International Studies Review (2008) 10, 667679

I: ETHICAL ISSUES IN IR THEORY AND RESEARCH

What Lies Ahead: Classical Realism on the Future of International Relations

Murielle Cozette Department of International Relations, Australian National University
Realism contends that politics is a struggle for power and or survival, and consequently depicts international politics as a realm of recurrent conicts among states with very little prospect for change. It is therefore not traditionally regarded as an approach which entertains an idea of progress. E.H Carr famously rejected pure realism as an untenable position precisely because it fails to provide a ground for action, and advocated nding a delicate balance between realism and utopia, as meaningful political action must include both. While realism certainly entails a degree of pessimism, it is far fetched to claim that realist scholars are radically sceptical about the future of international relations. The article investigates Hans Morgenthau and Raymond Aron, two leading classical realist scholars, and argues that neither advocated a strict version of power politics. On the contrary, they both attempted to nd the balance Carr suggested between realist concerns and ideals necessary to spur political action. Both were also very aware of the dangers of nihilism, and upheld hope in the future of humankind, even if this hope remains tempered by pessimism as to whether it will ever realize its destiny.

This article deals with terms which are traditionally regarded as mutually exclusive: realism and progress. E.H. Carr famously summed up the stark opposition between realism and what he calls utopianism. What differentiates these two approaches at the most fundamental level is their stance on the future of international relations. While utopianism is characterized by hope that progress is always at hand, realism contends that politics is a struggle for power and or survival, and depicts international politics as a realm of recurrent conicts among states with very little prospect for change. Utopianism is characterized by creative thinking, triggered by a dissatisfaction about the world as it is, and a belief that it can be changed. By contrast, realism seems to teach resignation to the existing order of things which is viewed as immutable (Carr 1974:11). What lies at the core of realism is thus the idea of necessity, which does not provide any incentive for action as it does not propose something to believe in. It is this fundamental lack of hope which leads Carr to reject pure realism as an untenable intellectual and political position, as it fails to provide a nite goal, an emotional appeal, a right of moral judgment and a ground for action

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(1974:89). In other words, the stumbling block realism comes up against is the question: why act? If states relations are governed by necessity, one is condemned to resignation at best, despair at worst. This is why Carr ultimately advocates nding a delicate combination of realism and utopia: sound political thought and sound political life will be found only when both have their place (1974:10). While realism certainly entails a degree of pessimism, it is far fetched to claim that realist scholars are radically sceptical about the future of international relations. Carrs rejection of pure realism is easy to accept, provided one keeps in mind that virtually none of the major realist gures in IR promote it. An analysis of Hans Morgenthau and Raymond Aron, two leading classical realist scholars, demonstrates this in the clearest way. Neither advocated a strict version of power politics. On the contrary, they both attempted to nd the balance Carr suggested between realist concerns and ideals necessary to spur political action. Both were aware of the dangers of nihilism, and upheld hope in the future of humankind, even if this hope remains tempered by pessimism as to whether it will ever realize their destiny. Hans Morgenthau on Politics, Ethics and the Future of International Relations Morgenthaus Pessimism: Politics as Tragedy Morgenthau is best known for his emphasis on the tragic nature of politics, which is rooted in his view of human nature. In the sphere of politics, the most powerful instinct that drives men to act is the lust for power. It is dened as a desire for domination over other men that can only be satised if man becomes omnipotent (Morgenthau 1946:193). This is why politics is in essence a neverending struggle for power. As power is dened as a relation where men always try to impose their will upon and dominate others, the political actor always considers others as means rather than ends, thus contradicting Kantian categorical imperatives (Morgenthau 1962:15; 1970:243; 1969:13). This explains why Morgenthau argues that political action is, inevitably, immoral (1970:243). In contrast to a moralistic position judging political acts according to whether or not they are right or just, Morgenthau asserts that There is no escape from the evil of power, regardless of what one does (1946:201). Acting in the political sphere never involves a clear cut choice between a morally good and an evil course of action, but is always a matter of choosing the lesser evil among several evil options (1945:11, 18). This essential evilness of politics is a perennial fact which cannot be overcome by an act of will: it stems from the lust for power, intimately rooted in human nature itself, which taints and corrupts any action undertaken in that sphere (1946:194195). The inevitability of doing evil when acting in the political sphere and the tension this creates for man lies at the core of Morgenthaus denition of politics as a tragedy. Fundamentally, Morgenthau speaks of tragedy in relation to a permanent inner struggle within man himself. If the lust for power is dened as the most fundamental drive of human actions in the realm of politics, this does not mean that human nature is reduced to this impulse. On the contrary, for Morgenthau, Man is a political animal by nature, he is a scientist by chance or choice, he is a moralist because he is a man (1946:168). Moral judgments are presented as specically characteristic of human beings: this is precisely what makes them truly human. Indeed, men cannot live without a philosophy which gives meaning to [their] existence by explaining it in terms of causality, rationalizing it in terms of philosophy proper, and justifying it in terms of ethics (1946:7). This is why man consistently tends to deny the importance of the lust for power, and feels compelled to justify his actions in ethical terms: The ethical life of the individual himself is a continued series of attempts to justify manifestations of individual egotism in terms of an ethically valuable goal and thus to

