3) [G.R. No. 112172.

November 20, 2000] 1st division PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY, RICARDO PEA AND RAMON AURELLANO, JR., petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. OMAR U. AMIN, in his capacity as PRESIDING JUDGE, Branch 135, Regional Trial Court of Makati, and BERNARDO DE LEON, respondents. DECISION PARDO, J.: The case is an appeal via certiorari from the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that of the Regional Trial Court, Makati, Branch 135 ruling that the respondent Bernardo de Leon has a legal right to the peaceful possession of Lot 5155 merely because he has a cadastral map issued in 1962 and a certification that Lot 5155 was alienable and disposable, plus tax declaration thereon.[1] The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, are as follows: The Public Estates Authority (PEA) claims that Lot No. 5155 used to be under water and was part of the salvage zone until it was reclaimed by the PEA in November of 1982; that in 1989 PEA built its field office inside Lot No. 5155 when it started the construction of the R-1 Toll Expressway, which is part of the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road Reclamation Project; that on December 22, 1992, Bernardo de Leon started building two (2) bunkhouses inside Lot No. 5155 and fencing a portion thereof; that when Ramon Aurellano, Jr., who is the project engineer of the PEA, confronted de Leon the latter stated that he had the blessings of the PEA management; that on December 26, 1992, Ricardo Pea, project manager of the PEA, noticed that de Leon had put up concrete posts around a portion of Lot No. 5155; that on December 27, 1992 Pea instructed the security guards of PEA to guard Lot No. 5155 to stop de Leon from further construction activities; and that in the first week of January, 1993 de Leon was able to finish the two (2) bunkhouses and a fence made of concrete posts with barbed wire. Bernardo de Leon claims, on the other hand, that during the lifetime of his father Faustino P. de Leon and for a period of at least fifty (50) years the latter had been in possession of Lot No. 5155; that no one ever disputed or disturbed the possession of his father over the said parcel of land; that after his father died in 1984, he and his brothers and sisters took over the possession of the property and fenced it with wooden posts and barbed wire; that in the middle of 1989 he fenced the entire area of Lot No. 5155 except the southern portion thereof which is occupied by the field office of the PEA and the yard of a certain Calixto; and that in the third week of December, 1989 he finished the fencing and the construction of two (2) houses inside the lot. De Leon further claims that in the morning of December 27, 1992 he met Raymundo Orpilla, the Detachment Commander of the security agency MASADA which had been hired by the PEA to guard its property; that Orpilla gave him a copy of a directive dated December 27, 1992 issued by the PEA directing Orpilla to stop the construction activities of de Leon inside Lot No. 5155; that after receiving the directive, de Leon gave Orpilla his documents showing that his parents Faustino de Leon and Anita Lorenzana are the claimants to Lot No. 5155; that inspite this, Orpilla gave de Leon in the afternoon of January 10, 1993 a notice giving the latter four (4) days from receipt thereof to vacate Lot No. 5155; that in that same afternoon, de Leon called Orpilla's attention to his letter of December 27, 1992 and submitted another set of documents to prove his right to Lot No. 5155; and that de Leon consulted a lawyer who advised him not to vacate the property. De Leon also states that in the morning of January 14, 1993 while he was away attending a hearing at the Department of Labor in Manila some twenty (20) security guards headed by Orpilla, fully armed with handguns, entered Lot No. 5155 and after driving away the workers of respondent de Leon from the houses, demolished and destroyed the two (2) houses and the fence surrounding the lot; that, unaware of what had happened that morning, de Leon went with his lawyer to the latters office after coming from the Department of Labor and his counsel prepared a letter addressed to the PEA informing it of the claim of de Leon to the property and advising it not to demolish the structures built by de Leon; that when de Leon returned to the lot, he saw that the houses and the fence had all been razed to the ground but he nevertheless served copies of the letter prepared by his lawyer to Pea and Orpilla. The following day, January 15, 1993, Bernardo de Leon went to the Regional Trial Court of Makati and filed a complaint for damages with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, naming as defendants the Public Estates Authority, its project manager Ricardo Pea, and its project engineer Ramon 1

