The musical sign between sound and meaning Mark Reybrouck Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Belgium This is a post-print

(authors final draft) of a chapter published in Ioannis Zannos (Ed.) (1999). Music and Signs, Semiotic and Cognitive Studies in Music (pp. 39-58). Bratislava: ASCO Art & Science. [Original page numbers between square brackets]. Details of the definitive version are available at http://books.google.com/books/about/Music_and_signs.html?id=0YwYAQAAI AAJ [39] Abstract Dealing with music is a mediated process that uses signs as tools for making sense of it. The musical signs, however, are rather ambiguous in their representational qualities. An operational approach is suggested for defining musical signs, leaning heavily on the conceptual work of semiotics. Central in this paper is the concept of musical denotation and the allocation of signs from the sonorous universe, the significance of these signs for the music user and the possible effect the signs could produce upon the listerer. 1. Introduction Music theory has a long tradition of historical and systematic research. The growing impact of cognitive studies, however, has advanced a paradigm shift, stressing the importance of the music user over the structure of the music. The musical experience, therefore, is likely to become a central issue of research, and the methodology of semiotics can be helpful here in providing an elegant formalism for describing both a concrete and abstract way of dealing with music. 2. Dealing with music Dealing with music is a communicative process between the music and the listener. Both meet in the concept of code, defined as the combined repertoire of sender (music) and addressee (listener). The musical code, however, does not consist of elements of a lexicon that refer unambiguously to their referents (Reybrouck 1995). Rather than describing music as a normalized sign system, one can try to uncover the decoding processes of the listener (Serafine 1988). [40] Listening, indeed, is so complex that multiple hearings are possible (Bamberger 1991).

The starting point, therefore, is not the music, but the competence of the listener, and the way he is acquiring listening strategies. Listening, in fact, is not a passive registration of sensory material, but is dependent on cognitive tools such as information processing and perceptual problem solving . Listening is essentially a higher function of the brain (Reybrouck 1989). What really matters, however, is not music as a vibratory phenomenon, but the process of making sense of it. Schooled listening, therefore, involves a kind of mediate knowledge, in the Peircean sense: Mediate knowledge is attained by Reasoning ... It is only necessary to mention here that the Aristotelians distinguished knowledge or of the facts themselves, and knowledge , or of the rational connection of facts, the knowledge of the how and why. (Peirce 1965a). Listening, then, involves a kind of listening strategy, that is the outcome of a learning process. Central in this process is the shaping of the human-environment interaction since the human being is not programmed to react upon the stimuli in a simple stimulus-response process, but in a way that is mediated by a mediating instance. This mediation between the stimulus and the responses can be offered by an external mediator (as in mediated learning experiences, Feuerstein, Rand and Rynders 1988), but internal mediation is possible as well. The pioneering work of Vygotsky (1978) is very important here. Leaning upon Engels concept of human labor and tool use as the means by which man changes nature and transforms himself (Engels 1940), he extended this concept of mediation in human-environment interaction to the use of signs as well as tools: The inventions and use of signs as auxiliary means for solving a given psychological problem (to remember, compare something, report, choose, and so on) is analogous to the invention and use of tools in one psychological respect. The sign acts as an instrument of psychological activity in a manner analogous to the role of a tool in labor. (Vygotsky 1978). The basic analogy between sign and tool rests on the mediating function that characterizes each of them. They may be subsumed under the same category of mediated activity. One major difference, however, is the different way they orient human behavior: The tools function ... is externally oriented; it must lead to changes in objects... The sign, on the other hand, changes nothing in the object of a psychological operation. It is a means of internal activity aimed at mastering oneself, the sign is internally oriented. (Vygotsky 1978). The sign operation, then, requires an intermediate link between the stimulus and the response, as a kind of second order stimulus that is drawn into the operation it fulfills. The result is a new relation between S and R, with the subject being actively engaged in establishing such a link (Vygotsky 1978). In this new process the direct impulse to react is inhibited, and an auxiliary stimulus that facilitates the completion of the operation by indirect means is incorporated.

