Apprac Digests

APPELLATE PRACTICE
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BRIEF MAKING | JUSTICE MAGDANGAL DE LEON
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the complaint, provided that their account be updated, w/c they did. Judge Cui curtly denied the motion in his order of Nov. 13, 1978. An MR was filed by the Laurels w/c was denied in a similar fashion. It was when BA Finance was poised to execute the judgment awarded in its favor that the Laurels went to the SC on certiorari alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of Judge Cui in not granting their motion for new trial. It could be that in strict law the motion for new trial was improper. For as stated in Tan vs. Dimayuga, a defendant who has been declared in default loses his standing in court as a party litigant and his remedy is a petition for relief under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court, filed w/in 60 days after he learned of the order & not more than 6 months after such order was entered. But if Judge Cui leaned more on equity than on strict legalism he could & should have treated the motion for new trial as a petition for relief under Sec. 2 of Rule 38, for although it was denominated as a motion for new trial in substance it could be considered as a petition for relief which had been filed w/in the reglementary period. Moreover, denial of relief from judgment would have caused overpayment to BA Finance resulting in unjust enrichment. The order of default & the decision as well as all the orders issued by Judge Cui subsequent thereto are hereby set aside; & he is ordered to allow the Laurels to answer the complaint of BA Finance w/in 15 days from their receipt of this decision. MARCELO v. PCIB GR 182735, 4 DECEMBER 2009 CASE: Sps. Marcelo filed a PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI before the SC under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Decision1 dated 31 Jan. 2007 & the Resolution2 dated 29 Aug. 2007 of the CA in CA-G.R. CV No. 82424, upholding the validity of the extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings initiated by Philippine Commercial International Bank (PCIB) & the subsequent public auction sale conducted against their properties. FACTS: Sps. Marcelo obtained from PCIB several loans in staggered amounts w/in the period 1996-1997. In turn, they executed promissory notes in favor of PCIB. To secure the payment of their loans, Sps. Marcelo executed an REM over 6 parcels of land all situated in Baliuag, Bulacan. Sps. Marcelo defaulted on the payment of their outstanding loans, prompting PCIB to make repeated demands for its payment. PCIB filed a Petition for Extra-judicial Foreclosure over the mortgaged properties before the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan. A Notice of Sheriffs Sale was issued by the Provincial Sheriff of Bulacan. The said Notice was posted on the Meralco posts w/in the vicinities of Baliuag Roman Catholic Church, Baliuag Public Market & the chapel of Sabang, Baliuag, Bulacan as evidenced by the Affidavit of Posting executed by Sheriff Ipac. The Notice was also sent by registered mail to PCIB & spouses Marcelo, but the latter denied receiving
RULE 37 MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL OR RECONSIDERATION LAUREL v. CUI GR L-50087, 30 JUNE 30 1980 FACTS: Manuel & Lilia Laurel (the Laurels) bought a Toyota Tamaraw from Delta Motor Sales Corp. (Delta). The Laurels executed a chattel mortgage over the vehicle & signed a promissory note (PN) in favour of Delta for P17,881. Delta assigned the PN to BA Finance Corp. (BA Finance). The Laurels allegedly defaulted in the payment of their monthly instalments, thus BA Finance filed a case for replevin, or if thats not possible, for the payment of the unpaid balance of P15,591 & interest, plus attorneys fees & liquidated damages. The case was raffled to Branch 25 presided by Judge Cui. Summons were served on the Laurels on Feb. 15, 1978 requiring them to answer the complaint w/in 15 days. As of May 5, they still had not answered. BA Finance filed a motion to have them declared in default & to be allowed to present its evidence ex-parte, & this was granted by Judge Cui. Judge Cui issued a decision ordering the Laurels to pay BA Finance the P15,591, legal interest, attorneys fees & liquidated damages. ISSUE: W/N the Laurels were properly declared in default. RULING: NO. The decision states that summons were served on the Laurels on Feb. 1, 1980, when in fact the sheriffs return gave the date as Feb. 15, 1980. Moreover, the decision BEARS NO DATE. A notice of the decision, dated Aug. 23, 1978, was issued by the branch clerk of court & the Laurels claim they received it on Sept. 6, 1978. On Sept. 7, the Laurels filed their Answer w/ Counterclaim. BA Finance moved that it be stricken from the records because it was filed out of time when the Laurels already lost their standing in court. This was granted by Judge Cui on Sept. 26. In a motion dated Sept. 24, the Laurels asked for an extension of 15 days to file a motion for new trial. BA Finance opposed the motion for new trial but the Laurels still filed the motion. In their verified motion for new trial dated Oct., 1978, the Laurels alleged that they made remittances to BA Finance totalling P12,300 w/c BA Finance maliciously & unjustly didnt tell the Court, so the remaining balance was only P3,291 & not P15,591 (w/c was the amount awarded in the decision of Judge Cui). (NOTE: During the hearing of the case before the SC, counsel for BA Finance admitted that payments had been made by the Laurels so that their balance was less than that w/c had been awarded by Judge Cui.) Moroever, by way of affidavit of merit the Laurels also alleged that BA Finance maliciously deceived them into not answering the complaint because BA Finances Mananger promised to withdraw
ABARQUEZ | CALANOY | CALIDA | FLORES | LIPANA | LIZARONDO | MANIGBAS | MORALES | PATINO | PINON | QUE | SAGAYADAN
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the same. The Notice of the Sheriffs Sale was, likewise, published in The Times Newsweekly, a newspaper of general circulation as evidenced by the Affidavit of Publication & copies of publications. Consequently, a public auction sale was held & the 6 parcels of land were sold to PCIB. The Certificate of Sale was issued to & was then annotated on the TCTs of the subject lands on 10 Nov. 1998. Shortly before the expiration of the redemption period, Sps. Marcelo filed a Complaint before RTC Bulacan on 26 Oct. 1999, alleging (1) PCIBs violations of the terms & conditions of the REM contract & the Promissory Notes by demanding exorbitant interest rates & unnecessary bank charges w/o them being notified; & (2) irregularities in the foreclosure proceedings for failure to comply w/ the posting & publication requirements as mandated by Act No. 3135. Sps. Marcelo prayed for the nullification of the foreclosure proceedings & the issuance of a TRO against PCIB to prevent the latter from taking possession of the foreclosed properties. The TC denied the application for a TRO for want of merit & ruled that the publication of the Notice of Sale in The Times Newsweekly necessarily connoted that said publication was duly accredited by the TC, having been allowed by the ExOfficio Sheriff. The TC declared that the lack of personal notice to the mortgagors is not a ground to set aside the foreclosure sale. PCIB, in its Motion to Dismiss, contended that the Complaint filed was empty rhetoric designed to delay its right to take possession of the foreclosed property even during the redemption period of one year. It added that the matters are now fait accompli, for it had already foreclosed the properties & the one-year redemption period had already lapsed. The spouses Marcelo opposed the above Motion by emphasizing the need for a fullblown trial. In its Decision, the TC ruled for PCIB, sustaining the legal presumption of regularity in the performance of Sheriff Ipacs official duty in the foreclosure proceedings. It also affirmed PCIBs allegation of laches against Sps. Marcelo, stating that the action was but a much-delayed afterthought following Sps. Marcelos neglect to seek an accurate accounting of their loan obligation & their omission to redeem their properties w/in the period prescribed by law. Sps. Marcelo filed a Motion for Reconsideration (MR). The TC then reversed itself & rendering the extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings null & void for being violative of Act No. 3135. According to the TC, the provision of law requiring the posting of the notices of sale of a property subject of extra-judicial foreclosure have not been faithfully complied w/ in the proceedings. Aggrieved, PCIB appealed to CA. The CA in its Decision dated 31 Jan. 2007, overturned the appealed Order. It held that the publication of the Notice of Sheriffs Sale at The Times Newsweekly, as recognized by the Executive Judge of the TC, was in compliance w. the publication requirement for the foreclosure sale. The CA, in its Resolution dated 29 Aug. 2007, denied the Sps. Marcelos Motion for Extension of Time to file MR of its 31 Jan. 2007 Decision, on the ground that the time for filing the same was non-extendible; Sps. Marcelos MR was denied for being filed 11 days late on 12 Mar. 2007. On 31 Oct. 2007, the CA resolved to deny the Sps. Marcelos MR filed on 19 Sept. 2007 for being a 2 nd MR that was proscribed under Sec. 2, Rule 52 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE: W/N a Motion for Extension of Time to file MR is non-extendible? RULING: YES. Revisiting the records of this case would reveal that the case attained its finality as of 26 Sept. 2007, & the same has already been recorded in the Book of Entries of Judgment. This Court, in a long line of cases, has maintained that once the judgment has become final & executory, it can no longer be disturbed, altered or modified.57 Except for clerical errors or mistakes, all the issues between the parties are deemed resolved & laid to rest.58 Furthermore, this Court provides in Sec. 1, Rule 37 of the Rules of Court that an MR of a judgment or a final order should be filed w/in the period for appeal, w/c is w/in 15 days after notice to the appellant of the judgment or final order appealed from. The 2002 Internal Rules of the CA also states that unless an appeal or a motion for reconsideration or new trial is filed w/in the 15-day reglementary period, the CAs decision becomes final.62 Hence, the general rule is that no motion for extension of time to file a MR is allowed. An exception, however, is provided in the case of Habaluyas Enterprises, Inc. v. Maximo M. Japson, where the SC ruled that the rule shall be strictly enforced that no motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration may be filed with the MeTCs MTCs, RTCs, & the IAC. Such a motion may be filed only in cases pending w/ the SC as the court of last resort, w/c may in its sound discretion either grant or deny the extension requested Accordingly, motions for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration may be filed only in connection w/ cases pending before the SC, w/c may in its sound discretion either grant or deny the extension requested. No such motion may be filed before any lower courts.64 In opting for the liberal application of the rules in the interest of equity & justice, we cannot look w/ favor on a course of action w/c would place the administration of justice in a straight jacket for then the result would be a poor kind of justice if there would be justice at all. HABALUYAS ENTERPRISES VS. JUDGE JAPSON, RTC 142 SCRA 208 (1986) FACTS: Respondents have filed a motion for reconsideration (MR) of the Decision of the 2nd Division of the sc promulgated on Aug. 5, 1985 w/c granted the petition for certiorari & prohibition & set aside the order of Judge Japson granting private respondents' motion for new trial. ISSUE: W/N the 15-day period w/in w/c a party may file an MR of a final order or ruling of the RTC may be extended. RULING: No. Sec. 39 of The Judiciary Reorganization Act reduced the period for appeal from final orders or judgments of the RTC from 30 to 15 days & provides a uniform period of 15 days for appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards, judgments, or decisions of any court counted from notice thereof, except in habeas corpus cases where the period for appeal remains at 48 hours. To expedite appeals, only a notice
APPELLATE PRACTICE
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It was agreed upon that the remaining balance was to be paid w/in a period of 16 months. He paid to Sps. Balanoba the amount of US$600 but before the lapse of the period, Sps. Balanoba, w/o his knowledge, sold the same lot to Aguilon. He offered to settle the remaining balance over the lot but Sps. Balanoba refused to convey the property. Despite his demands, Sps. Balanoba failed to reimburse him.
of appeal is required & a record on appeal is no longer required except in appeals in special proceedings under Rule 109 of the Rules of Court & in other cases wherein multiple appeals are allowed. Sec. 19 of the Interim Rules provides that in these exceptional cases, the period for appeal is 30 days since a record on appeal is required. Moreover Sec. 18 of the Interim Rules provides that no appeal bond shall be required for an appeal, & Sec. 4 thereof disallows a 2nd MR of a final order or judgment. However, the law & the Rules of Court do not expressly prohibit the filing of a motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration of a final order or judgment. The interest of justice would be better served if the ruling in the original decision1 were applied prospectively from the time herein stated. The reason is that it would be unfair to deprive parties of their right to appeal simply because they availed themselves of a procedure w/c was not expressly prohibited or allowed by the law or the Rules. On the other hand, a motion for new trial or reconsideration is not a pre-requisite to an appeal, a petition for review or a petition for review on certiorari, & since the purpose of the amendments above referred to is to expedite the final disposition of cases, a strict but prospective application of the said ruling is in order. Hence, for the guidance of Bench & Bar, the Court restates & clarifies the rules on this point, as follows: 1.) Beginning 1 month after the promulgation of this Resolution, the rule shall be strictly enforced that no motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration may be filed w/ the MeTCs, MTCs, RTCs, & the IAC. Such a motion may be filed only in cases pending w/ the SC as the court of last resort, w/c may in its sound discretion either grant or deny the extension requested. 2.) In appeals in special proceedings under Rule 109 of the Rules of Court & in other cases wherein multiple appeals are allowed, a motion for extension of time to file the record on appeal may be filed w/in the reglementary period of 30 days. If the court denies the motion for extension, the appeal must be taken w/in the original period inasmuch as such a motion does not suspend the period for appeal. The TC may grant said motion after the expiration of the period for appeal provided it was filed w/in the original period. BALANOBA V. MADRIAGA G.R. NO. 160109; NOVEMBER 22, 2005 FACTS: Manuel D. Madriaga filed an action for collection of a sum of money w/ damages alleging that: Sps. Balanoba offered for sale a parcel of land to him. He accepted the offer & made a partial payment in the amount of P200K through Abraham de Sagun, broker & brother of Elisa Balanoba.
1 Original Ruling: The 15 day period for appealing or for filing a motion for reconsideration cannot be extended. Even under the existing Rules of Court, the thirty-day period cannot be extended
Upon Sps. Balanobas failure to file their answer, the TC declared them in default & Madriaga was allowed to present his evidence ex parte. Madriaga filed his Motion for Issuance of a Notice of Garnishment, praying that a Notice of Garnishment be issued by the TC directing the garnishee Bandila Maritime Services, Inc., German Balanobas employer to deliver goods, effects, interests, money shares or other personal property belonging to German Balanoba sufficient to satisfy the amount of the judgment. Sps. Balanoba filed their Opposition praying that the motion be denied on the ground that the money judgment is part of the community property of Madriaga & his spouse, 1 of the petitioners, Rebecca Madriaga. The TC denied Madriagas Motion for Issuance of a Notice of Garnishment on the ground that the litigated motion does not comply w/ Sec. 5, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court; that the motion does not indicate the balance of the judgment w/c has not yet been satisfied; the TC does not issue a notice of garnishment but the Branch Sheriff implementing the writ of execution. Madriaga filed his Motion for Reconsideration (MR). The TC denied such on the ground that the same was not filed by his counsel of record, & that the amount paid per Annex A of the motion does not tally w/ the partial returns of the Sheriff in respect to the execution partially satisfied. Madriaga filed his 2nd MR alleging that he has caused the rectification of the discrepancy in the amounts collected & the remaining balance payable w/c showed that less the amount already collected as per garnishment previously issued, the outstanding balance of Sps. Balanoba. The TC denied Madriagas 2nd MR for the reason that the life of the original writ has already expired. The TC, however, admonished Madriaga to move, instead, for the issuance of an alias writ w/ a notice to Sps. Balanoba. Sps. Balanoba filed their Comment &/or Opposition on the ground that, under Sec. 5, Rule 37 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, no party shall be allowed a 2nd MR. Madriaga filed a Motion for Reconsideration w/ Prayer for the Issuance of Alias Writ of Execution. On Nov. 15, 2000, the TC, for the purpose of determining accurately the unpaid
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balance of the judgment rendered order directing Madriaga & the Branch Sheriff to submit to the said court a computation under oath of how much has been satisfied out of the judgment. Madriaga filed a Compliance asserting that, after conference w/ the implementing Sheriff, a total of P148,790 of the judgment debt was satisfied by Sps. Balanoba, leaving the amount of P236,696 as balance & collectible amount from Sps. Balanoba as of Nov. 27, 2000. On Dec. 15, 2000, the TC issued an order ruling that the Compliance submitted by counsel for Sps. Balanoba was not in accordance w/ the Order of Nov. 15, 2000, & directing Madriaga & the Branch Sheriff to comply strictly w/ the said Order. Madriaga filed his Motion for Reconsideration to the Order dated Dec. 15, 2000, praying that the Order of Dec. 15, 2000 be reconsidered. The TC ordered the issuance of an alias writ to enforce the unpaid balance (w/c in effect granted respondents series of motions). On appeal, the CA sustained the TCs grant of Madriagas series of Motions. The CA, in construing Sec. 5 of Rule 37 of the Rules of Court in relation to Sec. 1, 2, 3 & 4 of the same Rule, held that the prohibition on 2nd MR applied only to an aggrieved party, not to a winning litigant like Madriaga; & also only to judgments & final orders. ISSUE: W/IN Sec. 5, Par. 2 of Rule 37 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure refers only to the aggrieved party & not likewise to the winning party? RULING: NO. The aforementioned provision states: No party shall be allowed a 2 nd MR of a judgment or final order. Plainly, this statement means that any party -- whether the winning or the losing litigant -- is prohibited from filing a 2nd MR. Accordingly, winning litigants may also move for reconsideration of a part or parts of a decision or a final order. In the event that the motion is denied, an attempt at a 2 nd MR would be prohibited under the afore-quoted provision. However, the CA did not err in n sustaining the TCs actions allowing Madriagas Motions, w/c were aimed at the execution of the judgment in his favor since what is proscribed under Sec. 5 of Rule 37 is a 2 nd MR of a judgment or final order. In the instant case, the decision of the TC was already final & executory; yet, Madriaga has obtained only a partial execution of his money judgment. It was precisely to effect a full execution that he filed on Aug. 9, 2000, a Motion for Issuance of a Notice of Garnishment. The series of Motions for Reconsideration he subsequently filed referred to matters attendant to a complete execution of the Decision in his favor. Those Motions were not for the reconsideration of the final judgment. PHILGREEN TRADING CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION v. CA G.R. NO. 120408, 18 APRIL 1997 FACTS: (Take note of the dates)
In a foreclosure proceeding instituted by United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB), Philgreen Trading Construction Corp. (Philgreen) was the highest bidder. Philgreen only made partial payment w/ the agreement to pay the balance w/in 90 days. Philgreen & UCPB also agreed in a Contract to Sell that Philgreen was to take possession of the property but title shall remain with UCPB until full payment of the purchase price. Philgreen thereafter took possession of the property & later allegedly discovered that the lot was sequestered by the PCGG as ill-gotten wealth of Edna Camcam & was actually the subject before the Sandiganbayan. Philgreen instituted against UCPB before the RTC Br. 57 Makati City, (1st Case) for specific performance & rescission of contract w/ damages. The complaint sought to compel UCPB to clear the property from sequestration before full payment of the purchase price. On the other hand, later, UCPB, filed against Philgreen a complaint for ejectment before the MTC, Makati City, on the ground of failure to pay the balance of the purchase price under their Contract to Sell. MTC rendered a decision ordering Philgreen to vacate the property, restore possession to UCPB. UCPB filed a motion for execution of the decision pending appeal. The MeTC, however, did not act on the motion but instead forwarded the records of the case to the RTC upon appeal by Philgreen. The appeal was assigned to respondent RTC, Br 150, Makati (2nd case). Before Br. 150, Philgreen moved to consolidate the appeal w/ the other civil case then pending before Branch 57, or, in the alternative, to suspend proceedings in the appeal until resolution of the 1st case. On June 4, 1993, Br 150 issued an order denying consolidation of the cases. The court, however, found that the 1 st case "is unavoidably determinative of W/N the cause for ejectment should proceed w/ the risk that herein defendant-movant is ousted from the premises while in the meantime the rights & obligations of the parties are still in litigation.", hence, ordered the suspension of the proceedings in the 2nd case pending determination of the issues in the 1st case. UCPB moved for reconsideration of the order w/c the Br 150 denied on Aug. 23, 1993. On Nov. 17, 1993, UCPB filed a "Motion to Reopen Case with Motion to Resolve Motion for Execution Pending Appeal." On Feb. 8, 1994, Br 150 denied the Motion declaring that the motion to reopen was a second motion for reconsideration of the June 4, 1993 order & that the motion for execution pending appeal was not before it but before the MeTC. On Apr. 26, 1994, private respondent filed with the CA a petition for certiorari questioning the orders of the Br 150. Petitioner questions the timeliness of the filing of petition for certiorari. (Note: A petition for certiorari should be filed w/in a reasonable period of three months from notice of the decision or order.) Petitioner claims that since a second motion for reconsideration is prohibited then the period to file a petition for certiorari should be counted from receipt of the order denying the first motion for reconsideration, w/c was the order of Aug. 23, 1993. Private respondent received a copy of the Aug. 23, 1993 order on Aug. 31, 1993 & filed its petition with the CA on Apr. 26, 1994 seven (7) months & 26 days
APPELLATE PRACTICE
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purchase a condominium unit (Unit B-121). Thus, the parties entered into a Contract to Purchase & to Sell covering Unit B-121 for 3.6M. After paying more than half of the contract price, H.L. CARLOS demanded for the delivery of the unit, but MARINA refused. This prompted H.L. CARLOS to file w/ the RTC a complaint for damages. Meanwhile, MARINA wrote H.L. CARLOS that it was exercising its option under their Contract to take over the completion of the project due to its (H.L. CARLOS) abandonment of the construction. MARINA also informed them that it was cancelling the Contract to Purchase & Sell due to H.L. CARLOS abandonment & its filing of baseless & harassment suits against MARINA. H.L. CARLOS filed the instant complaint for specific performance w/ damages against MARINA w/ the Housing & Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB), alleging that it has substantially complied w/ the terms & conditions of the Contract to Purchase & Sell, having paid more than 50% of the contract price of the condominium unit; & that MARINAs act of cancelling the contract was done w/ malice & bad faith. MARINA claimed that its cancellation of the Contract to Purchase & Sell is justified since H.L. CARLOS has failed to pay its monthly instalment for a period of almost 2 years & abandoned its work on the project. The HLURB rendered a decision declaring the cancellation of the subject Contract to Sell null & void. MARINA filed its MR on the last day of its period to appeal. However, the MR was found by the Office of the President to be pro forma as the issues of litis pendentia, forum-shopping & splitting of a cause of action as well as the issue of unliquidated, speculative & unreasonable damages raised therein were basically the same issues raised & discussed extensively in the Appeal Memorandum & w/c were already weighed, discussed & considered by this Office in its Order dated Mar. 15, 1995. As a consequence, the Office of the President declared its decision final & executory. MARINA filed a petition for review w/ the CA ascribing errors to the Office of the President. One of w/c was the error in declaring the MR filed by MARINA "proforma" & depriving it of the right of appeal; ISSUE: W/N the MR filed by MARINA was pro forma. RULING: NO. Under our rules of procedure, a party adversely affected by a decision of a TC may move for reconsideration thereof on the following grounds: (a) the damages awarded are excessive; (b) the evidence is insufficient to justify the decision; or (c) the decision is contrary to law. An MR interrupts the running of the period to appeal, unless the motion is pro forma.
