AIM/

eKr

KS

# P-059
Koenigetein/Ts 3.0 Nov 31950

Burkhart M L RLHILLER11f Genieralmajor Qhef of Staff of Third P& izer Army

PROJECT # 47

GNRMAN~ TAINK LOSSiES

Translator: IEditort Reviewers

M. FRIK G; VAN1'DRSTADT Cat ]3,X, HUFFORD

HISTORICAL

DI VISION

EUROFiRA1

COM sAD

MS

P-059

INDEl2X CONTAINED) IN~ THE G I 's" COPY

MS # P-459
File No 72 C 12 Dec 1950

MOAI"Ui

FORt

Chief,

Operational History (Germ) Branch

Lt Col

NAWLOCK1Y

SUBJECT:

MS f P.059, Project

47,

TA1NK LOSSES

The following Questions are not answered fully: lb 2b Tank strength within Feldheer, listed by theater,. Tank losses and replacement for Polish, Norwegian, French, etc, campaigns, The topic Breakdown of losses by causative agents~ leader states that he cannot answer these questions more fully,

2c

No information at all is given on the bases used in predicting tank losses (question 2d) and the answer to question 2e (guidance furnished tank producers...) is so vague that it can hardly be called an answer at all. introduction, the topic leader refers to a conIn his tribution by Emil LD , the former chief of the Army Armament Office, This contribution contains very much the same informat;
ion embodied in the study but also gives the names

and.

present

addresses of persons who should be able to give more detailed information on product ion and so forth, He further states that of the TIGER Panzer and of the model developed an illustration by PORSCHE*, the ELEPHANT Panzer on a demonstration trip (No 20) was printed in the September issue of the PINGUIN**,

Professor PORSCHE, the designer

**

of the Volkswagen
of all German panzer

Good illustrations and descriptions

types are to be found in

FORCE S,

the HANDBOOK

ON GERMA1O MILITARY

H,

HEI TiA n1

Consultant & Analyst

MS # ?-059

The Author

Herman -Burkhart

ERHILL BA1Ifl,

Gene ralajr, Born.,- 26 Dec 1904,

Dieuze,

Lorraine,

in

;iU: +L -HILLeZeBRAN +' the Ohrdruf Officer

received training Candidate School since April

in 1925 after having served

1923 in the 16th Cavalzry Regiment, and. later underwent further training at the Hannover Cavalry School in 1925/26 and at the Berlin War College in 1934/368
II broke out, on Just before World far 15 September 1939, he was transferred of Army Organization Division from the 93 Inf Div as OperStaff to the Officer, On . October 1940 he was ations assigned. as adjutant to the Chief of Army General

General Staff end in

ed Chief

April 1942

as

appoint-

of Organization Division of Army

In 1944, after two brief General Staff. in the OKH Officer Reserve and an spells assignment as Commander of 24th Panzer I'D was assigned +LER-HIa B Regiment, NI as Chief of Staff to XJOXVI Panzer Corps in

Ukraine and Poland,

remaining in

that position

to the as Chief of Staff until transferred During the Wear he served. Third Panzer Army, in France, Italy and on the east front and captured near Schwerin, Mecklenburg was finally

on 2 May l945

MS

P-059 F

CONTENTS

Pg I
2

COHN3iNS
6

ON G'B.AN TAX K LO SSEiS

RU A

RY A KS

MD,,

.V"" 4

6O'

aai

Gere.n Nomenclature and Abbreviations used in the Text

1, TYPEiS AND AIu A1: T OF ARM'OREDf a., V. ICLi3
.

s
,

"
..

4
.
.

Types
Tak

of' Tank Carriages

f

4
4

b*
c.,

"

"

90

" .

"

Assault Guns and Je. .panzers

(Tank Destroyers).
Mount
,
..

6
*
,

d.,

Antitank Cannon on Self'--Propelled

7 8 9
10
10

e, Nomenclature of' Weapons and Their Abbreviations

f, Performaceof Kw Kand Pak~

2;p

TANK
a,

STREiNGTH

aW

"

m
..

vs

Tank s
Pak

,.

a .

a.~ v .

.r

eafvavo

b,
C,

Assault Guns and Jagdpanzers (Tank Destroyers),

on Self- ropelled. IMounts,
,

10
10

3,

TANK LOSSS ANDB 2PLAC MNT

.,

17

M4S

# p-059

Franz EALDEIHR Genobst a )

Koenigstein/l

7 Nov 1950

COMMET~itS

0N GBRA

TANK

LOSSES

(Project

~ 4'?;

MS # pO59)

After

thorough study of the subject,

the topic succeeded. in

leader,

former

Genmaj Butrkhart Mueller-Hillebrextd, has the uestions in detail,

answering most of

For question ib, incomplete data only,

allocation of tanks to theaters of operation, covering the years 1940, 1943, 1944 and 1945, could

be obtained, statistics

and these do not provide as comprehensive a picture as to the production and losses,
(question temporary) 2

on strength,

As for the breaking down

b), according to to cause

of tank losses types of loss

according to campaign (whether permanent or

and according

(question 2 c),

it

was impossible to procure data useful in the preparat-

ion of statistics,

The

topic leader was able) however,

pertaining to

to anwer in greater detail the

production and losses, The

remaining question

strength,

replies are given in

dices),

the form of tables ani. graphic charts (See

appen-

They are of great value because of

their completeness and the

clearness with which they have been presented and in this respect
are perh-aps unique,

they

In regard

to the text, I am in full accord with the author.

(signed)

Franz HALDER

Genobst a

Dl

MS j p-059

PREFATORY

REMARKS

Principal sources of information available to the author were the monthly bulletins published by the German Army Ordnance Office under the title, Suirve of Army armament, These served as the

offici
In

al statistical basis for the German Wehrmacht,

addition, the original documents of the Inspector General of the Tank Forces were made available to the author, and these contained the data for his reports
to the

FuIehrer, 'These

sources may be regarded as

reliable. In addition, Gen d Art a D Leeb, the former

Chief of the Army Ordnance Office, also made a study

available to the author,

MS #PO59

In conformity with the original manuscript, German nomenclature and abbreviations have been retained throughout the translation, In order to facilitate the reading of

this study

and attached

statistics, the German nomenclature and abbreviations used in the text have been consolidated on this page,

Flakc K Kwk MG Pak Pak/ Sf1

Plug zeuga bwehrkano ne

Kanone Kampfwagenkanone Maschinengewehr Panzerabwehrkenone Panzerabwehrkenone auf Selb stfahrlafet te Penzerbef ehl swagen

antiaircraft gun cannon tank gun machine gun

antitank

gun

antitank gun on selfpropelled mount armored command car tank

assault gun

Pz Bef W
Pz Kpfw Stu Gesch Stu H Stu K Stu Ps

Panz erkampfwagen
Sturmgeschuetz Sturmhaubit ze St urmka none Sturmpanzer Jagdpanzer
HJiashorn"

(self-propell-

ed) assault howitzer (selfpropelled) assault cannon (self-* propelled) assault tank tank destroyer
Panzer

"'rhinoceros" tank

MS # p-0O59

1, TYPES AND AR M NET

OF ABMORL) VEHICLE~S

a, Types of Tank

Carriages: Pz Kpfw
Pz Bef W~

Abbreviation:

Panzerkanipfwagen .Ltank/

Panzer Carriages:

Beofehl swagen Larmnored command carj:

35 (t),, 38

I to VI,

(t).