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prove that what has the appearance of egotism transcends actually the individual interest (Morgenthau 1946:183; Wong 2000:397). One could infer that these attempts are merely to be regarded as hypocritical smokescreens for the lust for power which remains at the roots of human actions, no matter what men may claim in order to disguise it under moral clothes. Such a radically cynical view is not, however, what Morgenthau has in mind. As he notes,
However devoid of positive ethical signicance the individual political act may be, it is bound to be less than completely evil and can never be without any ethical signicance at all: for the necessity of justifying it in ethical terms carries with it the obligation for even the most cynical of actors to choose his measures so that they, however evil, will coincide at least at some point, however limited and supercial, with the standards of ethics and thus will lend at least color to the positive ethical claims. (1946:177)

In fact, Morgenthau makes the same point as Carr when the latter emphasizes the necessity, recognized by all politicians, both in domestic and international affairs, for cloaking interests in a guise of moral principles (Carr 1974:92). Carr sees this perennial tendency as a symptom of the inadequacy of realism as this approach seems to deny any ethical signicance to political actions. However, Morgenthau certainly recognizes the profound ethical need to justify political actions in moral terms, and does not dismiss it as mere hypocrisy onlyeven though it can certainly be the case that moral claims are used as mere covers to disguise power politics, as he also clearly emphasizes. He stresses the curious dialectic of ethics and politics, which prevents the latter, in spite of itself, from escaping the formers judgment and normative direction, which has its roots in the nature of man as both a political and a moral animal (1946:177). For Morgenthau then, political action is characterized by a central antinomy which is composed of two poles between which it oscillates: the lust for power and its denial as universal ethical norm (1946:201). While Morgenthau is best known for his emphasis on the former, he makes it clear that there can be no renunciation of the ethical denial without renouncing the human nature of man (1946:201). Morgenthau is therefore most certainly not to be regarded as a Machiavellian (Scheuerman 2007). Indeed, claiming to be realistic in his understanding of politics, Morgenthau uses the adjective utopian to discredit not only liberal assumptions, but also strict Machiavellian ones. (1945; 145147). In fact, as Machiavellism denies any ethical signicance to political action, it is no less idealistic than its liberal opposite pole as it makes the same mistake: it rests upon a simplistic and one-sided understanding of human nature (Morgenthau 1945:145 146). While liberals overlook the lust for power, Machiavellians dismiss ethical needs as nothing but hypocrisy. Neither attitude is adequate to approach politics and to grasp its complexities, as both fail to understand man in the rst place. For Morgenthau, human nature is characterized by both an insatiable lust for power and a profound need to act in conformity to what man regards as being ethically right. This is why politics is a tragedy: man, if a slave to the lust for power, is also a moral being consistently trying to adapt his actions to ethical standards. Like Sisyphus, he is condemned to fail in his attempt to be moral, but will always try nonetheless because he is a man, and aspires to morality. Tragedy in this sense goes hand in hand with heroism: Morgenthau speaks of the aristeia of man, his heroic struggle to be and to be more than he is and to know that he is and can be more than he is (Morgenthau 1964:222). The struggle is tragic precisely because it cannot be won: the evil element of politics will ensure that mans ethical aspirations are defeated (Rengger 2005:324). It is also heroic because man still endlessly undertakes that struggle despite knowing he is bound to fail, which testies to his grandeur.