ISSUE: Whether the reckoning point in counting the period for filing a petition for certiorari should start to run on the day UCPB received the notice of the order of Aug. 23, 1993 (ruling on the 1st MR) or of Feb. 8, 1994 (ruling on the Motion to Reopen w/c was treated as a 2nd MR). RULING: FEB 8, 1994. The rule that a 2nd MR is prohibited by the Rules applies to final judgments & orders, not interlocutory orders. This is clear from the Interim or Transitional Rules Relative to the Implementation of BP 129. Sec. 4 of the Interim Rules provides that "no party shall be allowed a 2nd MR of a final order or judgment." A 2nd MR attacking an interlocutory order can be denied on the ground that it is a "rehash" or mere reiteration of grounds & arguments already passed upon & resolved by the court; it, however, cannot be rejected on the ground that a 2nd MR of an interlocutory order is forbidden by law. The order of June 4, 1993 suspending the decision in the ejectment case is an interlocutory order. An interlocutory order does not terminate nor finally dispose of the case, but leaves something to be done by the court before the case is finally decided on the merits. The TC did not rule nor did it dismiss the appeal in the ejectment case but merely suspended ruling thereon until the specific performance case shall have been decided. The order of June 4, 1993 being interlocutory, the TC therefore should not have dismissed the Motion to Reopen Case on the ground that it was prohibited by the Rules. Moreover, the Motion to Reopen was not the only pleading filed. It included a Motion to Resolve Motion for Execution Pending Appeal w/c the MeTC forwarded to Br 150 as appellate court. This was the 1st time UCPB moved for resolution of its Motion for Execution. Since the Motion to Reopen is not a prohibited pleading, then the order denying the same should be the reckoning point in counting the period for filing a petition for certiorari. The period to file a petition for certiorari started to run on Mar. 1, 1994, the day private respondent received notice of the order of Feb. 8, 1994. The petition for certiorari was filed before the CA on Apr. 26, 1994, almost 2 months thereafter, hence, it was filed w/in a reasonable period of time. MARINA PROPERTIES CORPORATION VS. CA 294 SCRA 273 (1998) FACTS: Marina Properties Corp (MARINA) is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of real estate development. Among its projects is a condominium complex project, known as the MARINA BAYHOMES CONDOMINIUM PROJECT H.L. Carlos Construction, Inc. (H.L. CARLOS) was the principal contractor, particularly of Phase III. As an incentive to complete the construction, MARINA allowed H.L. CARLOS to
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An MR based on the foregoing grounds is deemed pro forma if the same does not specify the findings or conclusions in the judgment w/c are not supported by the evidence or contrary to law, making express reference to the pertinent evidence or legal provisions. It is settled that although a MR may merely reiterate issues already passed upon by the court, that by itself does not make it pro forma & is immaterial because what is essential is compliance w/ the requisites of the Rules. Where the circumstances of a case do not show an intent on the part of the pleader to merely delay the proceedings, & his motion reveals a bona fide effort to present additional matters or to reiterate his arguments in a different light, the courts should be slow to declare the same outright as pro forma. The doctrine relating to pro forma motions has a direct bearing upon the movants valuable right to appeal. It would be in the interest of justice to accord the appellate court the opportunity to review the decision of the TC on the merits than to abort the appeal by declaring the motion pro forma, such that the period to appeal was not interrupted & had consequently lapsed. We are thus unable to hold that MARINAs MR was merely pro forma. Our review of the records reveals that said MR adequately pointed out the conclusions MARINA regarded as erroneous & contrary to law, & even referred to findings not supported by evidence as well as jurisprudence to sustain MARINAs claims. As to the justification proffered by the Office of the President that it had already passed upon the issues raised by MARINA in its motion, plainly, the authorities cited above readily refute such a position. YAP V. JUDGE TAADA & GOULDS PUMPS INTERNATIONAL, INC. GR L-32917, 18 JULY 1988 FACTS: Goulds Pumps International (GOULDS) installed a water pump in the Yap spouses (YAPS) house in Cebu. GOULDS filed a complaint against the YAPS for the recovery of the balance of the price & installation cost of the water pump. When the case was called for trial, the YAPS did not appear despite service of notice. GOULDS counsel presented its evidence ex-parte. The CITY COURT ruled in favor of GOULDS & ordered the YAPS to pay the balance. The YAPS appealed to the CFI & the case was assigned to the sala of Judge Taada (TAADA). When the case was called for pre-trial, the YAPS did not appear despite notice. At the latest possible time, YAPS counsel filed an ex-parte motion for postponement (11th hour motion). GOULDS opposed since the 11th Hour motion was not filed in accordance with the Rules of Court. TAADA declared the YAPS in default. The next day, TAADA rendered a decision requiring the YAPS to pay GOULDS. The YAPS filed a MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION (MR) on these grounds: (1) Their 11th hour motion should have been granted since they were exploring the possibility of an amicable settlement (2) They should be allowed to present evidence in support of their defenses as to the discrepancy in the price & breach of warranty The MR was NOT verified or accompanied by any separate affidavit. GOULDS opposed the MR. They averred that the YAPS had repeatedly sought for
postponements through 11th hour motions. TAADA denied the MR. TAADA issued an order granting GOULDS' Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution. The YAPS filed an "Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of Order" contending that the judgment had not yet become final since their MR was not pro forma for lack of an affidavit of merit. The YAPS alleged that this was not required under the Rules of Court. GOULDS opposed YAPS motion on two grounds: (1) YAPS MR claimed to have a valid defense to the action (discrepancy as to price & breach of sellers warranty). In effect, that there was fraud on the part of GOULDS. Hence, the MR should have been supported by an affidavit of merit respecting said defenses. Without the affidavit of merit, the MR was fatally defective. Hence, it did not interrupt the running of the period of appeal. (2) YAPS MR did not specify findings or conclusions in the judgment claimed to be contrary to law or not supported by evidence, making it a pro forma motion also incapable of stopping the running of the appeal period. After a series of complicated events with respect to the execution sale & several more motions from the YAPS,2 TAADA finally issued in favor of GOULDS an alias writ of execution. The YAPS filed a "Motion to Set Aside Execution Sale & to Quash Alias Writ of Execution" They argue that the Issuance of the writ is contrary to law, the judgment sought to be executed not being final & executory. TAADA denied the motion. It was held that YAPS motion was in reality one for NEW TRIAL. Hence, it should allege the grounds for new trial & be supported by affidavit of merits. If the YAPS sincerely desired for an opportunity to submit to an amicable settlement, they should have appeared in the pre-trial to achieve the same purpose. ISSUE: W/N the MR (not verified & not accompanied by an affidavit of merits or other sworn statements) was pro forma & consequently had not interrupted the running of the period of appeal. YAPS position: Their motion was not pro forma for lack of an affidavit of merits, such a document not being required by Sec. 1 (a) of Rule 37 of the Rules of Court upon w/c his motion was based. RULING: YAPS LOSE! Sec. 2, Rule 37 precisely requires that when the motion for new trial is founded on Sec. 1 (a), it should be accompanied by an affidavit of merit. 3 The YAPS assert that the MR is grounded on Sec. 1 (a) of Rule 37, (fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence) & that they were denied to present their evidence (discrepancy as to price & breach of warranty). It was a fatal omission to fail to attach to their motion an affidavit of merits (i.e. an affidavit showing the facts, not conclusions, constituting the valid defense w/c the
2 You can always read the original. =) 3 When the motion is made for the causes mentioned in subdivisions (a) & (b) of the preceding section, it shall be proved in the manner provided for proof of motions. Affidavit or affidavits of merits shall also be attached to a motion for the cause mentioned in subdivision (a) w/c may be rebutted by counter-affidavits.
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Maraviles pointed out that (1) the notice of the judgment was received on July 15, 1978 by precisely the same person who had received the notice of the Order of June 23, 1978; (2) an affidavit of merits was in fact indispensable because PCIB's lawyers were invoking excusable negligence as ground to set aside the Order of June 23, 1978 considering the case submitted for decision. The TC denied PCIB's MR, also declaring the judgment already final & executory. PCIB filed a 2nd MR, &, w/o awaiting service of notice of the resolution, but expressing the fear that execution of the judgment might render the issues moot, it instituted the instant special civil action for certiorari praying for the annulment of the TCs Orders denying its 1st MR & declaring the judgment final & executory, & granting execution as well as the anticipated order denying its 2nd MR. The TC did subsequently deny PCIB's 2nd MR. It said (1) that defendant's counsel had been receiving orders & notices of hearing from this court, in this case, through COMMEX, whose authority to do so the defendant is now estopped from denying, & (2) that even granting arguendo that defendant's 1st "Motion for Reconsideration" dated Aug. 15, 1978 was filed on time, the same did not interrupt the period of appeal since it was not accompanied by an affidavit of merit, as required by the rules, neither does the motion itself although verified state the good & valid defenses, if any of the defendant w/c as ruled by this Court in its order dated Aug. 15, 1978, do not exist even in defendant's answer itself . ISSUES: (1) W/N PCIB is estopped from claiming that notice had not been served to them; (2) W/N there was a need to append an affidavit of merits to its MR. (1) While it is true that the address of record of PCIB's counsel is entered as the "3rd Floor, LRT Building," w/c is different from that of COMMEX, w/c is on the "Ground Floor, LRT Building," it is equally true that notices served on the latter had been reaching the former & that, in any event, the PCIB lawyers had never protested such service on them "thru COMMEX." The only single instance of protest was as regards the particular instance of service of notice of the judgment on COMMEX on July 15, 1978. PCIB's attorney's had acquiesced to & impliedly adopted a different address for service of notices to them. They cannot now disown this adopted address to relieve them from the effects of their negligence, complacency or inattention. Service, therefore, on July 15, 1978 of the notice of judgment at the Ground Floor, LRT Building, should be deemed as effective service on PCIB's attorneys. The failure of the receiving clerk to deliver the notice to them on the same day, & what is worse, the lawyers omission to inquire of said receiving clerk exactly when the notice was received, & their blithe assumption that service was effected on July 17, 1978 since this was the day that the notice was handed over to them, is warrant imprudence & cannot in any sense be deemed to constitute that excusable negligence as would warrant reconsideration under Sec. 1 [a], Rule 37 of the Rules of Court. (2) It is true that when fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence is
movant may prove in case a new trial is granted). The affidavit is essential because obviously a new trial would be a waste of the court's time if the complaint turns out to be groundless or the defense ineffective. The dilatory tactics seeking postponements of hearings, or failing to appear therefor despite notice, not only in the CFI but also in the City Court negate the YAPS sincerity to reach an amicable settlement. The MR did not therefore interrupt the running of the period of appeal. The time during w/c it was pending before the court until when notice of the order denying the motion was received by the movant could not be deducted from the 30-day period of appeal. Sept. 1 YAPS received notice of judgment. Sept. 16 YAPS filed their MR (DID NOT INTERRUPT PERIOD OF APPEAL) Oct. 1 The 30-day period of appeal expired. PCIB vs. HON. ORTIZ GR L-49223, 29 MAY 29 1987 Rogelio Maraviles filed an action against PCIB for the recovery of damages resulting from the dishonor of 2 of his checks on account of the negligence of employees of PCIB. During trial, Maraviles presented his evidence, & the trial was reset for the reception of PCIB's proofs. PCIBs lawyers failed to appear at the appointed time. Consequently, the TC considered the case submitted for decision, thereafter rendering judgment ordering the payment to him by PCIB moral & exemplary damages & attorney's fees. PCIB's lawyers filed on Aug 15, 1978 an MR, arguing that the award of damages was exorbitant, & offering the explanation that the lawyer personally handling the case suddenly resigned & failed to include the case in the list of his pending cases w/ their respective status to the firm, thus the present case was not reassigned in time for another lawyer to attend the hearing. Maraviles opposed, on the grounds that (1) that judgment had already become final, notice thereof having been served on PCIB, thru COMMEX (a corporation in located on the ground floor of the same building as the law firm w/c was on the third floor), & the 15-day period to appeal had already lapsed when PCIB's motion for reconsideration was filed on Aug. 15, 1978; & (2) Mangohig's (the lawyer handling the case) failure to include the case in his report did not constitute excusable negligence warranting relief, & clients are bound by their counsel's mistakes. PCIB responded, arguing that (1) service of the judgment on COMMEX on July 15, 1978 was inefficacious, & the period for appeal should be reckoned only from July 17, 1978 when COMMEX delivered the notice to PCIB's lawyers; & (2) there was no need to append an affidavit of merits to its motion for reconsideration, this being required only when the motion for new trial was based on grounds other than excessive award of damages.