The two latter types were

taken from the Ozechoslovakian Army and were produced in Ozechoslovakian factories,

b~

Tanks:
Principal Weapon** Date Indtroduced to Troop Units

Type*

Pz Kpfw I

MG

already
II 'I if

use in 1940
if
to

Ps Kpfw II
Pz Kpfw

Kw K 38, 20 mm
Flame thrower Kw K 37 mm Kw K 3? mm Kw K 3? mm Kw K 50 mm L 42 Kw K 50 mm L 60 Kw K 75 mm L 24

II (F)

Ii

Bt

Pz

Kpfw 35 (t)

i, if is

II

Ps Kpfw 38 (t) Ps Kpfw III

i if

Jan 1941 Jan 1942 July 1942

* Cf .Sec.

Designation of ti'e includes designation of carriage. e tror abbreviations of weapor nomenclature.

Iv#P-05,9

Type

Principal Weapon

Date Introduced to Troop Units

Pz Kpfw III (i')

Flamethro~rer

Feb 43 already in use in 1940 43 April 42 Aug 44 Feb 43 June 42

Pz

Kp'lr IV

Kw K

75 mm L.24

KW K 40, 75 mm and. 48 Pak 42, 75 mm

70

Pz
Pz

Kpf'w V Panther
Kpfw

Kw K 42, 75 mm L 70

VI

Tiger I

Kw K 36, 88 mmL 56
Kw K 43, 88 mm L 71

Pz Kpf'w VI Tiger Flak tank on

carriage 38 (t) and IV

Niov

43

Flak

20

mm,

20

mm-four-

1Nov 43

barreled Flak 37 mm, 30 mm double-barreled same as Pz Kpfw 1-VI Jun 43

Pz :8etf W (carriage

I-VT )

Recovery tank (carri-' a'ge 38 (t),

III, IV, V)

Also called Komnigtiger

LtRoyal Tigerf,

MS f p--059

C,

Asault Guns~ and. JagdpanzersLTank

Destroyers-7

Abbreviations:

Sturngeschuetz L;assault gun7:

Kamrofwagenkexione tank cannonj:

Stu~ Gesch

Kw

Sturmhaubitze Lasseult howitzer 7:Stu H Stu K Sturmnkanone .Lassault cannonf

Sturmpanzer Lassault tanskj Type* Principal Weapon Stu Pz Date Introduced to Troop U~nits

Stu Gesch III

Kw K 75 mm L 24 Stu K 40, 75 nun L 48

already

in use
Apr 42 Dec 43 Mar 43

in 1940

Stu Gesch IV Stu H 42 (carriage III) Stu Pz (carriage IV)

Stui K 40, 75 mm L 48 Stu H 42, 105 mm L 28 Stu H 43, 150 mm L 12 ?ack 39, 75 mm L 48 Pack 39, 75 mm L 48 Pack 43/3, 88 mm L 71 Pak 43/2, 88 mm L 71 Pak

Apr 43 Apr 44
Jan 44 Oct 43 Apr 43 Feb 44

Jagdpanzer 38***
Jagd~pan~zer IV Jagdpant her

(carriage V)
lefhnt (carriage VI)** Jagdtiger (carriage VI)
* ** **4s

80,

128 mm L 55

Dlesignation of type includes designation of carriages, Cf. Sec. e for abbreviations of wee; on nomenclature,
Also

'called "Panzerjaeger

38" or "Hetzer".

Also celled "Ferdinand" or "18.8 $tu Gesch, it,

MS # PO'59

d~.
Abbreviation:

Ant ita k Cannon on Self -Pro elled Mount Panzerabwehrkerione auf Selbstfahrlafette: Pak/ Sfi

Type*

Weapon

Date Introdiuced to Troop Unit s

7:05 Pak 40/Sfl II

Pak 40, 75 rm
Pek

from Feb from Feb from Apr

71b Pak 4U / Sfl 38 (t)

40, 75 mm

7, Peik 5

40/ Sfl Lorraine**

Sfl II

Pak 40,. 75 mm

7,62 Pek/

76, 2

mm Pak 36 or

from Apr
from Apr 42 from Feb 42

76,2 mm K (r)*** 7,62 Pakf Sf1 38 (t) Nashorn/ Sf III or IV

76,2 mm
76,2

Pak 36 or

mmKIL(r)

88 mm Pak 43/41,

71

Designation of type includes designiation of carriage, French carriage, Captured Russian gun.n, After rebuilding they were called K (r)"r', 36" : prior rebuilding thaeir designa~tion was Caliber length unknown.

117;62

117.62

Pak

M4S # P-.059

e, Nomenclature of Weapons anid their Abbreviations

Abbreviation

Nomenclature (Germani)

Translation (American)

MG' Kw K 20 mm 3? mm, etc~

L 42, L60

Mschinengewehr Kanipfwagenkanone

Machine gun Tank cannon Caliber diameter in mm Length of the barrel Antitank cannon Antiaircraft gun
Assault cannon Assault howitzer

Kaliberdurchmesser in mm
Kal iberlaenge des Rohre s Pa c era bwehrkaxsone Flie gerabw eh rkan on e Stixrikanone Sturmhaubitze

etc,

Pak Flak Stu K

Stu H

A number behind "Kw K" or "Pak" designates the type,

such as

Kw K 42 or Pak 39,

The number, however, does not indicate the year

of introduction or construction.

MS # p-059

f.

