UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA Motion for Judicial Notice to the November 2010 amendments

on Formosa and the Pescadores reaffirming tolling ad interim and no running of statute of limitations for the gold yuan bonds issued by Taiwan (22 USC 3314) on China (or by that China now on Taiwan) and Constitutional Interpretation 475 of 1999 in Taiwan Civil Rights Litigation Org., et al v. NO. C 10-00362 JW

Chinese National Socialist Nazi KMT Party triad racketeering Golden Triangle Drug Dealing Chinatown crack dealing gangbanger organization Business Management Committee(www.asiapacificms.com/papers/pdf/gt_opium_trade.pdf, http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/FRUS/FRUS-idx? type=turn&entity=FRUS.FRUS1945v07.p0596&id=FRUS.FRUS1945v07&isiz e=M&q1=kuomintang&q2=burma, http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgibin/FRUS/FRUS-idx? type=turn&id=FRUS.FRUS1951v06p1&entity=FRUS.FRUS1951v06p1.p0305 &q1=KMT&q2=li&q3=burma, http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgibin/FRUS/FRUS-idx? type=boolean&size=First+100&q1=KMT&operator1=And&q2=li&operator2=A nd&q3=burma&rgn=Page+or+paragraph&size=First+100&work= , http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/FRUS/FRUS-idx? type=turn&id=FRUS.FRUS195860v15&entity=FRUS.FRUS195860v15.p1112 &q1=KMT&q2=opium&q3=burma In this connection [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] a knowledgeable source estimates that over 300 tons of opium pass through the KMT area in Burma each year. If the KMT problem could be liquidated there is no doubt that it would do much to reduce the opium problem. However, there seems to be no hope of this. Alternatively if the market for opium could be cut off it would cut off the major part of support for the KMTs and thus

probably make them more amenable to removal from their present area. However, as I mentioned, I am not hopeful that the market can be cut off. http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/FRUS/FRUS-idx? type=turn&id=FRUS.FRUS195254v12p2&entity=FRUS.FRUS195254v12p2.p 0034&q1=KMT&q2=opium&q3=burma The manner in which the KMT troops are now regarded by the inhabitants of areas they control or have traversed into Burma suggests they might prove a handicap rather than a help. The Embassy is informed that they are not very different from bandits. There has been more than one report that they have been smuggling gold and trafficking in opium. They live and prey upon an agricultural countryside which can ill afford to support them. According to comments of the Foreign Minister and War Office officials over the past year these KMT troops are a greater source of trouble than the insurgents and efforts to keep them in check have meant diversion of forces from insurgent areas. It is highly questionable whether the United Nations could count on any military assistance or disciplined cooperation from these soldiers. The Army Attache concurs in this view. That the KMT troops had to take refuge in Burma and have no place to go or other immediately apparent means of livelihood does not alter the fact of their lawlessness and defiance of authority. Their refusal to surrender cannot, http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/FRUS/FRUS-idx? type=turn&entity=FRUS.FRUS195254v12p2.p0036&id=FRUS.FRUS195254v 12p2&isize=M&q1=KMT&q2=opium&q3=burma , http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/FRUS/FRUS-idx? type=turn&id=FRUS.FRUS195254v12p2&entity=FRUS.FRUS195254v12p2.p 0049&q1=KMT&q2=opium&q3=burma The natural trade routes supplying the Shan States where the KMT troops have been based run southward into Thailand. The Shan States have traditionally been a source of opium. The KMT commanders soon become involved in the opium trade with Thailand as a source of funds. Movement of opium into Thailand, and of supplies north from Thailand has proceeded with apparent tacit approval of the Thai authorities, probably also with their conniv-

ance and to their profit. Involvement of Thai authorities, and the activities of officials of the Chinese Embassy in Bangkok on behalf of the KMT troops in Burma are common gossip in Bangkok. The visibility in Bangkok of the Taiwan connection with the KMT's in Upper Burma led Burmese authorities repeatedly to approach the United States Government with requests that pressure be brought on Taiwan to remove the KMT troops. 'In the interest of brevity, the term KMT in this despatch is used to mean the Chinese Nationalist Government troops presently located in Burma. These are generally referred to as "KMT troops" throughout Burma and elsewhere in Southeast Asia. [Footnote in the source text.] 29 BURMA http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/FRUS/FRUS-idx? type=turn&id=FRUS.FRUS195254v12p2&entity=FRUS.FRUS195254v12p2.p 0193&q1=KMT&q2=opium&q3=burma No. 124 690B.9321/1 1-2353: Telegram The Ambassador in Burma (Sebald) to the Department of State1 SECRET RANGOON, November 23, 1953-5 p. m. 504. Bangkok's 10022 raises fundamental questions whether (a) present evacuation is not in fact smokescreen for continuation KMT operations in Burma; (b) Li Mi possibly aided and abetted by certain segments Chinese Government proposes keep control over those remaining with view continuing nefarious operations in Burma and Thailand including opium smuggling racket. It appears me time has arrived when US Government should squarely face issue whether it should continue bear brunt criticisms over this affair in Burma in particular and SEA in general when party most directly involved fails exert its utmost in bringing about reasonable solution. Argument that Chiang has no influence

