It is Australias geographic isolation, rather than its Intelligence Agencies, which has kept Australia immune from terrorism

and other international crimes. Critically discuss and include in your answer analysis of at least two Intelligence Agencies in Australia.

Australias geographic isolation is no longer a barrier to terrorism, depending on what terrorism is defined as. This country is by no means immune to terrorism or other international crimes as witnessed by various incidents over the last half century. However the efforts of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) and the Australian Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS) have mitigated any major incident from occurring on Australian soil. Constant vigilance by the Australian Intelligence Community (AIC) and Customs & Border Protection (C&BP) are required to maintain the integrity of Australias sovereignty and protect its citizens and interests from attack. In claiming that Australia is susceptible to terrorism, it is important to define and understand exactly what terrorism is. An in-depth study by Alex Schmid analysed over one hundred different government and public sources in an attempt to define terrorism (Schmid, 2011). Whilst a vast array of definitions existed; Schmid established that terrorism can be summarised as the threat and/or use of violence in order to exact a political or social agenda. Using Schmids amalgamated definition, any act of intimidation or violence against the public used to influence policy of any kind can be considered terrorism. The misconception of all terrorists as Islamic fundamentalists preaching jihad is evident in all western civilisations yet Islamic extremism is only a fraction of what terrorism encompasses (Karabell, 1996). Non-religious examples of terrorism include the assassination of Franz Ferdinand in 1914 resulting in World War I, the 1940 to 1956 Mad Bomber attacks in New York City by a disgruntled electricity company employee (TIME Magazine US, 1957), the Provisional Irish Republican Army insurgency in Ireland (Gregory, 2010), and the 1995 Oklahoma City Bombing of a federal building by Timothy McVeigh (Linder, 2006). These examples illustrate various forms of terrorism yet all have a common denominator; an individual or group using violence to correct a perceived wrong through intimidation and terror. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . With this definition in hand Australias risk of terrorism can be analysed. As stated by Federal AttorneyGeneral Robert McClelland, the major threat (to Australia) has been home-grown potential terrorists (Collerton, 2011). The aforementioned examples of terrorism show this case in point; discontented American citizens bombing innocent American civilians and an Irish insurgency killing Irish civilians. Chalk and McClelland both note that Australias greatest threat lies within the borders. Only a few incidents in Australias history have been officially labelled as terrorist acts on home soil. These include the 1978 bombing of a Hilton Hotel in Sydney hosting the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting (Parliament of New South Wales, 1991), the 1986 bombing of the Turkish consulate in Melbourne (Veit, 2005) and the 1995 firebombing of the French embassy in Perth (Milliken, 1995). In each instance the suspects or known perpetrators have been either single or dual Australian citizens targeting foreign interests in Australia with political, not religious motive. Since 2001 numerous home-grown, albeit unsuccessful religious Muslim extremists have been identified and convicted of terrorism offences. These include Faheem Khalid who planned to disable the national electricity grid, the Australian born Sydney Five who planned to bomb Sydney, Abdul Nacer Benbrika and his followers who planned to detonate explosive devices in major sporting events, and the group who planned to storm Holsworthy Barracks with automatic weapons until they were killed or captured (Australian Government, 2010). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Anthony Dymock