[41] This auxiliary stimulus transfers the psychological operation to higher and qualitatively new forms of behavior that break away from biological development and create new forms of a culturally-based psychological process. Or, as Vygotsky puts it: All the higher psychic functions are mediated processes and signs are the basic means used to master and direct them. (Vygotsky 1962). 3. The claims of semiotics Using signs and sign processes typically refers to semiotic methodology. There is, however, no agreement as to a general definition of semiotics. Three major descriptions can be distinguished here: semiotics as the science of signs and communication systems, semiotics as a description that leans upon linguistic methodology, and semiotics simply as scientific description (Nattiez 1973a). Musicology has been oriented mostly to the second area, leaning heavily on linguistics. Scholars as Nattiez (1990), Molino (1975) and Ruwet (1975) e.g. are exponents of taxonomic-empirical research. Starting from a neutral level of description the sound (i.e. the empirical data) is classified in an objective and scientific way, using a kind of taxonomy in order to select and identify the classes of objects that can be arranged in terms of similarity and difference. A central topic in this methodology are procedures of division and extraction of structural elements. This way of proceeding has several advantages. It offers decoding strategies that work from text to code, and the structural units are describable in a formal way. To quote Nattiez: ...it is no longer a question of knowing whether one of the fragments ... is a motif or a cellule: it becomes an a, or A, or x, no matter which, possessing certain characteristics, which are defined by a group of features (melodic, rhythmic) which make it possible to compare it and classify it, that is to place it in hierarchy in relation to all the other segments of the piece. At the level of the metalanguage of the analysis one can guess what the immediate tasks of musicology will be: to develop fully a formal, artificial, explicit language which can take into account all the units one can find in music and their combinations. (1973b). This analytical methodology reduces structural units to a purely formal level, stressing the more essential parts and eliminating nonessential aspects as being unimportant. The way of doing this is using signs and symbols instead of real things. Signs, however, represent objects at a reduced level of cues, in the sense that the sign will not call forth all the responses that the object itself will call forth. This is the price we pay for the transposability of the sign system that we use instead of the less transposable original. The advantages, on the other hand, are numerous. Symbolization, in [42] fact, is an important cognitive tool, as a means for conceiving objects,

people or situations that are not physically present. The symbolic or semiotic function, therefore, takes an important place in developmental psychology (Piaget 1951, Vygotsky, 1978, Gardner1985), and is at the core of human representation and communication of knowledge. Representation, however, distances itself from reality, in the sense that to focus on something, one sometimes has to move back. This is the main idea of Cassirers conception of concept: one has to remove the presence (Prsenz) in order to come to representation (Reprsentation) (1954). Symbolic representation, further, uses symbols and signs. The symbol, however, is a general term that needs some conceptual refinement, in order to serve as an operational means for dealing with music. Two concepts are especially important here, the concept of sign and the dimensions of the semiotic process. We take as a starting point the Saussurian distinction between signifiant (that which signifies, the material sign vehicle) and signifi (that which is signified) (Saussure 1967). This dichotomy has been a major contribution to the operational description of the sign process, but is lacking in not including the interpreters mind in the process of semiosis. Semiotics had to wait for Peirce, who put the sign in a triadic relation: A sign, or representamen, is something which stands to somebody for something in some respect or capacity. It addresses somebody, that is, creates in the mind of that person an equivalent sign, or perhaps a more developed sign. That sign which is created, I call the interpretant of the first sign. The sign stands for something, its object. (Peirce 1960). A more operational definition of the semiotic process has been given by Morris, who described it as consisting of a sign vehicle (S), a designatum (D) and an interpretant (I). The following example can be helpful here: in hunting squirrels (D), a dog reacts upon some sound signals (S) by a typical pattern of behavior (I). Or to put it in another way: Semiosis (or sign process) is regarded as a five-term relation - v, w, x, y, z - in which v sets up in w the disposition to react in a certain kind of way ,x, to a certain kind of object y (not then acting as a stimulus), under certain conditions, z. The vs in the cases where this relation obtains, are signs, the ws are interpreters, the xs are interpretants, the ys are significations, and the zs are the contexts in which the signs occurs. (Morris 1964). The sign can be further subdivided with respect to its representational qualities, leading to one of the famous Peircean trichotomies, namely the distinction between icon, index and symbol: An icon is a representamen by virtue of a character which it possesses in itself, and would possess, just the same though its object did not exist... An index is a representamen by virtue of a character

