 168th IIBn to^t up p^ition uth #f AIHAHBaS. L3BT M M a coupled by t h r o Airfield BattaiiM ami th 352d i E O HIIX 550 wae dfndd by th H *nd 4th Saval B a i U U m , Tw lna3trTrtibla fact* iMrgd f r m this

^apansss wauld aat sarrandor in nuaimw ' tr<n la position thy wtttld fi^it t th iad

$m m 4*m*tm POU* I ***** ***** utti* mm* *** *

<rlQg ditpalr aad a fMliAg that th ! ia4 b dteaU. A# th# diviien UtF lcarntd, i t , m m an inar*a##d f%* *f withdraw!, an
: ;

%* mm cm,
hOl aata, knwn a HIU, 550, a ta* kfty t naval b*s and hap trpU f th W I 4 . tk h l U

tyj* f JapaMM araaant4 as4 th

ttaok xta4M iMrthtar4 Yr th afci* a # l f Ui a f WM 3,000 jarda. ,

:

'

:' . fh*

gtuu *f a l l

at n
goas ab44*4 la noft, awl r*ktt i ^ r t f i i t i twm

May, th 19tfc Xnfaatry Jtwpd *ff th# f th *P1T t Ua Inaaalnf at) jotlv#WTAO*

bank f th* T L W SITSft and qannilft< tha hl^hm AQ

. ^ . ^ ; . . ^ : . : . " . ; ; ;

whioh tha ft^Uaa adtandng toward JUUO mt fM,

Ury craat f uh h l U , and oaUad fr iwar/ jaatiar f | f t t Aft#r a brtLT fight, tha aaapany tk th# y l U t t i ad ad tap f th h U l ,
' . . '

AfUr aamuritt* tlM pMttlM^ th

"

A galUuit****** aaourad tha fa^ward a m *f t** k i l l *** F*ur 6" aval gun* and * larg* *MMm* *f *Mttal*iii *** ftapturad. fa*** gtina w*r* inap*ot*d by fciviai** ArtiUary **4 found t a b * British 6" n0fer*HttuclA ftttt* prafaably f* tit* *f *lM*t guo tiad by th artiUmry l i f t *f *b Pitld ArtiUry B*tt*Ute. But *h*

$*** *t b* * altwj d i m e u l t and ft 8IU. 550 Hftfl br*ka wXy a*t*r 17 daya f a*ffi*X artillary pmdln, and dtanalntd infantry atiarita, Tal aeUn will b f*Ud a$ hrn*lgi9ally a p***bl*# lHwir,

1* * by-pasa#d within 24 a*tira l a *ta> *4v*a*# ^* 84110* C* paay puah*d m **%* *i** * lMttiwhing ar*a R *b* atar fc*ak f t i 0 V O H i m prit AA f tha araaaini.

MaanwhU## r*ala*ano* ta *ha diviaian'a * ! iatt* *h* Japanvaa bald oaaatal plain w** d*Talapiag * ati^agly *lnfi th roada laadOag a*9*H and waat Um tha gulf, alaag l*ra anany f*raa had r*tir*d, 7h 24 Battaliaa, 19th Infantry at*ta4 * Jmat nwth of 3ALIA0 AIW)ECI Mi aalonn bagan t a**ing artillary, JiorUr, haavy waapwa, and Ugnt t m fir*, th* battaliaa waa oawaittad ta aaisa tha hi^h gwmnd rrl*fc~ ing tha airway frwt tha MITAL paad nrth t th* t L M JUfSfi. AQ O Alang *n* *** f r T L H U M T A tha battaUa* 0mm AQ O UTt *tf*gly d*fndad aariaa *f Japanaaa p#aiUtta, Thia d^aminad raaiatanaa w*a fir** taah*d *ff bgr Ua 24th Cavalry ftaoamaiaaanoa Trmp, whioh w* aU*w4 by ** J*pa ta past wall into thair paaitiona bafara hidd** gna ap*n*# fir*. Thdir fir* w* waa wild and tha *Bfctr* patr*l f witb * U *

guna blaaing, managad ** tern i t s T#aiole ar*nd and withdraw. A pa*r*l in tha f A C O *r** faund may maaHina gn p ^ i LK tiana with oMWOtlng tranohat alang tha baaah. r*r aaer*ta pUlbaajia 250 yards fri tha baaon *r* fofti wl*H their gw faaing tha wator. Tha **4*i |4*r wa* damg*d, An**a*r p*tr*l

found a well stocked meter pool diiap.

On thia same date, 1 Siay, at 0230, on* Jap plane dropped ac unknown nuober f beato* in the vicinity of DIGQS, The 3d Battalion prepared t e join the 1st Battalion in forcing a cr<wsii^ of the M A RI?IR the next day. VG At 0650, a May, % Company aeved forward M i Heaped tht read from the 3<* Battalion** position to the UttBehiag area, and providod security for the engineers oricing on tllo SafHI HIVER bridge. I t was isporatire that thia bridge bo repaired

in order to get the engineer assault boats to too launching asta on schedule* At 0900, Companies B and C aoved %Q tixKUr assesbly area on the south bank of the riyer, Ceapany Q had oo^lotod l i s recon

naissance of a secondary fording s i t e , and an artillery barrage vas laid on the lee House Point area, the intended beaefe&eed. As th assault fcroops of the 34 Battalion aered ferad tevard the river, harassing 20-n and aaohine gun five was received trm the vicinity of the h i l l s aerttaiost ef the road. According to plan, Ooapaay 9 a t t e s t e d t e ferd the Hver in the vicinity of the D V O water reservoir, AA in the flood stage and eould aet be forded. tb river wa

As the aasatlt

troops approached the river, the eaear l*id down a ange m the intended beachhead. An iuaedlate ehaage ef JSUIIS wai indicated and the troops aovod up-streaa 809 yards t e tae B ? O AA mm, bridge. One spaa had been entirely destroyed by tae Japs. Bagineers hastily oonstruetod a poatooa feet bridge eetween the spans, Voile salves from eaeay 6 and $* gmns pemdod the lee House Feint f C Company rushed across the preeaHeas bridge, asd secured a imU boaohhead. % Company quiesOy joi ** took %p the right fl*ok. hilo K Company was eroesiftg, the enemy dis

eevorod our ruse m4 quickly opened fire on our treeps with machine guas and r i f l e s . 0 Company was ordered to attaek noitiieist aad

destroy fche ene*y * ** high ground whioh was firing m mat beaehhead. While 0 Ceapany maneuvered, Coapany I aade th trussing e Jae opposition proved to bo rery strong, which i&eladed After * diffi~

a 2Q-aa gun, aertara, oaqhine guns, and r i f l e s .

ngagoaont, the Jap fercs wr d8trdyd and th ground

end of LIBBX A'IRD&MS by A Geapaiiy, 34th Infantry, and in to aop up the M TH AlHDRQilS, AI A .

On 3 May, the l e t Battalion (-A Coapany) dreve north frea O Y O along the east bank of the D V O R i m against AA AA e&eay resistance. As the battalion reached the northern

ekirta ef the Pity, a sharp engageaent develops** the holding the high greun to the north in the vicinity ef reservoir opened fire with saall aras, aortars, and aa guns* After the d e s e support ef artillery, dive and aertara, the battalieo aoved in under oever ef saeke and eeifted the h U l , capturing 2 naval gone/ radar eqipaentfeBd ejattf* euosliea* file 3d Battalion finished ereeeltts: iHii i^eeap

end rapidly pushed into the city ef BA?AO, Ceapaaies I e4sd L aered abreast through the. oity, A few trapped reanants ef the

feraer %amy garrison reaained to harass ear in a series of skirmishes in the streets and in the houses* Soeuring the north-oast edge of the city, the Jd Battt4i4* petrels en to S H A A A where only scattered m&p*v reeietanee AT K eppesod them* , ;

1 V U waa Infested with booby traps. During the days MA that fellewod, the eity was repeatedly sub^eeted t e eaejiy t i l l e r y fire and infiltration by Japanese snipers and tion detaohaants. BifXe fire dircted at ainea strapped te> th bellies ef demolition-bound Japs blew aany ef the atreaa the rubble ef flattened and depopulated BA?AO# 29

Wm than 99 prooi / DA7A0 had ba dft*tr*yd* 0. * fctabs had ** 330 building*. A city anginw i*p*rt*d that III* Jp had diawmtlad 747 D T O raldno9 a*d aartad tha AA f f t int tb hill*. With the vanithad buUdl*g **afc tt*

ity a 19,000 JapanM aiYilian*. Not saoy <*ay ftftw i t a capture, th*una4l f f l U | l i i i tiimggld inta D V O a iok, ^a^Lahd, trrifid &** AA, Itt^aa* Baldara atxon, th dirotr f DAVAO'S Mlsii pital, ttifid that 35,000 FUipinM had did and urdr duriog ^ m n rul.

aapaica# th# Jap milXttrj tabarlPid A an

' .

and aordar whioh nrtually xtmliMi%9d %tm ln f|f outljlnc qnwunltita, Tha 19th H T had ijatd i t s rord 17 4a/, 140 * & O , aod had Misad i t s b4otit, 0AVAO, 0a I May, F OMap^n/ rliod A Oo^aAjr f th HEX 550, On 4 May, th 2d BatUU ( th aaourity f ttATIIA In th B B A aia by th lt Battalim, 34th ACL try* ?h 3d Battaiian aappad up aaattarad paalntt *f Q V O and diapatchad patrl 2,500 ywrdi %mmH C B G I AA A A OO thty drt grtottd lrlad aotl-airfft J6UT# Owr ltaod th nay guas.
^ . , .

Th tQlL*mi&& iacidant i typical / tha praia***rthy ao tian *t th fild artUlry battalidna. At 1900 and 1830 i 3 May, rund f a l l U tha 13U Fild ArtlUry a r fron Japaiwa* artiUary pica ltatd i 8BX 5fO. Th batUUo adJuaUd and tii yarn nr# i&tatt** Th n t awning C Battry adjuatad on an oMKy piw la tht mm iittity, Hi* batUU firtd 6u tmmU and plaa*d JO% within th aaplao^Mot. At 0930* tfewrt Urgat. i &

The battalion caaandr, u <fcu Ufe# t#k mm gun fvm C B*ttry and 40 rund* f HS-Af ahoU and avd ta gaa *** th D V O RIVSH on * fXaat. AA Si thtn a**4 ** ga iat*

plao* diiwot fi*# n th* MplA0Ma^ AA <tul fUwd. Th 5th round

th iferfttiu* and blw up During

* ,.

* * knoi* fHS 1OTH R(2P IV

At 0830 a 5 JUy, tttr lt th aorthat fron l% p w i t i t o (hlU l a th D V O

AA of th / and
r U r , and MWXX ara fir*. Ai U00,

A C^)anjr Jlni th patrol. Thy wltfcdw UHloaXiy %+ high grtuid and in F Cdapan/ o HILL 550 ngagd an ttiaaWd 25 Jap, k i l l * 4 mt th ny. It 1* indiaattd that tH# | a f i f

In artillery tftaai r#pHd that aany f th at^r in clad oav8 and m%v wiiMld t t litttUt i t b Jttght inch htnitsara, adjutd by th X3U FiXd out 5 ny nawl gua. At 1500 5 lit/* 3 ia th rgiotal O P f tin n*rth*ait f th city. h i d hi O * May, th Xrt BatUUoi n

*staultd th<w pMitioat and m.4* a gain f 300 yrd ftaft AA 3d BatUli<m continued patrXXiag aroad D T O aad CABAGOIO. % rad* In thia a r ^ wr infaattd with ^ patrX ard f#M oonntry through XOM Myf trraift Qm %*!*>**& p***l ** easting tward ta

at CAIAQUIO wha, nithtut warning, a 250 fia< ariaX 31

riggod AS a aino oxplodod l a tr*& of tho U t t l o f t i t s * , T# similar ainos wont ff * ** squad's roar. Tno mm wort % blown m% m the groqnd, and fortmntoly, ft* with too *

ftn H

wipt tht m imoirt ttwlr &Mi An air *?** i HAS assign** tt dss4n i f It was ngaged in bittr fightiag in that ara fr

5 4ft? and subJot4 to rapatd laiiMi atUvJcs* OM ^ atUofe oaas at 0400 JI 10 May. Rao4 t aatil 4aa. At da^brtak^ I Cwpawy I Ctspany anca pXatn frta QaaiKB Q<sfflmy W *f tlw ntajr I Cfpaay rUafd t t# th b a t t a l i a a r ^ on th nwthastrn <ttaalHs f DfAO, A 0t*& f3AIIAX, r*tttrt4 B 6 Kay ao*

XMatin f appraitly 130 ^aps #A tiw vat *lit4 a4 at U09 4*pan4 by two* t# kt-titn U this itlaftd. aiat at^hibisus traeftt r attalM4 t

tht oafltot taa fap th SAiUL I3U j w t i u ftMPtt^ti Wtt

. ^^^w^. :^W^^tjt^a^t^|^tt^s^ , aj^s^^B|r. . wtff^p s^^wisfttili^P^^ t^BiftT^^^W .^t^p^^^^ptj^^s^. ^p^py Wwtfl^^t^^tJ^^ I P V P W ^w i

trp4# MS thr^rn tiwisr tht lsa ThitX i f U t i* ft blw i f f ths rtar htl aod t i t tbt tint*: aftjri, Th par-

Mimsl dlstonntaa and Jiln^i tbt plats^a i f AatitaaJi QttjjiBj aioh guaHlag th bri4fi, I Owspnny r4 via L?Tt undw o*rr #f 4arbitt 7 V*J *t 0830 was in p*sitUa i f 3 M L tw tht attMli* AfUr Aft A A oaptttrtd. Ths Jap biToae arta ihawad igM iT M M * patrols woro aispatohad to loeato oaosqr iatallaU otpoeially naval guns or rtJUIiy'f&m'tt^ ltUnd.

Tho onav harassod Co-pany , Ifth Infantry and snipor firo as i t roUovod F Cos^any on U i forward Up
32

of ,HILL 550, At iaoo# y May, f** M Division mmm & regliuwUl eontrol and praparsd to assanlt. ' ' .

E t a 550 in foraa*

S i Ditisioa ArtiUary plaoad jt** & i . H I W I t prsparation for taa infantry attaafc, fcxa following battalions firad froa 0620 to 0630 on 10 Mayi *3<fc and 524 (105 howitam)*

utn (155 howit*ara)t wmm A* M)i (155 mio) howltaws).

* *

troop ww* in position at 0630, 10 B^r* S and aowd out abrwwt aaa drwiotd 800 ymrta toward the objetit in oa# hour d*ipit wiv aipr and saoJxin* giu fir*. SPKs firing point blank with 105 h<wit*w. C^paay 0 aa afttjittd aotoar of Hift in aftarotwith flano troopa t h mottiiMNl harr fiv* frai watuall < eoawuidiag groaad to thai* froot A flanU&g m*m

m*&% prewU wamwte*9*tol9 ** to tawaia diffieultiw* WMtom fir* was $ftti on th# poaitlona waila tha imm&& sXMmmt* mmm* rarad to taatittal positions^in propagation far artUXnrjr ttm m*

0730 to 0730 on 11 May, DiTisloa ArtUlwy again plaaaa

ihnm luidas1 iAt^Stta fix* fwaii imliliia gontf nortajm ^ i roaktt m# A 4*2" aortar barna was laid on tha opposing position* tha fovwajra slovly At 1115 ai air strito, artillasy t aaA

loaatloas was roportad as vsry satisfactory at U00 *&* wm of

. AViM^ppJP' . Wjy ipsj^^s/^ SA4K ^MWWi^Ws|y iBJr^r^^ ^JpJWP^sssa*sji^W*ww 'J^P^FaSsp*JPPJPflp

At M on 12 Hay, tha forward slaasnts of tha 3d BattaUoa Jwpad off # ooatiiudng thair attaek northward* At 0940, sap*

portia SPi narksd with saok* tha gaaaral aroa of a roakat tar*

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gat* A m&

of 9,000 poaads of HE bcabs mm droppodt foUowad

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by a strafing run# At 1015, another strike consisting of 3

planes with 1,000 pounds of bombs each was made*
At H 3 0 , the forward elements advanced 500 yards through
thick undergrowth without opposition* This placed them within
500 yards of the objective, the northern and of the hill mass*
Here they observed an extensive chain of pillboxes, believed
to be occupied* Artillery was placed on these pillboxes, fol
lowed by an air strike of four Napalm bombs and a strafing run*
The battalion pushed forward* At 1400, Company E, left
flank of the forward elements, received heavy machine gun and
mortar fire from the north beyond the hill* Company G, not re
ceiving this fire, continued to move forward, pivoting its
left flank on the B Company right flank, thereby taking ad
S vantage of terrain for better offensive fields of fire*
At 0800 on 13 May, mortar and antiaircraft fire was re
ceived from enemy positions located on the reverse slope of
HILL 550 to the battalion1s right front. Artillery and air
strike were placed on the area* Companies E and G moved up
to secure high ground to the right front and to eliminate the
enemy positions in that area. Very heavy resistance was en
countered.
It became apparent that it would b tactically unwise to
attempt to assail the enemy's positions by frontal attack.
Companies E and G were pulled back to their former positions* .
The terrain over which the battalion was then operating
consisted of a series of small limestone hills and sharp draws
heavily covered with rain forest and tangled undergrowth. Pa
trols had difficulty in moving off the trails. Observation was
very limited except on the crest of the low hills. The formation
of the ground made it almost impossible to dig in.
The new plan was to launch the attack to the northwest to
flank the positions from which the enemy was so stubbornly re
34

sisting. Enemy artillery, rockets > mortar, and machine gun fire
was received during the night.
F Company launched the attack at 0730* Company E was
committed to support the attack. The company advanced 200 yards
before opposition was met. Here the enemy opened up on the ad
vancing troops with all the fire which was at his command. The
company was unable to advance any farther in the face of such
superior force.
The estimated weapon strength of the enemy on the battalion1s
front was: 2 rocket launchers (one on each flank) 2 4-0-mm guns
with excellent lanes of cross fire, 6 knee mortars, 1 90-mra mortar,
at least 10 machine guns, and 2 75-mm field pieces. These weapons
were well placed in caves with concrete embrasures. This estimate
was later confirmed* An OP for Division Artillery was established
at 1545 The infantry withdrew to the high ground 500 yards eaefc
of the enemy lines and took up defensive positions. During the
next two days this area was constantly pounded.
On 15 May* the 2d Battalion, 19th Infantry was relieved
on HILL 550 by elements of the 34th Infantry, and moved to DAVAO.
S A M ISLAM)
On the evening of 10 May, the 19th Regimental CP area in*
DAVAO received concentrated fire from high velocity shells which
burst in the air at house top height. The shelling was from guns
on SAMAL ISLAND and lasted from 1835 until 1935* Darkness and
rain prevented effective counterbattery fire.
Company K, on the island had been engaged in extensive patrol
ing but had made only minor enemy contacts. Its mission now was
to locate the enemy's large guns, which were thought to be in-the
area opposite SASA AIRDROME.
A Jap torpedo boat sank a supply ship in TALOMO BAY at
night on 10 May. A PW had reported two such boats somewhere
on SAMAL.

35

K Company scouted to the north on 11 May and encountered

machine gun fire* It was ordered to withdraw for safety in
preparation for a naval shelling* A PW, a Jewish refugee,
pinpointed on an aerial photo the position of the gun emplace
ment from which DAVAO had been shelled, A destroyer, directed
by a JASCO observer in a Division Artillery plane, fired on
this location and reported a direct hit on the piece and the
neutralization of two others (?).
On 11 May, Battery B, 655th Field Artillery shifted '
its 8" howitzers (which had participated in the mass shell*
ing of HILL 550) to a new sector of fire to support the in
fantry on SAMAL.
From 1930 until 2400 on 11 May, approximately 113
rounds of large caliber artillery fell in the 19th Regimental
CP area. Simultaneously, gun flashes were observed on SAMAL.
GP and Headquarters Company personnel moved to battle stations
on the possibility that the bombardment was preparatory for
an enemy assault on the DAVAO area defenses* One H^ shell
made a direct hit on the 62d Portable Surgical Hospital, caus
ing heavy casualties*
During most of 12 May* our 155 rifles fired on these
guns, with at least one* gun believed knocked out. The 13th
Field Artillery marked the target with smoke for an air strike*
A direct hit with a 1,000 pound bomb was scored on one of the
positions, which was then reported as definitely destroyed.
On 13 May, K Company attacked a dug-in position defended
by an estimated 150 Japs* After a sharp fight, the attack was
driven off by superior numbers and fire power* The 983d FA's
Long Tom rifles fired in support at intervals between 0930
and 1130* The fire was successful in pinning down the enemy
so that the wounded could be evacuated and K Company withdrawn*
Upon being relieved by the 1st Battalion in the defense
of the DAVAO area and in patrolling to the north and east of
36

CABAGUIO, the 3d Battalion recalled all patrols and moved by

truck on 14. May to TALOI1O In preparation for an amphibious
movement to join K Company on SAMAL. This was done on 15 Hay*
Also on this day, the 2d Battalion returned to DA7AO from HILL
550* The 1st Battalion was relieved in its positions north
east of the city by the 3d Battalion, 163d Infantry, which had
just been attached to the Division from the 41st Infantry Di
vision,
In 5 days of extensive patrolling, almost no enemy con
tacts were made on SAMAL* The Japs fled before our advancing
battalion* They abandoned three 5" naval gun positions with
out a fight* Two of these guns had already been pat out of
action by our own artillery and airy About 30 bancas (small
Filipino boats), which were known to have been on SAMAL in the
vicinity of the northern extremity of the island were report
ed missing* No Japs were located in further patrolling*
On 20 May, the expedition to SAMAL was closed and the
troops returned to DAVAO, where they relieved the 3d Battalion,
163d Infantry of the security mission in the DAVAO area,
TO THE
(See Map following page)
It was required by Higher Headquarters that Guerrilla
Forces to the northeast up the coast from DAVAO be contacted
as soon as possible* This was very desirable in the overall

' p

plan for the recapture and liberation of the MINDANAO GULF

area, but divided the efforts of the division by requiring
attacks in two divergent directions*
It was one of those.things the books say should not be
done, since a large part of the division had to be diverted

from the main attack against the bulk of the Japanese defenses*
Yet, the.far reaching results of this maneuver required its
adoption in spite of the temporary tactical disadvantages*
37

In p*l1do& t
oat t&ft ownhfii imiffiiiUritl^ &t

flop i^ir ^tiff^'mi'lyf' iiwiffm^i.^ifa; A d i ^ M ^ to the anrtliflMt

nvwtlgafcod* flii MMsr ^&-

u l t h t r i p sWLngi a?<*y*g tJat 1I1V111 i f

maohioe gaa flr 300 ytrdf aouth *f 1PIL PGIBT.

knocked out tiae poiti<sn Th battalion movd on,

the l i t Battalion wywd Iov3^' ahead*

of IS Ms^t t l l i t Battaliim f <4ffl in

I t 30J$ on 0$ Jfay, the 2d Battalion pawed to*ou#i the 1st and ptishod m nrth FM^IXKAIf naa at f AKAGAfi, the ri^wr oaased scoe delJ^

by a task* in tfc* sttafetae* the 2flt BsfctaldLon lftl&i 8&l0i$$ed an ftwwy' ( H P& The 2d BattaJAon puhed forward again at O8OOf 20 tfarough intwraittflart mfym &xe, oaiaed I3UUQ and
r^tardsd ter tho jtaet tiud# a l l fcrldtasft had IMMHI
'ftift- %l Bftfrt^Ht^n ifrfr'tnifwi f N a i aAMA3Lt flit

The 1st Battali<m movM ty ia<t<ir t o TIKJN(HO al then (500 potti^ bool) alpwed th Oaftonated l y a p u U staring and icOled th* load dooaiit SM a fight the %mm of HffilA A wis wmrod* AfUr

for t i aArandng | M H $ 8 * At dusk, theer vom i a contact t t h AH ttsloaewa mawfeffy eat tlis 'mfwy i n n^PL ting-ilii j?&&to&BB& SarOar i n th laarnlng on 22 toy, 36NMB ant^cUroradrt Ham m mmte& m> m 3*t> Battalion near KflmAM* At
<

2d Battalion passed ttarougti th l a t and mm& m north fffXflronnfrfi 0n bot^b ^ydfeea odt thg SPflftd* ^tm ifi^st fifflftiKf hJL*t

dfni'TO Ointt* Artillery &j$t***& the iwwv* ^ wm

1600| th tffitVllCTi had r^naod ttarou^i

Jh the ioQantira8f ^ 1st Battalion the BiiHASM area* C Oan|>any was dldpatetod to ooci^y the ooa strong en$r dtefeno lioea 1700 yards short of i t s Air strike m : placed on this area together *ith l ^ a with f t Leaving TMBimGOK at 0800 the next awaiBg, 23 Hy, the 2d Battalion adwneed rapiifly toward the regfcaental objeoUre, the road junction 7 miles to the norti^ !Q*ere wm on3y iight
resistance up to a point where a pillbox forced the

39

the ettpteeeaent.

The Jap defeaelve eyetea at the road

Junetioa objective waa deetroyed by air strikes* A patrol JMTO ceeded aortheaat to tho 1 G H T BlVSa where It contacted a pa UAA trol from the 130th Regiment, 107th Division (PA). The battal ion remained at the read junction*
^

Bie next day, a patrol went

m t* the TMIW RIVER a t BINCOWJAH which mm the mi* dmtmm* position of the GUMTTIUA Fcfrt 0 Companyi awning woat from B M A had secured i U objeotire mA the 1st BatUlion (-G CowU WK pa^jr) <mrd and pataroIUd tha U3CAliH AIRDROME araa # On 26 Kay, th ad Bittalion a.aembled a t PAGAMIKAN (on half i l aouth of PAKACAH) upon being relieved by eleaeote of the 107th Diviaioo* l i e 3d Battalion was relieved of the ae*

curity of CAVAO by the Prwiaioaal Battalion of th 130th Jnfaa try (PA) and aBseablftd a t IMiH t 1 a l l * eouto of TIBUIQKQ. Ihe l i t Battalion {*4 Company whioh eeoured the high ground weet ef Wmmm) continued to **am and patrol i n tbe UCAHAH AUUSaOMS

area # RRT?S Qij MASDOft Hie m mm J I aatraUone, lytn Infantry haa aseble<s i n the vteZMkw <** ffljwAwvk on 2o May. Hi* l e t Battalion oontime* aotive patrolling i n the UHAXAN AISDlttafiS area. On 28 May, S Company, reiaforeed by a platoon of 4*2 mortare, reeomoi* tered weet froaa the northern end of SASA AIRIffiOME for a dletaaee of aboat 2 f 500 y&4*$ yards. . . G Gorapany weet fro PANAGAN t&t 2,000 '

<fe. 29 May, the 19th Infantry eet out on i t s next major alaeion, a sweeping eorelopaent cowrergij^ on 1AIB?O(} the Jk~ Battalion lad off f r o s the I f *%fiUDBUDa t 0840t Unoccupied

eney eaplaceHients were deetroyed a* they were paeeed along the trail, $te f i r s t eontact was laade a t 10^5 when tae. forward e l e

jeants recelred sniper and asinine gun f i r e froi the froat and flaake. Artillery and mortar f i r e cleared out the reaietanoe*
40

to Wm battalion proceeded, resistance btoaae acre stubborn. A heavy a i r strifes of boobs and $ tanks f Hapal* made i t possible for K Company to secure high ground and i Company t* push forward on t r a i l * which branch north and southwest, lae

day closad with the battalion haying advanced 3,000 yards* the TIBUUQKO and H i g l areas ware patroUad by tha l a t Battalleo* f Coapany ant a pttrol t o rteonaoitftr the t r a i l wsat fro* 1UIC. The 3d Battalion pwahed soath on 30 Kay* A eoMbat patrol froa A Oofl^pany aomd up t o Join the 3d Battalion and relieve 7 Company aa eurity on th right flank of the ttSR, Cen^peny B mored t o the h l # i ground on the railroad 2 f 000 yards wet of TX BDKO Ihe 3d Buttalion oontimed aoathwerd. As t Company approached a railroad oreesing heavy ene^- f i r e warn received. Mortar f i r e drove the enoay froa elaborate jdefeneive peaitieea* leading eleaenta amffered several oassalties when they encounter ashoan depth sharges used ae p o l l type nines, Ihe 2d Battal

ion reeonnoltsred for other possible routes to the objective area. A Gavalry Keoonnaissanse patrol as dispatohed froa PA*

ACAH t o CABAGUXO* . Counter battery f i r e neutralised enosy sjiihisji m aad asr* tar f i r e i n the 3d B a t t a l i o n s area m the s^raing of 31 /# I Company sent patrols t o the front i ^ l U 1 Company drove asrtfr west along the railroad traclu After advaneing 400yi l 4 f 4%

enftountored the f i r s t enesgr roeket f i r e t o be rooelvod *tt*l this aisslon* ' ; . '

On 31 May, the M Battalion * csftitted to drive west on the trail from P K C K tmard the % Battalion's roate of ad AAA vance. Goapany B maneuvered toward high ground oa the battal*

I*'* l o f t flank* Kith dlreot fire from antitank gum and SPli 2G-*si gun on the ridge was knocked out. the top of the h i l l but was driven back,
s

A patrol advanced to

At %k$ *B % im>9 moving under cover of darkness, I Cost* pan/ attaotod the h i l l from which i t had boon driven the previ ous day# After a brief eagageaoat the ground was secured, %*

battalioa, l*d by G Company pushed w w t t e the *nd of the ACA8 t r a i l and thence nortfawest until rookst fir* WM encount red* ties. The route was heavily rained, which caused several casual Artillery fire was directed on too rocket ite with goad

results. the |d Battalion continued driving to the southwest, tad reached a point where the trail divided. One branch to the wet, and the other to the south parallel to the jaain road were both covered from well organised ontjy os$O*eaftfita# S Coapany with

drew slightly and employed a tank and artillery to destroy the pillboxos mmtw&im the roads. seissad the nengr* positions. Oa 2 June, the 3d Battalion continued i t s advance to the southwest over difficult terrain along a ridge* Observation was limited by banana groves and thich undergrowth* A patrol on the ri^ht flank, working throi^h the teash, flashed 3 J]ps from spidar holss which wsr the control points for pull type depth charge* in the battalion's route of advance* *m&m* and other ** plaoensnts wero destroyed by the battalion A and P platoon. Ons % * S0 Caliber machine gun (complete) was recovered from oas. Coapaay I* pthed tlaroiigh I and

At 0600 on I June, a force of from JO to 4Q Japs attacked til* $d Battalion jiwt after i t had started i t s forward aove nsnt. The atUck was repulsod and one Lewis aachine gun was cap-

Ihe M Battalion at the same Use pushed aggressively to th south* Ihe two battalions were rapidly approaching each other at the t r a i l Junction, The Jd Battalion seiaed Urn trail Ihe

Junction, a&eting sniper and kneo Aortar fire in so doing.

2d Battalion Joined thea froa the east* As the two forces aade contact, a heavy enoay aortar barrage was thrown m the# taking a t o i l of 38 oasualUes.

patrolling ty both 2d and 3d B ^ O | 8 nartoed The 3d eoath of tha road junction* 2d Battalion patrcJLB aada only Bin-

Starting at {$00 en $ #ts% tha 3*t Battalion began a drtY* SAS* U P S S wm% airi zarth t o d H H Q * Itoring rapidly, ADO battalion reached 1 ^ aato nortb-awtto road isher* * patrol mm * w t south and conta<ytd elwants of the 0O7tli QLviaimi

3d Bttalicix hld i t * p^itloisB and south, tcnerd the rkpid3y adr^natng 1st BottaOloo # taert ins mads with A CaoB>aar AaBin ^Jn> M Btfetalim MBt

lHlffPii!ff.iKI

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Isor G

^>MW

dud SUlft* thtt ^d fJNtteiriii'i^

pool wltli 7 trucks, a bull <tozer and aaoanitiaw

On ? June, tha 3#th Infantry ma rea^jr tor tha final in en M H X L 33i M Battalicn iMd drlra do 43X theaat, oro3ing ovr the wstward drlw of tho 2d l a t Battalion had adTaaoad rflpddbrftwm?tbe sotzfeh^fft* and mm in position to launoh a ooordSj^Nd attack idfch tha other
oft fyst tdhft i f f tftfif%!feffi1ij!nwifB

^* Jj^^^pUPw^r W W w W w

WlHpt^m^^r jjj^^UF^^B& w V l W P w ^fffc" ^^W^B^pBPlfflBB1 ^P^^pvVP whrtf ^i8iWp*W ^^ftWlpt

until tha 3d Battaliosu ^M,^ i battlins mi tlw imrtiiii of dflfining the UtaiWG baain an the southeast, ooold <D a 9m on line nod sectir# i t e l e f t flaak. mm 1*% Battalion 43

tip to position with B Company. 0 Company reoonnoirered the road south for 1,800 yards, destroyed caves ana enemy posit ions, and returned to the road junction. Company moved oat to secure the southern (left) flank of the ad Battalion's advance while F Company pushea forward tp smasn the enemy's defenses of the h i l l s northeast of HAS DOG. It aavanoed to very strong posit ions, believed to be the anchor of the main enemy defense line. terrain made maneuvering very difficult, Conditions of the !& concentration Artil

of intense fire prevented attempted frontal attacks.

lery and repeated assaults failed to fore* the strong point. Patrols were dispatched to prpbe the Jap flanks and to locate tactical positions from which an assault could be launched the next day* The enemy's position was defended by an estimated 6 machine guns, an 81 or 90-mm mortar, knee mortars, a SSfeoa dual purpose gun, and many riflemen. Soring an air strike,

the Japs dropped ftp mortar shells near our troops. A heavy artillery concentration preceeded I Company's attack on one of the h i l l s to i t s front* fae company assault

ed the h i l l , seizing and securing i t with only minor resistance. At this position on Bill # 1 , 1 company receiver enemy machine gun M ' f & U f*** Tno fe*ttalion pUeod ar*illo*y..:f*r^ on Bill #3, 50 yards to the southwest, in preparation for an assault by I Company, From the battalion O on Bill #L, 5^pp P
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imately 30 J*P8 * ! observed moving from Hill #3 16^0 yards

* : " ' ' ' ' " ' % duo west from 0) to Hill #2. 4.2 and ai-mm mortar fire placed on this group with very effective results. After ^ L ^

artillery concentration on #2 had been lifted, Compjany I, r i - V inforced by a platoon from K Company, assaulted the second seizing i t against moderate opposition. in for the night. Company I (plu A \

At 0800 on 8 June, the 1st Battalion (C Company) started i t s attack north toward M N Q . Several casualties were Caused ADG

44

by 20-mm fir which was r#civd shortly after crossing th IP*

SPM8 1*1 a direct fire on the 20-mm position and knocked out
th gun. As the troops advanced, led by a reconnaissance pla
toon from the 64Uth Tank Destroyer Battalion, two mints were

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detonated by pull wires, which damaged a reconnaissance ve hicle. A* th* Imttalion continued to drive ahead against

stiffeniiig resistance, heavy rocket fire was received from position* on flUi 5S0. " h rockets fwll XmyQ&& our troops* Ee Artillery and '*$* strike silencea the position. Th* troops, supported by artillery, pushea forward again atteapting to drive the enemy from his well fortified positions. The advance was

bitterly contested from the many caves which honeycombed the area. Many of the enemy were destroyed when A It P men demolished caves, battalion made a gain of about 550 yards during the day. 0

Company, battling terrain as well as the enemy, drove ^outji along the D V O EV S road. A A I JK Moving forward to engage the enemy after continuous Ma mering, the kfd Battalion was stopped by strong defenses right flank, and reached an elaborate trench system, pany continued to pound at the enemy *s defenses with l^ttLe resuits* Bo advance was possible. In the evening, th< Sis attack ws

a strong attack on this company's perimeter.

cessfully repulsed with mortar f i r e , causing heavy casualties to the enemy. ^

;

For the <as Battalion, Company I sent many patrols down slope of Hill #3.
% m *

Twenty ssven Japs were killed in this patrol

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On 9 June, Company k led the afcjaok for the 1st Battalion. It drove ahead and seized the town of M H O . On this advaae*, ADG a supply dump was captured. * tractor were found. Several trucks, si motorcycles, ana

Shacks in the area were stored with food

and clothing; also ammunition, 15 electrically controlled mines, and several M-l rifles*

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enemy placed heavy mortar fire on the troops as they

advanced to MANDOU. After an artillery barrage, A oompany moved
up again and assaulted MANDOG HILL. Tnirty five Japs were killed
and a 150-ma Mortar, several Knee mortars, machine guns, and 85-a
antiaircraft guns wara captured. ELements pushed beyond the hill
for about #00 yards, but returned and with tha remainder of the
battalion secured the newly gained position.
After an excellent air strifes B Company of the ad Battalion
drove through the defense positions to seize the ridge beyond.
It captured g zu-mm guns and a hftefty machine gun. Direet tank
fire destroyed the pillboxes which were impeding the advance.
The battalion moved up to secure the ridge* Patrols were sent
southwest to rout out small groups of the enemy.
in the hilla to the south, patrols from I Ooipany killed
isolated groups. Dlffloult terrain prevented the patrols from
K Company from contacting the left? flank of the ad Battalion.
BPJhd attached to the 3d Battalion tired on shacks and emplace
ments on the west bank of the DAVAO ktiV&L, scoring direct hits.
During 10 June, the 1st Battalion held Its position on
HAHDQtf ^JQUL ana sent patrols throughout the area destroying em
placements and supplies. Company B pushed northwast and Company
C pushed southwest attempting to locate suitable crossing of
the DAVAu HUM: Ihe object was to send a patrol west from the

river to contact the 1st Battalion, 34th Infantry at B I A O . Com

pany cB received intense machine gun, iiU-jam, and rifle fire at
the river* Tlv men were wounded ana on killed. While the fire

was returned, it was evident that a crossing at this point would

be too costly. 2190 air strikes, however, were placed on the enemy
held area*
The 2d Battalion carried out extensive patrolling and de
molition word in its sector* Patrols moved southwest to contact
the 1st Battalion on MAHDOG HILL. A force of from 30 to 40 Japs
wer% ^irTd I attempting to dig in on the ridge northwest of S Com
panys position. Machine gun and mortar fire killed 10. The others
withdrew. The 3d Battalion continued patrolling and securing the

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b i l l s to the soutiu On 11 Juno i i t t e r a preliminary a i r strike and naa*y pr paratlon of intense f i r e , Gompanias f and G attacked the second h i l l of a s e r i e s north of M N G HILL, ADG while enemy machine gun

and mortar fira f a l l on tha advancing troops, tha companies pushed up tha ataap alopas and at l5Qa had saourad tha h i l l . T*o l i g h t machine guns, ona 20-mm gun, $ rocket launchers, nd ammuiiitlott were captured, lbs position was oonsolidatad and

patrols puahad toward MkAfl- HILL, thira ot tha aarias. mth Hill #2 necurfd, tha l e t Battalion iaaadiataiy aittackad and took BtU | l . ,

On Id Jttna, Company e moTad alowiy OTar diffioult tarrain

and through a haavy downpour and saizad high ground north of
Hill # U Maanwhila, E Company puahad forward to locata an avanua
of approach from wtich to flank anamy hald MAA(J HILL. Moving
through haavy undarbrush, tha company saizad tha aouthwastarn
slop* of tli* hill* Tha many draws and ratings on tha battalion's

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flanks wara raconnoitarad for anamy or for avidanoa of anamy ac

tivity.
On V6 Juna, aft or an air strika on tha high ground 6OU yards
north of Bill # 1, B Oompany pushad through a torrential rain and
mud to assault. Tha anamy bl aw up tha road causing a land all da.
Pushing past tha alida, tha company auffarad 60 casualtita whan an
ammunition dump in a cava on tha fast aida of tha road a*

Company B pullad back to tha high ground hald by 0 Company and raorganizad. Company A movad i n to raplaca B Company and Tha innumarabla cavas i n tha araa saamad Tkm anamy

asaumad i t s mission,

ia^arrious to wall placa<i 4.2 a4 8k-m aortar t t ^ maintained a dafansa of withering fira powar. fira

Bvan tha direct Oompany A

of SiPMs failed to fiislodge him from h i s caves.

was forced to return to i t s former position, on Hill f l . The m Battalion pushed T Oompany forward we*f i t joined

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47

Davao Penal Colony

Cultivated A-ea v - ~~~

SM \ ,

La.Paz

86

85

84

83

82

^ J 22

CONTOUR INTERVAL 50 FEET. DATUM SEA LEVEL

2 9 May ,.

