BENJAMIN MASANGCAY, petitioner, vs.

THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,

respondent.Godofredo A. Ramos and Ruby SalazarAlberto for petitioner. Office of the Solicitor General and Dominador D. Dayot for respondent. BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.: Benjamin Masangcay, with several others, was on October 14, 1957 charged before the Commission on Election with contempt for having opened three boxes bearing serial numbers l-8071, l-8072 and l8073 containing official and sample ballots for the municipalities of the province of Aklan, in violation of the instructions of said Commission embodied in its resolution promulgated September 2, 1957, and its unnumbered resolution date March 5, 1957, inasmuch as he opened said boxes not the presence of the division superintendent of schools of Aklan, the provincial auditor, and the authorized representatives of the Nacionalista Party, the Liberal Party and the Citizens' Party, as required in the aforesaid resolutions, which are punishable under Section 5 of the Revised Election Code and Rule 64 of the Rules of Court. Masangcay was then the provincial treasurer of Aklan designated by the Commission in its resolution in Case CE-No. 270, part II 2 (b) thereof, to take charge of the receipt and custody of the official ballots, election forms and supplies, as well as of their distribution, among the different municipalities of the province. In compliance with the summons issued to Masangcay and his co-respondents to appear and show cause why they should not be punished for contempt on the basis of the aforementioned charge, they all appeared before the Commission on October 21, 1957 and entered a plea of not guilty. Thereupon, evidence was presented by both the prosecution and the defense, and on December 16, 1957 the Commission rendered its decision finding Masangcay and his co-respondent Molo guilty as charged and sentencing each of them to suffer three months imprisonment and pay a fine of P500, with

subsidiary imprisonment of two months in case of insolvency, to be served in the provincial jail of Aklan. The other respondents were exonerated for lack of evidence. Masangcay brought the present petition for review raising as main issue the constitutionality of Section 5 of the Revised Election Code which grants the Commission on Elections as well as its members the power to punish acts of contempt against said body under the same procedure and with the same penalties provided for in Rule 64 of the Rules of Court in that the portion of said section which grants to the Commission and members the power to punish for contempt is unconstitutional for it infringes the principle underlying the separation of powers that exists among the three departments of our constitutional form of government. In other words, it is contended that, even if petitioner can be held guilty of the act of contempt charged, the decision is null and void for lack of valid power on the part of the Commission to impose such disciplinary penalty under the principle of separation of powers. There is merit in the contention that the Commission on Elections lacks power to impose the disciplinary penalty meted out to petitioner in the decision subject of review. We had occasion to stress in the case of Guevara v. The Commission on 1 Elections that under the law and the constitution, the Commission on Elections has only the duty to enforce and administer all laws to the conduct of elections, but also the power to try, hear and decide any controversy that may be submitted to it in connection with the elections. In this sense, said, the Commission, although it cannot be classified a court of justice within the meaning of the Constitution (Section 30, Article VIII), for it is merely an administrative body, may however exercise quasijudicial functions insofar as controversies that by express provision law come under its jurisdiction. The difficulty lies in drawing the demarcation line between the duty which inherently is administrative in character and a function which calls for the exercise of the quasi-judicial function of the Commission. In the same case, we also expressed the view that when the Commission exercises a

ministerial function it cannot exercise the power to punish contempt because such power is inherently judicial in nature, as can be clearly gleaned from the following doctrine we laid down therein: . . . In proceeding on this matter, it only discharged a ministerial duty; it did not exercise any judicial function. Such being the case, it could not exercise the power to punish for contempt as postulated in the law, for such power is inherently judicial in nature. As this Court has aptly said: 'The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts; its existence is essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings, and to the enforcement of judgments, orders and mandates courts, and, consequently, in the administration of justice (Slade Perkins v. Director of Prisons, 58 Phil., 271; U.S. v. Lee Hoc, 36 Phil., 867; In Re Sotto, 46 O.G., 2570; In Re Kelly, Phil., 944). The exercise of this power has always been regarded as a necessary incident and attribute of courts (Slade Perkins v. Director of Prisons, Ibid.). Its exercise by administrative bodies has been invariably limited to making effective the power to elicit testimony (People v. Swena, 296 P., 271). And the exercise of that power by an administrative body in furtherance of its administrative function has been held invalid (Langenberg v. Lecker, 31 N.E., 190; In Re Sims, 37 P., 135; Roberts v. Hacney, 58 SW., 810).1awphl.nt In the instant case, the resolutions which the Commission tried to enforce and for whose violation the charge for contempt was filed against petitioner Masangcay merely call for the exercise of an administrative or ministerial function for they merely concern the procedure to be followed in the distribution of ballots and other election paraphernalia among the different municipalities. In fact, Masangcay, who as provincial treasurer of Aklan was the one designated to take charge of the receipt, custody and distribution of election supplies in that province, was charged with having opened three boxes containing official ballots for distribution among several municipalities in violation of the instructions of the Commission which enjoin that the same cannot be opened except in the presence of