which it could not have if its object did not exist, but which it will continue to [43] have just the same whether it be interpreted as a representamen or not. ... [A symbol is] a representamen which fulfills its functions regardless of any similarity or analogy with its object [icon] and equally regardless of any factual connection therewith [index], but solely and simply because it will be interpreted to be a representamen. (Peirce 1965b). This distinction has important educational perspectives, as it allows us to describe the music in a concrete or an abstract way. The dimensions of the semiotic process, on the other hand, have been elaborated by Morris, with respect to the relation of signs to signs, objects and interpretors: One may study the relations of signs to the objects to which the signs are applicable. These relations will be called the semantical dimension of semiosis. Or the subject of study may be the relations of signs to interpretors. This relation will be called the pragmatical dimension of semiosis ... and since all signs are potentially if not actually related to other signs, it is well to make a third dimension of semiosis co-ordinate with the other two which have been mentioned. This third dimension will be called the syntactical dimension of semiosis. (Morris 1975). 4. Musical semiotics Musical semiotics, ideally, should be the science of musical signs. Signs, however, are rather general and abstract in representing sounding reality. Music, on the other hand, is a sounding art, with the sonorous articulation as a primary category. The problem, then, is a possible tension between a general description of music at an abstract-symbolic level and the idiosyncracies of the concrete sonorous articulation. A somewhat analogous problem has been stated in linguistics by Lotman (1977), speaking of the individualization of the messages . According to this scholar, there is need of a generalized description by means of a semiotic system in the sense of a metalanguage that is referring to an abstract rather than a concrete description of the matter. Some generality, therefore, is necessary in describing concrete events, even if general characteristics are unsatisfactory for describing the full richness of sounding music. Music, furthermore, is a temporal art, that is essentially discursive. The general description we propose should be a kind of conceptualization that refers to the musical signs as analog functions of time, with a possible discretization of the function depending on the grid of categorizations that is laid over the sonorous articulation. This grid reflects the listening strategies of the music user, who can categorize the music in a polythetic or a monothetic way (Schutz, 1971). To

quote Wright: Congeneric meaning is polythetic, that is, it can only be grasped [44] by hearing the music as it unfolds step by step... And further: ... the music can also be described ... whether the music is played at that moment or not, in which case the meaning is monothetic. (1975). The monothetic grasping holds musical Gestalts as an immediate and directly experienced whole, but this is possible only if the discursive process is coded as a discrete entity. Such monothetic grasping of temporal Gestalt can be defined as a combination of actual and virtual impressions of sounds (Reybrouck 1997). The conceptualization concerning these qualities has ontological and epistemological implications, and is closely related to Husserls phenomenology of time (1928) and especially his conception of the synthesizing function of time where a succession of representations is the simultaneous object of a simple act of judgment. Another contribution to the monothetic/polythetic dichotomy is Bambergers distinction between the figural and formal approach. In a figural approach the listener attempts chiefly to the global features of a melodic fragment (getting louder or softer, faster or slower) and to the felt features of groupings (whether a set of tones appears to belong together and to be separated in time from its neighbors). The approach is intuitive, based solely on what is heard irrespective of any theoretical knowledge about music. In contrast, the individual with a formal mode of thought can conceptualize his musical experience in a principled manner. Equipped with propositional knowledge about music as a system, he understands what occurs on a measure-by-measure basis and can analyze passages in terms of their time signature (Bamberger 1991). We are not inclined, however, to follow this distinction. Rather than speaking in terms of a dichotomy, we propose a hybrid model that combines both coding mechanisms in a kind of analog-digital complex, in the sense that perception of music involves acts of categorization, with categories behaving as variables. The categories that lend themselves to perceptual judgment should be conceived as preferential places on a continuum of preverbal contents of consciousness that crystallize into propositions in a logical sense. There is, however, the never ending problem of music as a temporal art. A perceptual judgment proper concerns an instantaneous impression of the linear unfolding of the music, in the sense that the listener selects an entity to which he assigns some properties. Listening, however, cannot be reduced to snapshots of one moment, but has to be directed also to the greater spans of time. The operational description of the predication process, then, breaks down in a number of propositions (assigning predicates to a logical subject) that are actualized at each different time moment, somewhat analogous to the discretization of a continuous curvature in mathematics. The image should be this of a curvature that is cut into slices that can be described as discrete