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invoked as ground of a motion for new trial, it should "be proved in the manner provided for proof of motions," i.e., by "affidavits or depositions" unless the court should direct that "the matter be heard wholly or partly on oral testimony or depositions." It is also required that "affidavits of merits" be attached to the motion. A motion for new trial grounded on fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence should thus ordinarily be accompanied by two (2) affidavits: one, setting forth the facts & circumstances alleged to constitute such fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence; & the other, an affidavit of merits, setting forth the particular facts claimed to constitute the movant's meritorious cause of action or defense. Where, therefore, a motion for new trial on the ground of fraud, etc., is unaccompanied by either or both affidavits, the motion is pro forma a scrap of paper, as it were, & will not interrupt the running of the period of appeal. But where, as here, the motion for new trial is founded not only on fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence, but also on the ground of "award of excessive damages," as to w/c no affidavit of fraud, etc., or of merits is required, what being required of the movant being to "point out specifically the findings or conclusions of the judgment" demonstrating the invoked ground, the motion cannot be denied as pro forma simply because no affidavit of merits is appended thereto, provided there be a specification of the findings or conclusions of the judgment alleged to be erroneous because awarding excessive damages. Finally, it bears stressing that the filing of a proper motion for new trial interrupts the running of the period of appeal w/c begins to run again from receipt of notice by the movant of the order denying his motion. In this situation, the party adversely affected has only the balance of the period of appeal w/in w/c to perfect his appeal, the balance being the number of days remaining of the reglementary period after deducting the time during w/c the motion was pending; i.e., from the date when the motion was filed to the date when notice of the order of denial was served on the movant. It is well to also emphasize, in this connection, that the requirement for the perfection of an appeal w/in the time prescribed is mandatory & jurisdictional, that the lapse of said period without an appeal being taken operates to divest the court of all jurisdiction over the case & leaves it with no alternative but to order, on motion, the execution of the judgement. It not being possible under the facts to ascribe the commission of an act with grave abuse of discretion to the TC, the petition is dismissed, with costs against petitioner. VIA v. CA 126 SCRA 372 (1983) FACTS: Petitioner filed an action for collection of sum of money as his commission in the sale of Hacienda Bagumbong (owned by spouses Maronilla) to the Republic (RP). After pleadings were filed, RP admitted the validity of the sale but spouses opposed and moved to strike out RPs manifestation and motion. May 26, 1972 - trial court rendered judgment upholding the validity of the deed of sale and ordered RP to pay the vendor the purchase price. The judgment was premised on RPs confession of judgment. Thereafter, various motions/manifestations were filed, more particularly RPs motion
(Sept. 29, 1972) on the order granting partial execution of the judgment. A month later (October 24), RP filed another motion to suspend proceedings due to PD 2 proclaiming the entire country as a land reform area & therefore its necessary to await the IRR. RP then filed on October 27 a motion to suspend the running of period to file Record on Appeal until the court has resolved its October 24 motion. On December 27, 1972, the court denied both motions. Thus, no suspension of proceedings and parties must comply and perfect appeal within the reglementary period. RP received on January 5, 1973 the Dec. 27 order and filed MR on the order denying suspension of proceedings on January 10, 1973. MR to suspend denied but RP received denial only on March 16, 1973. Thus RP only filed Record on Appeal on March 23, 1973. Although RP and the spouses filed their Record on Appeal (March 23 and 29 respectively) the trial court dismissed the same for having been filed long after the period granted them in its order of December 27. CA = reversed dismissal of appeal. ISSUE: whether RPs MR dated January 10, 1973 was pro forma and did not toll the running of reglementary period to appeal? RULING NO. It was not pro forma. It therefore tolled the running of the reglementary period to appeal. RPs MR was not pro forma even if we were to concede that it was a reiteration of its previous motion for suspension of the proceedings. Among the ends to which an MR is addressed, one is precisely to convince the court that its ruling is erroneous and improper, contrary to law or the evidence (Rule 37, Sec.1, sub section C) and in doing so, the movant has to dwell of necessity upon the issues passed upon by the court. If an MR may not discuss these issues, the consequence would be that after a decision is rendered, the losing party would be confined to filing only motions for reopening and new trial. We find in the Rules of Court no warrant for ruling to that effect, a ruling that would, in effect eliminate subsection (C) of Section1 rules 37. It is also worth noting that the said MR specifically pointed out the erroneous conclusions of fact and law upon which the two subject orders of the Trial Court were based, and explained in detail why they were so. This circumstance further refutes petitioners contention that said MR was pro forma.
REPUBLIC V. INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS CORPORATION (ICC) GR 141667, JULY 17, 2006 FACTS: On April 4, 1995, ICC, holder of a legislative franchise under RA 7633 to operate
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A Victory Liner Bus and the truck of Malinias collided. A complaint for sum of money was filed against the petitioner. When the respondent finished presenting his evidence, the original counsel of the petitioner filed a motion to withdraw as counsel but this was denied. Hence, when the case was called for petitioner to present his evidence, no appearance was made. The case was therefore deemed submitted for decision and the MTC ruled in favor of the respondent. Petitioners new counsel filed a Motion for Reconsideration (MR). The MR was denied by the MTC because it did not conform with the mandatory requirements of Sec. 5 Rule 15 (Notice of Hearing). The MTC likewise declared that its earlier decision is now final and executory since the MR was a mere scrap of paper which did not suspend the period to appeal. Then came the series of unsuccessful attempts by the petitioner to set aside the decision of the MTC. ISSUE: W/N the failure to conform with the requirement of Sec. 5 Rule 15 is a fatal error. RULING: Under Sections 5 and 6 of Rule 15, the notice of hearing shall be addressed to the parties concerned and shall specify the time and date of the hearing of the motion; no motion shall be acted upon by the court without proof of service of the notice thereof, except when the court is satisfied that the rights of the adverse party are not affected. Not only did the defect render the motion for reconsideration itself unworthy of consideration, it more crucially failed to toll the period to appeal. A motion without a notice of hearing is pro forma, a mere scrap of paper that does not toll the period to appeal, and upon the expiration of the 15-day period, the questioned order or decision becomes final and executory. The rationale behind this rule is plain: unless the movant sets the time and place of hearing, the court will be unable to determine whether the adverse party agrees or objects to the motion, and if he objects, to hear him on his objection, since the rules themselves do not fix any period within which he may file his reply or opposition. Thus, the MTC judgment became final and executory despite the filing of the Motion for Reconsideration thereto, as said motion did not toll the period for filing an appeal therefrom. But that did not mean that petitioner was left bereft of further remedies under the Rules. For one, petitioner could have assailed the MTCs denial of the Motion for Reconsideration through a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 or under Rule 38 which governs petitions for relief from judgment. Section 2, Rule 38 finds specific application in this case, as it provides that "[w]hen a judgment or final order is rendered by any court in a case, and a party thereto, by fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, has been prevented from taking an appeal, he may file a petition [for relief from denial of appeal] in such court and in the same case praying that the appeal be given due course." Such petition should be filed within sixty days after the petitioner learns of the judgment or final order, and not more than six months after such judgment or final order was entered. RULE 40 APPEAL FROM MTC TO RTC
domestic telecommunications, filed w/ the NTC an application for a Certificate of Public Convenience & Necessity to install, operate & maintain an international communications service between the Philippines & other countries. NTC, through an Order, approved the application, subject to the condition that ICC pays a permit fee worth Php 1,190,750 in accordance w/ the Public Service Act. ICC filed a Motion for partial consideration of the Order ins o far as it required the payment of the permit fee. NTC denied the motion. Therefrom, ICC went to the CA on petition for certiorari with prayer for TRO and/or injunction, again questioning said fee. CA denied the petition. ICC filed a motion for reconsideration on the order of the CA, this time, the latter set aside the NTC Order and ruled in favor of ICC. NTC filed a motion for reconsideration, the assailed MR in this case, but its motion was denied by the CA. NTC now comes before the SC via a petition for review under Rule 45. ISSUE: W/N NTCs MR was a pro forma motion and therefore did not toll the running of the reglamentary period to file the petition for review. RULING: NO. Under established jurisprudence, the mere fact that a motion for reconsideration reiterates issues already passed upon by the court does not, make it a pro forma motion. Among the ends to which an MR is addressed is precisely to convince the court that its ruling is erroneous and improper, contrary to law and evidence and in so doing, the movant has to dwell of necessity on issues already passed upon. If an MR may not discuss those issues, the consequence would be that after a decision is rendered, the losing party would be confined to filing only motions for reopening and new trial. Where there is no apparent intent to employ dilatory tactics, courts should be slow in declaring outright an MR as pro forma. Even if it were pro forma, it would still be in the interest of justice to review the amended decision in the merits since the industry of telecommunications is vested with public interest. MERITS OF THE CASE: NTC, pursuant to the Public Service Act, is authorized to collect fees pursuant to the police power of the state. However, 1) the fees were found to be exorbitant. 2) Moreover, ICC cannot be made to pay such fees pursuant to PD 947, which specifically requires it to pay one-half percent of all its gross earnings in lieu of all taxes, fees and assessments. VICTORY LINER V. MALINIAS GR 151170, MAY 29, 2007 FACTS:
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REPUBLIC VS. LURIZ GR 158992, JANUARY 26, 2007 This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 41, seeking the annulment of a CA decision affirming Q.C. RTCs decision denying petitioner-appellants petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. The case arose form an ejectment complaint filed by respondents at the QC MeTC, against petitioner Clavel, as occupant of a certain lot. Respondents alleged that they were the owners of the disputed lots on the basis of a TCT issued in the name of Yoichi Urakami and two deeds of sale, the first of which conveyed the transfer of the lots from Urakami to Tomas Balingit, and the second, the transfer from Balingit to Amelia Kuriz. Clavel averred that the contested lots were owned and possessed by the Phil. Orthopedic Center (POC), a government medical facility, which had built four cottages on said lots and had been in possession of the said lots since 1953, and had authorized its administrative officers to use the cottages as their residences. He also said that the respondents TCT could not be relied upon, because the original copy had allegedly been burned during the fire of the office of the Register of Deeds of QC, and that such should bee deemed non-existent unless reconstituted. Lastly, he stated that the deeds of sale of respondents were not registered, and thus were of questionable character. The MeTC rendered a decision favoring respondents, ordering Clavel to immediately vacate the disputed lots and to pay respondents reasonable compensation, attorneys fees, and the costs of suit. Respondents thereafter moved for immediate execution of the judgement. Clavel filed a Notice of Appeal. The MeTC granted the motion for execution. Clavel filed an Opposition and moved ad cautelam for the fixing of the supersedeas bond. He moved for reconsideration and suspension of the implementation of the Writ of Execution. The MeTC dismissed the notice of Appeal for failure to file the required appeal fee, denying the motion to fix supersedeas bond as well. Thereafter, it also denied petitioners MR and motion to suspend implementation of Writ of execution. Thus, the Deputy Sheriff took possession of the lots. Clavel filed another MR questioning the dismissal of his Notice of Appeal, but the motion was consequently denied. Clavel filed with the Q.C. RTC a special civil action for certiorari, mandamus, and prohibition, to annul the Order and Writ of Execution and subsequent orders of the MeTC. The RTC denied the petition for lack of factual and legal basis. Petitioners eventually appealed the decision to the CA which held that they belatedly filed their appeal fees. It said that petitioners paid the appeal fee three days beyond the reglementary period, despite having received the decision earlier. Thus, the appeal was not perfected, the decision becoming final and executory. Thus, it was ministerial upon the MeTC judge to issue a writ of execution. The CA also noted that petitioners failed to oppose respondents motion for execution. ISSUE: Whether there was a timely payment of docket fees.
HELD: In order to perfect and appeal, first, a notice of appeal must be filed within 15 days from the notice of final judgment or final order appealed from; second, such notice must be filed with the court which rendered the judgment or final order, and served upon the adverse party; and third, within the same period, payment of the full amount of appellate court docket and other legal fees to the clerk of the court which rendered the judgment or final order. Full payment of the appellate docket fees within the prescribed period is mandatory, even jurisdictional. Otherwise, the appeal is deemed not perfected and the decision sought to be appealed form becomes final and executory. In this case, petitioners, although agreeing to the date wherein they are said to have paid the same, aver that they did so seasonably. They clarified that what was stated in their notice of appeal as the date of receipt of the MeTC Decision was mere inadvertence. The Court agrees. The trial court offhandedly dismissed the petitioners explanation without taking into account the proof of a photocopy of the notice of decision with the date of receipt stamped. Otherwise, it would have seen that the petitioners had validly perfected their appeal. Even assuming that petitioners belatedly filed the appellate docket fees, the circumstances of the case would have warranted a liberal construction of the rule on nonpayment of docket fees. Although the CA found that the docket fees were belatedly paid, it should have taken cognizance of the persuasive reasons attendant in the case that merit a relaxation of the rule. The Notice of Appeal was immediately prepared and filed before the expiration of the period to file said notice. It would seem thus, that the alleged three-day delay in the payment of appellate fees was not a result of petitioners inexcusable lethargy to pursue the case. A judgment in favor of the plaintiffs shall be immediately executory, but such can be stayed by the defendant by perfecting an appeal, filing a supersedeas bond, and making a periodic deposit of the rental or reasonable compensation. The execution of the MeTC judgment was ordered even before the period to file an appeal had lapsed, before petitioners had the opportunity to perfect their appeal and file a supersedeas bond, not affording petitioners the right to oppose respondents motion for execution. The petition is thus granted. MEJILLANO V. LUCILLO GR 154717, JUNE 19, 2009 FACTS: Faustino Loteria died sometime in 1931 leaving two parcels of land. During his lifetime, he begot six children. He sired three children by his first marriage to Ciriaca Luciada, namely, Tranquilino, Antonia and Cipriano; and another three during his subsequent marriage to Francisca Monreal, namely, Julita, Felix and Hospicio. The surviving children of Faustino Loteria with Ciriaca Luciada, namely Tranquilino and Antonia, executed an Extrajudicial Settlement and Cession covering Lot No. 1 wherein Tranquilino and Antonia divided the said lot equally between them and Antonia ceded her one-half (1/2) share in the property to Tranquilino. Tranquilino executed a Deed of Absolute Sale7 of Lot No. 1in favor of Jesus Lorente.
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lower court, a copy of which shall be furnished by him to the adverse party. Within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the appellants memorandum, the appellee may file his memorandum. Failure of the appellant to file a memorandum shall be a ground for dismissal of the appeal. The rule is clear. It is obligatory on the part of petitioner to file his memorandum on appeal within fifteen days from receipt of the notice to file the same; otherwise, his appeal will be dismissed. In Enriquez v. CA, the Court ruled: The use of the word "shall" in a statute or rule expresses what is mandatory and compulsory. Further, the Rule imposes upon an appellant the "duty" to submit his memorandum. A duty is a "legal or moral obligation, mandatory act, responsibility, charge, requirement, trust, chore, function, commission, debt, liability, assignment, role, pledge, dictate, office, (and) engagement." Thus, under the express mandate of said Rule, the appellant is duty-bound to submit his memorandum on appeal. Such submission is not a matter of discretion on his part. His failure to comply with this mandate or to perform said duty will compel the RTC to dismiss his appeal. ENCARNACION V. AMIGO GR 169793, SEPTEMBER 15, 2006 (original owner) Valiente > Mallapitan > Magpantay > Encarnacion (petitioner) FACTS: Encarnacion is now the registered owner of two lots in Isabela. Amigo allegedly entered the premises and took possession of the property without the permission of the then owner, Magpantay. The occupation of Amigo continued even after the issuance of the TCTs in favor of Encarnacion. Encarnacion sent a letter (February 1) demanding Amigo to vacate the property. The said letter was received by Amigo on February 12. Encarnacion filed a complaint for ejectment with the MTC. Amigo alleged that he has been in actual possession and occupation of a portion of the subject land since 1968 and the issuance of the titles in the name of Encarnacion was tainted with irregularities. The MTC ruled in favor of Encarnacion. On appeal with the RTC, the RTC dismissed the case ruling that the MTC had no jurisdiction over the case and that the RTC did not acquire appellate jurisdiction. On appeal, the CA remanded back the case to the RTC. ISSUES: (1) Did the MTC or RTC have jurisdiction over the case? (2) Was it proper for the RTC to dismiss the appeal? RULING: (1) RTC. From the allegations it appears that Encarnacion became the owner of the property on April 11 1995. The complaint for ejectment was filed on March 2 2001. From the date of the Encarnacion's dispossession in 1995 up to his filing of his
The agreement was modified to include Lot No. 2 in an amended Deed of Absolute Sale. The conflict arose when the children of Faustino with Francisca Monreal, namely Felix and Hospicio, claimed that Lot No. 2 is their inheritance from their late father. Hence, Jesus Lorente could not have validly bought it from Tranquilino. The conflicting claims to occupy and use the disputed property led Jesus Lorente to file an action for recovery of possession with the RTC of Legaspi City. The lower court dismissed the complaint and declared that Felix and Hospicio Loteria are co-heirs or co-owners of Lot No. 9014. The heirs of Hospicio sold to respondent Enrique Lucillo their one-half share in Lot No. 2 by way of an Extrajudicial Settlement and Sale. The remaining one-half portion was also sold to respondent Lucillo by Felix. When Lucillo was about to enter said property, however, he discovered that petitioner was occupying Lot No. 2. Respondent Lucillo wrote petitioner a letterrequesting him to vacate said property, but petitioner refused to surrender possession thereof claiming that he is the owner of Lot No. 1 and Lot No. 2 by virtue of an Extrajudicial Partition and Sale executed in their favor by the heirs of Jesus Lorente. Lucillo filed an action for recovery of possession of real property against petitioner with the MTC of Daraga, Albay. MTC rendered a decision ordering defendant Bonifacio Mejillano to relinquish possession of and to turn-over the peaceful possession thereof to plaintiff Enrique Lucillo. Petitioner appealed the case to the RTC, but failed to file an appeal memorandum. The petition was dismissed by the RTC. Petitioner, through new counsel, filed a motion for reconsideration attaching thereto the appeal memorandum. Petitioner alleged that his failure to file the required memorandum on time was due to ignorance, the untimely demise of his former counsel and the mistaken notion that what was needed in the appeal was merely a notice of appeal and nothing more. The motion was still dismissed. The CA, on appeal, likewise dismissed the petition. ISSUE: W/N the appellate court committed reversible error in affirming the order of the RTC dismissing petitioners appeal for failure to file on time his memorandum on appeal? RULING: No. The fundamental cause of the dismissal of petitioners appeal was his failure to file the obligatory appeal memorandum on time. Petitioner only filed his memorandum on appeal when the dismissal of his appeal had already been ordered. Resultantly, the trial court acted accordingly when it dismissed petitioners appeal pursuant to the clear mandate of the Rules of Court. Section 7 (b), Rule 40 of the Revised Rules of Court expressly states that:(b) Within fifteen (15) days from such notice, it shall be the duty of the appellant to submit a memorandum which shall briefly discuss the errors imputed to the
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complaint for ejectment in 2001, almost 6 years have elapsed. The length of time that the petitioner was dispossessed of his property made his cause of action beyond the ambit of an accion interdictal and effectively made it one for accion publiciana. After the lapse of the one-year period, the suit must be commenced in the RTC via an accion publiciana which is a suit for recovery of the right to possess. (2) NO. Read Sec. 8, Rule 40. The RTC should have taken cognizance of the case. If the case is tried on the merits by the MTC without jurisdiction over the subject matter, the RTC on appeal may no longer dismiss the case if it has original jurisdiction thereof. Moreover, the RTC shall no longer try the case on the merits, but shall decide the case on the basis of the evidence presented in the lower court, without prejudice to the admission of the amended pleadings and additional evidence in the interest of justice. CANLAS v. TUBIL GR 184285, SEPTEMBER 25, 2009 FACTS: Iluminada Tubil filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against Rodolfo Canlas, Victoria Canlas, Felicidad Canlas, and Sps. Pablo & Charito Canlas (Canlas et al.) before the MTC. Canlas et al. filed a motion to dismiss (MTD) alleging that the MTC is w/o jurisdiction over the subject matter because Tubils cause of action was for accion publiciana w/c is beyond the jurisdiction of the MTC. The MTC denied the MTD. The MTC dismissed the complaint for unlawful detainer, & this was affirmed by the RTC. However the CA reversed the RTC decision. Canlas et. als contention: The RTC does not have original jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. Thus, it cannot validly decide on the merits. ISSUE: Which court, the MTC or the RTC, has jurisdiction over the subject matter? If it is an unlawful detainer case, the action was properly filed in the MTC. However, if the suit is one for accion publiciana, original jurisdiction is w/ the RTC, w/c is mandated not to dismiss the appeal but to decide the case on the merits pursuant to Sec. 84 of Rule 40 of the Rules of Court. RULING: The MTC has jurisdiction. An unlawful detainer proceeding is summary in nature, jurisdiction of which lies in the proper MTC or MeTC. The action must be brought w/in 1 year from the date of last demand & the issue in said case is the right to physical possession. A complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful detainer if it recites the following: (1) initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or
4 If the case was tried on the merits by the lower court w/o jurisdiction over the subject matter, the RTC on appeal shall not dismiss the case if it has original jurisdiction thereof, but shall decide the case in accordance w/ the preceding section, w/o prejudice to the admission of amended pleadings and additional evidence in the interest of justice.