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The Transcendent Purpose of Foreign Policy While Morgenthau certainly insists that politics is a struggle for power, he never conceived politics as being just this (Williams 2005:189). In fact, the emphasis Morgenthau put on power must be placed in its historical context, and must also be related to the polemical purpose he had when writing Politics Among Nations (Wong 2000:392). At the time of its publication in 1948, Morgenthau felt that US foreign policy was dominated by a liberal faith in reason and progress, which had led the United States to think of itself as above power politics. More specically, Morgenthau ayed liberals ill-placed optimism in the powers of reason, which led them to conceive of international affairs as something essentially rational, where politics plays the role of a disease to be cured by means of reason (1946:71). This Morgenthau sees as an illusion bound to be dismissed by political reality itself (1946:207). This over condence in human reason is drastically inadequate when approaching politics, not so much because he denies that reason plays a role in human decisions, but rather because he does not regard it as being the most determining factor in the political sphere. In fact, it is merely the handmaid of irrational forceschief among them the lust for power: Reason is like a light which by its own inner force can move nowhere [] It is carried by the irrational forces of interests and emotion to where those forces want it to move, regardless of what the inner logic of abstract reason would require (1946:155). The liberal view that power politics is something that can eventually be suppressed was precisely Morgenthaus main target. He saw it part of his educational mission, as a scholar, to remind his American audience of some unpleasant but basic truths about the nature of the political sphere, notably the perpetuity of the struggle for power, even though that was bound to be unpopular. As he admitted, Politics Among Nations was indeed, and could be nothing else but, a frontal attack against [the liberal] conception. It has to be as radical on the side of its philosophy as had been the errors on the other side (Morgenthau 1973: xiii). In other words, while Morgenthau is best known for Politics Among Nations and for the denition of politics as a struggle for power on which the book insists, it should not be inferred that he conceives politics as being uniquely that: this work was intended to be polemical and extreme, and does not necessarily best exemplify Morgenthaus much more nuanced stance on the possibility of implementing moral values through political actions, and by extension on the future of international relations. That Morgenthau opposed a strict Machiavellian conception of international politics and its reduction to a struggle for power is most obvious when reading some of the works he produced in the 1960s and 1970s. At the time, Morgenthau argued that politics is not simply dened by a struggle for power, but is also, to some extent, a struggle for moral leadership. Worried that US decision makers conceived of power essentially in military terms, Morgenthau wrote that while military strength and political power are the preconditions for lasting international greatness, the substance of that greatness springs from the hidden sources of intellect and morale, from ideas and values, which we call civilization (Morgenthau 1969:176). These ideas and values are as inherently part of international politics as is the struggle for power. During the 1960s, and more particularly during the Vietnam war, Morgenthau thus forcefully reminded US decision makers of what they seemed to have forgotten: in order to be worthy of our lasting sympathy, a nation must pursue its interests for the sake of a transcendent purpose that gives meaning to the dayby-day operations of its foreign policy (Morgenthau 1960:8). The transcendent purpose that uniquely characterized the United States for Morgenthau is the realization of equality in freedom. It represents an ideal in the literal sense of

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the term, always to be striven for, even if by denition never fully achieved in the domestic realm. Morgenthau does not claim that the United States should impose its own unique purpose upon other countries by forcethis he regards as folly. Instead, he argues that by being true to its purpose at the domestic level, America sets up an example for the world to emulate. This is crucial as the United States enjoys a unique position in the world: Morgenthau does not hesitate to claim that America has become the Rome and Athens of the Western world, the foundation of its lawful order and the fountainhead of its culture (1960:5). Because of this unique position, the United States should be aware that other nations look to America for specic contributions to the affairs of man which only [it] can make. He further adds that we expect of certain nations certain deeds, for we have read in their past deeds a purpose to which we expect future deeds to conform (1960:10). In other words, the unique purpose of the United States sets up high expectations for its actions, and provides a standard to which the country will be held accountable by others. It is Morgenthaus conception of what the United States uniquely stands for that ultimately leads him to condemn US foreign policy in Vietnam. As he writes, This nation, alone among the nations of the world, was created for a noble purpose: to achieve equality in freedom at home and thereby set an example for the world to emulate. It is exactly for this reason that our prestige has suffered so disastrously: the world did not expect of us what it had come to expect of others (emphasis added) (Morgenthau 1965:20). By intervening in Vietnam and ghting a dirty war, the United States loses the struggle for moral leadership. In so doing, it not only miscalculated where its national interests truly lie, but it also betrayed its purpose by turning into a leading counter-revolutionary force. The American purpose must not lead to intervention abroad in a vain attempt to impose American ideals upon other countries. But it must be used to assess political actions which should not radically contradict this ideal: if that is the case, foreign policy must be condemned as ultimately self defeating. The ability to act upon realist assessments, without ever losing sight of the ideal for which a particular community stands, and which ultimately denes it, is the sign of a true statesman as opposed to a mere politician. The relationship between the purpose and the interests of a nation explains why Morgenthau can then claim that politics is not only simply a naked struggle for power, but also a moral struggle for the preservation or the extension or the victory of certain moral values [] And that is what the national interest is all about (Morgenthau in Lang 2004:111). The very concept of the national interest, so crucial to Morgenthaus understanding of international politics, is infused by ethical conceptions which give it substance. Politics is thus dened as an arena where men struggle for power, but also where they compete to, and strive toward, the implementation of what they regard as being ethically right. In fact, for Morgenthau, politics is a vector through which some moral values can at least sometimes by approximated, however imperfectly: political action can be dened as an attempt to realize moral values through the medium of politics, that is, power (1962:106). In contrast to the claim that realism promotes an amoral or immoral vision of politics, Morgenthau ultimately presents political actions as participating in mans deep ethical need to realize moral values. That this attempt consistently falls short from the ideal is not in dispute: the lust for power prevents men from achieving ethical perfection. But some improvements, however imperfect, are always to be striven for. The unique purpose the United States stands for should ensure that its decision makers avoid contradicting its founding ideals too radically in their foreign policy, and at least attempt to be true to them to the extent that it is possible in the political sphere. Morgenthau, therefore, does not argue that political actions are entirely devoid of ethical signicance. He does however strongly oppose what he regards