over Li Mi and thus over KMT's is patently transparent. Key to problem appears lie in Chiang's hands who could if he would I believe cleanse this sordid affair without undue difficulty. Unless present favorable opportunity is seized now in endeavor once and for all solve this problem I can only anticipate continuing difficulties and serious obstacles our relations not only with Burma but I should think in our endeavors give support Chinese Nationalist Government's international position in UN and elsewhere. I therefore strongly recommend Embassy Taipei be urged make strong approach to Chiang pointing out folly of present halfway measures. SEBALD 'Repeated to Bangkok and Taipei. 2Dated Nov. 18; Donovan reported that he witnessed the arrival of a Chinese detachment at the evacuation center the previous day. Lt. Gen. Lu Kuo-ch'uan, Commander of the 28th Army, told Donovan that until a few days before, he had 2,000 men in his command but that all but 450 were taken from him by the "Mong Hsat Committee." (690B.9321/11-1853) 173 BURMA ) Judicial Notice to the November 2010 amendments on Formosa and the Pescadores reaffirming no running of statute of limitations for the gold yuan bonds issued by Taiwan (22 USC 3314) on China (or by that China now on Taiwan) and Constitutional Interpretation 475 of 1999 averring that then existing statute also provided for an indeterminate deferral of creditors right to demand collection of the gold yuan bonds upon future reconciliation of a reunified united One China. Clearly the official posture of the apparent issuers of the obligations is that although in default, the creditors may nevertheless properly enjoy the equitable tolling of any statute of limitations pursuant to the statutory provisions affecting a deferral imposed on creditors rights. The said provisions arise under

statutes claiming authority under the amendments of the Constitution interpreted on Formosa to guide the administration thereon. Said amendments were drafted, as are ALL laws in effect on Formosa, with approval, review, and right of amendment, by the United States military government, as directed by the Commander in Chief through his White House Presidential directives. Military couriers may from time to time be tasked with the sensitive transport of such communications, as may be other channels of the Government of the United States, not limited to the Department of State through her contractor AIT. http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/en/p03_01.asp? expno=475 Constitutional Interpretation NO.475 ( 475 ) Date 1999/1/29 Issue Article 63, Paragraph 3, of the Act Governing Relations between People of the Taiwan Area and Mainland Area provides that the payment of all the national bonds issued before 1949 should be deferred until national reunification. Does the provision of said Article violate Article 23 of the Constitution, thus infringing upon bond holders property rights protected by the Constitution? Holding The National Assembly, responding to necessity before national reunification, enacted amendments to the Constitution, Article 11 of which provides that "For managing affairs and relations of rights and obligations between people living in the free area and the mainland area, relevant laws may be specifically enacted." The government's treasury bonds issued before 1949 in the mainland area had been issued on the basis of meeting the then nation's financial needs and guaranteed by the then nation's (including the mainland area) tax revenue and other assets. It was a

huge sum. Thereafter, due to national convulsions, the government retreated to Taiwan. Thus, the guarantee basis of those bonds has changed. Apparently, it would be against the principle of equality if the current government were to pay those debts immediately because this would put a heavy burden on the people in the Taiwan area. Accordingly, the legislature, based on the delegation provided in Article 11 of the Amendments, enacted the Act Governing Relations between People of the Taiwan Area and Mainland Area, Article 63, Paragraph 3, of which provides that those unpaid foreign currencies or gold-based bonds issued before 1949 in the mainland area and those debts owed by national banks and financial institutions receiving deposits incurred before the government's retreat to Taiwan would not be paid before national reunification. This deferral imposed on creditors rights to the government is consistent with the abovementioned amendments to the Constitution. It is furthermore not in conflict with Article 23 of Constitution, which specifies the criteria under which the people's freedoms and rights may be restrained. Reasoning The National Assembly, responding to necessity before national reunification, according to Article 27 Paragraph 1, Subparagraph 3, and Article 174, Subparagraph 1, enacted amendments to the Constitution, Article 11 of which provides that "For managing affairs and relations of rights and obligations between people living in the free area and the mainland area, relevant laws may be specifically enacted." The government's treasury bonds issued before 1949 in the mainland area had been issued on the basis of consolidating the then nation's financial needs and guaranteed by the then nation's (including the mainland area) tax revenue and other assets. It was a huge sum. Thereafter, due to national convulsions, the government retreated to Taiwan. Thus, the guarantee basis of those bonds has changed. Apparently, it would be against the principle of equality if the current government were to pay those debts immediately because this would put a heavy burden on people in the Taiwan area.