elements. The size of the elements is not defined a priori, but is dependent upon the listening strategies of the music user. Rather than defining them as fixed [45] elements, one has to conceive of these elements as variables that are dependent upon the predication processes that project themselves on the articulation of time. The predication process, however, is not arbitrary, but is constrained. The model we propose is a layered and hierarchical model. At the lowest level there is the unfolding of time, which we call the independent variable of the first order. At the next level comes the predication process, dividing time in time segments and assigning propositions to them. We call this layer the independent variable of the second order and the predication process of the first order. At the third level there is the grouping of individual propositions to greater units, leaning heavily on the listeners consciousness of time. This layer is a predication proces of second order. Each predication can be conceived as a variable that is dependent upon the lower level of variables . Such a dependent variable, however, can be conceived in turn as an independent variable for the hierarchically higher lever of variables, and so ad infinitum. It is possible, therefore, to distinguish independent variables of the first (the unfolding of physical time), the second (the propositions) and third order (grouping of propositions) with a gradual shift from a more analog to a more digital kind of representation. The hierarchical levels, however, do not exclude each other. They can be the simultaneous object of the listening process, allowing the combination of several listening strategies. 5. The musical sign Analytical descriptions that are applicable to a limited number of cases are lacking scientific generality. Music theory, therefore, must provide the analytical tools that offer more encompassing categories of description. One possibility is semiotic methodology, using musical signs instead of sonorous entities. Assigning to the sounding material the status of signs, however, is not arbitrary. Some conceptual and operational refinement is necessary, therefore, to do this in a motivated way. We take as a starting point the tripartition of Bense (1971) who distinguishes between the sign as a means (Mittel), i.e. the material sign vehicle, that refers to an object and the meaning it is given with respect to an interpretant. Every sign thus operates at three levels that stand in a hierarchical relation to each other. The allocation of signs, therefore, proceeds from the material signal (the means) over the level of object to the level of the interpretant. Starting from a sonorous universe that is theoretically unlimited, it is possible to define musical

configurations as signs These signs can be conceived as functions of the means (Maser 1977), defining the function as a process of giving the elements [46] semantical weight. Every sensory structure that acquires a repeatable and permanent character thus becomes an element of the symbolic repertoire, and can be a possible object of identification. These elements can be conceived as the elements of a psychologically satisfying set of manageable units, and are a subset of a more encompassing sonic universe (Reybrouck 1998). Psychological space, in fact, is a limited space as the potential continuum of physical stimuli is not parallelled by a psychological continuum (Schneider 1994). The mind is operating in a rather discrete manner, assigning stimuli to a set of ordered categories. This is, in fact, categorical perception (see Burns & Ward 1978, Repp 1984, Fricke 1988, Handel 1989, Rakowski 1990, Schneider 1994), reducing numerous objects to a single class. Such a category, therefore, involves a kind of generalization that reflects the qualitative distinction between sensation and thought. The latter refers to a generalized reflection of reality (Vygotsky 1962). Or to put in another way: assigning sense and meaning to an object marks the difference between isolated and categorized perception (Vygotsky 1978). The same conception is advocated by Bruner (1957) perception involves an act of categorization - and an echo of this categorical theory of perception can be found in the work of Edelman (1987). The act of perceptual categorization is likely to be an interesting topic of musical semiotics, since the categories of musical syntax are not normalized categories of a standard repertoire (Reybrouck 1995), but have to be defined in an ad hoc fashion. The central problem here is the relation between the signs as a means and their objects. As contrasted with words or images that can be easily distinguished as a means from the object they are referring to, it is not easy to distinguish the musical means from their objects. Music, indeed, is not referring to extramusical data in an unambiguous way, but is rather referring to itself. What can be defined as the object of the sign process, is not an objective thing, but something that is defined as such by the interpreting mind. One could say, in Saussurian terminology, that signifiant and signifi are melting together. A possible solution to this problem is the distinction between denotation and connotation. To quote Manicas and Kruger: the denotation of a term consists of all those objects of which the term is true. And further: The sense or connotation of a term is the conventional criterion for applying a term. The connotation is the set of characteristics or features which something must have if the term is correctly to apply it. In the strictest sense, the connotation or sense is the meaning of a term and tells us how the term is used by speakers of the language. (1976).