Performance of Kw K and Pak

Caliber mm

Cali

ber
length

Muzzle velo-.
city

Armor-piercing capacity in mm with armor-piercing shell 39 at an impact angel of 600 and a range of

M/sec

100m

50Cm

100Cm

1500m

2000m

250Cm

300Cm

75

48

704

!99

91

82

67

63

75

70

925

138

129

111

99

88

88

56

773

120

110

110

91

84

88

71

1000

.222

185

165

148

132

18

592

228

215

202

190

178

166

155

14S # P#059

2,

TAILK STR1E1GTH

=Apiendix

1 shows tank strength on the following dates:

1 Septeber 1 April 1940

1939

1 September 1940

1 January 1941
After January, 1941, strength is shown as of the first of every month

up to 1 February 1945, Strength in this case indicates the total strength in tanks of all units of the

Army

(Field and Replacement Army) and the Waffen-SS at

repair installations, schools, ordnance depots and the like4

Appendix 1 lists tanks according to type, which the author has

classified in the following three groups: a, Tanks b, c, Assault guns and Jagdpanzses tank destroyers-/ Pak on self-propelled mounts, a revolving turret;

A tank

is

characterized by

it is the principal

weapon of the Armored Command, In assault guns and Jagdpaenzer the gun is not mounted in a turret, which makes the vehicle lower and less ponderous and saves material and work hours, Assault guns and Jagdpenzers are principally 'employed as

1vS #

PO59
or antitank weapons in conjunction with other arms

infantry stxpprort of the service, The Pak on a

self-.propelled

mount

(Pak/Sfl)

is

simply

an

antitank

gun mounted on a tank carriage and is

on the sides. to compensate It is open on top. temporarily for

lightly armored in front and.

The Pak/Sfl is an emergency weapon of assault guns

the lack of production

and Jagdpanzers. Obsolete tank models, which can no longer be employed at the front,
are specifically designated as used in such in Appendix 1. Army; partisans, by occupation The carriages

They were normally troops and in

the Replacement

the protection of troops against tanks which had not rebuilt sa

of some of these inventories were It

been removed comletely from Army

PekfSf1 or Jagdpanzers. in Appendix 1, to break down the vehicles

has not been possible,

according to theater or according to Field. and Replacement Army,

It was possible only for certain to give a key-dates, limited breekdown according to theater but

a.
participated

In the Western Camaign of

as part of the Field. Army

&ay

1940 the'following tanks

brackets denotes

(The figure in The

the strength, (second

Pz,

but only after

1 April

1940,

Western; Campaign

column) began on 10

May

1940) 523 (1062)

(1079)

Kpfw. 1
II

955

"
*

"

III

349
Western

(329)*
Campaign, which by the fact that vehicles delivered to the

The figure for ?z,Xpfw III participating in the exceeds the strength as of 1 April, is explained of this type rolling off production lines in

April were

field

forces in

time for the campaign

KS # p-059
Pz Kpfw
a
11

IV
35 t

278
106 228

(280)
(143). (238)

"a

"

38 t

Pz Bef WLarmoaconmand car Total

135(2)
2574 (.3379 )

b,

The following tanks were by the field forces,

employed

on the Eastern

Front
(The

on 4

1943

inclusive of the Wfaffen-SS.

figuires in brackets denote strength of the respective types as of 1 Mae~ 1943) : Pz IKpfw f III IV 507 541 72 (1465) (1077) (165)

r Ha

VI

In repair installations Total:o NIote:

162

(230

The difference between the figures in the second column and

those in brackets is accounted for by distribution over the remaining theaters, the Replacement Army, tank repair installations. in the Zone of Interior and the ordnance depots,

c,

The Ps

fw II

VI and assault guns employed on the

Eastern Front on 10 June 1943 by the field forces, inclusive of the Waffen-SS amounted to the following:

MS

p059

(The figure in brackets denotes total Army strength 1943),; Ready for employment In repair installations

as

of 1 June

2569
463

Total
Notes distributed The difference as set forth between the figure above, and that in

3032 (5416)
-brackets was

under b,

d, theaters total is

breakdown covering much the for the

same

period and several (Figures denoting

possible

beginning of 1944. brackets)

Army strength

are added in

Italy
---

West
-

Last
23 Feb 44
1 ~--"-

-I-~---

1 Feb

'r

29 Feb
-

ZI Repair 29 Feb 44
I -

Total Strength

I1

Mar44

-r

Pz Kpfw III action)

(ready

for

106

99

450

655

( 888)

Pz

Kpfw IV (

ready for

171

58?

405

:1 1163 I(1824)

action) Pz Kpfw V (ready for act ion)

290 128

418

(1339)

Pz Kpfw VI (ready action)

Pz Bef W (ready for action)

for

63

78

149'

(504)

(466)

Assault guns
Total (ready for action) In repair installJationsf
Gr~nd totali

141
432 49

194
1233 1519 1534

171
1232
1232

506

(~no
(80a)1

c----

481

-------

12333

3053

11 5999

MS

p-059

The difference in

number of vehicles,

i.e.

the difference between

8031 and 5999 (2032 vehicles) applies to vehicles in use by occupation troops in N5orway and in in the Balkans, including Crete and Rhodes, newly ordnance depots and. the Replace-

activated units ment Army.

the Zone of Interior,

e,

The following survey shows the reinforcements, the

according

to month and type of tank, assigned to the tank forces in ing the six months preceding the Allied invasion.

'West dur-

The percentage of is

allover tank strength represented by each month's reinforcement, indicated by figures in brackets.

Date

Pz III

Pz IV

Pz (

Pz VI

Stu Gesch

Total

(%)
31 Dec 43 31 Jan 44
29 Feb 44

1%)
316 (19) 410 (24)
587 (32) 52? (25)

Jgdpz (%)

(%)
879 (14)

145 (16) 98 (11) 99

(11)

157 (14)j 180 (15)' 290 (22) 323 (20)

38 (10) 64 (15) 63 (12)

45 (9)

223 (10) 171 194

211

(7) (6)
(7)

1 923 (14)
1210 (16)
11205

31

Mar

44

99 (12)

(15)

30 Apr 44
10 Jun 44

114 (14)
39 (5)

674 (32)
748 (32)

514 (31)'101 (18)

663 (35) 102 (16)

219 (7)
310 (8)

1622 (19)
1862 (20)

MiS ; P059-1.

-15

IT.