the division superintendent of schools, the provincial auditor, and the authorized representatives of the Nacionalista Party, the Liberal Party, and the Citizens' Party, for he ordered their opening and distribution not in accordance with the manner and procedure laid down in said resolutions. And because of such violation he was dealt as for contempt of the Commission and was sentenced accordingly. In this sense, the Commission has exceeded its jurisdiction in punishing him for contempt, and so its decision is null and void. Having reached the foregoing conclusion, we deem it unnecessary to pass on the question of constitutionality raised by petitioner with regard to the portion of Section 5 of the Revised Election Code which confers upon the Commission on Elections the power to punish for contempt for acts provided for in Rule 64 of our rules of court. WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from insofar as petitioner Benjamin Masangcay is concerned, as well as the resolution denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration, insofar as it concerns him, are hereby reversed, without pronouncement as to costs.

MONTEJO v. COMELEC Facts:

The province of Leyte is composed of 5 legislative districts. Biliran, located in the third district of Leyte, was made its sub-province by virtue of RA 2141. When Biliran was converted into a regular province, 8 municipalities of the third district composed the new province. As a consequence, the composition of the third district was reduced to 5 municipalities. To remedy the resulting inequality in the distribution of inhabitants, voters and municipalities in Leyte, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2736 where it transferred the municipality of Capoocan of the second district and the municipality of Palompon of the fourth district to the third district of Leyte.

AKBAYAN-YOUTH v. COMELEC Facts:

Petitioners in this case represent the youth sector and they seek to seek to direct COMELEC to conduct a special registration before the May 14, 2001 General Elections, of new voters ages 18 to 21. According to them, around four million youth failed to register on or before the December 27, 2000 deadline set by the respondent COMELEC. However, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 3584 disapproving the request for additional registration of voters on the ground that Section 8 of R.A. 8189 explicitly provides that no registration shall be conducted during the period starting one hundred twenty (120) days before a regular election and that the Commission has no more time left to accomplish all pre-election activities. Aggrieved by the denial, petitioners filed before the SC the instant which seeks to set aside and nullify respondent COMELECs Resolution and/or to declare Section 8 of R. A. 8189 unconstitutional insofar as said provision effectively causes the disenfranchisement of petitioners and others similarly situated. Likewise, petitioners pray for the issuance of a writ of mandamus directing respondent COMELEC to conduct a special registration of new voters and to admit for registration petitioners and other similarly situated young Filipinos to qualify them to vote in the May 14, 2001 General Elections.

Issue:
Whether or not the COMELEC has the power to transfer municipalities from one legislative district to another legislative district

Held:
The COMELEC relies on the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution as the source of its power of redistricting which is traditionally regarded as part of the power to make laws. But based on the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, it denied to the COMELEC the major power of legislative apportionment as it itself exercised the power. Section 2 of the Ordinance only empowered the COMELEC to make minor adjustments of the reapportionment made. Consistent with the limit of its power to make minor adjustments, Sec. 3 of the Ordinance did not also give the COMELEC any authority to transfer municipalities from one legislative district to another district. It may well be that the conversion of Biliran from a sub-province to a regular province brought about an imbalance in the distribution of voters and inhabitants in the 5 legislative districts of Leyte. But the issue involves a problem of reapportionment of legislative districts and petitioners remedy lies with Congress. Section 5(4), Art. VI of the Constitution categorically gives Congress the power to reapportion. The Court held that COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it promulgated a resolution transferring the municipality of Capoocan of the second district and the municipality of Palompon of the fourth district to the third district of Leyte.

Issues:
1. Whether or not respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing COMELEC Resolution 2. Whether or not the SC can compel respondent COMELEC to conduct a special registration of new voters during the period between the COMELECs imposed December 27, 2000 deadline and the May 14, 2001 general elections.

