EN BANC [G.R. No. 114783, December 08, 1994] ROBERT V. TOBIAS, RAMON M. GUZMAN, TERRY T. LIM, GREGORIO D.

GABRIEL, AND ROBERTO R. TOBIAS, JR., PETITIONERS, VS. HON. CITY MAYOR BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, CITY TREASURER WILLIAM MARCELINO, AND THE SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD, ALL OF THE CITY OF MANDALUYONG, METRO MANILA, RESPONDENTS. DECISION BIDIN, J.:

Invoking their rights as taxpayers and as residents of Mandaluyong, herein petitioners assail the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7675, otherwise known as "An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be Known as the City of Mandaluyong."

Prior to the enactment of the assailed statute, the municipalities of Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to only one legislative district. Hon. Ronaldo Zamora, the incumbent congressional representative of this legislative district, sponsored the bill which eventually became R.A. No. 7675. President Ramos signed R.A. No. 7675 into law on February 9, 1994.

Pursuant to the Local Government Code of 1991, a plebiscite was held on April 10, 1994. The people of Mandaluyong were asked whether they approved of the conversion of the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city as provided under R.A. No. 7675. The turnout at the plebiscite was only 14.41% of the voting population. Nevertheless, 18,621 voted "yes" whereas 7,911 voted "no." By virtue of these results, R.A. No. 7675 was deemed ratified and in effect.

Petitioners now come before this Court, contending that R.A. No. 7675, specifically Article VIII, Section 49 thereof, is unconstitutional for being violative of three specific provisions of the Constitution.

Article VIII, Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 provides:

"As a highly-urbanized city, the City of Mandaluyong shall have its own legislative district with the first representative to be elected in the next national elections after the passage of this Act. The remainder of the former legislative district of San Juan/Mandaluyong shall become the new legislative district of San Juan with its first representative to be elected at the same election."

Petitioners' first objection to the aforequoted provision of R.A. No. 7675 is that it contravenes the "one subject-one bill" rule, as enunciated in Article VI, Section 26 (1) of the Constitution, to wit:

"Section 26 (1). Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof."

Petitioners allege that the inclusion of the assailed Section 49 in the subject law resulted in the latter embracing two principal subjects, namely: (1) the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city; and (2) the division of the congressional district of San Juan/Mandaluyong into two separate districts.

Petitioners contend that the second aforestated subject is not germane to the subject matter of R.A. No. 7675 since the said law treats of the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city, as expressed in the title of the law. Therefore, since Section 49 treats of a subject distinct from that stated in the title of the law, the "one subject-one bill" rule has not been complied with.

Petitioners' second and third objections involve Article VI, Sections 5 (1) and (4) of the Constitution, which provide, to wit:

"Section 5 (1). The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations." "Section 5(4). Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standard provided in this section."

Petitioners argue that the division of San Juan and Mandaluyong into separate congressional districts under Section 49 of the assailed law has resulted in an increase in the composition of the House of Representatives beyond that provided in Article VI, Sec. 5 (1) of the Constitution. Furthermore, petitioners contend that said division was not made pursuant to any census showing that the subject municipalities have attained the minimum population requirements. And finally, petitioners assert that Section 49 has the effect of preempting the right of Congress to reapportion legislative districts pursuant to Sec. 5 (4) as aforecited.

The contentions are devoid of merit.

Anent the first issue, we agree with the observation of the Solicitor General that the statutory conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city with a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand indubitably ordains compliance with the "one city-one representative" proviso in the Constitution:

"x x x Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative" (Article VI, Section 5(3), Constitution).

Hence, it is in compliance with the aforestated constitutional mandate that the creation of a separate congressional district for the City of Mandaluyong is decreed under Article VIII, Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675.

Contrary to petitioners' assertion, the creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a subject separate and distinct from the subject of its conversion into a highly urbanized city but is a natural and logical consequence of its conversion into a highly urbanized city. Verily, the title of R.A. No. 7675. "An Act Converting the Municipalit y of Mandaluyong Into a Highly Urbanized City of Mandaluyong" necessarily includes and contemplates the subject treated under Section 49 regarding the creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong.

Moreover, a liberal construction of the "one title-one subject" rule has been invariably adopted by this court so as not to cripple or impede legislation. Thus, in Sumulong v. Comelec (73 Phil. 288 [1941]), we ruled that the constitutional requirement as now expressed in Article VI, Section 26(1) "should be given a practical rather than a technical construction. It should be sufficient compliance with such requirement if the title expresses the general subject and all the provisions are germane to that general subject."

The liberal construction of the "one title-one subject" rule had been further elucidated in Lidasan v. Comelec (21 SCRA 496 [1967]), to wit:

"Of course, the Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the title of an enactment, language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein. It suffices if the title should serve the purpose of the constitutional demand that it inform the legislators, the persons interested in the subject of the bill and the public, of the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation" (emphasis supplied).

Proceeding now to the other constitutional issues raised by petitioners to the effect that there is no mention in the assailed law of any census to show that Mandaluyong and San Juan had each attained the minimum requirement of 250,000 inhabitants to justify their separation into two legislative districts, the same does not suffice to strike down the validity of R.A. No. 7675. The said Act enjoys the presumption of having passed through the regular congressional processes, including due consideration by the members of Congress of the minimum requirements for the establishment of separate legislative districts. At any rate, it is not required that all laws emanating from the legislature must contain all relevant data considered by Congress in the enactment of said laws.

As to the contention that the assailed law violates the present limit on the number of representatives as set forth in the Constitution, a reading of the applicable provision, Article VI, Section 5 (1), as aforequoted, shows that the present limit of 250 members is not absolute. The Constitution clearly provides that the House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than 250 members, "unless otherwise provided by law." The inescapable import of the latter clause is that the present composition of Congress may be increased, if Congress itself so mandates through a legislative enactment. Therefore, the increase in congressional representation mandated by R.A. No. 7675 is not unconstitutional.

Thus, in the absence of proof that Mandaluyong and San Juan do not qualify to have separate legislative districts, the assailed Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 must be allowed to stand.

As to the contention that Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 in effect preempts the right of Congress to reapportion legislative districts, the said argument borders on the absurd since petitioners overlook the glaring fact that it was Congress itself which drafted, deliberated upon and enacted the assailed law, including Section 49 thereof. Congress cannot possibly preempt itself on a right which pertains to itself.

Aside from the constitutional objections to R.A. No. 7675, petitioners present further arguments against the velidity thereof.

Petitioners contend that the people of San Juan should have been made to participate in the plebiscite on R.A. No. 7675 as the same involved a change in their legislative district. The contention is bereft of merit since the principal subject involved in the plebiscite was the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city. The matter of separate district representation was only ancillary thereto. Thus, the inhabitants of San Juan were properly excluded from the said plebiscite as they had nothing to do with the change of status of neighboring Mandaluyong.