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as a typical liberal belief in a global peace through universal agreement about what universal moral values, and what the best institutions to implement them, are. Liberals unconditional faith in the powers of reason blinds them to the tragic elements inherent to politics which are bound to thwart their optimism regarding the possibility of a perpetual peace. In fact, politics is a sphere of constant struggle among competing denitions of what the good or the right is. This competition takes place within states, and also among them on the international scene. Liberals are, therefore, guilty of equating their own, historically specic and particular understanding of the good with that of humankind at large (Morgenthau 1946:20). This explains why while agreeing that a world state may be the only lasting solution to the problem of international peace, Morgenthau remains distinctively pessimistic as to whether it will ever become a reality. In Politics Among Nations, Morgenthau argued the conditions for the implementation of a world state were not present at the time he was writing, and may never be. They include overwhelming force, suprasectional loyalties, expectation of justice, three key elements that explain the existence of peace within nation states, and which are conspicuously lacking on the international scene (1973:482). Most importantly, while the state is indispensable for the maintenance of domestic peace, it cannot by itself maintain [it] (1973:488). This is because the state does not pre-exist in the society it protects, but emanates from it. This means that, for a world state to come into existence, what is required is a true world community sharing similar values. For Morgenthau, it is highly unlikely such community will ever become a reality, as people still feel more deeply attached to their nations than to humanity at large (1973:491). Hence his pessimistic conclusion: international peace cannot be permanent without a world state, and [] a world state cannot be established under the present moral, social and political conditions of the world (1973:493). While perpetual peace is not to be expected, Morgenthau does not necessarily argue that men are endlessly condemned to repeat past mistakes. In fact, it is essential for man to be aware of the tragic nature of politics in order to learn how to mitigate it (Lebow 2005:333). In particular, such knowledge constitutes the best antidote against hubris, which always ends up in murderous ideological crusades in an attempt to impose ones values upon others. This is a tendency Morgenthau sees typical of the modern age: nationalism is prone to equate one nations moral code with the universal one: Instead of the universality of an ethics to which all nations adhere, we have in the end the particularity of national ethics which claims the right to, and aspires toward, universal recognition (Morgenthau 1948:96). Morgenthau worried about this tendency, as it breaks down moral boundaries previously recognized as binding by states, and which notably preclude mass extermination. Total war is the offspring of nationalistic universalism. An awareness of the fact that any attempt to impose ones specic moral code upon others will always end in tragedy is thus most important, especially in a nuclear age: it prevents ideological crusades which, by denition, cannot be won, and which are most detrimental to a recognition of some basic moral values to be respected by all states. What remains possible is a progressive implementation of some moral values within the boundaries of nationstates. In fact, this is the only realistic kind of progress one can hope for, given the lack of a supranational authority: In the absence of an integrated international society, the attainment of a modicum of order and the realization of a minimum of moral values are predicated upon the existence of national communities capable of preserving order and realizing moral values within the limits of their power (Morgenthau 1982:38). In other words, the kind of progress Morgenthau proposes seems intrinsically linked to the nation state.