by tolerance of the plaintiff; (2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to defendant of the termination of the latters right of possession; (3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and (4) within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment. On the other hand, accion publiciana is the plenary action to recover the right of possession which should be brought in the proper regional trial court when dispossession has lasted for more than 1 year. It is an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of possession of realty independently of title. In other words, if at the time of the filing of the complaint, more than 1 year had elapsed since defendant had turned plaintiff out of possession or defendants possession had become illegal, the action will be, not one of forcible entry or illegal detainer, but an accion publiciana. In the instant case, Tubils allegations in the complaint clearly make a case for an unlawful detainer, essential to confer jurisdiction on the MTC over the subject matter. Tubil alleged that she was the owner of the land as shown by the OCT issued by the RD of Pampanga; that the land had been declared for taxation purposes & she had been paying the taxes thereon; that Canlas et al.s entry & construction of their houses were tolerated as they are relatives; & that she sent a letter demanding that Canlas et al. vacate the property but they failed & refused to do so. The complaint for unlawful detainer was filed w/in 1 year from the time the last demand to vacate was made. Having ruled that the MTC acquired jurisdiction over thecase, it thus properly exercised its discretion in dismissing the complaint for unlawful detainer for failure of Tubil to prove tolerance by sufficient evidence. Consquently, Section 8 (2nd par.) of Rule 40 of the Rules of Court w/c ordains the RTC not to dismiss the cases appealed to it from the MTC/MeTC w/c tried the same albeit w/po jurisdiction, but to decide the said case on the merits, finds no application here. FIVE STAR MARKETING CO. INC V BOOC| AZCUNA G.R. NO. 143331, OCTOBER 5, 2007 | 535 SCRA 28 FACTS: 7 Siblings: Sheikding, Rufino, Felisa, Salvador, Jose and Roque Booc decided to buy LOT 69-A in Quezon Ave., Iligan City from Nicolas Abarca. Because they had unequal contribution to the purchase price, the siblings formed 5 Star Marketing. Their respective company shares reflected their contribution in the purchase price of the lot. 1982: When the original structure was razed by fire, the siblings built a 4 storey building. G/F and 4th floor occupied by Rufino, 2nd floor by the family matriarch, Ong Chuy Tiok, and the 3rd floor by Shiekding. All of them were RENT-FREE. Late 1980: the matriarch insisted that the PR, James Booc, and son of Sheikding to be allowed to use of the G/F for his business. Use was still RENT-FREE.
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preliminary conference was not explained at all. MTCC correctly decided the decision on the basis of the complaint pursuant to the summary rules of procedure in FEUD actions. On the REMAND: The Court notes that the decision and order of the RTC are for remanding the case to the MTCC on the mistaken conclusion that there was denial of due process for failure of the respondent to present his evidence. As discussed above, the decision of the MTCC on the basis of petitioner's complaint is fully warranted. Furthermore, the RTC should have decided the case on the merits, as an appeal before it, and not prolong the determination of the issues by remanding it to the MTCC. It must be emphasized that in cases governed by the Rules on Summary Procedure, no hearing is conducted; rather, the parties are required to submit their respective position papers. On appeal to the RTC, the parties are required to submit their memoranda. The RTC should have decided the appeal on the basis of the records elevated by the MTCC, as well as the memoranda of the parties. To remand it is a superfluity and contrary to the summary nature of the case. Finally, had the RTC decided the case in the manner required, the result could only have been to affirm the MTCC decision, since respondent did not contest it on the merits. All told, therefore, the decision and order of the RTC must be set aside and the decision of the MTCC must stand, there being no contrary evidence presented by respondent, and the fact of ownership by petitioner of the building being undisputed.
1993: 5 Star and James had a lease agreement, where the latter became the lessees of the spaces occupied by Rufino and that of de Leon Gun Store. Several years later: the BOD of 5 Star passed a resolution terminating all the rentfree arrangements in the building until March 31, 1999. Future occupants will pay the corresponding rentals and enter into a lease agreement with 5 Star. Despite notice and repeated demands, James did not negotiate and enter into a lease agreement with 5 Star, nor did he vacate the G/F door 2 (with 40K rental/mo. beginning Apr. 1 99). 5 Star filed UD case against James in the MTCC. During the proceedings, PR and his counsel file a MOTION TO RESET the preliminary conference because PRs counsel had an unpostponable personal engagement. MTCC denied the motion to reset. PR failed to appear in the preliminary conference and pursuant to the summary procedure in FEUD, Petitioners was entitled to judgment. MTCC favored Petitioners and the PR was ordered to vacate and pay rental until possession is restored to petitioners. PR filed an MR, but was denied. PR filed an appeal via Rule 40 to the RTC. RTC: remanded the case to the MTCC claiming that procedure should be relaxed in the interest of justice, because PR was effectively denied of his day in court when MTCC rendered judgment solely based on the complaint of the plaintiff. Petitioners filed an MR but was denied, hence this Petition for Review under Rule 45 to the SC. ISSUES: W/N the RTC properly remanded the case to the MTCC or should it have decided the case based on the record, pleading, memoranda? RULING: RTC should have decided the case based on the record, pleading, memoranda. Before explaining the ratio: the Court held that this case should have been filed in the CA with due regard for the hierarchy of courts. On this score, the SC couldve outrightly dismissed the case, but in the interest of justice, in view of the clear mistake of the RTCs decision, the SC took cognizance of the case. The avowed objective of actions for FEUD, which have purposely been made summary in nature, is to provide peace, speedy and expeditious means of preventing an alleged illegal possessor for a long time, thereby insuring the maintenance of peace and order in the community, otherwise the party illegally deprived of possession might feel the despair of long waiting and decide as a measure of self-protection to take the law into his hands and seize the same by force and violence. The Court on occasion grants the relaxation of procedural rules when the appellant substantially complied with the formal requirements. In this case, the reason for the counsels absence did not warrant an excuse. Further, the PRs absence during the
RULE 41 APPEAL FROM RTC TO CA SILVERIO V. CA GR 178993, SEPTEMBER 16, 2009 FACTS: The instant controversy stemmed from the settlement of estate of the deceased
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Beatriz Silverio. After her death, her surviving spouse, Ricardo Silverio, Sr., filed an intestate proceeding for the settlement of her estate. On November 16, 2004, during the pendency of the case, Ricardo Silverio, Jr. filed a petition to remove Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr. as the administrator of the subject estate. On January 3, 2005, the RTC issued an Order granting the petition and removing Ricardo Silverio, Sr. as administrator of the estate, while appointing Ricardo Silverio, Jr. as the new administrator. On January 26, 2005, Nelia S. Silverio-Dee filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated January 3, 2005, as well as all other related orders. On May 31, 2005, the RTC issued an Omnibus Order ordering Nelia Silverio-Dee to vacate the premises of the property located at No. 3, Intsia Road, Forbes Park, Makati City. She received a copy of the said Order on June 8, 2005. Instead of filing a Notice of Appeal and Record on Appeal, private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order. This motion for reconsideration was denied in an Order dated December 12, 2005. This Order was received by private respondent on December 22, 2005. On January 6, 2006, private respondent filed her Notice of Appeal while she filed her Record on Appeal on January 23, 2006. Thus, on April 2, 2007, the RTC issued an Order denying the appeal on the ground that it was not perfected within the reglementary period. The RTC further issued a writ of execution for the enforcement of the Order dated May 31, 2005 against private respondent to vacate the premises. Consequently, private respondent filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition dated May 2, 2007 with the CA. On May 4, 2007, the CA issued the assailed Resolution granting the prayer for the issuance of a TRO. ISSUE: W/N the Omnibus Order dated May 31, 2005 and the Order dated December 12, 2005 are Interlocutory Orders which are not subject to appeal under Sec. 1 of Rule 41. RULING: The Orders are interlocutory and thus, cannot be appealed. The denial of due course by the RTC was based on two (2) grounds: (1) that Nelia Silverio-Dees appeal was against an order denying a motion for reconsideration which is disallowed under Sec. 1(a), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court; and (2) that Nelia Silverio-Dees Record on Appeal was filed beyond the reglementary period to file an appeal provided under Sec. 3 of Rule 41. Petitioner argues that because private respondent filed a Notice of Appeal from the Order dated December 12, 2005 which denied her motion for reconsideration of the Omnibus Order dated May 31, 2005, her appeal is of an order denying a motion for reconsideration. Thus, petitioner alleges that private respondent employed the wrong remedy in filing a notice of appeal and should have filed a petition for certiorari with the CA under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court instead. A final order is one that disposes of the subject matter in its entirety or terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing else to be done but to enforce by execution what has been determined by the court, while an interlocutory order is one which does not dispose of the case completely but leaves something to be
decided upon. Additionally, it is only after a judgment has been rendered in the case that the ground for the appeal of the interlocutory order may be included in the appeal of the judgment itself. The interlocutory order generally cannot be appealed separately from the judgment. It is only when such interlocutory order was rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion that certiorari under Rule 65 may be resorted to. In the instant case, Nelia Silverio-Dee appealed the May 31, 2005 Order of the RTC on the ground that it ordered her to vacate the premises of the property located at No. 3 Intsia Road, Forbes Park, Makati City. On that aspect the order is not a final determination of the case or of the issue of distribution of the shares of the heirs in the estate or their rights therein. The purported authority of Nelia SilverioDee, which she allegedly secured from Ricardo Silverio, Sr., was never approved by the probate court. She, therefore, never had any real interest in the specific property located at No. 3 Intsia Road,Forbes Park, Makati City. As such, the May 31, 2005 Order of the RTC must be considered as interlocutory and, therefore, not subject to an appeal. Thus, private respondent employed the wrong mode of appeal by filing a Notice of Appeal with the RTC. Hence, for employing the improper mode of appeal, the case should have been dismissed. The implication of such improper appeal is that the notice of appeal did not toll the reglementary period for the filing of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, the proper remedy in the instant case. This means that private respondent has now lost her remedy of appeal from the May 31, 2005 Order of the RTC. MANGALIAG V. PASTORAL GR 143951, OCTOBER 25, 2005 FACTS: Respondent Serquina filed a complaint for damages with the RTC against petitioners Mangaliag and Solano. This complaint alleges that the Serquina and his copassengers sustained serious injuries and permanent deformities from the collision of their tricycle with the petitioners dump truck and the gross negligence, carelessness and imprudence of the petitioners in driving the dump truck. Respondents seek damages in the form of medical expenses amounting to P71,392.00. Respondents also claim P500,000.00 by way of moral damages, as a further result of his hospitalization, lost income of P25,000.00 or the nominal damages, and attorneys fees. Petitioners filed their answer with counterclaim. After pre-trial conference, trial on the merits ensued. After the respondent rested his case, petitioners testified in their defense. Subsequently, petitioners filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. They alleged that since the principal amount prayed for, in the amount of P71,392.00, falls within the jurisdiction of MTC.http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/oct2005/143951.htm - _ftn3 Petitioners maintain that the courts jurisdiction should be based exclusively on the amount of actual damages, excluding therefrom the amounts claimed as moral, exemplary, nominal damages and attorneys fee, etc. The respondent opposed the motion saying that since the claim for damages is the
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moral damages must be considered as a separate cause of action, independent of the claim for actual damages and must be included in determining the jurisdictional amount. If the rule were otherwise, i.e., the courts jurisdiction in a case of quasi-delict causing physical injuries would only be based on the claim for actual damages and the complaint is filed in the MTC, it can only award moral damages in an amount within its jurisdictional limitations, a situation not intended by the framers of the law. (Not really an issue raised by the respondent himself, but was nonetheless discussed by the SC) On the issue whether a direct recourse by petition for certiorari to the SC from the order of RTC: Generally a direct recourse to this Court is highly improper, for it violates the established policy of strict observance of the judicial hierarchy of courts. Although this Court, the RTCs and the CA have concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction, such concurrence does not give the petitioner unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. This Court is a court of last resort, and must so remain if it is to satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to it by the Constitution and immemorial tradition. Thus, this Court, as a rule, will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts, and exceptional and compelling circumstances, such as cases of national interest and of serious implications, justify the availment of the extraordinary remedy of writ of certiorari, calling for the exercise of its primary jurisdiction. Be that as it may, the judicial hierarchy of courts is not an iron-clad rule. It generally applies to cases involving warring factual allegations. For this reason, litigants are required to repair to the trial courts at the first instance to determine the truth or falsity of these contending allegations on the basis of the evidence of the parties. Cases which depend on disputed facts for decision cannot be brought immediately before appellate courts as they are not triers of facts. Therefore, a strict application of the rule of hierarchy of courts is not necessary when the cases brought before the appellate courts do not involve factual but legal questions. In the present case, petitioners submit a pure question of law involving the interpretation and application of paragraph 2 of Administrative Circular No. 09-94. This legal question and in order to avoid further delay are compelling enough reasons to allow petitioners invocation of this Courts jurisdiction in the first instance. (Maybe it is important to note that the petition for certiorari was filed from the denial of the RTC of the petitioners motion to dismiss. There is no final adjudication yet as to the complaint for damages.) NEYPES v. CA G.R. NO. 141524 | SEPTEMBER 14, 2005
main action, the totality of the damages sought to be recovered should be considered in determining jurisdiction. He relied on Administrative Circular No. 0994 which provides that in cases where the claim for damages is the main cause of action. . . the amount of such claim shall be considered in determining the jurisdiction of the court Also, the petitioners defense of lack of jurisdiction has already been barred by estoppel and laches. He contends that after actively taking part in the trial proceedings and presenting a witness to seek exoneration, it would be unfair and legally improper for petitioners to seek the dismissal of the case. RTC ruled in favor of respondent. Petitioners filed an MR which was denied. Subsequently, they filed a petition for certiorari with the SC. ISSUES: (1) Whether petitioners are barred from raising the defense of the RTCs lack of jurisdiction? NO (2) Whether it is the amount of P71,392.00 as medical expenses, excluding moral, nominal damages and attorneys fees, which determines jurisdiction, hence it is MTC which has jurisdiction? NO RULING: On the matter of estoppel and laches: In the present case, no judgment has yet been rendered by the RTC. As a matter of fact, as soon as the petitioners discovered the alleged jurisdictional defect, they did not fail or neglect to file the appropriate motion to dismiss. Hence, finding the pivotal element of laches to be absent, the Sibonghanoy doctrine does not control the present controversy. What happened in the Sibonghanoy, the party invoking lack of jurisdiction did so only after fifteen years and at a stage when the proceedings had already been elevated to the CA. Sibonghanoy is an exceptional case because of the presence of laches. But in this case, there is no laches. Thus, the general rule that the question of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of the proceedings must apply. Petitioners are not estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the RTC. On the issue which of the amounts is determinative of jurisdiction: The wellentrenched principle is that the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter of the action is determined by the material allegations of the complaint and the law, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover all or some of the claims or reliefs sought therein. In the present case, the allegations in the complaint plainly show that private respondent seeks to recover not only his medical expenses, lost income but also damages for physical suffering and mental anguish due to permanent facial deformity from injuries sustained in the vehicular accident. Viewed as an action for quasi-delict, the present case falls squarely within the purview of Article 2219 (2), which provides for the payment of moral damages in cases of quasi-delict causing physical injuries. Private respondents claim for moral damages of P500,000.00 cannot be considered as merely incidental to or a consequence of the claim for actual damages. It is a separate and distinct cause of action or an independent actionable tort. It springs from the right of a person to the physical integrity of his or her body, and if that integrity is violated, damages are due and assessable. Hence, the demand for
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FACTS: Petitioners filed an action for annulment of judgment and titles of land and/or reconveyance and/or reversion with preliminary injunction before the RTC against the private respondents. Later, in an order, the trial court dismissed petitioners complaint on the ground that the action had already prescribed. Petitioners allegedly received a copy of the order of dismissal on March 3, 1998 and, on the 15th day thereafter or on March 18, filed a motion for reconsideration. On July 1, 1998, the trial court issued another order dismissing the motion for reconsideration which petitioners received on July 22, 1998. Five days later, on July 27, 1998, petitioners filed a notice of appeal and paid the appeal fees on August 3, 1998. On August 4, 1998, the court a quo denied the notice of appeal, holding that it was filed eight days late. This was received by petitioners on July 31, 1998. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but this too was denied in an order dated September 3, 1998. Via a petition for certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65, petitioners assailed the dismissal of the notice of appeal before the CA. In the appellate court, petitioners claimed that they had seasonably filed their notice of appeal. They argued that the 15-day reglementary period to appeal started to run only on July 22, 1998 since this was the day they received the final order of the trial court denying their motion for reconsideration. When they filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998, only five days had elapsed and they were well within the reglementary period for appeal. On September 16, 1999, the CA dismissed the petition. It ruled that the 15-day period to appeal should have been reckoned from March 3, 1998 or the day they received the February 12, 1998 order dismissing their complaint. According to the appellate court, the order was the final order appealable under the Rules. ISSUE: W/N petitioners filed their notice of appeal on time. HELD: YES. To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the RTC, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration. Henceforth, this fresh period rule shall also apply to Rule 40, Rule 42, Rule 43 and Rule 45. The new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying the motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order or resolution. The SC thus held that petitioners seasonably filed their notice of appeal within the fresh period of 15 days, counted from July 22, 1998 (the date of receipt of notice denying their motion for reconsideration). This pronouncement is not inconsistent with Rule 41, Section 3 of the Rules which states that the appeal shall be taken within 15 days from notice of judgment or final order appealed from. The use of the disjunctive word or signifies disassociation and independence of one thing from another. It should, as a rule, be construed in the sense in which it ordinarily implies. Hence, the use of or in the above provision supposes that the notice of appeal may be filed within 15 days from the notice of judgment or within 15 days from notice of the final order, which we already determined to refer to the July 1, 1998 order denying the motion for a new trial or reconsideration.