Aurellano, Jr. The complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 93-143 in the Regional Trial Court of Makati (Br. 135). On January 18, 1993, the court issued a temporary restraining order to maintain the status quo, restraining the defendants from disturbing by means of force and intimidation the lawful and peaceful possession of the plaintiff over Lot No. 5155 and from destroying and/or removing whatever other improvements have been constructed thereon, until after the hearing of the petition for preliminary injunction which was set for January 22, 1993. After the hearing of the said petition as scheduled, the court issued an Order dated February 8, 1993, the pertinent portions of which are hereunder quoted: After a careful consideration of the evidence presented and without going into the actual merits of the case, this Court finds that plaintiff has duly established by preponderance of evidence that he has a legal right over the subject matter of the instant case and is entitled to the injunctive relief demanded for and may suffer irreparable damage or injury if such right is not protected by law (Rules 58, Section 3 of the Revised). Premises considered, upon plaintiffs filing of a bond in the amount of P500,000.00, let a writ of preliminary injuction be issued against the defendants, their agents, representatives and other persons acting for and in their behalf are hereby enjoined from disturbing the peaceful possession of plaintiff and his co-owners over Lot 5155 and further, from destroying and/or removing whatever other improvements thereon constructed, until further orders of this Court. On March 1993, the Public Estate Authority, Ricardo Pea and Ramon Aurellano, Jr. filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari with restraining order.[2] On September 30, 1993, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision dismissing the petition.[3] Hence, this appeal.[4] The issue raised is whether respondent and his brothers and sisters were lawful owners and possessors of Lot 5155 by mere claim of ownership by possession for a period of at least fifty (50) years. The Court of Appeals ruled that respondent Bernardo de Leon and his brothers and sisters were lawful owners and possessors of Lot 5155 entitled to protection by injunction against anyone disturbing their peaceful possession of said Lot. The ruling is erroneous. An applicant seeking to establish ownership of land must conclusively show that he is the owner in fee simple,[5] for the standing presumption is that all lands belong to the public domain of the State, unless acquired from the Government either by purchase or by grant, except lands possessed by an occupant and his predecessors since time immemorial, for such possession would justify the presumption that the land had never been part of the public domain, or that it had been private property even before the Spanish conquest.[6] In this case, the land in question is admittedly public. The respondent Bernardo de Leon has no title thereto at all. His claim of ownership is based on mere possession by himself and his predecessors-ininterests, who claim to have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the land in question, under a bona fide claim of ownership for a period of at least fifty (50) years. However, the survey plan for the land was approved only in 1992, and respondent paid the realty taxes thereon on October 30, 1992, shortly before the filing of the suit below for damages with injunction. Hence, respondent must be deemed to begin asserting his adverse claim to Lot 5155 only in 1992. More, Lot 5155 was certified as alienable and disposable on March 27, 1972, per certificate of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources. It is obvious that respondent's possession has not ripened into ownership.[7] In other words, no public land can be acquired by private persons without any grant, express or implied from the government; it is indispensable that there be a showing of a title from the state.[8] On the other hand, one claiming private rights must prove that he has complied with C.A. No. 141, as amended, otherwise known as the Public Land Act, which prescribed the substantive as well as the procedural requirements for acquisition of public lands.[9] Under the public land act, judicial confirmation of imperfect title required possession en concepto de dueo since time immemorial, or since July 26, 1894.[10] Under C.A. No. 141, this requirement was retained.[11] However, on June 22, 1957, Republic Act No. 1942 was enacted amending C.A. No. 141. This later enactment required adverse possession for a period of only thirty (30) years.[12] On January 25, 2