CuJvation

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Points of eneri^y contact

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Note:

O 21 May I

Many minor contacts .with enengr along entire route oi" advance, esp. at road blocks, are not -shown.

t o SA$A Drome

-1 31 May

15 June Y

S L A ND

j 9 June

3 |X 1 3

"' \ 18 June
If

17 May U

_ _ _ _ ] Coconuts

.1
8 May Rlvd

May _

gO!
^PiSnPOfK..

Santa Ana
^ 1 (Partially Destroyed)

20_ n May )cReturn t o DAVAO

7 - 8 toy t o SAMAL ISLAND |

n Dumuy /jPumuy P{ j

of W #iwat <rf the 34th Kat a of 4 * May 9* m foUaw* l a t Battalion, attached to ZUt Infaatory
IBIM*

i n tha MXMTAl*ftLX3iar'fAllS> BXfSft teotak oatoMitl&a

th ?Ai)ADA mC K ***** 3d Battalion ( m I iM

&ctMditiMMtiy Mttalijftn. l&tth

filvii*

ion (PA) were &*$*&* on f H*y to th 3d Battalion, 34th 2**

to **!** th
A D inolacUwi tAGAKgJE, DJOOQ, P DA A, and
Conp*ny 3E,

i at ^ 5

ion *fol4 and dlpla4 to tii OOltt tfa to Join I pacflr. I t * ml*lon wa t o search tharcmghl/ tb< ara and t r a i l s

to tfe* iwrth, saiK aoa/r dtaray a l l aiwsy n ^ U # a o 4 d trgr or sattr a l l anugr* & battalion rxdtA at tiio aa~

igaea area at 0900, and jar4 out ii&adlatJy nertii and north at OQ paialli t r a i l * , it

artillary, supporting in thi OJ A im% t l r e i oa th poaitian IH aad, i t

in th am* the f*#lUow of ttie t t e ^ l f th 3d

^
:

BattaUon, 34th Infantry, are rwrd#d i n rl*Uon t o an arbi

trary baaa At th nd of th t r * l l tmr *a om half adlat

the n^ht of 5-6 Kay, aporadltf rUllry *z& ZO-mm M fire me rclw! in tb battalion pwriaatar lMat^i 2,000 y&rda north northwest from th base, and in th L Ctttpaiy per ,500 yarda aarthwwt from
49

 the nearest ****# of auar atroagth oppeainf the 34 Battalion *ac bet*eii 500 and 1,000. 0a ife^ J Coc^wagp1 oil ^ i*f t and the 3d 8atta3J&2i " ^ mlnos i Company on the rl^ht ad?aaed north oa the parallel ridgs 1^00 yard apart,
:

.'

Fiire hundred yard* iwrth tf the atartiag point, tt baV Ulion received coneentratod fire from Sovse 2Q*m gwt on it ri^ht flank* ftm Xire wae ailenood by out artillery.

ing 300 yard* farmer, the batUlion caraa into coaaeifltrated' xaaahine gun iad knee m#%& fire from omplaceaente and od by prepared fires of artillery and haairy srtar# Ihe

talion withdrew and placed artillery fire on the peeition, but with l i t t l e effectt Ihe eae^y had the advantage of perfect Ihe entire length of

aorvation of the battaion*a aovwaenta*

the battalion column, which waft confined to a aharp ridge top, continued to receive the enemy's fire. Due to our poor oNMifw

vntion, the #nBfl@r aortar and artillary positions coold not be pin-pointed* Ihe battalion having auffred 5 KIA and 78

only apoyadifi eow^y f i r e , and no fortified pceitiooi,

^ with*

drawal of th bttUalion 3*f t thl ooapany isoUted, ^ i c h tfeawn* foro ratiirmd to it atartin poaition for the night, irfCQ yard* Borthweat of base, Battalion Headquarters aad Battery A 63d

Field ArtiUary die placed U join Battery G# wippeytii^ the iu

the enaayfl atroog poaitioa wa* on high grouad whieh vaa b e l l i e d to be tho foot hUle of MT. APO, and aa e t t i n t e d U be at loaet 2,000 ysuIa in depth, Ihore wae no asUve ground contact with the e a e ^ m 1
. . ' 'f .

May, Patrolc were diapatched to determine the poaiUon and strength of eiie^y defene* ^ .
: :

'" ' - ::

At 0900, an air strike of nine 1,000-powad bobe# guided by artillary amofco ahella, aa placed 4#000 yarda north of the

ba$e.

T J f of the obawed boafc* had good effeet. b W*

A reOft~

n*4*aa<3 patrol along the ridge north for a distance of 2,00Q yarde. located and direeted artiia#ry f & on a &f> field : pl*t and fortified pealtloiu At ap|*tdUtely 1100, K Ocopaay

d 1,000 yarda north and while preparing a perimeter wa ubjeet* ed to emw artillery fire, %im was quickly alleaced by coma-

A Filipino oiTlliaR reported * trail circlinf northeaet i^h ground to ft* area behind the eney, Coctpaiyr I die*

patted a ^ t e o l to leoate tbe trail whi<h# i f found, would be utilised* Ooapany L moved %$O0iMi''iMViMNli f th baee, but
. " . ' .

not advanoe f artoer beeatiae f a aohaduled Maptla bm* < X Jap positions to the inwediate front, M the atriiDi did

not jaateriiOize* Planoa were not available at that ti* A eeoooi air etrike of eight 1,000-pound bombs wa# dropped J,000 yaroie nortii erf ban, to th battalion* a front, firing the day, B Battery, 63d PA joined the battalion* At epproBcis&teiy 0930, and Antitank Compaq l | ton loaded with personnel, on a trail 3*000 yard* eaet of turned out to paea an aj^aUaee whioh was enroute to woanded from GJ A ^ truck detonated a buried mind (heavy *M * aerial bob) tarn feet off the road# Both rehiclee were de etoroyed and 10 oaaltie were incurred* ' ; '

the Afttitank ffiiG pUtoon then aearohed the road fro the BatUlioa O to Ml^hPay II, f ioding and diaarming three 500 P pound mines {b<&toa) and oa 63 $& mim* 3he I and ii platoon was (iUpatehed to reoonneiter for a I>oaibl9 route to flank the mmnf to to norttiweet* < Iwo Jap field pieoea, poeitlvely identifid as W$*m .
(or coaparabl sia) howitsere, plaoed U rounds of R in the iciaity of ths battalion # at apprcadaatel

was m activity daring **** $l#ti

Oewsenaliig at

S S y iM*i G<mtiiHili until 1300, a&^r artillery &r of or hvy aaliber gun haraaaed the entire 3d Battalion area* At 1430* m air t t r t e of tight l,GOG-pottnd b*aba WM placed approximately 3,500 yard* nartfcwaat r^ tarn oo * pee* ition ocoupijad by eneay on the ridge* Cooipansr L ttiyanft^ took the positloa without opp&tltion* 4 aa^at pa^-ol from I ftemmsp amed northwit fro ba*, then nortiwest along th rldgs to ft point &pprmlmt*ly 3,500 yards north of tfe ba# tk U s t 1,000 yard* of th

was through extaly thick vgration with BO trall

%# I and 1 pi*toon rported that no feasible routes b foand to surmount a marly vertical cliff on the west sidt nt to ridgo, 5#000 yards went of the best. Bparting on f May the results of mi alar strike on 8 Eay, ir>tatgift$y fout an area of haatiV oonB truetod pillboxe# ' Farttoer on, i t f^und the poeltion from whieh the Jape had de llwred fire on the battalion during the paet few day ' positions were in depth and about 100 yr<ia apart. Ihe .

Die?* aere

leg piUboowB wall caoottflftged, I type foKholes, and aaehine gun poaitioi# Advancing farther, I* Company $*wA wore bCKea, 0P, and two guo position* with onsMerable 75-*fflft aisaanltion* i " # M f contact wa jaade* / A relafereed platoon from K Company red northeast into what *J9*t#e to be impassible teg**!** A reinforced platoon fro I Ceapaoy wed neaf^i^ .

Coapaniee % g, &t& % adtaaeed on 10 Kay without eppoei tion. In an area whioh had been heavlV shelled by artillery

and planes for tteree day, there were tmm& blook, bones, f leah, bandAgee! and any freeh graree, Qm UO^m and one A* gun with feolta reawred were foui*i together with the

and mail &aiwnt of 40 ^ fcong, ufloj^luted edv*iwi wr ffldda en 11 May. Iteeh *ftfe* . -toft* eia$r equipaent iia f oswi aleng thfi t r a i l . In ona ar*

withia a radiuB of 200 yar^t, the battalion found betirten 130 15 fdxholes ^ 10 dogottta with ccflraanieation traeh6 f 20 ifacuated shacks, and aswainition for 90-ram, 75~ram, 40*iaa 20-ay, and knee mcrtara, a l s o .50 and #3C caliber aaaanition. P l i a b l e jnfttlve gulda reported that the t r a i l led to 1U3aOK, twenty miles aiay. the enesy was 4g hours ahad of cmr

f<>*, and fwoied toward URBOK, whei^ they (the g u i d ) drtod the Jaj wex^ i o jeake a strong s t a n i . On 12 May, th* ntlr battalion aaee^led* % 2d

iott iwfd from DEKJS t o tfa Ti0XO ara and r e l i v e d the 3d Bat talion, U2A Ittfantry, which took oTr the PIGOS ara4 On 13 May, the 3d Battalion, 34th Infantry mm& from th QOIA ara to the Ticinity of BANGAL.

76

^ fhtgUrt Wt$ m | April, wia rapidly di^slaoing for . ward, hawing been ccaaalttod to the Emission of d*4t*ag into the main line of Japanese resistance nhich bad developed i n $ie area nortfrmjat froa $AMS% TkLo was the area into whioh the sain Mfcr. e&ssr foroa had withdrawn m the eoaatel

m % Hart

th

* 2* Battalion 19th Ixax&xy, ppottiiig th

l e f t flank af i t s aragissntal rout of a&rmao to m?AO wao . i u onfcaet ^i"to the lararwr fringe of th* enasy's defansiw dlspoitio| i** across the loww end of USffi AIRSSC^ i a a S i m runniag northeast

of BftNCaitf ^ilch overlooks the- whole area* . Here, the 21st- Infai&ry entered the coafliot, ^j l t Battalion adVBB<d to B&00# thrwe aiSLttt da north of milAO* the road not running thrw^i thia area had Jtwfc rocently been iained. One of thsae baried $X)-paind boob took a ha^ toll4 lart Battalion pasbed off at 0900 oa 2 K^r froa

tlsds within 1,000 yards cf the $mmlto$m objectlw, MO&lg* the th actent aad trngtai ^ iAdh twi ro aooa t learn* tfe 2d Battalioa awvd forward froet the road loatoi 600 yarda nori^sest ^ TSHB., and by a flanldJQg ia@nt to the l o f t around LIBBY AIRra^MS, caae to the uppr id of the atrip* tli battalion sssung outhoat to awp the leog^i erf airdroia and amah the nefi^r f oroaa tetapoen i t and the Infantry* the tta<ric was launohed ith tiK) coi^aaies ta3M9% 0 < a $ W on the l e f t and t 3aH F on the ri^at* moflmdin &t th slos of the day, tlie mm? mi torn

Ls M a t^UU^&Xy maXX earea at the 3 eN f ead of the

54

C I foroea HT

holding tb0 louver 3dU . m m^mmimi

afctao*

progressed, OoJ^ar^ % 19Ui Tntmtxy* holding WB lft flaak position o? tft 2d BattaLlaa, 19fch t&rfantty'a line, was #* lieved by Coapoi^r % Jbflfc Infantry. mmm *& %$0&** &*3 Ifer* the l a t Battalion, 2ljfc* r&~ ta. strops oounfcorattactcs* The f i r ^ atta^c

(MIir?AL} at 22.00* TI^ asocaJi attach <a @ at sa pcdats airauad tl^ ontir battalion peidiaet^p* &mltim fro tJiia action totalad 20# began f alliiig l a tlw ni^Ml^ of it

lag laomlaig, th^ baHaaioa remaed i t s atta^c to $& aesisli

' '

tha oity od

l a i ^ p e l # m Job ml M

Battery B, 6^th BattaOlon (8 hcmltaers) wwt into to relnfta* the tim of the M m Field

into position end laid to rotefor^e ti)

3?lold 4rtniiT, ipportinj^ the

BattaLion p^MI the attars fiercely oo a May,

ning i%g. ffoita with tie of F to the froartal dri^* The fighting wsw iufcena the line lut pr^rosdod to isithin X*000 yarda of the l a t Battalion, 3litJi Isfantiy, holding Tbo one^ vas ^ U -Aig^iG in an 4 i p l a c t a t i i ] i M@
*W '/f'*w^ff^^svi!^fl^pp ^ P B M S W ".jMnW^^Vw^ttpfPpF wv-i'Ww ^P j ff^^^^WBy ((iff' T^WHW^BS^P w^HpflBSl^illF ^PW^^F wW'WpPWiwp^

^\0

i s ooe of the ,7oapld>e l a r i a t atmro of h

Coordinated inforxtiy, artillaxy, apd air atUatoi dtwyd ^wy of tfa MMp*i ttroag paiMfct bat I t w e aot powiSU on tht .

^P?Iip

. WHSK^HT

jplWWHpHp'^iPwWw"ip(wBPP'

^HSWwp^jpw^.

WMIF

iB^^^^r^WMffWP^I^^y

WPP-

^WP^^W

jwpifr^y y-Wr*"^WW^

^^BWUjp^w^TOMp

^^fl^^^^^^^p

foXlcwriUig morning, li Ba^ the third d^r of tho ' batU, the reuistanc* m brotei and Ir 1200 the

objectiY aleadon was acccsapll^ad* Praceeded Igr a tagtgr rllSii battalion atrongth, : B Oewpany had

countarattaetoi during ti night*

Daring t i * d ^ # rtan>ng

tbe nlgl^ # sioftevsAiU^r prgtgutad, B r life* dB g

M Battalion &ks$mmk imim

the 4Uo- to t t e

i t enooaBfeiirtd M M g mvmp &^a&*^$fo& ami I M ^ M tha

west along the n<^th bank of f L M RIVSfi. Tb mmy AO O of the

as the Slviaioa doafeiBaad th

4*
fl*

Jtrom %$ to 20 feet hijgi, and with long luh rnMHt l m i t th banaiw* The plants wwm nvlimnfty &*m l the Bumn*r o^ ^pr iae% aad eo olo33r # i tho a m^i bos t o niili scd tJnwal pomring tiaat hmt protfcicttw wre fr^kfaoat, A a Major obtaol#f garastly fff<dl1tat.ing the M m t and
^b J t i l w i l y t i j iturfhiiiiih and f i i & H i s m@BT a n x o a r

4mm tte&$ vfatm m Immm mm mmsk mm m

^ ^

ay

d 1$ lift 1$ ft*

(Note man left

foreground)

a froa a poiot about # yard* aortfa of MXSfAt **sUaat to point Juift north *f the Xowr ad f IffiPf AIHlHlfi$ K mmm ^m f L M Rivsa ai in dpth aUag AQ S

0830, td 3d BBttalioo encmurtarad

for tank sappart fro Cc^woy A, a 6 t h Tank Battalia^

XV

'

tfce
l$ad <g|A9&il "tin

^t^jf foialP flgpaffij ^ i t jNi tNt%traTf^w irBta^wwi n^? %o dWfeHi lav tlav

ift Inilnniiiii iMd road amei tlw the l f t flank of th 3d BRfefasXlett and ** with tb latter until i t s drlTO to l&aK

mm ti*a poaitloaat aiontf tiw northatm aldi f

fwward jit-a <nooTtHiwtart Li)fmituy fiiiiill

fiKi 5CMna UMI loeatad i n tha b i U i on tha M H H iajH

tmHra atiri

"fcsaaww (iajfljiJF'^p^ *^^w^r^i^wa?wiawww^Bp

.^yPttft'Hawat

wBw'iSp^aif^^Baijj^'^f-

^anPr^WHU^P^^'a^'w^j^

^ P ^ ^ ^ p^aH|Qpav

spav^^^iaiH^aY

"""".;

57

'

MAIN ENEMY DEFENSE LINE

5 MAY

5r-T5-8OMM GUNS

Ml

15)
TALOMO BAY
J/4 /Z '4 O 0

SCALE
MILES
IOOO 2POQ

IOOO 5 0 0

ZQQQ

4OQQ

YARDS

tHftf

-1 41

illjjl.ilII i f

of tlm

to Mfteni to

I^HP

'^^pW' -^PPW

p|riW|MP^^B

'^^w'^WiflP'P'

-i|*^**<WP^WPF ' ilF^pM^Gt^*1 ' l ^ ' ^ ^ i * ^w^PI^P^^- ' ^^PBr "^ffP**J^PWBB^r^^'^^ff^PAp,

that a or f fr 50 V 100 * M wotk f ' loffejy m Ifftonii ^Iffgliffii ny^fflilffy iwnwrti f$v

inovf I s

%| itlMI

tto
of

- & tlai #nmr to ^lis aarHu

tbm

^pPB'W^B^pB^B(WBf

^WiW

^pwp^^

B^BJBT)PF p^^^^^^w^B^W^^^^^^BM

^P^r^B^^

itt to* ld i f

aortar

VSRiilWMRpx rtSP B> B M N H M B ? iMHRtlfciflNbi

tbo Xt BkttoUon pMtertor * 10**1 tv M m tfe*

i f nr rt MX tft tititj iitinmw to t i t

Iflr <%INI IBPMl

vltli tto 3d of tto Xgt BKttaat^ 3kth s m J M J tangly NW

air wrtles mec* fXom

fiffMB% I P *HW| I I I M

i ^ l itf!Ei w north into KS8flS^ IlliiVi

feiar tin l i t m u r i i KI mutt out % itfat M at?ai ^ t t i th MIJMIOSI tut orbit ttet

wvt nflrtiahiiaih a ttwuf tfln^r tit, H n tiwir tif thu w

MHHI 'AST IHPV j g j H p iwBp

orowd the rtvwr at 1615#

iwwy ftrUU<ry ^tm rwoil^rtl trm

^iBPibP^ INI iMflfiteff % W filiPP t d 4MA9yi SWIi J I

aod 1 0 llffir^ tJjs l o t

ft&fttttM^Utfpjlltff fftlpitmi'ft
59

and flna& lirtMitt

any aDpreosLalUe avtrance l a the MH1i# and aloae tiaa the north bank of the TAtQJIO M II m i vrtdmt, tiiat th

not be pushsd baait against the l i t BsttaUo% b had t3 %8&$&T I M I I 's3^i- " o iytfetfOffpfc aod *&t i ^ tJ*e th Xerfefifcfea*oBhad pushed into artanmglr fartdUCltd mmy U&* cold mm i s a ila&i&srmtiQLy aoaoaed Dosltlenk tfewlws* <asvor odf <&&toi9a& oia IIMI jj^n% *f 10 H p e* il3*d back ttoM?h HtBTA!, fnm' ft<l' to aasantele in t l r t d a H y i BftHa in t l of the l a t B^ttaUon, 3lith and frca $&& to

battaltoa attack along the northeast bank of tb* g U v l i t IMit i t s aauthwm point having bwn jwuihad bartte but l i t t l e

tare mi the bridge, <tetTO7li^ it*

A qaad wa ait to rapatr

fuiwiud

and then dii^*fced the f i*e of a a&3jf-piN3p<aid howttwr

/SPpWijifc

^PW^^iiPw fl^Wpwi'^'fflPJ|p . ' TT^ffW^^JJPPf" . Jprffl|WW'^W^fcft|S^jpf

jww^p^Pw^^^^^aP

#PV

WWfT^^^P^^^^ , '^^^^P*/.

to aafdrty ir mmm m+m*mi $m *&m mm*

I^H* the 2d BattaXioa doggedly held on to MltfM^ t i * DUrUicm Artillery massed tbe ftr* of th U t b , l>th and

teik at tiw TAJ^aiD SJVS i

f it.

l e t Battalion hail diitutiujiKl tfaa eanar ^wIMfltt" ^tlah had

mm m*im* aa *r a* * utf
th Mai
Tito 3d

1st Ba^ftli^n^ 21i

1st Battalion A%, to the to tbe ** aai

^IW^ff SH^^PWfc^jPp^pl ^PWpiPWp ^i^P^P^^'w <fh^^ ^ 11^ W^ 1 ^^l^^j^^^Vmw^^ ^liWiWfPlftBw fli^HpTTP fm^^PK|l JWHF^^^^

vented,

(It was tn thia igagiwnt that m v a t e QLanond w*a

On 13 ttfe *&* 3d Battalloa, 3Uth Infantiy nwred f ro the o m arca t o the viclsity tf north lafe the h i l l s on the east sidfc of the B#l<&Mff!fr& **! to rsllevis the prosoure on the 1st Battalion, 3kth Infantry* l e f t flank and relieved the 1st Battalion* Ha
ovd to an area 1,000 yaisi north of B LA AIHBRC^S.
&IO

IT Hn M 9atttflto% 16M Sifantry, diapUeod t t i aorthgra

of HILL 550, ***** i t relieved the 2d BottAlon,
3 Ooa^ai^rf 3bth Tnfgff^Tyjt IIMMI aorUiwwt atLoag
S ing tha area twtwau the 1st and 3d Battalioa*,

wst Iwi.^

W BS N fey %M 3d W IW I I I

f .momi wm i t s poaitioo l a tlat mm (aaar tSRB*)

the ni^ht t &mm$$m. t o approariwfctaly 1,000 H joinadi aaz^y la. I and 0 i^vad forwaa?d and iaa^red tmg xvsJUitiSHM at 1200, t JQ * $10 f M * flou-^s^ast of TK B K The battalion ltbdi<ert iflaood artillery and air a&ritea oa the eneaqjr lfttious# ataaatod snid tor dflfonao against night counteraitaok* . , . . Jlftar sharp fleiifcins on the nnTrronohoa to aad l a %b& %otra tho 2d Ife|*M@% 21t liafantry* ais5d TlWffiDK* faftpany ff ing i i i f i B*.fAB&% m% the ese^r aewrely eiKtramiiod 1A a feofap field south f the towa and nas iaable t o jpxoiimd^ t^i 18 Ma/* ft fin nail, patrol fro L Oonpan^ .i^ovple^l to AO O oroa tl T L M t H K l a point 1,M yards badow %h* &&?& bridge* Tho patwl w# oau^xt i n autoaatie ^*oaa ftoa fro*

%tfe si(^ i t %& v&mtm Hwly dug apicter hole irar ioaad on the souths&st aide of the streaa. oontimied to be
62

The flgh^sg north of

fighting north f tmm

eontinoaeU, Tha inrtwmsity c tha

eperatioii M l atepped up again on a. Mey* At O330g the 3d Battalion moVwi oat frosa HISiTAL north to tho TAL(W HIVRR bridge* Hwray automatic fire was on the ou^ tdte of the rivor ^ d tho battalion found bridge area *U tit*4 Si apit of enany fir %

on the l e f t flank and I Oompai^r oo tha r i g i t , for<d tb ing* Tm gfiii aRi^ported tlie meroBentt % 1220, tth ^ out oa^ny antmu&tteafeftt ^#rlng t l

for t i t sianrwHent af tha l t Bttaiio ' ' M IfeJ% tlii l*t Battalion began awting through th 3d, crossed the rivf f and otta^cttd* air and artiXlwy oonowjtilatl<Ma, asaaated md eapturad

gnwsth a l ^ ^

%m&&*<$B%ri!$ nm$$. bot i a ^>lt of artillery

The objeoUw <rf the lert Battalion, 21a^ IrfaotiT* road jmwfcion l f 700 yard* aorth of the MBIfAt ln*idgi Qa 22 a

and acui3fcer<l a strong pillbox poaltioii p&Bfo&kA I r f

, (Tverran t i p o a i t i ^ oa 23 M^ and

the 2d BattaUoiv 3Uth lnfantiy f b*O.d the lat ain&r ooz^dOt^* Followlag UMI tradll oor1>h froni t)io of MTXNA, i% mm up era l i i with tha 2d Bettalion, l300 yards to the aast* la th oowrse of thia adTmeet ww& mteriel ^

ma $m$& md dsafcrcyed, ItwliwMngi U aaaral d^sth ohargoat oaa iiO-am A ^im, two ^OO-pound bojdba, aevaral land minaa, 12,000 A rounds m ammlUGn, ^00 jKRiad of piorl* aeid f ^^0 i m l gra uadea, 2(X) taeo mortar rounds and 16 unoocwpied

On 2b Steer, the 3d Battalion, 21et Infantry, 1st Battalion at i t * roeri jmHElm portion at 0$a^ *t<i pushed east against tetnainBd roslBtfflia* tommm* pillboxee were encountered along the route erf ratgey but tbwe were ow*un Ir.** oOloao of the day# ad a gala # Xf000 yarda daring tto nigM. In * w O l aoaU o o o g f r a t t A ^ Ocaa^paay A

a patrca east oa th BftHQAL-HIBWI, road toward the O M BatttaLi*^ $k$k $am*ry* AfUr advaiolag T O yards, f i r e &$' received from a piUJxaE* A report at 1^30 JfroB an F Ooqpeiqr .

36 dead Japa* On 23-2U M^r, the l i t I t s stone e f aotictt*

Battalion hai

Infoitaatioa was reeeiTWd iMn^ inlioafced the BQSM defeaae to the wt. f be Urn ran ftm Y4BA3 to

H Battalion* 3Uth Infantry* was *ell&vd In on HILL $$Oty the l e t Battallaa, 3btfa, and souredfcgrtfuek to

assesfcle l a the rear of the 3d Sattalioa on the BWTCWUMIHftt Hiv' intli'e li^Nfllliwi <O\<IBMWI M ^to> aeMnslsr a^ea at 2)0P0# ftf%iip

wwwl whH# th@ & 3a%Niyic^i y^mg to tho x^t^it 8x& MM % > $^ east flank* ftt: attaok w^ stop|>edfegrJap pUXboflDfts* flip ffffe1i*# and laid mortar fire on the enaegr poitloaii a l l of which were futile* Thsee attaoke

An attapt to flank the

"

- _. ,

W.

fortified poaitlfflw w

enogaaafctred a l l the wjqr to the .:;.

HVSl# At 16I^D^ the id^raQoe elaaenta t hroncht under a heavy aertar barrage and ii"e foroed to withdraw Ymnriwiin of

64

On m * r * . j # 3d Battalion, 2Xat Infantry's attack eaet the road 2f 000 yards norto of MO A progreisedwall* ITL It had also repulsed a strong night eoiaat#rattaekf killing 111 &p#* An &nmp aoEsunitloa ctop was destroyed on the fBSBSJI area by 2d Battalion artar fire* The 2d and 3d Battalions, 3Uth Infantry, maintained pressure on the enes$r while air strikes, r t l l l y and laeirtars eontinuouaay pounded the area 1S attack uaa resumed on 26 May, Supported toy the 3d Battalion, the M ^.ttalion aasaalt^d and took i t s objective, Ti^ 3d moved l a and oured this position whil the 2d ^ittalion launched another attack ami took a second objeotlwe* Thl now paoedi the A t h Infantry within ltl400 yard* of the road north from ittNTAL*
:

-.

The lab Battalion, 21t sent patrols north toward V&k with no contact** The 2d Battalion, 21et Infantry, Isiew up sofveral oaroa and aaaainition dcuq>s in the TmBOK area, Ho Important action took plaae In this aaotor daring the dajr of 27 ll^r# Baring the proceeding night an aaasing episode TBC occairred Tfa&a the 3d Battalion, 21st Infantry, i n T O K heard small aims and mortar fire to the east. position 2*000 yards in that direction, The l e t Battalion was in . Sajor Roy W Marqr

was oomnandlng the 2d Battalion, ^ Major Kiohola S* Sloan uas 1st Battalion Qonraander* Major Maroy eaid, 31oan i s geti t . " Major 31oan said, "Marcy im getting i t t each other i n the darkness* It twraed

to be a *il between two lap forces which had run into

Contact was established between the 3Uth Infantry and the Infantry, farther to the west, fh oxily major mttewfc oa 2B Msy wa sad northwest of , where 1$ Japa were killed* . f i e softening up process was being laid Into the vast area to the northwest* Enansr biYouaoks, brra^ai, wtemtm, and dmapa ^ r e subjected to long range artillery and bosfcing. On 28 May, 63 tons of bomba mam dropped l a the m. wmt area

the 21st Infantry W relierod in the TUaBOK 65

M J A aroa ty elearants of the &tfa Infantry, which had BT L extended to tha west. The 21st aasaaabled itt tha vicinity of B T mA L0300AH, poised for a drive to tha waat, than north, AO Tha l i t Battalion, Jj$ti Infantry, was nor fighting in the area O north of HfiaV$!09 It was also on this day that the 19th H P startad i t s westward drive toward the easier base at MMf&&* On 30 Kay, the 2Uth Qlvlaion ma attacking on three frontat the 19th Infantry driving waat tram the ooaat,

northeast of D V O th 3Uth.Sataatry pushing north to AA, OLA, and th 21at Infantry, having roved to ft mm warn &t action,
driv/i^s
IMNSV

wBwrord jjMyldfflwwwi

The 3Uth Infaniry'a drive north to tafca O A was not wu&# L ftm toan was aeoured only aTtor hm&y fighting* Th enaeor did

not the ooBipletely vaouata t i e tows but coatinuad t mm aoatterad positions to daiUvw harassing fire frcai rifle a and kaas iaortr, Strong m$mmmfo8 halted th advanoo of patrols aovlng M&

a praviously wglatersd oonosntratloa of 3$ rouada on DIA . Tha 1st Battalion, Jbm Infantry, in tha arae around ths

northern base of HIIX !?#>, fought rasolutely with the support of mm&Lmef and sjertard agalnat a strong aeries of pillbojs and entronalmaatst 4 peta?@ai. to the aat f o w l oafeSlo aoroas tha

D V O HIVBR, bat thaj? were no signs of a ferry, or of having AA been used roseatlav .