Neither does this new rule run counter to the spirit of Section 39 of BP 129 which shortened the appeal period from 30 days to 15 days to hasten the disposition of cases. The original period of appeal (in this case March 3-18, 1998) remains and the requirement for strict compliance still applies. The fresh period of 15 days becomes significant only when a party opts to file a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. In this manner, the trial court which rendered the assailed decision is given another opportunity to review the case and, in the process, minimize and/or rectify any error of judgment. While we aim to resolve cases with dispatch and to have judgments of courts become final at some definite time, we likewise aspire to deliver justice fairly. To recapitulate, a party litigant may either file his notice of appeal within 15 days from receipt of the RTCs decision or file it within 15 days from receipt of the order (the final order) denying his motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. Obviously, the new 15-day period may be availed of only if either motion is filed; otherwise, the decision becomes final and executory after the lapse of the original appeal period provided in Rule 41, Section 3. Petitioners here filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998 or five days from receipt of the order denying their motion for reconsideration on July 22, 1998. Hence, the notice of appeal was well within the fresh appeal period of 15 days, as already discussed. ST. MARY OF THE WOODS SCHOOL V. OFFICE OF THE REGISTER OF DEEDS GR 174290, JANUARY 20, 2009 FACTS: The private respondent filed a complaint with the RTC for Declaration of Nullity of Deed of Assignment, Deed of Sales and Cancellation of TCTS registered in the name of Oro Development Corporation (ODC) and SMWSI. In his Complaint, private respondent alleged that Tomas Soriano and Josefina Soriano, parents of the private respondent, executed a Deed of Assignment in favor of ODC involving the subject properties to pay for Tomas Q. Sorianos subscription of stocks in the said corporation. Tomas Q. Soriano then diedintestate.By virtue of the said Deed of Assignment, the ownership and title over the subject properties were transferred to ODC. Thereafter, ODC executed in favor of petitioner SMWSI a Deed of Saleover one of the subject property. Private respondent claimed that several years after his father Tomas Sorianos death, he discovered that the latters signature in the Deed of Assignment in favor of ODC was a forgery.A Notice of LisPendens was annotated on TCTs of the property owned by ODC and SMWSI. Petitioners filed with the RTC a Motion to Dismiss.RTC issued an Order dismissing the private respondents Complaint. Aggrieved by the RTC Order, private respondent moved for its reconsideration, but the RTC denied the same.Petitioners, et al., filed with the RTC a Motion to Cancel Notice of LisPendensannotated on the titles, which Motion was opposed by the private respondent. Private respondent filed a Notice of Appeal stating his intention to elevate the RTC Orders to the CA. RTC issued its Ordergranting the Motion to Cancel Notice of LisPendens. The private respondent, on the other hand, filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the RTC Order.RTC denied for lack of merit private respondents Motion for Reconsideration. Private respondent filed before the CA a Motion to Reinstate/Re-annotate Notice of LisPendens on the TCTs of the subject properties given that there was yet no final judgment of dismissal of his Complaint, as its dismissal had been duly appealed.
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improbable; (7) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process; (8) where the proceedings were ex parte or were such that the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and (9) where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is involved. Petitioners averment of sense of urgency in that private respondent was already taking steps and other measures to have the Notice of LisPendens re-annotated by presenting the Resolution of the CA to the Office of the Registry of Deeds of Makati City deserves scant consideration. Petitioners never described with particularity, much less, presented proof of the steps purportedly taken by the private respondent that would justify their immediate resort to this Court on certiorari without seeking reconsideration of the Resolution in question from the CA. Petitioners simply made a sweeping allegation that absolutely has no basis. The records themselves are bare of any proof that would convince this Court that the private respondent indeed, took steps to have the challenged Resolution implemented. In fact, petitioners themselves, in their letterdated 8 September 2006 addressed to the Office of the Registry of Deeds of Makati City, pointed out that the questioned Resolution of the CA did not yet order the said Office to reannotate the Notice of LisPendens. More importantly, petitioners explicitly revealed in their letter that they intended to file a Motion for Reconsideration with the CA, as its Resolution dated 18 August 2006 had not yet acquired finality. Why then did petitioners not proceed with filing their motion for reconsideration, and opted to immediately file the present Petition for Certiorari?Similarly baseless is petitioners bare assertion, without even an attempt at explaining, that the issues subject of the Petition at bar involve public interest sufficient to excuse them from filing a Motion for Reconsideration. G.R. No. 176116 ISSUE: Whether or not private respondent's appeal to the CA involves purely questions of law, in which case, the proper mode of appeal would be a Petition for Review on Certiorari to the SC under Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure; or questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law, in which case, the proper mode would be by ordinary appeal to the CA under Rule 41? RULING: Rule 41. Ordinarily, the determination of whether an appeal involves only questions of law or questions both of law and of fact is best left to the appellate court, and all doubts as to the correctness of such conclusions will be resolved in favor of the CA. Among the grounds raised by petitioners in seeking the dismissal by the RTC of private respondents Complaint are: (1) the Complaint stated no cause of action;(2) the claim or demand set forth in the Complaint had been paid, waived, abandoned, or otherwise extinguished; and (3) a condition precedent for filing the claim has not been complied with. In a Motion to Dismiss based on failure to state a cause of action, there cannot be any question of fact or doubt or difference as to the truth or falsehood of facts,
Petitioners opposed the aforesaid Motion of private respondent.Petitionersfiled a Motion to Dismiss the Appeal on the ground that the issues in the appeal are and can only be questions of law, the appellate jurisdiction over which belongs exclusively to the SC, thus the dismissal of private respondents appeal is mandatory pursuant to SC Circular No. 2-90 and Section 2, Rule 50 of the 1997 Rules of Civil procedure.The CA issued a Resolution granting private respondents Motion to Reinstate/Re-annotate Notice of LisPendens. The CA also issued a Resolution denying petitioners Motion to Dismiss Appeal of private respondent. According to the appellate court, private respondent raised both questions of fact and law in his appeal. The petitioners instituted two special civil actions for certiorari and prohibition before the SC. In G.R. No. 174290, the petitioner, seek to annul and set aside on the ground of grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction the Resolution of the CA, which granted herein private respondent Hilario P. Sorianos Motion to Reinstate/Re-annotate the Notice of LisPendens over TCT. In G.R. No. 176116, the petitioner also seek to annul and set aside, on the ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the three Resolutions similarly rendered by the CA to wit: (1) Resolution denying petitioners Motion to Dismiss Appeal of herein private respondent Hilario P. Soriano; (2) Resolutiondenying for lack of merit petitioners Motion for Reconsideration and (3) Resolution requiring the Register of Deeds of Makati City to submit to the appellate court the original copies of the documents involvedso that they can be presented to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) for comparative analysis of the signatures of Tomas Q. Soriano. G.R. No. 174290 ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner may file the instant Petition without filing a Motion for Reconsideration of the assailed resolution. RULING: No. A Motion for Reconsideration of the order or resolution is a condition precedent for the filing of a Petition for Certiorari challenging the issuance of the same.The general rule that the filing of a Motion for Reconsideration before resort to certiorari will lie is intended to afford the public respondent an opportunity to correct any factual or fancied error attributed to it by way of re-examination of the legal and factual aspects of the case. This rule, however, is subject to certain recognized exceptions, to wit: (1) where the order or a resolution, is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction; (2) where the questions raised in the certiorari proceeding have been duly raised and passed upon in the lower court; (3) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question, and any further delay would prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the action is perishable; (4) where, under the circumstances, a Motion for Reconsideration would be useless; (5) where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief; (6) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial court is
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simply because there are no findings of fact in the first place. What the trial court merely does is to apply the law to the facts as alleged in the complaint, assuming such allegations to be true. It follows then that any appeal therefrom could only raise questions of law or doubt or controversy as to what the law is on a certain state of facts." It must be remembered, however, that the basis of the RTC Order dismissing private respondents Complaint was not only its failure to state a cause of action, but also the fact that the claim or demand set forth therein had been paid, waived, abandoned, or otherwise extinguished, and that the condition precedent for filing a claim had not been complied with. According to the RTC, the Complaint was dismissible on the ground that the claim or demand set forth therein had been paid, waived, abandoned, or otherwise extinguished. Private respondent, in accepting a certain parcel of land as his share in the estate of his late father Tomas Q. Soriano, was now deemed to have been paid or compensated because his share in the estate of the deceased had been delivered to him. In arriving at such a finding, the RTC necessarily made a preliminary determination of the facts in order to verify that, indeed, private respondents claim or demand had been paid. When the private respondent assigned as error in his appeal such finding of the RTC, he raised not only a question of law, but also a question of fact. It must be stressed that in its 17 January 2005 Order, the trial court expressed a finding that in the beholder of untrained eyes, the signatures in the Deed of Assignment and in the Second Amendment of Credit Agreement are the same. Considering that the trial court made a finding of fact as regards the issue of forgery and such issue was properly raised in the private respondents appeal with the appellate court, it certainly behooves the appellate court to review the said findings. Accordingly, as the CA has the power to inquire into the allegations of forgery made in the private respondents Complaint, it can validly require the submission of the original copies of the documents involved to enable the NBI to perform a comparative analysis of Tomas Q. Sorianos signatures therein. KHO v. CAMACHO 204 SCRA 150 (1991) FACTS: In payment of atty's fees resolved against him, petitioner Kho, a businessman, issued in favor of respondent Atty. Camacho 6 postdated Manila Bank checks in the total sum of P57,349.00. One of the checks, in the amount of P10K was lost by Atty. Camacho who promptly notified Kho. When the other 5 checks were negotiated by Camacho, the same were returned uncleared because Manila Bank had been ordered closed by the Central Bank. Petitioner refused to replace the said checks or pay his obligation. Camacho instituted an action for a sum of money against Kho before trial court. Kho alleged that he was under no obligation to replace the lost check for P10K, arguing that Camacho should have executed a sworn statement that he lost the check instead of merely informing petitioner. He also refused to issue new checks alleging that the closure of Manila Bank was beyond his control.
Contending that Kho's answer failed to tender a genuine issue, Camacho moved for a judgment on the pleadings. Judge Leviste directed Kho to pay the debt minus the P10K pertaining to the lost check. Kho seasonably filed a notice of appeal which respondent Judge duly approved. Camacho made no move to contest the award. Instead, he filed a motion/manifestation praying that Kho's notice of appeal be stricken off the record as a mere scrap of paper. The Judge issued the assailed order setting aside the previously approved notice of appeal and adopting Camacho's view that the proper remedy from a judgment on the pleadings was a petition for certiorari to the SC. Hence this petition for certiorari. ISSUE: W/N the lower court committed GAD in dismissing the appeal on the ground that it involved only questions of law. RULING: Yes. In E Razon, Inc. vs. Judge Moya, the court held: Issues that involve pure questions of law are within the exclusive jurisdiction of this Court. However, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court does not authorize the Trial Court to disallow an appeal on the ground that there is no question of fact, but only a question of law, involved. The Court was no less explicit and emphatic when it declared in the subsequent case of PNB vs. Romillo, Jr: We hold the view that whether an appeal involves only question of law or both questions of fact and law, this question should be left for the determination of an appellate court and not by the court which rendered the subject decision appealed from. Respondent Judge erred in dismissing said appeal on his misconception that the same involves only a question of law and based on this reasoning, disallowed petitioner's appeal because it was not made to the SC By dismissing the appeal on the ground that it was misdirected because the case was resolved by it on a pure question of law, the trial court committed a grave error. Respondent Judge should have allowed the IAC to decide whether or not the petitioner's appeal involves only a question of law and not arrogate unto himself the determination of this question. His error in dismissing petitioner bank's appeal becomes even more obvious considering the provisions of Section 3 of Rule 50 of the Rules of Court, wherein it is specifically provided that "where the appealed case has been erroneously brought to the CA, it shall not dismiss the appeal but shall certify the case to the proper court, with a specific and clear statement of the grounds therefor." Thus, following the above pronouncements, what respondent Judge should have done under the circumstances was to sustain his approval of the notice of appeal and leave it to the CA to certify the case to the proper tribunal if warranted. Indeed, Judge Leviste had absolutely no authority to disapprove the notice of appeal. Under the present rules, his role is to approve or disapprove the record on appeal (when required) and the appeal bond, but not a notice of appeal. A notice of appeal does not require the approval of the trial court.
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Moreover, the August 14, 1998 Order was not a proper subject of certiorari or appeal, since it was merely an interlocutory order. Petitioner also contends that certiorari cannot prosper in this case, because CHED did not file a motion for reconsideration before filing its Petition for Certiorari with the CA. Respondent counters that reconsideration should be dispensed with, because the December 9, 1998 Order is a patent nullity. The general rule is that, in order to give the lower court the opportunity to correct itself, a motion for reconsideration is a prerequisite to certiorari. It is also basic that a petitioner must exhaust all other available remedies before resorting to certiorari. This rule, however, is subject to certain exceptions such as any of the following: (1) the issues raised are purely legal in nature, (2) public interest is involved, (3) extreme urgency is obvious or (4) special circumstances warrant immediate or more direct action.6 It is patently clear that the regulation or administration of educational institutions, especially on the tertiary level, is invested with public interest. Hence, the haste with which the solicitor general raised these issues before the appellate court is understandable. Therefore, CHED's Petition for Certiorari did not require prior resort to a motion for reconsideration. CITYTRUST BANKING CORP. V. CA 196 SCRA 553 (1991) FACTS: Samara bought from Citytrust (drawer) a bank draft5 for $40,000 for Thai International Airways (payee). The corresponding bank in the U.S. was Marine Midland (drawee). Samara executed a stop-payment order and instructed Citytrust to inform Midland about the order. Citytrust then credited back $40k to Samaras account only to re-debit the same later upon discovery that Midland had already debited Citytrusts own account. Midland claimed that it had already paid the claim prior to receiving the stop-order payment. RTC ruled in favor of Samara and ordered Citytrust and Midland to jointly and severally pay Samara $40k plus 12% interest, exemplary damages and attorneys fees. Midland appealed to the CA and the CA affirmed RTCs decision consisting of a reduction of the rate of the interest and attorneys fees, as well as the exclusion of exemplary damages. Meanwhile, Citytrust filed a separate and independent appeal to the CA, but the same was dismissed for being filed out of time. Citytrust tried to argue that Midlands timely appeal inured to its benefit, but this argument was not accepted by the court. Citytrust filed a petition for review before the SC but was dismissed as well. Basically, Citytrusts liability was adjudged by the court based on the RTC ruling
5 A bank draft is a bill of exchange drawn by a bank upon its corresponding bank issued at the solicitation of a stranger who purchases and pays therefore.
Nonetheless, although a procedural error was committed, to require the judge to give due course to the appeal and then elevate the records to the Appellate Court will serve no useful purpose and will only delay the resolution of an otherwise openand-shut case. The records before us are sufficient to enable us to rule on the propriety of the judgment on the pleadings and to terminate this case once and for all. The judgment on the pleadings was proper. In that pleading, petitioner disavowed any obligation to replace the useless checks and gratuitously advanced the reason that the bank where he had deposited his lifetime savings had been closed through no fault of his. In effect, what petitioner was saying was that Camacho should wait until he (petitioner) was in a position to pay. This is not a sufficient controversion of the material allegations in the complaint. Finding no reversible error in the judgment on the pleadings rendered by respondent Judge Leviste, the Court considers the same as the final adjudication on the respective rights of the parties. INDIANA AEROSPACE UNIVERSITY V. CHED 356 SCRA 367 (2001) FACTS: CHED conducted an investigation inquiring whether petitioner already acquired university status in view of the latters advertisement in the Manila Bulletin. The result of the investigation was that petitioner has not yet acquired university status. CHED directed the petitioner to desist from using the term university in its name. Petitioner then appealed to CHED to reconsider its decision and it promised that it will comply with the CHED requirement in order to attain university status. While the appeal was pending, petitioner filed a for Damages with prayer for Writ of Preliminary and Mandatory Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order against respondent. CHED filed a motion to dismiss, but this was denied. The RTC also issued the Writ of Preliminary Injunction. Without filing for an MR, CHED filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari. The CA ruled that petitioner had no cause of action against CHED. Petitioner failed to show any evidence that it had been granted university status by respondent as required under existing law and CHED rules and regulations. For the same reason, the appellate court also ruled that the Writ of Preliminary Injunction had improvidently been issued. ISSUE: (1) W/N the certiorari was seasonably filed. (2) W/N a Motion for Reconsideration is a prerequisite to certiorari. RULING: CHEDs Petition for Certiorari was seasonably filed. In computing its timeliness, what should have been considered was not the Order of august 14, 1998, but the date when respondent received the December 9, 1998 Order declaring it in default. Since it received this Order only on January 13, 1999, and filed its Petition for Certiorari on February 23, 1999, it obviously complied with the sixty-day reglementary period stated in Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Court.