1977, the President enacted P. D. No. 1073,[13] further amending C.A. No. 141, extending the period for filing applications for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles to December 31, 1987. Under this decree, the provisions of Section 48 (b) and Section 48 (c), Chapter VIII, of the Public Land Act are hereby amended in the sense that these provisions shall apply only to alienable and disposable land of the public domain which have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation by the applicant himself or thru his predecessor-in-interest under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945.[14] What is more, Under the Public Land Act as amended, only titles to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain may be judicially confirmed. Unless a public land is reclassified and declared as such, occupation thereof in the concept of owner, no matter how long ago, cannot confer ownership or possessory rights.[15] Consequently, respondent de Leon has no clear legal right to the lot in question, and a writ of injunction will not lie to protect such nebulous right of possession.[16] Yet, the trial court issued a writ of preliminary injunction against petitioners not to disturb the peaceful possession of respondent and his co-owners over Lot 5155.[17] And the Court of Appeals affirmed this ruling.[18] Two requisites are necessary if a preliminary injunction is to issue, namely: (1) the existence of a right to be protected and (2) the facts against which the injunction is to be directed are violative of said rights.[19] None of the above requisites exists in the case at bar. On the other hand, it is not disputed that there is a government infrastructure project in progress traversing Lot 5155, which has been enjoined by the writ of injunction issued by the trial court. WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 30630, and DISMISSES the complaint in Civil Case No. 93-143 of the Regional Trial Court, Makati. No costs. SO ORDERED. Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Kapunan, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur. 5) THIRD DIVISION G.R. No. 125797. February 15, 2002] DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT and NATURAL RESOURCES (DENR), Region VIII, Tacloban City, Represented by Regional Executive Director Israel C. Gaddi, petitioner, vs. GREGORIO DARAMAN, NARCISO LUCENECIO and Hon. CLEMENTE C. ROSALES, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 32, Calbayog City, respondents. DECISION PANGANIBAN, J.: Under the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines, particularly Section 68-A, the Department of Environment and Natural Resources secretary or a duly authorized representative may order the confiscation in favor of the government of, among others, the vehicles used in the commission of offenses punishable by the said Code. The Case Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the December 6, 1995 Decision[1] and the June 3, 1996 Order[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Calbayog City (Branch 32) in Criminal Case No. 1958. The assailed Decision disposed as follows: WHEREFORE, for insufficiency of evidence, the Court hereby declares accused GREGORIO DARAMAN and NARCISO LUCENECIO acquitted of the crime charged, with costs de [o]ficio. The bond of the accused is hereby cancelled. The court hereby orders the CENR Officer of Samar, or any DENR employee who is taking custody of the Holy Cross Funeral Services vehicle St. Jude, with Plate No. HAJ-848, to return the said vehicle to the owner thereof.[3] The assailed Order denied the Motion for Reconsideration challenging the last paragraph of the Decision regarding the return of the subject vehicle to herein respondents. The Facts In the assailed Decision, the trial court summarized the facts of this case as follows: 3

The accused herein Gregorio Daraman and Narciso Lucenecio are charged [with] violation of Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705 as amended by Executive Order No. 277 in an information which is quoted herein below: That on or about the 30th day of November, 1993, at about 1:00 oclock in the afternoon, at Barangay Bulao, Municipality of San Jorge, Province of Samar, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping one another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously gather, collect and possess seventy two (72) pieces of assorted sizes of lumber, with a total volume of 72.93 board feet valued at SEVEN HUNDRED TWENTY NINE PESOS (P729.30) and THIRTY CENTAVOS, without first securing and obtaining any permit or licensetherefor from the proper authorities, thus Violating Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705, as amended and further Amended by Executive