Pz

Kpf'w

and

Stu Gesch with the field forces on the

eastern Front as of' 5 Januar 1945:

Stu Ge sch ?z units; brigades 0)

Pz Jaeger companies

0))

Total F..stern Front

ro

Strength

(according to
Appendix

1)

y4E

Pz Kpfw IV

596
(q

596 670 26

(2259) (1982) (428) (576)

670 26 Pz Bef W, Flakpz

Stu Gesch
Jagdp z

641

902

949

} {

2492

( 6167)

1933

902

949

3784

(11412)

*Already included in the figures directly above. 0) Stu Gesch Brigades ~[Sturmgeschxetz Brigaden -Assault gun brigades / are GHC, troops for the reinf'orcement of' infaentry divisions, 0)) Pz Jaeger companies are component parts of' infantry divisions,, N~oce: The great Russian offensive, which extended over the entire Eastern Front began on 15 January 1945,

us # P-059

g,

Tank strength at

the

Wetern Front on 5 February 1945: Readyr for action

Strength

Strength

ing

(accord-

to Appendix 1)

Pz Kpfw III and IV

if if

110 219
61

68
.96 26

(2810)
(1964)
(

n
"r

V VI Pz~efW

404)
299)

Flak tanks

(228)

Total number vehicles

Stu

390
IV 892

190
533

(5705)
(6054)

Gesch

anid

Jagclpz

Assault tank Jagdpz V Jagdpz VI Total number of Jagdpz and Stu Ge sch

32 66 28 1018 I21 .612

15 43

( 188) ( 208) ( 51)) (6501)

1Nashorn (?ako/SfJ. with 88 mm cannon)

12

( 141)

Total number of Pz Kpfw, Stu ~esh an. lashrn 120

10

12277?)

MS # P-059

3.

TANK LOSSES AND I fLACBMirT

a,

In

principle the repairing of tanks was carried out as close

to the front as possible,

The repair services accompanied the troops

permitted..

to the combat area, as far as enem~y fire

TLhe motor officers

of the tank battalions accompanied the repair services to the combat area and directed their employment there. In this manner these officers

were able personally to survey losses and damages. Daiaged tanks which could not be repaired with the means available to the field forces were collected by recovery vehicles and turned

over to the repair companies of the tank regiments or to other repair services. In the evening, battalions or regiments were informed as

to the number of tanks ready for action, the number in need of minor repairs, the number in need of major repairs and total losses. These

figures were reported through command channels at divisional headquarters

(adjutant

to Ia branch

and from there to Is. branch at corps headcontrol channels (regimental

quarters, etc.), as well as through traffic motor officer to divisional motor officer).

This short standardized

report was transmitted by telephone or radio, and from division to higher echelons usually by teletype.

These

daily reports were supplemented by a monthly report through

traffic control channels in which the daily reports were compiled and, if necessary, corrected and completed by means of accurate and These reports were for-

detailed accounts covering damages and causes.

warded through channels to the Chief of Army Supply and Administration

MS + p-O59

at the Army High Command, who in agencies in

turn,

submitted them to interested

the Army High Command for further evaluation~

b0

Total losses are compiled in Appendix 2 and are broken

down by month and according to tank types beginning with

These losses comprise all combat losses at the front,.

May

1941,
of

regardless

whether they occurred in

through enemy action, were occasioned

by vehicles,

falling
result

into enemy hands in

of "canibalization".

damaged or undamaged condit

of damaged vehicles to

ion or were the

make others fully serviceable,*

Temporary losses (damages)

During the latter
repaired the by the field

are not considered in

Appendix 2.

part of, the War,

forces, and at least

95 percent of damages were

95 percent of these within were

tank regiment,

while

only about

5 percent

of the damages

repaired

in

repair

shops in

the Zone of the Interior,.

In

this

connect-

ion see also the following;

Performance of the Tank Re air Services

aa

At the front, ie,

the' tank repair shop companies of the

regiments, armies and army groups, exclusive of repair services in companies, etc~:

Reductions in number because of sales to foreign countries, transfers to agencies outside the Wehrmacht and total loss in the Replacement These are so small, however, that Army have not been considered. they would not have affected the statistics to an appreciable extent,

MS

P-059

*1P -19"4

Month

Pz

II-VI

Stu Gesch

Pak/ Sfl

Total

Motors

Oct 43 Nov Dec Jan

973 911 1294

652 698 873 1111

.200

1825 1804 2391 4239 10259

143 216 2831 228

195 224 938 Total

*44

2190

bb. Oct 43 1Nov. Dec Jan 44

Zone of the Interior: 62 90 57 71 22 19 41 91 Total 45 36 30 39 129 145 128

201
603

C.

It was impossible

to prepare

a breakdown of losses

according to cause.

d~. Estimation

of tank losses and replacement

Up to the beginning of the 1941 Rissian campaign, the course of

the War was rather abnormal on the German side because consumption of materie1 occurred almost exclusively during the short the campaigns (Poland~, Norway, made it. possible,

periods
This

France, Yugoslavia/Greece) lasted.

in spite of low -production, to increase the stocks of

war materiel whichi were very limited at the beginninz of the

War

during

v S # p-059

-20w

the long intervals between the campaigns, of 1941, sufficient forces were at hand for

so that,

in the summer task ahead.,

the difficult

For production data see Appendix 3,

In spite of very low production of Pz Xpfw and Stu Gesch, it had

been possible to increase

the number of tank divisions from ten to

twenty during the period oaf twelve months

French campaign and the of the the tank divisions, customary four, beginning of however,

between

the end of the

Some of

the Russian campaign,

had only two battalions instead

Su.bseqyuently,

they were to have been brought up

to full strength, Aside from 4200 Pz Kpfw, at there was as a result of this
able. Monthly production

the beginning of the Russian campaign

situation, practically no reserve avail.,

only 260 Pz Kpfw, but it was

amounted to

increasing,

The Army High Command viewed this

been unable to

development

with great

concern but had

step up production, it could risk It

N~evertheless, the reto

Army High Command believed that

being aole to meet hoped to be able it

quirements for
replenish losses

the campaign from current

against Russia.
production,

especially

since

erroneously

believed that operations

on a large

scale were impossible

in Russia

during

the winter.
3800 Pz Kpfw were expected to roll
in June,

Approximately
lines

off production
to the end of

from the beginning of the camipaign,

1940,

Mays, 1942, that year, At first

i.e. prior to the beginning of furtner large operations in

actual

production

came up to expectations,

Losses during

~jS P p-059

the summer of 1941,1900 tanks up to the end of October,

were

high

but could have been met by current production without difficulty if two unexpected events had not complicated the situation:

a.
months, b,

The fighting continued unabated during the winter

The superiority in

armament of the Russian T 34 tanks,

which appeared in

ever-increasing numbers, neutralized the lightly with the result that

armed German tank models on the battleield, the latter with better

had to be withdrawn and replaced by new models equipped cannon, (Of. Appendix 1), in which the

In preparation of the big summer offensive. of 1942,

majority of our tank units from battle in was to participate,

tanks were withdrawn

spite of the fact

that doing so involved great risks.