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Morgenthau on Nuclear Weapons This conclusion does not do justice to what Morgenthau actually argued. In fact, he was fully aware of the need to go beyond the state when reecting upon specic threats facing humanity as a whole, and in order to ensure the protection of some basic values he regarded as universal. Indeed, far from being a defender of the existing status quo, Morgenthau called for a radical change in world politics in the 1970s, and more specically, for the implementation of a world government, even though he remained pessimistic about the possibility of its realization (Scheuerman 2007). Morgenthau consistently emphasized the uniqueness of nuclear weapons, which render the Clausewitzian conception of war as the continuation of politics by other means obsolete for the rst time in human history (Morgenthau 1970:260, 1977:255). Faced with the prospect of nuclear war, Morgenthau asserts that it is at this point that the realistic and utopian approaches to politics in general, and to international relations in particular, merge (1970:260). Morgenthau readily admits that thinking about nuclear weapons implies, by denition, transcending the nation state and creating new, supranational forms of government (1970:261). Indeed, he consistently argued that the state remained a particular political organization which was not to be regarded as eternaland certainly not when it is obviously ill-suited to address problems which are global in scope (1973:10). It is true that Morgenthau remains notoriously vague as to what such supranational political structure may be, or how it could be concretely implemented. But he certainly made clear he regarded a world government as the only long lasting solution to avoid a nuclear disaster, and to cope with other issues like environmental threats and population growth (Lebow 2003:245). These global threats compel men to think creatively about, and to strive towards the implementation of, new forms of political organizations that have yet to emerge (Graig 2003:109). For Morgenthau, to envisage and advocate these new forms of political organizations is a moral duty for scholars and decision-makers alike, as without them, the survival of humanity is at risk. This is ultimately consistent with Morgenthaus claim that politics is never entirely devoid of ethical signicance, and that one should always, at least, attempt to preserve some basic values he dened as universal, namely life and freedom in the sense of the Judeo-Christian tradition and, more particularly, of Kantian philosophy (Morgenthau in Frei 2001:216). These values constitute what Morgenthau calls a transcendent standard of ethics which supersedes particular moral codes, and which should lie at the core of scholarly activity. Its promotion can be dened as the very raison detre of academia, as speaking truth to power ensures these values are never lost sight of. When advocating for a world government despite being fully aware of the obstacles that stand in its way, Morgenthau, therefore, upholds his denition of scholars as being the conscience of their time. While calling for new forms of political organizations, Morgenthau ultimately remained sceptical about their realization. Nuclear weapons may well render the Clausewitzian conception of war obsolete, but they do not eradicate the lust for power. While nothing can be won out of a nuclear war, man will always be tempted to dominate other men, and will therefore likely think that nuclear weapons can help him do so (Morgenthau 1946:216). Morgenthau, therefore, wished for the implementation of a world government, but did not suggest any concrete ways of realizing it, and remained sceptical that it will be realized at all: some of the arguments he so powerfully promotes, most notably the ubiquity of the lust for power, radically hamper such a task (Boyle 1985:73). However, if Morgenthau certainly remained pessimistic as to whether a world state would ever be implemented, what matters is the very fact that he advocated it publicly: he would not have done so if he genuinely believed that there was

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absolutely no possibility to at least approximate such idealthat would render his claim pointless. In other words, a world government is truly a utopia, but one that Morgenthau felt necessary to advocate, if only because it should constitute an ideal men should strive for, even if they are bound to fall short of it: in the nuclear age, this is the very condition of their survival as a species. To sum up, if Morgenthau presents his position in stark contrast to liberal optimism in the power of Reason, he refuses to lapse into nihilism or cynicism and provides an understanding of both human nature and politics which gives importance to ethical concerns. He was also aware of the need to include ideals into his political thinking, and reminded his American audience of the central role that the American purpose should play at both the domestic and international levels. His reection upon nuclear weapons testies to his deep awareness of the global character of the challenges facing mankind, and to his hope that it will rise to them and ultimately approximate the only utopia that can save it, namely a world state. Arons Realism: Hope versus Faith Politics and Ethics Aron shares some important assumptions with Morgenthau on the relationship between ethics and politics. For Aron, anarchy is the fundamental characteristic of the international sphere. International relations are therefore distinct from other social relations because they take place within the shadow of war (Aron 1962:17). As there is no supreme authority to refer to in case of conict, states decide when and if they want to use force to protect their interests. Aron thus evokes the necessity of national selshness, which logically stems from [] the state of nature which prevails among states (1962:568). Even if Aron does not root his denition of politics in a lust for power inherent to human nature as Morgenthau does, he agrees that international politics is, inevitably, a sphere of conict among states because it is characterized by anarchy. He therefore frontally attacked a moralistic approach to foreign policy, he regarded as fundamentally inappropriate to understand the complexities of political action, and dangerous because of the risk of fanaticism it carries. If the statesman follows his heart without taking into account the consequences of his actions, [he] would fail his duty and would consequently be immoral (1962:620). For Aron, the position of the moralist who judges political actions according to whether they are right or wrong is a way of avoiding commitment in doubtful struggles, and all political struggles are doubtful. It is never a struggle between good and evil, it is between the preferable and the detestable (1990:176). This matches Morgenthaus denition of political ethics as choosing the lesser evil. A moralistic approach to politics is radically ill suited to comprehend its complexities. It can lead to the disregard of prudence and the launching of moral crusades in a vain attempt to spread ones values on a global scale. Hubris is thus the corollary of moralism. Importantly, Aron equally rejects what he calls absolute Machiavellism which radically separates politics from the ethical sphere and which makes it immune to judgment emanating from the latter. This turns politics into a set of technical requirements to manage human passions, which is an open door to totalitarianism, as it rests upon a denial of the ethical side of politics:
The great illusion of cynical thought, obsessed by the struggle for power, consists in disregarding another aspect of reality: the search for legitimate power, for an accepted authority, for the best regime. Men have never thought of politics as being exclusively dened by the struggle for power. The one who does

