Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Networks
Margaret F. Reid,
Associate Professor
University of Arkansas
Department of Political Science
Fayetteville, AR 72701
T: 479-575-5352 mreid@uark.edu
Session 8.5
1
Abstract
The paper argues that the urban regime model can be salvaged as a useful approach to
examining urban policy issues if it is seen within a multi-level and multi-sectoral
governance context. The advantage of this expansion is three-fold: for one the model
reflects contingencies that explain some of the differences within country and between
country experiences; two, it expands the focus beyond its traditional interest in
(economic) elite regime actors to the interactions of key policy-makers and the resulting
choice sets that determine policy outcomes; finally it links to the developing literature of
inter-organizational networks. In contemporary service environments governance
arrangements are largely hybrids rather than pure forms-- hierarchies as well as
networks—to relate broader policy level issues (urban regime) to provision of services
(contracting regimes). It is not always clear however which services are provided and to
whom; the nature of the urban regime may shed some light on these decisions.
2
Introduction
urban service delivery must be seen in its historical institutional context. Service delivery
has occurred via a multitude of channels from the beginning of United States and many
other countries before the creation of modern welfare states. Hall’s (1987) historical
recounting of the role of nonprofits noted their almost immediate central role as service
providers, long before they were enlisted by private philanthropies and later the public
In the second part of the 20th century, services have been delivered through a
limited number of preferred mechanisms (Savas 2002): directly through public agencies
the federal/national to state and/or local levels requires a renewed examination of these
(Smith and Lipsky 1993). Policy shifts generically termed as “devolution” are driven by
several ideological factors: that the public sector is “too big”, that non-governmental
service providers or markets are more efficient or caring in what they do, and that
services are best delivered closest to where they are needed (subsidiarity). Notably, both
public and nonprofit organizations have been called upon to behave in a more business-
like manner which presumably means for them to be better stewards of their resources
3
and to show greater responsiveness to the clients they serve. 1 The question however
remains if and how the underlying behaviors of dominant regime actors can be or are
influenced by such changes (McAdam et al. 2001). In poor urban districts in Southern
California researches Joassart-Marcelli and Wolch (2003: p.) found that while there are
increasing numbers of nonprofits serving poor communities, the poorest are the least well
supported:
Nonprofits tend to gravitate to areas where they can mobilize resources, locations
characterized by lower unemployment, a higher proportion of married families,
and higher education. Although this is a rational behavior, this may have the
indirect effect of physically separating antipoverty organizations from those most
in need.
democracies are attempting to develop their social capital, encourage volunteering and
other forms of civic participation across sectarian lines, the balkanization of special
Smith (2000) for example note that reliance on volunteers and close-knit social networks
The rapid speed with which these new multi-actor and/or multi-purpose service
arrangements are diffused throughout the world is even more astounding in light of the
fact that “there is little evidence that governments or academics know much about how to
govern or manage networks” effectively (Milward & Provan 2000: 260; Collinge &
1
Note the recent article by Durst and Newell (2001) on the differential effects of “reinvention”
on nonprofits compared to their public counterparts.
4
Srbljanin 2002,2003).2 Moreover, many of these discussions have not been linked to
earlier state-centered theorizing of the 1970s and thus lack a fundamental theoretical
explicitly emphasizes the shift from “public agency and program to distinctive tools or
instruments through which public purposes are pursued” (p. 9). Tool choices cannot be,
however, as Peters outlines in the same volume, de-linked from institutional choices (p.
approaches become the preferred policy and program tools for those who wield the power
to select them. On normative grounds, some observers have begun to question the
“marketization” of both public and nonprofit organizations with its attendant problems
for the sustenance of democratic and civic values (e.g.,Denhardt & Denhardt 2002;
Eikenberry & Kluver 2004). The boundaries between polis and market however are
artificial ones and in constant flux. Thus prescribed policy tools can never be solely
argument misses a more important issue: efficient/effective to do what and for whom?