Thiese were completely re-equipped so that approximately 2500 Pz Kpfw could be conmmitted in this operation alone. of the campaign of 1941 up to the start of

From the beginning

the summer offensive on 1 July 1942,

approximate losses of 3850 Pz Kpfww However, an additional since these

were offset by the production of 4100 tanks.

number of over 1000 tanks must be added to the losses, tanks were no longer fit for service at the front,

The Stu Gesch and the PakfSf1 have so far not been taken into consideration. weapon, tests still in The Stu Geech was at that time a stage, comparatively new

the development Its

and had to undergo extensive considerable

at the front.

production surpassed losses to a

extent so that the supply of 400 available at the beginning of the

IVS f p-059

-2 -22-

campaign increased to 780 by 1 July

1942.

These weapons did not but that of the

increase the fighting power of the tank divisions,

infantry divisions. and loss figures, to fill

D~endices 5 and 6 show comparative production The Pak/ Sf1 was introduced in the spring of 1942 This was a, temporary

the production in the Armored Command.

emergency solution, designed to increase antitank fighting power at the front. If these vehicles are included in the estimate, a more

favorable picture develops,

as

shown by the following statistics:

remd
1Jul 41

for action lDec 4l lkiar42 1 Jul42

1 Jan43

Pz Kpfw Stu Gesch Pakf Sf1 Total

4278.
416
--

4084 598

2468 625

3471 780 306

4364 1155 1124 6643

4694

4682

3093

4557

The heavy destruaction of tank forces at Stalingrad introduced a new phase,9 Here, as

well as

during the ensuing retrograde. battles, January

losses increased immensely. to the followings 2945

From
Kpfw,

to

April 1943 they amounted

Pz

461 Stu Gesch, 426 Pak/ Sfl1

MS # p-059

The strength of the Pz ed to 2500 during this period,

Kpfw

ready for action thus again decreasThe fact that, as a result of the

Stalingrad defeat, became

the initiative

had passed to

the enemy now also

evident in the field of materiel, would it

Only by conducting the War 1943 to regain

on an economical basis this initiative,* to do, The Stalingrad successful

have been possible in

This,

the German command,

however, could not decide

mistake was soon followed by another. of 1943 at after Orel-Kursk

The un-

summer offensive

(Uitadele'"l), was again very

with the retreats

following upon it losses,

4 and

July 1943,

costly in
chats

tank

This is
5,j

shown in

Appendix

2 ahd in the graphic

in bend~es

Due to new tank units

the fact that Hitler continuously ordered activation of necessary rehabilitation of units was impeded in spite

of a considerable available

increase in production,

The result was that the

tanks were distributed over an ever-increasing number of

tank
these

units,
units,

and this
It

consequently affected the fighting power of

the spring of 1944, that the number of

was only in

available tanks again increased appreciably,

in l4arch, 1944, the tank strength

so that,

for exanple,

as of January 1943, was again

attained,

At the beginning of July,

1944,, the number of available

tanks reached its However, due to

wartime peak with 5800 vehicles,

the overtaxing of tank forces

(Cf. Appendix 4),

which. had occurred earlier,

Similar conditions prevailed

in other fields of materiel and personnel.

MS : p-059

the increase in ed personnel,

materiel was counterbalanced by a decrease in

train-

so that the fighting power of these forces was no A steady

longer commensurate with the number of tanks available. increase in losses was the result. during the battles after

The high losses in tanks suffered

the invasion of France and during the retreats certain extent by increased production; 3 and the graphic chart in Appendix 7. of assault guns and Jagdpanzers were requirements in materiel it

in Russia could be met to a as illustrated by A

endice

Developments in the field more favorable,

due to the fact that their

and' labor were considerably lower than those for tanks,

was easier to increase production,

so that

In conclusion, and judging by the course of events after 144,

it

may be regarded as an established fact that although tanks were subject to almost continuous commitment, forces could be maintained at a 10 15 'percent of its the strength of the German tank fixed level by monthly production of A prerequisite for this,

over-all strength,

however, posal

is that the tank forces have a

repair service at their dis-

to take care of all A sufficient

small and average repairs within the units

supply of snare parts and interchangeable installations to insure

themselves. units

must be made available to unit repair

Quick repair of damages sustained, able to work efficiently,

Unless repair installations are

the number of total losses quickly increases,

e,

Tank production was guided through the following channels: on the -basis of strategic intentions and

The Army General Staff,

MMS #

O59

25-

organizational plans, filed a request with the General Army Office for the further development of the tank arm, For the purpose of establish-

ing a pattern, this request took into consideration a long period of time (several this In reauest case it years). in detail

The and

General Army Office in

turn worked out

forwarded it to the Army Ordnance Office, the

should be impossible for these three offices of a uniform conception,

Army High Command to attain Chief of the Army had to

the Commander in

make

the decision.

The Army Ordnance Office

integrated the resulting plan into its

over-all armament plan, which Tnereafter the

had to be approved by the Wehrmacht High Command,

Ordnance Office had to insure that everything proceeded according to

plan, The already industrial output necessary or had to be created, to attain the goal either

existed

During the

course of the

War the authority of the agencies involved shifted as a result of the creation of a Miinistry for of Army Equipment, Chief of the

Armaments

and

a.

Office of Chief

With the dissolution of the post of Commander in and the assumption of its fuanctions by the Chief
-

Army

of the Wehrmacht High Comu and and Hitler himself since Hitler showed increased interest to armaments in

particularly

all questions pertaining

authority shifted more and more to the Fuehrer. the monithly production this goal

For 1940, prior to the French campaign, quota for tanks

and

assault guns was established at 600;

was to be attained in 1943,

At the beginning of 1940) production At the beginning of the Russian tank divisions from ten

was still considerably below 200, campaign the figure wias 300.