Similarly, petitioners' additional argument that the subject law has resulted in "gerrymandering," which is the practice of creating legislative districts to favor a particular candidate or party, is not worthy of credence. As correctly observed by the Solicitor General, it should be noted that Rep. Ronaldo Zamora, the author of the assailed law, is the incumbent representative of the former San Juan/Mandaluyong district, having consistently won in both localities. By dividing San Juan/Mandaluyong, Rep. Zamora's constituency has in fact been diminished, which development could hardly be considered as favorable to him.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC [G.R. No. 190529, April 29, 2010] PHILIPPINE GUARDIANS BROTHERHOOD, INC. (PGBI), REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY-GENERAL GEORGE "FGBF GEORGE" DULDULAO, PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, RESPONDENT. RESOLUTION BRION, J.: The Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc. (PGBI) seeks in this petition for certiorari[1] and in the motion for reconsideration it subsequently filed to nullify Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Resolution No. 8679 dated October 13, 2009 insofar as it relates to PGBI, and the Resolution dated December 9, 2009 denying PGBI's motion for reconsideration in SPP No. 09004 (MP). Via these resolutions, the COMELEC delisted PGBI from the roster of registered national, regional or sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions under the party-list system. BACKGROUND Section 6(8) of Republic Act No. 7941 (RA 7941), otherwise known as the Party-List System Act, provides: Section 6. Removal and/or Cancellation of Registration. - The COMELEC may motu proprio or upon verified complaint of any interested party, remove or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition on any of the following grounds: xxxx (8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered.[Emphasis supplied.] The COMELEC replicated this provision in COMELEC Resolution No. 2847 - the Rules and Regulations Governing the Election of the Party-List Representatives through the Party-List System

- which it promulgated on June 25, 1996. For the upcoming May 2010 elections, the COMELEC en banc issued on October 13, 2009 Resolution No. 8679 deleting several party-list groups or organizations from the list of registered national, regional or sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions. Among the party-list organizations affected was PGBI; it was delisted because it failed to get 2% of the votes cast in 2004 and it did not participate in the 2007 elections. Nevertheless, the COMELEC stated in this Resolution that any national, regional sectoral party or organizations or coalitions adversely affected can personally or through its authorized representative file a verified opposition on October 26, 2009. PGBI filed its Opposition to Resolution No. 8679, but likewise sought, through its pleading, the admission ad cautelam of its petition for accreditation as a party-list organization under the PartyList System Act. Among other arguments, PGBI asserted that: (1) The assailed resolution negates the right of movant and those similarly situated to invoke Section 4 of R.A. No. 7941, which allows any party, organization and coalition already registered with the Commission to no longer register anew; the party though is required to file with the Commission, not later than ninety (90) days before the election, a manifestation of its desire to participate in the party-list system; since PGBI filed a Request/Manifestation seeking a deferment of its participation in the 2007 elections within the required period prior to the 2007 elections, it has the option to choose whether or not to participate in the next succeeding election under the same conditions as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed; The Supreme Court's ruling in G.R. No. 177548 - Philippine Mines Safety Environment Association, also known as "MINERO" v. Commission on Elections - cannot apply in the instant controversy for two reasons: (a) the factual milieu of the cited case is removed from PGBI's; (b) MINERO, prior to delisting, was afforded the opportunity to be heard, while PGBI and the 25 others similarly affected by Resolution No. 8679 were not. Additionally, the requirement of Section 6(8) has been relaxed by the Court's ruling in G.R. No. 179271 (Banat v. COMELEC) and the exclusion of PGBI and the 25 other party-list is a denial of the equal protection of the laws; The implementation of the challenged resolution should be suspended and/or aborted to prevent a miscarriage of justice in view of the failure to notify the parties in accordance with the same Section 6(8) or R.A. No. 7941.[2]

(2)

(3)

The COMELEC denied PGBI's motion/opposition for lack of merit. First, the COMELEC observed that PGBI clearly misunderstood the import of Section 4 of R.A. 7941. [3] The provision simply means that without the required manifestation or if a party or organization does not participate, the exemption from registration does not arise and the party, organization or coalition must go through the process again and apply for requalification; a request for deferment would not exempt PGBI from registering anew. Second, the MINERO ruling is squarely in point, as MINERO failed to get 2% of the votes in 2001 and did not participate at all in the 2004 elections. Third, PGBI was given an opportunity to be heard or to seek the reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of - the essence of due process; this is clear from Resolution No. 8679 which expressly gave the adversely affected parties the opportunity to file their opposition. As regards the alternative relief of application for accreditation, the COMELEC found the motion to have been filed out of time, as August 17, 2009 was the deadline for accreditation provided in Resolution 8646. The motion was obviously filed months after the deadline. PGBI came to us in its petition for certiorari, arguing the same positions it raised with the COMELEC when it moved to reconsider its delisting. We initially dismissed the petition in light of our ruling in Philippine Mines Safety Environment Association, also known as "MINERO" v. Commission on Elections (Minero);[4] we said that no grave abuse of discretion exists in a ruling that correctly applies the prevailing law and jurisprudence. Applying Section 6(8) of RA 7941, the Court disqualified MINERO under the following reasoning: Since petitioner by its own admission failed to get 2% of the votes in 2001 and did not participate at all in the 2004 elections, it necessarily failed to get at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast in the two preceding elections. COMELEC, therefore, is not duty bound to certify it. PGBI subsequently moved to reconsider the dismissal of its petition. Among other arguments, PGBI claimed that the dismissal of the petition was contrary to law, the evidence and existing jurisprudence. Essentially, PGBI asserts that Section 6(8) of RA 7941 does not apply if one is to follow the tenor and import of the deliberations inclusive of the interpellations in Senate Bill No. 1913 on October 19, 1994. It cited the following excerpts from the Records of the Senate: Senator Gonzales: On the other hand, Mr. President, under ground no. (7), Section 5 - there are actually two grounds it states: " Failure to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or its failure to obtain at least ten percent (10%) of the votes case under the party-list system in either of the last two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered" In short, the first ground is that, it failed to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections. The second is, failure to obtain at least 10 percent of the votes cast under the party-list system in either of the last two preceding elections, Mr. President, Senator Tolentino: Actually, these are two separate grounds. Senator Gonzales: There are actually two grounds, Mr. President. Senator Tolentino: Yes, Mr. President.[5] [Underscoring supplied.] PGBI thus asserts that Section 6(8) does not apply to its situation, as it is obvious that it failed to participate in one (1) but not in the two (2) preceding elections. Implied in this is that it also failed to secure the required percentage in one (1) but not in the two (2) preceding elections. Considering PGBI's arguments, we granted the motion and reinstated the petition in the court's docket. THE ISSUES We are called upon to resolve: (a) whether there is legal basis for delisting PGBI; and (b) whether PGBI's right to due process was violated. OUR RULING We find the petition partly impressed with merit. a. The Minero Ruling Our Minero ruling is an erroneous application of Section 6(8) of RA 7941; hence, it cannot sustain PGBI's delisting from the roster of registered national, regional or sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions under the party-list system. First, the law is clear - the COMELEC may motu proprio or upon verified complaint of any interested party, remove or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition if it: (a) fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections; or (b) fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered.[6] The word "or" is a disjunctive term signifying disassociation and independence of one thing from the other things enumerated; it should, as a rule, be construed in the sense in which it ordinarily implies, as a disjunctive word.[7] Thus, the plain, clear and unmistakable language of the law provides for two (2) separate reasons for delisting. Second, Minero is diametrically opposed to the legislative intent of Section 6(8) of RA 7941, as PGBI's cited congressional deliberations clearly show. Minero therefore simply cannot stand. Its basic defect lies in its characterization of the non-participation of a party-list organization in an election as similar to a failure to garner the 2% threshold party-list vote. What Minero effectively holds is that a party list organization that does not participate in an election necessarily gets, by default, less than 2% of the party-list votes. To be sure,