Held:
1. No
The right of suffrage invoked by petitioners is not at all absolute. The exercise of the right of suffrage, as in the enjoyment of all other rights is subject to

existing substantive and procedural requirements embodied in our Constitution, statute books and other repositories of law. As to the procedural limitation, the right of a citizen to vote is necessarily conditioned upon certain procedural requirements he must undergo: among others, the process of registration. Specifically, a citizen in order to be qualified to exercise his right to vote, in addition to the minimum requirements set by the fundamental charter, is obliged by law to register, at present, under the provisions of Republic Act No. 8189, otherwise known as the VotersRegistration Act of 1996. Section 8, of the R.A. 8189, explicitly provides that No registration shall, however, be conducted during the period starting one hundred twenty (120) days before a regular election and ninety (90) days before a special election. The 100-day prohibitive period serves a vital role in protecting the integrity of the registration process. Without the prohibitive periods, the COMELEC would be deprived of any time to evaluate the evidence on the application. If we compromise on these safety nets, we may very well end up with a voter s list full of flying voters, overflowing with unqualified registrants, populated with shadows and ghosts . Likewise, petitioners invoke the so called standby powers or resi dual powers of the COMELEC, as provided under the relevant provisions of Sec. 28 of RA 8436 Designation of Other Dates for Certain Pre- election Acts. The act of registration is concededly, by its very nature, a pre-election act. Under Section 3(a) of R.A. 8189, (a) Registration refers to the act of accomplishing and filing of a sworn application for registration by a qualified voter before the election officer of the city or municipality wherein he resides and including the same in the book of registered voters upon approval by the Election Registration Board. It bears emphasis that the provisions of Section 29 of R.A. 8436 invoked by herein petitioners and Section 8 of R.A. 8189 volunteered by respondent COMELEC, far from contradicting each other. SC hold that Section 8 of R.A. 8189 applies in the present case, for the purpose of upholding the assailed COMELEC Resolution and denying the instant petitions, considering that the aforesaid law explicitly provides that no registration shall be conducted during the period starting one hundred twenty (120) days before a regular election. The provisions of Section 28, R.A. 8436 would come into play in cases where the pre-election acts are susceptible of performance

within the available period prior to election day.The stand-by power of the respondent COMELEC under Section 28 of R.A. 8436, presupposes the possibility of its being exercised or availed of, and not otherwise. Moreover, the petitioners in the instant case are not without fault or blame. They admit in their petition that they failed to register, for whatever reason, within the period of registration and came to this Court and invoked its protective mantle not realizing, so to speak, the speck in their eyes. Impuris minibus nemo accedat curiam. Let no one come to court with unclean hands. Well-entrenched is the rule in our jurisdiction that the law aids the vigilant and not those who slumber on their rights.Vigilantis sed non dormientibus jura in re subveniunt. 2.NO SC believes that petitioners failed to establish, to the satisfaction of this Court, that they are entitled to the issuance of this extraordinary writ so as to effectively compel respondent COMELEC to conduct a special registration of voters.

Kabataan Party-List vs. Comelec

COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8585 on February 12, 2009 adjusting the deadline of voter registration for the May 10, 2010 national and local elections to October 31, 2009, instead of December 15, 2009 as previously fixed by Resolution No. 8514. The intense public clamor for an extension of the October 31, 2009 deadline notwithstanding, the COMELEC stood firm in its decision not to extend it, arguing mainly that it needs ample time to prepare for the automated elections. Via the present Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus filed on October 30, 2009, petitioners challenge the validity of COMELEC Resolution No. 8585 and seek a declaration of its nullity.

ANG LADLAD LGBT PARTY V. COMELEC, GR No. 190582, April 8, 2010

This is a Petition forCertiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, with an application for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, filed by Ang Ladlad LGBT Party (Ang Ladlad) against the Resolutions of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) dated November 11, 2009 (the First Assailed Resolution) and December 16, 2009 (the Second Assailed Resolution) in SPP No. 09-228 (PL) (collectively, the Assailed Resolutions). The case has its roots in the COMELECs refusal to accredit Ang Ladlad as a party-list organization under Republic Act (RA) No. 7941, otherwise known as the Party-List System Act.

Issue: Does the Comelec have discretion to fix other

dates for continuing registration?