 Although the people's freedoms and rights are protected by the Constitution, the legislature, balancing the public interests gained and private interests lost and meeting the criteria provided in Article 23 of Constitution, may enact laws to restrain them. Furthermore, they will not be in conflict with the Constitution when, under certain circumstances, the Constitution explicitly delegates the legislature to enact those specific laws. The Act Governing Relations between People of the Taiwan Area and Mainland Area, as promulgated on July 31, 1992, has been enacted on the basis of the delegation provided in Article 11 of Amendments. Article 63, Paragraph 3, of that Act provides that those unpaid foreign currencies or gold-based bonds issued before 1949 in the mainland area and those debts owed by national banks and financial institutions receiving deposits incurred before the government's retreat to Taiwan would not be paid before national reunification. Being a necessity under the changed circumstances, this deferral imposed on creditors rights to the government is not in conflict with the abovementioned purpose of the Constitution and its Amendments and, hence, is not unconstitutional. ' Translated by Dr. Tze-Shiou Chien, Associate Research Fellow, The Sun Yat-Sen Institute for the Social Sciences and Philosophy, Academia Sinica.

http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/FRUS/FRUS-idx? type=turn&entity=FRUS.FRUS1945v07.p0599&id=FRUS.FRUS1945v 07&isize=M&q1=kuomintang&q2=burma creating a de facto colonial army in China under our official aegis http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/FRUS/FRUS-idx?

type=turn&entity=FRUS.FRUS1945v07.p0602&id=FRUS.FRUS1945v 07&isize=M&q1=kuomintang&q2=burma 7. The Joint Chiefs of Staff request that the State Department undertake the necessary action to negotiate the required contracts between the U. S. and China for the establishment of a U. S. Military Advisory Group in China, generally in accordance with the plan proposed herewith. ANNEX TO APPENDIX PLAN FOR U. S. MILITARY ADVISORY GROUP TO CHINA 1. Object. To assist and advise the Chinese Government in the development of modern armed forces for the maintenance of internal peace and security and to establish adequate control over liberated areas in China, including Manchuria, and Formosa, and for the fulfillment of those obligations which may devolve upon China in the occupation of Korea and Japan. 2. Title. In order to advise and assist the Chinese in the establishment of modern armed forces, there will be organized a special group called "The U. S. Military Advisory Group to China", which will comprise a Naval Advisory Group and Army Advisory Groups. The Army Advisory Groups will be composed of an Army Ground Force Group, Army Air Forces Group and Army Service Forces (Logistics) Group. The Naval Group will be headed by a flag officer of the Navy; the Army Advisory Groups will be headed by a general officer. 3. Relationship with the head of the Chinese Government. The heads of the U. S. Naval and Army Advisory Groups will at all times have direct access to the head of the Chinese Government on matters pertaining to their functions and will be the channel of communication between the head of the Chinese Government and the U. S. Military authorities. There will be a designated chairman of the U. S. a8 Post, p. 596. 592

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------Military Advisory Group from among its members to serve as a unified channel of communication with the head of the Chinese Government on all matters of joint concern. This provision in no way affects necessary communication between the head of any of the advisory groups and the head of the Chinese Government or departments of the Chinese Government on matters pertaining wholly to the business of that group.