Order No. 277, series of 1989. CONTRARY TO LAW. Assisted by their counsels, the accused were arraigned and they entered the plea of not guilty. Thereafter trial was conducted. The prosecution presented Pablo Opinion who testified as follows: That he is an employee of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources as a Forest Ranger. On November 30, 1993 at about 1:00 oclock in the afternoon, while he was in his house in Brgy. Bulao, San Jorge, Samar, a vehicle named St. Jude with Plate No. HAJ-848 coming from barangay Blanca Aurora passed by. He stopped the said vehicle and found some lumber of assorted sizes [and] wood shavings inside. The lumber consisted of 62 pieces of 1 x 2 x 4, 16 pieces of 1 x 24 x 2.3 and 1 piece of 1 x 2 x 4. In his estimate at the price of P10.00 per board foot the total value of the lumber would be P729.30. He asked the driver for [the] owner of the lumber and he was informed that it was a certain Asan of Brgy. Blanca Aurora. The driver also informed him that the vehicle was owned by his employer, Narciso Lucenecio of the Holy Cross Funeral Services in Calbayog City. He then took hold of the vehicle and the assorted lumber and, thereafter, he issued a Seizure Receipt marked as Exhs. B and series. He also took photographs of the lumber which are now marked as Exhs. C and series. Besides, he signed a Joint Affidavit with Oligario Mabansag, also a Forest Ranger. When he asked the driver Gregorio Daraman for some papers for the assorted lumber, the latter replied that he had none because they were not his. Daraman further told him that [they] went to Brgy. Blanca Aurora to secure some wood shavings from the furniture shop owned by Asan and Asan merely asked him a favor of loading his assorted lumbers in the vehicle of the Holy Cross Funeral Services to be brought to his (Asans) house in Barangay Abrero, Calbayog City. The prosecution has still another witness in the person of Oligario Mabansag, but both the prosecution and the defense agreed to dispense with his testimony considering that the case would be merely corroborative [of] those already offered by Pablo Opinion. The prosecution rested its case with the admission of Exhs. A and B and their series. Its Exhs. C and series were rejected because the photographer who took them did not testify to identify [them]. For the defense, only accused Gregorio Daraman testified because his co-accused would merely offer corroborative testimony. From his testimony, the following facts have been established: That on November 30, 1993 in the afternoon his employer Baby Lucenecio instructed him to procure some wood shavings (sinapyo) in San Jorge, Samar. He used the service vehicle of the Holy Cross Funeral Services. His companion[s] were Melio Bedoya, Fanny Fiel and Ragi Mabutol. They went to barangay Blanca Aurora, San Jorge, Samar and thereat, they got some wood shavings from the furniture shop owned by a certain Asan Abing. They loaded 20 sacks of wood shavings, each sack measuring 22 inches in height by 32 1/2 inches in circumference as he demonstrated in court. The wood shavings [were] being used by the Holy Cross Funeral Services as cushions in the coffin. After the 20 sacks of wood shavings were loaded, Asan Abing asked him a favor to bring his (Asan) assorted lumber to his house in Brgy. Obrero, Calbayog City where the Holy Cross Funeral Services [was] also located. Asan himself personally loaded his assorted lumber into the vehicle. The subject assorted lumber were already in the furniture shop where they got the wood shavings. On their way home as they passed by Brgy.Bulao, Pablo Opinion stopped him and took the wood shavings. Opinion also inquired about the assorted lumber and he told him that they were owned by Asan, owner of the furniture shop in Brgy. Blanca Aurora, who loaded 4

them in his vehicle to be brought to his (Asans) house in Barangay Obrero, Calbayog City. He told Opinion also that Asan advised him that if somebody would [ask] about his lumber, just to tell the person that Asan had the papers for the lumber with him in his furniture shop at Brgy. Blanca Aurora, San Jorge, Samar. Pablo Opinion, however, did not take his word and he instead impounded the vehicle together with the assorted lumber. At about 5:00 oclock in the afternoon, the vehicle was still not returned to him and so Gregorio Daraman left and returned to his employer at Brgy.Obrero, Calbayog City and told the latter about what happened.[4] After trial, the RTC acquitted both accused and ordered the return of the disputed vehicle to Lucenecio. Prior to these court proceedings, the Department of Environment and Natural Resources-Community and Environment and Natural Resources Office (DENR-CENRO) of Catbalogan, Samar conducted administrative confiscation proceedings on the seized lumber and vehicle in the presence of private respondents.