Wm mump defenses around D A seemed to encircle tha L town in a 1,000 yajNI radiua and were natually supporting to * prevent envelopEent* A oonsarvative eatinate of the strength of the eneuy here mm 150, b*t thay were able to aove rapidly one location to another in their prepared aystoa of

The M Battalion bagan to paah west from U A on 1 ^une. L ^ B began i t s attack west along both aides of the road, cautiously ewer the difficult terrain, whUe moved north for ^00 yards where t% vm to turn weat and

66

I Ooespany* At tMs point, mehine gon fire uas received from tbe north* Baring the flro fight which developed, an S M mowed P into position behind artillery over and knoqfced out the p i l l boxfegrdirect f i r e . Company G then joined S Company and laid

mortar and artillery fire on Jap positions in abaoa to their

Daring the morning, the 3d Battalion patrolled and f e l t out the mmp positions north ofTO1BOK*FIT tonka joined I here at 1300 The Japs fired en the tanks *fh heavy light mortars and oaahine gutnav T lie combined fir fwaa

knocked out 4 pillboxes, 3 nachine ^nnsf set a gas doaq? afire, and killed 1*1 ag>* in tils axa* Tanks, 3PKaf ad flame throwers wire used to assist 2d Battalion in routingtitommmm? twm MB strong ajOaoflHents i n l i p irth and astm outskirts ^f tJU, 2 June, the 2d Battalion kilOad 7^ Japa, hosvy air strikes, and supported % tanks r aad SPSS, th 3d Battalion pushed $00 yards north froa i t a attack north along th on 3 June, the 3d Battalion adronrod 3f 000 |fafi to the point AG D where the T L M RIVSR roass the road, 1 Coiapa^r Moved up the road hilo L Ooi^any moved up the east side of TALOifi) H T R TK to a position on line ulth I Ooapany* Heavy fire warn reelvwl and i Obapany uithdrev 2^0 yards for the nighU Daring the action g&

The 3d Battalion, 163d Infantry (attaohad to the 3Uth), relieved tin 3d Battalion, 3Uth Infantry, In posiAiCRi at the T L M SI7BR bridge and contintted t o aeet t l aam AO O from the north aid of th r l w &&<& held up the 3l*tli Infantry*
' . . . * '

A coordinated infantiy-tank asaalt failed to dislodge the asQr from his fortifications i n an abaea jungle. The fodlowlng Incident i s indicative of the nature of t i l s . flghtlng # The tanks mm advancing in column along the edge of the abaca, firing into the lap positions* and rooeiYlag intense ' MMm and laaehlne gon flre
/

Suddenly, a Jap rifleaaa leaped

" '

from the thteket and hurled a heavy Bdne under the leading tank. The explosion ripped open the ^buttoned down" &am& and

hurled the tank coaaander, Sergeant JFoao O Qanolu, through

tank* In the meantim, th second tank <a rolling jm closing on tbe disabled lead tank, 'ft*approa&hiog

crewmen, seeing the ooafuaion and tho condition of th flrat tank, started firing in tdmt diswotioat alstaidLng the dis mounted orsw and the sapporting infant^Tn for MBr troopa, Sffipgeant Baaeiu realised fully tha dasperabe situation* He ran out into the path of tbs OEKOoming tank^ not only to th enen^r'a firo, but to tlriat f Ms frionda a !! Ife sdgnallod frantiaally to oaaae firing. On $ ilune, the 1st Battalion, 3Uth Infawti^r, Ootapatqy to patrol and aecur th HILL 50 sector, displaced l35r truck to TJU* driving eaatt fro tILA, ^iia battalion fx into h^avy 3#* ^ 9 nacy ntrenohments about 1,000 yards from the town* On 6 June, this battalion uithdreir throu^ TJLA, aouth, thaa oast aai north tn a taaaeuwr to flank tho nagr# Tho battalion oajae i^> ^ | line 3t& yarda oaat of ULA, aaking s

d Battalion, I6>d Infantry, jo^pod off fxt i t s position at th TAWM) HIVSH on t&e aouth ffida of It ororeas th rasistane north of ti bridge and ooatiaad i t a advmwe Paced by ha^vy adr strlkw and artlllexy ooa* oontrations, th 2d Battalion, 3Uth Infantry, waa also aM# to break through and puah ahead nori^i from ULA* Th 1st Battalion, roaobod anil sooured BIAO During tho night of 8-9 June, thia battalion killed $9 lite lsere aoving nat$t and re uaoiiare of the pmmam* of American troopa in 314% A total of ISO Japs mm killed on 8 June awi 30^ on 9 June* K Coagjany of the 3d Battalian* 163U which north on the TtJGBOS-CALIUAH road,tywp&aawdenE5r rsirbaaoe and on the afternoon of 141 Jane oecupiod RIVKasiIE, behind On 11 Jam, tins 1st Battalion, 3Uth Infantry, ima relivved
BIAO l$r the 1st Battalion, H M Jafantsyt
63

fb 14 Battalien,

Company In -mfiSmtWk, Qa 13 $wm$ ti 31jth

Infantry was relljmd i s tilt MISTA3>.fuaBaifc-lEA a*a ty tbo
I62d Infantry itegliaeat, and paaswd Infeo Blvis&sit Baowve* Tba
3d Battalion, 163d, in RXVSRSIDE, passed to tb control of ti

On 1U 4te the l a t Battalion, l62d (~ C pm$my i n BUO), displaced to the vicinity of RUft&SIEB* fh 3d Battalion, l62d, adhranosd to a paint ix mil# north of W*k (road junction east Tha 3d BatttaLion^ 163d advanowi to a point leas thaa 2,000 yarda southeast frea O L H N The paoe of the ad ^X A vance vma slowad down oa 1^ *ma lagr i s s m i m l wr resistauee* Howewr, ttea l i t Battalion, l62d, attaeking northwotit along ti road to tbe i^lght of and para3.1el to the aaia road, acfraneed X#300 yards frca RIVaSISSt . . .'

the 3d Battalion, 163d lufmtry seissi e*LKJA^ tbtt aovea 1,200 yards along the road nortbast . ? fee l t Bfttta&iom, 16M, movad i n and woottrod the town* * b 3d Bsfetalion, Ifiad, btfdjtis ? driven in from the s&sfe* turned i t s mmo&m rwrfch froe OAL33UH* .
ML.

ot atta^c to th .

fhe 21t RGf, on 29 J^r* aasettKldd to the '?ifiaai%- of

to olan out the enfciio area bctwwafi&Sffi&iaad

A misrrilla ^afafe attaok l a smemn and tfvaaiated the torn i n g***fewt baste* PlUboa

in ^* Beset BscKTOim, 31 ippanr i f reiaforod with half^tractei fro* the toward ALAIS3R3 at 0330, 31 May. Badatance waa qulokSy barotowi and AiJUi^S was <^>tured In t l raeantlfflo, 1 Goapangr,

the 2Uth atvision, as coi^paaed oft l e t aad 3A Ssfasfcry B aeats (attaobed 8 m&U torn reapeotiTftJy)# 20^th Fiaild Battalion, Detaeiffleat b ^ 3d Battalion, 163d Infantry m$lmt& as attacked
69

guns rafeod the troaiw free the rlgi?t rear. aid SPHa ^lJioad tbaa eaaaagr poaltloas* .

on 1 J^% 4 @ppr f M&$ ^pod nit north to atta^c S l E i t ^ I

the a*ma<30 mus daO^rod \rr m sfcmm *&m? poattloiu

1m i t s oft>je<ytivB, A

of a prsrviousisr 3?eportd artdllesy positicHi la

083 O x

containing 1,?36 3raimdb of 75-eea shells ftOl into hands on 9 JtS,Y# '. Ifeanahile* t i t 2d Battg^lcm |?usbed north fw AUIi^B# G mgm& mmm to the Xaft sod toote MAi^AiiHiLAHt l i i i . I m and F CoiapaBles contiiwed < and oapturod SH4M(^4I mvl KASHID, turned west to asamilt t)ttli ISp^i tlB 21iit Infantry one m& om-h&f alias wast iMrttNMft T f A P H At thB Smith bik of AV K A ,

Battattoo drow at along tl

fraa -Usa a?oM junction, ocmtiusted 2^aoot <sf th 3lith Iisfantiy to Tb 3d Battalion advaaoed north froa

3lany trlimtariea of th TAJ(<M) RIVSR n ^

torou^

the Slfft IXtfmtijy*^ Xii o

obfftaclea bgr fir \ t the tflose of 4 3tm$

the threa battalions of the *sg$M& TST held yp ty onoqr fir

70

powsr at riTOr roingi

l t Battalion at the aouther*

outskirts of T O K A , 3d Battalion on the road to WAifcAN, AAPB 2d Battalion on the T J B W N A road* TG G & G H fthile B Ocanpany aainta&ijad frontal p*w*ur on the

made a crossly undetected %- the eneaty* 0 aaapany fcO fhesy pushed on north and eataKLlsbed a road WLoek ' ^00 ja3rds north of T G K A ^ The 3d and 2d Battlica\9 made AAPH resolute attempts to averpomr tlie rite^bank oi^oattian, iBt eleanents of both battalions did axsoaed In foreing croslng, but nore unata to take the high ground <M8iaanding the opposite

Artilleiy and aortar barrage f i m l l y pouaiod the

out of theae saplaoeents pensitting a l l battalion* of th

On 7 JPuna, the 21at R T attadced tiiard W I 1 H on a O AKA three battalion front* flit eaa^r** dslaering wrtiona

O ^ $wm$ %mm&&mm& around n

to While the 1st and 3d Battalion* seized the town, the 2d droTre north to another r i w ow>asing With t i aipport of tajiks, and after air #^1. artillery preparafcionfl, i t secured high ground north of the $&$&% Ths nsirt. objeoUve was OALBIAS, three mile nortl>-nrtii. . On 11 Jwm$ the lt Battalion m s relienred by ail6Bent TO of the 3d Sattalion, 2Xat and moved adstai to the O O S area* The 3d Battalion* i n i t s attack northwest of wmhM on I f Jons# met very strong resiaianeet The poeition was attacked

twice during the dajr after heavy artilleir ooneentraticne had been pilaoed on the ane7. Both attacks iaet hsavy aortar and machine gun fire Only sligiit galas were made. The 2d Bat

talion, supported t*y a platoon of tanks macte only aligbt gain#

71

On 1U June, the 3d Battalion, $km Infantry, was attaohed to the ZLt Sifaatrri aad oa 15 #* took up poeitiosw aortic mat of W4B3M on th rsgiaant's l o f t flank* he 2d and 3d Bat

talions attacked north toward GALINA1*, encountering atiffenlng

Expeditionary Battalion of the K)3th l&Ttaicm (PA)# which -was attached to the 21st R T aaaeablsd 1,000 yards west O* The 3d Battalion, 21st, made four attempts <m 16 Jun to oaross the river 1,OG yards north of WAITiAK, but mm rapulwjd
I FT DJ

madiine gun and mortar fir# fank detftroyere, working in oLoaa support of tho 2d tet

talion o n l ? ^ n e t knocked out nevwi oooapiad pillboxes, timmp tm t)m battalion nhish than draw thpaigii positions and advanced t o ttht 600 yard of
1

'

"

keep up* SlaawTfca of the 3d Battalion, Jfe|% m a t e d tb* T L M RIVBR and adrmced to tlw MALAG03-BAQDI0 poad, ^aro AO O . tha^r osjtabliahodi a road block l)tw99n the ioaaoft* From thi point, patrols ere dt^pateh^d on 13 ^un norttoaat ad along th road* making seatterad ooataota* The Si 21st* Gdttt r>atro3.s north intofiALIMASaxd oootacrtad 3d Battalioa # 163d Infaaty#

The 3ktb Infantry Reg2aeat passed through the 23Jft Infaa

tr^ and
^ESISJOVSK*

t o e Ajffcfeiw* af* '01900* :3& jjMBtt*

i^Me

W1.M^. MBH&

into a pet area near B^LIAO* The 1st and 2d Battaliis # 19th Bjfantry dUplaoed to the
area north o WUEBKXk. '

IUTO THE WB.DEEHS3S final drive to the nortorest was under way*
r

a flee-

Japa, now being aswaailted on a wide front with aoarorging attaoke, were forced ^ ^ ^ i a natural teawaia ftusaal into un escplored mountain wilderness, besronci T i X A * AK J H 19th took up the ri^ht flank of tlie broad front, and
72

On 20 June, the 1st Battalion, |i*%attiofeed northwwt from MA1AG0S* Affcor overruiminrt fftrong ri*iana# at the HftX*A003 H&Nty- crossed, and advanced to secure the oosaaanding ground on th ue#t flank of MB* JlBfSOr* 4 patrol f*vm Hm 3d Battalion advanced aoubiraast to n&thin 200 yards of BAQ0IO* ffm I62d Infantry moved aorthaest aad ae<sard the saddla of !? I^5!t Y Ou the next dae>r th 1st Battalion, 3Utht ar

ried the wtomm forward and s4sttd (WU*SA$r>9 Is^-pa^in^ th very strong defensive position of Ifr* 1OI)T# 3d BattaUoo aeissed MGUIOt than sotBmita to WUG03 aad north to the m^ljaitr # GHH4LAm Advanoe eluwiwitw of tbe A UO B a t t a l i a , w$$m$m around the mnmp bdtwMBt B G I said T# light
J y ^w^p^^WW^* mtJ&i&M ^RWW ^MBff w fBfifcwwpPffwp* ^F*5R^f^fr * * * flBP^Ww^Mi^fllB^^^B^^^ ^ffWp*^ 1 ^^ ^P^Ip^^^BwI.'l^ '^fri^WWBPBWJI^Pj^j^f

major portion of th atroai* mM

'< . : <.

$m$. tJ l a t BattaUon* 19th, oootimod t o t2 road

function JHdLdw^ betarwa VHaAFOSCn: and C U & AO The 2d Bat* JK LI* talion,, 19th, adratwied w a t t o 3 H W i Tha 3d Battalion

Battalion,

toring am oneffiT tron^ point 2,000 yards nortiwoat of

^ | i i * 0 h 3* lTj^^BFwWKA * h 3w'NM^^utm39Eb 3*J^^# (SPffV! HfiVwil
JMPQK

aada against roaiatano which tiffend as th# front

On 23 Jaw, th lat Battalion 19th drov nor^i and oroa> d the T ^ O N RV f * The ca?oing HAS aad mm mftMM&& A O A I EW oalt trrain# the 3d Battalion, 163d patrolled sttaive3y i n a l l <|ireotiona in the B G 1 D ar% ^.th I Oaapaay to 1^e somth In A 03 and 3d Battalions, 162d, patrollftd i n the # 1st Battalion, 1<H&, advanced aggresaiv^y on

73

attack forward.

At a point %$&$ yarda southeast at f

the battalion saoafuntarad *wy heaty *esttaaos# '4% this rattaclwd oftfr a Heavy mortar md

fhesaas % 03J^ford was killed i n action ishil

MwMV *|jBi^^^ iwWmfc wffWP^p SP ^W* ^WMPir ^W"^^|P*^Jr"^pf

tb X^th seat pa^reQji out In a l l directlone frorr, TAMC^,^ Attapts to oroa the K L P J HIVSH A AT

of tlw riTr aiKi tbe d l / f l a t tarrala*

mwill
%mHBi

battalion g^i^nwHl % f Ifrwwt f 1 # 4 gmvi imvUi odP >t

in.
^ ' On 30 $mm$ & patroi fraa tfea -14 Battalion, \9%b* across tin M A E V S aaid pAtroiXfid inland for If0G0 VO XB ssOdng a^r contacts* The 3Uth ooutinaad id push traehartod and

this date, 30 Jura> ^ $

thft

feorn Igr UMI valiant they oomtimd to pairatie the a*K)gr 1st virtoaUy H the f l u t i n g daxlng th 1*8% mek of |q% ti

aad' mxmcted, had to be tasansp^wted aoroaa

74

I t tfaa battle for mVAQ, tfca 2kth a heavy price. In tha gorges of th T L H RI7EH, on th AQ O and i a '

torn* bad paid in H$& for tha grim H i of t& oat fanatioal Japs flgjjtiag

t&o

AIHK$&

dBod &BP9& i n

riflaae^j aights* l a a^dltionp i t ** no

dag %&&g Qtf&$ ffiti h&tm

Upl ^Sirafl^w wBStt BW^iP WHMHI

t t e pr^iloi i n

#S

_^L aiJA i|^ 4MltfktffcHft

^HVM^V 'TF ^^^M^fctt^l' jflt ^^tttf^^ftl^

Ht^Myk.

of ng in the h i l l s i the p3fawic# of to

^ti^fe sane

intending to flush tbre

froa a

hurled a t ^ ^ t ciiarge whlob aet <^t #

aacsudtiOB tesp and J*|^- lull I1I09 up the

auidti ta^mi ohargw aad f(|^nt inftltratlo 8&X

n i t h ainea strapped t o thedlr b e l i e s .

kHXad a Jap in tha TALOIO STTO b^ pushiag Ms assailant's head uisfer water with his foot^ Another poaadad a Jap to death with his hal^et, ;

An offloer, leaning against & bansaa

tree, mm laspaled upon i t i t a i a Jap bajroneted him from the. rear* Japs mm killed ^ith pocket kaivos and *ith ba* fit* Japanss gipisfted to irf.thin three feet of antitank eaanon and then jisrped up to rash, oiily to receive a cliarip < in 2x1J Mdriff ' .

fhe Japs utili2id two triofcs nhioh wore more

euch perfect coaoaalaieiit for UTGXT jairpo* Cne waa for th

sl^k^i fi^pbd *3iid &X$$ a - l*^gnl#^@ t0rp<9k> HS$E$$* tJw wTijcili iiC
* ' >

target ma asr%y

f hosa aused us an of to oad

advano guard OB the roadt aid 10 to 1$ yards off Mm road, oould locaise the rope* out i t , and k&n the 4ap $m tha

. ?iotoiy i n i>WA0 was the f l M l ^aptr in the Liberation Campaign, thoagh. there i l l be a namber of

W Oi r-i ^ C O H C2 W H v

Epilogue to Hiatory of tfae Mindanao foregoing rport %M the saga of an organiaafcijon sf and courageous officers and mm we had eiaall regard tor f slf-tyled reputation as invincible iUghfcws* $&t of Hollandia, JUsyte, lAJ^on, and the ttest flUifaf sot onOjr 1M searched/out the! Jap, but challenged hixi to coiae out. and attack them on any %#?m he refused to see an enec^ behind ereiy troe Imfc of advance nhioh i t was iapowibla for the mm
to fathoa. . .^ . ; ;. , .

advance through teyt to Manila mtm Jauch hei'aiciad oi gr^at pubUo interest, Thia a baok-tracticing Job $$0 would g epeotaaular, aiffiply another chore* Japs OD Ififtftiisift to the inhabitant* and a potential nuiaatiO to w operation. Hence, t^ey were waa nothing new, nothing Sapbleoaic abottfe
got to him quiekly by the aast direct route md whliJpod hi* tfeor* : at the saallast possible cost, ' - \
.. ^ . ... ^ , * ^ ^ . . . >

a^fe. feod?r o f t h e ej&eitr WAS apbamsn&l.v i n t h e n&e&tiit'

story of an infaniry division i s a stoiy m tee am with /-I rifle* With his iunediAte aseooiatss, he takes th aajor I lives uader the w t difficult ocuditions ctf weather and i s hungry aacl sleeplessi but when his big fmit ^tafflp at ^ door, Japan i JPlislid, ." ,

^w^P^PWB? -^P' fllpJ'^^pp^flpM^p* ^^^W^F H^VHflV

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la *&** bt

mmlirt hit

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in

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1

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iji ni^ iit

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Hi nimhai irltiiMi jnn tnr nuaiiliir

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1 brl4 >* 4 A f t

* private johille* *e?pa ttmA forty peeei fleatlag la a altea* he played poker, wen 186 mre peeee, ^iea weat to market* m *#to*mm te the perimeter with eeveaty eatfieh # tweatytaree be*M ef Jefeaete eigarettes, aix pineapples* a hog, and a fighting oeek* That aight p p p , * gg g
In a tri!TOLtlta downpour, H M Jap <ft4te#htdU fji* fih w i eeattere* in the audf the oig*t1 Tni^id, i c n t m t hurld th p i a X Xik grid, th cook ^mrrA ft.ppM in the ra ittd Ppp hi* neck in roreng f and tht hog wa k i l l e d in t

C. OoglUlsoiii wt bo%Nrt by a 90 aillimtar *$ d &r#r* away th 4ap gunnr and hi* aatittaat* t alaly diaount*d th wrtr and carried away tha tub*.
XXXXX

irivatt Roy How M t*klin * pXlb*x with hand grtft***** uddaa aaohiaBsvat fir* ^pat trm aathr pillbox whih hm bad a% iiwm< four ballet* olippad few n*at furrewa through hit hair# l*aTlB him ** othrwi unhurt. Said h $ 0oh# *Uot lik a 01 hair
AJOUUI

Two teldiort lot b#hiad tha Vapaaaa* lina* Rar fugMc ipottwd a 1937 * B4l tar f Awiriaa ik in tbt bak yard C aa A h t H i i h rtjrad t
X3C33CC

- a#rgant V*m*r& 0ari fouad & tnerlag Jap taldier ia a ahakf whaekad him m th ola ef hit foat to waka kit ^p fb* te fftr a grw&ad** Dari wJhaokwd hia acaia thii tla* in ta# ahla, tho Jap wwnt back to lop. Ha awaka ia tha W *tka4*.

- "Wharo th h a l l i t that pillboxt* ak*l gt. Bn**|l 9trritt

driTing a bulldoiwr.' *
Baok up * felt** a fallow laior adriaad* ^Toutrw aittla^ m iU* Ih doar >akwd, adraaoad# oruahad tho pillbox and b r i d f i #
c r o a m i n g Jap* ',.: . . ' ". . _ ":'.'/_,, " . i - ' ~ v "

xxxxx

f a rttooaaiaain** patrol found a awbora iafaat

on th braatt of i t s <toad aothar* ftm *oldUr kopt tha ohild
by fwading i t dilutod naaad ilk through an oyw

* ma a Jap chared a pariaotor attrido a aarabao, tfe* ^ap M

th buffalo woundod. Por day* aftsrward. the wovatdod oarabao
wathad in white gaua* banaagei aaong the fexholei.

In hit !*!> &nd^l# mU # iSy in S i l l don't yu UX1

houlfla't I

ll

Jap did aot 1U to bulgM in Hw trMMt sook% f tbo

ttMi 1itittf##a
^^^^^r . ^v^^^^p^K^p^f'

Sot j ^ j w iiMflftl^i ANHy^w* : l t e Jte

^p^v^F ^^^^W^ ^^^^pi ^^^F ' w^ ^BBpS.^PiW^W^PW^^PPr v ww^^ ^^IP^r

the reeeipt of the simian the #*1 Section H I sag*

mented bgr * eaptain # assistant Q#l# A n ether staff sections
were augmented to provide the personnel required la amphibious
operation* where A division performsferns*functions eonourront
ly with it taotioal operations* Past experience has lndlaated
that the present division T/0 is Inadequate for such operations*
The Military Pollee Platoon was augmented by 20 men* & reoep*
tion point was established with personnel, kitohen eqctipent#
eots and blankets, the division drawee Itogis^ratien offiooTy
Ciwil Affairs offioer, the Aseriean INI Cross and the Press
Eolations officer ware provided with personnel and oqplpwnt to
arry out their ftinetions* Permission was requested and ob
tained to aov* the April leave and rotation qaota of if offi
oers and 383 sen before the division eabarlted for the opera*
tional area* in 1 April the turnover to the new eeaaand on the
Island of HINDANAO was effeeted. The inooaing staff worked
with the division staff for a few days and by $ April had taken
over ost all of the 0*1 fnnotions pertaining to too island.

Prior to ebarkation, classes wore held for subordinate

units on graves registration ami strength and oasualty report*
ing* One officer and two enlisted m m froa units of oeapany
sise were designated as graves registration personnel and were
directly responsible for all graves registration of their re*
speetive units The proaptnese of safcittinr all reports on
the day and tle tailed tmt la the administrative order was
stressed to reporting personnel*

The division arrived la the operational area 23 under

strength. The following chart shows the disposition of divis
ion personnelt Present for duty 575 teer eohelon (IGEHBORO) 28 Absent (TDT in US, OS outside the 0iv sal asgd but not yet Joined 73 Aligned Understrength $$ T/0 Strength W IS 7 H U 44 10,463 823 lf393 m lf

Total strength of attaehed units In tee operational area

was 15 offioers, 5 warrant offieors and 2,862 enlisted men,
making a total landing team strength of 590 officers, If war
rant offloers and 13,325 enllstod men*

During tae operation four groups of replaoesents were re*

ceived totalling U ffioers and 3,715 enlisted men. Of these
^ t 124 offioors and $+ enlisted men wore i d

to iim infaotffy rafiaaata,

Gtely 19 officar and 2^0 oliatad

id ibat mm swt iil|pMl to pviviii ewwal to li^fi'intfMM i f pmtumml i t l i ttf^Bfly yaoo th parfal yoi^ % a*m% % atr ^ aariti at ^ l*t 24. I M P * prior t the rrlirl of tlw fiM i t i "CAstiiaTii^11

r f t i i t l H i U P Wm m^ iimm yp diTiit fflear. T

feattl* Mmaltis &ffrd Igr

the tfgfftiteii w^ & f l l

KIA

IM

U4
i

43 & wxaa<i tad ?6ftff<lid of vttiai^ lift

wmtim mm twatad on t& fi14 r la t aid tatloct Initial oaaealtiw ww light, Oy 7 aid 32 waadad dnying ^w firgt i w m k |wrli< Oaialti# aa Wm'ifaMm ati^A i atdp^agly pgaparad tnwiy ia tte riainity f th TAl<30 ri^wr and tha it^ af of th fightiag ia roflaatad in tha f e l l o w

R^I-BUI M N mmm MT
^tttaliiQwt ffi^^'iiaiinlain

o
4

Battalion *tr.Qfl?iar a*

1 A

5
12

Sat %Blt9' 3WWfe<fca^ftl(BBm%a 9MMMM*W9i sftBMHSK s o a ajMHWkwJUSHBi y

offiers and 472 aidittad WMI Itaaawa oawaitiaa* ffa* aw offi<

twt aaffawA oely | p f tlia affiaar futmff-ltti Us an*

riaiaa ^ t d?frd taOy a?#5* of tJ aaliatad aaaaaltiaa. A In A w#%k&w a^pa^atJlflB a^^a- fnilnitiot ^Kt tto* aiNttdt^ia attiiifffM^yMMHMtNi.ia n mftmim* i t ia baliaw* that i aw u s

.$ <

td

to $

aia&taal

^9F

iNNMI 1ft WtHSSf SNMW*

tarftfflo te

OR
"Wi^^^PTl^ff^ ^fw^HKm^^^fm ^Km&*m*!!&m*f>

13 y g tl p prior i t i t * *loa* Cwrtwt ttpp6isteata tig^ I rtiUry ^ %

to

eentrol ti

13

4 It we Yir!at that tbe

to y
n P nt p <my alieaa ml n i i p l w oll*brtort j*a iba pmmmtim <** i l l poroml i m fpmi Mi attach** &it witwtif^ to duty l l ^ H % l 7 i trm hsmpiUXs mi
fbed
ans av

GSAVFJ3 1EGTST ATTOH

three eeaeteriee w w established by the division* 0n

at SABTA CKfZ and two at ?AL(MO* Tfce bodies in SAflTA CKtTZ
and TALOJ3O f i wore later Feinterred in TAtOMO #2* A detaeh
est of t graves registration platoon was attached te tfe*
aiTlsion for the aprati0ii# Jafty seven isolated bttrials were
made all of whioh were reiaterred in division eeaoteriee be
fore the olose of the operation* This Has sads possible %
detailed information beiag gire cm reports of isolated burials,
i^ih inaluded owrlays of the area tad the aaaes of two eye
witnesses to the laarials* All bodies were identified before

See Military Poliae Platoon Report, lael j*lt $imm #!

See Ciril Affairs Report, Annex #13

! Saoh General Staff Section shimld be astgaented hy saffi*

iest personnel to operate two eohelons effeetirely. This per*
sosanel should enter the section leag enough fB'ior to the opera*
tion to enable complete fsjiiliarisation with the seetioa's
procedures*
2# Rifle and heavy weapons aowpaaies ean absorb and iheald be
assigned a 15/S orerstrength ppi&e to m operation.
!# A H off leer air oourier should be dispatched fysi replaee*
went depots to deliver serrice reeords prior to the arrival
of the replacements
it the hour of reporting and the period covered by reports
should be eoordinated In eaoh headtaarters so that all staff
sections will require reports as of i&m saae hour sad eover
the sase period.
5* One Grares Registration section permanently attaehed or
assigned is ore desirable than a larger Graves Registration
unit temporarily attached.
6 The iaportaiiee and awwnt of work involved in Civil
Affairs has increased t sah an extent that so section in a
division ean handle it in addition to its Br*ml duties.
Qualified Civil Affairs pers^mel should be persjaaetttly at*
twhed to a division or aa allo^eat of grades and ratings
given to a division for this propose* Tbe ssae oosdition i
applioable to the 3Nblie Relations offioe and the Aarian

to

The landing of our troop* ea the island of WKWUtAQ brought aa

soae new phases ia the Military Police lint of duties. Oa this op*
oration, for the first tiae, we m m espectiag to aeet two new aato*
gorle* of prisoners, naaely Japanese Civilians and Filipino eoliab*
oratorf all of which wast fee confined watil such tiae aa they hava
boon proven haralass and paroled lay (tautter-Intelligenee* Tha COTABATG
and BAVA0 areas especially were known to have a great auaber of these
typa of people.
In prapariag for tha f* eperatiea, the Military Police Platooa
vas brokas doro into four parts and waro daploysd aa follow*
a 0u offloar cad thirtaan anlistad mm attaohad to tha 19th
ECT. and to land m W MUCH on R*Bay to pnah forward
with tha 19th R*C,T* This DataalaMnt hanUd traffic aot*
trol fro tha forward point baek to tha Bivision C.P#
b, Oaa offioar and twantyava anliatod aan to land on U
BKACH with tha Oirision C.P. o R*Bay# this dataohaaat
handlad tra^io on QfiBBIT WMM and aooaaa roads laadinc t#
tha Supply tapi This dataohaant also followad up tha 1
%*Q*f*i roliating th forward dotaohasnt of lilitary Polioa
on ecntrol of bridgaa and oaa*way stratohaa of roads.
o# Oaa offioar and twanty^oaa anliatad aan landad at IBB BE&OB
on R*Bay and oontrollad tha traffia fro tha ships to tha
Supply dumps #
d. 0m of floor and thirtywona nlistad asn landad on W
forwards
AS tho Division ovad forward tha lilitary Polioa nataon fol
lowed elosely, working the bridges, oontrolliag Vbm priortles on the
ferries that ware need on three rlrer erossings on tha aoTswjant froa
the PARASG area to tha DAVAO area. At one tiw the platoon was work-
a stretch of road approximately serenty-five wiles long.
the platoon* while aottag forward oontinnally, was unable to
am inolosure for P^O.W.'s and tha few eaptared daring the sxwe*
eat to the BA?AO area were either taken haok to PARAHQ arts and
plaoed in the I Corps stookade there or oarrled forward with tha
platoon when the route of evacuation beosae too long. Opon arriving
at tha ft$ia area and shipping eaae in lay water, **0V**s were then
acted baek to the PARAHO area on the return trips of the ships, to
S Hay 1945, a stookade was ereeted at BAUAO for teaporary eonfinaaent
of all types of prisoners. This stockade was operated until $ i*m
and all type* of prisoners of war were interned there* is of 30 $wm
1945 the Military Police Platoon had handled 71 Prisoners of far, 200
Civilian Snowy Aliens, and 24? Collaborators.
This operation brought out tha fact that radio aqoipaast is
necessary to operate offiaiently the suparvislon and operation of tat
aoveaent forward* At tiaes, eontrol point* on one-way reads ware fiva
alias apart maA the baton or H a g aethede of working eonvoys through
these points proved unsatisfactory, as often tlaes vahiales oarrying
the baton or flag drop off the eonvoy thereby holding up traffic at
the other end* In other #**** %k*m would be no vahiole waiting at
the w eontrol point to return the baton, thus holding traffic that
ecmld be running though. By the use of radios, we m m able to hold
the road open froa oat end until a sufficient asaber of vehieles ware
collected to warrant the starting of a eonvoy back. Radios also !a
stalled la our vehicles aided our control by giving us a asthcd of

oatstaetiiag th rod $*ta* Mai dip*tehing thta to point*

2 #

G-2 BEFORT

it

mum
Mitt t*1itflii4#t Ha th f th

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WHI H fiy feft

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initial

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# tha 0m$mm *f mm *mmm$ t&*

Aerial requeot Ml %h rapid im df grat ftal$ la

a&td wtflttiN& sn&ii&t wast* lanift&lar *k# 13&f p t r t t i s n * Bait Shift g i t * ffimiii'illintiiii ijsd ati^iAB, mB^tenradfed&2J&* ZHUMW attjt tt&

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at to Japanew pXana at
^PH^^^WS'P^y1 vHOTw

til* 4t f w## a# SA7A0

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operations mt$0 mfti

^PWV^^ ^P^PP1 ^PIWWPWPWP^PJ *P^>PWP ^pPpwi^^^^^r ^p ^PKP^PT ^p^^fc IWI^'W^

glaring
WWWBB^^P 1 ^P^PPHPP TPPB^ S M P P 9 ^PppfW^^I^^^

lt lat^t^st ia that X% piottad war adraww lfflwat

ftlig #pf taga w turaiNi In

p trong-point* whil orri by and f i l l * an| mrtar fij. , ^pon reaching ttw D T O arwi tb* trwp yrt<ct<Nl th AA trail* f any Is^wtanw whlfe wr# log^sal tmtm to fe am attack m mot fiaak* ^ t r o ^ e*U*etd tat work In t t IOBST drtoi pam

trnf paint* and In

of A snd Mvol artillery pieces In ground support A enemy elid not, & en l^ffS* a t t e s t argr large He eontected hklf bjr fighting each important terrain feature, KLowtfcg . a&d mplaying miners and booby traps* The final .; t&nd ejected at tAMXAK aid not develop. However, thi stand was not mde because of the heavy losses inflicted % our infantiy, artillery and air* Th* Japs 414 m% pat l i l extensively and had l i t t l e information f our advance AA until we struck them la force In the D T O are*, Ther was often evidence that the Jap was at least 24 hours INK hind in hi# intelligence, probably Ate to poor commmica-

Although til* P A and CIC did a good jeb in hwatLLng a CU r ttnc|?pativ c i t i l pvpul&tim th9ir m&rm were inade quate # la futur* opraticwa *hrs th civil population i s known to hm ho#til qr xuioopratiT a great lncreas# in PC/IO and CIG pemmmmik with a4ditlonal traiwporUtitm ihaold b prov!4d or plan* ad asans to iiaffiftdiately establish civil g&vernmant or aar t l a l Iwr* An adqat plan f#r handlijag P ahuOd b asid* . flitW lf diatano | t had to b it te Orp ateckad* prs#nt#d a la # uatil in latr tag C^rpt etabli4id a sU^eadc n#ap th* division G - a vry aatisfactory arragint P abould apt ch#wk w>part to g qvmrtr# t mm that the aitaatiiB i* biag tttOy ad aoiupmtly ted, Gn mat* than one ooa^aion an S~2 would prmetnt & i t radically different fro* that presented by hi* li Check lerrilla reports most carefully* In this operation rUXA reports w&re very ndaleading. They were based en hea** ay and did not present the true picture on the ground. Civilian report* wer* oueh mere reliable, as the civilian while untrained re often m* an y-witnea* to that which he reported* If* Plaee jaare empbaai* on eecuring identifications of the mm? dead. This top particularly iffip&itei la. thie e*$ftl$i bec*a*e the enes- lift* beceae definately *#garity-*rt.niii Tnw deg tag and rery^eir diarie* were found* ? fbu Ma are needed and out patrols for the specific pur p l e of getting thtm* Thi* paid dividend* in thla operation be cau** ufiit a-2, and frent line troop* md* honest atteflg>t* to cap ture priaonere and to keep them from cofficiitting suicide", 7X# Place eispha*i* on the use of map substitutes, Thi* was most ijaqpartant in the past operation becA\e our tanit* "an elf the map", and were dependent on *ketche6 and blown up strategic U tftiliae a l l *i ymw intelligence agencies. The artillery observers, both air and $?owdf provided a ^ e a t deal ef va3jaab2*:. > ' : iiiforaatten <MI trwsp wntteiatratieos, eoej^r artillety w& defensive;. positina. Close lialsoji between the division G-2 and ^ie division artillery S-2 paid off, SIOM ppert air eoabat imits gave valua* bl# informaUoB an M fii Mii piu-peiaUd strong pelnts as thes#

ware ofta dual*parpe autoaatic weapons.

the eneay situation i s vague, more extensive mp and photograph cobras i^ast be cm hand prior to the Ijwaiehing of an attaek, and photo request mm% be atftde by the divisien two weeks prior te the oceupation ef the area photographed. tre| lent in the mm of pheto* deoand great quantities of prints*

ENEMY

DISPOSITIONS

DAVAO PROVINCE AS OF MAY

PAVAO POPPET 60VT. N

TAM^GAN

SAMAL

SLAND

DIG05- PADADA AREA

STRENGTH I5OO

. OF PADADA

GUMA AREA

?P NJW

KABACAN

A-P-GASUALFfEa

MINDANAO]
APRILl7-JUNEEiB

KILLED

l_M

,},

,U

mm

Wm

? leading to the sniapeetdd &f being rlaies to me espolnf.ge or furth er

In

in

to th
of

plan far the op^mtim mUM for to t^

within Mvialon control. Oft* agent was placed on vdtii eaeh i^gi-'ent. His duties eonai^tsd of aasist iit in. !r imita of the had tf f
in

which :alght

job of JUienririg ttet nil of Interest to tr Betachmeirt

firom

had

19th inform? tion to farlo

office

in % * operation wimn the Zte-U-xhrnmt set up an M to $ purpose of this net to about the Japanese Army mid civilians froci F i l l opemtion sas denrotd of and Filipino col labors tors.

adl aai** j^tiwOay fit fo*

IMMIB

into && JwiiiiMiif Mtittt ftfttiftpl 4 Tbo uri' WIT flonaw of iftirnnftfl

ink

%#

fhiriin Hm iii^plt iiitti i

Pi

'i

flit
miiwr liHiitui ft*
^PJ(PJPJp^P^flp jBPp^PJWr V ^ ^P^|F

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^kdtotfks^dUjflF v t wtt; .-^^JB^ 4t)ta^fa. HftAPJ^P^^Mdpi

4W&iMMNI
-^b.M^fei'^tJPJMpjft^fcltf-jMk^feU9& ^^^_^^^^^^ J^^^^^t.