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not see the struggle for power aspect is nave, the one who does not see anything but the struggle for power aspect is a false realist. (Aron 1965:53)

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Aron therefore reminds that politics, as a human activity, remains inescapably concerned with ethics: it is subject to ethical norms and recognises their authority (1962:712). This leads him to assert, in a passage that strikingly echoes Morgenthaus claims, that politics is one of the primary vectors through which morality can be realized (1962:764):
Morality [] is borne out of history. It is the very progress of our moral conceptions which leads us to severely judge states practices and to progressively transform them. It is within the concrete morality of communities that universal morality realises itselfimperfectly. And it is in and through politics that concrete moralities are realized.

Aron, like Morgenthau, acknowledges the plurality of moral universes. Politics at large, far from being uniquely equated with a naked struggle for power, is also presented as a project which upholds the moral values of a particular community, and by doing so, participates in the never ending realization of a universal morality that each community recognizes and implements through its specic, cultural lenses. If Aron shares some key assumptions with Morgenthau, he provides some distinctive insights which set him apart from the American scholar. His realism is informed by an active pessimism which, while being adverse to revolutionary prophecies, nonetheless maintains hope in the future of mankind, sustained by a Kantian regulative ideal of Reason. Active Pessimism: Aron as a Progressist Like Morgenthau, Aron had a rst hand experience of Nazism. He spent three years in Germany, from 1930 to 1933, and witnessed the demise of the Weimar Republic and the establishment of Hitlers dictatorship. Reecting on his historical experience, Aron writes that it inclined [him] towards an active pessimism. Once and for all, [he] ceased to believe that history obeys the imperatives of reason or good mens desires. [he] lost faith and [he] kept, not without some efforts, hope (Aron 1971:21). Aron therefore does not deny a degree of pessimism, but this pessimism is qualied as active, and does not necessarily lead to despair. On the contrary, the active dimension of Arons pessimism is informed by a notion of hope, which Aron retained to the end of his life (Aron 1990:339). Refusing to give up hope in the future of humankind does not mean turning into a follower of secular religions and to accept their prophecies. In fact, Aron attempts to nd a middle way between, on the one hand, an attitude which sees nothing but permanence in human history, and on the other hand, a pretence to know its ultimate truth. He singles out two ideal types. The rst, millenarism, confers to an objective, susceptible to be achieved within a specic time frame, an absolute value, or confuses a historical society, created or to be created, with the ideal societies which would accomplish human destiny (Aron 1955:178). Marxism is the archetypal example of this attitude. Its opposite is conservatism, which emphasizes the permanence of an order, whether historical or eternal, and denies the possibility of a nal regime which would overcome the contradictions of previous regimes (1955:184). Pure realism exemplies this position. Between these two attitudes, Aron defends a third which he terms progressive politics. It refuses to exclusively assert either the end or the permanence of history, and admits that there are transformations, irregular but undened, which lead towards an end situated at the horizon, itself justied by abstract