or worse. Rather, governance involves a continuum of contingent choices that under the
2
Multi-purpose alliances are typical outcomes of policies that require direct collaboration and
coordination of public agencies, of public agencies with private employers (e.g., workforce
development) or nonprofits (e.g.,CDCs)
5
best of circumstances provide for input from many of the players. All produce temporary
arrangements that are sufficient to resolve outstanding problems – until they are replaced
environments governance arrangements are hybrids rather than pure forms: hierarchical
for one purpose, to e.g., assure accountability, resembling networks for improved
information and decisionmaking purposes (Oliver 1990). Such service arrangements are
similar to border regions between countries: some for either historical, economic or
political reasons produce hierarchical modes of interaction while others prefer more
cooperative policy making modes (see e.g. Blatter 2000). In other words, the choice of
instruments is influenced both by the preferences of network actors, but also constrained
by political, cultural or institutional experiences that may limit available choice sets (see
e.g. Breyer 1982; Majone 1976; 1989). In other words, we currently lack an effective way
of explaining how service delivery choice sets are influenced by regime level choices
the paucity of systematic comparative studies that can shed light on the
local regimes (see e.g. Davies 2002). Empirically, arguments favoring the adoption of
these evolving practices are often derived from a very limited number of cases or
“success stories.” Moreover, many of these cases are not studied longitudinally or reflect
The purpose of this paper is three-fold: to start, I will briefly sketch why an
expanded urban regime model is needed. Second, I will examine --using the fragmented
urban social service environment as an example-- how institutional choices can increase
I will conclude with a sketch how such an extended, multi-level urban governance
model might serve to enhance the explanatory power of the urban regime model.
Specifically, the paper will propose a fusion of regime theories (policy level) with
contracting regime theory (provider level) to reflect these more complex decisional
environments.
arrangements
The last two decades have witnessed a tremendous restructuring of social service
environments that leaves the traditional top-down authority structure as only one of many
options for policy design and implementation (Agranoff and McGuire 2001).
policy or service relationships. In their stead a plethora of new coordinating devices have
emerged (Mandell & Steelman 2003) that involve both market and non-market actors in
sometimes fluid alliances with formalized, structured and informal relationships. What
non-hierarchical settings and the ability to marshal the resources needed to bring the task
to fruition (see Stoker 1985; Stone 1993). For governmental actors the greatest challenges
7
associated with the presence of multiple principals (Bardach & Lesser 1996) arise from
the diminished transparency and perceived lack of accountability to their citizens (Dicke
service environments and their likely impact on the extant and future role of urban
exist are widely dispersed and often inaccessible to US and international service
impediments and research design issues. Theorizing about these arrangements is in its
infancy. While some of the network research has begun to incorporate these discussions
(Mandell 2001; Forrest 2003; MacClean 2003; April 2003 and others in a special issue of
the International Journal Public Administration), more widely used urban policy
frameworks such as regime theory have been slow in incorporating the increasingly
complex layering of these service networks (e.g. Clark 2001; Davies 2003).
can explain the existence of localistic regime characteristics and attendant service
arrangements. This requires a level of theoretic sophistication that none of the extant
these dynamics.
8
the gap between all levels of authority (public and private) involved in a particular policy
area and to identify avenues for effective policymaking under such conditions while
understanding the limits of urban regime level theorizing (see Stone 2004, p. 6-7).
properly, there must be agreement across four dimensions: ideological consensus, domain
consensus (i.e. the role of each agent); support from those working within the networks;
coordination of purposes and work efforts across policy sectors, intergovernmental and
interorganizational domains require a different response than calls for more command-
traditional hierarchies. The advent of the concept of urban regime was in many ways an
acknowledgement of the complexities of governing diverse urban areas: the need to pool
limited resources; the recognition of extant local power structures that shape policy
agendas; the need for a stable coalitions of actors to provide for continuity of policy.
formation and the inclusion of players from governmental and non-governmental arenas.