[5] The two failed to present documents to show the legality of their possession and transportation of the lumber seized. Hence, CENRO Officer Marciano T. Talavera recommended to the Regional Executive Director (RED) the final confiscation of the seized lumber and conveyance.[6] Atty. Pastor C. Salazar filed a Memorandum dated January 26, 1994, concurring with the recommendation to forfeit the lumber and the vehicle seized from private respondents. The Memorandum was approved by RED Augustus L. Momongan and Arty.Fiel I. Marmita, chief of the Legal Division of the DENR, Region VIII, Tacloban City.[7] Atty. Rogelio G. Bato Jr. of DENR, Region 8, Tacloban City, moved for the reconsideration of the assailed Decision, only insofar as it ordered the return of the said vehicle to the owner thereof. [8] He contended that the vehicle had already been administratively confiscated by the DENR on December 2, 1993, and that the RED approved its forfeiture on January 26, 1994.[9] He further claimed that the DENR had exclusive jurisdiction over the conveyance, which had been used in violation of the Revised Forestry Code pursuant to Section 68-A of PD 705, as amended by EO 277. The trial court denied the Motion via the assailed Order. Ruling of the Trial Court The trial court acquitted private respondents for insufficiency of evidence. The unrebutted testimony of Respondent Daraman was that, in exchange for the wood shavings from Asan, the former agreed to take the lumber to the latters house in Calbayog City, where the Holy Cross Funeral Services office was also located. Asan advised Daraman to reply, when asked, that the papers showing the authorization for the lumber were in the formers shop in Barangay Blanca Aurora. Finding the evidence against Respondent Lucenecio to be likewise insufficient, the RTC considered the vehicle as an effect of the crime and ordered its delivery to him. In the challenged Order, the trial court ruled that the Motion for Reconsideration was untenable on procedural and substantive grounds. Since Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Feliciano Aguilar did not sign the Motion, the RTC deemed his silence a sign of his disapproval of the Motion. Substantively, the trial court ruled: x x x [T]he Court finds the motion still wanting in merits considering that as found by the Court the owner of the vehicle in question, St. Jude, which is the Holy Cross Funeral Parlor owned by accused Narciso Lucenecio, did not commit any violation of P.D. 705. Likewise, the prosecution failed to sufficiently establish that accused Gregorio Daraman had taken or kept control of the lumber subject of the motion which would thereby demonstrate that he had x x x possession of the subject forest products. Instead, as established by the evidence it was a certain Asan who owned the subject lumber. xxx. xxx xxx xxx The decision of the Court has never been brought on appeal, thereby the same has long become final and executory. Again, as shown by the evidence in the alleged confiscation proceedings conducted by the OIC DENR Officer Marciano Talavera of Samar on December 2, 1992, the lumber in question [was] found to be owned by Asan Abing. But notwithstanding this fact, for reasons not known to the Court, the said Asan Abing was never made an accused in the present case. Sec. 68-1 of P.D. 705 contemplates a situation where the owner of the vehicle is himself a violator of P.D. 705 or has been found to have conspired with any other persons who committed the violation of Sec. 68 of P.D. 705 or consented to the use of his vehicle in violating the said law. In the present case as shown by the 5

evidence, neither the Holy Cross Funeral Parlor or its owner accused Narciso Lucenecio has committed a violation of P.D. 705 as already declared by the Court in its decision of December 6, 1995 nor the driver, accused Gregorio Daraman. In fact both were declared acquitted of the violation charged, and the decision has not been appealed.[10] Hence, this Petition.[11] Issues In its Memorandum, petitioner raises the following issues for the Courts consideration: (A) Regional Trial Courts have no jurisdiction and/or authority to order x x x the return of property already owned by the government. (B) Respondent judge utterly disregarded and/or misinterpreted the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 705, as amended by Executive Order No. 277, otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines. (C) The government is not estopped from protecting its interest by reason of mistake, error or failure of its officers to perform their duties.