FACTS:
Before the COMELEC, petitioner argued that the LGBT (lesbians, gays, bisexuals and transgender) community is a marginalized and under-represented sector that is particularly disadvantaged because of their sexual orientation and gender identity; that LGBTs are victims of exclusion, discrimination, and violence; that because of negative societal attitudes, LGBTs are constrained to hide their sexual orientation; and that Ang Ladlad complied with the 8-point guidelines enunciated by this Court inAng Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections. Ang Ladlad laid out its national membership base consisting of individual members and organizational supporters, and outlined its platform of governance. On August 17, 2009, Ang Ladlad filed a Petition for registration with the COMELEC. On November 11, 2009, after admitting the petitioners evidence, the COMELEC (Second Division) dismissed the Petition on moral grounds that petitioner tolerates immorality which offends religious beliefs, and advocates sexual immorality. Petitioner should likewise be denied accreditation not only for advocating immoral doctrines but likewise for not being truthful when it said that it or any of its nominees/party-list representatives have not violated or failed to comply with laws, rules, or regulations relating to the elections. Furthermore, states COMELEC, Ang Ladlad will be exposing our youth to an environment that does not conform to the teachings of our faith. When Ang Ladlad sought reconsideration, COMELEC still, on December 16, 2010, upheld the First Assailed Resolution.

Held: The clear text of the law thus decrees that

voters be allowed to register daily during regular offices hours, except during the period starting 120 days before a regular election and 90 days before a special election. Both R.A. No. 6646, Section 29 and R.A. No. 8436, Section 28 grant the COMELEC the power to fix other periods and dates for pre-election activities only if the same cannot be reasonably held within the period provided by law. This grant of power, however, is for the purpose of enabling the people to exercise the right of suffrage the common underlying policy of RA 8189, RA 6646 and RA 8436. In the present case, the Court finds no ground to hold that the mandate of continuing voter registration cannot be reasonably held within the period provided by RA 8189, Sec. 8 daily during office hours, except during the period starting 120 days before the May 10, 2010 regular elections. There is thus no occasion for the COMELEC to exercise its power to fix other dates or deadlines therefor.

On January 4, 2010, Ang Ladlad a Petition, praying that the Supreme Court annul the Assailed Resolutions and direct the COMELEC to grant Ang Ladlads application for accreditation.Ang Ladlad also sought the issuance ex parte of a preliminary mandatory injunction against the COMELEC, which had previously announced that it would begin printing the final ballots for the May 2010 elections by January 25, 2010.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the denial of accreditation by COMELEC, violated the constitutional guarantees against the establishment of religion. insofar as it justified the exclusion by using religious dogma. 2. Whether or not the Assailed Resolutions contravened the constitutional rights to privacy, freedom of speech and assembly, and equal protection of laws, of Ang Ladlad, as well as constituted violations of the Philippines international obligations against discrimination based on sexual orientation.

HELD:
1. Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. At bottom, what our nonestablishment clause calls for is government neutrality in religious matters. Clearly, governmental reliance on religious justification is inconsistent with this policy of neutrality. The Supreme Court ruled that it was grave violation of the non-establishment clause for the COMELEC to utilize the Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad. Rather than relying on religious belief, the legitimacy of the Assailed Resolutions should depend, instead, on whether the COMELEC is able to advance some justification for its rulings beyond mere conformity to religious doctrine. The government must act for secular purposes and in ways that have primarily secular effects.

2. The Assailed Resolutions have not identified any specific overt immoral act performed by Ang Ladlad. Even the Office of the Solicitor General agrees that there should have been a finding by the COMELEC that the groups members have committed or are committing immoral acts. Respondent have failed to explain what societal ills are sought to be prevented, or why special protection is required for the youth. Under our system of laws, every group has the right to promote its agenda and attempt to persuade society of the validity of its position through normal democratic means. Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic society, and this freedom applies not only to those that are favorably received but also to those that offend, shock, or disturb. Absent of any compelling state interest, it is not for the COMELEC or the Supreme Court, to impose its views on the populace. Otherwise stated, the COMELEC is certainly not free to interfere with speech for no better reason than promoting an approved message or discouraging a disfavored one. Laws of general application should apply with equal force to LGBTs, and they deserve to participate in the party-list system on the same basis as other marginalized and under-represented sectors. This is in accord with the countrys international obligations to protect and promote human rights. The principle of nondiscrimination as it relates to the right to electoral participation, enunciated in the UDHR and the ICCPR should be recognized. The Constitution and laws should be applied uninfluenced by public opinion. True democracy should be resilient enough to withstand vigorous debate due to conflicting opinions. The Petition was GRANTED. The Resolutions of the Commission on Elections dated November 11, 2009 and December 16, 2009 in SPP No. 09-228 (PL) was SET ASIDE and the COMELEC was directed to GRANT petitioners application for party-list accreditation.