this is a confused interpretation of the law, given the law's clear and categorical language and the legislative intent to treat the two scenarios differently. A delisting based on a mixture or fusion of these two different and separate grounds for delisting is therefore a strained application of the law - in jurisdictional terms, it is an interpretation not within the contemplation of the framers of the law and hence is a gravely abusive interpretation of the law. [8] What we say here should of course take into account our ruling in Barangay Association for Advancement and National Transparency v. COMELEC[9] (Banat) where we partly invalidated the 2% party-list vote requirement provided in RA 7941 as follows: We rule that, in computing the allocation of additional seats, the continued operation of the two percent threshold for the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause ofSection 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 is unconstitutional. This Court finds that the two percent threshold makes it mathematically impossible to achieve the maximum number of available party list seats when the number of available party list seats exceeds 50. The continued operation of the two percent threshold in the distribution of the additional seats frustrates the attainment of the permissive ceiling that 20% of the members of the House of Representatives shall consist of party-list representatives. The disqualification for failure to get 2% party-list votes in two (2) preceding elections should therefore be understood in light of the Banat ruling that party-list groups or organizations garnering less than 2% of the party-list votes may yet qualify for a seat in the allocation of additional seats. We need not extensively discuss Banat's significance, except to state that a party-list group or organization which qualified in the second round of seat allocation cannot now validly be delisted for the reason alone that it garnered less than 2% in the last two elections. In other words, the application of this disqualification should henceforth be contingent on the percentage of party-list votes garnered by the last party-list organization that qualified for a seat in the House of Representatives, a percentage that is less than the 2% threshold invalidated in Banat. The disqualification should now necessarily be read to apply to party-list groups or organizations that did not qualify for a seat in the two preceding elections for the constituency in which it registered. To reiterate, (a) Section 6(8) of RA 7941 provides for two separate grounds for delisting; these grounds cannot be mixed or combined to support delisting; and (b) the disqualification for failure to garner 2% party-list votes in two preceding elections should now be understood, in light of the Banat ruling, to mean failure to qualify for a party-list seat in two preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered. This, we declare, is how Section 6(8) of RA 7941 should be understood and applied. We do so under our authority to state what the law is,[10] and as an exception to the application of the principle of stare decisis. The doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta movere (to adhere to precedents and not to unsettle things which are established) is embodied in Article 8 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which provides, thus: ART. 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines. The doctrine enjoins adherence to judicial precedents. It requires courts in a country to follow the rule established in a decision of its Supreme Court. That decision becomes a judicial precedent to be followed in subsequent cases by all courts in the land. The doctrine of stare decisis is based on the principle that once a question of law has been examined and decided, it should be deemed settled and closed to further argument.[11] The doctrine is grounded on the necessity for securing certainty and stability of judicial decisions, thus: Time and again, the court has held that it is a very desirable and necessary judicial practice that when a court has laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it will adhere to that principle and apply it to all future cases in which the facts are substantially the same. Stare decisis et non quieta movere. Stand by the decisions and disturb not what is settled. Stare decisis simply means that for the sake of certainty, a conclusion reached in one case should be applied to those that follow if the facts are substantially the same, even though the parties may be different. It proceeds from the first principle of justice that, absent any powerful countervailing considerations, like cases ought to be decided alike. Thus, where the same questions relating to the same event have been put forward by the parties similarly situated as in a previous case litigated and decided by a competent court, the rule of stare decisis is a bar to any attempt to relitigate the same issue.[12] The doctrine though is not cast in stone for upon a showing that circumstances attendant in a particular case override the great benefits derived by our judicial system from the doctrine of stare decisis, the Court is justified in setting it aside.[13] As our discussion above shows, the most compelling reason to abandon Minero exists; it was clearly an erroneous application of the law - an application that the principle of stability or predictability of decisions alone cannot sustain. Minero did unnecessary violence to the language of the law, the intent of the legislature, and to the rule of law in general. Clearly, we cannot allow PGBI to be prejudiced by the continuing validity of an erroneous ruling. Thus, we now abandon Minero and strike it out from our ruling case law. We are aware that PGBI's situation - a party list group or organization that failed to garner 2% in a prior election and immediately thereafter did not participate in the preceding election - is something that is not covered by Section 6(8) of RA 7941. From this perspective, it may be an unintended gap in the law and as such is a matter for Congress to address. We cannot and do not address matters over which full discretionary authority is given by the Constitution to the legislature; to do so will offend the principle of separation of powers. If a gap indeed exists, then the present case should bring this concern to the legislature's notice. b. The Issue of Due Process On the due process issue, we agree with the COMELEC that PGBI's right to due process was not violated for PGBI was given an opportunity to seek, as it did seek, a reconsideration of Resolution No. 8679. The essence of due process, we have consistently held, is simply the opportunity to be heard; as applied to administrative proceedings, due process is the opportunity to explain one's side or the opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. A formal or trial-type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential. The requirement is satisfied where the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy at hand. What is frowned upon is absolute lack of notice and hearing x x x.[14] We find it obvious under the attendant circumstances that PGBI was not denied due process. In any case, given the result of this Resolution, PGBI has no longer any cause for complaint on due process grounds. WHEREFORE, premises considered, we GRANT the petition and accordingly ANNUL COMELEC Resolution No. 8679 dated October 13, 2009 insofar as the petitioner PGBI is concerned, and the Resolution dated December 9, 2009 which denied PGBI's motion for reconsideration in SPP No. 09-004 (MP). PGBI is qualified to be voted upon as a party-list group or organization in the coming May 2010 elections. SO ORDERED.

EN BANC [G.R No. 188078, March 15, 2010] VICTORINO B. ALDABA, CARLO JOLETTE S. FAJARDO, JULIO G. MORADA, AND MINERVA ALDABA MORADA, PETITIONERS, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, RESPONDENT. RESOLUTION CARPIO, J.: This resolves the motion for reconsideration of respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) of the Decision dated 25 January 2010.[1] The COMELEC grounds its motion on the singular reason, already considered and rejected in the Decision, that Congress' reliance on the Certification of Alberto N. Miranda (Miranda), Region III Director, National Statistics Office (NSO), projecting Malolos City's population in 2010, is non-justiciable. The COMELEC also calls attention to the other sources of Malolos City's population indicators as of 2007 (2007 Census of Population - PMS 3 - Progress Enumeration Report [2]) and as of 2008 (Certification of the City of Malolos' Water District, dated 31 July 2008, [3] and Certification of the Liga ng Barangay, dated 22 August 2008[4]) which Congress allegedly used in enacting Republic Act No. 9591 (RA 9591). The COMELEC extends its non-justiciability argument to these materials.