9
Urban regimes are the outcome of institutional, political and policy process
with the various forms of collaborations and partnerships between urban actors remains
an ongoing discussion. It is not clear at this point if the urban regime concept should be
abandoned altogether for lack of comparative applicability, used more or less for the
characteristics beyond US settings without losing its explanatory usefulness (see e.g.
Davies 2003). Certainly, regimes should not be confused with networks or partnerships.
All share the need for collaboration, but conceptualized at different levels of analysis.
Urban policy climates and political preferences shift over time with economic,
demographic and other conditions that may not only induce a realignment of urban
regimes but also the ideological foundations that supported the existence of particular
local power structures (Stone, 1993; DiGaetano & Klemanski 1999). Moreover, the
beyond the urban context. Agranoff and McGuire capture these complexities when they
“The operational reality for many cities at the end of the twentieth century is a milieu of
multiple incentives, organizations, actors, and agencies (Judd and Swanstrom 1997).”
The substantial variety and variability that these conditions produce has not been
conditions far less serve as a foundation for comparative analyses (see e.g. Davies 2002).
It is unfortunate that the regime theory construct until recently has been largely
limited to elite economic actor relationships even though Stone’s own writings seemed
10
to suggest a broader view of urban power relationships that extend beyond the economic
bases of power (most recently, Stone 2004). In an era when policies and events outside
the local environment influence power relationships as much as do those inside the
community, such elaborations of the model could produce added explanatory power. Its
lack of accounting for both formal and informal policy relationships has limited its
usefulness for comparative work. In its focus on governing coalitions it also misses
potential early indicators for regime change as new players, organizations or ideas enter
the fray (Moore 1988). Here the interorganizational and network literature could be
carefully grafted onto the regime concept to produce a multilevel governance theory that
includes both elite and non-elite actors while alos acknowledging the influences of extra-
local players such as the states in the US context or supra-national agencies and actors for
the European context. This must be the subject of another project and cannot be tackled
here. The focus for this paper will focused largely on the urban level.
Examining relationships at the level of the elite policy actors, the neighborhood
level and the degree of isolation of one from the other might (a) generate a more multi-
dimensional picture of the political (in)stability of urban regimes over time, (b) identify
economic turmoil, and (c) explore its ability to transform itself when faced with such
challenges.
increasingly prevalent practice within the urban service delivery field (Agranoff and
11
McGuire 2001;example for UK: Stephens and Fowler 2004). More significantly for our
purposes are the institutional implications of what some have called “sector blurring” (
and others refer to as “tangled” relationships; see e.g., Saidel & Harlan 1998 ).
Community based service delivery represents an interesting case for the evolution
of urban governance because of its local and extra-local components. Central mandates
(even when they are disguised in the US under the rhetorical mantle of devolution or
states’ rights) exert a powerful pull on local regime actors and their ability to govern
independently. When ideological forces at the central (or federal level) attempt to effect
changes in local behaviors --as was the case with welfare reform in the US and elsewhere
since the early 1990s --the policies produced locally may vary quite substantially . In
order for the federal/national players to effect desired behavioral changes, conflict over
ideological or policy goals must be minimized and discretion of local actors maximized
without jeopardizing the desired policy directions (see e.g. for the UK health sector
Kitchener & Gask 2003). In the UK where policy cooperation and coordination between
central and local level actors has not been well developed, the policy shifts since 1997
have led to extensive discussions how such devolution can work in a policy setting that
features comparatively large local authorities. The likely outcome is that the structure of
(inter)-local policy networks are initially minimally disrupted, but the desired behavioral
changes are also not guaranteed. Benson captured these dynamics when he wrote (1975:
237): “agencies can agree on matters of domain and ideology only to the extent that such
agreement does not threaten their interests.” Within a provider network that may
encompass many agencies, effectiveness is only assured when the member agencies are
willing to surrender some of their individual autonomy to assure the independence of the
12
policy or provider network from unwanted intrusions that might cause disruptions to the
proper functioning of the network (see e.g. Provan & Milward 1995).