ANG BAGONG BAYANI V. COMELEC) FACTS:

The Omnibus Resolution No. 3785 issued by the COMELEC is challenged insofar as it approves the participation of 154 organizations and parties in the 2001 party-list elections. Petitioners seek the disqualification of private respondents as the partylist system was intended to benefit the marginalized and underrepresented and not the mainstream political parties. The COMELEC received several petitions for registration filed by sectoral parties, etc. for the 2001 elections. The COMELEC allege that verifications for the qualifications of these parties take a long process and as a result the 2 divisions promulgated a separate Omnibus Resolution and individual resolution on political parties only on February 10, 2001. Before the February 12, 2001 deadline, the registered parties and organizations filed their Manifestations, stating their intention to participate in the party-list elections. The COMELEC approved the Manifestations of 154 parties and organizations but denied those of several others. ACAP filed before the COMELEC a petition praying that the names of some respondents be deleted from the Certified List of Political PartiesParticipating in the Party List System for the May 14, 2001 Elections. It also prayed that the votes cast for the said respondents be not counted or canvassed and that the latters nominees not be proclaimed. Bayan Muna and Bayan Muna-Youth also filed a similar petition against some of the respondents.

collation of parties. Sec. 11 of the same Act leaves no doubt as to the participation of political parties in the party-list system. Indubitable, political parties even the major ones-may participate in the party-list elections.

ISSUE 2: WON the party-list system is exclusive to

marginalized and underrepresented sectors and organizations For political parties to participate in the party-list elections their requisite character must be consistent with the purpose of the partylist system in the Constitution and RA 7941. The purpose of the party-list system is to give genuine power to our people in Congress. However, the constitutional provision is not self- executory, hence RA 7941 was enacted. Proportional representation does not refer to the number of people in a particular district, because the party-list election is national in scope. It refers to the representation of the marginalized and underrepresented as exemplified in Section 5 of the Act. The party- list organization must factually and truly represent the marginalized and underrepresented constituencies. The persons nominated to the party-list system must also belong to the underrepresented and marginalized sectors, organizations and parties. Lack of well-defined constituency refers to the absence of a traditionally identifiable electoral group. It points to those with disparate interests defined with the marginalized and underrepresented. In the end, the COMELECs role is to see to it that only those Filipinos who are marginalized and underrepresented become members of Congress under the party- list system. Not all sectors can be represented under the partylist system. The law crafted to address the peculiar disadvantages of Payatas hovel dwellers cannot be appropriated by the mansion owners of Forbes Park. While the mega-rich are numerically speaking, a minority, they are neither marginalized nor underrepresented. It is illogical to open the system to those who have long been within it those privileged sectors that have long dominated the congressional district elections. The SC held that it cannot allow the party-list system to be sullied and prostituted by those who are neither marginalized nor underrepresented. Mendoza, dissenting: The text of Art. VI, Sec. 5(1)(2) provides for a party-list system of registered,

ISSUE 1: WON political parties may participate in

the party-list elections. The SC held that under the Constitution and RA 7941, private respondents cannot be disqualified from the party-list elections, merely on the ground that they are political parties. Sec. 7 and 8, Article IX-C provides that political parties may be registered under the partylist system. In the ConCom deliberations, Com. Monsod stated that the purpose of the party-list provision was to open up the system, in order to give a chance to parties that consistently place 3rd or 4th in congressional district elections to win a seat in Congress. Sec. 3 of RA 7941 provides that a party is either a political party or a sectoral party or a

regional and sectoral parties or organizations, and not for sectoral representation. It provides for no basis for petitioners contention that whether it is sectoral representation or party-list system the purpose is to provide exclusive representation for marginalized sectors. The Record of the ConCom speaks clearly against the petitioners assertion. Two proposals for additional representation in the House of Representatives were submitted namely, sectoral representation and party-list system. These two are not the same. In the end, the ConCom chose the party-list system. In choosing this system, the ConCom did not intend to reserve the party-list system to the marginalized or underrepresented. In fact, the party-list system mandates the opposite. Furthermore, Justice Mendoza holds that the majority misapprehended the meaning of Section 2 of RA No. 7941. The provision states that the purpose of the party-list system is to promote promotional representation in the election of representatives in the House of Representatives. To this end, a full, free and open party system is guaranteed to obtain the broadest possible representation of a party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives. While the representation of the marginalized and underrepresented sectors is a basic purpose of the law, it is not its only purpose.

project organized or an entity funded or assisted by the government, (5) party must not comply with the requirements of the law, (6) not only the candidate party or organization must represent marginalized and underrepresented sectors, so also must its nominees, (7) the nominee must likewise be able to contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole.