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principles (1955:191). While not denying meaning to history, Aron refuses to assert that this meaning is xed, as he always denounced the dangers of secular religions and their moral certainty. Ultimately, Aron opposes two notions: faith, characteristic of all secular religions, and despair, which leads to nihilism. In between these two notions, Aron inserts and promotes a third one: hope, sustained by Reason. Such an attitude is not dened as pessimistic: on the contrary, it rests upon the idea that human history is not meaningless, while refraining from dening its ultimate ends. Aron does not necessarily dismiss the use of the word tragedy to depict international politics (that is, he accepts the term tragedy as a good description of a particular historical conguration, that of the Cold War and its nuclear equilibrium of terror). However, Aron refuses to dene international politics as a whole as a tragedy, as this precludes any idea of progress. At the end of his Memoires, he explains: tragedy would be the last word only if a happy outcome was not even conceivable. I continue to believe a happy outcome [is] conceivable, well beyond the political horizon, the Idea of Reason (1993:741; 1990:323). While Morgenthau remained sceptical of the powers of human reason, Aron ultimately sides with it when it comes to imagining the future of humankind. Importantly, Arons hope in Reason amounts to a wager in the literal sense of the term (Baverez 1993:145). He accepts, with Weber, that modernity creates a disenchanted world where the divine has lost its central place. The task of the moderns becomes to retain hope while not relying on the divine: If man manages to live without expecting anything from God, one doubts he lives without hope (Aron 1945:303). For Aron, Reason is consequently the only thing left on which man can bet if he wants to hope the worst can be avoided. As he writes, in the nuclear age, if one does not bet on Reason, on what can one bet? (Aron 1976:174). In his Memoires, he further asks: if all civilizations, all ambitious and all contingent, must realize in a distant future the prophets dreams, which universal vocation could unite them apart from Reason? (Aron 1957:343, 1993:729) Reason alone is viewed by Aron as having a universal potential which can eventually lead men to realize their destiny. The Kantian Side of Arons Realism The Idea of Reason which underlies Arons views on the future of humankind has distinctive Kantian overtones. In his Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View, Kant makes it clear that if there is Progress, it is not at the individual level that one must expect it. Rather, one should look to humanity as a species, and take a long-term view of its history (Kant 1988:11). This is almost exactly how Aron describes the idea of an end of history: [it] is an idea of Reason, it characterises not the individual man but the collective effort of men in groups throughout time. It is the project of humanity, insofar as it thinks of itself as reasonable (1955:220). The belief in Reason is what sustains Arons faith in progress against all odds. It is not equated with the preaching of abstract ideals as the denitive end of human history; nor is it to be understood as presenting existing regimes or societies as constituting this end. These are precisely the two errors that Aron guards against: One conceives the radical solution of the problem of the common life, whether or not one thinks its realization is possible. But there is a permanent temptation to substitute to the concept of resolved contradictions either an abstract formulaequality, fraternityor a particular and prosaic reality (1955:220). For Aron, the Kantian idea of Reason avoids these two pitfalls, as it does not subsume human destiny under one single direction, nor does it suggest that contingent historical realities represent the nal accomplishment of history. In other words, such a notion allows for retaining hope, while not succumbing to the