8. Responsibility to Chinese Goovernment. No officer or man in the Military Advisory Group shall assume any duties as a result of which he will be responsible to the Chinese Government. 9. Relationship with Attaches. On matters other than those pertaining to the Military Advisory Group mission or functions, the Military and Naval Attaches to China will act as representatives of the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy respectively. 10. Relationship with Ambassador. The U. S. Ambassador, or in his absence, the Charge d'Affaires, is the senior representative of the U. S. Government in China. The Military and Naval Attaches, as members of the Chief of the Diplomatic Mission's Staff, and as the representatives of the Secretary of War and the War Department, and of the Secretary of Navy and Navy Department, act as Military and Naval Advisors to the U. S. Ambassador to China. The Chiefs of the Army and the Navy Advisory Groups will have direct access to the Ambassador and should keep the Ambassador and the Military Attaches informed of activities and problems pertaining to their mission. *These figures are tentative; it is considered that an ultimate strength of 300 officers and 400 enlisted men may be required. [Footnote in the

original.] 594 JURISDICTION OVER MEMBERS OF ADVISORY GROUP 16. U. S. service military or naval courts and authorities will have exclusive jurisdiction over all members of the U. S. armed forces serving with the Military Advisory Group and over American nationals employed by or accompanying these forces. TAB TO ANNEX U. S. MILITARY ADVISORY GROUP TO CHINA RIGHTS OR CONCESSIONS DESIRED FROM CHINA 1. In negotiating contracts with the Chinese Government, consideration should be given to obtaining certain economic and military rights or concessions in China in return for U. S. support, past and future. It is recognized that the concessions or settlements desired by the Joint Chiefs of Staff represent but a portion of those which must be presented by the U. S. Government as a whole. The military list alone might represent in the eyes of China, more than the value of the U. S. support they are seeking. An effort has therefore been made to separate the items considered militarily essential from the standpoint of operation of the Military Advisory Group from other items, highly desirable though they may be, which are not required in connection with the Military Advisory Group. These other items might be partially acquired in connection with other negotiations with the Chinese. 596 e. The unrestricted use of U. S. military and governmental communications facilities and cryptographic systems will be granted U. S. military personnel and government agencies. f. Military Advisory Group personnel will be granted the right to operate U. S. aircraft, vehicles, ships and craft over and through Chinese territory and waters.

g. China will refrain from supporting armed forces, not sponsored by the U. S., when such support would interfere quantitatively or qualitatively with the effectiveness or efficiency of the U. S. sponsored units. h. The Chinese will agree that purchases from foreign powers other than the U. S. of arms, ammunition and military equipment will be made only after consultation with the U. S. Military Advisory Group. i. In the event that both governments shall agree that it is desirable that U. S. personnel receive their pay and allowances in yuan, rather than U. S. dollars, the Chinese Government will agree to make available a rate of exchange which will enable an equitable purchasing power to be maintained at all times for U. S. military personnel. 99 09 01 63

63 1 475

475 88 01 29 41 2 36-40 99 5 52-58 6271 6-10 2327 11 63

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 ( ) Fletcher v. Peck () () ( () ( )

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 () () ( ) () 11 (86.07.21) 63 (86.05.14) 2327 (36.01.01)

Additionally the former President, and former Foreign Minister, for free China in exile on Formosa, known as Taiwan, Shuibian Chen, and Dr. Mark Tonsen Chen a former NOAA employee of two decades service to the US government, can testify under oath for Judge Ware that they personally received oral US military government directives from President Bush from the White House delivered by AIT for the Department of State, NSC, JCS, and PACOM, exercising actual legal control in fact of the US over Formosa and the Pescadores as Principal Victor, under the Aide Memoire of October 25, 1950 to FEC invoking Article 73 UN Charter to Formosa with the US assuming therefor duties as Administering Authority state, and the UN Charter (Art. 107, 73, 77) and Treaty of Peace with Japan at San Francisco (Articles 2,3,4,17, 23). They have already both publicly admitted the veracity of the US military government Formosa directives to them in their administrative capacities on the islands. Respectfully, Dr. Paul Maas Risenhoover Robin Hood

Tainan, allied American Formosa drpaulmaas@gmail.com Certificate of service by email to: jswpo@cand.uscourts.gov, JSWpdf@cand.uscourts.gov, CAND@cand.uscourts.gov, "Jeff Geer" <taiwanstatus@yahoo.com>, "Dr. Jonathan Levy" <jonlevy@hargray.com>, john.hsieh.b9ec@statefarm.com, "Cheng Kuang Chen" <chengkuangchen@gmail.com>, Victoria2281947@aol.com, "RWH (Taipei)" <rwh.midway@gmail.com>, "roger Lin" <rogerlin.tw@hotmail.com>, ogc@ogc.law.navy.mil, "pacom.foia.fct" <PACOM.FOIA.FCT@pacom.mil>, cvchen@leeandli.com, chairman@kmt.org.tw, " ( DPP )" <chairperson@dpp.org.tw>, mattel@mail2000.com.tw, "stantonwa" <stantonwa@state.gov>, madisoneh@state.gov, "Zobel, James" <james.zobel@norfolk.gov>,