, DA7A0 City, o 3
Mktf^ME

f teotfe Dtn)hii*ntg w i iafeo Hit t1

foment (Mat of Staff, ?h,i.l1,tapin /9 |^p for i^BM^AO *i SUIU, eo^Loto f t l i of t^ QA7A0

tn o

preparaUon and briefing on th in aa r ^teofojPtoatsmnco lisfco i t wmM perfojmnoo of tfeo

^

h&9 aot Tbo itfteXf $B thm I

tN S M

^ tho ilntjutmijnti utiijrot of *

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i t * reasoc 7 in l f l 1 p

J fit.,!, fiflMffit^i^liitfiiJiii |NHHNI jto^oiiiiiiiiiwi nuiTdlim i n

tb*
g a i t fttttmisfliy-iiiitial ^ ******* mfltmmiMt oua %MI iihtairMirt

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24th division Language &etachmefct landed at PAMKG on fWfey with tke advance ecl^elon of division headqaart* #r. - thm dfiiaoftment iesued i t s f i r e t report on captured eagr d<uisRtB th afternoon of the sams day* Documents translated during the f i r s t three diys rtwtfeltd Japanese plan* for withdrawal from the COTiBATOPAHAKG area and gave personalities and *gania~ tian of unlt with umieh the 24th Dirision cnticad in eontaet the clo9 iff the operation. During our eastward sweep across MINMMO, a gratifying t i t y f enefi^ operfttion orders, orgtirdsation chart* and personnel rotrs contlimid t o increase our knoitletige H** Japanese force*. C After arrival of Division Headquarters at TAfcCMO, J May, th* to #f oapturad docmaents l l d t o a flood. &reat quiititi* of thte foand in buildings in DA?AO BM rrrLronB, otiip # U t e n units in th fields fg*tfc tliey a ffondW 0-^2 liith A : picture of the etrngth t <argani*atia? pl*a and armament of th& Japanese units with wh<m th 241n oiriim n by then a t death gripe, fhe mmth of my and the ir*t half of Juaa was a ptsx^ioel of intense traiieliition ac-U^ritj for th* drtacln t* g of prioar of $ job* 0f 76 Pit eaptur<I t # 3' |ne, hfc wmm totem during Xmt two mek@ of the month* t h l f ;iiierta^4 flow af FtfV with the disiritegration sf t i ^ ifepans I d ^ h Diriaion |ja area* Tnea prisoners cad i t clear that Geoeral now planned only to conduct delating actions in the KIBA8GAI a a.XMt r@^ort to disperse his broken i^sitii ia the fm4. was running out, madxoal supplies were esbau*t4 and moral of nearly a l l units wa3 verjr low* T^eae circumetaricee were reflected in &* ir?ereased ntmber of deserters and surrender r cases among Fs^f taken at t h i s time. An effort was n&d 25 J^ne to persuade enenf troop near T4M0GA^ to surrender. This was dona thrdugb the' medium of a leafl e t written by a PW, a eergeant in the 163rd Independmt Infantry Battalion, wt:o urgd hia comrades to surrender t o save their count ry. Flans were a l s o outlined by the detachment and presented to G- e^rtaiii PsW and Civilian Internee* could be released to r e to thijr gftnqp'ii asd penmade fehr to surreruier.

suggested that the learen #f **amirS%

^ g g 2 $ - permeating tiie Jap iaind l a the fJW) sector. Iroops wei-e warned to b on the lookout for US ipie and i t a n t doct3;^ait were to be Altro^ed or buried (f)# ^ ^ tH titXe hSj^f'tlmt troops w^re mmm Qf-trm dajager t o iiifeerent in free t&IJc* Loquacity o f the majri% l e f t l i t t l e to h deeired^ from otir vie?poiiit* i^4 i f ft s# i&fegwar4ing. <l^ii2@iit8f- i^ a c t i ^ l l j fmt im% eif^tfe, i t be other opefationi,. .n^e a^aiB bora eat on of one tran3^t<^-i3St^&gst#jp ni^h each language intelliga s ^ i i d b g vtg&aiBU <eBiaiidera pr^mpt%:. %e necessity of follsssisg c l s s e l y tlm y i i ae reported. 1^ $~% was impressed sa a l l personnel *? the an#. ;ua4, a# alway# oooperaticm with the WMfar ef Battl* pa*OT4 essential in producing a cl#ar pietar# # f the enay ti

#5*

showed the 30th .Division (-) rtssponsibl^ f^r the of MI^ANAO, and tu 100th Division for the SoutUm half, ffc* JSt' ti&ml Base .&$#* i t a headqusrteri caKss&ndijrig a l l naval unit UO AA ori M3a\r-1AO miM. in fee S L Archip^lige, wa* carried in the Q 7 G arau . Th total ener^f Mrwtygbii estimate was 3^,000, including For %tm Sont-mrn ml of ti> ^aland, the 24th Dlvi*ione seet o r , the 163 and 166 Independent Lnl'ant^ Battaliona in the PAKAIGCOTABAfO area, the 16? Hidp(lent infantry Battalion plu* lant of the 30tfi F;\ tie^t at a^i^mHX BAY, and th m e t of the 100th ^ including Diviaicm and Brigaito Hack|oa5Ttraf In th v i e - . WM0, and &lmg tm s**t coast of 0 V O GULF* %pm m* AA at PAMId, e@sttrM ooatact ras faad with th* 166th I I Throughout the Division* rapid adWAee across th Xelaial t# : , the onl^ identifications were mtto mm the 30th Division Medical Unit and tl>e 30th Division Engineer lt Oae idntifi tion #f th 74th Infantry Eegisiert was. mad but p ^ v ^ i to be strag glers from SAMUGAMI attetapting to join tr&Sr m%H% m th i\t DIGOS, operations oniers vaaied thet th# 167th I I Bn M l ordei-ed to leav SAHAN'lAivI and proceed to DA7A0 In l a t e March 1945.. A F%# captured st f*w dav l a t e r , stated that the 2nd Co, 167th I I Bn, ha4 been lft a t SAHAMJA^I t o ooro nortte at 4 lfttr date* BocumsRtary mMmm* trongly imtieat^d that t? 163rd I I Hi was tho garrieon fore at PA0Am* lAt^ infoiraation honro<i that th i67th U Bn controlld Midway 5 froie K B C K AAA I Bn for K\BAGAN t o Bi@6i At thi
|

163rd XI Bn, M E * signwi by th he 163rd I I im, r e v ^ i i a g that ths 32nd Kaval / brokm d&m into b a t t a l i o n , which, some casos a t l e a s t , were md&r &mmm4 f the military. there was a sarked inerase in seouritj taken bj the Jap, tJi disposition and deplo^saaai of tha imknown 32fid Kaiml Bae | ^ m my r*veald by ft rorganissatin chart, d^ted Fobruai7 1945, which consolidate &H naval ujaitson the Xaiand lat# a fiim batt&Iion fast*** m addition, the bmmdari and sectors of i&$ aaval tv&$m were plotted on a m$}* % now, only tht etr^igths. of tli* battAlidiii were tuteoim* I t wns Aoao that &s.<Jh battalion had approxiiiiateljr 500 oesbat and 400 civilian and labor mrmmiel, an s s t i m t e irhich lat#r piwed t o b fairly aceur&ts. AS at ibrth in tue orgauiAtion ofeart, the Division the naval troopa, as had ben predicted, ^hen aLftswnts of the 24th ^ Infantrjr Diviaion entered DATAO, cms of the first documents cap tured waa a map showing both a my arii navy ctlspoeitiona. With th axeoption of tb 5ih Kaval BAtt&licm, out off by oar rapid advance at DIGO3, the imvy was t # 4fdnd alng th banks of th DA7A0 RI?SR to th. Crulf * Helationhip between tm arc^f and navy was poor* 2fc that tf-re OT/ clef ended Sast #f tb DA7A0 MI?E } indftpoiMlently of th lOOtii Divsion 03a the The f i r s t real grfi>aiid contact with eiements of the ICKJth Div ision w i ^ sad as our ^roop awaultod tha high p#^n4 i^rth of v @> T^ 352d and 353d I I Bns wer mm positive ia5 , A i ^ ^ ojxir&tiorie orders eapturd aM4 us t o vmat attr fores w&aW probably #aoiaitr in future attaclw location, t^pee of position*, weapons, and approximately nuisber of troops, fh 121% and 14th Airfield Battalions, and ^' ^ Airfield Contraction Unit mm also icovmt0rd in th ;

Division reached C,dMM and the south bar* for the fir^t ti-.^ iii the operation a l l * oaptiori oX til X66th II SB, #f tiai l)Oth Division #& deployed on oue front, strtehig fni BAGUIO to I ^ g g l i t : tha 163 XI &i had. m*$kM its mj tNm&fh th# root T hUia of M I f t % ' i t J # l n the Divi-ion at t!& U,u. witn til* three-pr^riged attack by our forss at SAGUIO, M L G S A A O, CA 2 A f t'h; n-^ was toro^d to abaria^i lilt last prepared . L I J hilia.

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In order to got a complete picture of the operation from the G-3 point of view, a brief review of the general nrobleme present during the planning, amphibious and tactical phasos, coupled with the solution t o these problem* ia presented. Specific and Individual lessons learned will be listed iri the latter part of this 2* PUfmiNG A D UBAaiUTION I K su the i n i t i a l order for th MN A A operation was IDNO issued to the Coiaaanding General, 24th Infantry Sivision and so- . lscted staff noobers at Headquarter*, I Corps on LOTS. At this time the Division was aaaaafcling an MK O O After receipt of the IDR. general plan f# the operation, the Caaaandlng General and his staff returned to IttNDO&C and began detailed planning* 3e2*otad Ualnon Officer* with clerka, e t c . , were l e f t at Corps Headquarters to coordinate arid iron out the minor details* These Liaison Offi cers were experienced personnel who were capable of submitting a completed plan without first submitting many minor details for ap~ prov&l while the $,&& was being written. By this aotbod long de lays in approval of plans, which might hare occurred due to long ooranainleations lines between this and higher Headquarters, were avoided anil the planning process was greatly accelerated. b* During the planning, several of the attached units scheduled to take part in the operation wore staging from other islands. The difficulties caused by this azra&geaettt were over* come to some extent by the use of liaison Officers, but i t would hare been ft moh oore s^tisfaotory arrarigement if a l l units had 8tagd from Q Aa planning began i t was found that the arailablo i n foraation on landing beaohes, dispositions and strength of enej^y end terrain was limited bat satisfactory for planning purposes. The original plan called for the Division less one Regiment to land in the H&iirad area, while one Regiment was to remain in floating re serve to sake an administrative or aesault landing on R plus 2 days in the vicinity of PARMG, depending upon the enesy situation. The plan was made * flexible as possible. This feature of the f&an proved to be of great value, for later developments in the enemy situation caused material changes in the plan while enroute to the far shore. These changes eabodied the landing of the main assault forces at P.-.RANG, while only one Battalion landed in the area to secure the IM beach, airfield and the town* d* Planning for eabsrkation and the eaO>arkation i t s e l f was simplified to & great extent by the natural f a c i l i t i e s avail able at MIKDOBO. Large, well organised beaches with ample slotting space and staging araa in close proximity to the beaches and a good road net eliminated saany of the problems usually encountered when loading out a Division, Loading was alao simplified by the type of craft allotted, for the operation. The entire Division was lifted hf landing or$i typo shipping* fkis s&Laplng provod s4tau* tageotts not only because I t could bach during loading, but also when t% was necessary to change the landing plans wfcile enroute. The regrouping of tht landing teams necessitated by the change In orders was easily accomplished by reshuffling the ships* If the Division had b*ri lifted by APAs the necessary reshuffling sight have necessitated putting Into port and reloading.

problsm af moving the *a\aller %yp* landing graft to the objective area waa solved In two different ways. First, the aaallar craft wjsieh war* at alNDORO r towsd b/ the larger craft. Second, other saall craft Joined the convoy as i t passed and procwded to the objective under their own power. b, ^ftiile enrouts th old problem of fading troeps de veloped on B&UJ ahipa* I t i s believed desirable that a l l ship Captain* bs aside responsible for the feeding of troop* afearfeed. I f the army attempt* to feed i t s own aen the rssult i s generally as shoim by the f lowing eocaaplft which took plaoe on an LSI* the navy uses the kitchen for breakfast froa 0500 to 0800, for lunch from 1*000 to 1300 &nd for supper from 1500 to 1000* This l e f t the a ray from 0S00 to 1000 to prepare and f*#4 one cosal to approxjjaately 200 mm and from 1300 to 1500 to prepare and feed another aeal. I t ie not praoti cable to atteay^t to feed 200 sen a meal after the ship ha* been blacked out* The mnt practicable solution seeat to be to have the army and navy pool their rations, pool their kitofeen perl and feed both army and navy the **c* fowl at the m * serving
m m t

During the M T A A operation Urge nw&m* of dif BO K G ferent typ9 of terrain w8 nc?oentrd, ah prtenting different problis. For disoussion purposes the taetieal operation can be divided into three separate phases: First, the drive from FAIAUd efast across the island to mGOS; second, the push north along the coastal corridor to D T O ?nd third, th# destruction of ne^y AA j HM T AO forces in the D V O - LIBBT D O S - M M N T sectors. AA b# Speed was tfee priiae objectiva in the drive east froa AM PAgk^G to DXG03* The enemy, expeetirg & landing in U T ) GULF, ted l e f t his reaf unguarded ajad the Division nerved to DIGOS before the J&P& cx>uld rectify their edstake. A steadied risk was taken to acaoiaplish this, for flank* were not securely guarded and the sup ply route was extended dangerously. The risk proved definitely north taking, The terrain over whioh this attack aovw* M very rugged and the routes of approach e*n&li**d. Koserou* obctaole* in the fora of d&*p gullies and wide, stdft rivers, with practic ally all. of the bridge* destroyed, nere encountered. On both flank* was rugged overgrown, isoatly unexplored territory A very few eti#jqgr troop*, courageoual/ led, could have gratly hindered the division drive at innumerable i c. The attack north from &IQOS along the coa*tal corri dor was typified by nua^rous trail blocks of fallen tree* and delay ing positions. The tactics used to overcoae these positions were basic. If the dnemy did not flee when frontal presents* was applied, the position waa by-pass*d. Here, too, speed wa* the password ot the day* The ensiay was s t i l l of jf b&lanoe and unable %o cope with our rapid advance, ka th$ Birision broke into the wide tkJUMO and D V O KLfrn valleys, our 2$ft flank wa* secured and the drive pushed AA on to 4? d. In clearing the northweet 0 V O are* the Division had AA the two fold problem of first operating on an extremely extended front while securing coauaunicatiori lines far to the south, and secondly, destroying an eneaay whose strength was at least as large, i f not larger, thai tip strength of the Uivision i t s e l f . At tie* the Division wee operating on three different fronts and attacking la item different directions. The problems were solved by light ly scouring 8)QSie :r***, even merely screening soae f*ws&*f *n$ ** aeabling striking forces at other points. After the striking force had taken i t s objective, the objective would fee lightly held

fc* weight #t the Division thrown to another aim** Mere again speed aeeeied to kep tho enemy off balance, for be waswiable, or at least not incllnid, to launch any large c*le counter attacks, althou|:h opportunities presented themselves asmy tlffi#a. The terreii? over which this fighting took place wa* largely ewr*d nith heavy abaca growth which afforded the ** way 3tellnt s^.ioeal8nt find natural camouflage for hit posi tions. As the DiTieion fought 1101th and west up the river val ly, tine &m& was continually holding the commanding ground, for th* terrain ri*9 In ft series of h i l l s to the JWtmtain## 'fbt enemy poeltione found in this terrain were well organised with interlocking fires and commanded a l l routes of approach, th Jap who occupied these positions seened to have gotten away froci mmf of his unorthodox and fan&tlcal battle tactics as way rather well illustrated after his Mlfi had been broken and he ** sorted to well thought out delaying actions. In this delaying &4&im he fought smart battle even by occidental standajpda* $b$ took adya-ntage of key terrain features along rote of approach, manning them lightly with personnel but heavy with auioaiu wo&pons* In eome in^Unoss he hold these poeitiont until killed but la many h held only until in danger of encirclement and then withdrew to nw p^aitions to take up the fight again* $** with drawal* were aided by th coyered routes of withdrawal which the heavy abaca affords tteau This mm heavy abaca aade i t difficult for our troops to rapidly envelope Jap positions. - G>3 | ^ Ifiiaediately upon reipt.f an operation order the G-3 Section Bust b split into & planning section aad ftn administrative section. Th planning section with %/$ of the G*-3 personnel aiust be set up to operate ir, separate physical loca tion from that of the administrative part and equipped completely a l l necessary typewriters! desks, etc* The planning seetion not be hampered with any type of normal ednlnlstrative duties. At the beginning of planning a schedule should be established giv ing definite dates when certain portions of the Field Order nust be completed. If this i s rot done th section will find i t s e l f In an embarrassing position trying to complete a l l sections of the order at once. Due ctetss of annexes to be prepared by other sec tions of the headquarters and the necessary fora instructions and other pertinent data should be put out &% the earliest possible time to iklXmm these sections to got started on their annexes. Amphibious; The 0*3 Section should definitely b split and tnt ut'' on different vessels tp safegtiard against arrival of one of the vessels* Bach part should contain the neces sary personnel to run the G-3 Section alone. This i s particularly necessary on the coainand ship where i t may become necessary to pub lish changes to the plans 7*1 le enroute. The office equipment, of %im G-3 Section, ehould be divided the s&m as c. I t was found desirable to divide the section Into two six hour shifts* Being off for aix hours does not allow a man to lose track of the situation completely and only a short briefing i s necessary to bring him up to date, twelve hour shifts have proven too long. To keep a seetion working efficiently on a twentyfour hour period over an extended period of time, aoae type of duty schedule mist be setup and followed as closely as the situation permits.
b

6* ummB mmms ~ TACTICS*

of the most effective harassing and delaying
tactical measures, which the Jap employed, was that of setting
a bomb or bombs along the routes of advance, the bomb to be de
tonated manually by a Jap In a nearby fox-hole (See attached
sketch)* The most practical method of countering the above
measure w&s to send flanking patrols 10 to 25 yards off the side
of the ro&d preceding the point by 50 yards and destroying the
enemy before the point reached the danger zone, the Jap never
waited to detonate these bombs when the main body was passing
but always detonated them as leading elements reached the danger
point* Mines detonated by push type fuses or trip wires were not
especially effective because of poor camouflage.
b Hare emphasis should be The night is generally thought of as has grown complacent because of this Such attacks demand superior troops, planning*
placed on the night attack*
belonging to the Jap and he
and can easily be surprised*
complete information, sound

c. The easiest place to kill the Jap is on top of the

ground* The enemy did not make his usual fanatical banzai charges
during this operation but he was caught out of his hole by other
methods. The use of ambush patrols on all trails and the-use of
booby traps on all routes of approach paid dividends*
d. there is still a reluctance on the part of troops to
close in tight against an artillery preparation* In all training
it must be emphasized that artillery fire does not completely de
stroy the enemy but keeps him down, allowing the attacking forces
to close under cover of the fire. Any delay in overrunning the
position when fire lifts permits the Jap to recover from shock,
remount his weapons and put up stout defense*
9* Bypassed pockets of Japs as well as infiltrating
groups were found to have reoccupied positions to the rear of our
advancing forces necessitating cleaning up of these positions a
second time* the counter-measure used to stop this practice was
simple but effective* The enemy positions, when taken, were either
destroyed by blasting or filled in with a bull-dozer.
f the small suicide group of Japs, snipers and small
scale attacks on installations and transportation in rear areas
were successful in some eases but were minimised to & great extent
by the following precautions* All jeeps and weapons carriers, ex
cept those used for motor maintenance and those carrying radios,
travel with their tops and windshields down and weapons manned*
The Japs were reluctant to ambush these vehicles or throw their
mines when the personnel were thus alerted* Since the Jap must
stand to throw his mine or torpedo, slow moving vehicles had no
difficulty in killing the attacking party while fast moving vehicles
were destroyed. Movement of vehicles at night was held to a minimum*
Only essential ambulances (always with armored escort) and certain
other special vehicles were allowed to travel during darkness*
Around installations, patrols thoroughly combed the area for a dis
tance from 500 to 1000 yards at dawn and at dusk,
g. theftnti-iankcompany of the regiment should be trained
as an infantry company for it is very often called up to perform
rifle company missions*
h. The rapid movement mentioned in earlier parts of this
annex should be emphasised* It not only keeps the Jap from becoming
set and organizing a defense but also minimises his harassing efforts
in rear areas by keeping him too well occupied elsewhere*

a* 'Much enthusiasm has been developed throughout the in regains to the possible uses and possibilities of recoilless weapons* Many cases were noted during the operation where such a weapon would have, been the solution to the problem, the portable feature, the ea*y concealment and the close approach which this type of weapon allows i s the desirable factor here. b# A rude enemy rocket mas encountered during the op* ration this rocket was fired from wooden troughs with l i t t l e pro* vision for accurate sighting* this inaccuracy of aim mde the weapon generally ineffective although there was & large desiolition and blast effect at the point of d c. Tanks were of l i t t l e use during thetilbDMihQoperation for any att&ck mad by them was canalised by the terrain and thus they could not bring their afoximm fire power to bear* However, It i s felt that men*- infantry - tank training i s necessary and offi cers must become isore familiar with the capabilities and liaitatlonft of tank warfare. Tanks &s well as Infantry must expect to take losses in accomplishment of their missions* d* 4 sniper-scope allowing a man to fire by sight at night i s a very desirable piece of qulpmnt* A very few of these scat tered about the perimeter would allow riflemen to spot the eneiay imich sooner and either k i l l him or mark him by tracer for automatic e* the other weapons in the rifle company are f e l t to be correct* Aaaple firepower i s available at any one time and on the other hsjntisl-ths amiaunition resupply i s not a great problem. f* Golored smoke for a l l types of shells, artillery as well as Bort&iy.ls desired for marking areas. White smoke i s none too effective for the #aps have this type and often create confusion by using i t at the same tiise we do*

a* .In the first two phases of the operation, the drive from P B K to 0I8OS and the push from 3EGQ3 to Dit?AG, air support AM * w&s mainly Hotted to ro&d reconnaissance, limited strategic bomb ing and night heckler attacks* Air cover was furrdshed the Division in the opening days of the operation but did not prove to be needed* b* In the third phase of the operation, the clearing of the northwest 8kVM sector, very excellent close air support was re ceived* An indication of the amount used can b given by the follow ing figuress 3260 sorties were flown, 1450 tons of bombs and 1B3 tons of Kapaloi were dropped and numerous strafing missions run* the majority of this air support came over on air alert. A f l i ^ i t re ported in to the Division SAP every hour on the hour from 0800 to 1600 daily, the air alert aaethod was used to such a great extent because of the distances involved between the target area and the plane base* I&turally ther ware times when planes appeared over head Bind ground troops were not calling for a strike. A system of having secondary targets available at a l l times in the rear areas (target data being obtained from G-2 information) was worked out so that practically no planes returned to their base loaded* As this system developed i t was possible to send target data to the plane base so that flights coming in the next day would be prebriefed on a secondary target and b a l l set to hit i t i f no ground unit was calling for a strike. One difficulty which this prebriefing solved was that of the planes coming from a distant port thus being low on

g&s whieh prohibited them from remaining In the target area for
the necessary briefing and target designation* Planes arriving
which were low on gas were directed to their prebriefed target*
This saved many planes from returning to base still bombed up.

a. The combat boot has proven to be the most excellent

of footgear yet designed for the infantryman over varying
type of terrain* the eanvas jungle boot is not liked
b. the poncho Is one of the necessities of the infantry
soldier* Its uses, besides that of a raincoat! are many* An
additional one per front line infantryman is highly desirable*

i&r

in Foxhole

Poin Hank Patrols*

Route of Approach

Jap in Foxhole

Flank

Patrols

Route of

Approach

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fwBt%K^Hi ittidto^hMl a^aa^MMwy tiiMifcit Hat* tfattNttaNMi ^UMRHI* I B H t w i f t l I M I tfeat th s t a t i c f atgwiay ratiaiia a t tha
SW^jpirpftli^y ^ar ^KpMW-W^ ^w4rVr vPawwA a|4affwVvnlMll4h ^a^aWBHWwhy aip^pajpajB* W M P 4PPmpH> ^aajiajpw

I^MI 'lypm inf aawHNWttajr fOTliftUff avoMwn^tad ato'ta aavld iwy% % laauad in a l l ittfttwft H m naaaaaafy in tfea* >a to aetittito one typa of i i t i i a m i a t l for aaotbor* 4 daflaita ahopta^a of *!** iationa oadatod l a tao taati* at tha tiao of lifting tw tb* V*5 fejoftliro mm** All daaa I a^plloa 00
4v iaip awiwpii^B1 y& ^p^tPia> ^P 1 ajBaiwBwa^awia* *apaip MaaytVMat awiapiv wa>apP''^"^iN^ wawjaaaMi^^ajf

43ti <!T|[iTi1tat1<nia1 nqjrtljpaiit takan aahoM l a l t l a l l y an H Day w** aoMlo la4od OB s a l t vahloloa* 30 daya of daaa H - ma t ntiananno af t / 6 wfitiaw>iil law oitpnlo and attaaiHHl o&ita via ^fantportod uadof tho Dtrlaion Wmmk Supfly Offloor^a l KaltttoaaYioo for &oiHdiTlalOBal troopa m* aayrlod % tho f iomiiiiiait- aa Ba^r ipowtaTiii'1 Itaaw of attmfty yaawUyMf t o tyfMi of toalt aoxo ttxiimtadi 30 day* aspoadai^a aa^illoa varo ta aasrlod a|r a l l tusita wlta tlMi oanM^ptloB of
^wwwi^^ iyrH^aya^wMa^^^y ^Bwwap^^ww ^w^v^p^^ ^^^^^^Hw^a^ft ^^wf ^aaa^^ w^iap"^Faiiawaiw*ow ^aja^vaav ^^^^^FwaaawF^^^waT

fm all troopa*

4* 8MBB HI*
15 B/3 of iO ootano gaaollM, 30 daya of dlatlllato, 30 day* of a l l tlso* POt laaa kt&M and 1.000 dmna of Avfaa f tho an*
wNifta^P *ja^Bja^aYiajHPi3i(*#a*ajawav. #"^WF^Pfa** ^^paay^ai Mnl^awaa^at ^^f ^a^aaj* awaW^AIanPb^Wft *4palWBaw^WRa^*ajB*aP*HPaF

on allottod oMj^tef All FOt **# plaotd la tho DlTlaion Qaar* tonaastor daaa I H dus on tho far ahora* @f tho 30 day* dl*

t i l l a U sad a l l #*taf PCI. (lo#a Avgaa) If day n r t oarriod arriwd la th* &J&** aroa ityTCU Avgaa i u oarriod forward oa I 'lay *M|pa#*

# g %

of Baflaoor Claw If &$$&* mam

0 wpplioa ostsi*tl f t feridgo aatovial sad forttf ioatiea *** plioa* I daya mppty dasa If HMl awwmtad t I t 4ay witli rtl if 1 yU S tt ita Aih wmm UfUA tlaftt& x^Qirvwokta fear tfe* i#|rtoa !* la

- 3 Baiia of ftr iiaaoyMil<ril a l l : fir* aoecapaa*** l i t noft*4iviiia t i p waa obll# ladd wltWs the vaHabHity of tmlt troaica establlaked an aaaitio davp IK ^MI objoaiiva araa.

the ShippiAf illoeaticai Plan, attahad aa

shipping. I t will U noi#d taat t D*y shipplM (tSTa only) eeAstitat4 tho roar ooholoa akippiac a4 tfc ao^atml of a l l s wl # ^ p a i ot iiwwwyiiylif th* aaaaH

ftt mk ao yawfUiBjg tpf v s awi VMMMI itt)MNi(|utti

arrivad in tho objoativo aroa om lALX# tfe* Sftlp^tBi AUooa

^l

t l i i

tho aaaaalt laaiUm la t i l * oporatioa trat offotod la two to tlto o1|otiir aroa |irafM 4iwwioa of altlppiag at
a *Bii Hit i^oi'tttlMi f^tiiit. tlkat #a# ffellifflMt #a1i1id j^r UMI

laadlag in aatoriol* to laad in to land ta

tho PA&im aroa of Iteft ajori^r # B aoppilioa aad 0adp tb origiaal plan l i b aaaamlt tmita oaly * tfck* lATiftftflffl araa nallo tlN> otbwr fwroaa oai'i doatiao4 % tlw f ASU?ft sroa two &y lato? t 1 o olimv la pdaa

asaaait SAadlac ^6 Is^tli mum aoatiioijl aliwi Sipp^f #snpi ' thoroforo wow oooatrato4 in tbo ?AfJa aroa wbovo tbo ao4eri ty f tiso f yoos laadod* Siirisioa doaps to haadlo Olaiw lt XXf . lltp If aad t mipplioa owo ostalliaod la tho iaaodiata wioia* 0iTlaioa doapa to oo takoa owor I f I Corya m aooa ooaditioas warrtod* ffeia waa offootod oa $& aad UMI I Corpo **?$&? # t | i i % d l^ tllf -OW^fiaal f||^% l^fiaiiat ^Iwip i baao of sapplioa $mt lofiatioal mmm% &t 24ta Mviai pipay nottw yXy m maia mpptir, road* ^RT**aaa wxwa aswpt apooa ojoaysvo 4ni '^IMMMMNI i M ta lit <toaii%w><i'tod to. lsap K t forwadpd o^bat oloaoata ooatlsaod to aovo a tfy^K proMoa* I t aowlopod t&a* aftoip tlMi ansaalt laad&sg tao fofiafd #oafeo*t

by aotor tranaportatioa ooald aot bo aatiBfaetorily offootod

of the *ottHtiOR of the y, l m t# oatabHah m <&t**a*tft *#*% of tapp^y tat * pUn vaa doptod for tho oatabliahaont f t Dirialoa duapa {apo*lfiaally
^P 'PTPPF" lippw^P^P'a* -pi ajpajaj^at ip^lpupt fp^p]jp^pWP^^^^Pj^f ^ ^ w ^"P**fliP^PWWw^iMPf ^p^PJj^^^"Jawpppa*a^ ^a^pipj^pr W"*P^Ww

H H to C T B T 4mf* |gr W*a and Wi*B W* tho WlffiaAO Wh OAAO WM mi within t i t daya tho COfABAf drnpa *af*flawttdto bo to*
jjpjt ^pjp *IWP' ^PWW* ^PT^P^IKBT * I(|WIPBF jp^WB^W ^P^Falwpjdw VJflPPWiWP JISPF^I^P** ^UrTJS-^pa^a^ij^'^f ^p^Wp^Bia^B^^Bj ^PW^^^^^

11m*4 t0 pmmm* a tflltiittlt p m & not i i $ th# ISft p m 4 I t fteftftfi Mnbftt lot. 4

^i

to mmmm

p p ^MI WBt iNMliifci to th* potot of tafeiiil^d tmpi to frra ti^eft* A t to i^ t i& iK
MMJVOT W V ^W' swSnBfltiK^K taaaiMp^MHI 3MPJ9 WntB0m3t flpsPPaVHaMpV

to tilt vioialta" of MTA0# iAlTA #}K9Z 4wna mvp tham to fAI0BO bpa^t A i w ifiq^i** to Kanllvd % i ^ H t tapaaprttlB t a l l Mhrtffim m i y ti> fOSt flffP tonui* Air dbuni *f ff#et*dU 4 r^ord of air lirapi for th pwid IT April ( 1 9 ^ to 30 Aim (*11 dato for f5 oprtioji) la %%*& m 1** elomtr* #2 0f thl A

^
IP^Pip^P^P' ^P'Sff^Pr1 MWP*

*fa Br ef a Q B ami t t f t i ga Ja*a yor ^ y O A t OO

^PfflWKWWr^''P' ^PwWP^Wp^WpTipJ ^ W ^ ?P^P ^ P M I T^PW^F ^^pwpJpJ^ippp^P|IWR ^P^P> TUBjiPnp' ^ ^ W P ^

lRIJMIIIBt "Mitii Jtttililiililmil n lllHMMAftVk WBM %tSttUk MHH^ I f f It i

^ W P W flpj|P^Pw ^pm^wpt T|PJ^^P 49t#Pfc^F4fVnPNPI^PHnl JH^pn^^m' TJP^JP^P Tjwp^ ffPvWMP P^^PTlr^WHS|fl|pi^V* ^PQ(PfPJHPMW|^F ^^

Labor pwwtromont la C T B T ^ tfc Cirll AfTftira Qffip M OAAO alnly fpr ^ e us of tho ait B^Naitr|r fttg^imsttf Itbopfi #**
S3T8#1P lpp% I w i 9 44 w l PWl SB gp

11 Affairs pontrol i tho arau At lAfIiaa*lir tfeo $ W WM # t tsi^p &p A f A ti 0 i 3 t f J I f i f l | 5 of th Philippine H l l t U f * | m y H l l * ttftit* m i tosior ttoo rootlon of 0-4. thoy amlatod tho 3rd BtogliMwr Battallaa in

g a for* at the UBOIGAI EtVKft* fitta* aa& top two 4f refuatBg pay* tpsm arrifisf at URAL ae tamdred t**rar for t**o uao af tho 19tfa 8egient wmm tgoouro* by tho Sl*il Affair* Offiooj a aunt** of thoae lafeorora wave Ba&ebe# a lal aboriginal tribe, *t* offered their oerrlooa In thia l t haaardoaa eployaeat# At BKKJS approxiinatel t % t l f In SAITA CRtF2 POAf 29 par day for yw m ^ baaeh an as pgp ^ownt of labor

iedioal tmlta

la*

a grtmp of labevera

nalt of flu* tabXa f i r Ghai#al Wai*wr Orauadaa vat f sand t be iBAdk<{tiat# in qati^r ** p^portioa of typa ia priaiaf taa imit of f ! in aaalygla baaad an I wilta af f iwitial aepply, ahwing tfea D|>ariai batvaaa it of f i t * tafcl* of allo^uieaa m i actual $xpmM%mm to f*5 Oparatioa i praatat4# Sflmwwadad #liflfaa i i W/^P tafela aya iiliaata4 la

Baeraaa* , t Ml $ #a$a* 9 Sffloka, Wf I f 1,590 %$$M 2,010 5t4l6 %& 1,295 Inaraaaa Bearoaaa Baor*aa* 30$

& A tmsi*irabla dalay wa agfwyloaaad tn tha p Olaaa f I raa^ifrply a|)pa7ntly <tu t# atoialatratlra Alf fiaultiaa l jfoaai!if paqulaitloa It I t baliarad tfea* thia d l t i eaii ba l|a*wad % raqui^lof th oparatiwaal aaita to pH t % W && 4 i g f a&* Tfeia rMW^ly tat aboold ba oa proj#et4 hi^iag for ayritatl IE ttea tafi% aroa oa doflnlta dt b It ha bw tt xpari9M that malog tmita alt* ntly fail to tak 1B thair aathoilia4 allowaaoaa af Claas H Orananaa stppliaa not onV lth ftei f I w t or adroaaa oloaanta ba takan Order i s tako% In ages mm by QHztanoa ptraoiflaol to ismro t^at tlia Aiifiiatrtl<v eog>ll*4 with to tto lottor aai t M A f a l l Mfeig 1* If tbo mal^t arm l i th| popatioa, aorioua iiwil* foaad to oxlat p l o r to %W Jt boonuia of am mmm*

ure to oarry tho f a l l attthorisod aUowoiaoa lato tho poratioaal spit of th* faot that aupply in tho stafiag area waa plontlfol. l i l t * obricmaly had failed to oaary witk them ^ o l r ait^orfaod H tl

i t t * #oi6*irtBBitlo; # i^ok flMtti l i l t %a#n^Mi o f ft (faflffliiiii'i'iiiii ft^El*'

**' All number* <sf mttfmm *afeat fea&talleft a aaaault

&Sfi&ai* f^fftiiwwf ifagttlji ltd tiiwiT'WHiiiili tiwidad i n stot # *

ad therooghly* faottoal dmtUUm afeeeM to %**# *m virtual aamirawa th^t *&fitt*#r affo*t and faailitU* available will Into inootmt oliiliilii that 4Hifiatarti will
-flit ^ijitioli <tii|# MadbBiiH^ AM^Li %n iliidnintif lAiafit Miriest MltnNi a ftaaM&ai to I M M | 4 tfiifMiiiiti
^^^^Jfc j^^u^^^^l^^,^^^|ViB 'flk^kk^H^k^ft-w'^teiki^X' 4p^^^U|^^^^^UuSkHt^^^^ JL^^^^^^^^^ J B J L ^ A ^ui^^^^^H flk^^ jJf^^Bb^^^^^^^

fc

wiglntftr fert P^ff^yfff lugtitliii.

tm lultiiy liNNlii tlwuM INI IMMII

IMI I

.it jjijili- ^bijisaNi as at@a#a%iAB.* itt^ltti 'Hit

tp

|r

l^P

f and

A oiwint battaUmirtwrai^1M ii,nl||'t follow a vmpU t&mm* ***** i t n b i M i ttfear a a l l a

^ IhhlWi tin I t a i ba wovad OD tfallara ymtbar than

luvm fttfiii A fl^uiaa

| to * at g tary n*o#i^ ^iatataa* M A a f with Ughta in fbrwavd araaa

n*. TniiMinait a^lowiiBUMi a# ^^Mtfi iwniiifti in

^ 7 f uwuraal

and illuatrata ti intriaaaias #t the |

i ia

S At 2*tf% mm Bobil water to

unit twol* *t fatttftUta to

f
<ittii l i t

far mppe#% of

a* In ft

mm iwntant vain ta**a4 t*

-^Bfc1

t the tfesi ao mi* room

maoH

one ot* th fbl la jfiftiHtfifr ty f i i

|ft%|iiifftHffllttff' twil^bBBti H lit CHEW

tHN

i^

Tinnram Tn i forwaifd f

fn th< T t i f mitftn

litter b station*

p y badly M M M for l l t t w anryii^ to th aid awiuiportation ha 3jurily i i p i i ^ M

itlatI i t eertalnly
*

1& ft.

aifls were hold for *f*r torn weofce beeause sot IMEPB wswiffi$ tlwi land efaouatioia roate-# $$BNH atrips were ooastrBotod bat mm* eoalA be aa& opera a Irf oawrlfif a patient beoaase of iaeoasast raisuu

g. The inereaae ia adainiatr&tl** ort deaaadedl g stations In the proae&t a*pfti*ii render* l the off! ^Qi$attt aad per9^el allotted, A thie fi4alfilstrflti? traff lo lnelndes Det of and disposition m$m*a* imim*%im msA hoipitaliiatioii bi*wmthly report of battle eacualtlos ivtantdi to d t Statiatidil Sealth 8portt ADbroviat4 Statitittalp report at be ade in seagr oopioa for (tistritntlofi to unit appearing theroos ao tlio oaljr praotiaHo ay la to oograph it* A the leaHag eo^ioa l^i* operated the entire tawpalga with r o than tie tiioir storaal potiost oapaoity ^ the a4ai&ict*atl*e roporta hmre atfdod a heajfjr i cm persoiael aad eqtiifftent* Hw followimf o^oipaeat i i ered l
' J Ut%> iffMNi- t l t i WNf JMHI f#|JO*'t i % %

oa the ttaainfi 10 iih fcrrlafo

(2) ;H;g)iijpri|hi f*ffcilft^t ,j&* ytporta are ro^ftlrod to % i lis so M B ittiiMi HM# yjJITodmHtltm ter Qf - Ift t t t t i n i y fniifliintidla i tfco MBM fnt>lii li i
f S i IfcwWPUl p n

^lolo blo4 f ololofiMla y pmi0illlA aai other ttonaUy i^oaaible to IUO QP i^ofora thoy aro ^ f ar to the *e***

(5) (6)

A4ditloaal nrfiaal lejilartoweiii of mUtnionio apring*

toa tfiha and al ton ttmiXora to p i i i i o

i fly rt

Attthorito a iq ^ot ItNNit yiouiiw>llj lia oatet i t ia adviaable to ho Bn i | with DiT lift thaa with an ati?e X H
h* Tl following ahangoa.ml aoititiomi ia fioXd w t i f t i \ bat and acmmoMbat wrvio voold bo iMnpaaao4 and ^iat a aorration af Vedioal Corps ^Tlt^rv imald roanlt* (1) Kedioal Battalion. WC Offiaer. I t ie f e l t that preeeut t / 0 ia a vairte of pfoaaioma Raplae 1*6* Cewnawfiltig dffloor in C<pany by IAC Offier. I t i s f e l t that t to ohiofly i i t

*and*r titarftaco l i rude to Ifojer* &!? ***rl#g ft** stall** t* tfe** with a rank Swrgioal Boapital

ty & tl tlwrlng wi^aiy IMM .ftp** with a 450 l*d jwtdtj ad usually t 55O ft i t l i t3

ratingsrtfT/5 to 9ifiif H sue

IIJI Jr<Di'M
JBjWpj ipW^P^'1 1^^^ ^BWS*^PWP^P>* W^WBpgWHgr

ll

l
w H w

rtMfe
^PlJIsJp^ffWWp^P

t J
^PHH^^^Wg^w WPjEf^WRr^P"

H oaad a^a di#aMa o^otriac In t l * **a filgit hat* b^a lllar to t h o In othr PWLlip* af *f tV*t* iMMbt' sd iMpM^Mft m to land

itiiifi 48 h 0 m to

ftp

t i t

lt

fe6*pttli*tl*xu Saw 4 t i fro IsritatJn af uff

t4

4B to jv3tiitr t alviliaa habitation* mtimm 1mm

too

fl

'

than in o^or ttlaidoos ara** of tho oliillt and fv# tfeoro haa bo aa i a a*anuBO - m mmmt B . prwraro muiafma ITon e la ttf.mt i t mm $m& pcBoieayy to i tft atabriao dosa to 2 tab&et*

. a la fNi a^oomtioa ae ^ poroiBl to ^ tirioaa laai* lag eraft, a#h group asaigawi had b aa or^aiod ait *?* able of providiag fall e^rtoratr aoirriott ladopoadoat of tha

. >. b. Claaa U QI *aiatBaa#e aappXlea tafcea in initially h<nxld to held to the wiwiaw, alatonanga ate** of orgaal* l&tloiiil. i^^^i^ieiki* l M* than <MBUJUI Jj "tfjft- Twitter eafts & t f M inflaaaable drsaa aeed aot at*!** before JPt0* 8triot aupervialoa oa the part #f fraaapert Quarter* d milt Csaftsdrt hoald b xril t p k U fr*gt both atard ship si a t! Itcdtef bmh* - d* Oobat noa In m ptwttioft r h that lag Qamrtr&fter attlttts to m slrablet . . (1) Oao Q Sorviw or IUilJd M
. ' .