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temptation to think that one knows the supreme truth about history. Aron presents the Idea of Reason as a regulative ideal, as a Kantian horizon: something always to be striven for, even if never achieved. Writing against Sartre who advocated a revolution to radically transform the existing order, Aron asserts that the good society in Kantian terms is only an Idea of Reason: it has a regulative use (1989:223). Animated not only simply by a faith in human Reason, but also by the belief that men can use Reason to achieve their humanity, the Kantian regulative idea of Reason therefore does not necessarily prescribe a given course of action. In fact, it can be used as a yardstick with which one can assess the existing political order and its institutions: the end of history is not a concrete event, soon to come, dened by the socialization of the means of production or by the seizing of power by the communist party: it is an idea of Reason, in the Kantian sense of the term, susceptible to be used as a criterion (1955:192). On this, Aron appears strikingly close to cosmopolitan scholars like Beitzand this claim also echoes the role Morgenthau devotes to the purpose of foreign policy (Beitz 1979:170). If Aron adopts Kants idea of a possible unity of humanity through Reason, he does not, however, accept Kants postulates without caveats. First, while upholding the belief that humanity has a destiny, Aron, like Morgenthau, refrains from asserting what such a destiny will look like. On the contrary, for Aron, such a belief leaves the door open to a plurality of possible futures, including disastrous ones. For Kant, each generation, building upon the experience of previous ones, will gradually learn and understand that Nature calls humanity to implement the rule of law, which conforms to Reason. He asserts that one can consider the history of the human species as a whole as the execution of a hidden plan of nature (Kant 1988:22). This process will not be straightforward: set-backs and errors are inevitable. But humanity as a whole will eventually realize the hidden plan of Nature, even though it will need war to accept its wisdom. By contrast, Aron does not believe that humanity will necessarily realize its rational destiny. While retaining faith in Reason, he nonetheless includes a degree of pessimism which reects his historical experience, and modernity at large. Debating the argument that men do not suffer in vain, and that there is some kind of retribution in the future, Aron abruptly asserts: even formulated by Kant, this argument leaves me perfectly cold. Nothing has ever been promised to us. There is no reason for the world to be just (1989:367). In other words, there is no guarantee that there will be a happy ending: there is no hidden plan of Nature. Arons Kantianism is, therefore, tempered by his core belief in human freedom: as men are free, it can never be automatically assumed that they will make the right choice. They always have the possibility of choosing mass destruction or nuclear war. Therefore, what remains is hope, not faith. Tragedy is constantly looming because men are free. But precisely because they are both free and reasonable beings, there remains hope that they will demonstrate wisdom. As Aron writes, nothing prevents from imagining the spread of wisdom simultaneously with the spread of nuclear weapons (Aron 1969:251). Aron is, therefore, less categorical than Kant in his reection upon human history. He accepts Kants idea that Reason can lead humanity to realize itself in history. He also retains Kants notion of a regulative ideal, something that is always to be striven for, even if never achieved in ones lifetime. But Aron does not share Kants certainty regarding the inevitability of the realization of this rational project. Promoting hope as opposed to faith, Aron ultimately upholds a belief in mans potential, without predicting what mans actual realizations will be. This in turn sheds light on how Aron modies Kantian postulates. Kant is certain that men will eventually conform to Natures plans: as Nature does nothing in vain, and as it endowed men with Reason, they will ultimately develop it to the full and implement the rule of law. In other words, the meaning of

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human history is already decided from outside, by an external force against which men cannot compete. By contrast, Aron asserts that the world has no meaning in itself; it has no external meaning; it can only have the meaning that we give it, that is, that of our will or of our project (1989:228). The Aronian idea of Reason constitutes a Kantian horizon, an ideal which has no concrete denition, which does not foreclose different possibilities about human destiny, as men themselves give meaning to their own history: they cannot expect God, or Nature, to rescue them. As free and reasonable beings, men make their own history. Aron consequently refrains from asserting with certainty what the future of humanity will look like, but he does assert it has one, which can only be realized by men themselves: There is no global fatality. The transcendence of the future gives man, throughout time, a reason to want and a guarantee that all things considered, hope will never perish (1955:255). Conclusion Morgenthau and Aron both attacked a moralistic approach to international politics, which they saw as dangerously misguided. This polemical design led them, inevitably, to emphasize some features at odds with liberalism, notably the belief that the struggle for power can be abolished. This explains why, when investigating some of their works, it certainly is possible to claim that they are infused by a degree of pessimism. Pessimism however is not to be equated with nihilism or despair: while realism warns against ideological prophecies, it does not necessarily teach resignation to the existing status quo. On the contrary, for Morgenthau and Aron, politics, while being a struggle for power or survival, is also to be regarded as part of mans never ended attempt to implement what he regards as ethically right, even though this attempt is bound to fall short of the ethical ideal from which it arises. That realism does not provide a grand vision of what the future of international relations may look like is indisputable, and explains why it is consistently attacked for lacking emotional appeal. In fact, realism purposefully refrains from asserting with certainty what lies ahead, as this is characteristic of secular religions, or political ideologies: their emotional appeal is as undeniable as the catastrophes that have occurred whenever men tried to implement them on a global scale. While not providing a precise vision of the future of humankind, realism certainly recognizes that meaningful political action is always infused by something that transcends pure power politics, that is, by an ideal for which to stand, and a belief that it can be realized, however imperfectly. Ultimately, realism does not lead to despair or nihilism. Both Morgenthau and Aron give a place to utopian ideals which should infuse political actions, and which can be used to critically assess existing political decisions and or political orders. In fact, realism occupies a middle way between moralism which remains incapable of understanding the ethical complexities of political actions and opens the door to ideological crusades, and pure power politics which condemns man to hopelessness and leads to totalitarianism. Both Morgenthau and Aron bet on the future of humankind, while stressing that there is no guarantee that men will ever realize their destiny. The very fact that this remains a possibility is enough to keep hope in mans future, beyond the unconditional faith demanded by secular religions, and beyond the despair that inevitably stems from a strict Machiavellian conception of politics and human nature. References
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