We find no reason to grant the motion. First. It will not do for the COMELEC to insist that the reliability and authoritativeness of the population indicators Congress used in enacting RA 9591 are non-justiciable. If laws creating legislative districts are unquestionably within the ambit of this Court's judicial review power, [5] then there is more reason to hold justiciable subsidiary questions impacting on their constitutionality, such as their compliance with a specific constitutional limitation under Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution that only cities with at least 250,000 constituents are entitled to representation in Congress. To fulfill this obligation, the Court, of necessity, must inquire into the authoritativeness and reliability of the population indicators Congress used to comply with the constitutional limitation. Thus, nearly five decades ago, we already rejected claims of non-justiciability of an apportionment law alleged to violate the constitutional requirement of proportional representation: It is argued in the motion to reconsider, that since Republic Act 3040 improves existing conditions, this Court could perhaps, in the exercise of judicial statesmanship, consider the question involved as purely political and therefore non-justiciable. The overwhelming weight of authority is that district apportionment laws are subject to review by the courts[:] The constitutionality of a legislative apportionment act is a judicial question, and not one which the court cannot consider on the ground that it is a political question. It is well settled that the passage of apportionment acts is not so exclusively within the political power of the legislature as to preclude a court from inquiring into their constitutionality when the question is properly brought before it. It may be added in this connection, that the mere impact of the suit upon the political situation does not render it political instead of judicial. The alleged circumstance that this statute improves the present set-up constitutes no excuse for approving a transgression of constitutional limitations, because the end does not justify the means. Furthermore, there is no reason to doubt that, aware of the existing inequality of representation, and impelled by its sense of duty, Congress will opportunely approve remedial legislation in accord with the precepts of the Constitution. [6] (Emphasis supplied; internal citations omitted) To deny the Court the exercise of its judicial review power over RA 9591 is to contend that this Court has no power "to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government," a duty mandated under Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution. Indeed, if we subscribe to the COMELEC's theory, this Court would be reduced to rubberstamping laws creating legislative districts no matter how unreliable and non-authoritative the population indicators Congress used to justify their creation. There can be no surer way to render meaningless the limitation in Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.[7] Second. Under Executive Order No. 135 (EO 135), the population indicators Congress used to measure Malolos City's compliance with the constitutional limitation are unreliable and nonauthoritative. On Miranda's Certification, (that the "projected population of the [City] of Malolos will be 254,030 by the year 2010 using the population growth rate of 3.78[%] between 1995 and 2000"), this fell short of EO 135's requirements that (a) for intercensal years, the certification should be based on a set of demographic projections and estimates declared official by the National Statistical and Coordination Board (NSCB); (b) certifications on intercensal population estimates will be as of the middle of every year; and (c) certifications based on projections or estimates must be issued by the NSO Administrator or his designated certifying officer. Further, using Miranda's own growth rate assumption of 3.78%, Malolos City's population as of 1 August 2010 will only be 249,333, below the constitutional threshold of 250,000 (using as base Malolos City's population as of 1 August 2007 which is 223,069). That Miranda issued his Certification "by authority of the NSO administrator" does not make the document reliable as it neither makes Miranda the NSO Administrator's designated certifying officer nor cures the Certification of its fatal defects for failing to use demographic projections and estimates declared official by the NSCB or make the projection as of the middle of 2010. Nor are the 2007 Census of Population - PMS 3 - Progress Enumeration Report, the Certification of the City of Malolos' Water District, dated 31 July 2008 and the Certification of the Liga ng Barangay, dated 22 August 2008, reliable because none of them qualifies as authoritative population indicator under EO 135. The 2007 Census of Population - PMS 3 - Progress Enumeration Report merely contains preliminary data on the population census of Bulacan which were subsequently adjusted to reflect actual population as indicated in the 2007 Census results (showing Malolos City's population at 223,069). The COMELEC, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), adopts Malolos City's claim that the 2007 census for Malolos City was "sloped to make it appear that come Year 2010, the population count for Malolos would still fall short of the constitutional requirement."[8] This unbecoming attack by the government's chief counsel on the integrity of the processes of the government's census authority has no place in our judicial system. The OSG ought to know that absent convincing proof of so-called data "sloping," the NSO enjoys the presumption of the regularity in the performance of its functions. The Certification of the City of Malolos' Water District fares no better. EO 135 excludes from its ambit certifications from a public utility gathered incidentally in the course of pursuing its business. To elevate the water district's so-called population census to the level of credibility NSO certifications enjoy is to render useless the existence of NSO. This will allow population data incidentally gathered by electric, telephone, sewage, and other utilities to enter into legislative processes even though these private entities are not in the business of generating statist ical data and thus lack the scientific training, experience and competence to handle, collate and process them. Similarly, the Certification of the Liga ng Barangay is not authoritative because much like the Malolos City Water District, the Liga ng Barangay is not authorized to conduct population census, much less during off-census years. The non-NSO entities EO 135 authorizes to conduct population census are local government units (that is, province, city, municipality or barangay) subject to the prior approval of the NSCB and under the technical supervision of the NSO from planning to data processing. [9] By presenting these alternative population indicators with their widely divergent population figures, [10] the COMELEC unwittingly highlighted the danger of relying on non-NSO authorized certifications. EO 135's stringent standards ensuring reliability of population census cannot be diluted as these data lie at the core of crucial government decisions and, in this case, the legislative function of enforcing the constitutional mandate of creating congressional districts in cities with at least 250,000 constituents. There can be no doubt on the applicability of EO 135 to test the constitutionality of RA 9591. The COMELEC invoked EO 135 to convince the Court of the credibility and authoritativeness of Miranda's certificate.[11] It is hardly alien for the Court to adopt standards contained in a parallel statute to fill gaps in the law in the absence of an express prohibition. [12] Indeed, one is hardpressed to find any distinction, statistically speaking, on the reliability of an NSO certification of a city's population for purposes of creating its legislative district and for purposes of converting it to a highly-urbanized or an independent component city. [13] Congress itself confirms the wisdom and relevance of EO 135's paradigm of privileging NSO certifications by mandating that compliance with the population requirement in the creation and conversion of local government units shall be proved exclusively by an NSO certification.[14] Unquestionably, representation in Congress is no less important than the creation of local government units in enhancing our democratic institutions, thus both processes should be subject to the same stringent standards. Third. Malolos City is entitled to representation in Congress only if, before the 10 May 2010 elections, it breaches the 250,000 population mark following the mandate in Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution that "any city whose population may hereafter increase to more than two hundred fifty thousand shall be entitled in the immediately following election to at least one Member." COMELEC neither alleged nor proved that Malolos City is in compliance with Section 3 of the Ordinance. Fourth. Aside from failing to comply with Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution on the population requirement, the creation by RA 9591 of a legislative district for Malolos City, carving the city from the former First Legislative District, leaves the town of Bulacan isolated from the rest of the geographic mass of that district.[15] This contravenes the requirement in Section 5(3), Article VI that each legislative district shall "comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory." It is no argument to say, as the OSG does, that it was impracticable for Congress to create a district with contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory because Malolos city lies at the center of the First Legislative District. The geographic lay-out of the First Legislative District is not an insuperable condition making compliance with Section 5(3) impracticable. To adhere to the constitutional mandate, and thus maintain fidelity to its purpose of ensuring efficient representation, the practicable alternative for Congress was to include the municipality of Bulacan in Malolos City's legislative district. Although unorthodox, the resulting contiguous and compact district fulfills the constitutional requirements of geographic unity and population floor, ensuring efficient representation of the minimum mass of constituents. WHEREFORE, the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration of respondent Commission on Elections dated 22 February 2010 is DENIED WITH FINALITY. Let no further pleadings be allowed. SO ORDERED.

EN BANC [G.R. No. 177271, May 04, 2007] BA-RA [G.R. NO. 177314]