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which was higher and more onerous than the modified ruling of the CA (pursuant to Midlands appeal) which reduced the rate of interest, attorneys fees, etc. Citytrsut raises the main issue, whether or not the respondent appellate court committed reversible error in ruling that the liability of the petitioner should be based on the original decision of the trial court and not the modified one. RULING: It should be based on the RTC ruling. Otherwise, Samara would be given a choice of executing the claim for $40k plus bigger interest (12%), exemplary damages, and attorneys fees from petitioner Citytrust, or $40k plus a smaller sum inclusive of simple interest (6%) and attorneys fees from Midland. Midland was the one actually responsible for the injury to Samara, yet between it and Citytrust, it was being asked to provide for a lesser indemnity. There are two final judgments arising from one and the same basic claim of Samara. The Court will not allow the absurd situation where a co-defendant who is adjudged to be primarily responsible for the sums of money and for tort would be charged for an amount lesser than what its co-defendant is bound to pay to the common creditor. Such principle runs counter to the principle of solidarity in obligations as between co-defendants established by a judgment for recovery of sum of money and damages. Substantial justice shall not allow Midland, which is the source of the injury afflicted, to be unjustly enriched either by the direct execution against him of the judgment for the reduced amount or by indirect execution by way of reimbursement at a latter time. Additionally, the Court noted the modification made by the court which ordered not only Midland but both defendants jointly and severally to pay the new amount. Though as a matter of procedure, the modification shall be applied only to the appellant, substantial justice and equity also demand that we reinterpret the decision to refer to Cityland as well (in other words, they both pay for the lesser amount). There exist a strong and compelling reason to warrant an exception to the rule that a judgment creditor is entitled to execution of a final judgment against a party especially if that party (Cityland) failed to appeal. MARAWI MARANTAO GENERAL HOSPITAL, INC. VS. CA 349 SCRA 321 (2001) FACTS: Private Respondents Marawi-Marantao General Hospital, Inc. and Atty. Macapanton K. Mangondato filed complant against the petitioner Social Security System, with the RTC of Lanao del Sur, for specific performance with damages. The respondents allege that the parties executed a deed of conditional sale where petitioner transferred and conveyed unto private respondent Mangondato, the disputed property, covered by a TCT under the name of respondent hospital, but that respondent Mangondatos repurchase thereof having been consummated, the petitioner refused to execute a deed of absolute sale. Later on, petitioner declared the said deed of conditional sale a nullity. Private respondents then prayed for the execution of an absolute deed of sale. The Court ordered for the execution of an absolute deed of sale. Private respondents filed a motion for partial execution, serving a copy of said motion on
petitioner. However, petitioner failed to appear, considering that as of said date, he had not as yet been served with a copy of the Decision and a copy of private respondents motion. Nevertheless, the court issued an order granting the motion for execution. A writ of execution was issued, and a notice of garnishment served. Petitioner filed an urgent motion for reconsideration and immediate stay of execution, which was denied. Petitioner filed a notice of appeal, however failing to indicate when it received a copy of the decision of the court. It also filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, which court also nullified the order and writ of execution issued by the lower court. Petitioner thereafter filed an amended notice of appeal, quoting only the first item in the decision of the lower court, placing ellipses in lieu of the other items. Private respondents filed a manifestation to the effect that, under the amended notice of appeal of the petitioner, only the first item was appealed from, and thus, execution must be ordered as to the other items of the decisions. Petitioner filed a manifestation to the effect that the petitioner, having perfected its appeal from the decision of the lower court, the latter had no more jurisdiction to grant relief to the private respondent on their motion for execution. It subsequently filed a petition for certiorari with the SC. ISSUE: Whether the trial court has JD to order the partial execution of its judgment insofar as the second, third, fourth and fifth subparagraphs thereof are concerned. RULING: In cases of appeals by notice of appeal, the court loses jurisdiction over the case upon the perfection of the appeals filed in due time and the expiration of the time to appeal of other parties. Considering that the SSS appealed the entirety of the decision to the CA (because even though only the first item was quoted, the ellipses indicated that petitioner meant to include the other items) and considering further that the period of appeal of the petitioners had already expired, the RTC already lost jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case when it issued the order declaring item number 2,3,4, and 5 final and executory. Thus, such are void. BUKIDNON DOCTORS HOSPITAL V. METROBANK 463 SCRA 222 (2005) FACTS: Petitioner Bukidnon Doctors' Hospital, Inc., obtained a loan of P25 million from respondent Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company to be used for the construction of its hospital. To secure this loan, the petitioner mortgaged six parcels of land owned by Dr. Rene Sison and Rory P. Roque, President and Administrator, respectively, of the petitioner. Upon petitioner's default in the payment of the loan, the mortgage was extrajudicially foreclosed and the mortgaged lots were sold in a public auction to respondent bank, being the sole and highest bidder. The petitioner failed to redeem the properties within the period of redemption. Forthwith, the respondent consolidated its ownership over the properties and was issued new certificates of title on 1 October 2001. Petitioner expressed its desire to continue staying in the subject premises so that the operation of the hospital erected thereon would not be disrupted. For that
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extension of time to file a petition under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. And the petition was filed within the extended period we granted, raising only one question of law.
purpose, the petitioner proposed to pay rent in the amount of P100,000 per month for a period of, but not limited to, three years. The terms finally agreed upon by the parties, as culled from respondent's letter to the petitioner of 30 May 2002, were (1) a monthly rental of P150,000, and (2) the effectivity of the lease contract in November 2001. However, approximately a year and eight months after the agreed effectivity date of the lease contract, the respondent asked the petitioner to vacate the leased premises within fifteen days. The petitioner refused, invoking the subsisting lease agreement. The respondent filed with the RTC an Ex Parte Motion for a Writ of Possession. The trial court issued an order granting respondent's ex parte motion for a writ of possession. Its motion for reconsideration having been denied by the trial court in the Order of 23 January 2004,[6] the petitioner filed on 29 January 2004 (the day it received the denial order) a Notice of Appeal stating that it was appealing to the CA on both questions of fact and law. Before its Notice of Appeal could be acted upon by the trial court, the petitioner filed a Manifestation and Motion stating that due to the nature of the appeal that it intended to file, it was withdrawing the Notice of Appeal. On the last day within which to appeal the 29 January 2004 Order, it filed with us a motion for extension of thirty days from the expiration of the reglementary period to file a petition for review on certiorari. Said motion was granted. Petitioner instituted the instant petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. Respondent opposed such petition claiming that by filing an ordinary appeal under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, the petitioner had already waived its right to file a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, since the two modes of appeal are mutually exclusive and governed by different rules. ISSUE: W/N petitioner is barred from filing a petition for review on certiorari? RULING: No. Petitioner cannot be deemed to have waived its right to file this petition. Realizing that the remaining issue was a pure question of law, it withdrew its Notice of Appeal stating that it was appealing the 28 January 2002 Order on both questions of law and fact. Section 9 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides that prior to the transmittal of the original record, the court may allow withdrawal of the appeal. Nothing in the Rules prevents a party from filing a petition under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court after seasonably withdrawing the Notice of Appeal as long as it is done within the reglementary period and the issue involved is purely one of law. In this case it was before the lapse of the reglementary period to appeal that the petitioner withdrew its Notice of Appeal to the CA and filed with us a motion for
RULE 42 PETITION FOR REVIEW FROM THE RTC TO THE CA BARANGAY SANGALANG VS. BARANGAY MAGUIHAN G.R. NO. 159792, DECEMBER 23, 2009 FACTS: The case is a petition for review on certiorari under rule 45, seeking to set aside the decision and resolution of the CA. The root of the controversy is about a barangay jurisdiction dispute between petitioner Barangay Sangalang and respondent Barangay Maguihan, both situated in Lemery,
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Batangas. Petitioner claims the lots to be within their territorial jurisdiction, whereas respondent maintains that they are within their territorial boundary. The case was lodged before the Sangguniang Bayan of Lemery, Batangas, which referred it to a hearing committee that rendered a report to the effect that the properties belonged to petitioner. Such recommendation was affirmed by the Sangguniang Bayan. Respondent appealed to the RTC, who ruled in favor of respondent. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the RTC. Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal, and later on an Amended Notice of Appeal. The CA dismissed the appeal, ruling that petitioner had availed itself of the wrong remedy in filing a notice of appeal instead of filing a petition for review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court. To wit: "Given the procedural mandates, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Lemery, Batangas, dated April 27, 2000, was rendered by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. Appropriately, under Section 22 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, decisions of the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, shall be appealable to the CA by way of petitions for review under Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure." The CA also ruled that if said appeal were to be considered as an ordinary appeal under Rule 41, it still should be dismissed, because the submitted appellants brief failed to contain a subject index and page references to the records requirement in its Statement of Facts and Case and Argument, as provided for in Section 13 of Rule 44 of the 1997 Rules of Procedure. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied by the CA. ISSUES: 1. Whether the Court committed GADLEJ in dismissing the appeal solely based in the rigid and strict application of technicalities, overriding the merit of the appeal or substantial justice. 2. Whether the decision and order of the RTC of Lemery, Batangas, which set aside the appealed resolution of the Sangguiniang Bayan, are null and void because respondent Maguihan has not perfected its appeal and by reason thereof, the RTC has not acquired appellate jurisdiction RULING: As to his first assigned error, petitioner faults the CA for having strictly applied the rules of court notwithstanding his choice of the wrong remedy; yet, on the other hand, as to his second assigned error, petitioner faults the RTC for not having strictly applied the rules of court to respondents alleged failure to pay the corresponding docket fees. A reading of the records of the case shows that it was only in his Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration to the RTC Decision that petitioner first raised the issue of non-payment of docket fees. Respondent, for his part, filed with the RTC an Opposition and Comment explaining his failure to file the corresponding docket fees, that the non-payment of docket fees is correct, but that the appellant who appealed the case by himself and being a layman was not aware that a docket fee should be paid in case perfection of an appeal and no one from the courts personnel reminds him of this requirement. In order not to sacrifice the ends of justice, the appellant was willing to pay the docket fee and other lawful charges necessary for the perfection of an appeal.
The Order denying petitioners motion for reconsideration was silent as to the issue of the non-payment of docket fees. The SC deems that the RTC must have accepted the explanation given by respondent, otherwise, said court would have dismissed the appeal and reconsidered its decision. The failure to pay docket fees does not automatically result in the dismissal of an appeal, it being discretionary on the part of the appellate court to give it due course or not. The SC will then not interfere with matters addressed to the sound discretion of the RTC in the absence of proof that the exercise of such discretion was tainted with bias or prejudice, or made without due circumspection of the attendant circumstances of the case. In any case, the more pressing issue is whether or not the SC should even entertain petitioners appeal. By filing a Notice of Appeal assailing the RTC Decision, petitioner has availed itself of the remedy provided for under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, which provides for the ordinary mode of appeal. The CA, however, considered petitioners choice to be the wrong remedy and, forthwith, dismissed the petition. After an examination of relevant laws pertinent to herein petition, the SC finds that the CA was correct in holding that petitioner had availed itself of the wrong remedy. As correctly observed by the CA, under Section 118 of the Local Government Code, the jurisdictional responsibility for settlement of boundary disputes between and among local government units is to be lodged before the proper Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan concerned, if it involves two or more barangays in the same city or municipality. Under Section 118(e) of the same Code, if there is a failure of amicable settlement, the dispute shall be formally tried by the sanggunian concerned and shall decide the same within (60) days from the date of the certification referred to. Section 119 of the Local Government Code also provides that the decision of the sanggunian concerned may be appealed to the RTC having jurisdiction over the area in dispute, within the time and manner prescribed by the Rules of Court. In the case at bar, it is clear that when the case was appealed to the RTC, the latter took cognizance of the case in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, not its original jurisdiction. Hence, any further appeal from the RTC Decision must conform to the provisions of the Rules of Court dealing with said matter. On this score, Section 2, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides: Sec. 2. Modes of appeal. (a) Ordinary appeal. The appeal to the CA in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from and serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party. No record on appeal shall be required except in special proceedings and other cases of multiple or separate appeals where the law or these Rules so require. In such cases, the record on appeal shall be filed and served in like manner. (b) Petition for review. - The appeal to the CA in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction shall be by
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which was approximately 10 years before the controversy in hand developed. Hence, the same should be controlling in the absence of proof that such document is invalid or inaccurate. As a matter of fact, notwithstanding the hearing committees recommendation to rule in favor of petitioner, the committee itself stated in its report that the cadastral map submitted by respondent was authentic. Moreover, in ruling against petitioner, the RTC also gave greater weight to the documents submitted by respondent, thus: x x x This Court is mindful of the fact and takes judicial notice that the Land Management Bureau is manned by geodetic engineers with sufficient expertise and is the cognizant agency of government charged with the responsibility of matters respecting surveys of land. This Court likewise takes into consideration that the duty of the provincial and municipal assessors are primarily assessments of taxes. It is undisputed that the Land Management Bureau is the principal government agency tasked with the survey of lands, and thus, more weight should be given to the documents relating to its official tasks which are presumed to be done in the ordinary course of business. Between a geodetic engineer and a tax assessor, the conclusion is inevitable that it is the formers certification as to the location of properties in dispute that is controlling, absent any finding of abuse of discretion. As correctly observed by respondent and the RTC, the duty of provincial and municipal assessors is primarily the assessment of taxes and not the survey of lands. Lastly, petitioner alludes to a petition/resolution allegedly of persons residing in the properties in dispute to the effect they are under the jurisdiction of petitioner. On this note, the SC agrees with the observation of the RTC that the determination as to whether the properties in dispute are within a certain jurisdiction is not a decision to be made by the populace, to wit: x x x In simple language, the population follows the territory and not vice versa. It is the determination of the ambit and sphere of the land area as culled in the approved barangay map that determines the jurisdiction of the barangay and not the decision of the populace. To allow the latter will open endless litigation concerning disputes of jurisdiction. In sum, the SC does not belittle the documents presented by petitioner or the duties of the provincial and municipal assessors; however, since the documents presented by respondent are sourced from the very agency primarily tasked with the survey of lands, more credence must be given to the same in the absence of proof that would cast doubt on the contents thereof. The petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution of the CA are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision and Order of the Regional Trial Court, Lemery, Batangas, in Barangay Jurisdiction Dispute No. 1, are AFFIRMED. YUKI, JR. VS. WELLINGTON CO
petition for review in accordance with Rule 42. Based on the foregoing, it is apparent that petitioner has availed itself of the wrong remedy. Since the RTC tried the case in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, petitioner should have filed a petition for review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court, instead of an ordinary appeal under Rule 41. The law is clear in this respect. In any case, as in the past, the SC has recognized the emerging trend towards a liberal construction of the Rules of Court. Courts have the prerogative to relax procedural rules of even the most mandatory character, mindful of the duty to reconcile both the need to speedily put an end to litigation and the parties' right to due process. In numerous cases, this Court has allowed liberal construction of the rules when to do so would serve the demands of substantial justice and equity. Thus, notwithstanding petitioners wrong mode of appeal, the CA should not have so easily dismissed the petition, considering that the parties involved are local government units and that what is involved is the determination of their respective territorial jurisdictions. In the same vein, the CAs strict reliance on the requirements under Section 13 of Rule 44 of the 1997 Rules of Procedure relating to subject index and page references in an appellants brief is, to stress, putting a premium on technicalities. While the purpose of Section 13, Rule 44, is to present to the appellate court in the most helpful light, the factual and legal antecedents of a case on appeal, said rule should not be strictly applied considering that petitioners brief before the CA contained only 9 pages, the records of the case consisted only of a few documents and pleadings, and there was no testimonial evidence. Other Issues: Moving on to the substantive merits of the case, what it basically involves is adjudication as to which barangay the lots in dispute belong. Ideally, herein petition should be remanded to the CA, as the same inherently involves a question of fact. However, since this case has been pending for almost 13 years now, the SC deems it best to once and for all settle the controversy. Article 17, Rule III of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991, outlines the procedures governing boundary disputes, including the documents that should be attached to the petition. The RTC observed that neither of the parties satisfied the requirement that all the enumerated documents must be attached to the petition. Hence, like the RTC, the Supreme Court is left with no other option but to select which between the documents presented by the parties carries greater weight in proving its claim. The documents presented by petitioner were sourced from the tax assessors office, whereas the documents presented by respondent were sourced from the land management bureau. To the SCs mind, the presence of the cadastral map, which was approved by the Director of Lands, should be given more weight than the documents sourced by petitioner from the assessors office. Said map was approved on March 17, 1986,
FACTS: Mr. Joseph Chua was the registered owner of a parcel of land, together with a commercial building erected thereon. In 1981, he leased a portion of the building to
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petitioner Joven Yuki, Jr., who put up a business therein under the name and style Supersale Auto Supply. The contract of lease between Mr. Chua and petitioner had a term of five years but was not reduced into writing. Thereafter, the lease was renewed through a series of verbal and written agreements, the last of which was a written Contract of Lease covering the period of January 1, 2003 to December 31, 2003 at a monthly rental of P7, 000.00. However, in November 2003, Mr. Chua informed petitioner that he sold the property to respondent Wellington Co and instructed petitioner to thenceforth pay the rent to the new owner. Petitioner refused to vacate and surrender the property at the expiration of the lease contract. Consequently, respondent, being the new owner of the property pursuant to a contract of sale executed between the company and the previous owner, filed a Complaint for unlawful detainer before the MeTC of Manila praying that petitioners possession of subject premises be declared unlawful and that petitioner be ordered to vacate it.. MeTC ruled in favor of the respondent ordering petitioner to vacate the property and to pay the reasonable compensation for the use and occupancy. On appeal, the RTC reversed the decision and dismissed the unlawful detainer case. It found no proof on record that petitioner actually received the notice to vacate, thereby making the Complaint fatally defective. The RTC likewise opined that the resolution of the case hinges on the existence of implied new lease, a question which is incapable of pecuniary estimation and, therefore, beyond the MeTCs jurisdiction. Aggrived by the decision, respondent filed with the CA a Petition for Review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court assailing the RTC Decision. The CA ruled in favor of the respondent and set aside the decision of the RTC. Petitioner now contends that the Petition for Review filed by the respondent with the CA is procedurally infirmed and that the appellate court should have outrightly dismissed the same. Petitioner alleges that while respondent attached to the petition the parties respective position papers, he failed to attach to said position papers the annexes thereto. This, petitioner insists, warrants the dismissal of respondents petition per Section 2, Rule 42 of the Rules of Court, in relation to Section 3 of the same Rule. ISSUE: W/N petitioner correct? What must be attached as annexes to the petition? RULING: No, petitioners contention is wrong. Section 2 of Rule 42 does not require that all the pleadings and documents filed before the lower courts must be attached as annexes to the petition. Aside from clearly legible duplicate originals or true copies of the judgments or final orders of both lower courts, it merely requires that the petition be accompanied by copies of pleadings and other material portions of the record as would support the allegations of the petition. As to what these pleadings and material portions of the record are, the Rules grants the petitioner sufficient
discretion to determine the same. This discretion is of course subject to CAs evaluation whether the supporting documents are sufficient to make out a prima facie case. Thus, Section 3 empowers the CA to dismiss the petition where the allegations contained therein are utterly bereft of evidentiary foundation. Since in this case the CA gave due course to respondents Petition for Review and proceeded to decide it on the merits, it can be fairly assumed that the appellate court is satisfied that respondent has sufficiently complied with Section 2 of Rule 42. In the case at hand, the CA rollo reveals that the annexes to the position papers can be found somewhere else in the petition. The annexes to the parties respective position papers are the same annexes attached to the Complaint and the Answer. These are more than substantial compliance with the requirements of the rules. Indeed, if we are to apply the rules of procedure in a very rigid and technical sense as what the petitioner suggests in this case, the ends of justice would be defeated.