The increase in

HIS #i p-059

u26-

to

twenty,

beginning with the autumn

of 1A940,

led

to

revision

of the monthly production quota of 600 tanks.

demand to raise the monthly production

The result was a

quota of tanks and assault

guns to 1250,

This reqies ,in January,

1941,

fulfillment of which

was dependent on the building of new production centers, was opposed by the Minister of Armaments, Todt,
as exaggerated and impossible obtained an order from the to satisfy

The latter regarded the demands

by German industry, Keitel, He

Wehrmacht High Command,

which

prohibited. an increase over the old quota of 600,

being, the Army High Command was' satisfied with this

For the time

decision and

oelieved that it would be able to conduct the campaign against Russia

without the increase, The considerations which motivated this attitude

have been mentioned above,

In January,
the Arnlrls

1942,

the Chief of the Ordnance Oftice again presented

1250 tanks and assault guns per month, to

requirements,

the Minister of Armaments.

high losses in of tank divisions tanks in the

In the meantime,
past during

however,

there had been

activation of tank units

the winter, activation

further

had been ordered by Hitler,

tor

the SS had started and the demands for assault guns

and bounds. The inister to of Armaments presented make a decision, since

had increased
the recuire-

by leaps

ments to Hitler, moment

who failed

he was for

the

favorably impressed by events at the front and relied upon the efficient antitank guns whose employment the future of the tank forces, wa s imminent,

effect of the more This made him doubt

In response to renewed pressure by the Chief of the Ordnance

MS + P059

-27-

Office von Speer,

Minister of Armaments,

in

July 1942,

Hitler

finally was compelled to make a

decision,

He now exceeded the

origin-

el. demand. made by the Army and ordered a monthly production of 1450 tanks and assault guns, The steps which were immediately taken the new quota began to show rethe

to increase production and to fill sults in

A joences In

the spring of 1943, and 5

60 meet

as shown in

graphic charts in

order to

the reauested increases of a great

in

production

it of

was

necessary various

to coordinate production especially as a large

many factories of plants

kinds,

number

shared in

the production of the following parts:

Tank hulls.

Tracks and bogie wheels. Motors,

Gears,

Turrets,
Armament.

Optical instruments, Ammunition, etc,

In addition, frequent changes in tank types, the War, had to and, be considered, armament, It etc,,

which occurre.during of the

was the mission

Ordnance Office

later, the Ministry of Armaments constantly

to coordinate production orders and the capacity of the manufacturing

plants

by allocating manpower,

etc,

The fact

that tnis was to a

spite

great extent achieved in the face of great difficulties and in

1s P-059

of the air war is shown in A nni Arnendi es 5 and 6_,

rpi

hrsi

The air attacks were successfully minimized by transferring proOduction centers to areas in less danger and particularly by de-

centralising prodtuction,

It was not until the end of 1944 that

the air war affected production.so severely that there was a cow~

siderable drop in production,

sig. Burkhart MUZ " Ri HILLIBRI#

1) TYF Fahrge8tell Carrisage

-Tank

Te&F z I VI VI Tiger Tiger

c-I

*) a csaul t guns and Tank Ld destroyirs readfo for

AAN

E Asaul i-u:xe &vrdTank T

-

Destroyers
9 t

front uie.

3)
P--W-W-

Antitwangun
11Is.III/

~rop.led mount.

on self-

{ 1 ppendi x 1 e1 . "Illa.

rnt

1.1 II

(F) II/III

35(t)

38(t)

III III
Tank

III

IV

IV
Iv

IV

V
Panthf~j

Recove

ecov

Flak
Pz. 36(t)

35(t) 38(t)
gun Tank

Iv

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5cm L 6o L6
Kw.K. Kw. K.

Iv
Tank
-

v
Tank
n

VI

II VI

Pz b Bef. Wten
I -VI
co d

TOTAL
Summer~f
d), etr

TStu.c
Stu. G.

--

III/

e 1IPk/ 4=DaA-tI
y

Stu. H. Stu. Jagd- Jagd..__

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um
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ain

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37c~37c

KwK.

PakL 70 75mm

WepnMachine.

Coluan

gun colun
1445
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thrower
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477mm

37mm

KwK..
5 cm~
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7,.5
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75mm

7,5

L 43
u.48

7,9J

it;" " 7.5

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9WUL

IV 2 cm
2cm

*)armored i very ch. T0m arious

Ider
hieeil

K . X.

:
____ ___ ___

42 7.5 7zaw and

___ ____ ___

Kam. ~. , ,8 L 56 L 71 83mm 86mm

K. Flak
Viercmn3?min

Zeilen
zhe

III/ f rontfac- :III IV

Pzspf.

ITT-TV

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W-9i

r-

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i

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der * ).front-firers Ze ilea, faeh.

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the

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tanks
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w. K.XW.K. 7,5 '7,

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for use tank tank gun 75.i:3~X i~4 L48

., ,

Pak Pak 8,5 12,6 15cm7.5 15cm 7,5 L71 L55 L 12 L 48 L71 antitank anak H. H. Pak

ter.

19 -2pz.

7!5 8,8
U.

L '71

27, 31

28, 31

7,bo2

tank - 88 mm
21
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tank
e, r^f ' . r'*7 I3?K :C: raw

1,9.193 9

1.4.1940
t A ^,

1223

1075

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--

98 23e X26 c#.ti' 520 570

329
;-L. U.

10

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143

2o:.
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1.2. J 1.3. 1 1.41.

1 1 1

1., 11079

955
1023

871
85

1.,.

78
877 843

984 994
1019
1042

1751
179

1015
1110 1200 1323 1440

1.6.
1.9.

187:
86

1 1..
1 1

1.10. 1] 1 1.11.
1

642
717

771

1072 1067 9E5S 900

896

189 191,
86 1911

636 686 754 763 661 543 547

528
4y{/f/1/l

476 459 499

453

215 ifourbarreled 243 ~~30 mm double-T-86 barrled 2441 232

2O0n

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19

20

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2,

2~ii

3195
4368

3195 4178 4317

5y

88mm

5 6

200

3365

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33n.5 44 47',5 5977

4251

260 286
308 330

4467
4956

1654 227
240

227
256

4714 4650
5264 5310
4989

4539
3685

227 256
29

X714 54 1 '
5726
5450 5216 53b2

292
31c~

1501
1479

517
533.
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3 943

292 316

488

331
331

4200 4278

377
416

377
41o
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31377

17LI
708 693
708 701 092 692

T
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191 Ii 201'

1571 1646 1784

or

4029
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461
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499 485

335
Clj4993 328 315 307 289 278 273 26 9

4737
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Figuxres framed in~ Red indcicate vehiles wnich could no longer be used at the front but only in the security service behind the lines and for training troops in the Replacement Armyr.

AP: V ERL U ST E ITanks .1 -nzer~amDwa zn. T YP T Y Ph

Fahrueate1
s y

-b

1X2

k-s a

2) Stunngeschuetze und Jagdpanzer.

F,
TITII

II
11 11/

(F)
TI/ITTI
l11

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111*

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Jagd-

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IV

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Carriee Wa11'e MG WepnFae5 KW.K, 2c Flanr- Kwi.K. ror ,7 thrower XK. Kw.K. 3,7 5 1607,5 42 :7,5 L24 124 Kw.X. Kw.K.

vi
Xw.K. 8118 L56

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ItY."