The application of the concept of denotation on music is rather difficult, since there is no standard lexicon. It is possible, however, to use a weaker version of lexical meaning, if one states that the musical sign is referring to itself. The [47] signs, then, should be the elements of a self-referential semantics and denotation should be defined on the basis of a process of recognition through identification and differentiation (Martin 1978). Music, in this sense, is the carrier of immanent meaning, and the sign is a recognizable entity that is assigned some conventional meaning. The denotative aspect of musical semantics, therefore, is not reducible to an extramusical reference in the strictest sense, but is referring to the sonorous articulation. The reference collapses to melt with the musical means (the sonorous articulation), on the understanding that the denotatum acquires some conceptual quality. The denotation of the note g e.g. does not refer to the vibratory sound event, but to the recognition of the category or class that embraces the actualisation of it. The reference, therefore, is not external but internal to the musical system (Imberty 1979). Musical denotata, thus defined, are closely linked to the process of giving meaning. They are not concrete-sounding sonorous events, but the abstract terms that refer to them. What is meant is not the physical datum, but the datum that is disengaged from its existential dependency from the particular thing it is referring to. Defining denotata thus implies a generalized reflection of sonic reality. At a formal level this can be formalized as assigning attributes to the sensory material. This is a proposition in logical sense with the sounding material as subject and the attributes as predicate. The predicates, however, are not gratuitous, but are constrained by the character of the sign as a means and its denotational qualities. At the level of the means one can rely, once again, on the conceptual work of Peirce (1965a), who distinguishes three categories of signs, dependent on the rather qualitative character of the sign (qualisign), the singular or unique character of its appearance (sinsign) and the lawfulness (legisign) of the sign. Translating these terms to the realm of music should read as follows: the sonorous articulation, in its sounding qualities can be defined in terms of qualisigns, the concrete and unique articulation as a sinsign, and the categorization grid of the listener (the propositions) as legisigns. A further refinement, however, of the conceptual apparatus, is possible if one leans upon a further trichotomy of Morris. Depending on the generality of reference he makes the following distinction: In so far as a particular act of pointing can denotate only a single object, it has the state of an index [indexical sign]; if it can denote a plurality of things (such as the term man) then it is combinable in various ways with signs which explicate or restrict the range of its application [characterising sign]; if it can denote everything (such as the

term something), then it has relations with every sign, and so has universal implication, that is to say, it is implicated by every sign within the language [universal sign]. (Morris 1975) [48] The combination of indexical and characterising sign (e.g. this horse) is very fruitful, as this combination unifies the definiteness of the reference of the indexical sign (this horse) with the expectation that is implied in the characterising sign (this horse ). It provides further an operational means for describing the interaction between an abstract and concrete approach of dealing with sound, and it reflects the old epistemological problem of what Scotus called Common Nature and Haecceity. To quote Peirce again: If Socrates is a truly man, there must be something in Socrates which is the basis for that assertion. In addition, there must be a principle by which Socrates is the real, unique, individual he is. Scotus calls the first principle the Common Nature, and the second the Haecceity ... The word haecceity functions like uniqueness ... Then haecceity is the ultimate actualizing entity. (Boler 1963). The musical denotatum, in our conception, is the building block par excellence for describing music. Its delimitation is both dependent on the structural qualities of the sounding material and the semantic loadings of this material by the listener, allowing a description on an extensional and intensional base. This distinction has been advanced by Carnap (1947), in an attempt to bring together the concept of meaning and reference (Sinn und Bedeutung) of Frege (1892) in one operational expression: A one-place predicate designates a property. We call this property the intension of the predicate. By the extension of a predicate we shal understand the class of individuals having the property designated by the predicate. (Carnap 1947). A musical denotatum, then, can be described on an extensional-denotative and intensional-connotative basis, as a proposition in a logical sense, with the subject referring to the denotation and the predicate to the connotations. Musical denotata not only refer to the more objective qualities of sound (sonorous denotata), but they involve connotative properties as well (connotative denotata), on condition that these are identifiable as discrete concepts. Analogous to the discretization of the sonorous universe one can conceive of a connotative universe, with connotative complexes that refer quite unambiguously to recognizabe objects. The objects, then, are not material objects, but clusters of adjectives that are assumed to be almost identical. This whole of moods, affects and emotions is likely to be as important as the sonorous denotation, so that it is possible to speak of connotative denotata (Reybrouck 1995) that act as a common denominator of multiple predicates that are in a way synonymous to each other. The clusters, as elaborated by Hevner (1936) and Farnsworth (1954) and the semantic