REP. LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES, KILOSBAYAN FOUNDATION, BANTAY KATARUNGAN FOUNDATION, PETITIONERS, VS. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, RESPONDENT. DECISION GARCIA, J.: Before the Court are these two consolidated petitions for certiorari and mandamus to nullify and set aside certain issuances of the Commission on Elections (Comelec) respecting party-list groups which have manifested their intention to participate in the party-list elections on May 14, 2007. In the first petition, docketed as G.R. No. 177271, petitioners Bantay Republic Act (BA-RA 7941, for short) and the Urban Poor for Legal Reforms (UP-LR, for short) assail the various Comelec resolutions accrediting private respondents Biyaheng Pinoy et al., to participate in the forthcoming party-list elections on May 14, 2007 without simultaneously determining whether or not their respective nominees possess the requisite qualifications defined in Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7941, or the "Party-List System Act" and belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sector each seeks to represent. In the second, docketed as G.R. No. 177314, petitioners Loreta Ann P. Rosales, Kilosbayan Foundation and Bantay Katarungan Foundation impugn Comelec Resolution 07-0724 dated April 3, 2007 effectively denying their request for the release or disclosure of the names of the nominees of the fourteen (14) accredited participating party-list groups mentioned in petitioner Rosales' previous letter-request. While both petitions commonly seek to compel the Comelec to disclose or publish the names of the nominees of the various party-list groups named in the petitions,[1] the petitioners in G.R. No. 177271 have the following additional prayers: 1) that the 33 private respondents named therein be "declare[d] as unqualified to participate in the party-list elections as sectoral organizations, parties or coalition for failure to comply with the guidelines prescribed by the [Court] in [Ang Bagong Bayani v. Comelec[2]]" and, 2) correspondingly, that the Comelec be enjoined from allowing respondent groups from participating in the May 2007 elections. In separate resolutions both dated April 24, 2007, the Court en banc required the public and private respondents to file their respective comments on the petitions within a non-extendible period of five (5) days from notice. Apart from respondent Comelec, seven (7) private respondents [3] in G.R. No. 177271 and one party-list group[4] mentioned in G.R. No. 177314 submitted their separate comments. In the main, the separate comments of the private respondents focused on the untenability and prematurity of the plea of petitioners BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR to nullify their accreditation as party-list groups and thus disqualify them and their respective nominees from participating in the May 14, 2007 party-list elections. The facts: On January 12, 2007, the Comelec issued Resolution No. 7804 prescribing rules and regulations to govern the filing of manifestation of intent to participate and submission of names of nominees under the party-list system of representation in connection with the May 14, 2007 elections. Pursuant thereto, a number of organized groups filed the necessary manifestations. Among these - and ostensibly subsequently accredited by the Comelec to participate in the 2007 elections - are 14 party-list groups, namely: (1) BABAE KA; (2) ANG KASANGGA; (3) AKBAY PINOY; (4) AKSA; (5) KAKUSA; (6) AHON PINOY; (7) OFW PARTY; (8) BIYAHENG PINOY; (9) ANAD; (10) AANGAT ANG KABUHAYAN; (11) AGBIAG; (12) BANAT; (13) BANTAY LIPAD; (14) AGING PINOY. Petitioners BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR presented a longer, albeit an overlapping, list. Subsequent events saw BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR filing with the Comelec an Urgent Petition to Disqualify, thereunder seeking to disqualify the nominees of certain party-list organizations. Both petitioners appear not to have the names of the nominees sought to be disqualified since they still asked for a copy of the list of nominees. Docketed in the Comelec as SPA Case No 07-026, this urgent petition has yet to be resolved. Meanwhile, reacting to the emerging public perception that the individuals behind the aforementioned 14 party-list groups do not, as they should, actually represent the poor and marginalized sectors, petitioner Rosales, in G.R. No. 177314, addressed a letter[5] dated March 29, 2007 to Director Alioden Dalaig of the Comelecs Law Department requesting a list of that groups nominees. Another letter[6] of the same tenor dated March 31, 2007 followed, this time petitioner Rosales impressing upon Atty. Dalaig the particular urgency of the subject request. Neither the Comelec Proper nor its Law Department officially responded to petitioner Rosales requests. The April 13, 2007 issue of the Manila Bulletin, however, carried the front-page banner headline "COMELEC WON'T BARE PARTY-LIST NOMINEES",[7] with the following sub-heading: "Abalos says party-list polls not personality oriented." On April 16, 2007, Atty. Emilio Capulong, Jr. and ex-Senator Jovito R. Salonga, in their own behalves and as counsels of petitioner Rosales, forwarded a letter [8] to the Comelec formally requesting action and definitive decision on Rosales earlier plea for information regarding the names of several party-list nominees. Invoking their constitutionally-guaranteed right to information, Messrs. Capulong and Salonga at the same time drew attention to the banner headline adverted to earlier, with a request for the Comelec, "collectively or individually, to issue a formal clarification, either confirming or denying " the banner headline and the alleged statement of Chairman Benjamin Abalos, Sr. xxx" Evidently unbeknownst then to Ms. Rosales, et al., was the issuance of Comelec en banc Resolution 07-0724[9] under date April 3, 2007 virtually declaring the nominees' names confidential and in net effect denying petitioner Rosales' basic disclosure request. In its relevant part, Resolution 07-0724 reads as follows: RESOLVED, moreover, that the Commission will disclose/publicize the names of party-list nominees in connection with the May 14, 2007 Elections only after 3:00 p.m. on election day. Let the Law Department implement this resolution and reply to all letters addressed to the Commission inquiring on the party-list nominees. (Emphasis added.) According to petitioner Rosales, she was able to obtain a copy of the April 3, 2007 Resolution only on April 21, 2007. She would later state the observation that the last part of the "Order empowering the Law Department to 'implement this resolution and reply to all letters ... inquiring on the party-list nominees' is apparently a fool-proof bureaucratic way to distort and mangle the truth and give the impression that the antedated Resolution of April 3, 2007 ... is the final answer to the two formal requests ... of Petitioners".[10] The herein consolidated petitions are cast against the foregoing factual setting, albeit petitioners BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR appear not to be aware, when they filed their petition on April 18, 2007, of the April 3, 2007 Comelec Resolution 07-0724. To start off, petitioners BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR would have the Court cancel the accreditation accorded by the Comelec to the respondent party-list groups named in their petition on the ground that these groups and their respective nominees do not appear to be qualified. In the words of petitioners BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR, Comelec xxx committed grave abuse of discretion ... when it granted the assailed accreditations even without simultaneously determining whether the nominees of herein private respondents are qualified or not, or whether or not the nominees are likewise belonging to the marginalized and underrepresented sector they claim to represent in Congress, in accordance with No. 7 of the eightpoint guidelines prescribed by the Honorable Supreme in the Ang Bagong Bayani[11] case which states that, "not only the candidate party or organization must represent marginalized and underrepresented sectors; so also must its nominees." In the case of private respondents, public respondent Comelec granted accreditations without the required simultaneous determination of the qualification of the nominees as part of the accreditation process of the party-list organization itself. (Words in bracket added; italization in the original) [12] The Court is unable to grant the desired plea of petitioners BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR for cancellation of accreditation on the grounds thus advanced in their petition. For, such course of action would entail going over and evaluating the qualities of the sectoral groups or parties in question, particularly whether or not they indeed represent marginalized/underrepresented groups. The exercise would require the Court to make a factual determination, a matter which is outside the office of judicial review by way of special civil action for certiorari. In certiorari proceedings, the Court is not called upon to decide factual issues and the case must be decided on the undisputed facts on record. [13] The sole function of a writ of certiorari is to address issues of want of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion and does not include a review of the tribunal's evaluation of the evidence.[14] Not lost on the Court of course is the pendency before the Comelec of SPA Case No. 07-026 in which petitioners BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR themselves seek to disqualify the nominees of the respondent party-list groups named in their petition. Petitioners BA-RA 7941s and UP-LR's posture that the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion when it granted the assailed accreditations without simultaneously determining the qualifications of their nominees is without basis. Nowhere in R.A. No. 7941 is there a requirement that the qualification of a party-list nominee be determined simultaneously with the accreditation of an organization. And as aptly pointed out by private respondent Babae Para sa Kaunlaran (Babae Ka), Section 4 of R.A. No. 7941 requires a petition for registration of a party-list organization to be filed with the Comelec "not later than ninety (90) days before the election" whereas the succeeding Section 8 requires the submission "not later than forty-five (45) days before the election" of the list of names whence party-list representatives shall be chosen. Now to the other but core issues of the case. The petition in G.R. No. 177314 formulates and captures the main issues tendered by the petitioners in these consolidated cases and they may be summarized as follows:

1.

Whether respondent Comelec, by refusing to reveal the names of the nominees of the various party-list groups, has violated the right to information and free access to documents as guaranteed by the Constitution; and Whether respondent Comelec is mandated by the Constitution to disclose to the public the names of said nominees.

2.