. (2)

(tee f Irory Platowa, , on* I^Bsdr/ ?Utoo *&|

i at loaat two Mti prior to os^arkatlofi tvt a of orlontatlon* ohangoa to T/0 * 1 1CV17 date* I f 10

offieor and aaljgtod:

(a) OBO offKwf, lat i t , for tety 1B tho Off! ^ * tteo 0lTi*loti Qartratp a Orvrts ig> i t t i asA S1T< Offlaor, 19 allrtod am | f
1 Ka4ial Aid Baa and 16 additional laborer*

() Additlooal drlwra to allow two driers por

(2) tatoMMffllod atkaztgoa la f/i (a) dital Add 1 t of aodital l ^ p i a t for 0o pany Aid (b) OrdnaiMe Woapeaat Soloto 4 aal Add 4 fana, ahino, frowning, light oal

a# BlffldHlty otttoniiif fitld wlro aM dry t i l l battrloa vas acporiontod ** tho wlro waa &*t*Q%iv*t tho ^ l t a f o of tho dry ooU battorlos balow apoifleatloa. la both mm* tho trobl# appeared to be dw to poor atorago of tho ^iipOBt la ti ara d^a# fow lro aa<i dry all batt#rio ao oldar tlua H aoatha fi data i f aaasfaetsroi ttomlA bo aado availa&ia to *$&& officor at loaat thirty iaya prorleaa to m Say, b, f/$shertatoa of oo^ilpMnt did aot arrive at the

aioa Sigaal tanp in tiite to bo toatod aad Borriood*; That aoant ihat a portion of tho oqaipaoat *hoa opoaod ji*$ii**efy t iasao * the uaing organisation* daring th oporatioa, *as wmMtom able dao to daaago ia tranait er *iaing parta. #,. A groat ber of aisor oporatiomi aro mattally oosdtiet* ed along with the aain siasioa* Taia ro$&i?oa addltioaal aigaal eqttipont : Si tdiit eaeti i t ia wioma^Bd that a l l t*qtl* itioas for sigBal oqblfaMBt ataro f/0 1 1 %t apisrovedfcgrhi^tor hoadqoartora witlioat tho mooaalty of vriticgp roo^ioatlBf' maifo oojiipMnt* fho diYisiea sifiial offior ia in a pwitiou rt he oac ostisato hia ro<{Blrooatt ia i&nm* for aa 4# 0owmiatioa iastallatioaa for * diviaioa ia imt groat* or than owr aatioipatod to bo latallod, opomtod aad aiaftata^ ed aador tho |goaoat t/0# To prerido tlio aooonayy yotoat day aigaal ro^ttiroonta for a di-riaion i t ia rooowaoadtd taat a ij aal lsattaliim oontiating of a ooaatamotioa ettpa3rt m #gmm tiona ooapaay aad a hoadqaartora ao^aay rojplao tho pngoat diviaioa aigaal ' o* f e t f oftoa oonnmioatioR to lovor imita It diffioult whoro tho aatoro of tho torraia and tho distaaoo isfolvod ptv* olmdoc th -mm of tolophoao wiro oitaiatioB* la aooh oaaoa rery high froqtioiioy radio*tolofliOB oojaipamxt aaold bo oado ilJbl f* Diffioaltjr waa oxporioaood in thia oporatioa ohoa ary sifaal orp dotaoiiaoat aboard too mmmA ahip wia aaod oxoluaiToly % tho ipty* To ororooao thia difficulty i t ia ro ooM2idod that at loaat aix radio o|ratorf four ao**go oontor oriaod to travel oa tho oanaad ahip dtviag aa aaphlbiwn oporm* tioa# . Fart of tho additional aigaal dotaohaeat vita oao aijjpal offioor oottld follow tho dirUioa ooammdor aahoro aad pvovido oowsoaioatioaa for him vith bola too iiawnTiii ahip aid tho aitfing W aahoro, Tho roaaiador of tho aigaal dotanhaont woold aostia* tto oa dotgr aboard tho oosnaad ahip aatil tao diviaioa d post io poraaaoatlj oatabliahod ashoro. 7 Roporta of 0-i alliod aupply aorriaoa aaoly Infjaoor^ Mod* ioal f Ordaaaoo aad Qaartoraaator aro ahova ia tho folloviag Aano3ts $ l l f f aad 10 roaottiTaly

3 Inol*j #1 * Shippiag Allocation Plaa ?2 - llooord of Air Breps

-'Report of 24th Signal

\:[:.

gHiyPIJQ ALLOCATION FLA1

** I**y ship naabers oyrspondiBf to ship a*sigients

will be announced when available* : , . ,:
\ , b Forsonnol aestgrasents are approxisato, t1y ay be .
. . aried li^il7 so as to awoid splitting organisation*, bat will
; be adhered t o a s eloaely a s possible, . - i. , . .
o, *ehiole asslgaaeiitft are If total M I W reg*dlees of
typo. Soirti trailor, towed gon, or piooo of trtolcod o^tilpot i
- - .
onidorod to bo * vohilo# dm milk cargo aasigtiod to o*h fhip will bo spottoA *t tho
aaaignod slot cm tho loar Shoro udor Dl-riiioa eoatrol, with tfeo
xooption of aaarctnition whioh will bo tpottod at tbo fc*tffto4
tflot I g tho unit to whioh It porUino, and with Oortain othor
sr exception* notod in footnotos*
o. Tho ualt aapkod wii an aotoriak () on mtk ahip aiftt
nt is roaponolblo for tho ship, to ixeludo tho followlnf pointst
(1) To appoint a 00 of troopo for tho hipt who will bo
tho aonior offieop of tho rooponaiblo milt aboard*
Ho is w&% noooisarily the tonioy offiaor aboard
tho ihip, bat will novortholoof be rooognisod $m
CO of troops for alt pertoimol aboard*
' ' . ^ (2) To appoint a TQK who will for^ilato loading pla
' and apor*io loading n tho Roar Shoro ad wJdoad^

. ing on tho Par Shoro* Loading on tho Boajrfllioro= .. to bo oonduoto4 by tho unit rwaponaiblo iH a toliod
' dulo to bo dirostod, . . - .
(3) To bo rosponoiblo for ^riding 7 dayo voyago
tiont (or lo If thip will furnish part yations),
aaoaalt rationa ieouod prior to landing (2 I, 1 D
' . : por IndiTldual), m*B faoilitios, and billot g* .
' . ' slginonta for all poroonnol aboard*
(4) to subait oopies of loading piano and loading lists
as diroctod by this hoadqaartoro* Whon intlvdod
In oargOy at loast no f and paroforably two, bill
dotors will bo in tho bow of eaeh oraft (oxeopt
those carrying LTT's), All H f f will bo loadod
so as to bo disohargod first* 10 f 000 sandbagst
attiag$ and 300 foot of roller onvoyor will bo
lottod \andor Dirislon oontrol and loadod on oaiah
LST. All TOhieles will bo properly watorproofod,
tires ehainod, and ehookod on boards Tow chains
or cables will bo oarrlod. Balk cargo is lJtaitod
to 206 tons on LST'sj no balk oargo on other type
f*#tlft
To be responsible for unloading bulk oargo on too
tar 8horo An unloading detail oonsisting of 80
men and at loast ? trtiofcs, 2i*ton will bo assigned
bjr tho CO of Troops of eaoh 1ST turn porsonnol and
ehioles aboard. This detail will roaain with tho
ship tintil all bulk cargo is discharged, Theoo
personnol will bo identified by a white ohalk

Jail/A

$ iaahes In diameter on the left knee of their

trousers, and the traeks will have white letters
P 6 inehes high painted on tas windshield.
$ absorb variations in. the saaber of vehicles #
signed to the ship &s *ade necessary bgr actual
eharaeteristios of the vehicles and the ship.
!?** are assigned 62 whittles (les if LtTf are
inoladed) aaA LSB's are assigned 15 vehicles. If
more tehieles thaa assigned ean be ldtdf the
uait responsible for the ship prorides tie assess;
If fewer eaa be loaded# the xmit respoosible will
deerease Its e m qaota# Wm vmit responsible will
m % deerease the quota of any other assigned tmit
witoout aathoriaation of this headquarters. If
any onit fails t# arrive in tine for loading or
fails to provide Its qaota of vehieles, the uit
responsible will inerease its own qtiota eorres*
(7) To provide guarde for cargo in the slots on the
Sear Shore, to tall vehieles to the slots as 61*
rctedf and t polio* the slots after loading.

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190 57 21 40 44 170

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JM #1 * 2 t o lay *ff e*SBI to*dh during dbriwtion* This foi^n L H O O CAIL. AT N

1-v 20 Apr i f Apr.

B JMMf* it * ASSr,

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3 August 1945

mmm m rimm*tm
f xlor to %isg alerted for tko itor*fivo Opratin and during th pe)rl*d of staging, the Signal Cmgwiy was engaged in the maintenance and operation of di r i s ion and base casBauniaations at S W JO01t MOT0!O# PI. l a addition to this e l e J ments of the signal totally woro proriding i ti f l small task forces on nearby ll k f cation for several

Tmining during this period consisted of o radio school for tlTision personnel whleh was in aper&tin twelve hours eeoh day. signal security ana procedure were the points stressed. Constant supervision and correction of deficiencies noted during the L Y E operation was arrled on la a l l HT seotione. 'Supplies in this poration, as ta former operations, presented the moat difficult obstacle to mmmimm* A acute lack of dynassotors caused m sereral radio sots to be out of serrico during the i n i t i a l stagos of the operation. The al^o of the object ire area and d i s tances between beaches necessitated that personnel end equipment hm distributed amo&g fifteen ships im t&o imwrm ffeo fXioeibiXity of tho signal pl was such as to provide for any exigencies before or after landing. This was proren by tho last minute ehftngo in tho tactic el plan* One radio team and ne wire toam was attached for tho operation to each infantry regiment. As on tho LJ5TTS operation, this proved to bo em excellent prooed^ire. The extra radio sot provided a second radio channel thus en abling more traffic to be handled apeeaily end efficiently by radio. The wire team remaining with regimental headquarters enabled tho teas chief to close liaison with th regimental c&miunl~ officer and to anticipate the moves of tho 3 d post, thus providing almost wire cosmunication with Division. fh# raiJid aArnt of the diTlslon ovor groat of adverse terrain made It virtually im* possible to maintain wire communication between aivIsion forward and roar echelons, fills placed an additional burton on tho message center and radio naotiOB* Even though many messages wore transmitted In tlio clmrt It was necessary to encode at least torn thousand groups dailv. Motor messengers im scsme instances re;ulrd three days to complete tho circuit between division f M M roar echelons duo to tho distance^ road tom and haxards. . whomoror possible f a i l use made of airplane drop and piek*up of messages.

The tarrlfte* f thr#e massage toatw men were last t these men were wtm&td at a forward command From lessons learned during the IXfTI eper tlon It was found t&mt the signal repair section oouid not prform ff ieintly unless i t were com* fletely mobile. This was accomplished by the use tot small srms repair trueks supplemented by one I ton ta*g# %ru#k During displaoement ef the e mand. post, additions! cargo trunks were required to transport the signal equipment exalting repairs Likewise, mobility was %hm keynote of the efficient aperatiens of t i e signal duiap, 7aat quen t i t l e s of wire, batteries ant other ritieal items % e e transperted by eeirg* trmtka anfl lending oraft* ^r Signal suppliee were kept teaedlately available em mobile landed trucks at the division forward tmem post in order to insure rep id delivery of urgently & items. fhis service was only nai* possible #&& If the taamwerk of tb<9 entire oompany as the table #f orgaril^atlon does not mtlffliTlse mitieient mtl t@ perform in this mmnner# Sii5e a large peroentse of signal f#r ere engaged im normal duties both &*j and night It often prarrad diffieult to establish an adequate f#r*' imeter. Signal installations such as radio stations, message enters and awitehboards must be well die* ersed* This results in a need for an exceedingly arge perimeter defense. In many eases signal per*
soimel were usable t# adequately prepare perimeter
positions prir t darkness because their services
were required installing esamand post i t i
f u t i l i t i e s *

Slgaal Cot
2 Inclsures:

1 - Lessns Learned n
Victr Five Operation.
2 - Officers Participating in Victr
Five Operation on R Day.

SXCBUL

3 August 1946
UES80K,5 tfABHtD .OR VICTOR-glTa1

IB this operation as w i l l us im th# t p i i t was found tkat the pr@s#s.t Tablo Of Organisation of th Biriai^n si^aal l i p p
al personr-el &r required to insure th e f f i c i e n t oot?^unlcation fsGilttlfts possible to a r!af*ead diTiiiom in t h i s thatr* P#rsoimel im th following o'tttogofyo' r# fioeossaxr graphle 1>oo]i&i9iiiiisf BoAio porators sad wire

eonstruotloxu

prosost tablo of-. @rgauiEati@K dots u@t prorldo ftrirors. of rohlelos as sueh* Porsosnol wbs primary function Is to prorldo eeeaiBuniegtio f a o i l l t l p aro drivers as a secondary occupation. I f drirors woro auiliorl^td t&oy could teo usod to supploiaont t&# porsoimol-of tho I)1T1B1II g t & also prorldo porsonnol far po3rim%or In mj operation xtended over a r&st distamoo of time and opaoo'ssoro r e h i c l e s should bo prorldod t o xBOb(lo load signal supplloa* Infantry roglnoBts ' oaanot'oojrry with tliom9 < oror am appreeiabla dlstamo t oaouish oxpondtablo signal supplitf h&? dopond upon tho sigaai QmpmT to replenish th#ir d l l l

Inclomir #1*

S August

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HWQH*

SECTION I

1* Planning and
if

Organisation for Combat of

h 4* Highlight* in feeUeal ^laymnt

f# W M t l o n , , ipply 6* 7#

i*

order wae begua and loading plaai were diseoaoed* ' Coaforoaooa were held with a l l OiTiaioa ArtUlory oaito and with h i ^ r aod* aape of MXHPAmo wore etodiod in ooajaaotioa with the lorraia ioa Fiold Order was oapleted oa 3 April and a l l f iaal were disaod aboard the ia^y Comaiand Ship, Oa f %ril ptrnil of tha aaaaalt anita boarcted ahip lojr a rahaaraal of ti* oparation oa U AprU at KA1CASIK# BISDCaO, P.I. On 14 April at 1145 th conroy for too ?-5 oparation laft WHITE l IKOR P*I jfr ta oparatioaal area. (Wiinal plan ealliMi for two ECT'a to Und l a tha MAUU ECT t o lanl on R D and WHITaiffi^CHSSand tha 19th RCf on BLUB K B A H % DlTlJiion Artillery l w a too Bill and 63rd Fiald Ar* &C* tlllary Bittalioas would aupport tha l^th and 21at Infantry ftagisaata* Upon cvevuring th baaefchaada, th imnAtog foroaa would advantta by sotorisad pt afltphjybioM ooiwaant South t o aoisa tao POLLOGi H & Oi aroa, ftp 34th ECT with tho 11th Fiold ABf ArtiUary Battalion woro ia ttmmtf f t o p # * l l o aait in *** ii^t ta# F R M area by aajiiibioai aaaault i f aaoaaaary. If tha AA S I Bay (17 AprU; lawiing* wer aucoaaaful and fUGl HAiUW by I p l f {If *pril) ^ a toari^ tmm would safe* aa a4* UT* landii^ oa OftH G Tha original Mtiaato of aaa^r atroagth i a tao COXABAtO araa was batwata t]0O aad 2600 tro|p g wan rportd garriona4 by 500-700 oaoogr doaooatratad arottaa ft Q(3&8$M&A* ^fe# l^yflAiiS C SU & a wa# osl^tai^NI mi 3.50 aad l^@0 W i E O' troop* wore rwpartad bctwean PAEAH} and COfABAfCw Ho 8tlnat of osnajr itroaght prowd t o be in orror a a l l i * fying a l l prariou* preparationa with regard t o the landings at mUBAHS, On 15 April, whiit earoata, FO #6 was iaa^d ehaafing the plane for toe iaraeloa. force* aeored the landing beachee prior to i f with oiUy li^ht reeiatanoe reported at PAEAMS. Ihe l^th KCT RJH landed on Q SS BACH while one reinforced battalion of the 21t lafaatry reined in floatiag reaerre prepared to make an ad*ia* iatrativ %mMm ftt P & upon order, lhe 52nd fiold Artillery A AO Battalioa aado an adainietrative landing on 1 and R / I daye at M B A H whUe th 11th and 6 > 4 Field Artillery BmttaUon* SG landed on : i ^ 2 aa originally echeduled*

a* Snring thi campaign the following Field Artillery i and attached operated under oomaiand of 24th Infantry {

ilia FA BR FA ai

105*ttHow
IOJJWI HOW

105aHow

S a t i r e Period %tire foried Satire Period

eSHpnPWWPWMp W

205th FA to 105-t How i f Smm to Btry A 24 ftftt t# Btry B If Juns to 2J June Btry G ?i*f> to i f Jtu Btry C, I44th rA to 105** Hew 15 May to S J a l / 983rd F Bn A (leseBtryC) 155* Gun 11May to 1* Kay Btry A 3 l i y toUMiy Btry A 25 June to 4 Jttljr Btry C, 496th A Bn 90m Gun A 11 Kay to lo May 8" How Btry B, 655th FA Bn 3 Say to 1* May b. In addition the 1 Uorps Artillery Headquarters tat**** & the eoabat are* on 3 My taking orr i l l a*4iwa and heavy e r t l U * ry *t that time attached and eowisting after eoaplete a*****2jr i f the following* ^ Bn (Isss Btry G), 155wv 0m with Btry C, 496th A lh atchd A 655th FA fc 8" Hew Ihi* trtlllery reenforsed and d**p*a*d the fire* of the _. ftnihed soanterUattery, and fired long range interdiction and harassing fires the cooperation ami assistance furnished by this organization throughout the can paign left nothing to be desired. It was particularly active daring His hours of darkness and aaterially impeded night moreaunt of ens^y *uppll** and troops* c* At oas tioe or another during the campaign ever/ con ceivable grouping of $%*&& artillery was employed in the organi sation for eoabat in support of infantry action* Ihis ranged from attaching ia&lvidual batter!** to battalion ccabat teaa, battalion* to regiwotal eoabat team* or task force*, and a groupneat of two battalion* to a regiaeatal oosbat tea* to noraal, coordinated divisional support with light battalion* in direct support of infantry regiasnts and m&im and heavy artillery l a general support* When Infantry regisents were withdrawn for rest their direct support artillery wa* given the mission of reenfoye ing the fires of adjacent light f l i M artillery battalion*,

(Ml eatiaate of etreagth of enesgr artillery on of the ZMBQtmk PeainmOa placed the number of artillery weapon* in the vicinity of 51 the** gan* were or* v; ganic weapons of the 100th Division and believed to be located in the O f O area* Of the** 51 gun*, U were reported as infantry AA support weapons and the reminder were under the' lOOUi Division' Artillery* In addition to the above cannon i t was believed there were a large number i f coastal defense weapons (probably 5* or 6 Haval guns) located in the PAiUJO-COTABAID, S R W A I B T and AA OH A D V O areas* Soae A guns were believed to be eaplaeed for coasts AA A a l defense, the 30th Division located in the Berth sector of the island was eotiaated to have 39 artillery weapons* b, the total nuober oi guns captured by the 24th Division in the D3QS4)AVAO-G!J1JAJA!C area shows the original estimates were ; quite accurate* A total of 39 artillery weapons were either cap* tured or destroyed by counterbattery fire* In addition 30 naval guns were captured, the bulk of the weapons were located in the D V O area, (*ee overlay, paragraph 8a, Sassy Guns ~ Captured and AA Seetreyed)* Brokfta down by type the guns captured included h MX-.** 4*?*| f * I* '.r 6*| 4 7 ^ * 4*p$ 2 < TS* British< 2 * J^ail * imp aad 1 - 2*95* $#* gum. Areas in which 2a Artillery weapon* f ' were seen to mm$m direct hits have not yet been entered* . Interrogation of m IVi* froa lt Sittery of 100th Division g y Artillery revealAd that his unit had 3 type 41 itountain guns and

4id not know the araawmt of the other units of the 100th r t i l l a r y bat bellaved that oae f th# fiatterys l a h i * Battalion Mid # w *A weapons, i n addition to the above ***** asnt, mm guns i n P*W** unit were transport* fey earlb& i*- I t i s believed that the regaining weapons a* y e t a s * . accounted for are either ooneealed l a *b*HKa&d patahes of dn* jungle growth, eisplaeed l a bypassed tmlocated ** positions, burled inside sealed cave positions or in a very few instances of msantain type a r t i l l e r y that tfeftjf-.Mp havo been dismantled and transported by earlbao to the interior fastnesses of the i s ~ e* tteporte indicate that never 4J4 the J a p * M S the f i r e of over tot* gans on any target and instances of other than individ* aal f i r i n g are rare. For the moat part h employed h i s a r t i l l e r y isore l i k e lrg calibre aachlne guns coesaitted to defensive f i r e s m*v a narrow, short range aone, ' A siaail number or rounds nere fired a t n l ^ i t as haraasing f i r e i n tlie general direction of i n fantry perimeters but tliis firing always ceased when oar a r t i U ^ 017 fired i n tha direction from itiieh eaeiqy p a fXasaes were ob served. &ere were only two insUnees of Jap counterbattery fir** aarly one morning 12 rounds oi high v e l o c i t y armor plering shJJL i*Uim*, battery position or the l l t i i f i U Artixl*ry iKUaMoa witaoat aaisag ami one night th position on ATINA BECKS wftich had Juat been vatft(l by tne Ijth f i e l d Artillery Oattalioa as heavily shellsd by a 47W gun* Itiis l a t t e r tta* would nave s^tt* sed consiaerabi damage l i ttie isattalion hact reaainea i n the tar* 1 ' f * i*arge caXiDr ^psiMts fired from HXU, 5^0 causes erabl* damage botls. ua easualtles and moraJte e i f e c t . t o e*r rie were never very s u c c e s s f a i i n tttateMsg this f ir*# l e u rounds irere fired s t any one Mm and those easts, from defiladed positions and apparently the launcher was rapidly ed to *mm ^ave for protection iajediately after firing* It,. fired a very heavy p r o j e c t i l e with a Ion v e l o o i t y . I t s d i s t i a e * t i v e h i s s eould be heard for many seconds before the arrival of the shell* In the same area the Jap* resorted to thrc*isg fasted armor piercing s h e l l s a t the front l i n e troops by c a t * paolt* Hw*t were no mmm e f f e c t i v e than roeks would have bean for they eou!4 bo seen coming| toabling and over end and never ) ' ' ploded on impact* (Sea par TACTICAL SMPLOfYKSST <F FI^LD AR a* the fact that initially this division was greatl numbered by the Jfap MBA&0 garriscsn espaoially in the IA A ITO area - the iaens sis of the theatre cat operations * the gen*. eral disrepair into which the Japs had p^pfiitted a l l roads to Ull - the dil'fieult terrain which praoticall^ limited advance to roads and trails - the necessity fur jaaintaining the q$t*m . sive at a l l times in order that the eneigy sight be kpt off balance * and the race to sela eoanaiKlJUig terrain or strategic' . defiles mgmm tha enea^y oould organise Uieir defense, a l l con tributed to some interesting nethods of ejapioyiaont of field ar- t i l e r y in other than standard ways* Sou* of these ways are worthy of note. . b. Dorii3g the first three weeks of th oaapa%n, and in $m9% until the D V O RVtm mi finally been bridged about the AA Middle of May# Hit. infantry was *}&*# fighting well in adv*ic . i f any road system capable of transporting the heavier loads of Iht division and attached troops* Self-propelled Mounts, attach* ed tanks, tank $$im&W*t heavy artiUcry and heavy engineering . .ulpaent were always far behind. In a*aay instances artillery prime movers coiad not sroes the Him? eadsting bridges and the advance mm too rapid to it for the construction of a division*

load W\$s?' ijr lypfrea ^ I t vae during thi* -tlaa that the *y feofi P *1$* Im4if infati7 c&eaenta % aoiag V traoke a* |TSO aorr Ouae would be m&iabered and atfred by hand m*t Up oM$r pol* bridgee, Jeops **nte eoaple a and tio adTanee would fffooaed. I t wao not tiaaenal for aa artillery eergeaat to wave down a paaelag mm\H j*mp ani repeat U W tin forward a trailer load of aaaualtloji to inOreaee %hm epaed of the ah*ttX&# Uaaplete cooperation wo* glvsn If t offlor* Jn muqr plaeoi T^&ISIBS r rafted rivera and tha inland watar way of tha y t b i I I G ayatam wa used to awra one batUXion In IGHa a far aa Ft PIttT* Only o Mriow adahap ooaajred* Jk priaa N^ and traiXir of aaaunltlon craahod tluna * bridge asd diaapfaarod l a the deptha of tiie oarah balow ainklag ao Mm mb of aight tnat too oagiaoora covOd not own uaa i t aa a baae for piling to impair the bfldgo* I t waa aorar roolaiawl# o 1hia ane Uck of ability to briag op oolf*prof)OlXo4 diraot firo woapeno foroed tha OMplagraant of IO^BI Howitoow i t aaoaiilt guna* Ihoy worlsM parfaotly in thi* rolo* In tbo G B G I oootor n<rth of D T O tho 13th f*M Artillory Battal A A UO AA ion oont foamar4 a aoction wndor tha paroo&al mmm^i of i t o BattalioB and Battary CcffliMtndora out ro^toood pil32>cnao pomitt ing tho infantry adTaneo to prooaod, Owing thla aotion i t fought on&ooafuL doala with tbraa Jimp 4*7* $m* loaatad in theae aa pillbtKOO, I t ia bollavad th&t mm aaoh ooooO of aotploynant oould haro boon oxploltad aad th* adranoa a^odltod on aoToral othar oeoaalono. Whilo thia amploj^aont ia not ad* tooatod idmm aalf**ppopollod araorod waapono ara aTailabla. i t ttorartfealasa ia a pooorfal capability of dlTiaional artillory and ahottld not b orerloo)e>d vhon i t alone oaa :f u l f i l l a diroot ' f iro doatrtdtotioa niaoion* d. After arrival at TAUI40 tii niAi Civlaion aaotor (400 U P whn SAJUL JSUm i iaolwitd) t o ^ i r o i aalaotlaa of po aiUom lth aliaost 640P a i l * fialds of fir* i f w affart ioa to bo md* to aaaa th f irei of ti Diriaioo artillory Uiio CB aa acaMplUhed ^ uoing the DALU(^tiATIKA*nd U B X a i r fiolda of firo m i obtainod aiaaltaaooly # and tM piano nonta aado wollont ahaltor f or paroonoolf vhiiXa and Firo Oiraotloa Conter* Machina guna Meontad on the aa^anlaMiAta . gavo oxoollont periaotar dofanoa against the naoal raiding oar tioa. In thla ^poration l#aaaa doo to night raidora mm' Umr itad to one Cub piano deatrogrod aad ono offiosr WM iHllo at l#aet 100 ^ape wore killed olthor during too attaok or by 00* osrlty patrol* aoarohing tip andorbrwh l a th Hoifiity of tho pooltiono# I t i s romtina to aaaroh oat a l l routea of aparoaoli to a pDOlUoo iooodiataly after daylight and juat before dark tion pays dlvidenda* . ' ' .' Ondor thia paragraph montion mat be stade of the ont aerrtee roadored by Battery f t 496th A Bn tho 4400 ail* A traYeree of ito aoaato and i t a aoourate fire in a ground f o i l oade I t an ideal weapon dvring thia period. I t froqoofiily fired direct eapfiort eo a l l throe regimental froata on too oaae afternoon oat could fire in any direction at a very fo# aimtoa notice* %m ConiBitnding Offieor and Staff of the f#>d FA Fa are to be ooanewied fear the akill and apeod with whleh they i n traoted thie A Battery In the deliTery of ground firee # a A heretofore unwed oapability of thia partieolar Battery* <tei afternoon Jape opoaod fire on this Battery from a ooneoalod and bypaead oaT poaiUon with a 25n dual perpoae gan at a range of 1200 yarde. After mo firat turpriae thia tamed oat to be jaat another aaielae attack for the Jape, the offiooro aad a few otlier volaatoora from the battery aaaaed t*e of tho

mm *ay ld#a or ftpftteilltar the Jap force isay have Ml of har~ sssing ottr position** 1h radar oc^iipaint of thl battery aouplsd with the long range of the gnat oeuie i% wry valaabl* for night interdiction missions, % laying the radar on stretches of roed ond by tl*o Japs as their Main supply roate the nwmftt ..f motor vehicles e uld be traced and f i r i would 1 opened at approprlaU Uass* the Jap* ana-t often have won dertd at the bad lack his conveys always appeared to have when negotiating certain a ire tehee ef road In piteh-felaek night that previously had appeared to be quiet as far as our artillery was e One of the outstanding artillery triumphs of this eaa
peign wa the aliaoet single-handed defeat of the 3&8 XtB$ re*
inforeed by elea&ata of the laJgXB and the 2nd Battery of the
100th Divieion Artillery in the BATABA3 area, the rapid ad
vance to apfcure SAfAO and aak contact with the lOfth Bivieion
ilia) at FAHU-^^^ coupled with the fugged fighting to eecure
HILL i P | UMr Airdroae, MISTAL and T O O l e f t no troope for
UBK operations on the South Flank* the B4IABAS area with i t s oe*
standing terrain feature of Wmm HILL HAS garrifioned by the
Jap fore liated above* Ihe position was iwll fortified, mined
and heavily stocked with aaaunitlon, and only seven thousand
S yards Sest of mr M B and with a 1500 foot advantage in
. t i e s , ' &v*ry jftovejaent of our troops, every ship entering the barber waa plainly visibla to the Jap garrison* At tias only a pUtooa of the BooofiBsissance troop and a few bridge gvards were between thiaenwy installation and Mr rear areas* $*e ArtlUtry Gojaaander assigned the i*sion of de*traUen and aeatraXisaUon of thia center of resistance.m Battery A, ft!** FA te a* i t s irineipl objective. Over a period of tlsw the destruction o o&tertal and equipaent in this area was 1sam* A group of buildings pointed out by one Froderis (anforttwate ly iapoaaded as a; olUbrationistj he had to be oa* or he . could not have known so maeh) as an important eneay iostaUatioii tart*d oat to bo one of the biggest aamnitlon damps in the en* . tire area* A direct h i t on i t produced a hofeeaast that shook the entire flountaln side, Shell fragaenta entered oaves, & ed buildings &nd. ial>edded thessolves in fam* a l l over the Another diroot h i t on o of the tannel entranoes of tit eousand post gutted i t . A hit on another building identified by Frederioo aa an o i l storage warehoase produced an o i l fire that baratd im two hoars. In the end HM Japs withdrew this garrison, which P,W**s report had been reduced in streflth as M i as 5056, without over exploiting i t s capability of ooanter* attaek on oar undefended rear* $hen the infantry eould finally be spared In enter this area a l l that roaained was an oatpost of aboat m impk <i M and 13 July aa orxlEaoe boab disposal wimd wor^d two f a l l days destroying abandoned 75si and 2$t* ^ . assraaitlon found by m artillery reeomaifisance party in this area. I t i s to be hoped that when the final day of settlement cooes Frederic will lie forgiven hi* collaboration fey virtae of the treawadoo* assistance he gave the 24th Infantry Divis ion In reducing thia mmm defensive position. f. Many time daring the rapid mnsh from P fA G to D T O At U AA only om artiHary battalion at a tiws could b ased advantage ooaaly in sappcrt of the infantry oolwm* the others were not $#* large details of personnel were famished to 3#&
to assist thea in road eonstraotion and sAiAtftfianee,
roek aad aany bridge timers mm aored ly artillry per
somisl - jsAny bfpiwses were cat by artillery dosers aod great
artillery waited i t s tarn to enter the aareh eolfl&A* I t i s be
lisved that l a aitaations of this kind i t i s best to attach a
peraa&e&t detail to the Sngiaeers withoat *ggr trings to it
efflply*sat# i t oan then be ased % ths Bngi#r oATieor to r e
lieve his own persona*! froa noa-tethftteal tasks, thas

trainad i*rGnal for eonatrttction promote, . & aawenta to -. branch horoeyj but 4 i ! M i l Hat la** t*d* ; g* tho a*lf~j*opwllod nt* of the infantry MM** <M** joititfa wore Iroqiiontly *od to aqpont artilXwy #S** tnia I*, particular^ true in the rolatioaihip betwoon tho 34th Infantry ,** too $**#. Fijsld Artllltry BattaUoiu Stenoror tarroln did . aeit pomlt th* mpHaytmnt C, 1ft oott-fpefaiXada in tholr !** ttf>*rt rolo* th*y mm oapiaood in tho artilUry battalion po* aitioni and hanilad a* m additiol ix gun batUry, Ho dlff 1* eulty In stuth apijat w xp*ri5d# h* tonUon ^aat b# sad of tbt iceMful and i a r t i l ^ r y to aurk 4**trito. A Marliw Air Orttp 1 i i g In %** v^^i^l #f*H| I t bt;#HNf ietT^l by this diTiviM* An SOP wat **rlid witr* by th attack 0m#* r*Prtad i to * laoal Air $^pri Nrty
t %# 4 K tiM lMM^|*t , ftW^t A jJ(fiUl'f ngftd MI )iMi j M l ^ i n w pl*d | a th t a r g t * # *

th# plQ8 were tt*a talkdda to the proptr ta^gvtv ;%ii UUdnr^i^ M a jprvraqalaite t* a atwceaafal iai< for i t wai act Ittag %tfp the Japa triad to diirtipt oar air atrikaa by fiiNNl mw&bmim rwda of *aok into oar araa ntuin Maria* plana* *t In th air# Ibr ia no reeord of tha faiXvro of any aeh arrayed aOioii# Prooodoro ooald hara boon aijaplifiad if i . *iro aootiona and aurroy oroua woro ottatanding i a thi* eparation* Oarryiog m &*$# vmtk alya ia eloao aomitry. sa tiaoa aob>ted to ftM? attack, tboy not only porfonaod thair aiavioii but ooott&tod for a *oAai4oi**b2A ottsbor of onoay doad whilo oarryiag on thoir toohttiaai $wtioai tho otsirao> ft**'' tooroofttliiaao aa4 akULX i^tb liiJM/ tltoy.]<ifoiaw<1 tliol# tojilaf worthy of tho bei traditiona of tho aorvioe*

mil* aartil3*ry #fi*i**tioB* woro aaj&e for tho tho oporation *@i*ldf*felo ro*trtatioa on thoir mm wa* by tho draatie awauniUon a11iwn*ia rooalUng froa Iwartamiata -. \ hipping and lg$g *w|$>3y lino*. A roatrietioa to 0.1 unit of
f i r o otwiliiitivV* por dajf pair gw.t%*li|i?m iffjff p^yaood on ***nts^LtJbo^i
OKiNwadi.'iaiitt* & r h l d b o j r h a a r t n i M i i ^ l o r a n HftHiNMKP^ ^ 1 0 t * fcajNtntiHJg -

land lino* of eominleatioA and iaTroquftney of n*vl #oroy* H waa not until 30 <ltaat that awnnltlon botwaa availablo % fiillf ' oxpand thi* allOTr*noo Hw additional tiait* of firo f i r tho Jlth Fiold Artillory BatUUon, 155* Howitsor, aad | / | unit of firo 105**I ifor tho Dirijilon Artillory waa oado ATaDablo t thl* $&* iaion froa that criminally allotted to 31*t Xsfaa^py G^risloa whioh foantl itvolf f l u t i n g la torr*in wiwro I t wa* lapoa*iblo t o f uiay tttilito i t * artillory *trooth On f July hi^Mn* ho*d* quartars vmamd a l l auasttaiUoa rostrlotiof)** tho total matfmr . of routtda of flaid artillory aaamnltion fired by tho Eiriaion Artillory aad *tt&chod unlta *roi 155nHow Um ^un % earofui eonaorraUofi i t a possible to alwaya ba in a petition to rondor fuU dofonaiw firoa whn callod i*t and to aupport oajor attfcl with tho fnU woight of Birlaional ArtiU ory. HI* mm aeopliahd by olittinatif^ ooarching firoa. ro- ' atriftUng iatepdlUofl aad haraaMnt to a oLniam and oaly f i r ing ooooontaratiom on pointe which wor pomiUvoly kaown to ooa tin oa*y troopa or i p h omid*ra # bio aoro doatruetion dould havo boon aoooapliahod in a ahortor t i with unlimited aaaunition aOlowmaeoa, It ia narorthoXaa

f e l t tl*at few i*uly important targeta saeapod deatruailon or neutralisation, Ihia laat atateaent i s substantiatedtogrth d*t*uoUon ai dead found by tur infantry upon: overrunning aneay hld territory*." . ^ -