differential of Osgood (1952) are interesting tools for allocating dimensions in semantic space. Connotative clusters can be reduced to a single predicate, that can be assigned as one global property to the sonorous material. Defining connotative complexes as [49] denotata, however, allows a reversal of the subject-predicate relationship, with the complex as the subject to which a sonorous predicate can be assigned (Reybrouck 1995). The latter, probably, is the process that takes place while improvising and composing music, with the former referring to the listening process. Important here is the flexibility and the reversibility of the operations. Giving the same status to the subject and the predicate allows us to formalize them in terms of variables that can be filled in at will. 6. From structural to phenomenological approach Defining subject and predicate as variables undermines the concept of musical signs as fixed elements of a pre-established lexicon. This hampers, however, the communication between music and listener. Rather than proceeding in a normative way (from code to text), the music user has to extract and construct the code (from text to code) in an inductive-heuristic way. The delimitation of the syntactic units, therefore, does not refer to the elements of the object domain, but to the way these are given semantical and pragmatical loadings. What matters here is not merely the structure of the stimuli but the nature of the response by the listener. The problem, however, is the supposed similarity between the structure of the world and the structure of the mind: adaequatio rei et intellectus . This scholastic adage reflects the central issues of conflicting epistemological paradigms (nominalism and realism) and has been elaborated by Kant: The conditions of the possibility of experience are also the conditions of the possibility of the objects of experience. (Kant 1781) We are inclined to hold a nominalistic position in claiming the importance of the knowing subject. Listening, in fact, is both a private experience and a higher order coding operation that leans upon learning processes. The former aspect has been a major problem in designing analytical descriptions of dealing with music. There is, as Burke has stated, the principium individuationis with the individuality that is intrinsic to the centrality of the nervous system. It is the listener who allocates his signs and his repertoire. The objects they refer to (the musical denotata), therefore, are not objective entities, but entities that appeal to certain dispositions in the listener, and these are the outcome of both innate competence and learned listening strategies. The listener, in this sense, is an information-processing organism, that behaves as ego cogitans(Husserl 1931), in being actively involved in the construction of interpretation of his sonic world.

This shift from a structural to a rather phenomenological approach has received both conceptual and empirical support. At the conceptual level there are the claims of reception aesthetics, as advanced by Iser (1970) for the realm of [50] linguistics in stating that a text begins to live only when it is read. A work of art, indeed, is not an invariable substance, but an object that must be invested with an intentional correlate. Every text, then, is an empty form that functions as a structure that appeals to the reader. One has to take into account, further, the acculturation process and the role of the learning processes that are mediated by the environment. This factor challenges an empirically unbiased approach to perception. According to Pronko (1987), there are no pristine data uncontaminated by our previously acquired beliefs, assumptions and so forth. To put it in a formal way: observation of x is shaped by prior knowledge of x (Hanson, 1958). Our past experiences determine our perceptions. There are, however, perceptual stimuli that impose their structure in a more compelling way. The responses, then, are getting standardized in some way, so that it is possible to speak of a kind of lexicon. The musical code, therefore, must be distinguished with respect to the more or less compelling nature of its elements. What matters here is the factual organization of the perceptive field and the degree to which it constrains perception. This fact has been stressed by Gestalt theorists (Khler 1929) though we are sceptical of a rectilinear transposition to the domain of music (Reybrouck 1997). The intentions of the listener are of major importance here, since music, as a temporal art, is leaning upon focusing and selecting processes by the music user. To quote Bamberger: the mark of the sophisticated musician is the capacity to shift focus to select for attention multiple kinds of features and relations and to coordinate them in various ways depending on when and what for. This is an ontological problem: on the view that the sense made of phenomena is always a construction ... each of the individual finds in the material and thereby gives existence to aspects that simply do not exist for the other. (1991). There is, however, a solution to this problem, if one relies upon a definition of the concept of code as a complex of relatively invariant systems of rules regulating information processes. These can be classified with respect to their being biologically programmed or culturally acquired. Bystrina (1983) e.g. has advanced a layered model of code. On the phylogenetically earlier primary or hypolinguistic code (the genetic code, intra-organic and perception codes) that involve no learning process are superimposed secondary codes (linguistic or sign codes) that are the outcome of a learning proces, and tertiary hyperlinguistic codes (text or cultural codes that go beyond the level of the individual elements).