[12] Stated simply, the issues are: (1) whether the RTC had jurisdiction to release the confiscated vehicle; (2) whether the trial court misconstrued PD 705, as amended; and (3) whether, as a result of its filing of the criminal action, petitioner is estopped from confiscating the vehicle administratively. The Courts Ruling The Petition is meritorious. First Issue: Jurisdiction to Order Return of Vehicle Petitioner contends that the RTC overstepped its jurisdiction when it ordered the return of the disputed vehicle, because the vehicle had already become government property by virtue of the forfeiture Order issued by DENR on January 26, 1994. The DENR secretary or his duly authorized representative, under Section 68-A of PD 705 as amended by EO 277, may order the confiscation and disposition of all conveyances -- by land, water or air -- used in illegally cutting, gathering, removing, possessing or abandoning forest products. We agree. Jurisdiction is conferred by substantive law.[13] A comparison of the provisions of the two relevant sections of PD 705, as amended, shows that the jurisdiction of the RTC covers the confiscation of the timber or forest products as well as the machinery, equipment, implements and tools illegally used in the area where the timber or forest products are found; it is the DENR that has jurisdiction over the confiscation of forest products and, to stress, all conveyances used in the commission of the offense. Section 68 reads: Section 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber, or Other Forest Products Without License. -- Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land, without any authority, or possess timber or other forest products without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code: x x x. The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the timber or any forest products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or possessed, as well as the machinery, equipment, implements and tools illegally used in the area where the timber or forest products are found.[14] Section 68-A, in contrast, provides: SEC. 68-A. Administrative Authority of the Department Head or His Duly Authorized Representative to Order Confiscation. -- In all cases of violations of this Code or other forest laws rules and regulations, the Department Head or his duly authorized representative, may order the confiscation of any forest products illegally cut, gathered, removed, or possessed or abandoned, and all conveyances used either by land, water or air in the commission of the offense and to dispose of the same in accordance with pertinent laws, regulations or policies on the matter.[15] If a statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be understood in its literal meaning and applied without resort to interpretation, on the presumption that its wording correctly expresses its intent or will. The courts may not construe it differently.[16] 6

Machinery is a collective term for machines and appliances used in the industrial arts;[17] equipment covers physical facilities available for production, including buildings, machineries and tools;[18] and implements pertains to whatever may supply a want, especially an instrument, tool or utensil.[19] These terms do not include conveyances that are specifically covered by Section 68-A. The implementing guidelines of Section 68-A define conveyance in a manner that includes any type or class of vehicle, craft, whether motorized or not, used either in land, water or air, or a combination thereof or any mode of transport used in the movement of any forest product.[20] Hence, the original and exclusive jurisdiction over the confiscation of all conveyances used either by land, water or air in the commission of the offense and to dispose of the same is vested in the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) secretary or a duly authorized representative. The DENR secretary has supervision and control over the enforcement of forestry, reforestation, parks, game and wildlife laws, rules and regulations.[21] To implement Section 68-A, DENR promulgated Administrative Order (AO) No. 54-93, amending Department Administrative Order (DAO) No. 59-90. AO 54-93 provides the guidelines for the confiscation, forfeiture and disposition of conveyances used in violation of forestry laws, rules and regulations. Even the Information filed in Criminal Case No. 1958 limited the acts attributed to private respondents to willfully, unlawfully and feloniously gather, collect and possess seventy two (72) pieces of assorted sizes of lumber, x x x without first securing and obtaining any permit or licensetherefor from the proper authorities, x x x. The Information did not contain any allegation pertaining to the transportation or conveyance of illegally cut, gathered, possessed or abandoned lumber in violation