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VI
-"1

l4

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VI
. ,

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der
t..

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Kw.X. 898 L71

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1W.K.

TTT 11-y.

NT

Zeilen

Viarar%

T TT 11;

1V

.Laa

Seujen

7,5
1.43 u.48

795
L70

7,5
L70

tversch. 2cm Vierling

2cm,

Stu. x.

Stu. x.

H 10,5

L24

7,5

jt448

795

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Pak
12, 8 L55 17-24

7,5
u-.7062

Pa

8,8
L71

898
L71

6,8
L 71

26-27

Column 13
N. d

coZwil11

Ma3i

~ile
1941

1
-

56
-

7
11

91012

139

5x

11_
8 22 12 20 10

7<15

2.1

23

24

25

3uni13 Juili August

September

16
107

33
175 173

109
141

96

127' 219 90

16
108 70

112
1873 1258

3.
3!12

1 3

2(2

8 22 20

(ktober November
Dezemnber

7 15
25

34
27

24

62 84 144

35
105
208

98

36
1
-

21 52
6K

1729
2856

1424
634
62 2838 1628 8 410 2 318
1634

14~
315

89
3373

102
31 8

19

Totp]

1-Suiie111

Januar 1942
FeLr. Maerz April

18 15
1 1

76 40

72 .. 181

6 48
10 22

1C 19

53 6 6

14949

3
12

7
11

32 50

j
30 41
61

10 25 28

53

Mai Juni
Jufl August September Cvtober

6
22
28

5
-

6 . 4
5 20
24

14 110
235

10 25 10 28-

13
20

13-

27
21

130
179

37
48

-221

37
32

37
32

20

15

15

25

4
1

November
Dezember TotalSwme92

5
-

11 . 29
12

37
25
18

87 266

54
57
93

-428 3
-939
-

319
i 1743 40 2750 3

34

34
28

35
24

28
20

23

25 35 24 1
.r..127

6o

287
49 207 51
-

6o
10152 231 988

196

Januar 1943 Febr. Maerz

30,
13 30

399268 11

390
30-30

10

90
253 135
-

2A2

343
1 9

3
6 17306
-

19
41
-

246

12 5

220

220

April
Ma125
Juni

22
12

4
2
-

'0
13
-

134 1
-

1
41--43
36-. 141 132 216, 191 219
i6,16
-

1
-

Juli August

26

4
11

18

90 2 171 . 163

1117.
152 4 271 269 '136 83 4.1

119 821
56

119 82

September Ckt ober November

4 1 2

9
13 11
6322

1 1

:14

1 19 11

33
40

17365
18-57

10
,11)-

17

39
-

36 207 143

76 75
25

4
19 30

80

7
10 21
Sr
5 1

5
10
-

55

5
1h1!.
..

184
312
37
-

1 6 2
10

Dezember
Total
-

193 260 301'

149

123 107 79
92
O

65 32 28.
58
.096
r

9-35
26145 22254
26
._209-766
n

8 1613

224
1

4
-169

20o 243

46
19

94 55

16
1 17 17 24 30

62
20 84

15 531

67
a
291 259 260 3)8 139 70

Sunme 1949
... . ~ ALL

108

166
0

18
f 2277
7r7r7
,

Januar 1944 Fe bruar

3
i

3
8

Maerz
April Ma i Juni 3u:1 Lugus t Sep temle r Odtober November Dezember Total
TnT% 101. Z

2 1' 2 1 1

13
19 242 114 28

339
191

120
276

6
1

12

38

1
-

960
20

1
2

690
226

83
262 426

243 236 323 131

16
22 22 2

58
22

86
2
-_-

46 4
S

365
292

347
20

133

89
191 91 142

528 1068

17,.

8
16

3 4 39
16 2 10 23 2

1.56

278
298

5
3 3
C.1

769
775

914 368 346

315 120 10lj
7I -777

80

19v 1056
430 523 551
'

33 75
306

7 7
46.
29

87 82 52 163 4t0 123

11
ti

5
Suiire
-

283 105
001. < 141-<-v . :
C7 27

39
19
7ii 4

546
254
-S17
IULL

44 74 86 35
21
1.0'? LI.. IL
411 K4
77

98
131

64
19

9
2
1
i~.

! 335

166 12
.
_r"

73 166
1'~

}14
__________

I
-1 - tm--

L f.t L

T 0TA L Sommne 19dJan

rh5

I.1105 Note:

11 19Q

. 1 V

16
S~o '.J1 0_1
v .

39 76
---- 144
4
1 10

210
I'

i n

II 1
'I

I
-nnL

I1
I

0.1 I

... I 1K

I .,
4

.>
L

I 1

i
i

1- r%I-nnnn , , o 'Q l7 1
Ine 1 J Xr7

co 4 i

C;q7
O'2

1 1.1
n

t
i

r-

1
J

G-7Ih

1J.Lf

91
77 .f1

'(1

i1~ Z (1 un

II

OJI. )LLAJ.

00
4 J

3.9ev\ LI -- ~~1I.j LI
LL1 fl as

W Iv

'4(. I

1 -A-

7lv I - X16

1 4
i

17

(11 O11
v. . .

tZ LA In [lV
l.+

171i
in

1 1 '

1n
1V

11
't

cu
:IQ

IP
.. 1. S]nQ

1K1
1 h , JZ
.JII,

I1

~7I
..

11

1721

1O9

4..W LOO

59~

18966

5866

67
J'
1

108

r6o
I'-,'., -

Kn
I

79
I 1

1
-'

4
I

'1

4x4
I IQ '1

sp,>(,

Benerk ung :

Pz. Kpfw. 35 (t) waren ab 1941 nicht mehr imn Felcdheer vorharxden.
were no longer

Begi.u ing in 1941, Pz.KNw 35 (t)

used 1y the Field Forces.

PR ODUCT I OhJ
PRWDUT 1 nzerka ION we. en 1

tame.
1

Recovery tank
T 'I

2) Assault Guns and Tank Destroyer

+

Total strength
4 -eno of .4'

ahrgestel l

II

III

38(t)

ef.VI. III
K.

pz.
1 R

fde
. R " 1

trm

1r f

"

"

V7

VU Q

406

+,

a.

) I

IIIv
I T .

IIIf

I IIIIV
TT. / .

IV

V
KwX

Kw.K.
W f c

II VI
TfT

Pz.
_-_

Jagd- 1Jagd- Elepanzcer panthe~ f'ant

i

.gdtiger

Pak/Sfi_._ . _----

Ti/f1

( cc- tet~d
r---

ANLAGE appendix 3

3.