RULE 43 APPEAL FROM CTA & QUASI JUDICIAL AGENCIES TO THE CA LANTING V. OMBUDSMAN G.R. NO. 141426. MAY 6, 2005 FACTS: Lanting is an Administrative Officer of the City Council of Manila. She filed with the Ombudsman a complaint charging then Manila Vice-Mayor Atienza (now City Mayor); Secretary to the City Council; and a Human Resource Management Officer with violating the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and Falsification of Public documents. Lanting also questions the appointment in the City Government of several individuals which are relatives of the respondents. The Graft Investigator Officer issued a Resolution recommending that Lansings complaint be dismissed. It stated that: (1) the evidence does not warrant the filing of graft charges and (2) the appointments are governed by the Civil Service
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FACTS: Polytechnic University of the Philippines (PUP) appointed Indalicio Conti as Assistant Professor IV. In order for him to be reclassified/promoted to Professor I, he had to submit himself to written & oral exams conducted by the Philippine Association of State Universities & Colleges (PASUC) evaluators. Conti was directed to present himself for IAC Evaluation & submit a personal data sheet which he did. Conti undertook the tests conducted by the accreditation/evaluation committee. The result of the accreditation/evaluation showed that Conti placed 8th among the candidates & was reclassified from Assistant Professor IV to Professor I. Dr. Zenaida Olonan, President of PUP, issued an appointment paper to Conti, confirming his promotional appointment w/ Dionisia Pingol, Director II of CSFO-NCR, signing below the name of Dr. Olonan for the CSC. Pingol sent a letter to Olanan asking for a copy of Contis MBA diploma or transcript of records in order to verify an information she received that Conti was not a masteral degree holder. Conti was formally charged w/ dishonesty. Contis defense: A masteral degree is not necessary for the promotion of a faculty member to professorial level, thus he had not benefited nor gained an undue advantage over other faculty members. He was given limited time in the preparation of supporting papers for his reclassification & it was an honest mistake. CSC, after conducting a hearing, issued a resolution w/c held Conti guilty of dishonesty. Thus he was meted out the penalty of dismissal from service. Conti filed an MR. He sent several letters to the CSC calling its attention to his pending MR, & even filed a formal motion for the resolution of his plea for reconsideration. Still, the CSC had not acted. Thus, Conti filed w/ the SC a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus The CA dismissed the petition for having been filed out of time (almost 3 months passed its due date). Contis contention: His petition before the SC for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus is an original action under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules on Civil Procedure and not an appeal under Rule 43 thereof. Accordingly, the petition has not been filed out of time. PUPs contention: appeal via a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Revised Rules on Civil Procedure, and not the special civil action of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, is the proper remedy anent the final resolution of the CSC. ISSUE: W/N the petitioner for certiorari was proper. RULING: YES. An essential requisite for the availability of the extraordinary remedies under the Rules is an absence of an appeal nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, one w/c has been so defined as a "remedy which
Lanting filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution on the ground that the Investigator conveniently and intentionally skirted the issue of falsification of public documents which are crystal clear in my complaint. Lanting then prayed for a reinvestigation of her complaint by a Special Prosecutor. The Ombudsman denied the motion. Dissatisfied, Lanting filed with the CA a petition for certiorari and mandamus. Aside from several procedural errors, the petition was dismissed on the ground that the CA has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the assailed Ombudsmans resolution. The CA held that Section 14 of The Ombudsman Act of 1989 provides that No court shall hear any appeal or application for remedy against the decision or findings of the Ombudsman, except the SC on pure question of law. Lanting filed a Motion for Reconsideration but was again denied. The CA held that the Congress through The Ombudsman Act of 1989 designated only the SC as the appellate authority in Ombudsman decisions in criminal cases. ISSUE: W/N the CA gravely erred in dismissing Lantings petition for certiorari on the ground of lack of jurisdiction on the basis of The Ombudsman Act. Lantings position: Her complaint before the Ombudsman was not limited to violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, but likewise includes acts constituting ground for administrative complaint hence cognizable by the CA. RULING: NO. The complaint is for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Acts. It is not an administrative complaint. Nowhere in her complaint did she allege administrative offenses, such as dishonesty or misconduct on the part of respondents. The allegations describe the acts complained of as willful, felonious, unlawful, odious and despicable criminal activities. In her motion for reconsideration of the Ombudsmans Resolution, Lanting claimed that the Investigator skirted the issue of falsification of public documents which is crystal clear in my complaint. Considering that the complaint is criminal in nature, the SC, not the CA, has the sole authority to review the Ombudsmans Resolutions on pure question of law as expressly mandated in The Ombudsman Act of 1989. In Fabian vs. Desierto, it was held that only appeals from the decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases should be taken to the CA under the provisions of Rule 43. Therefore, the CA did not commit grave abuse of discretion. Clearly, it has no jurisdiction over Lantings criminal action. GONTI v. CA G.R. No. 134441. May 19, 1999
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would equally be beneficial, speedy and sufficient, not merely a remedy which at some time in the future will bring about a revival of the judgment complained of in the certiorari proceeding, but a remedy w/c will promptly relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects of that judgment & the acts of the inferior court or tribunal" concerned. Illustrative of such a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law is a MR that has thus often been considered a condition sine qua non for the grant of certiorari. PUP capitalizes on the admission of Conti that he has a pending MR on the adverse resolution of the CSC, contending that his petition for certiorari is thereby premature. Ironically, it is this very argument that militates against PUP. The continuous failure of CSC to resolve Contis MR for so long a time has virtually amounted to a denial of his right to due process & right to the speedy disposition of his case. In fact, there is yet no indication on record that CSC has already resolved Contis MR. It cannot be gainsaid that it is the inadequacy, not the total absence, of all other legal remedies, and the danger of the failure of justice w/o the writ, that should determine the propriety of certiorari. This Court has ruled that a recourse to certiorari is proper not only where there is a clear deprivation of petitioners fundamental right to due process; but so also from where other special circumstances warrant immediate and more direct action. Contis MR has been pending w/ the CSC for more than 2 years. ALCARAZ V GONZALEZ G.R. NO. 164715, SEPTEMBER 20, 2006 | 502 SCRA 518 FACTS: Atty. Alcaraz, Customs Collector at the Batangas Port, was driving his car (Nissan Infiniti) along SLEX, bound to Manila when he had a road encounter with Gonzalez. Alcaraz signaled he was taking the right most lane to take the skyway and in this process, he cut the lane of Gonzalez. Gonzalez chased Alcaraz, opened his windows and shouted invectives. Alcaraz, armed with a .38 caliber pistol responded with 2 gun fires: bullet 1, hitting the right front window exiting the left rear door and bullet 2, hitting the left rear window of Gonzalez car. After that, Alcaraz drove away, but he was apprehended at the Skyway toll gate by the PNCC guards. Gonzalez filed a criminal complaint for ATTEMPTED HOMICIDE against Alcaraz. On motion of Alvarez, MeTC of Paraaque ordered the City Prosecutor to conduct PI. Alcaraz countered that it was Gonzalez who uttered invectives, waived a dirty finger, threw a coin which hit his chest and aimed a short firearm at him. Alcaraz said, this prompted him to take his firearm and aimed it onto the right passenger door of Gonzalez car. Gonzalez denied throwing a coin and having a gun. He also raised that admitting to the shooting but raising self-defense was in effect an admission of intent to kill. The Investigating Prosecutor found probable cause (PC) and recommended to retain the Information. Alcaraz filed an MR, but was denied, then Petition for Review with City Prosecutors Office of the DOJ DOJ Secretary Nani Perez granted the petition and ordered the withdrawal of the Information. Gonzalez filed an MR, which was denied by the DOJ Usec; he then filed a petition for review under RULE 43 before the CA.
Alcaraz raised in his comment that the petition should be dismissed because the CA lacked jusrisdiction and Gonzalez lack of standing. He also insisted that a Petition for Certiorari (R65) is the proper remedy because determination of PC is not a judicial but an executive function, thus the CA has no authority to substitute its own judgment for that of the DOJ Secretary. CA gave merit to the petition. Alcaraz filed and MR, but was denied, hence ALCARAZ files this Petition. Alcarazs contention: The State, through the OSG, has the standing to appeal the resolution of the DOJ Secretary because as the private party in the criminal complaint, Gonzalez was a mere witness to the offense. Filing an Information in court is not a judicial but an executive function, hence the resolution of the DOJ Secretary should prevail over that of the CA Gonzalezs contention: He has standing and that interest of the State is nominal. The DOJ Secretary is a quasi-judicial officer thus his resolutions are reviewable under R43. ISSUE: W/N the proper remedy to review the assailed resolution of the DOJ Secretary is to file a petition for review under rule 43 or to file a petition for Certiorari under R65 RULING: PETION FOR CERTIORARI under R65 is the proper remedy. COURT agreed with ALCARAZ. Determination of PC is an executive function. Courts are not empowered to substitute their own decision for that of the executive branch. While the CA may review the resolution of the DOJ Sec., it may only do so under R65 on the grounds of GADALEJ. Resolution of the DOJ Sec is final. After the MR of the said resolution has been denied, it can no longer be the subject of an appeal. Since no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy is available, a petition for certiorari under R65 is the proper remedy. BUAN V. MATUGAS GR 161179, AUGUST 7, 2007 FACTS: On May 9, 2001 with a complaint for attempted rape filed by petitioner against the herein respondent. 6 years ago, the petitioner was an employee of the provincial government of Surigao del Norte when the respondent was still the governor. In an alleged work-related trip from July 22 to 28, 1995 (they had a lunch at the Heritage Hotel), the then governor tried to make a pass on her but she fought back and the former desisted. The petitioner told her mother about the incident but the latter advised her not to file any complaint yet since respondent was still powerful and influential being the Provincial Governor of Surigao del Norte at that time. Petitioner nevertheless decided to immediately resign from her work at the Provincial Government. Almost six years later, or on May 9, 2001, petitioner finally gathered enough courage to execute and file an affidavit-complaint against the respondent before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasay City. On June 22, 2001, the respondent executed and submitted his counter-affidavit belying petitioner's
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a petition for certiorari before the CA because the decision of the Secretary of Justice is not appealable to the CA. The only issue rightfully presented before the CA was whether or not the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion in reversing the findings of the City Prosecutor, dismissing the complaint, and directing the filing of an information for attempted rape against the herein respondent. This is, as it should be for the determination of probable cause, a function that, by law, pertains to the public prosecutor. Absent a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, the appellate court is precluded, under the principle of separation of powers, from usurping the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the executive branch, the Department of Justice. There is grave abuse of discretion only when there is a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, such as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and personal hostility, and it must be so patent or gross as to constitute an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty or to act at all in contemplation of law. Not every error in the proceedings, or every erroneous conclusion of law or fact, is grave abuse of discretion. The CA, in reviewing and weighing/evaluating the evidence submitted, exercised appellate jurisdiction and stepped down to the role of becoming a trier of facts which is definitely uncalled for under the circumstances. The appellate court had "jumped the gun," so to speak, when it had, for all intents and purposes, acquitted the respondent based on the facts alleged and the defenses he raised in denial of said allegations. It had, indeed, missed a crucial step: the trial proper. Had the respondent been convicted by the trial court and an appeal therefrom taken to the CA, then the latters consideration of such matters as his defense of alibi would be proper, but not in a certiorari proceedings before it. We may also be well reminded that the purpose of preliminary investigation is to determine whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief as to the fact of the commission of a crime and the respondent's probable guilt thereof. It is exclusively within the ambit of the prosecutor's powers to determine whether probable cause exists and which crime to prosecute for. Should it be determined later on after a full-blown trial where a full account can be made of the incident, that not all the elements of attempted rape exist, it is then for the trial court to acquit respondent or convict him for a lesser crime necessarily included therein such as acts of lasciviousness or unjust vexation. But the Secretary of Justice has the discretion to determine for which crime he should prosecute for. Dissenting Opinion of Justice Brawner was relied upon by the SC: While a resolution of the existence of grave abuse in this case necessitates an examination of the evidence on record, such evaluation should never touch upon the quality of the evidence, or the defenses to which the same are subject, but should be confined to a determination of whether or not there is such evidence as to support the act of the respondent Secretary, regardless of whether or not the same may later be shown to be of little probative value during trial. Nor should certiorari issue simply
allegations. He averred that he was never billeted in Heritage Hotel and his tight schedule would not allow him to be at the scene of the alleged crime. In a Resolution dated July 5, 2001, the City Prosecutor of Pasay City dismissed the complaint for lack of probable cause prompting petitioner to file an appeal with the Department of Justice on July 20, 2001. On February 13, 2002, the Secretary of Justice issued a Resolution reversing the findings of the City Prosecutor and holding that there is reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed and that respondent is probably guilty thereof. A subsequent Resolution of September 30, 2002 denied respondent's motion for reconsideration. On November 28, 2002, respondent filed with the CA a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with prayer for preliminary injunction, claiming grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Secretary of Justice in the issuance of the aforementioned resolutions. The petition was docketed in the appellate court as CA-G.R. SP No. 74094. In its decision of September 4, 2003, the Special Division of Five of the CA reversed and set aside the questioned resolutions of the Secretary of Justice, and ordered the dismissal of the criminal information for Attempted Rape filed against the respondent then pending before Branch 111 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City. Her motion for reconsideration having been denied by the CA in its Resolution of December 9, 2003, petitioner is now with this Court via the present recourse, a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, raising the main issue of whether the CA had erred in holding that the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion when he overturned the findings of the City Prosecutor. ISSUE: Did the CA commit GADLEJ by when it REVERSED and SET ASIDE the questioned resolutions of the Secretary of Justice by substituting its own judgment to that of the former? RULING: Yes. CA is empowered under its certiorari jurisdiction to annul and declare void the questioned resolutions of the Secretary of Justice, but only on two (2) grounds, namely, lack of jurisdiction, and grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The power to reverse and set aside partakes of an appellate jurisdiction which the CA does not have over judgments of the Secretary of Justice exercising quasi-judicial functions. There is a whale of a difference between the CAs power of review in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction and its original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari as that filed by the respondent in CA-G.R. SP No. 74094. Certiorari power is limited to questions of jurisdiction and grave abuse of discretion only. Wisdom or error of judgment on the part of the Secretary of Justice in arriving at his conclusions of fact and law which is proper in an appeal cannot legitimately be the subject of review in
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because We happen to disagree with the conclusions of the Secretary of Justice. For here, We are not a trier of facts. That office properly belongs to the trial court, and all allegations pointing towards the exculpation of the petitioner are matters of evidence, which should be put forward during trial. PHILLIPS SEAFOOD CORP. v. BOARD OF INVESTMENTS GR 175787, FEBRUARY 4, 2009 FACTS: Phillips Seafood is registered with respondent Bureau of Investments (BOI) as an existing and expansion producer of soft shell crabs and other seafood products, on a non-pioneer status under Certificate of Registration No. EP 93-219. When Phillips relocated its plant to Roxas City, it filed with BOI an application for registration, which the latter granted. In effect, Petitioners Certificate of Registration No. EP 93219 was extended up to 12 August 2000, pursuant to Article 39 (a) (1) (ii) of Executive Order No. 226. Petitioner changed its corporate name from PS-Masbate to its current name of Phillips Seafood (Philippines) Corporation, which was approved by respondent BOI on 16 February 2001. In a letter dated 25 September 2003, respondent BOI informed petitioner that the ITH previously granted would be applicable only to the period from 13 August 1999 to 21 October 1999 or before petitioners transfer to a not less-developed area. Petitioner wrote respondent BOI requesting for a reconsideration of its decision. On 03 May 2004, petitioner received BOIs letter denying its motion for reconsideration. Petitioner elevated the matter to the Office of the President, which dismissed petitioners appeal on the ground of lack of jurisdiction in a Decision dated 22 September 2004. The Office of the President likewise denied petitioners motion for reconsideration in an Order dated 14 March 2005. Petitioner received a copy of the order on 01 April 2005. On 05 April 2005, petitioner filed a petition for review before the CA, questioning the dismissal of its appeal before the Office of the President. After respondent BOI filed its comment on the petition, petitioner filed an omnibus motion asking for leave to file an amended petition to counter the issues raised in the comment for the first time and to suspend the period for filing a reply. On 24 May 2006, the CA rendered the first assailed resolution denying petitioners omnibus motion and dismissing its petition for review. The appellate court denied petitioners omnibus motion on the ground that the same was filed with intent to delay the case. Simultaneously, the appellate court dismissed the petition for review for having been filed out of time as petitioner opted to appeal to the Office of the President instead of filing a Rule 43 petition to the CA within the reglementary period. ISSUE: W/N the CA err in denying the petition for review for having filed out of time? NO RULING: Indeed, under E.O. 226, when the action or decision pertains to either of these two instances: first, in the decisions of the BOI over controversies concerning the implementation of the relevant provisions of E.O No. 226 that may arise between
registered enterprises or investors and government agencies under Article 7; and second, in an action of the BOI over applications for the Office of the President is available. E.O. No. 226 contains no provision specifically governing the remedy of a party whose application for an ITH has been denied by the BOI in the same manner that Articles 7 and 36 thereof allow recourse to the Office of the President in certain instances. Nevertheless, Article 82 of E.O. No. 22 is the catch-all provision allowing the appeal to the courts from all other decisions of respondent BOI involving the other provisions of E.O. No. 226. The intendment of the law is undoubtedly to afford immediate judicial relief from the decision of respondent BOI, save in cases mentioned under Articles 7 and 36. In relation to Article 82, E.O. No. 226, Section 1 of Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure expressly includes respondent BOI as one of the quasi-judicial agencies whose judgments or final orders are appealable to the CA via a verified petition for review. Appeals from judgments and final orders of quasi-judicial agencies are now required to be brought to the CA on a verified petition for review, under the requirements and conditions in Rule 43 which was precisely formulated and adopted to provide for a uniform rule of appellate procedure for quasi-judicial agencies. Thus, petitioner should have immediately elevated to the CA the denial by respondent BOI of its application for an ITH. From the letter dated 09 October 2003 of respondent BOI, which informed petitioner that its ITH would be extended only from 13 August 1999 to 21 October 1999, petitioner appealed to the Office of the President, a recourse that is not sanctioned by either the Rules of Civil Procedure or by the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987. Petitioner cannot invoke Article 36 of E.O. No. 226 to justify its appeal to the Office of the President. Article 36, along with Article 7, which allows recourse to the Office of the President, applies to specific instances, namely, controversies between a registered enterprise and a government agency and decisions concerning the registration of an enterprise, respectively. Expresio unius est exclusio alterius. This enumeration is exclusive so that other controversies outside of its purview, including petitioners entitlement to an ITH, can invoke only the appellate judicial relief provided under Article 82. In the instant case, the denial of petitioners application for an ITH is not within the cases where the law expressly provides for appellate recourse to the Office of the President. That being the case, petitioner should have elevated its appeal to the CA under Rule 43. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN v. SAMANIEGO. G.R. NO. 175573 | SEPTEMBER 11, 2008 FACTS: Respondent Samaniego was the City Treasurer of Ligao City, Albay. On separate dates, the Commission on Audit (COA) filed two administrative complaints against Samaniego, for dishonesty and grave misconduct. In these administrative complaints, the COA alleged that respondent incurred shortages in his accountabilities for two separate periods. Respondent received letters of demand requiring him to explain his side and settle his accountabilities. Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon found respondent liable for grave misconduct because he failed to explain his side and settle his accountabilities. Via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 43 with a motion for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
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execution of the joint decision against him. Respondent's prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction (for purposes of staying the execution of the decision against him) was therefore a superfluity.