Contracting Regimes
capacity of the public sector, the “hollow state” (Milward, Provan & Else 1993; Milward
& Provan 2000). When the legitimacy of the central state as the primary source for
the institution that can command the greatest authority or enlist the greater trust (Sabel
1993).
For nonprofits this means that their prime standard of accountability becomes
increasingly one dictated by those who they contract with. The dependence of many
nonprofit organizations on external resources has been well documented. During the
1980s, when federal programs were cut by more than 20 percent, American nonprofits
lost more than $30 billion in funding. Many organizations were forced to terminate
programs and reduce staffs (Liebschutz,1992). North Carolina, e.g., lost more than $241
million in federal funds in the first year of the devolution to the states in 1981-82 (Coble
nonprofits seek public funding at that same times that their private funding base
percent or more. Likewise, the steady stream of volunteers that nonprofits were able to
government funding outright, others leave because they be “disillusioned with the
changes in the organization” (Smith and Lipsky 1993: 114), while yet others may stay on
and continue to fight for what they believe is the true mission of the organization.
consideration for some nonprofits, for the purpose of this discussion, the interests rests
actors -- a shadow state as Wolch (1990:41) called it: “Shadow state activities are not
formally part of the state. They do not involve the same types of direct accountability and
oversight procedures characteristic of the internal state apparatus. Instead, they are
traditional urban regime discussions have reflected little on the political and economic
power of the nonprofit sector to shape local policies but also the danger to be co-opted to
lose their independent voices as a result of their increasing dependence on state contracts
(Wolch 1990).
14
Figure 1
have found significant support from public managers and the general public alike. Those
arguing in their favor cite several factors: that they are a cost-effective alternative of
poorly managed public programs, that private providers have a strong incentive to
produce results (their contract can be revoked), that private partners are less risk-averse,
more flexible and innovative in their approaches to solving problems, and that private
providers supply the jobs that the public agency could never secure for its clients (see
e.g., Allen et al. 1989). These discussions leave much to be desired. Their focus on
“tools” of governing rather than the governance arrangements themselves and reasons for
Even fewer efforts have been undertaken to examine how contracting regimes
between public agencies and private providers are in turn defined by urban regime
characteristics, the institutional context, that prevails in the community examined (see
15
e.g. Austin & McCaffrey 2002). Depending on the contracting motivations and capacities
of the partnering entities involved, these arrangements may be short term engagements or
complement public and private interests, goals and resources over the longer term. The
many case studies both from the United States and Europe seem to suggest however, that
these partnerships are successful when they feature the right blend of public policy issues,
leadership, a process for the partners to sort out their different perceptions of the issue to
be resolved, and broad civic engagement. This would suggest that there are inherent
structural conditions that shape the preferences for certain provider models.
programs such as health care, daycare, job-training, or nursing home care (Seefeldt et al.
2001). On the surface, they should represent the most straightforward case for successful
(Alexander 2000; O'Connell, 1996; Grønbjerg 1993). The survival of such organizations
is closely tied to conformity with the demands of dominant actors contracting regime. In
practices as they are forced to compete with private actors in areas that once were the
exclusive domain of nonprofits (see e.g. Rojas 2000, Ryan 1999, Rom 1999). For
organizations with specific service missions or close ties to particular clientele this may
be sufficient cause to reject any collaboration with other organizations that are likely to
compromise their work or jeopardize their ability to provide programs and services to
Examining the "contracting regime" (Smith and Lipsky 1993) is a useful way to
capture manifestations of the institutional shift toward publicly funded but privately
delivered human services. The work by Weick (1993), Di Maggio and Powell(1983) and
Schlesinger (1998) is instructive in this context as well. They all have argued that
provider networks. These influences include: the growth of large purchasers who can
obtain services from organizations they prefer to interact with; the increased uncertainty
or ambivalence about organizational goals due to a multitude of factors over which the
single organization has limited control, and thirdly, the proliferation of widely accepted
professional norms and management practices. The resulting isomorphism tends to make
organizations look and act more alike over time. Differences may continue to occur when
complementary with the organization’s own normative commitments that it can continue
independence remain largely unviable in the future or find they are unable to compete for
17
resources with their networked counterparts. In fact, many grants now require
Service complexity is one of the driving factors for many of these collaborative efforts.