While the Comelec did not explicitly say so, it based its refusal to disclose the names of the nominees of subject party-list groups on Section 7 of R.A. 7941. This provision, while commanding the publication and the posting in polling places of a certified list of party-list system participating groups, nonetheless tells the Comelec not to show or include the names of the party-list nominees in said certified list. Thus: SEC. 7. Certified List of Registered Parties.-The COMELEC shall, not later than sixty (60) days before election, prepare a certified list of national, regional, or sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions which have applied or who have manifested their desire to participate under the party-list system and distribute copies thereof to all precincts for posting in the polling places on election day. The names of the party-list nominees shall not be shown on the certified list. (Emphasis added.) And doubtless part of Comelec's reason for keeping the names of the party list nominees away from the public is deducible from the following excerpts of the news report appearing in the adverted April 13, 2007 issue of the Manila Bulletin: The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) firmed up yesterday its decision not to release the names of nominees of sectoral parties, organizations, or coalitions accredited to participate in the party-list election which will be held simultaneously with the May 14 mid-term polls. COMELEC Chairman Benjamin S. Abalos, Sr. ... said he and [the other five COMELEC] Commissioners --- believe that the party list elections must not be personality oriented. Abalos said under [R.A.] 7941 ..., the people are to vote for sectoral parties, organizations, or coalitions, not for their nominees. He said there is nothing in R.A. 7941 that requires the Comelec to disclose the names of nominees. xxx (Words in brackets and emphasis added) Insofar as the disclosure issue is concerned, the petitions are impressed with merit. Assayed against the non-disclosure stance of the Comelec and the given rationale therefor is the right to information enshrined in the self-executory[15] Section 7, Article III of the Constitution, viz: Sec.7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. Complementing and going hand in hand with the right to information is another constitutional provision enunciating the policy of full disclosure and transparency in Government. We refer to Section 28, Article II of the Constitution reading: Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest. The right to information is a public right where the real parties in interest are the public, or the citizens to be precise. And for every right of the people recognized as fundamental lies a corresponding duty on the part of those who govern to respect and protect that right. This is the essence of the Bill of Rights in a constitutional regime.[16] Without a government's acceptance of the limitations upon it by the Constitution in order to uphold individual liberties, without an acknowledgment on its part of those duties exacted by the rights pertaining to the citizens, the Bill of Rights becomes a sophistry. By weight of jurisprudence, any citizen can challenge any attempt to obstruct the exercise of his right to information and may seek its enforcement by mandamus. [17] And since every citizen by the simple fact of his citizenship possesses the right to be informed, objections on ground of locus standi are ordinarily unavailing.[18] Like all constitutional guarantees, however, the right to information and its companion right of access to official records are not absolute. As articulated in Legaspi, supra, the people's right to know is limited to "matters of public concern" and is further subject to such limitation as may be provided by law. Similarly, the policy of full disclosure is confined to transactions involving "public interest" and is subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law. Too, there is also the need of preserving a measure of confidentiality on some matters, such as military, trade, banking and diplomatic secrets or those affecting national security. [19] The terms "public concerns" and "public interest" have eluded precise definition. But both terms embrace, to borrow from Legaspi, a broad spectrum of subjects which the public may want to know, either because these directly affect their lives, or simply because such matters naturally whet the interest of an ordinary citizen. At the end of the day, it is for the courts to determine, on a case to case basis, whether or not at issue is of interest or importance to the public. If, as in Legaspi, it was the legitimate concern of a citizen to know if certain persons employed as sanitarians of a health department of a city are civil service eligibles, surely the identity of candidates for a lofty elective public office should be a matter of highest public concern and interest. As may be noted, no national security or like concerns is involved in the disclosure of the names of the nominees of the party-list groups in question. Doubtless, the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing the legitimate demands of the petitioners for a list of the nominees of the party-list groups subject of their respective petitions. Mandamus, therefore, lies. The last sentence of Section 7 of R.A. 7941 reading: "[T]he names of the party-list nominees shall not be shown on the certified list" is certainly not a justifying card for the Comelec to deny the requested disclosure. To us, the prohibition imposed on the Comelec under said Section 7 is limited in scope and duration, meaning, that it extends only to the certified list which the same provision requires to be posted in the polling places on election day. To stretch the coverage of the prohibition to the absolute is to read into the law something that is not intended. As it were, there is absolutely nothing in R.A. No. 7941 that prohibits the Comelec from disclosing or even publishing through mediums other than the "Certified List" the names of the party-list nominees. The Comelec obviously misread the limited non-disclosure aspect of the provision as an absolute bar to public disclosure before the May 2007 elections. The interpretation thus given by the Comelec virtually tacks an unconstitutional dimension on the last sentence of Section 7 of R.A. No. 7941. The Comelecs reasoning that a party-list election is not an election of personalities is valid to a point. It cannot be taken, however, to justify its assailed non-disclosure stance which comes, as it were, with a weighty presumption of invalidity, impinging, as it does, on a fundamental right to information. [20] While the vote cast in a party-list elections is a vote for a party, such vote, in the end, would be a vote for its nominees, who, in appropriate cases, would eventually sit in the House of Representatives. The Court is very much aware of newspaper reports detailing the purported reasons behind the Comelecs disinclination to release the names of party-list nominees. It is to be stressed, however, that the Court is in the business of dispensing justice on the basis of hard facts and applicable statutory and decisional laws. And lest it be overlooked, the Court always assumes, at the first instance, the presumptive validity and regularity of official acts of government officials and offices. It has been repeatedly said in various contexts that the people have the right to elect their representatives on the basis of an informed judgment. Hence the need for voters to be informed about matters that have a bearing on their choice. The ideal cannot be achieved in a system of blind voting, as veritably advocated in the assailed resolution of the Comelec. The Court, since the 1914 case of Gardiner v. Romulo,[21] has consistently made it clear that it frowns upon any interpretation of the law or rules that would hinder in any way the free and intelligent casting of the votes in an election.[22] So it must be here for still other reasons articulated earlier. In all, we agree with the petitioners that respondent Comelec has a constitutional duty to disclose and release the names of the nominees of the party-list groups named in the herein petitions. WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 177271 is partly DENIED insofar as it seeks to nullify the accreditation of the respondents named therein. However, insofar as it seeks to compel the Comelec to disclose or publish the names of the nominees of party-list groups, sectors or organizations accredited to participate in the May 14, 2007 elections, the same petition and the petition in G.R. No. 177314 are GRANTED. Accordingly, the Comelec is hereby ORDERED to immediately disclose and release the names of the nominees of the party-list groups, sectors or organizations accredited to participate in the May 14, 2007 party-list elections. The Comelec is further DIRECTED to submit to the Court its compliance herewith within five (5) days from notice hereof. This Decision is declared immediately executory upon its receipt by the Comelec. No pronouncement as to cost. SO ORDERED.

EN BANC [G.R. No. 172103, April 13, 2007] CITIZENS' BATTLE AGAINST CORRUPTION (CIBAC), PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (COMELEC), REPRESENTED BY CHAIRMAN BENJAMIN ABALOS, SR., RESPONDENT.

DECISION VELASCO, JR., J.:

The Case Before us is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing the March 7, 2006 Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Resolution No. 06-0248,[2] which rejected the Motion for Proclamation of the Second Nominees of Citizens' Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC), et al. under the party-list system in connection with the May 2004 National and Local Elections. The Facts The COMELEC, sitting en banc as the National Board of Canvassers for the Party-List System, issued Resolution No. NBC 04-004[3] promulgated on June 2, 2004, which proclaimed petitioner CIBAC as one of those which qualified to occupy a seat in Congress having received the required two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list representatives. Based on Party-List Canvass Report No. 19,[4] CIBAC received a total number of 493,546 votes out of the 12,627,852 votes cast for all the party-list participants, which, by applying the formula adopted by the Supreme Court in Veterans Federation Party v. COMELEC,[5] resulted in a percentage of 3.9084.[6] In the computation for additional seats for the parties, the COMELEC adopted a simplified formula of one additional seat per additional 2%, thereby foreclosing the chances of CIBAC to gain an additional seat under the party-list system for having received less than what was prescribed by the poll body.[7] On June 22, 2004, petitioner CIBAC, together with Luzon Farmers Party (BUTIL) and Partido ng Manggagawa (PM), filed a Joint Motion for Immediate Proclamation[8] entreating the COMELEC en banc to recognize their entitlement to an additional seat and that their second nominees be immediately proclaimed. They based their claim on Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC (Ang Bagong Bayani and Bayan Muna), applying the following Veterans formula:
[1]