Rc2i

der
I

4
the

Pak/ 1 sSf.1. horn

coversch. Various

Sum dert Zeilenpj Tot alof the

der

C1I

TfT

8(t),

I-V-I
I

Weapon

20=m

thrower 37mmL

F lam,t.. Kw.X. i~or,7 la-5c

3,7
42
37mm

K.(Kw.K.PawK wK. z5crn'7 795 L60 L 24 tL 43

7575
L

7,58m

0
_______

L56

L94

7m

5m7

Ki.Xlak2cm versch*I 68cmViervarious L71 ing

47

.t .t
't

Z.eilen Total of: the 1 1_ col.umns

-- .
7

III
-

"IIIv
I I
:T

III
tH
10,5

I~V

3,6/IV

--

VI

vi
Pak 12,8
a

of
... ,"

II I/IV Pak L 71 88mm

I %

Stu.K btu.X.

7,5

+k

L 24

7.5
L'43
u.48 75mm

L 28 lO5mm
'

115cm Plak L 12 795 L48 15Uum

i io ;

Pak 8,8 L 71 88mm

ril
v

the co-

____

8, 8
7.

16 -23

Pak u.7,62
76,2mm

7,5
--

--- --

Zeilen
Total of
coinDM

1'25

u. 2'

'71

IL

5mColumn *88mm cm
infl

75mm an

24, 27

"Note.

Zwji
. -I

7?5mm
on

88mm

128m

This production chart includes all vehicles which were delivered by the manufacturers to the Arzlr Acceptance Officers during the respective months.

Jan. 1941

Febr

45 7
50

Maerz
prl15 Mai Juni

5 49
78

A'wust
September Oktober

12 1 1u 21

88. 108 22 124 143

314
26

~11

12-

1,

+
Z

ion

1A
U

17
1

R"
U' k.1

'

36
2

lb I k20n a Dmm f&u 2 0

.L50

25

65

November
fl zemiQpr-

j135
yV

25

64

76
./J

127 179

38

17c
i164k1i
206
171
Limo III -(

44
At
i. a~

46j1

arreled 22 37 mm 14 X0mm 5 iouble )arrele4 2

11lb
7I

204 204 246 276

44 30 30

25

i'

,P7

OR

47
48

444 30 30
4

47
48

224} 234 234 293

Bernerku: Untc~r Produktion' sind die in dem betrefienden Monat durch die I eeresabnahxeste11en von den I Herstellern ueLernoninen Fain'-

256 264
312 325 308

56 34
50 38 71
a

324
312 298 362 363

56 34
50 38 71

53

zeuge

zu vers tehen.

40o
1L
]

50 o

348
IL6
1 r.
r/

46
0

379

n 1E4A Jai 1942i22

Maerz
A~pril

iaux

191o-,2 A.-J-" A

73

IV

D %IG

AaK

(
1 04

It

111L[]9"Q
143796

--

---

_ .1929

50
137

216
28 21 26

244
246 246 228 231

58 58

320 330

__

377

45 45
3

45 45 36
79
70
4

365
422

Mai ,Toni Juli AWuut September Oktober Noyvember

Lazember

5~6
42 20

80 85
{72

363

408

3 36
79 70

333
128 142 23 172 128 142 23 172. 527

231

88
84

217

I188
1;8
j163

93 99 .113
1 Kr

369 339 364

325 324 309
r15265:25 -

629
462 571 .515 520

6o
80 70 80 100 3
-

6o
80 70 80 100
120

167

167

120 104
11

120 116 104

1'

51J
!

'-unmme 192 T0 1
1943 1 s

,406 27Ta60

893n.

896 18

f35

4278
13
-3

784122
130

6189_ 527

Fe tr. Maerz

14

65

April
a Juni. Agu st Septemlerj

34
1
-

34
'

25713

35 46
11 $ -284

171 205 213

32

59
-

-43

272
5

324 6

37 46 506o

12 11 15 20 17

2014370 30628

140

140

17

6892645 48425
511 458295 591 662395616 212

34
3-

0 0

140 207

89 ~14 40 30

103< 70 1

563
647

30

312
405 305 306 2662

34
76
82 90

6o

41 35

75
111.

693
.1205

253 259 338 238 354

Oktober
November
_______r

202 120 )197 257 1209

65
60

35 44
1i6

117
134 78

85 50-

351 3365071
34

906 951 832

355

101
141 100
1030

27

120
18. 124
f3

1074
1252 852

56
67-

1 1

501
37

7
13 82
-j
.

~299
21

4
7 2 1 3 4 3
-

4407 167

i 42 24
-

$ure 19L

A!1,t100

02

Jan. 1944
Fair. ;.4 esrz

18
256
79

!61a
9

87
41 13

5966

30 252
3027

95
66_25

5 5

20
1

641

718
704

;3

774

0. 6

1
5

..

22..
-

3L0
416 2
.629

,Yuri 1
Juni
1Ju1i I, ,ust.

29

3160420
-

10
.15. 32 15t151792

750
840

315

21 1

30

67

35

67
79
70
7034

I10747
1201

49
75

7
8-

500

'8 46
406 41

8
10 2 119719

129
140

10
10
6

506

72125

594
797
--

6459
46

20
24
-L624

I
V

97 164
;

1238
1274

1423
1491

32345 300

37

100

300
300

380

Kj7
'6

64
-

45
94

31

34!

201831

2201

20f ~
251 2'67
25 241

225
263 162

15

60 350

30

865432100
1 87900
8002-

(,t obo r

'ptem~ber
Noebr IjI200 Nvme18
____ _________3125

180
18

"'101 335

147 281006 203431. . J72786 66 .38k

235

6Iz24
26 29
260

330

1 '21 8
? 720 _

3 3

832
792 750
87

-3I6313
31

16345
31 12
1

405 55

6 1 10
13

8 9

12 7
08

1012

5
___

}
1
!

511817

1688 1482 1562

2.76

12
23

96.

Jan.

194~.

15
945

237_6
434
398

8682
1015
68910
0_

13
1

41182
211

-8

__

__

__

__1729__

__

10 170
0

55

211 271-1221i -

40 82

684

72
1,2
8921

5unnae total Jn/Febr

q_____ 197L 6

25
2

0Q.411

62
8"56

__2_

SJS 09

1 0,E

893 Pz. Kpfrw.

53

60o

2at

3j2

lc,

15120

2161

J29S.

L2

Bemerkunl;: Motes

I unc 35 (t;~ wurden at,

1941

niche meir produziert.

From 1941 on P, KDfv I and the 35 tontyp. were mawdfactured.

no 1on er