injunction in the CA, respondent assailed the joint decision of the Office of the Ombudsman insofar as it found him liable in one of the admin cases filed. His prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction was granted. Since it was not impleaded as a respondent, the Office of the Ombudsman filed a motion for intervention and to admit the attached motion to recall the writ of preliminary injunction. The motions were denied. The Office of the Ombudsman now claims that the CA erred in denying its right to intervene, considering that its joint decision was the subject of the appeal. It also asserts that the writ of preliminary injunction should be recalled. ISSUE: Whether writ of injunction was necessary to stay the execution of the order of the Ombudsman? RULING: NO. Under Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Ombudsman, as amended: Section 7. Finality and execution of decision. - xxx where the penalty imposed is public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one month, or a fine equivalent to one month salary, the decision shall be final, executory and unappealable. In all other cases, the decision may be appealed to the CA xxx An appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory. xxx. A literal reading of this rule shows that the mere filing of an appeal does not prevent the decision of the Ombudsman from becoming executory. However, we clarified this rule in Office of the Ombudsman v. Laja: [O]nly orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative cases imposing the penalty of public censure, reprimand, or suspension of not more than one month, or a fine not equivalent to one month salary shall be final and unappealable hence, immediately executory. In all other disciplinary cases where the penalty imposed is other than public censure, reprimand, or suspension of not more than one month, or a fine not equivalent to one month salary, the law gives the respondent the right to appeal. In these cases, the order, directive or decision becomes final and executory only after the lapse of the period to appeal if no appeal is perfected, or after the denial of the appeal from the said order, directive or decision. It is only then that execution shall perforce issue as a matter of right. The fact that the Ombudsman Act gives parties the right to appeal from its decisions should generally carry with it the stay of these decisions pending appeal. Otherwise, the essential nature of these judgments as being appealable would be rendered nugatory. The penalty meted out to respondent was suspension for one year without pay. He filed an appeal of the Ombudsman's joint decision on time. In his appeal, he included a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction in order to stay the execution of the decision against him. Following Office of the Ombudsman v. Laja, we hold that the mere filing by respondent of an appeal sufficed to stay the
RULE 45 APPEAL BY CERTIORARI TO THE SC AMA v. NACINO GR 162739, FEBRUARY 12, 2006 FACTS: Petitioner AMA Computer College employed Chelly P. Nacino as Online Coordinator of the college. One day, during inspection, the Human Resources Division Supervisor, Ms. San Pedro found Nacino absent from his post. San Pedro then issued a Memorandum requiring Nacino to explain his absence. Nacino filed with San Pedro a written explanation claiming that he had to rush home because he was suffering from LBM and that the facilities in the school were inadequate. Not satisfied with the explanation, San Pedro sought another explanation but Nacino furnished the same written explanation earlier submitted. San Pedro then filed a formal complaint against Nacino for false testimony, in addition to the charge of abandonment. The Investigating Committee found Nacino guilty as charged, and was subsequently dismissed from the service.
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Aggrieved, Nacino filed a complaint for Illegal Suspension and Termination before the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB). AMA's representative, signed the submission Agreement, accepting the jurisdiction of Voluntary Arbitrator Samaniego over the controversy. The parties agreed to settle the case amicably, with Nacino discharging and releasing AMA from all his claims in consideration of the sum of P7,719.81. The Decision embodying the Compromise was duly prepared and signed, but the check in payment of the consideration for the settlement had yet to be released. During the pendency of the case, Nacino died in an accident. The Voluntary Arbitrator ordered Nacino's reinstatement and the payment of his backwages and 13th month pay. He manifested that, due to AMA's failure to pay the sum of P7,719.81, Nacino withdrew from the Compromise Agreement. then issued a Writ of Execution upon motion of Nacino's surviving spouse. AMA filed a Motion to Quash the said Writ but the Voluntary Arbitrator allegedly refused to receive the same. Thus, the heirs of Nacino were able to garnish AMA's bank deposits in the amount of P52,021.70. AMA filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 before the CA. The CA dismissed the said petition because it was a wrong mode of review. It held that the proper remedy was an appeal by way of Rule 43. The CA held an erroneous appeal shall be dismissed outright pursuant to Section 2, Rule 50. MR was also denied. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: W/N the CA committed an error in dismissing the petition for certiorari under Rule 65. - NO RULING: The instant petition lacks merit. Pertinent is our ruling in Centro Escolar University Faculty v. CA where we held: We find that the CA did not err in holding that petitioner used a wrong remedy when it filed a special civil action on certiorari under Rule 65 instead of an appeal under Rule 43. The Court held that decisions of the voluntary arbitrator under the Labor Code are appealable to the CA. In that case, the Court observed that the Labor Code was silent as regards the appeals from the decisions of the voluntary arbitrator, unlike those of the Labor Arbiter which may be appealed to the NLRC. The Court noted, however, that the voluntary arbitrator is a government instrumentality within the contemplation of Section 9 of BP 129 which provides for the appellate jurisdiction of the CA. The decisions of the voluntary arbitrator are akin to those of the RTC, and, therefore, should first be appealed to the CA before being elevated to this Court. This is in furtherance and consistent with the original purpose of Circular No. 1-91 to provide a uniform procedure for the appellate review of adjudications of all quasi-judicial agencies not expressly excepted from the coverage of Section 9 of BP 129. We are not unmindful of instances when certiorari was granted despite the availability of appeal, such as (a) when public welfare and the advancement of
public policy dictates; (b) when the broader interest of justice so requires; (c) when the writs issued are null and void; or (d) when the questioned order amounts to an oppressive exercise of judicial authority. However, none of these recognized exceptions attends the case at bar. AMA has sadly failed to show circumstances that would justify a deviation from the general rule. While it is true that, a petition for certiorari may be treated as having been filed under Rule 45, the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner before the CA cannot be treated as such, without the exceptional circumstances mentioned above, because it was filed way beyond the 15-day reglementary period within which to file the Petition for Review. By parity of reasoning, the same reglementary period should apply to appeals taken from the decisions of Voluntary Arbitrators under Rule 43. The assailed Decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator had already become final and executory and beyond the purview of this Court to act upon. LATORRE V. LATORRE GR 183926, MARCH 29, 2010 FACTS: In October 2000, petitioner filed before the RTC of Muntinlupa City a Complaint for Collection and Declaration of Nullity of Deed of Absolute Sale with application for Injunction against her own son, herein respondent, and one Ifzal Ali. Petitioner alleged that respondent leased a parcel of land that they co-owned to Ifzal in Dasmarinas Village and that respondent declared that he is the sole owner of the said parcel of land. Respondent immediately filed a Motion to Dismiss on the sole ground that the venue of the case was improperly laid. He stressed that while the complaint was denominated as one for Collection and Declaration of Nullity of Deed of Absolute Sale with application for Injunction, in truth the case was a real action affecting title to and interest over the subject property. Since the subject property is located in Makati City, respondent argued that petitioner should have filed the case before the RTC of Makati City and not of Muntinlupa City. The RTC denied the Motion to Dismiss of the respondent on January 2, 2001. However, on April 28, 2008, the RTC dismissed the case for want of jurisdiction because the case should have been filed in RTC Makati. Petitioner filed an MR which was denied. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: W/N petitioners Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, in relation to Rule 41, of the Rules of Civil Procedure on alleged pure questions of law directly filed to the SC is the proper remedy in the case at bar. HELD: A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, while there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. Petitioner prayed to the Supreme Court to decide the case on the merits. To do so, however, would require the examination by this Court of the probative value of the evidence presented, taking into account the fact that the RTC failed to adjudicate this controversy on the merits. This, unfortunately, the Supreme Court cannot do. It thus becomes exceedingly clear that the filing of the case directly with the Supreme Court ran afoul of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. Pursuant to this doctrine, direct resort from the lower courts to the Supreme Court will not be entertained unless the appropriate remedy sought cannot be obtained in the lower tribunals. This Court is a court of last resort, and
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ISSUE: Whether petitioner should have been allowed to intervene even after the CA had promulgated its Decision. RULING: No. As a rule, intervention is allowed at any time before rendition of judgment by the trial court. After the lapse of this period, it will not be warranted anymore because intervention is not an independent action but is ancillary and supplemental to an existing litigation. The factors that should be reckoned in permitting or disallowing the same are whether intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties and whether the intervenors rights may be fully protected in a separate proceeding. Keeping these factors in mind, the courts have to give much consideration to the fact that actions for ejectment are designed to summarily restore physical possession to one who has been illegally deprived of such possession. It is primarily a quieting process intended to provide an expeditious manner for protecting possession or right to possession without involvement of the title. Petitioner's intervention in the ejectment case would not result in a complete adjudication of her rights. The issue raised by petitioner is mainly that of ownership, claiming that the property in dispute was registered and titled in the name of respondents through the use of fraud. Such issue cannot even be properly threshed out in an action for ejectment. A just and complete determination of petitioner's rights could actually be had in the action for annulment, revocation and reconveyance of title that she had previously filed, not in the instant action for ejectment. It is likewise for this reason that petitioner is not an indispensable party in the instant case. The records bear out that the disputed property is in the possession of Spouses Fernandez. Even petitioner does not allege that she was in the possession of subject premises prior to or during the commencement of the ejectment proceedings. Since her claim of ownership cannot be properly adjudicated in said action, she is, therefore, not an indispensable party therein. ISSUE: W/N the CA committed grave abuse of discretion to include her in its decision because she is not a party to the ejectment case. RULING: No. Note that the MeTC, RTC, and the CA unanimously found that the disputed property is presently registered under the Torrens System in the name of respondents. The lower courts then concluded that respondents presented the best proof to establish the right to possess the same. It should be borne in mind that unless the case falls under one of the recognized exceptions, to wit:(1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the CA went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are
must so remain if it is to satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to it by the Constitution and by immemorial tradition. SALANDANAN VS. SPS. ISABEL AND BAYANIMENDEZ GR 160280, MARCH 13, 2009 FACTS: The case stemmed from a complaint for ejectment instituted by respondents against Spouses Fernandez before the MeTC. In their Complaint, respondents alleged that they are the owners of the subject property. A letter of demand to vacate the subject property was already sent to Spouses Fernandez but they refused to vacate the same. In their Answer, Spouses Fernandez denied the allegations of the complaint and averred that Spouses Pablo and Sofia Salandanan (Spouses Salandanan) are the registered owners of the subject property. Delfin Fernandez (Delfin) is the nearest of kin of Pablo Salandanan being the nephew of the latter. Delfin has continuously occupied the said property since time immemorial with the permission of Spouses Salandanan. MeTC rendered its decision in favor of respondents and against Spouses Fernandez. Spouses Fernandez appealed to the RTC. RTC promulgated its Decision affirming the decision of the MeTC of Manila. Spouses Fernandez filed before the CA a petition for review.CA rendered its Decision affirming intoto the decision of the RTC and ordered Spouses Fernandez and all persons claiming rights under them including petitioner to vacate the premise.CA further ruled nowhere in any pleadings of petitioners submitted below could it find any allegations to the effect that their possession of the disputed premises sprung from their claim of ownership over the same nor, at the very least, that they are in possession of any document that would support their entitlement to enjoy the disputed premises.Petitioners plainly have no basis to insist that they have a better right to possess the premises over respondents who have a Torrens Title over the same. Spouses Fernandez filed their motion for reconsideration.Sofia Salandanan (petitioner) filed a Motion for Clarification and Intervention and attached a Motion for Reconsideration.In her motion for clarification and intervention, she alleged that she and her deceased spouse are the real owners of the subject property and that she was not a party to the case for ejectment and did not receive any notice therefrom. Petitioner further claims that sometime in 1999, respondents went to their house and showed certain papers purportedly copies of a special power of attorney but which turned out to be a deed of donation involving the subject property and that by virtue of the said donation, respondents were able to register the subject properties in their name. Petitioner prayed that she be allowed to intervene in the appeal and that the attached motion for reconsideration be admitted.CA denied the motion for reconsideration filed by Spouses Fernandez and petitioners motion for clarification and intervention, for lack of merit.
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contrary to the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; and (11) when the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.factual findings of the trial court are conclusive on the parties and not reviewable by this Court, more so when the CA affirms the factual findings of the trial court. This case does not fall under any of the exceptions, thus, the factual finding of the lower courts, that the new registered owners of the subject premises are respondents, must be respected and upheld by this Court.Petitioner's ownership not having been fully established in this case, she cannot, therefore, claim that the lower court's decision divesting the Spouses Fernandez of possession should not apply to her. Of particular significance is the fact that in Spouses Fernandez's Answer, they never alleged that petitioner was in actual possession of the disputed property. In fact, in said Answer, they stated that it was Delfin Fernandez, Jr. who has continuously occupied the premises since time immemorial and that petitioner resides in her house in Dasmarias, Cavite. In the petition for review dated April 3, 2003 filed with the CA, Spouses Fernandez admitted that it was only after the RTC issued its Order dated February 10, 2003, denying the motion for reconsideration of the Order for issuance of the writ of execution, that petitioner took possession of the subject premises.Taking the foregoing into account, it is clear that petitioner, even though a non-party, is bound by the judgment because aside from being a relative of or privy to Spouses Fernandez, she is also acting as their agent when she occupied the property after the RTC ordered execution pending appeal in order to frustrate the judgment. ASIAN CONSTRUCTION & DEVELOPMENT CORP. vs. TULABUT GR 161904, APRIL 26, 2005 FACTS: In January 1998, petitioner Asian Construction and Development Corporation (ACDC) was awarded the development of the Philippine Centennial Exposition (Theme Park Project) at Clarkfield, Pampanga. Subsequently, in February 1998, the petitioner ACDC contracted the services of respondent Noel T. Tulabut, doing business under the name and style of N.T. Tulabut Construction Supply. The latter was to supply labor, materials, tools, equipment and supervision for other necessary works for the construction of two cafeterias, two fast food take-out stands and a snack stand, all located at the Food Plaza of the project site. Subsequently, the petitioner again contracted the services of the respondent for the construction of two additional cafeterias via Purchase Order (P.O.) No. 73-985, the net cost of which amounted to P400,000.75. In partial payment of the project, the petitioner drew and issued a Land Bank Check and delivered the same to the respondent. However, the said check was dishonored upon its presentment for payment on the ground that it was drawn against insufficient funds. The respondent was able to complete the project and turned the same over to the petitioner. The total amount due as of the final billing dated November 26, 1998 was P486,409.45. However, despite the respondents written demand for payment, the petitioner failed to settle the balance of its obligation.
The respondent then filed a complaint for collection against the petitioner with the RTC of San Fernando, Pampanga. RTC ruled in favor of Respondent. The petitioner appealed to the CA. The CA rendered judgment dismissing the appeal and affirming the appealed decision with modification. The CA ruled that the petitioner was estopped from denying liability for the respondents claims since its officers had approved the pertinent purchase orders and billings. The appellate court also held that the petitioner failed to prove that it was a common practice in the construction industry for the subcontractor to pay the retention billings only upon the main contractors issuance of a certificate of completion of the projects agreed upon. ISSUE: W/N the CA erred in affirming the ruling of the TC? RULING: The petition is barren of merit. The petitioner admits that the issues on appeal are factual. Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only questions of law may be raised, for the simple reason that the Court is not a trier of facts. The findings of the trial court as affirmed by the CA are conclusive on this Court, absent proof of any of the recognized exceptional circumstances such as: (1) the conclusion is grounded on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (2) the inference is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) there is no citation of specific evidence on which the factual findings are based; (7) the finding of absence of facts is contradicted by the presence of evidence on record; (8) the findings of the CA are contrary to those of the trial court; (9) the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant and undisputed facts that, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion; (10) the findings of the CA are beyond the issues of the case; and (11) the findings are contrary to the admissions of both parties. These exclusions notwithstanding, we find no compelling reason to treat the instant case as falling under any of the aforementioned exceptional circumstances. The trial court concluded that the respondent had completed the project and that the project had been approved and accepted by the petitioner, sans any plaint. The petitioner even made partial payment in the amount of P125,571.81 after the complaint was filed against it in the trial court. In affirming the findings of the trial court, the CA ratiocinated as follows: It should be noted that there existed a contract between the plaintiff-appellee and the defendant-appellant and the same was expressed in the purchase orders and final billings which bear the signatures of the officers of the appellant corporation. This fact is not disputed by the appellant corporation. While defendant-appellant argues that the project has not been completed, it did not deny the aforesaid purchase orders and final billings as well as the authority of the persons whose signatures appeared thereon who made the approval thereto, to act and sign in behalf of the appellant corporation. It is also significant to note that the amount for which the appellant corporation is liable, is clearly stated therein which bears the signatures of the officers of the appellant corporation. Thus, it cannot escape its pecuniary obligation by merely denying the completion of the project because by
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signing the aforesaid purchase orders and progress billings, the appellant corporation manifested its approval to the matters stated therein and it is thereby precluded to deny it subsequently by principle of estoppel.
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