This distinction is very fruitful for an operational description of dealing with music. Music, as a sensational art, continuously calls forth sensory processing of acoustic material. Inasmuch as this processing involves some innate mechanism of signal processing of man as a species, one can speak of primary perception [51] codes, that are, in fact, reducible to a limited number of musical universals (Hulse & Page 1988). The human listener, however, is also a learning system that leans upon acquired and learned listening strategies. These involve, in fact, the secondary code. The very concept of code, however, is in danger of reducing semiotic methodology to a set of structural elements. Yet, dealing with music is also a transactional process that is linked with the unfolding of time. Semiotics, as applied to music, must provide the methodological tools for giving a processlike description as well. The solution for this problem is likely to be found in the concept of logical calculus that allows a formal description of the musical structure as well as the structuring process by the listener. The concept of calculus has been elaborated by Carnap in his theoretical work on the logical syntax of language: A calculus is understood as a system of conventions or rules of the following kind. The rules are concerned with elements - the so-called symbols - about which nothing more is assumed than that they are distributed in various classes. Any finite series of these symbols is called an expression of the calculus in question. (1937). The rules involved are formation and transformation rules. The former define an expression as well-formed if it is composed of well-defined symbols that are ordered in a certain way and in a certain kind of succession. The latter determine the way of deducing well-formed expressions from other well-formed expressions. The analogy with the game of chess is helpful here: the pieces functions als symbols, the formation rules determine their position and starting position, and the transformation rules determine the possible moves that can be conceived as possible transformations from one position to another. (Carnap 1937). It is possible to formalize music as a calculus with the formal way of proceeding referring to the metalanguage for describing the process of dealing with music. This idea fits in very well with Leibniz algebra of thoughts and Peirces conception of semiotics that leans heavily on the logics of relation. Music, indeed, is not reducible to isolated units, but can be grasped in greater tension building chains of succession. There is need of a transition from the molecular to the molar sphere (Tolman 1932), from the isolated entities to the level of units with at least some psychological relevance.

To build temporal blocks involves rules of combination and concatenation, and semiotic methodology, once again can be helpful here. The problem, however, remains very complex, since there is the tension between the discretization of the perception process and the more global grasping of larger blocks. The answer probably is to be found in a combination of analog and digital decoding strategies. The time as a continuum can be broken down into discrete moments [52] that capture our attention. To quote Geach: Anybody performs an act of judgment at least as often he makes up his mind how to answer a question; and acts of judgment in this sense are plainly episodic - have a position in a timeseries. (1981). Listening to music, either, is a process of giving meaning that breaks up into a discrete succession of individual acts of predication. These propositions can keep step with the unfolding of time, but they can emancipate themselves from all the temporal and factual constraints. The only way, therefore, to give an account of the listeners dealing with music, is an a posteriori- way that leans on pragmatic methodology. Pragmatics, in fact, is retrospective, in this sense that it proceeds from effects to causes. As Peirce puts it: Consider what effect that might conceivably have practical bearings you conceive the concepts of your conception to have. Then, your whole conception of those effects is the whole of your conception of the objects. (1958). Central in this definition is the great importance of conceiving, as is exemplified in another definition of pragmatics by this father of semiotics: The entire intellectual purpose of any symbol consists in the total of all general modes of rational conduct which conditionally upon all the possible different circumstances and desires, would ensue upon the acceptance of the symbol. (1958) We are inclined, therefore, to move from a structuralistic description of the sound to a kind of structuring by the listener, with a corresponding shift from a mere syntactic to a pragmatic level of description. 7. Pragmatics and the unfolding of time. Starting from the sonorous universe, one can delimitate configurations and assign to them the status of sign. The result is a semantical system with signs as basic elements that build relations between the signifying means and signified objects. In building such a semantical system one can proceed in a way analogous to the building of syntactic systems: defining elements with elementary meaning, putting them together in a basic set and formulating rule systems for defining signs and combining them to supersigns. Such a way of proceeding is classical in stating that meanings are static, discrete and objective. These principles, however, are hampering communicative interaction between