Additional Seats =

Votes Cast for Qualified Party Votes Cast for First Party for First Party[9]

x Allotted Seats

On March 7, 2006, the COMELEC en banc issued the challenged Resolution No. 06-0248 contained in the Excerpt from the Minutes of the Regular En Banc Meeting of the COMELEC,[10] which adopted the March 6, 2006 Memorandum of the Supervisory Committee relative to the Urgent Motion to Resolve the Motion for Proclamation of the Second Nominees of CIBAC, BUTIL, and PM party-lists, in connection with the May 2004 elections for party-list representatives. The pertinent portion reads: "On 01 May 2004, Commissioner Mehol K. Sadain, then CIC on Party-List Concerns, acting on queries from several party-list candidates regarding the formula to be used by the Commission in determining the additional seats for party list winners in the 10 May 2004 elections, issued a memorandum on the matter to the Commission en-banc. As a result, on the [sic] 08 May 2004, the Commission en banc promulgated Resolution No. 6835 (Annex "A") the resolutory portion of which reads" "RESOLVES, to adopt the simplified formula of one additional seat per additional two percent (underscoring supplied) of the total party-list votes in the proclamation of the party-list winners in the coming 10 May 2004 National and Local Elections." The Party List Canvass Report No. 22 of the National Board of Canvassers, (Annex "B") shows that CIBAC, BUTIL and PM have the following percentage of total votes garnered: CIBAC BUTIL PM 3.8638 3.3479 3.4947

Following the simplified formula of the Commission, after the first 2% is deducted from the percentage of votes of the above-named party-lists, they are no longer entitled to an additional seat. It is worth mentioning that the Commission, consistent with its formula, denied the petition for a seat of ABA-AKO and ANAD after garnering a percentage of votes of 1.9900 and 1.9099 respectively. For consideration." Considering the foregoing, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to adopt the recommendation of the Supervisory Committee to deny the foregoing Motion of CIBAC, BUTIL and PM party-lists for proclamation of second nominees, following the simplified formula of the Commission on the matter per Comelec Resolution No. 6835 promulgated 08 May 2004. The Issues Undeterred, CIBAC filed the instant Petition for Certiorari[11] before this Court, raising two issues, viz: A. WHETHER OR NOT THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, IN ADOPTING THE SIMPLIFIED FORMULA OF ONE ADDITIONAL SEAT PER ADDITIONAL TWO PERCENT OF THE TOTAL PARTY-LIST VOTES IN THE PROCLAMATION OF THE PARTY-LIST WINNERS IN THE MAY 10, 2004 NATIONAL AND LOCAL ELECTION, THUS, ADJUDGING THE PETITIONER HEREIN AS ENTITLED ONLY TO ONE (1) SEAT, ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION. B. WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER CIBAC, AND OTHER PARTY-LIST GROUPS SIMILARLY SITUATED, ARE ENTITLED TO ONE (1) ADDITIONAL SEAT BASED ON THE FORMULA CRAFTED BY THE SUPREME COURT IN THE CASES OF ANG BAGONG BAYANI AND BAYAN MUNA.[12] In gist, the core issue is whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it denied petitioner CIBAC an additional seat in the House of Representatives under the party-list system by using the simplified formula instead of the claimed Ang Bagong Bayani and Bayan Muna formula. Petitioner CIBAC asseverates that the COMELEC committed a serious departure from settled jurisprudence amounting to grave abuse of discretion when it mistakenly relied on the "simplified formula" as the basis for its resolution. Moreover, it stressed that the COMELEC simplified formula runs counter to the Ang Bagong Bayani and Bayan Muna formula which used the "number of allotted seats for the first party" as multiplier. If the Ang Bagong Bayani and Bayan Muna formula were applied, CIBAC would be entitled to one additional seat, thus: Additional seats = 495,193 x 3 = 1.2345 1,203,305 Lastly, petitioner faults the COMELEC for its failure to act on and so dismiss the petitions for disqualification filed by the other party-list groups which could have enabled the COMELEC to "make an accurate determination of the votes that each party-list group has actually obtained." It therefore asks the Court to set aside the assailed COMELEC Resolution No. 06-0248; and direct the COMELEC to declare CIBAC as entitled to one (1) additional seat and to immediately proclaim Ma. Blanca Kim Bernardo-Lokin, its second nominee, as member of the House of Representatives. The Court's Ruling Entitlement to an additional seat In deciding the controversy at hand, a second look at the enabling law, Republic Act No. (R.A.) 7941, "An Act Providing for the Election of Party-List Representatives through the Party-List System, and Appropriating Funds Therefor," is in order. The objective of the law was made clear in Section 2, thus: Declaration of Policy.The State shall promote proportional representation in the election of representatives to the House of Representatives through a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the House of Representatives. Towards this end, the State shall develop and guarantee a full, free and open party system in order to attain the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives by enhancing their chances to compete for and win seats in the legislature, and shall provide the simplest scheme possible. (Emphasis supplied.) In determining the number of seats a party-list is entitled to, Sec. 11 prescribes that:

The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each: provided, that those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes: provided, finally, that each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats (emphasis supplied). The Court, in the leading case of Veterans, listed the four (4) inviolable parameters to determine the winners in a Philippine-style party-list election mandated by the Constitution and R.A. 7941, as follows: First, the twenty percent allocationthe combined number of all party-list congressmen shall not exceed twenty percent of the total membership of the House of Representatives, including those elected under the party list. Second, the two percent thresholdonly those parties garnering a minimum of two percent of the total valid votes cast for the party-list system are "qualified" to have a seat in the House of Representatives. Third, the three-seat limiteach qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it actually obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three seats; that is, one "qualifying" and two additional seats. Fourth, proportional representationthe additional seats which a qualified party is entitled to shall be computed "in proportion to their total number of votes." [13] (Emphasis supplied.) In determining the number of additional seats for each party-list that has met the 2% threshold, "proportional representation" is the touchstone to ascertain entitlement to extra seats. The correct formula in ascertaining the entitlement to additional seats of the first party and other qualified party-list groups was clearly explicated in Veterans: [H]ow do we determine the number of seats the first party is entitled to? The only basis given by the law is that a party receiving at least two percent of the total votes shall be entitled to one seat. Proportionally, if the first party were to receive twice the number of votes of the second party, it should be entitled to twice the latter's number of seats and so on. The formula, therefore, for computing the number of seats to which the first party is entitled is as follows:

Number of votes of first party Total votes for party-list system

Proportion of votes of first party relative to total votes for party-list system

If the proportion of votes received by the first party without rounding it off is equal to at least six percent of the total valid votes cast for all the party list groups, then the first party shall be entitled to two additional seats or a total of three seats overall. If the proportion of votes without a rounding off is equal to or greater than four percent, but less than six percent, then the first party shall have one additional or a total of two seats. And if the proportion is less than four percent, then the first party shall not be entitled to any additional seat. We adopted the six percent bench mark, because the first party is not always entitled to the maximum number of additional seats. Likewise, it would prevent the allotment of more than the total number of available seats, such as in an extreme case wherein 18 or more parties tie for the highest rank and are thus entitled to three seats each. In such scenario, the number of seats to which all the parties are entitled may exceed the maximum number of party-list seats reserved in the House of Representatives. xxxx Formula for Additional Seats of Other Qualified Parties The next step is to solve for the number of additional seats that the other qualified parties are entitled to, based on proportional representation. x x x xxxx In simplified form, it is written as follows:

Additional seats for concerned party

No. of votes of concerned party No. of votes of first party

No. of additional seats allocated to the first party (Emphasis supplied.)

xxxx The above formula does not give an exact mathematical representation of the number of additional seats to be awarded since, in order to be entitled to one additional seat, an exact whole number is necessary. In fact, most of the actual mathematical proportions are not whole numbers and are not rounded off for the reasons explained earlier. To repeat, rounding off may result in the awarding of a number of seats in excess of that provided by the law. Furthermore, obtaining absolute proportional representation is restricted by the three-seat-per-party limit to a maximum of two additional slots. An increase in the maximum number of additional representatives a party may be entitled to would result in a more accurate proportional representation. But the law itself has set the limit: only two additional seats. Hence, we need to work within such extant parameter. [14] (Emphasis supplied.) On June 25, 2003, the formula was put to test in Ang Bagong Bayani and Bayan Muna. In determining the additional seats for the other qualified partiesBUHAY, AMIN, ABA, COCOFED, PM, SANLAKAS, and ABANSE! PINAYthe following computation was made: Applying the relevant formula in Veterans to BUHAY, we arrive at 0.51:

Additional Seats

= = =

Votes Cast for Qualified Party Votes Cast for First Party 290,760 1,708,253 0.51

x x

Alloted Seats for First Party 3

Since 0.51 is less than one, BUHAY is not entitled to any additional seat. [15] From a scrutiny of the Veterans and Ang Bagong Bayani and Bayan Muna formulae in determining the additional seats for party-list representatives, it is readily apparent that the Veterans formula is materially different from the one used in Ang Bagong Bayani and Bayan Muna. In Veterans, the multiplier used was "the [number] of additional seats allocated to the first party,:" while in the Ang Bagong Bayani and Bayan Muna formula, the multiplier "allotted seats for first party" was applied. The dissimilarity in the multiplier used spells out a big difference in the outcome of the equation. This divergence on the multiplier was pointed out and stressed by respondent COMELEC. Nevertheless, petitioner insists that the correct multiplier is the ALLOTTED seats for the first party referring to the three (3) seats won by Bayan Muna which emerged as the winning first party, as allegedly prescribed in Ang Bagong Bayani and Bayan Muna. On this issue, petitioner ratiocinates this way: It cannot be emphasized enough that the formula in the Ang Bagong Bayani and Bayan Muna cases rendered in 2003, effectively modified the earlier Veterans formula, with the clear and explicit use of the "allotted seats for the first party". Considering that the first party, Bayan Muna, was allotted to the maximum three (3) seats under the law, it is therefore clear that the multiplier to be used is three (3), the allotted seats for the first party. [16] However, this postulation is bereft of merit and basis. A careful perusal of the four corners of Ang Bagong Bayani and Bayan Muna betrays petitioner's claim as it did not mention any revision or reshaping of the Veterans formula. As a matter of fact, the Court had in mind the application of the original Veterans formula in Ang Bagong Bayani and Bayan Muna. This conclusion is based on the aforequoted formula in Ang Bagong Bayani and Bayan Muna, as follows: Applying the relevant formula in Veterans to BUHAY, we arrive at 0.51: Additional Seats = = Votes Cast for Qualified Party Votes Cast for First Party 290,760 1,708,253 = 0.51 x x Allotted Seats for First Party 3

The phrase "applying the relevant formula in Veterans to BUHAY" admits of no other conclusion than that the Court merely applied the Veterans formula to Ang Bagong Bayani and Bayan Muna in resolving the additional seats by the other qualified party-list groups. However, it appears that there was an inaccurate presentation of the Veterans formula as the Court used the multiplier "allotted seats for the first party" in Ang Bagong Bayani and Bayan Muna instead of the "[number] of additional seats allocated to the first party" prescribed in the Veterans formula. It is apparent that the phrase "[number] of additional" was omitted, possibly by inadvertence from the phrase "allotted seats for First Party." The disparity is material, substantial, and significant since the multiplier "[number] of additional seats allocated to the First Party" prescribed in the Veterans formula pertains to a multiplier of two (2) seats, while the multiplier "allotted seats for the first party" in Ang Bagong Bayani and Bayan Muna formula can mean a multiplier of maximum three (3) seats, since the first party can garner a maximum of three (3) seats. Moreover, footnote 37 of Ang Bagong Bayani and Bayan Muna states that "for a discussion of how to compute additional nominees for parties other than the first, see Veterans x x x." It clarifies the confusion created by the imprecise formula expressed in Ang Bagong Bayani and Bayan Muna. Thus, the Court rules that the claimed Ang Bagong Bayani and Bayan Muna formula has not modified the Veterans formula. As a matter of fact, there was really no other formula approved by the Court other than the Veterans formula in fixing the number of additional seats for the other qualified party-list groups. Also, in Partido ng Manggagawa v. COMELEC, the Court found that the confusion in the computation of additional seats for the other qualified party-list groups arose "[from] the way the Veterans formula was cited in the June 25, 2003 Resolution of the Court in Ang Bagong Bayani." We reiterated that "the prevailing formula for the computation of additional seats for party-list winners is the formula stated in the landmark case of Veterans x x x."[17] Applying the Veterans formula in petitioner's case, we reach the conclusion that CIBAC is not entitled to an additional seat. Party-List Canvass Report No. 20[18] contained in the petition shows that the first party, Bayan Muna, garnered the highest number of votes, that is, a total of 1,203,305 votes. Petitioner CIBAC, on the other hand, received a total of 495,190 votes. It was proclaimed that the first party, Bayan Muna, was entitled to a maximum of three (3) seats[19] based on June 2, 2004 Resolution No. NBC 04-004 of the COMELEC. A computation using the Veterans formula would therefore lead us to the following result:

No. of votes of concerned party No. of votes of first party Applying this formula, the result is as follows: 495,190 1,203,305 0.41152493

No. of additional seats allocated to the first party(Emphasis supplied.)

Additional Seats for concerned party

x x

2 2 = 0.82304986

This is a far cry from the claimed Ang Bagong Bayani and Bayan Muna formula which used the multiplier "allotted seats for the first party," viz:

Additional Seats =

Votes Cast for Qualified Party Votes Cast for First Party

Allotted Seats for First Party

Applying the Ang Bagong Bayani and Bayan Muna formula to CIBAC, it yields the following result:

Additional seats =

495,190 1,203,305

= 1.2345

Unfortunately, it is the Veterans formula that is sanctioned by the Court and not the Ang Bagong Bayani and Bayan Muna formula that petitioner alleges. Since petitioner CIBAC got a result of 0.82304986 only, which is less than one (1), then it did not obtain or reach a whole number. Petitioner has not convinced us to deviate from our ruling in Veterans that "in order to be entitled to one additional seat, an exact whole number is necessary." Clearly, petitioner is not entitled to an additional seat. COMELEC's application of Ang Bagong Bayani and Bayan Muna is incorrect The Court laments the fact that the COMELEC insisted in using a simplified formula when it is fully aware of the ruling in the Veterans case. The COMELEC explained that it "merely based its judgment on Comelec Resolution No. 6835 which cited Supreme Court Resolution[20] dated 20 November 2003 granting BUHAY's Motion for Reconsideration and entitling it to one additional seat for having garnered more than four percent (4%) of the total number of votes validly cast for the party-list system, thus recognizing once again the simplified formula." However, in said Resolution, the Court, in granting BUHAY an additional seat, meant to apply it on that specific case alone, not being a precedentpro hac vice (for this one particular occasion); thus, this Resolution cannot be applied as a precedent to future cases. The simplified formula having already been abandoned, the COMELEC should have used and adhered to the Veterans formula. The Court has consistently reminded the COMELEC of its "function to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election." As judicial decisions form part of the law of the land, the COMELEC cannot just ignore or be oblivious to the rulings issued by the Court. Basic is the rule that lower courts and quasi-judicial tribunals must bow to the decisions and resolutions of the highest court of the land. The COMELEC is not an exception. It cannot do otherwise. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed March 7, 2006 Comelec Resolution No. 06-0248 is hereby AFFIRMED only insofar as it denied petitioner CIBAC's motion for the proclamation of its second nominee to an additional seat under the 2004 party-list elections. The portion of Comelec Resolution No. 06-0248, which adopted and applied the "simplified formula of the Commission on the matter per Comelec Resolution No. 6835 promulgated 08 May 2004," is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Respondent Comelec is ORDERED to strictly apply the Veterans formula in determining the entitlement of qualified party-list groups to additional seats in the party-list system. No costs. SO ORDERED.