Upwi arrival lit the D V G area the first nwiniUon eaip AA to arrive broi^ght th initial $$$? of f t f a M i m r vtaad by thia Division i n ooabat* For report of effeeUveaeee of thia f*e t and laaaoaa learned in i t s taetieal oaplajsiant, eee attached report to I Gorpe Artillery Officer, ineleawra to

AgpMii

"

ft <ilUn0t Wn^nej on tto* p*r% < artillery tsr$*n

to f a i l to tafc* i01 adwantaga f t* important oap
f the torraatriil obaanraticn pct and dapand on
pilota ajyi feswarti oba#rrr with fpoot line unita for Uiair anqr iafwwitioiit Caaaandara aaat atreaa the valsa o tha aiXd^aahionad obarratioai paint I**ata4 n a acaoanding.! tion and inaiat on i t a aotira aBployaant* ifomwIUttA f tea anaaiy aaotor aat be aa wall argaaiaad a are xawa of fire*

HCTlftfoP

ftlii

n ttw days of Liaison Hants

ar firaa wban a ti^b la ovarliaad, ^warairt tha *|iartr aj| % M aeta Ui a wtiiatla laat to U r t hi* ala9#d gr<ml>* IKall a^otti obeerratiea painta on n^naanfil wg t a w i n : # | p with hi^a paa# taUaaopa* pay big tfividaiala at tfeaee tia# lha foi^md abaarvar witto tna frcot Una iitfaatvy *
mwwp v&^^B'f/r ^jpwwwpiff^wi^Mp ap^PflM^: !a^a^|^wajir H^^^ppppam^pi- i m a a^^^ wmwwua^i^^r HIHUMP ^tp^w ^(HBI^IBBPJP* jBipv^Pftajpt ^a^a jH^nnpr^PF. ^pajfr

aawp- #a>4a)a^pqp-

VWva^vav

^PMPajpptjajpV

a W A w ajpHpaj^^a^yay w p

^a)BPi|a^P3H|^^ay

plaiias a&i delay in fira ari**4*as eattscKl fay aeai noora fOP hia aetiTitiaa* Staggaris ^ joeel hows for raapaatiTa f i r * ing batterifte of the battalion and intnaiTe uae of texraatrial iaerTatioa at thia tl i s tha anawar. Daring tha houra of daricnaaa tha terrestrial OP raaehea ita peak of ralua. I t ia than i*ian no otherraaanawe* available ; ' that J*p artiliary and Bortara, area oooasional bivaaa and mUar aorasent are picked r la/ oeaarvera XoUraaatioai llroje ariowi pointa in the tflYiaion aector quickly give ififonaation fm aoanterbattery and haraaaing flrea 4 mia work thoold be handled by Ilia Uiviaion Artillery Opar*tloi eUon and a l l OH att be required to sake flaah' reports f their aenainga' both aa to direction and tiae # HaUhee nuat be aymhronisad aai pra* arranged reforence pointo well eatabliahed for direetional pttr* $m*$ to produce best reaulta* 0ire mm frequantly brosght to bear within five aimitee frost the tiae Vm Japa opened :ap fra aew gm poaitloae ty applieation of theae jprtei^a** ' ' : ' ery advantage aaet be taln of tree UBB# partioulArly in ^ttngle owntry the additional view obtained from a t a l l tree ia worth ita weight in gold or rather In nesy oaanaltlea asA friendly infantary livea aaved. l o tree gro\ that oanaot ba
^wWiMBpiflii^w^^'w ^pw^pi^ ^v^^^HpT^^^ ^^^^^w ^ep^p^^^a* ^^ W-w^pm^HRHW ^^B*ja^jiB^w'' 1 ^" ^^^'. wwsa^w ^war^^pawap4(p^^(i^jj'

. liny ^a^aaaae 2O-po*er binoanlara have been eaptarad l a operation and have jareven thaaaelvea a aattraaaly valaabla that i t ia diff Jflult to undaratand why we have aot sj^ilar iaatraaenta ae a part of our V fi tav fiald Artillery. A bai of laa*e ef two per battalioo and Diviaion Artillery ^aeiqvartera la raoaa

this daaaely ettertd terrain aeewratt Itatloa 0 mmt I** ... d l ttallafriftnff waa onita a Hreblam*' ftintt Hit etifistst of a r t l l l * #*f * Jadged by H i ability to deatroy the will if the tat*? to ttjee to i l t a t g r i p witti o v infantry tht aaaroh f t r p * # itabla targets anat axpltit avary vmmmm* 4 Ut #f try qntatioi* aa f*a*ni*hedtat fWI taajaa aatl nhaanwar l i 4 Lt 3S f | f F naa naS by tha aaaUoa as wall m tha yiTiaton KI team* QwirlUa eiTiUan raporta wara indbNi In tha aaaa mmmt **& Mirer Itable targate mm* pift*pointad la thla ooiaU<Mi l i | a airad to paint oat tha traittloiai paaalblUtloa tw aaaaitfXaga and oonBaalaant m?wteto*& by and alsaaa (hasp) plantation* In-* ataUationa aa Xarga a * battalion barraoke araa m n oonaaait i a BOM fialiis asd Tiawl air obaarrstlon waa ooaplataly *aM to Identify tha buildinga. fr thoaa not faaiUar with thia pUitt i t la a B&abar el1 tha banana f a s i l / f growa to a h a i ^ t m about 20 *at and haa th eharaetariaUe wida l*aT of tha family. For *a** In avltlvatien and harvaating tha plantationa art ant by a ohaiBart>oard of roada whloh, when tha crop ia in t l r * ra iiraetloa Uy iariaiblt fpoa the air dwe to orar* ing frooda of adjaoant &&%** tha Jap built low gtwtajfaa th rowa (in aoiaa iMtaneaa ttei grcfwii^ planta wara in* trodooad thru tha floor awl roofa;, Iheae war ***$*& with galTa&iad iron, linad with plywood and farniahed with alaatria light frcm oonoa&lad gaaaratora* mm roof a ware aaverad with ault daflad Hi* aya - b a t not tha aya of tha oaaara* jarah whan tha anmqr appOara to daaira to ^Nif eaptra of tha araa in apot tiw loaallUaa avan aftar m$ alTiliftn r gpKtlXU raparta knit drawn your attention to thaa, btit raaslta obtaiatd wiU warm tlta haart of <m M^i Hany aoah bati wtrt iast* la tht m&ty daya of thia oparation unUl axptriaia point** tha way

wMHRp

BM Mi ijtff fhiinyiilt

f i t thia oparation waa of aowrae prtparad froa a t r U l |titit* grains a*t waa lAOking In tartioal oontrol* iil a l l faaturat that appaared <m Hit sapa wara praaant on Hit ground, a graat aaj|r proaiwnt laiadttarka wara not atta* two omtatandiaig a amplea of thia ware tha l*Ural diaplaoajaent of HIIX 5$0 V about 1500 yarde and tha pcrtrayal i f a swaap to Q mm f KT. M HT which, in fact, turned oat to be a ridge aorarad with O CT turned in ly front U w troopa and very oonaidorable diapiaaa^ want of hm$ ptUge haraaaing firaa on points whoaa angle of t i l t fitttld not be ctttarainad, tlaration tt*oU often being aa great aa 400 y*rda On the whole the map wa a fine piece of work of l i t Mat and iroved ioaBnaely Taliiabla, Air l*httt Coftrag aa uaoal prored to bt too l i t t l e and tot late* I t | t t t i unfortunate thai troopa engaged ia a aeparate tptratloQ ataah aa thia mat go through ehaa&tle It obtain tnr* rent air ewrarago* tie tad again during tat Jap withdrawal t!*af tha Mmxm*Wm Trail the a r t i l l e ^ reqaeeted freah pittra of the area into whioh tha taajQr had retrtattA to that new lnatallatioat could be diaoorerad fro interpretatioBTand tta pariaon ^ mm and t i l ptteto** tfaraatating t$m eoald hare beta plaeed m areas otherwiee aaaked or eongtaltd If thia toYtrage had betn obtaiatd* Ita laek a*de iaterdlttlon f l r t a aatttr t f hy gutaa and ty mm after 4t toaaultatiofl with aa talja bar4, 4 rfaotograjfci* '0mm ahould be plaoad at the dlraet dltpttal of the aaaaulting diTleion tad If material UffiitAUona rtquirt re* t ^ l e t i n g the amber tf expatmrea aralUIOie thta fat 4 i f i t i t a thould know aboat i t and be allewtd to dttamlnt i t a t l f waat

_
Ot^O^ ^S''BP/SB* BV^B^

should bo takoa to *ojtt within t a l i tilswaati*

by tromsalttal of wrtttoft roojaott* from BiHslon

OP^Bf; .OBjMPSJB^v ^^^P^ .' SBjBBP4Bfc Of W w ^PBJp OJPOSBBBjgwSBjUB/ tJBBBISBJBBFBBI BF^^BJB1 BBBP ^BMBB>^PBBr TBPBJI O > BB> ^ p ^

too lato, If at all, to that they botom* aattort of htttorioal

intorott oaly# , ; . . . .

Jt ! net belioi^ that tfeo najorlty of 0-2 oootioa*

through whiahphoto roqaoott past ftdly niitsfif and tho imp***

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froa photographs and propagation thorfroa of radial lino shoott. Withont going into tap ttotalsi) yfouodaia l i t I t ! tmffioiont to 007 that m ariiUory WttoOloa f i n q y p*9ro a Mt wowrato firing ohart fim a atrip of air pboto* and that twrgtto Xotatoa y am Ufiaatfyfn om oao af th* ladlvidaal print* #OJI bo lodiatly takoa U r flr# # f i t dittriteUon of mmh photo ovirao thoold bo oooh ao to prcfldo t#o tott l i t . tlio flro dlroftioa oostor of oaoh fiold artUXor/ battalion ooaoor&o4 a4 ittAiviAttal frifttt for omoh Jforoart t% tojftog mA i&faatnr i>1ato<ia ttirfttf a4 for out aot til' oaoh ^ highor i&ftotrjr aoa4qv*rto*'o 4^ oopioa i t ooaoidtrod o. propor Dliritioa ArtUlory dlotrib*Uo* / i las? oopio of mpo and air ^ o t o t aro oo41otoly w*&M ' by laok of propor aarryiBC * I t i t inntiioiufl ta*t *
i*4 '4n 4^H| igui aapiiiAaol ooati **<*fc*i> frihfifrlo d
jp^ffBJpWw <B|ktPPfltMjp|f. OpO^|O| ^Hwp MB^^^^P^pOJPUWB^PUBmr ^^O^^HMP^tPk WPHJP ^w4VB'v/0tp**OJHJt9SHHJ0^9ES OJpBHBHfc i^HW4PPOP^9' * | p ^P-s

bat alroady booa proomiod i a q*tttity for that thoaUo, tbo14 : ' ; " bo rooAily obtoiJULblo for t h i t . - i%f*%y; jpy^Miif^If** oJ* iwtiitl UJMI ooatimX IMHI'IO by flto^l ariiUory battalioiui^ o^try offort m a i bo ad to tdtoto #rtioaX oonirol* A(lo of tito oan bo aoatm^d t o promisoMt torraia foatmrot a&4 aiaoo ditiaaoo I* obtaiaabXo fros tho
^P^PPOJPJIOf BP ..VP^tPp .^Hipp^PflPfOJBpiP'OP'^tOtJp VPBH>Ca. OB'i|Bt. -^(BMpOpPVOBHBjHBP "Pwjp^t^jp OPVPWVff VB^Hlflv ^PBBRBk ^j|p^P 4fl^OPr . ^PWflHhdf

a attor a t Xofioal oostoriiig| ntiiig the otroas Uao oloarly YS.ti.blo OB tho phi^Ml a# a jpili# . t%

am who dooa not alvayt ttrl* to aako hit i$&* ^ho o#t m*m*
p i t i t til o a M ^ f f y o^BpBiutsWr* wMl i ^ i ^ F ^ iMt% i l i n j i i bo ^ t # t^JifBiNita 1P%II ta^lploJpiy o^t iaosHWMrtUMpaoOi pa^aoJHioX t o

** +?****** fm MftTftTT tf lilt*' *

^ * poar artillory*

ovt a l l roqairoitontt i f aatiraoy bataiMt ont oXaaoat i t in doobt* ToUratioa of tuth a#tiom o t w for oao pmblos loads
^P^P ^"Wpf^tJBjtpTOJBJpr^BTBJtJp? OJT^OTvP'OJtlflti ^Pflp^tj <!MHPH|P ^t(OIOPf"l^(P T U P J ^P*O OJHHBJOW (^OtBt^^HMBJ^Pi -OJtHjy V t H l t * ^ ^ ^ ' J P OJOJt?OJB>,
;

,.

to clarifying tho tioaont mhioh l e 1A doabt, t o gay that wo : oaH bothor abowt povdor tasporaturot booauit tho aotvo atiaffi hao boom tmafrlp to got wtathor oboorfmtioat loads t o failr to ^rotoot podor from diroot rayt of tho gam- and groat roamltomt orror item fiaally tho motro aoatago oomot throoglu rory wtll known point I f whioh aoovraoy I* obtained i t tttbj<%ot t o i i t ifrttSilgttdHit 6oamaadora inuit trtrifii t o nionioam i a and thoir mon tho *ttoram oomplose*, *Wo kiUod a l o t of without doing that at * I t t good onongh for horov* : - Atowemto mrtoy twit bo ootablithod oarly i a th gomo. All
"^PJW^taaajt>BjiBjBi wa^Kj ojaaBar a^jp^WiomlvoBVomaBj ^Qi&f^lMRi&mH^&VjJ H V l H p f J V ap^B^TBt* V^BBa^B/oaaaajpwv BUjHRMajpar ta> _,

airiiOOaAttiiiMBl o a r p o y aSmmk
-. BF*r ^F^^^^^P^^^v^Hr V W W .jjprvnpp V ^mUf B^VBP'VVIBF

ISBBM l a m aaiih t # a '<^BOit B^nnl^aai*

IPF^W^V^F^BP* 4V^||P VP^^ 4lp(^pi^^PW ^P^r w v ^mpjBPJ''^ - TPnBRB^BPMBPpnpp

tion of offort oa&aot b toloratd, Tho Divitioa ArtiUory

Attittant S-2 (Snr*oy Offloor) autt bo anthoritod to diroot tho
off ortt f all battalion tmrvoy partlot and battory iatlttmtM
portonaol toward tho totmun oad of eoaploto oomtrol, A U traw*
ortot aatt bo oloood* Too muth tiao it lott in U a g winding
N
iravrtoo whoa rotdily ritlblo ooatrol pointt ooiOd bo ottab
BB)HMp'BJPOp|P94Bp BJBJBBPBH JBPBPiBVOa\BPaW^SWBigll^B^BtJtBfHT pWJBBawBjpBPBaiBBBJP_y . ^MPaWfBa^^P BJB^JFBJP OK^BtSJPSBIP Banw ' OP^BMp^(PWP''JF^t^BaB|(mf

4&d onoo again tortioal ooatrol afaj. bo ftoaght by a l l potiiblo: aoana . ^ \ fj&til 'MBBII tlmo M tfflOtmiotnflriat: oaar% I s awallablo artiUory unit dopead on roittratioas division ArtiUory
. ' : v ' '

atttt mmmmm aaay rfltiUi polnU aad *#qylr U batt **$** l a SttMp t # to r<^lftWd o& tha fta* aft** Wm l a
Wfiwaw ^Pj|WBfV^PvB*Jipail WpaSpjW ^^PWPJFVW^P^* ^PaPw^^pj ^pHwy VH^Jr aHiSWI aBpjWWpWWP JtjMv^SRpp

warp, tu^utttit t n twMti*' m l^pwriiiiitt tmfti>tt>

to tfe* a*tlllsryamg ptapwanU l i t * aa*t way* & lii*iadl with tint bt pppom* 4*t* aad mMUm aapt \ X f t iw&mti w t i l iafan*tioa U **aUaM for i ' ## all ilitMWfi *ff#tlB fig Mnuimj* g W ndl o# ir iiitliiii' i tmmto*** pp^r

of *iftt*pNi!*vfttleR flm ia ttoppiag a *ttlu % tagr# la a tmmmtim of flW artUlwar r fir pg>fflrtttly ltv Iwwiri t yrtbi in

^ liHif<0fl 9mm

r artful 1B tb

t g

y y

our PMWit ftfn falling ahrtt* 1 nwiiily not Jttttifle* i

' /> Of eonr th* o f f U
WP^ff1 ^B^^P^P'^T. ^pwWHPUPJP^ ^P^^^P^^P

p
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Jlb f ffe iioptiftirti fla42jum a m i b ywiiltfiai twl I f j^it lioilifli wipijppai otii b# ptat*4 -UMI Iftlwii'iriy

qaieidy t14 that oar PB aftiU#v? taa %9km %h* mm? gm* mtor ttr** '. r ' .:. ' f ^ X&)MUttdplUflft* - $* artillery #f thl tlM epftftttlott qui|9<94 with Iptupiiad tyator M i l pt at- yiaadtiidt1^fir <^tgia l a pagthr op^fttl^p^ On ^ . . oon ay vop4 tlm #>>^ tf-ta* valvaa U"IMmmA to taat ritfftl^pjpt f3Lfn at itft> TWIT atta? %PaaaMNPt~

th* o f f l c U l ol^dag dat## Tb* fladlnpi aaalr aalr t ^i U l r tad T att wmiaamfi id fwr ay of tfc* larg*r plibprt Throogheat th* #atli* period of th#
(PPJBPBPWBPJPWB J W P ^ W W I P JP'flWP^WHWfcPflijfc VMRpVvpBHPpnWp ^^f ^ ^ '^P^^^P^PaVB^^^^^F ^WH^Pa tapWPVP : ^PPV^W^WJ^^^'

ti

ti f i

tol lJUrtjU f f% f i t hp4 wmfwt astai aat af aaitaa ilp? aajr

wui *Mt**^*>^ Muyi t a l

- gopyillaftift^aaaUl aaiftat' tupaa aaafattaaa aa tilduly <H,fW* * ^ t H of ta at3t-iai aattoty laa tidUwl aadi thp
4^9pi!NpfpVw4P' ^ ^ o w I P ^ V P J W P v p y
:

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ajjUBPipyp

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tfcia rport f a t aafcpaa a t tho

1

SIJI

gm amttoty wpfiaiat<d aith filipaat

aWpaWPppMpwBpjpp*f

'%wp||r

WTPSPTPMPIPWPJBMWP IWpVJIJMp^ppriP ^*^ ^H& M^pW(a4w*wHpp5'- a^l*''^pJ"yjf

Atvlptaat %a*oatlvt t Form* , f 7 q iataa 24, Firing Bmtt^ 65, AaawdLtloa aad C S U 1^ IU 7 S V 2 , - * * 3 # iattti + (2) ifptpMlt aajor itpaa of mjulpawo* warn 3^0 ol. p , V30 aaU IB.. 5-4ia Badloo, aaaiia aad 8 all^o af *!** (l^iaf^fwid fm m&mto. U gy M l aad 1-193 Radloo, PAVPOHWI ad 1lAi hil tmm ttOl f #

($} Tehielas* 6 $# Traotors, t IW> Traotors with tarn ?rioksf 2 2j~toa traaks* % Water Trailer, 1 l~ton frailer, and 3 |*toa Trailers*
%% *iiii be ao&aOi t&tt *fo iwiriiMitiHT" ituftiana baa been

strengthened afeov* those off * fo*r gga battery* this i* high* ly ipertaat# The total saving la persona*! to serve 12 how* i t*srs ****** to J& enlisted *a* Til aatter of flOsfltfafwf Isa^piaf**** aad Service lattortss i t not disoassed la this port as It ha* boo* * aattor of wash previous st*dy, aad fee *|pft#*& ftww itJir id with soh MyptfUaf X^l<i ^1 featt#*y mm m$M of liviap a a nit or of lug a# two platoaaa ^ ^r* gon oaeh itfe#r ipi tl* pagition aroa or In oilittloftid pitio&* i t illft<iti w** x^eirUmed in th macisg of Battalion ltt aaA tolootion of poaitioa ara FU Imttory firoa wr itijiitr ttaw iareYintiH wa fowl to to poMibXo to ftr as *ar ^ ^ *iffowA iBfloBB at * tlaa Th firo poMlUUU laolwii * a U m battalion ooMooatyatiom, two c|x goa laattotr ooa#otwitioat on* aix m lmttofjr aad two | gv& Biatooa ooaooatvaUoa*t aai foiap 3 gim alitooa ooaooattatioaa waioh al#ot doviblo* tko th taadayd battalioa of tb 4 **a to*ttoria# lan a battotjr t A aloao i t waa intnM* of ttiantiitiiir \st iiaolwif aaft t&aa 4 battaiion of two anam battorio* aal a ooapuit* feiadqaar* r OJHI Haittiii Iat1&afs waa talwn oa aa ajaaaUatowa fliafat!^9tt apvtoxiaatoljr oao tail* loao toaiaUt than would har booa ^ M for a aorval battalioa a4 ooyrowtttoly 100 ioa t it ffooUw atroacta at %fc* tlao wort loft %**!** da I 4 at thit battalion aa4 boos oivagoft with th aoa]r firiag tiawuOy for t i t wooaa aad aad oaporloaood ao alffioaltioa* 4 ooparats battorjT amottoi aaotar o^oratioa aad d tiroo tiliaiao Aray battalioao oa a wido froat* t i ii c a g ita fir dirootlea oootioa aad proTidiiif i t mlHi a liaitoa aotioa9 aMiUoaal forward obaorwor aad ntrroy por* oaaol froa ftattalioa Iadqiwartorf i t ia fraetiaaiag portoet* ly* ftaah attiwotttation plaooa m otrain oa tao Sattalioa whlaa baa ia thi aaao oaly oa^ othor battory to ooa^ol* Tali hadqwLPtor fools that tao aix gm battory should bo adopts by taa Fiold Artillery ia th# latoroste of #ooaoaloal fir pownr. taore $x* two posSibilttUs oaaa wortay of ooasIA ratioa Kirstf witaomt otar abaafo^ add two howitser *oa* tloas to oaah flriag battory aad aagaoat its aaaaiao fm soa* tioa* This aeUoa will iatraaao th fir* powor of U|*t artill. ry by $G^ wita aft lavraaao at apfarouiaatoly lof la paraoAol^ aaottdi Xf pnsoat lira pawar i s stastdstod ado<saatot rodvso the mm\*r *i firing hatt*ria ia a battalion to two at***** battorios aodifiod aa aa**** This will rosalt ia a saving of approxlaately 11$ of tho porsoaaol roqairod to aall^ir tbo prsat battalion firos* . tt fiU^&UQEjMtt**Aflof1 tim HW* ffO positioa was serdf owriosity as to why tfeo Jawaaoso wore ablo to withstand for so long a paiiod tao hoaty fir#a ooaooatratod ia this aroa aad a* th saw* time rotttra roolwt firo alaost at will lod to a pr*' aoaal rooonasissaaoe of th ara by th Division aitillory
TR^PHIBPJI^^^^PB^JP^ waai^^a w^^^^iip^^'^'^" wisa^ Sj^B^^p/ wpw^w^^a^ ^^Hp^b^a^^p^pw^p^p wi^p 4HMHi9*ap ^BWSH^^P" ^O^^^W

foand to bo litorally aomoynoabad with oat**, tho Mtraats to

a k i i ^ wmrm
w*

fl^so wor* not battlo positions bat rathr for th p

t i t n m s s i o i i i i i f r o a b o t h s i r *"*

w^^p^pHfepWWP wMWB wW -wwM^WiaT^p^ aP^^P W***mflPWK^|^^WW * w W w WPP W 5 1

garriioaiag the position, Thoy eoasisted of large chaa* bora esoatated froa the very bowols of the earthy with aafflo* ieat otorhead oov*r to withstand any kn*tn projestile. They had l l eatraaooSf wore p*ovid*d with elostrio lights aad alooa* f p g dtl di i l l d t i t i ing aoeoaodatloas aad ia wmy oases aa iaollaed passage toraiaatiag

til a abaft and laddor g*r* a*ot to th# h i l l t i p , H& haft again vaa not an OF or ftt* jioaitien but a m l y a way f frM and eatraftoo to ta aoatral oaambor and alto n m l to loop tfco air inaido too tuaaol !**#& Oa* omoh *** not* a oosplot* airp^aa* ypalr ctop and ted an m&mm oapaM.# f taidaf i l $*tea tw^ I t at f a l l # am aaaitaent of repair part* aa atatly arraafed at In aay otd#ar haagar Aithr aoataia** roekat aaa^aUy plani, r^ wr* at luaat thoaaaad lrvlaiM bob* la tM. elMabr and %h taola and patts to ahaagii tfewi to f i t th propollaat o^rgo mrm only a roiy fow propUiag abarf^a hopt*r# Tfe boardt m*r* M a d ar th# e&tvatc* te thli oat* and tito pryl<maly oaptmrod doaign of a woodoa troa^i otmted oa bipod lga# Th# #wl ooatraptioii^i^id jmat a fw pwrii and oaally oapablo of botag oarrid l a and oat the oa? atraaoo* I t wae at ono apparont that tk h U l d^sMHl noro only fcaiy garrlaoaod at ttao of attack fell la bottom i f i t *o trla with aatoaatla voaponi pandttod the garrlaon to l#ad a Uf of rlatiT# aofo*t whil# <mr taroopo w^ro nipoaed to th I1O1 foroo of tb w^thsr a ^ hoatlXi flr w i ^ only amh pro* tootion aa old bo galand from tm holoa aad o l l t treoa*a Tb loag ooatlmnd proyajratl(a aad groat quastltiAt of baraaa* lag fir doli^rod on thia ptattioa aorved o&ly to baraa* ow otm gwa 9mm and JMMB! ti,. poyonagl, HtUo tla# flr ## going oa tbo Iap rotlrod t the soovity of hit vndovgrooad yti # ' In th abaao of' tao. obtorvcd flro oa oa o*tranea . th only oamltii w*r tfeoa* obtainod by th* flrat fw roiadt of any fir aitale& i t nig)^ thoy alopt ovoly mA dfy wfell our tapoopa n^ro kopt awako by tho barati of itrditlon fire ad toakod by tho oontinml tropical donpor* Th aaowor to th rodnotion of aooh poaitioaa mmtm to b hort sharp barsta of flr# doUr#r*d at tiaa noat llkoly to find too oaoagr oataid hl oava and th aggreaai^ of nii^t attack* to oatoh hl ain froo oat of poalUon. Froloiged artlllory ffct* i only Juttifiod In support of aotmal infaatry
advaae*** . . , . . _ .

24TH m&xm
AP0 24

mtrnmt
If

SOBJfiCTt AuUritlfts of ** 24th Piviaion ArtiTUry Air U*i~ on Soatlon* for Period 17 April 1%5 to 10 July tG i Gwmnliag Gonoral, 1 Corp* Artillory, A O 310* P

1* & following import I* utadttod in ocaplianco with vf%tl ordory Oommnriing Cbnralt I C Oa 17 April 19V5 th 24th Diviion landed at P R M AA O on tfeo Uland of laHDAJlAG, *ai t* following day * DiTlion A i i y $$AifMl w w tfwbl4 and pwrridiig alt ebMrraUofi tba DiYieleB1* rapid advaao* aero# tha ialaad ar Jiliaioii ware chifl/ f ^ m > l i w *nd <irop mli and courier arrio* Af tr tmMi& f0 il1 and targt af ArtUlgr PUOM were kpt bww mm w&mtem of
th opftraUoa* during tto* oleii day* f
ratios, a tto oxmay witt^iriw to tho t A l l targot woro toaroo ami f ir*-al**iofa gavo way to aud eoorior & Aati-^iroraft f i * mm l ^ p u i t l y *mmmi* 1mm U th DAVitt) GUIT aroa* All of the Division ArUll*ry plaooa wwmt at OHM tiaa or aao^or atO>^9e%i4 to ground fi $m plane* roeiTd dlroot Hits bat ufford l l ^ #apaaw ouieido patol and raiding *rtla aado attoopt^ to doatroy our pUa> Iho oeo^y *' ofttl I s iafUtratiue out Battalioa* porittttor and donol* liking one plani by throeiog domolltion ohargea aacior tho air oraft* Tbnardt the elooo of the oporatioA anothor piano was la*t 20#CXX) yards behind onony Uno * a rooult of woathor tonditioin, Iho plan* waa dottroyod by tao pilot bofoi% no tartod hU to*day aroh back to tho *f%r of our own liooa, 4# In ordor to eloaoly follow tho Fiild Artilloiy Battalic^i i t me mooaaary for tho Air Section* to eomtract ton air tferipoj thoo woro in addition t throo oxWap atripo whioh fr# d darins tho oporatlon. I t was fond that too moot aatiafaetory man* of oporatlon wa* to haro on* baa* trip, Iboeatod woll bohind friond^y trooj f at which th* piano* would undor-go TariotM ^ I M I #f aalntenaneo and apsnt tho hoar* of darkno, Bering tno day aircraft oporatod froa adTanwwl Battalion tripo tm only 4M Wit ptmU* bottor for rotion of oai-pomaotpt *ho|i aM tttpply touts* 5 A total of flro night fll^t *$* aado ftroi on* i f tho largar tr%o for gonaral arvei^lwico of onoogr oooaplod aroa*, and altfao^h vry l i t t l o positive infomation wa* ob tained, i t U genorally boliored that tho oiwetod1 foar of oborraUon and countorbattory firo* Iwpt thoa from w*lng tholr artUXry during tho* and attboeqjiont nightt.

* $**ral fhoto alloi t*a flitwra and daapit* JTarsrabl* **thr aontlUoai or#r th target ni gatfez*d froa them ? At pgrnt tfaa QlYialont* aeUvitla* coatlat two ectot toaas operationi and two Air i4*i*on Sactlom ara oparating under BattaXioa antrol to sratid* air obaarraUoa for Wm$ fcaiseotlvo cobat teaaa*

II

mmM
3I0NAL

E4fH OTMTEY DITISXCI!

Office of the Signal Officer
A*?.0. # U, 7 August 1945 FI?I

m uissim
The mission for the 384th Infantry Division in the Victor Fire Operation was annunced at a combined X Corps*24th Division staff meeting at headquarters X Corps, CARiaARA, LSTTE, PI t n March 14, 1945*

Subsequent t o the announcement of the mission, training f radio operators at the Division Radio School was i n t e n s i f i e d . Particular attoution was given to radio procedure and transmission security precautions* All message center personnel were given r e fresher courses in codes and ciphers as used within the d i v i s i o n .

A directive was issued by headquarters Eighth

? approximately sixty days before *R* Day, direct
ing that the division submit requisitions for all
shortages of signal equipment and supplies. Some
shortages did mot arrive until after the operation
had actually begun, for example, dynamotors for radio
sots SCR-193 and SCR-608. Such delay In delivery
prevented pTmpat servicing and testing of the equip
ment previous to issue to the lower units* This
caused communication difficulties for the using or
ganizatina.
Again, as la past operations, a large portion
of wire W-110 was defective. The dry cell batter
ies also proved to be below specification.
All signal equipment in the hands of troops
was delivered to the Division Signal Repair Depot
where it was serviced and repaired whore necessary*
Such preventive maintenance prevented failures of
signal communication during the operation.

3IG&IAL

fHS TOT/MI*
The Division Signal Officer was authorized four
radio operators and three message ooutor personnel
to travel om the command ship during the voyage to
the far shore. This signal detachment proved very
valuable during the voyage and during the Initial
landing phase.

te 14 April 1945 on board the USS Wasatoh en-

route, a directive was issued that another plan was
to b prepared in the event that the original plan
for landing in fare* at MALABANG was abandoned and
a mew plan to land one battalion vicinity MjkXABm'
and the remainder f the force at PARANG, MINDANAO,
PI, This necessitated the writing of a mew field
order with seme changes. However, the riginal sig
nal plan was flexible enough so that such plans
dovetailed with the new tactical plan.