sender and addressee. A transclassical model, therefore, defines the elements as subjective, process-like and non-discrete (Maser 1977). The same is true of a pragmatic description of dealing with music. At this level it is the user who makes sense of the music, rather than the music forcing its structure upon the listener (Rsing, 1981). There is an interaction between the sonorous articulation and the perception by the listerer, not in a behavioristic [53] manner, with normalized stimuli and standard responses, but in a neobehavioristic way, in the sense that the responses are not fixed but constrained. Some properties of musical patterns are indeed more compelling and imperative than others as is exemplified by the collative properties of Berlyne (novelty, surprisingness, complexity, ambiguity and puzzlingness) (1971) and Gestalt principles of perception (Leman 1997 ). Besides, there are also cultural constraints. Some predication processes, therefore, are rather predictable, with propositions that can be conceived as the elements of a lexicon to the extent that they become identifiable and repeatable as such. This lexicon, however, is dependent upon the listeners competence. If he does not answer to the stimuli, then there is no proposition in the proper sense. Rather than speaking of stimuli propositions, one can speak of response propositions (Lang 1977), conceiving of the reactions as being more important than the stimuli. Reactions, furthermore, can be propositional, but they can have a temporal course as well. The example of a bodily movement can be helpful here. Dancing a pirouette e.g. can have a schematic representation in the mind. The act of dancing, however, is dependent on articulation through time, involving minute specifications for adjusting the movement to the needs of the moment. Also music is a temporal art. The response propositions, therefore, can be monothetic or polythetic. We are inclined, however, to weaken this distinction, leaning on the subtle conceptual apparatus of the English use of passive auxiliaries. Decoding the unfolding of time in terms of a substantive is rather problematic. A description in transformational terms is likely to be more convenient (Palmer 1977). Passive constructions, in fact, are possible only with transitive verbs that refer to a possible object hat undergoes a transformation. Applied to music one can substitue the listener for the object. The listener, then, is inbedded in the unfolding of time and is carried from one time moment to another. Another distinction was advanced by Stein (1979) who contrasts auxiliaries as to be with to become, to get and to grow. To get has been studied extensively since its characteristics are quite clear: 1. to get is colloquial, 2. it has an actional meaning, 3. a. it has a perfective aspect, b. it has a mutative

meaning, c. it represents a resultative copula, d. it reports both the action and the resultant state, 4. it has ingressive forces, 5. it is rarely followed by an animate agent. What is meant here is an action verb that is linked strongly to the moment. To become, on the contrary is a process verb that can be described as 1. being actional, 2. expressing a durative aspect, 3. denoting gradual change, 4. expressing incipient action, 5. being rarely combined with adverbials denoting rapidity, such as quickly, rapidly, etc. What is referred to are non-momentary actions without sudden changes. [54] Applied to music, one can state that music has some effects on the mental, psychological and physical state of the listener. The action that calls forth the effects is a process that involves both an action (to become) and a result (to get). Real involvement with music, therefore, is dependent on the sonorous articulation and the unfolding of time, and cannot be gathered from mere symbolic representation, as musical signs at a mere symbolic level do not induce pragmatic responses. 8. Educational perspectives Dealing with music is a complex process that leans upon the higher functions of the brain. Many of the listening strategies that are typical of schooled listening are the outcome of learning processes. Using signs and propositions offers an operational tool for mediating between the music and the reactions of the listener. Ideally, there should be a one-to-one correspondence between the sounding events and the acts of judgment by the listener. In reality, the number of propositions mostly does not match the number of sensory realia. Educational mediation therefore has to direct the attention of the listener to the proper articulation of sound, laying a grid of categorization on its unfolding. The propositions, then, can be distinguished with respect to the temporal span they are referring to and to the level of abstraction. The Peircean distinction between icon, index and symbol, once again, is likely to be an interesting starting point for developing listening skills. At the lowest level of abstraction, there is the structural information that is iconic and that can keep step with the sonorous articulation. At the next level comes indexical knowledge that is linked in a causal-empirical way with the object of perception. We suggest to conceive of the motor responses (manifest and internalized) and the other effector reactions that are induced by the music as index. At the highest level, finally, there is symbolic knowledge with its representational contents being independent of the sensory material. At this level, one can operate in a formal way, reducing the process of semiosis to a mere syntactical level. We are inclined, however, to advocate a way of dealing with music where the symbolic processes are grafted

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