Service partnerships are viewed as an effective and cost-efficient way to address the
needs of poor neighborhoods or to compensate for the loss of federal funding to provide
integrated services to those communities (Chaskin & Brown 1996). Similar approaches
are being considered for health care delivery. The main difference between the two policy
domains is the policy dominance of private providers in one and the dominance of public
and nonprofit providers in the other. Stability of neither of these provider networks and
their attendant contracting regimes is not assured, however. Forrest suggests (2003, 594):
service alliances together over extended periods of time that it may take to address most
social service problems. Economically powerful actors are notorious for the lack of
or inability of the central state to resolve intractable policy problems such as poverty,
the macro-levels of policy decision making as well as an the intense involvement of local
18
policy actors who must fashion the structural and behavioral responses politically
Graph 1
Institutional design:
Authority in multi-
actor networks
Fragmentation
(internal or external)
Contracting
Regime
Service arrangement
predictability/stability
Accountability for
resource uses
Shared Values
The rapid institutionalization of the third sector – especially in the realm of urban
service delivery requires a rethinking of urban regime models. No longer can these
nonprofits be considered as a passing curiosity. The size of the sector, as well as their
scholars. The field now has a half dozen or more reputable journals, universities have
added research centers and courses to reflect their growing significance. The huge
diversity of the sector makes generalizations about their contributions, their political
weight, and their economic clout almost impossible. Load-shedding of both public and
private sectors have contributed to the growth of the sector, but has also contributed to
the sector blurring phenomenon that produces some of the analytical dilemmas briefly
addressed in this paper. Yet despite their role as major service providers, the urban
regime models have not reflected these increasingly complex partnerships, and networks
of service providers.
as “contract failure” (Hansmann 1987, 1996) have been generally rejected (e.g. Salamon
1996) while in some other fields nonprofits have not been classified as distinctive form
contrast to economics, law and political science has not viewed nonprofit organizations
a. for regime theory to advance it must reflect on its embeddedness into specific macro-
institutional settings (e.g. the legal and as well as political economic roles of these
organizations)
b. regime theorists also must be more sensitive to policy contexts: some service sectors
feature intense interactions of nonprofits with the market, in others with the public sector.
The resulting differentials in norms as well as preferred structures that shape these
interactions (e.g. the emphasis or preference of the corporate form may suggest the
c. regime theory may benefit from longitudinal analyses (such as Stone’s work on Atlana)
their various stakeholder that make up the contracting regimes described earlier.
Graph 2
Urban Regime
Contracting Regime
Stone suggested many years ago (1987:295) that instead “of fragmenting our attention by
looking at discrete correlates of regime form, analysis might aim for a broad picture of
how various elements of the community fit together in a porcess of change.” Urban
regimes are not static entities but subject to structural and policy changes as well as
difficult to detect links between national mandates/policy initiatives and local responses
or lack thereof. In order for us to understand why some minority communities are
thriving while others with similar conditions are not cannot be solely explained by
national policies. A group of local activists may initiate discussions in their communities
22
community, while in another setting similar discussions may deteriorate to conflicts over
turf, power and access to valued resources and thus fail to transform service delivery in
the community. Hence, the nature of contracting regime is a visible reflection of the
larger policy priories and purposes beyond specific service provider networks within a
community or urban area. Changes in service network structure may signal that the
regime structure and its supporting norms may be shifting. Because it is so difficult to
analyze regimes per se, examining the prevailing contracting regimes may serve as a
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