The signal plan during the landing phase werked

very well* It provided continuous communication
from the units ashore te the Divlaien Commander a
board the command ship, and during the time that the
CP moved from the oeiamasd ship te the shore*
Ill
On "1* Bay communication problems wore relative
ly simple. Telephone wire communication was install
ed from division headquarters to all lower units. On
the following day. however, the 19th Infantry Regi
ment proceeded swiftly from the vicinity of PARAKS
In the general direction of COTABATO along difficult
terrain where all bridges were previously destroyed,
fhls caused considerable difficulty In maintaining
wiretelephone service to the regimental headquarters.
Radio communication was very satisfactory dur
ing the daylight hours from division headquarters to
all units. During the period from 0001 to about
0400 radi communication was not satisfactory due to
atmosphoric conditions. The X Corps signal offleer
loaned the division signal officer a high frequency
radiotelephone unit which solved the communication
problem from Headquarters 24th Infantry Division to
Headquarters 19th Infantry Regiment. This radio
channel worked very well. As the division continued
to advance, portions of the road wore closed to
heavy motor vehicular traffic and as a result It was
impossible to more the heavy voice radiotelephone
equipment. At such times the radiotelephone cir
cuits could mot be depended upon. During the ad*
vanee from PARAKG to OTf&ft Diaos 0W radio circuits
were used extensively. This proved that the Div
ision Commander can exercise control of his lower
units by the use of radio communication. As the
tactical situation developed from UPPER DIGOS north
along the coastal road to T0L0M0 hath radio and wire
communication was installed, operated and maintained
to all units. The X Corps signal officer Installed
a very high frequency radio circuit from division
headquarters at TOLCMO to X Corps headquarters at
KABAKM. This ciroult wae of exceptional value.
During a small portion of the time some Interruption
was oaused by atmospheric conditions.
AHD RSC<
In the V-5 operation, as In all past amphibious
operations of this division, the same difficulty
concerning field wire and dry call batteries was ex
periencedthe wire was defective, the voltage of

the try cell batteries below speeif lcatien. In both

eases the trouble appeared te be due to poor storage
of the equipment In the rear area dumps. How wire
ant dry tell batteries me older than three months
from date of manufacture, should be made available
te the signal officer at least thirty days previous
Again, like in other operations some T/S short
ages of equipment did met arrive at the Division
Signal Dump in time te be tested and serviced. That
meant that a portion of the equipment whom opened
preparatory te issue te the using organizations dur
ing the operation, was unserviceable due to damage
in transit or parts missing.
A great number f minor operations are usually
conducted along with the main mission. This re
quires additional signal equipment. In this oonneot
ion it Is recommended that all requisitions for sig
nal equipment above T/B be approved by higher head
quarters without the necessity of writing requesting
such equipment. The division signal officer is In a
position where he earn estimate his requirements in
advance for an operation.
Communication installations for a division is
tmt greater than ever anticipated to be installed,
operated and maintained under the present T/O. T O
provide the necessary present day signal require
ments for a division it Is reooiamended that a slg-**
nal battalion consisting of & construction company,
am operations company and a headquarters company re
place the present division signal company.
Very oftern communication to lower units is
difficult where the nature f the terrain and the
distance involved precludes the ase of telephone
wire eomunleatlen* In sueh eases reryhigh f*e>
quency radiotelephone equipment should be made a
i i M
From past experience and again en the TJSS
Wasatoh during the reeent T*5 operation the army
signal corps detachment aboard the couaaand ship was
used exclusively hj the Navy (see copy of attached
memorandum, Incl@sure number 1 ) . To overcome this
difficulty It Is reeosamended that at least six radio
operators, four message center personnel, the div
ision signal officor and an assistant be authorized
te travel on the command ship during an amphibious
operation. Part of the additional signal detachment
with one signal of floor oeuld fellew the division
oesmander ashore and provide communications for hl&
with both the ooraaand ship and the advance OP ashore
The remainder of the signal detaehment would con
tinue on duty aboard the command ship tint 11 the div
pest Is permanently established ashore
1 Inoletmre:
Copy of memorandum, 3th Signal
Detachment, USS Wasatoh*

SHIP T O A
TK WasatOh / FPO, San Franeiso, Calif* 17 April 194

TO SUBJECT

; X*t+ Q1
: Lack f Army Communications facilities
board USS Wasateh During invasion, f

1* B t u t i l i s a t i o n f Army personnel m SoraX 002smttsti0atlaxis t th X Ooirps and HIT Division Staffs were deprived of available radio f a o i l i t i o s
plaead at>@ard %h& WSS Wastoh fr Army use*

There i s attached t the USS Was at b as ^ Corps Betaehmeat fr tli use of Anay Staffs tofearked* This Betadaaent consists f feur (4) Officers ad thirty*@ne (31) enlisted menf uMir the ceinmand of Clxarles E. Robertson, Jr, Captain, Signal 0rps# Orer Caftain lefeertseii* s pretest t h i s Dtaeh rnent was detailed toy Casaaander Lgwea (CemPhifc Or 8 Flag O@miEuiLieatins Officer) t the fllewliig duties: 3 Officers * i s s i s t a n d GWO*B in Cnamiiicatins Office* 13 B * Havy Cderom
9 M ' Eadi Operators in Hadi #1 (Mara!
Circuits) In addition the Army Detachment handles the s h i p f s newspaper {5 radi peratrs) and Aerlgy radio l i (3 radi operators)* in the ship just aft f the %eratims E L i s an Army Signal Center in whleh S termimat s i x {) C Circuits and tw (E) T1 *t W firm (5) C end three (3) ! c i r c u i t s * Addition W a l f a c i l i t i e s fer operating SCE^OO's and/r SOB* 600*s. frm t h i s Signal Center are arailable. Trans mittersf arailahl are f g (E) BC 6lOf and 5 ( f i r e ) B0 191 s plus SCI d(B s and 608s* The Signal Ga* tr was mt used hecaus persennel nermally arall* fr i t s peration were u t i l i z e d by the Hary#
/ s / Charles S# g / t / CHARLES . RdB2HTS0Mt Captain, Sig Cf

WARFARH RKPORT

#7
WARFARE HEPORT

ffl were directed to carry mo *&& loaded, inUnit supply, one kit, ointment, protective, H$t and one -gas mask per individual. fliese items were to be carried in thejanit supply to the most forward area practical. All other (MB T/S equipment, expendables, sod 30 D/s as aythorieed, were bulk leaded to arrive I plus 2 aid remain the responsibility of the iivieicm dhemieal offieer* Combat units were issued 1 U/F of chemieal grenades and 2 carried under diTision control. Three TJ/F for flame nere carried by units and t U/F tinder division control. Besides a jeep for Chemical Section transportation the sec
tion vas assigned a 2f ton truck to pull the ton trailer contain
ing the air compressor and shop tools. $ie truck carried: fear
(li) M2-2 flame throwers; two (I) M2-2 flame thrower service kitsj one (1) E-3 flame thrower service kitsj two (2) Vdkl flame thrower service kits} ignition cylinders for flame throwers $ four (U) nitrogen (onaaerGial) cylinders! three (3) hydrogen (oonsaereial) cylinders? 100 grenades, yfl$$ go grenades, ffitj 2$ grenades, W\ 25 grenades each of the five &&j&rB& smokes $ office equipment and sappliesj and necessary tentage. F Ch^Saiicai ^ervi'<S<S "W6ops staged trith the division fca* the <spera
tion. These units were to be attached to the division at the
scene of the operation, therefore this offlee was net responsible
f i n i t i a l supply ef these tmits*
I e Division Chemical Officer held meetings with a l l Gas
Officers and non-coimnisioned offleers discussing with them Htm
problems thai might occur during the operation, A flame thrower
school for flame thrower operators and maintenance men of each
regiment was conducted and completed just prior to the operation.
Wo- regtBents eaeh carried fifteen 0$) flame throwers* portable,
1&-2 with necessary kits* akd one regiment earried twenty (20)
ftsaae thrflrarers, >rtable f idXLj with neeessary k i t s .

fJ

J^g^

Oaemieal Mortar troops

k t pi lAITOCt# Four meoibers of the Division Cheoieal

Section landed n iTSay, proceeded t e the Bivisio CP area and
began functioning as a section, one member of the section landed
with Hq l^feh Infantry to aid in maintenance ef the regajnents
flame throwers and t help in keeping the regiment's CffiS supplies
and amaunition available te forward tmits, One member of the
section landed n R plm fear along with the 2t ton truek and
trailer earrying WiS equipment and l i
Daily reconnaissance was made of the tigaeh and a l l storage areas te determine whether a l l masks and oiltanent was being ear ried by unit supplies and to ascertain whether a l l C S equipment W was being protected as well as possible. 2nad Fiatoon, dompany t i ,8uth onwnieai ij^attaiiCon earrying 1280 8uth onwniea j^attaiCon earying
division
rounds ef HE and 320 rounds ef WP was attached te this d for 1^ie operation* Sinee this unit had net staged wi1& the divir*
sioi^ i t was briefed by the Division Ohoaiea! Officer, ffeis nnit
was requested to submit daily ammunition reports to the Division
Sheisieal Office*

Bt amemti&? nxk wxrriM mt eXX tx pg g 3 expending a total of ffi l f rounds of the l t 7 rounds of WI# $*t mm of th platoon's firs t f i r<ajRd* of H wsre lost tn a river fhis # tamwer, was B y m$m$&m tm to shoerta&i of transportation 790 rounds H were ll e f t at a Corpss Ingime rr Bm$ to ttrfr tt back t t oG E ere t t a Corp Ingime Bm$ to rfr back o i leaving t! platoon tto prooeed with U90 roonda of i t l i t! lt i f M AM Baring the operation, the platoon

Mi

of i t e operatim ordy 15 rounds of

A:

t or wre beoara out of issaedlatay repaired liy tho UD8th ry

allft

ohecfeadi i l l

a l l tm All Cla XI and d __ . mtX stm&i aid protected by tarp and d stared in a separata arasamition bigr t^the

to bo
them to after the

tuniadt In to and sito had

plus U the Cbmicsl rnffioer ad^anoed iHi the mm&& OP mt$$ three (3) nn and the trade and tnd3bir with C^ qo to follow T^lth the Heur CP# H Chcedeal Offieor remained to ehoek sOl load isims a i t was reported by natives that l d i t i t l srs, of ti !f1se rjivj.sicm Niil Officer and Corps Chemieal Officer ^ t h thft first troops ebeckitig on pocsiblo ohieioal and jaeatitljissMt# *!li@5i t^s no evldeiiQe of auy of the .All mmfamm of the section joined at t d tfolild
ifhtsre

on B. plus 20 the Cheieal officer roceived the of use of a'tqjdc sraok >y the eiwciy, Ttwsti^atidn T?rcwe to bo a battigalore torpedo that partially exploaod with the r e 1 i foap A eh^rt tdbae giYin^ off a yelliewieh On H plus $1 the 19th Tftfantrjr reported t3 ne of f^p by the
tHvuyti^Etiofi provnd thi^t ofi^y-oneHsofid tlofcxm nosiitiCBi
thrown filing of it gr^rtah imtte eisi trl-Hi the odor of
dosd jrass catttdi^: irritation r of the $m md mmm^ fhe d r i * elis^ldciit did ?iot p^rffiit m ittfMBNBft4csi of the # of the smmltion. A full report inclusUng a l l affidavits

t o M$m h3qtuarter8 for ana3^cis BCB of nail up of a 10 o* bottle containing a solid ' in a elar litpid* Others is^re similar vith<st y the yellow ambetanee fjreisades

des w

flame thrower* were used by

all vm$msnfo& sfcee*s*fa31y with a combat misfires reported. Only
one flame thrower was lost in combat.
One battalioxi of the 19th infantry carried two fully loaded
^ - 3 flaae throwers is a 3e# with every Battalion Headquarters
at all times returning to Regimental Headquarters every other day
to hare presmsre checked.
Q?enadesf incendiary, Mlu, were vm& to destroy enemy weapons,
supplies, anf as flarea to illuminate the perimeter. It was found
thai many of this type of grenade were duds.
weouss| hand, smoke, WP, 1H5* were used throughout the
campaign. Their main tactieal employment was as anti personnel
grenades thrown into fox holes, caves, and thick underbrush.
Grenades, hand, smoke, colored, Ml8, were used extensively
throughout the operation for the purpose of marking strips for air
dropping of supplies, for air strikes, and for marking forward
areas for ttie artillery*
LESSOKS LEATOM)
1. By having a 2i ton truck assigned to the section, the
section tras able to operate efficiently and speedily having all
office equipment, flame throwers and maintenance kits, flame
thrower aiDBsunltion, and extra chemical grenades at hand, set up,
and available for any unit needing additional service or supplies.
Farther need for the truck is to draw the ton trailer carrying the
air compressor necessary to maintain the ammunition level for all
flame throwers in the division*
2* 3& fature operations it would be highly desirable to send
one man from the section with all bulk loaded chemical equipment,
supplies, and ammunition to be sore that all supplies are collected
and transpcrtated to their proper destination* It Is believed that
much tine and labor can be saved and less equipment lost in un
loading and moving supplies to forward areas*
3* With units being mptfttM by air and ground forces being
supported by air, it Is believed that the unit of fire for colored
smoke grenades should be tripled* In operations where terrain
and weather tends to interfere with ground supply, colored smoks
grenades have been used extensively and have been found necessary
for marking air strikes and strips for air drops*

,#t
REPORT

ngln*r operation* and the eeeond eentaiae photograph* illoetrat ing coot point* of intereet in the Kngineer work, II. a, LAIPIHS AEP BSAQB AftSA

tint* a** two m%mwm mm*L

I. The following narrative doeerttee the *aiio* pteee #

operation* # tut a4th Diri*ia Laniijif To** m mmm i u

$ **** u m***& * *u
&

the Jrd instate* Oosfeat Battalion eailed fro* M T R 0 e* * OO part of the 2*th Division Landing Tea m 15 April SjM$t and I M M 1OB Company C, at PARAM3, MI1CAKA0 <m 17 April (H-day). C<Mpaw 0 landed 18 April, One platoon f Oa^aty B va* attahii t o tJ* 2 U t H T and dm platoon of Oaajmi^ 0 t o ihi 34ih SOT* Tl* platoons O wsro reltovtd frot attatenb upon laniii^* 0t t o ^irar bneh actriBtic8 t Snginwr uppll wore sin in being The hmmh profilo was tuoh that tb largtr landing craft oouW only at high tide. In ord#r t o pa up the unloading, tir float ii^ 1ST Jetti* wr eonatrtaota froa an citing # daiaasd pir # Beaeh exit and latoral roade mv otrttd with l i t t l o difficulty. 0afflpany A9 inowdiaUly upon landing, prooooded t o th im XS vhieh they t|ridg*d on If April. f ft LIBYAN Hivsa ^ y I mo7d by vatr t G fi B T on l April and worted on CfA A O road* and bridgd* from th#y* t o th* LBUIWAN HI7ER. OoaqwwiiW A an! 0 workd on bridges from PARAI t o the $mw>t aiVER which ** bridged by the ^O6th Light Pontoon 0oapany on 2 April* Company 0 and Battalion Headfluartere eection moved forward t o T r i n i t y cf the LIBUMJASRIVSR, ani a servlee eeotion of Head quarter* an* Serviee OAAO Oompany wae left at P R AW. Company A moved t o C T B T and from A there mored >y water t o PULAH3I with the mieelon <t repairing roade and brtdgfts mmm&* The LIBUKIAN Elfgn vas oroeaed initially by an improTieed Jeep raft. A rubber f i e a t H**f was then eonstructed f cr >epe and V^Wten t r w k e , and a ford aade for artillery and # ^ o n truotai. A 1 1 0 1 ponton bridge vae oontrtted acroea thie r i w r on 24 April by the 506th Light Pontoon Company. Oeopaiil** B and 0 and Battalion Headquarter* aoted t o FQ\T Pffirr
0* LBUNQAH RI7SR TO FCRT PI&P

A larger part of the Dlrteion aade the mote t o FCRT PHUT

behind m Wltimm m$ % W * ^ si0a no work Mi boen dose. Bridge* wore repaired enrout* aiA by-paeee wore aado f i r hoarier vjhittlo*. Two bridM failed and woro byfpaso^d, Ooapu*/ t ttiVti PCRT PIKIT whero they wrlad on WM mppreoohoo on tin rsumt ana aoio H^UMT bridso repair* In tin roojr. ^ Oa H Ai^il the Rear Seheloa # Headqwurier* and Sorvlee pany awwod t o year f H H *ad Oiiobliehod * eoppiy dtaep, HOTR

d Fear p a i r

TO DISOB

two platoon, of Company 4 whieh laniod t PULAIWI aovod

g f orward* When Ooapany 4 had repalrod the br id gee in their eector, they turned o*>r the mintonawo if thle eeotar t o O # azri mm forward through Oo.pauy ^ They maintained t l * |fC wae reached. 0mpany f e f * f M W i t ^ ^ f ttltf repaired P D D 4 9 t f l ] r ' ***** AAA

of Btffctalta* tim&m&tom *ved forward with the ooapanies, al ways raftainlag with the grward eoKpany
#

Company $ passed thjwi# GowpalJsy 4 g | BI06S and AT HZ the lead to DAVAO, GoeapaflBr 0 moved t * S N A C & on 30 April and tajHPor^d roads, bridgae and by^paaa** to tlia rear of Oonpeagr B. Gonpaiqr A remained at 1P@$ and ttaintalned roads and bridges both forward and t their rear* Bedauae of th sp#d of the nova aad th large smcrant of work In the rear area*, Battalion Keadcyiarteya reaalaed with tagMttF + ^^r Ke&aioa of Baadqpiartars aai i i t f i i t C d to SAIffA 0K0Z mi 1 Hay. Iteet of th h e a ^ #<yrt|ant
l

f.
Sngiaaw opaapatloas Id th# %&& BT%& mm dividad lat the tkr h

pp i was ralldrad tjy Cmpany A, uhltth for nlshad n pdat<if to m @ f l tha drive north from B T & fba &J * reet of tha Coffipany l?ullt tB approahQ on the DA7A0 RIVER and operatad an asaat&t t i l t fM3T aoross this river. They t l f rapaitf of th MTAO RIOTl bridge on 16 May# Compsi^r A a li of ths s'lpport of th driTe Sorth by Company B on 16 1 stipportad tha drive to th TAGC1 RIVER and h K i dirdtat Wast to KAKBOa, Thir work consisted of the repair end oon~ t t l of brldgo# repair of roads, reaoimX of mines, god the fl of eneay fortifications They w o relieved on 16 tad aoTftd iato a semi-permanent OBJ^ at LIPID&S,

A drive on MR A from rlolnity of L3BBI was ITL ^ I f elemawlis of OoE^anies BandC, Their work oonslstad of repair t bridges, raaoval of iis ani f i l l i n g of mud oratar RA AO O A drita a the Wmim A B froa the East side of the T L M RI7RE o Qa Q was suppoftad I f C B i a r A ExtensiY road work and soae bridg* t t i were repaired in this eeetor. W^n MBffAL m& a l i roads leadlJig iato It were secured, an attack was started from the UBOGAN area forth and Wet m&* awrtwotlt of xmim&t<m& roads* TMe attack was support* $d l|f 'Owiijpmy a&d agroaWBi'ya i^&ad afid EQpsavi Vf^tSsto WKQ ary. A oogbiaatioti of raia aud tff&Tfie aasd mm **&** of plaice road. A sedcmd drif* orer tfee 1WPA3WJU*HIVKBSIBB ^ita e^g^ported by Coan^aa^ A Jolaed tha abo^ aW slva road ajad feridgs rt^i^ mmB vmffsMsf^d mjmBTm^o ^sot raspoesiblllty of road Bala*nai to the rear of CAI.IRAH, and Coapany C acred toOTAUWSto aalfltain the road forwards k aad Sestloa of Battallom lead<|aarters ngfid forward with Oc A. H i Engineer work during M s phase of 1te oa^paia wan ha erd % heavy raie Ierge amounts of oral, bank rtm graml, eruahed rook, ani river rook were dua^ed m the roads and mmm* t dralfian fas neoessary. Coepany B aoved to T K Q K oa 30
AOA to HBdtataift the road forward*

H i eo|>6nies, when they <mM be spared fm

w$mimm$ ite** srapXegmd in eenatrootion of *a* s*&itlaa Bock bgun, Coiapeiay i startad f i l l i n g rtr on 1 M T 6 Majr, logrs w s aliv beca nock U M N m ftn tk sts^p alaoet eTwy day ty nipr HN^ j C took e w impair of the atrip <m %$ May and aoetinaad U s tenanea wfcil 22 Bay.

mmumm wmm

*f In the histories! report of tbe Qrdna&ee phase of any

operation, there sifttfi tendency to dell lit detail upon
specific teobnieel problems to the neglect of the orer-ell

"'i(F ^St^W1 TlMSiP' ^^>e*-^* TppOJ' ^S wf^r l^r**j^mSmmHi^""-frip?^^ mjmm^^ ^ P ^ H H ^ T | P ' | P ^t^Plie^^B^^^m* ^WH* ^PHyiW(^

particular operation, and in a fssrtlw effort to deal only ia gsiT*litie* f i t mfe*definitaly iaid that ti*# Ctatnaae* materiel of our igr has again atom* the tt # I t has prowl t t d i l i tarrifie tts t ^ I A n au^jottt i t * The 0lTiiaa* Crdtaa&o* aatril stood op r o y th rapid Horement across the s*ni3*l part of during t) bittor atrngglo i*ich followod l a and * Thiro wore froqtiwjt oasos of orokon springs, oraoltod tra&sKisaisASf and daaagsd as^-os o ti^iolo* KJIIIU toil, but based a aqporioaeo tabulations t1j mortality iras not

a* i?hil preparing for an operation, eostbat sorvlooability of a l l itBS of Ordaanco nateriel oaanot bo ovo3>em|>hasiMd# Cosbat readiness sbfsld be predicated on ni^i staadards of par ewelleooe* Determination of oombat seifigeability Stan4ar4 Mmm & i f 4 Ordnance l i b, During the p&pxtom pb* of operation, the work of Ordnance inelndes not osly a perforBanoe of i t s ainteaa&oe and e ^ ^ f fanotion, birt also a oontintiini eteek ^>on the using eras and fterrloes to insure that they themtelves are performing satisfactorily responsibilities v i m which they are o* .the preparation of vehicles and araeaeat for oombat serrioeabilitgr, and the procurement of r i t a l supplies prier t l esbarkatlonf has invariably proted to be more diffionlt than 1*he S ^&^ i3 M of i<p 1 |Hi<it; wa# the ism9ssjio^i of Mt 1M W i e I the ebjeotive area* d* 'S^MI ditPteKtt#o iwoi'Ved in t# v ^ ofNipai^^ IJ^HSMWII the . staging area and the base of supply, coupled by the fast that . elements of this f&vicion were s t i l l in oombat almost immedi ately prier t thi* operation, preeented many difTienlties oo eerned with obtaining eorrsot levels of authorised equipment. e. Principal Ordnanee problems eneountered ineludedt (1) The procurement and issue of t/t shortages of Ordnanee major items and 30 days supply of maia tenanee stocks as well as of 03 and preserving materiel stocks, (2) The procurement, receipt, and %mm of serrieeable ; a in designated quantities. :; ^ (3) The inspoetioa, preparation and r*inpet&n of a l l Ordnanoe materiel for oombat

fliti

mil landing toaa oloaoata to

dotoraia* adoqaaoy* f# fhoro oxiatod alao tl protaoa of ahertftgoa at of tho tlao of l i f t i n g . Boquiuitioaa voro fillod at tho initial %a*e and feaek ordora tm t/% aalntonaatfo atoek wovo ftafcaittod to Baa I on UOTTS. On tho baaoa of tho roquiaitioaa #a% ' nittod to bring; tho Siriaioa tip to anthoriso* lorola of aain ofejootivo aroat ' . , ^ .

Farta for t / Truck, l ^ t o n ,

:

. / *

Trudt, 2i*ton, 6x6

Truck, ^-tont 6*6 10*
Motor GarriagoB, 1-7 and 1-8 65*
Saall A w e (all typ) ArtUleir (*H typos) 60
90*

prior to ^ o oa^iratioa of tho first 30 4*?* f t i t opovmtion. l a gonovalf bowr t i t toka wtro fairly ooa^ploto u f t r aa tho Mvleloft aa aWLo to salBtaim a roor4 durif t l firt 60 day of hairing at no tla oro than 3$ of ita vahloles doad* lined for laek of aftintonaaoo* . .. . Api^roxiamtoly 30 <la7 prior to otabarkatioxiy i t mm
t o (OowmitiiB avttffltiMott Tjoni muwnlia ta* Bi*ai4fr H

for Bi-riaion anA atteli4 oslta* . Thoao i mm roqalaiUoBod oa initial anmftltioa dna^a Snortegoa oadating voro ro<|alaitiomo4 tbrougn Baoo I , 1, too fHHaioB JUanmitioii Offieor a-pprora* a l l traaapor* tatloa ordora f i r tlo DtrUlen and attoiio4 \mita, and kopt a musing balenoo and roportod progroaa tolly to th i i i Ordaaneo Offioor* . .j;# la tho ataging aroa, 1G0JI taapeotion of tho aondoooMo ^ aa o i ^ r ropairod or roplaeod* . k. Tho Slghth imp Ordnaaoo Incpootion Toa inapoetod dato ^sroty affoHiag a dooblo hook s forrioo>iliV# . .

AU

wore m$*Sm& or. roplaeod. tnit ahopa porfomod a l l mixttonaaoo oheeka on thoir roapootl^ irohioloa. fhro a*ifMf& tho addi tional work mm porfrod elthor tagr tho nita or the & t t dopon&lag oa tho oeholon of Balntonaaeo roquirod, ' 1* All a#tor oarriagoaf **7 and K*8f mro gi^oa 100 ehoeka tqr Ordaaaoo and Cannon oapaay poraoanol. Ouo to tho high aortality of motor carrlagoa, both on LE T and tB20It tho JTK o r asoalMar -an hand ia ooaaidai'a.ttly % l M aM^hoafisod alltfiia^Mft* sbao<|uont ehaago in tho TA atitooriiod oightoon (1) oa f actor oarriagoa, witti no aotor oarriagoa W-8. R o q i i .mm subaittod through Bigh^i Aray Hoadquartora for fourtoon (U) oaoh, motor carriageer M-7, with an arrival data in too staging aroa of 5 April 19^5 ConBidorisig tho Uao oloaont iirrolTOd, i t ma diroetod that a l l motor earrlafos, iaclvrfiing the rootor earriage K-8, be put in eonriooatlo eondition and giren to tho 19th and 21at Regiaetttf who nado \sp oar aaaaiat eloaenta* All of the sotor oarriagoa, 1*7, woro not tocolrod
t .' ' } :

a t mmm prior to embarkation. I t l a indicated that infantry reglaoats prof or the aotar oarriafe i * t o tha M*f^a twoattso of ftipeator aanattreittfeilltsr aad saaa&. *HMI balaaoe of the #ft wore ro^roatod t o the oporatloaal area whore they wore issued. The aeter oarriages, *8, perforaed e i e e l l o a t l y throaghout the oporaUon.

a,; Artillery traetors could set ho giroa a thorough

serriciag as seals, traok rollorst aad

^ this prlr t sbarkfttien. thic laek f

Ih* Dirllon Ordawiee Offl e w with h i s R D ^ (17 April 1945) *t 1205, f w a LCI 615.

!W l

ffe )

lt l

lfl

e A f r mil a r t U l i T ^ !* uaiUi * pUd on a l l t o tli pitlH f and tdtttr "R* Day^ s ! d 1 t (U) % l i J d t , The r e t u r n was aftffllBt t * M * t t i l

4* A *& &lcaftd tfc* Division t o prt s u e w w l v s mm: W W i t HKIT, SANTA CTffg, T L K and KISTAL. AO A sdPM23**y w^tes* A '#iittl#lMi Mvnttl%dyB& <TWi.pt'iff'' i s dftiiiivtlila support a d l v l s i w l a pfatii #f t h i s 8ale y as a !** t ydues the seiriea tliat should be re&dared* disposal s^oad arrlvd with t* assamlt w "E Say, %t their saiYieas war sat exsaft*tf*ly m pree4 ontll tha BlTlsioa had p*tim& elghtT (0) !** aeross tli islaM* Bh disposal araws ware f i r s t aativaly aaplayad in tha area ^afiiid *AfA G8B2 en tha read tawurd 0ATAO* f# l a the fAl(aiO^AfA0 saetar. a l l reads* beaehes^alr 'it%lNL|Ni, aad %&N&8 wara > tw&sA %& Ivs uaafil^T aiiwid* *o ex^adlta defusing Map* aad clearluf T&lgr ^ a p s , addlUaaal fceafe dis* posal persiamel ware raqulrad* fbase sc^ads ware highly trained teohaielaaa f a a i l l a r with the Tmrlaoa mmm e ^ l e a i v e s r efforts a&1arl%>atad l a no s a a l i way t o areas so as not t o impede the progress of the taetioal

a Pr#Tiu operations indicted S Q M 4 for * greater quantity of balk supplies with the Ordnance Ceapeer. fjfct* was acciwplished and proved to W well worth the difficult!** encountered* Ordaee Geapaugr * % up as lil * 10.** This proved m distinot adntnt* beantt f th l b Sharing the opwttioa, the Ordaaa p ^ placwwS foaward aajr tint*, and i tfeeoame0saaz7 t# tmlk suppliee and dea41ind thil toidp gvtajrd In. a aw, Bw t the ahertftfa of afmllatoe vhieU and to BCWI bulk sapplie* and dadliiid Thiol frw*rd, of OHaB eo^aals ihotild b a4e a infrqwatly as

6, Tfe fenduing fotr wre noted dha*inf th f5 operationi aw Thir^f (30) day* 61a# II aapplie* fewi^it in bjr OrdBaae had baam deplatad prior t* wwoipt of rosupply ahip>ping. fe* Duriflg tho opoaratioa, a high g*fs*t of Tohielo* doadlinod woro for part* that woro m% obtainable prior t

mm

ANHEX # | 0
RSPORT

X*

AXortod for tit* madia** operation * soparato aootion a* O

tabiiahod within th* offieo of tho Biviaioa Qwtoraiwtor.
noX In tho nation woro roliovod trm thoir nora*X dutlo* thua
Hitting without interruption * oaroftiX tdy of aXX iaforaatioa
availabXo portaining to tho frthcoaing operation. In foranXatiag
tilt qttartmator pXaa for tho initial stagoa of tho opo ration aad
for rooitpjsXjr tho foXXowlag faotorc woro eosoidorodi &o>turo of ao
aXtt Rbor of our troopa iovoXvod, probabXo dioporioaoat of our
troopo, roportod ttroagth of m n r forco, typo of torrain to bo on
eoimtorod, and rootiltt of tho two proriouo ajor oporatioao oagagod
in bj tho Diviaioa,
It waa docidod to tako in initialXjr thirty (30) daya of OXata
I, II, and If auppXio. m d thirty (30) daya of oXaos XU with tho
oxeoption that tho ^>ply of Bo oetane gaaoXiao and dioaoi fuoX
would ooi liaitod to fUtoon (15) dayo supply, Tho ichodule for tho
arriraX of Quartomaator supplioa waa aa foXXowat

a, Oa indiriduaXa: 3(3,K) (AXX oohoXona).

b, Withunitai Z$ C-MobUo Xoadod (All ooholont).
With unita and dotaohaonta Xandiag oa R day (uador W.T QM
control). XO (l, Cj 4, lO-l{ 5, B ) .
d. With unit* landing oa & plu* 10 (under Div Qtf eoatreX) 20
aXX catogorio* pXu* 1$ D/S # fl, for troop* of firat oohoXoa.
o. KotpitaX ration* 30 D/S to bo Xoadod by appropriate aed
iaX unit*.
f. foyif rationa, 7 i/S to bo drawn by T QJI1* froa tho
Qttartoraaator. Roquioitioaa to bo baaod oa awabor of
Aray poraonnol aboard oaeh ahip.
CLASS H a. % 4i&i: 5 daya ahooa, ooelta, 88Tfi, pauXina, bXankota, aoap, haXasoao, caXeiw hypoihXorito aad ata^ brino (aobilo loadod). XO daya individual oquipaoat, m a p , haXasoaoy eaXeitai hypoehXorito aad atabrino (aobiXo Ioadod)| 25 day W T 1 * , ohooo aad ok* (aobiXo Xoadod); 30 daya aXX othor clothing (jaobiXo Xoadod); X5 day* organisational oquijaont, bXankota, ooap, haXawno, oaXeioa hypoohiorito aad atabrino (bulk loadd)j 20 daya individual oquipaont Xoaa blankot* (bulk Xoadod)} 30 daft eloaning and proaorving Xoaa ap# haXaKoao^ oalciua hypoohlorito and atabrino (bulk Xoadod),

b. R pXu* 2i

e. I pXua 10* 15 dayo organisationai oquipaont (bulk Xoadod).

d M day* atationory and offlot auppXio* iasuod
to unit **pplj offiooro prior to doparturo.

GLA3S XII a, R Bay b* a plus 2

.,

. '

x 1000 drums Aviation gasoline, 3 days -80 octane gasoline and diesel f uel$ 5 days all other. : 9 days So octane gasoline and diesel fuel; 15 days all other*

c. E plus 10 s 3 days 30 octane gasoline and diesel fuel; 10 days all other* II. C T O

a. Quartermaster personnel scheduled to land on R-Day were to

debark at EE-0 BEACH* However, due to change in tactical situation
-one group landed at GREEK BEACH. Immediately upon landing both
groups assisted the Shore party in the establishment of dumps, the
following day personnel received md stored supplies coming in to
the dumps from the beach* Several emergency issues of rations were
upon presentation of certified strength figures from oait com
b Following a conference with G-4 the Division Quartermaster
KXVER hy hCM to 00?A3ATG'for purpose of
proceeded up the MIMU^AO reconnaissance and selection of dump site, A temporary dump was es
tablished and a. small detachment of enlisted aen remained to operate
the dump, the Quartermaster- returning to Uivision Headquarters.
Twenty-five (25) tons of eaiergei^'-y rations were received and stored
at C O T A B A T O during the afternoon, from R. plus 2 until the closing
of the G0I&B&T0 dump, daily shipments by water of rations and POk to
support approximately 120C troops were made to C O T A B A T O f roaii PARANG
(G&2SSN BE&GH). Status of supply reports were made daily by radio to
the Division Quartermaster both frota COTABATO and from ESD BK&CH*
c. CM E plus 4 it was decided to issue "B" rations to all
troops having facilities for using aame. Issues were made accord
ingly, the Quartermaster travelled fey road from PAMJG to PIfOT to
reconnoiter the area to select a dump site. Results of the recon
naissance-; were favorable and the Quartermaster returned to the
PARANG dump via the MiUDAMO RIVER stopping off at CATABATO fto alert
the detachment at that point for m7ement of dump forward t PI&IT.
Personnel at RED. BEACH were instructed to turn over rations under
their control- to a Marine Air Group and to proceed by water to
COTABATO,
cU The Division class I and III dumps at PARANG were turned
over to Corps* Division Quartermaster personnel departed by road
for F1KIT leaving behind several men to safe guard class II aup~
plier in as muea as sufficient trucks were not available ior move
ment of all class II at one time* In conjunction with the iuove
forward from PA&ANG the dump at COTABATO was closed. The COTABATO '
detaeoaient together with the personnel from RED 8SACH proceeded up
the river to'?XKXT leaving behind sufficient rations and POL to
siipply remaining tactical units in the completion of their mission.
The dump at PXKIT was established on R plus 7* Arrangements were
Bade whereby reupply would be made from the Corps dump via the
KIHIMAG _RIVSR# Division QU trucks were utilized to shuttle class
II from
e. As the tempo of the advance of the tactical troops toward
ihQ increased organisation supply officers encountered diificulty
in returning to Division dumps for supplies. This was due to the
extremely poor condition of the single lane road Traffic was con
gested and often held up due to bridges oeing out. To alleviate
.the burden put on organizational supply officers in the foremost
area the Quartermaster established a class I and III dump on E plus

9 at IEEDAPOAK* located ai^aad&ately thirty (30) miles in

ftf m&in 4mp$ at PIKIT. llth the occupation of SAUTA CElfc it was
decided on f plus 12 to r^ove the dumps to that location. Arrange-
l si@4ts neve made- whereby resupply mx&d cose by water fron PARANG*
6500 emergency rations m d 50 dru&s of Class III products were
to S4ifA *$%'$Z from ^IKJT daring the night lor a'taetia).
of a regimeiifc&l combat tea#*. ' A representative from the Div
ision Quartevaiaster offie accompanied the e&nYoy Punp sites at
SAftTA. ?!/; were selected the following morning .and trucks eos**
prising "th* convoy of the previous night returned to K1SAP0AH to .
assist in th# eKyvesisat of that, (imp to SASTA CHCG, Th balanc
of Q'itsrioniiAAtir trucks w$r@ utilised in th# ^ov^sent of suppli#
nd pro!UisX fro& PIKXT. 10 tSM*s and 10 LGM's with cl&ss 1 and
'III auppli^s arrived from PABAfff?'on ti plus 16. fh# s u p p ^ of ^0
oetftne gisolit3 h$d rsaehod the critical point and in a aueh as
the ..auppljr receivsd by wat^r was negligible, it was necessary to
dispatch vehicle* to P A R A H G for n additional supply.
t. FoUowing * reconnaissance of th^ TAJX-iuc- area a f plus
i t 16 it was declaed to move all Qunrt^imatter dump installations to
fALOMO* 0iffip sit nere cleared and warehouses constructed to
hu# d a s a II supplies and those items of (vlass I reqairing
#rd storagef Prior to arrival of r^supply shipping from
O K I plus -20 all C-uartenftaster activity wns consolidated at
t g. Quartermaster service at TALcM) was augmented with the
arrival of a bakery and a salvage platoon and ane section of. a'
laundry platoon. The bakery *n& salvage platoons served all units
in the area. Facilities of the laundry section were limited to
hospitals im u^dieii clearing companies, supplies were received
by air and wmter fro* Corps and fro Bm&ms on the laiands of LHI
smd LUZ03S, In addition Quartermaster personnel received and stored
Quartemaster supplies arriving on tvo liberty ships Xrm the States.
h # Division transportation under the Division
trftasportatioa officer wis heavier taxed with the rapid y
of tactical troops and supplies over the 145 ^il^s of tortuous
road extending between PAiU8G md fAL^O. Msxiwrn, use nas made
of. available transportation. Drivers -and trucks -were often on
th# road 16 hour a day and on numerous occasions wer@ subjected
to #n#y fire. At TALOMO approximately 3D vehicles were dis**
'patched daily to the beaohmaster f<>r hauliag of besich cargo and
native laborers. In atktition vehicles wr used in the trans*
porting of t&etic^l troops, ammunition, &nd other supplies to
ami froa th Iroat U n a s . .
1. Gravf@ Registration functioned under the direction of
the Division Quartensaster* Durliig the operation thrwe ce.etcries
ere established* the first, at ;:AHTA. CBUZ, wa opened m S plus
13. V&en.the QuroterBisster isoved to the TAI-OMO area the 3A^fA
CElv: ee&etery wa closed and T & 0 & 0 Ho. X wa opened* Flans for
fALCHO Ho. 1 included 2 American *plot and whm irw^e bue^ime fil
led TAtOMO So, 2 was established, TAL(M) I3o, 2_ contained suf^
fleient plots for reintensente Item cemeteries previously estab
.lished. All isolated burials were recovered and relnterred. " .411
Aeerioan deceased mr identified. Deceased troops of the Philip
pine kray Yi@r# also interred and in as i&ueh as no civilii^ri ceas
et#ry was in operation^ five civilians were interred in the Fil
ipino plot at the iJS&F Ceast#ry, TALCHG So. 2,

4,

SAsaax 0 k,

ANN5X # 1 1

She tastieal m# i f Kediaal T**oj* l a fe# X M i l oper ation deviated l i t t l e Item the original plan Insofar a* & * g $ had Medical tupfwrt on* GellftetU^ CoMpiiy and oao Fortabl* ?* al Hospital. l**y were an integral part of th KIT and pe*~ to Gorpt 0iieX aTUr th i a t t i a l to th# nith in mi th o^qunt ^Miiogi i n th ^ f H & wl OA othr tbaa tfe bifl ABN attalioa wa euppoad to hai Uu44 at M U A O and tfen aaifi l y I.GX to F H B to apport th awaialt tyoops tii!# A AG but l a s t e d lanlad iidUally at PAMNG. rorttonately ther* a> batU# cauaXtIe at eittir landii % 57th Portable i c a l Hoapital, i n iupport of the 2Ut MSt, m* apUt ty tha <diang in plan*. Ont half of th hospital laaled i t M U B B AJW nith th 1st Battalion and th othr haU t t PA1UN0. th half CO at m$mm* iwdiatly mm**m 0ft L 3 *al mm to IUUB4J. 0 platoon of ts 24th Madical BatUlion Clearing Company la*Kl t U U A G nd the other at W i S Ml tiy *t up for ABM ation. On I plua one the 30th Evacuation Hoapital 1O nt 1000 and l^r I 6 O wtro at $ an* i^ad^ for opei*tion# 0m Battalion of tht 21t RCT awd Igr Sf fw POAW to # on tb 1^1 l AprU, IMUr |>popUn i m b*Lng idth
l ^ t t a l i o t i a t M&ljLMBQ 4 4 iyi *>*fliiiii.Fjr ta MftMi vis ft

g t

l tea& ftorn W& mutloit. 3ffHtittAlln to upprt ttauo* and tn urioal and a4iol Uehnioiaai eapilttd t h l l
wtfTr IPOJUMSOIMMESK IpQffijpWmySO SWPJrOr3utt wllOiy