JUST2300 Customs and Border Security

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The successful home-grown terrorist would be an Australian citizen by birth or naturalisation who evades detection by developing their extremist views within the country, having the discretion to keep quiet about their activities, and possessing the knowledge and ability to attack their target according to their plan. This is the threat that Intelligence Agencies have come to fear as there is they provide no indication that an attack is imminent (Australian Government, 2006). This applies to the entire scope of terrorism, whether it is a disgruntled corporate employee, a far-right Christian extremist or a Muslim jihadist for example. Such a threat has not emerged in Australia as of yet as all convicted terrorists discussed their plans publicly and left a trail of evidence in their wake as mentioned previously. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Opposite to the home-grown threat is the entrance of foreign operatives with preconceived intent on committing terrorist acts. Australias geographic isolation limits but not eliminates the ability and methods of entry of said operatives. Unlike European nations and the United States where borders are relatively easily crossed through surrounding countries, the only conventional methods of entry into Australia are by sea or air and both methods of entry are closely monitored by Customs & Border Protection authorities (Chalk & Rosenau, 2004). Australia faces a relatively slim threat due to the combined factors of geographic distance and the work of federal authorities and Intelligence Agencies to detect, deter and prevent this kind of attack occurring. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The two primary Intelligence Agencies, the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) and the Australian Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS) have evolved with the changing security environment and have been instrumental in detecting and preventing both home-grown and foreign terrorism threats. ASIS mission is to obtain secret intelligence about the capabilities, intentions and activities of individuals or organisations outside Australia intent on causing harm to Australian interests and/or citizens (Australian Secret Intelligence Service, 2011). ASIS is the frontline agency responsible for detecting international terrorism and transnational crimes such as drug running or people smuggling and has the legislative authority to directly engage identified targets if and when required (Australian Government, 2008). Where ASIS is unwilling or unable to prevent a threat before it reaches Australian shores, it passes on names and other information to ASIO, C&BP and the Australian Federal Police (AFP) for further investigation. In these circumstances the AFP will lead investigative efforts for criminal matters; ASIO will intervene if the threat is security related. Whilst ASIO mostly operates within Australias territorial borders, the ASIO Act mandates them to investigate threats to security wherever they arise (Australian Government, 2011). The ASIO Act however does not grant its operators Executive Powers and as such they work closely with the AFP in reducing the national security risk. Whilst ASIO aims to subdue both foreign and home-grown terrorism threats, ASIS concerns itself solely with the foreign terrorist. It is important to note that whilst these two organisations are the elite security branch designed to identify threats to Australia they themselves have come under intense scrutiny through numerous catastrophic public failures, with numerous Royal Commissions condemning them for their actions (Hope, 1984). ASIS was humiliated when a 1983 training activity conducted at the Sheraton Hotel in Melbourne went horribly wrong, resulting in the loss of ASIS right to carry firearms and conduct covert operations (Grabosky, 1989). An updated Hope Commission queried the legitimacy of ASIS paramilitary arm, believing that the operatives should have been trained well enough to complete the task without firearms and masks, threatening any civilians or damaging any property (Hope, 1984). Since 1993, several ASIS officers both past and present have broken the veil and spoken publicly about mismanagement within the Service and poorly tasked and experienced staff (The Bulletin, 2005).

Anthony Dymock

JUST2300 Customs and Border Security

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ASIO has also been the centre of much unwanted public attention since its birth in 1949. ASIO was for the most part created due to the detection of classified Australian and British documents passing through Soviet channels following World War II (Wake, 2004). During the Cold War in the 1970s it became apparent to the Allied forces that the Australian intelligence community had a leak when once again classified documents began circulating in Soviet data intercepts (Kalugin, 2004). In 1978, the previously mentioned bombing of the Sydney Hilton hotel cast a long shadow over the organisation. Many reporters and journalists obtained information that linked an ASIO exercise to the bombing that claimed the lives of two rubbish removalists and a police officer (Parliament of New South Wales, 1991). Despite stringent denials by the DirectorGeneral the Parliament of New South Wales demanded a Federal level inquiry into the incident which was vetoed by the Labor government, incensing public distrust. In the post-9/11 world several incidents relevant to actual terrorism threats have been reversed by courts of Law due to ASIO failing to follow its legal mandate. For example, in 2001 ASIO and the AFP raided the property of a suspected terrorist but the address raided was different to the one listed on the warrant. In 2005 and 2007, two separate suspects queried their treatment by ASIO with the Supreme Court of New South Wales ruling that the agents engaged in improper conduct (R v Ul-Haque, 2007). Despite their errors in operations and judgement however, the work of these two Intelligence Agencies as well as other Federal authorities has ensured that the threat of terrorism on Australian soil is minimal. Before the major globalisation boom brought about by the proliferation of technology and the internet Australias geographic isolation provided a buffer zone that isolated it from the majority of the external terrorism present in Europe and the United States. As a result of this globalisation the newest threat to emerge is the home-grown terrorist whos ideological, political or religious beliefs are dangerously transformed by what they see in modern media. Through efficient detection and prevention of overseas threats, monitoring high-risk individuals within Australian territorial borders, and preventing any dangerous persons or articles entering the country, the combined work of the Australian Intelligence Community, the Australian Federal Police and Customs & Border Protection ensures that the terrorist risk is kept to a minimum.

Anthony Dymock

JUST2300 Customs and Border Security

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