ISSUE 3: WON the COMELEC committed grave

abuse of discretion in promulgating Omnibus Resolution No. 3785.

The SC held that it is proper to remand the case to the COMELECT to determine whether the 154 parties and organizations allowed to participate
in the party-list elections comply with the requirements of the law. In light of this, the SC provides for guidelines to assist the COMELEC in its work. (1) The political partymust represent the marginalized and underrepresented groups identified in Section 5 of RA 7941, (2) Even if major political parties are allowed to participate in the party-list system, they must comply with the declared statutory policy of enabling Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors to be elected to the House of Representatives, (3) a party or an organization must not be disqualified under Section 6 of the Act which enumerates the grounds for disqualification, (4) the party or organization must not be an adjunct of, or a

Penera, Rosalinda A. vs. COMELEC and Edgar T.Andanar FACTS:

Petitioner and private respondents were candidates for mayor of the Municipality of Sta.Monica, Surigao del Norte in the last May 2007 elections. The former filed her certificate of candidacy on the day before the prescribed campaign period. When she went to the COMELEC Office for filing she was accompanied by her partymates. Thereafter, they had a motorcade which was consist of two trucks and ten motorcycles running around the municipality convincing the residents to vote for her and the other candidates of their political party. Due to this, private respondent filed a petition against her alleging premature campaigning as provided in the Omnibus Election Code Section 80 which says: Election or partisan political activity outside campaign period.--- It shall be unlawful for any person, whether or not a voter or candidate, or for any party, or association of persons, to engage in an election campaign or partisan political activity except during the campaign period. She argued that she is not guilty since she was not yet a candidate at that time and the campaign period has not yet started when the motorcade was conducted. While the petition was pending in the COMELEC, she was voted as mayor and took her office thereafter. The COMELEC Second Division decided in favor of the complainant and found her guilty of premature campaigning. Likewise, when she appealed in the COMELEC En Banc, the previous decision was affirmed. Subsequently, she filed with the Supreme Court which decided against her. It held that the conduct of the motorcade is a form of election campaign or partisan political activity, falling under Section 79(b)(2) of the Omnibus Election Code which says: *h+olding political caucuses, conferences, meetings, rallies, parades, or other similar assemblies, for the purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign or propaganda for or against a candidate*.+ Furthermore, it was held that she should vacate the position. Now, she comes for a motion for reconsideration using the same arguments.

RULING: No, she is not.

Any act is lawful unless expressly declared unlawful by law. It is enough that Congress stated that any unlawful act or omission applicable to a candidate shall take effectonly upon the start of the campaign period. So, it is lawful if done before the start of the campaign period. This plain language of the law need not be construed further. Moreover, on the day of the motorcade, she was not yet a candidate for. As what was decided in the Lanot Case which says that prior to the campaign period, even if the candidate has filed his/her certificate of candidacy, he/she is not yet considered as a candidate for purposes other than the printing of ballots. Hence, she cannot be guilty of premature campaigning for in the first place there is no candidate to talk about. What she did was an exercise of her freedom of expression.

JUDGMENT:
WHEREFORE, we GRANT petitioner Rosalinda A. Peneras Motion for Reconsideration. We SET ASIDE the Decision of this Court in G.R. No. 181613 promulgated on 11 September 2009, as well as the Resolutions dated 24 July 2007 and 30 January 2008 of the COMELEC Second Division and the COMELEC En Banc, respectively, in SPA No. 07-224. Rosalinda A. Penera shall continue as Mayor of Sta. Monica, Surigao del Norte.

DISSENTING OPINIONS: Chico-Nazario, J:

It is obvious that the motorcade was planned to gain more votes from their constituents. Even if she was not yet a candidate at that time, she can he held guilty of premature campaigning as an ordinary citizen committing the prohibited act. But the fact that Penera was not yet a candidate before she actually handed in her certificate of candidacy to the designated COMELEC official does not exempt her from the prohibition against engaging in premature election campaign. Section 80 which imposes the ban ensnares any person, even a non-candidate.

ISSUE: Is petitioner guilty of premature

campaigning?