QT^a!3JlBPit

fgging eaeh other as the swift *d*anos

parUouLar strain was pat upon the aodioal faoilities tspt Hi to bulk ef hoapital-tyj* f%Uo f ivilre4 to b y ft oleaidng company i too great test present transportation. Forward nwveaent of ie rations inquired shuttling t and thU ooabined with the long jmp of this operation, and the condition Of the roads, proved a difficult obstacle to free nobility of the clearing platoons. 15, 17, 30, 22 and 44 mile Jumps js*de I t a l i t t l e difficult to do much shuttling* the PUUHGSt river was reaobed at F R PHI? i t as OT neosry to tmrry a l l troops and ectuipnent across by 1^31 and i t nas sewial days before the job was finished. At this Um no platoon of the clearing oompaay was on the Hot ido of tfao river i n opeiaUoa tut tbe other pUtoon waiting to cross. Or^w woro

ill on l i t ***% id% of the fttAML

On the afternoon of the 27^1 April the Division Madioal p f y i i mowi im***& to the vicinity of 1194191 along with . the 2nd PI*toon of th Clearing taffciy* Btwn K3 N O and IA T ICD the firt hoary c*sttalUe of the operation ti* sufft*ird On the i m ft? April th# 1st Platoon of the during Company tvm mm to S K A OUii and set up for optration, a* AX l ft* one platoon eaoh of the 6Q3rd and the 656 d u r i n g 0e j toth Corp* aedical unite. Ihe 99th I^omUon Hopit*l In opr*Uoo at K B A A O KftaATmeufctloD to tha vary ciiffiat and Um-mmwinz )mmwm of th* coaiiU*i f tb
mad Urti Xl^Ltsd luxdaex' of Mftilft&le taSNtiJusriMMl
* h*ami&$m trip ^l1 60 all** throagb mdft *&mmm #1 tb* Division ** tht UtXa 4 %^t *afi2 ti *nv M tt* oroide aiad & lag ttiooi tiy ^**ii#lf I t la iapoibL far in this opewtion, to proHdo ^ l r ira prlitr dfiw4 ff oH wm mfo to Alt up within tfo perfj*itr laata i f $% % b t thi* t^olQtldn to t
caabat uolt
8 U mmX mmm i f i t 1 to bATe ftdsqwta protatlQ# fuel 100 to 200 patinta to tattoe mm of i t i iapMiblo to g ^ tf ftn iaaftioqviatoi i*i4stoi? mtug oa^r eftfMH.0 atdiotl i rasa coanot stay oa g*Td U ni^ht and router o*tt*f*9texy l a l l day. In addition the station funetloat spot of the night *ion battlo Mmlti *i Iwa^y. At tiaoo i t law boon mmmm to aim th patient* an* pl*<w oonraleooont pat* iont on tho peyiaator. Iho 0#po have *boluto2y no respect for aodieal p f . ombulanoeg and hoopital inatallationB, On the night of the l i t of May the 57th P3H was part of a oonroy of the 21t AT Wi from 3 K & M i Sorth to Da w o . The oemoy was y an lanknowi waabor of Oape wing aatofeel Hargeof into the ambulance*, ow of ^ i c h contained * wunded Po*f^ito both the gxvaule and the cocktail exploding the aabl*noe tHi patient ooompod idth only one sertovm must. 1h GowaanOing Officer of the 57th Portable SwgLoaX HopiUX ae boyotntod thro# the aeok. I l l of their ^ joaot of i t s SNK&OAX e>al osv^loal oquipwia^ was o^Otroyed ty fire and eas|Ooive Oiv tbe 2nd of Hay one platoon of tfeo %rlaioa an fttUejstd to the ZJm% Wt for o^pport uatlX tbo i etxlp *t PABADA, but thi required a 20 Ue awh^Unoo wm tmm UXttk 0m MM mm eerioue oaaos m&M not tftn& th tilp* All awiXabl* hoepitals mm filiod to ff9*Mt&g* The M M Motor Aatmlanoe Qmpugr (oat jqatooiQ ta diiving ir^ 24 hoar* per day, M l with only ten aabalancoe, thia not alO*vi*te tbe eitaation nmwy h for owcaation were tilUh2 f h% thie tia owr 100 pattnt ^

wm m*mmm *?witnm mem t i*am MMT n*3ume

patient* oould be talaus beeauee of lack of faoiUUeo to r o for Uttor pUent l t i w 4 0 hor trip and several of the aoro ooilooe oaeee were i n *hok # n they arrivad at P S H AA O

too daBgorous far MrLouft batllii of y # to that whih could tft gflpMNJftit by I f ajyplanM, oj**
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* 14 iaiX t i i f ovr tjy T O ^ *nd aaipa* contlnalag^ bat tsgr mm tfe* ftiAn 80 jttllea *a took tit* tiMtamft f 8 to 12 b o w to prt of Juw> or troop*

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of raidieal su^sly tnd Tmetlon thftt in th nUr gtagsifltft* the *ra i Xo*ttd lpi of UNT A O Md OTT K N T ad the i*iflfll Iff P AO Btant, Th 23 MI ro*U frca I fl M to f t t K H ScX U oni/ with th gr*Ut 4imltjr *i the idth til* ooasUnt efengtr # f hoara ii cooidr*4 good tiat to ^r nd th i J quippod with onainro on *U four whU. *** i n th oper*Ung Uat of &* 62nd and 64th g p l S o u * 3 j r Nisii& p*UutJ couLd not bat nooi ilA bo

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Whol blood And j*ntUlin wp flown l a b/

i n w QuiaMi, tin* Un raw hrt* tet nidtni to eool bodtt ##14 iitilci nninrt ter to prewnt Jfarthor otooaftti*tion# foot inf#ctiofli wore *& mlthongh 1A f*wor mmamm* Hmm f not 4 I pretiUat, M

th l*rgr pftfrt of y *r the dowm of th h*od and AYEHI, th houMrt aboat th kmi, ankl *ad foot. I t begiiii as % * g i i m i e U fUld with * jio-imralent mUrl&U ' thi bw*iei i#wn and th ldn IH wtpidy 4ot>yd foraing a chJOlow WLoor with r*io4 inoidnnoo of rooj&wtoiy infortion* was m l than would bo oxpoetod, pjpobabl^r da t eloo with tho eidioalth/ natiw populAtioa, M woll ao tho f l i l i i iaai<lnoo of aalaria, iNiidftswil di>oato and intostinal iil oxi aain i i j j j f f f axiating aaortg tho wtiro poptilatio&nptitt galgffii. diartfeoa* tropioal o l o s n . tubareuLoaiJi. and isefetini Xh inortaiod uao by tho Japa *g artiUry, aortara, auta

tt #f Iftjyp boat* and paspt9Atix wottnte of too abdoavn and

pareeence of & aurgiatl team with th 603rd ajai ^b6 24th g Companies wa# of lfml\)abl0 aid during th ?^my%lgn and i t would haw been impisibl to oaro for patient* i n eaeh s. Urge cumbers, considering the explicated wourtfs being receive*, had ttaif not been available.. lifts* etirgleal teams worked t i w !% through long diffioalt hourst tls* aaaioefc without tm% for *#ve*el daya at a tie**, they performed ourgfy of ti i calibor andr the laoet tigring oooditionn.

%g and gg bag and huoan waata waa diposd of by borUl, In the Division boaoh area garbage nas oarried out to & and dwiped* Pr-ar hiatory oonoerning tta interadiate boat of i revealed that nem nis prant except i n Hyp Hortheaotern part of the island* Goaiimial aurwys war md* ol a l l streAias i n the sent of action of the HriMim aad ns host nas aww^*t of a profaleau the inoraa* i a rate began around the 22ud of Kay and eontisntd through p r i l i w at*brii m* increajMKi wm one to two tablet* per CheoJ&ng oobat troopo off on a $m&$ roster i s i^oaaiWL* ing oorabat and a oomiderabl* maiber of uen f a l l to t*i preaeilbeii ao*e.. On quittionif^ mpprccdflately o m ttiird of tHe titwpa d*floping clinleaJL smlaria stated they h*4 jt to Ukiiag atabrin* regularly, B doabt the stresa, atrain and ^ fatipie from Bvatx a 2*ag period of contimaous combat hS m . piyohologioal #ffect on attbrim dlseijOine. I t i s probablj tio*t enteritis and dysentery tlterod the atabflai abaorpUon %n sa c&ses tl^ereby lowering the blood w w a outbreaks of diArrheal disease* urere f i i e s were eoiidera4 the aost important agent of %mm>&M importn t gent of s wr e eoiidera4 th mm exceeding^ preralent in areas previously oocui3|*d the eij^ AM aoong the itow tillages, the emploTassnt f mUv arouai ma* U l l a and ttie eaUng of poorly washed fo&d u ofidrad the next iajpartant factor. Th ineidenoa of venereal dis*8 ro* aharply. Heat of the oaas mm oontweted vm prostituiea and pstekup* aieund the Daw are*. Hose of the ial^cted troopt clained tfeey had is4 the |P kit, othesrs aaid tly took no preoautioa % effeetlvnesa of the pro kit i s doobUul. 411 naUve village. were j&aoed off l i a i t e and natiwM were barr4 from *rtwp areas* There are a t l l l , however, mmTow contact*.

Ifodieal epplia -mm:*&mim% i n quantity, quality and % t a l l times, tm mp$& 4$ refrigerated *b*l bl#d lafcintained in flpite of difficulties of delivery and pr~ without adequate refrigeration, the Divialn Medtioal #3i04 bo equipped with * abile reefer* In th firt atagas of an operation the Qu&rteriBter reefers are not *m&~ able at * U ad frequentljr after th^y arrive are not rwuUly acoeaeibSLe 4o the using units* Maoy of the attached unit ***$* ona 8tot*& that thay wi*e rtiaiered the best service by the 24th Division Itodieal Supply that they had encountered i n ^i SW^* this 4apite supplying two hospitals, idth a total of iOOO b4# k atoak of oedical supplies thai was .pot predicated :: : c th on of two hopit*l sush IUI Field and Evacuation* ' ^ ' '

Ana** # 4 ef tala report.

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peoiss wtre r*Yiwd. e^iiiit* Mfligjuwct was aad* C moh tm a p*eif i j#b l i t tfat pr!blii rah U t U r tatia technician, kltohto aod ffio O U 4prU 1%5 th BrttaUm t# tOrtd fr n p 1J w r advanca preparatUai paid IX tme tha BattaUn M SC r t m i l S A H and Xa4ed * ! * * Cb U # r U 1945 tfeft p anoh*r and tratpc i^ld that or fi4fit wa tht ISSt Q A T OS f fflmtRt* tb ry aaM frblddlag a rplt 1B j #tia anaictsf 41SMUI0# llMrtsf aapl Maantaloa, Jap aad th 24th Ifcdloal Battalltn ae an intagral part f th 24th was tlma oaaltt*d t# hXp laar tha Xat lm$* 1mA I U I la th FIMB ISLAUDS a t i U andar JapaiMi itr*l # ta BrttaUwi X**IBMI frar4 t raderlng MtdleaX aamd* in a gwtliag aopalg9 and was d la th natura that 7 p as mash as i t did tha lafantry. Ifcjiiiwnt X ths ttlylaiafi was miislf oar risd frward lsog stahllshad hlghws/s and trails* flwmiw tbw vift Xsw plaos alwig thsss r#ads that wr ant hasnsd In t f grw** vrhsjagliig ds#-bush4 aUoa gpfitp nt uiOlks thick iMdgas. This T*gttatla
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w rsds with th as^QXaDM d r i w a af th oXletiog oBpanls torn thwat wighsd hsavlljr p#a ap H t t t r brrs aod aid asa as tha/ oasoaXtias t tha rar JUt wara ths osXXsotiag statlsas a&d Xt frs Jtraa this asaaos* loltiaX Xsndlag was aad m X? sprlX X945 Qmtrtrj t# wlglnal plans rOjr ths rsiafsresd 3d BittaUso sf the 2Xst Infantrjr dlssabarksd osar lOUBAIIG^ mdiaX support esasistsd i f & ssXX esXXsetlAg d^ashsmit pXas o# plats#a f Osariiig Gso^afij Su Aftsr ssvaraX days Stf dtBsiT patrtXing as far as 141% UHUO with pp#sltiii aiX, ths eowbat tsa rsjsiosd: ths agin $mm+ this fares aXa* had Xsad^d sa If IpriX X945 out |& ths ioiciit/ sf JPHMPI* tors initiaX rssistanes was Xlght^ Sswsvsrf
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rsd and fifty niiss srsrXaad la ths dlrsotloa f ths HAfAO rsgiso sbjsfr

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bridgsn* la the advance ths M I AI O RITSa was ussd t s ths foUest satsnt DD IA f sr transport* ths aedicaX slsassts which had landsd at lUULEAVO bsardsd LCI's w& stsaasd p ths Uim&W MintL t s OOf iBASfO. thsrs thsy sntrasksd fsr FT* PICHSTt. Other sf star ssdieaX sXsasnts sapp#rting thsir rsspsstlf* X KT OaAO m&n& tsaas arrired at Ft. P G S T If Mt^s frsa C T B T * ths MU^IIaO HVJBl at FT. PICISTT beeams a ajer abstaele far the avisisnai esnvsy isalAg SYsrlaod frsa 6OTABATO, ths bridgs was sut and each vshiX of ths Xsng osfitwy had to bs separately ferried aeress Urn swift trsachersus i i s the advaaee apprsafthsd ths sWA0 iSdS@R# rosistancs iasrsassd* ftiriag the t&ly part ef May osdicaX aetivity was great. Ihe selXeotiag

eoapaalos woro kopt baa/ troatlag * vaeuatiag patioats from tit* fr~ ward units to tho doariiig Hatooas. Tt ollooting eoBpanios In a44l~ tiea % ovaouatiag a hoafy f3M..*C casualties woro eoafroatod with risks from laad ffllnoa, aafcujihod, and oArrr roads* fceof iho apfeulaooo* f r ollocting eoapa&y C was d*aih4 and both d r i w s killod whan ' - ' i t struck a land aino* About t hie Um tfco 57th *.** was attaafaod for duty to tha
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Ml raiiiatianal quijiat was dstr*y4 this oad* i t p f tbs hospital t s spsrat* as a anit # Ihsrafwr*, i t was attaohsd t tha 2d plats** f tbs dsaring o^aajr to aiffllanos mt otfasctlag l i a s tr#ps U tbs sesas sf aid^sh thrsugb a hsav/ raia stars in ths blaok f night. ' Owtsaltiss tern ths scsns ths aatoush wsrs by tiasss saws sfftoqlano** i fiHt,* *&m ott^any wa praissd bjr ths 21st Hgiawatal Osaaaadsr fsr i t s sffisisn*/. ' ' ftrl/ llay 1945 imwi fcltaUsa Hsad^iartsrs and fcvisisfi Mwiioal Supply Ioats4 at MliUi flLUOS. UM S*^rig to#a^r was psratiag* as tws platssas with ths 1st fOats#ii statisesd at SAiTA <02 sM t l A. OsUscting Gtopany B was Jfunstisiiing at TIMOCiU sad Csllsct
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Oallaoting @m&m A ti4 advanasd with ths 19thfiCTta thi vi8iflity and hsrw ths fisapsny was sabjsets4 t s aosay artilltry tut f i t s sa bsiJig tdllsd and aowt^r wsandsd* OaHsotiog OM>y A had to kssp as way as si^tJr-tw patlnts in i t s statlsn sstttisa whils tfettf* bsosituHi tfas \stidXB ^*g th* SAV^D ElVi& WAS sfttt. 3& was osesssary t wait tKtil ICtf*a wsrs ^psarrd bfare furtbsr traevatlsa

islasd svaeu^iSQ, ths #***&* Hatssos ww hsarily burdsasd at Uatft withi andical sad sorgial patisnts.. Ihs 1st aats& of GLsarifig Csjspan f had as ftsfir i t l l i patioats (6O56 surgical and post oporativo oasos)

whon 8STnty patisiits wors oracuatad to tho 456 CSLoaring Oos^ony mi tho H i Hold Hispital* tho wmbor of patisnts In oaeh OloariRg H*toon rsiiissd fro 120 to 180 but iaeroasod to 235 ty 20 *y. Csogostioa
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tios 120 soriottsly woundod asd post-oporativo oasoo wors soot to Alt 72.

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Snpply bogaa oporatiag out of TtfJ3ffl* ^ tbs adjaeoat aroa was oloarod of, dotois. VUipiaos woro s^vod oat of thoir &oar^r ho*asos. this rosultod in iaprovod saflitary oondltioas. At tho front, swift progross was aads iateroakiag tho baek of rosistaftoo. Ttm J*p* woro drivsn toward tho foothills of iff, M380X. liwoTor, oasualtios on oar sido woro s t i l l hoavy. &&*$*%*_ this was a arioid iaoroaoo of mdioal OTmeuoos ao tho ouaalatlvo offoot of tho rigors of tho eaapal^a stado itsoif f o l t . In 4mm ^h 1st HUtooa of tho GQloariag Company was ** and opor* out t o T W O BSAGH. Two huodrod (200) paUonta woro boing hospit A M
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O 17 Juo ths 2d aatoon moTd with 100 pationts from DALIO to f n ^ bod eapaoity of 415 was roaehod. Mi caapftiga offioially dosod on 30 teo 1945* HOWOTOT, pany l i a s troops plus oar supporting nsdioal oloaonts aro s t i l l in tho f iold ongag

ing Jap tmrnmb* under the ehadewa f iff. MOIIOI, * TL M UACH the iQ G bearing Station centinued t e heepitaliae and average ef 400 patients. All these *** nen-eperative cases, thia reflected * hign aiak rate. $* wae influenced by rl*Uv exhauatien and debilitetlen ef the treapa trim pielenged eaeibat without eoffleleat rest. lisa*** learned w#*e> aaay and f iipa#tai** fhey ean be oeaeidar* ad under twe Uaaifieatiatts* fir t> were these preaeduree within ill* eperatiaa af the oattaliea which i t <ta& earreet by iteelf prier U i l 4B *mtUndiag s3tui>X f the Uttr m tb l ) f ffi

v u pXied upa ti fiiviia ltodiel Mt-n^ l m t t with which Gwrp* a*dieal ttttit* gattr#d it ptti^. wh wr mmm&lm *& th Slviaio. Patitnta ia iarga jnwlwm ahaold hana ban vvtOttttUd had Mi b earriad alaog with tha g Hataana aa thajr avad farward witfa tha ad^aaeia^ traapa* aB traaapartatian waa at a praidu* i t wa a probXas %m earfy patiaata
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haapitaX avary fajw dajra* thara i a a liadt ta whieh thia eaa ba earriad an and atiXX raadar tha aptiawt aarvica ta tha aan wha haa faXXaa in . battXa* It waa nat untiU iat in the caapaigB that thia naad panatrat* %k GLaariag HaapitaXa wara *a aooaaaibla ta baaoh ahippiag. Aoathar daXaet l a tha aparatiaaa waa that Tfaga aanditiaaa dvuria ahara t a alra aTwmanta wara dapiarabXa* Ofar 500 traapa wara erawdad m the daek af na LST with a faur heXe %&*$M aa th oaX/ f a a l l i t / far waete diapaaaX. Oa baardiog ahip i t waa faoad that lit faoiXitiea wra availabXa far' waahing a a - * i t a . & waa aaX/ f the faritmaia ehanea that aaaring Oiajaajr $ and aa# athar unit had nabila Xaadad kitchen aquipiBawit abaard* Ibaaa wara snieadad and uoad dialing tha va/asa* OaXy twa aXa wara aanrad daiXjr but iha/ iaaXadad fraah patt#aaf naat, and oabbagt* Wd* waa jaat abat ilia f irai tiaa thai thaaa dietary eeaatitneota had baaa piaead ia fraai aX tha traapa in aatha. It ia a qoaatiaa whathar er set i t wauXd hara ba*i bafttar ta aafitiaua ta atriNi uniatarrptadiy tha per I t i that waa raatioa m MUOOaO rather than ta highlight tha fat te the traapa lHaijm* tm* and an^uatifiad haaard ta tha healtfee #X tha a n and the siomisa af tha eperatin frier ta the -5 eperatien Celleating flenpanjr A waa in tha SXat aCTj Caliaotiag CanpeAy Bwa ia tha I^th ECTj and OaXXaetiag Oeayay C waa in the 3#h && theee team had werked aawaaefoXXy in ail prerieuB aaan1^a and had bean teeted in the fire ef battle ibdiaaX effleers ef the GaUeoting Geapaniea pereeoaXXj *aw the aiaff and l i n t effioera ef the regiments and knew the igiantal aed lattaiien Airgaana af their reapectlTa oeaibat te*ae Ifea aajm eaa be aaid at tha enlisted mm* Ifttheda ef eparatien aod kaawiag what te axpaat fram the ether feiiew were eetabUahed by Xeag c aatact. Lth l i t t l e warning prier i eiobarkatieo, aerely because 19, 21, and % mm* in that nusr ioal erder and A % and C fellew ene anether in the alphabet, an mtfm? waa received which braJte y.p the aid aasbai teaaui aad aubatituiad new eaos cenaiating ef QaXXaeting Gaqpany A with tha 19th Safantry ICf, GeUecting Caapany B with the ZLat Infantry 8CT and Qellecting Oaapany G with the 3tth jjaimtry *8t* lha reauita wara a feragaae eoaalaian fellawiag principle* laid dawn in field aanuale waa in the habit f werfeUsg l i t l i t t e r bearera eut ef ita awn aiailan avmeoatlng fraa the Wtalian Aid i* tha Oaiiaeting Sttftian* 9m thay wara aoq^aoied i e remain at ilia Baitalien Aid ftatiea and werk ffw^pd an wall aa i a the

Such a situation c r e a t e diesaUefasUea on 11 aides, fiagisisnts desired their eld CeUectiag Companies and the ealieted aea elaaared fc# be with thesu : '. , during the latter stages of tat cai^aigQ the clearing SC platwie were heapitalisiag 400 patieata at their TALGltG B A H loeatiea. Ihe eteaa breese, sand and euaay beaoh here was idoal f#r tat iafaatry n eonvaleaciag after weeka in the duat and aire of the h i l l a , *%* H ordor was resolved and executed mmnlMM the Capital to a ieh ara uaf airrabla l^eatian s I k * th itraieh f bah oeo^pid b/ tha aoid ba tatan a w Iar ffieara aod 4thm %m%* af tha bast I****** lamad which th Battalian eaa iak adrantaga / ifi th wara ouaras* Qia ioataac la ^g&t*BU ia a l l allteiing Buriag t i hours 1600-ldOO ataTd tha haavlaat Xa4 af aiok and w*tuid*cU lhapfarf avaKtiag art>alarw ruaa ware aapaaaa^* QaUaeting Qtiyany d had earn partlottXarljr aacia aiht An aakmlane* aired* It * twd U th anrrlo* Om>aoyf of thia iaf raatia^
^wiiPi^^^^W^TBfc W '^^^^^^SP^^^^(p ^H^^^BW^^|^,"^PW[pW w'^W-^. W^ ^Piflfc<^p||^^^P^^W ^^(((t^^^'^Wlp^H^fc ^W^^PB VPNNMWVb-V ^BPW ^^""^|Mr ^WW^UBIniW

Qmpmy BMwiquartara, !Biat l^intft wara btaiaad ANM tha itgitttatal Signal Offior, tha &ttv*r had aaly to elaap into a l i n t anroato whan troutola thraataMd. & Immm 0P l a SaUtoting f^ftany B im mm tha evwdBfi hirala fc earry thaaa oda tw Vm hmmiH * patiaata i o awbtilan<wia daring tranait ware soon; firat^ holders aeeoaodating two roadily acoaaail&la f a l l canfeoB of wator ahould b ola^ad inaid* tho aMfcmlanooa, tha iarar iabla ro^uoat of tha woondod aa thoy aro boiag loadad i s for wator thoro i ao 'Mm for tha aaalatant drivor to rouad % wator* CaAtooaa flopping aroand tho eab of tho aMbolaaeo aro aaatiafaotory, 8ooadly# ono or two blood plaama holdort ateowld bo hookod op to tho eoiling of tho aBbuIBo, Iro^ioatly at tho Battalion iid Statlos two ot #1 $mm l i t t o r eaaoa had to bo htarrlodXy loa^d with blood plaaoia bottloj aeeoapanyi&g thorn, Iho only way t o haodlo thia waa foir tho patieata in tho appor bortha to hold tho bottloa la tholr handa for tho aoro aoriotta eaooa bolow thoa. Wt a. fifth man had to crowd in tho anbulonco aaoog tho four l i t t o r oaaoa and haag on to tho bottloo tho boot ho could, Ihia ia vory wwatiafactory ao thoro ia ao tino to wasto at th Battalion Aid Station whan the battlo U awirliag all around. flood tm Traiaing im tho uao of wo&poae by oar nadlcal porao&aol waa oyidont. JR. tho 21t ACft oar l i t t o r boarora, &$****, aad aodieal toehaiciaaa woro nbtfMf roquirod to hold a aootioa of tho lagiaontal poriwtor. traiaiag should iaolado bayooot praetico, haadliag of aaad groaada# H-l rifloa # and i a tho placiag of graaado trip-oard booby trap 4ttatura in tho uao of thoao woapoaa doat haro tho aaao caaaeoa for tarvival aa do tho traiaod iafaatry-aaa* QoeoToaiag a odicol aoldior atatioaod oa tho iogiaoatal poriotor was diaoovorod to haro plaood a trip~oo*d booby trap so oloao to hie foxholo that i f i t had goao off i t would have oblitoratad himself and all tho pationtu sloopiag ia tlit aoarby aid station* *m* mm alwaya subject to awfcush. aaok-togora guns aarriod by tha drivra wore of groat advantago, %oial aathorisatian should allow thoso woapoas to the eoUsjtiag ooapaaios oa tho b**l* of one gua per Che of tha bright apots of tha sawpaign was the work turned out. by %h0.mmm*0mm highly skillsd aurgeoaa attached to eaeh of the clearing platoons^ their work w^s #1 inestimable value aad doubtleas sared mj 11w s . . . .

3$ mm mm****? %* * several tehicle eenvey ** *t aigfal with the eneaqr t& aurreunding territory therefore, i t i s extres*ly iaporiaat that blaeksmt liginto funotlon perfectly and dont threw eat any but the Biniatum light. During teaperary faults the biveuacs individual equipment eftss became rnixtd ap ft^aquent wranglea and dispute a oeeuTfed awng ilMl a i a t i Ata Tar owaarship f like itas* fiwrything inoladias f a i i gm$ OAP> blt8, tatrtnehing tdol, packs, aaicits, and wmmm wbmiLd b narkd elaarly with tbi #wjira aaat, X8aiag #4nfuii, i t wtuld be easier te f i x reaponibiXltjr that equipwnt iE^preperly oard far aad left r$oad tfce ara* Jtethr eed in ceo^at i fer cerapanji k i t t e n s t# be aem alert t e tfee requireaBBta ef the es. Bit eeffee wa routinely served at a^pper at 1630 during the heat of the day* water r ay eel driak would be preferable. IN kitohen eheuld eave 1M cffee ami aate i t available jut at suadaiwn when the men are preparing ta turn inte their f*JEhle fer the night, ilee^ the kitehen equipment eheuld be ee loaded a a truck that a sal ean be gotten up en hort aeiiee. Frequent halts ef unknown duratiec are s&d during an advanoe la but aXi ahould net be isiaeed ea these i mamemm difficulties the $5 eperation closed fully on jQ June 1945. m Ksdical Battalin if rovitalied with the bloed t new offieera m i mnM tegether with Its cuaulative Aay be expected te render another eateiandiug exaa^le of euperier ical aervioe in the next campaign*

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HISTORIOAL of t&*

m$ tr
oonaacitiafitlr* havs a soars fee sattlf) i&iatt inly tlia (Umpisto rtafsat of H l obliUrt#, of
attaok Igr hitting tha

Mm m division* this iiinliir Arr mxtKit date i t s i OttoUr X9U ib*n i t ; furn the eXd "vquajrv* Hmwilftti KhM^idB *t I tin Ilim Hit l f ltrwntiB f th first cosnander <rf th tj WHM ^

original unit* comprising th Bgt

g
298th Inffit
UthFABn
13th FA fe

724th Otttowwo Co

of tko 2A,th of th 34th , and th to X l

in in T/D for
^PS^^w ^P^^^^^^^^J

IJI tha #ytiyy

X9th Infantry, toiowi M tha -Eoak of a # a* organiiad 4 May l6l* In i t haa fought along tha WOICAK B Q IWUX X X

of

20t Infantry, too, bagan ita hiatory in i i H $ tha CiTU War, i t fought Indiana In tha opeatag M th foi^ht In CSBA, then apant taa yaara in tha wmmmSh & tety on tha MOICAN BC^DKft i t wvrad to 8AXAIX in thara, baooadng a part of tha 24th Pivtvlcm |jft 34th Infantry, organiaad | Jvaaa 1916# fought

m m part of the ?th Division In ths in the U S Amgr, i t participated **' lit* 19U then we* prewiring to eafeark for the
Jbcanese gyfefiiirik flBJfifi ttlUHfllla 1% iifiiflMirtiill

in th Dtpartawit fimm untU i t Joined ti*#

13th alJO fought at ST JCHISU Botii

hitoriel z^oord, Oi^aniii 25 rwwi In O S y P K H j ffy* in U A A A A. Hut Arthtir *t e& t i a s it aeee^Xsd in HAWAII h* i t 1 ^Wilinff tmtil WestM,

24th mm m mm in tto mmmm wm*m

I M g | | p | g g | | . It guffert light ca*u*Xti* 4 i W P l i

oatolfld arm f and IKHT* a^hibioua training*

t h e E&vlftion befcin ^wftyl^g' ^

tr&S&iiiig i t TAHAHIflBRAHttHTwillOIiiUiiKIIAOpeniti w haa been ^ ^ l e d oise o f

of the Pacific War. Sa I8 thfto fiva - had been aei*ed aunviee imv atthieT6d and defilea and i i W I BAIS to the AIfiFXSU>t whU& wmia operation'* ooat difficult probl wea pf^ were ii^aaaaJOie to irehiele# and the operatSjeu tommm a fine between ft forced advanoe and the danger f l It vfiB handled aaaterfully, and when troope of the 24th t d a h U l on the DmHUI Trail to look over tiid L K I BSOiE, they had auff ered only A DA The oaapaign went into th mopping-up etage* % i M i l the Diuiaion had kiUed 1,771 Japeneee and had taJkan tl>e unpreedent 2 22 April 1%U*

ed nua&er of 502 prifioners *$ **f; At thie ^ in killed and sTtnty

the IJivialan had

regiaeate. the $$|3 mod tit* 21*t, wwe tawsd dJtt t&s gftftaslt, bj the U t h t 13th, and 52d field Artillery UOJ

afterward the 34th Infantry Eegiiwat went to

^Japanese far back rear the ride, oeptured IMM&* and aided wtterially in atftttrali*iag efiw ^apane and did not Xose a aan*
tyH*f }%%g)*%y *[.yfi-ffy^ y ^ p f f ^ KUXlw^ '

m^ti^mm

froop
ione arotand IMS
hundred and fifty
real battle teat o&me with the Mtfi the Iflog amited a^ai^i for the liberatiim .#$ tli fiivieion. - lundtd: with two regiamt* : obtw0%f. tis$ eouth and the 34th on the north* Beginning wi,^ the l^i env registered aortara and t5**w be*gh p i . A | i ; . | i ^ were liit
51t Infantry landed qpoppoeed on * day on
e l f tfa t^uthem t i p of UEHB, and wwterod
between CABAUAH &a and SOOOD BAI, The 21*1
5 Uoveaber 1944 after the Piviaicm had taken
ftbe%sr #jp' the l3nQSfiiyifliiflflfi^f#JMI' WMLII INK 'tHfrSit witii tho wercte of Fred Hanpeon, wfOl-4oH eorrwf ponciont for the battle : for the IBTTK fAUSX, wnih U r t e d &add an j Bi^ar, aiid nohine g\m barrage cm the J A J beach * JD ^ " " I division faeed <town the l a t thvwe W4JJM of
oedipied Ci^x6Afti, key e l t y on
of the valley dfendtarti )nfe tfttt t the aouth. Soaroely a ahot ww f ired a we
toifi wliich ha been the goal of y&M
aliaopt two weeka of ht, dirty.

*It waa antioliatic after the forty-eight hear* of grin below, toward the town of 4M fih tt

ftidi

to

Qjkl ^ ^ w H

aaid after we entered the town*

teroken their bak in the 4AI10 fiht* It was a

The eaaualtiea were net heavy, neither warn

24th Diviaion, whioh bore the bruot of the "

_ _ . ^ and tov&t

with ***** e m t t f t *nd tactical brlUi&iM*a

It

ad 3^000 and there l a m knowing how fwuay ua&JMWtit rUl~ ^ Yietiw l i e ia the swaoi*, grove*, and vootei hill*# f lk mm mm * latocMi aiaaar on the road t# UftTftAR* f&Hr# red of evacuation* of tfapaaeae dead aad tod D&ffOSi f o l t tke f u l l fury of Jjjtricnn a$m and I iWMHabiiwt ' b a t t i o ojf tlMl rSjdS-# e> INMBBSMI -WSWIMM^ #t0na. #ti$ fta&y ds# <Bt oruai^yiiB^ IMMJ&$ W$ JPP^M^ t' i n the v l l l a g s s , and along the bank* the Jfap fro* bin dugouts) we i a&d * s iJUitightfyftd MJ at Wit ad^o of tto &&Q$$$ fio ) t o th<l oo#t i n ~ " bl^sojdg bt?aiitft* ai>l

, the fifteenth day of hard f l ^ i t i i ^ the M f i m awieired a iww objeetiva, th city of O U O imti&H BDt A ifUU to mmmm finaUy encotmter^l asio of *

^aliHMi a^d fOMW& rxumiiii t o s^atMi 4iHMBtt i & ^H irla mt*r f carabao, or natiw oarryiag ii day aftar 1 oiftm brought avldetioe t^at the y preparations to dfen4 the &M M A feeling grew amog staff offlrs that the WStS$ 0QBSID&1 atvi^her GUAPAlCASAi, aiui thy nmrm i s takeo from am estimate of tha proiauwd by 0-a of the 24ta Bivisl i s of If 0r&g the porlod 5*43 Kovriior enesy foreas on tlie M l Division have b i t t e r l y contested ota* froa i^iMAJflOFOAJi towaard 0KUG6 jfi^atine has Partioularly aerere reaiotanee p a cfep **Vitte on the north aa imH aa the
^^ i l n N W W ^^^fl|p$efl(^^^pejftejF^B'^f fp ^ ^ w * ^ 4RM^& *wiAWBiRPw^Bwwfl*^w _ ^FwoeR'^p^^^^Mk ijHnBPie ^p'^p^^ "a**siw ^ '^KF1 ^^S^^5!HPa> ^ q p

of the lat Japaneee I>iTiioa#.. During the period of HX ii i oftiaated that ^ g < tiie front of the S l i t Infantry totaled botuean '%Ht m 3^ 4 nabr. The Battle of BRtAKKSCit BIDGB was n punishing one for tis Battle of B8EAKSGR HZDOB KM i n b i t t e r p p was carried out which proved t o be a (teclsi^ faetor the eneffly i n % 10 November, the 24th Division began a ooorcHaated dfjifflt tho WIQC H U H t o drive the eneiDgr $rontaliy I'SCit imxaSE and at the saae tiiae tl<ps both f i^Uffi, 3ii5# o f :geia&Kii$i9ftMoi!|s and cteny niA o^ffisjans^l&g ^sjfeiid ^6& nld.eji to conduct delaying aetion* south of U^OH# The frontttl a^task ridge mis borne by the 21st Infantry Rsgiamt# *m& %& 19th Infantry, was oossgUted t o prooootti^e l^im f i t on the enes|r*ft right flank t o eut the C U P HO 'SUd tiis 1st jpattaJUbBKB* 34th nfsjst$y waff t n
3dft flank, ei*e and hold the high ground tenm Q0
" and harass the eneny froa the rear*

toriXliantiy carrying out the aaaigned aiottioea, t&a Battalion, J*%fct and the 3d Battalion, 19th received id Wm 24th Plviaion was relieved in the the wmths ef ^aauaty, F^bruaiy, i^d Msreh, the 0iviiai partioipftted i a relatiTO^ Wtm Tiiayas Twik Force op^ratd^w SB the oontrolled the ehip and their to St&h Pinl0i<m* houldr patch i* a gn*m from the root of ^ i e h the Hawaiian fooci poi ) l a yellow OR a red circular background ith a lOaefe: feorder, earae aa the old 8aaiian Piviaion* oi the division represent a l l sestiemi *i & ^ '' 24th Diviaioia i s aoiaetifflea ealled
pa o i t s non-secret ode ayabol, a ? rtOfih in
F m t o M helaata, etc. It has riohly eaniad
l I t haa never l lot a battle in any Q iU mw&xm