of Section 68-A of PD 705, as amended. Confiscation Without Due Process Private respondents main defense is that the Order of Forfeiture (Annex C) is a false, falsified and perjurious document. The Order was attached to and made part of the record only when petitioner filed its Motion for Reconsideration dated February 6, 1996, or only after the trial court rendered the assailed Decision. Petitioner made it appear, according to the private respondents, that RED Momongan had approved the Memorandum on January 26, 1994. This does not appear to be true because Atty. Marmita, officer-in-charge (OIC) of the DENR Legal Division of Tacloban City, signed the Memorandum recommending approval only on January 31, 1994. Further, on April 6, 1995, Judge Rosales of the RTC of Calbayog City (Branch 32) ordered the provincial environment and natural resources officer to transfer the confiscated vehicle and pieces of lumber in connection with the prosecution of Criminal Case 1958.[22] Reynaldo R.Villafuerte, OIC of the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO), replied that his office could not deliver the vehicle because it was not in running condition.[23] We are not persuaded. The validity and legality of the Order of Forfeiture falls outside the ambit of the review of the assailed Decision and Order. The basis for the assailed Order to release the vehicle was private respondents acquittal of the charge of violating Section 68. On the other hand, the forfeiture Order issued by the DENR was based on Section 68-A, which involved a distinct and separate matter cognizable by it. Petitioner is questioning only the RTCs jurisdiction over the assailed Order to release the confiscated vehicle. Private respondents have not appealed the DENRs Order of Forfeiture, the validity of which can thus be presumed.[24] The genuineness of the Order and its proper service upon them are factual issues that will not be dwelt upon by this Court, which is not a trier of facts.[25] The jurisdiction of this Court, under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Court, is in the main limited to reviewing legal errors committed by a lower court.[26] Under PD 705, the actions and the decisions of the DENR are reviewable by the courts only through special civil actions for certiorari or prohibition.[27] Second Issue: Construing PD 705, as Amended Petitioner alleges that the RTC misinterpreted the law when it held that Section 68-A, PD 705 contemplated a situation in which the very owner of the vehicle was the violator or was a conspirator with other violators of that law. Department Order No. 54, Series of 1993, provides that the proceedings for the confiscation and the forfeiture of the conveyance shall be directed against its owner, and that lack of knowledge of its illegal use shall not bar its forfeiture. 7

In the present Petition, the trial court ruled in the assailed Order that Section 68-A of PD 705 contemplated a situation in which the very owner of the vehicle violated this law or conspired with other persons who violated it or consented to the use of his or her vehicle in violating it. Respondents Lucenecio and Daraman were not shown to have violated PD 705, and their acquittals were not appealed. We side with petitioner. The guilt or the innocence of the accused in the criminal case is immaterial, because what is punished under Section 68 is the transportation, movement or conveyance of forest products without legal documents. The DENR secretary or the authorized representatives do not possess criminal jurisdiction; thus, they are not capable of making such a ruling, which is properly a function of the courts. Even Section 68-A of PD 705, as amended, does not clothe petitioner with that authority. Conversely, the same law takes out of the general jurisdiction of the regional trial courts the confiscation of conveyances used in violation of forestry laws. Hence, we cannot expect the DENR to rule on the criminal liability of the accused before it impounds such vehicles. Section 68-A covers only the movement of lumber or forest products without proper documents. Where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the law is applied according to its express terms, and interpretation is resorted to only where a literal interpretation would lead to either an absurdity or an injustice.[28] We also uphold petitioners argument that the release of the vehicle to private respondents would defeat the purpose and undermine the implementation of forestry laws. The preamble of the amendment in EO 277 underscores the urgency to conserve the remaining forest resources of the country for the benefit of the present and future generations. Our forest resources may be effectively conserved and protected only through the vigilant enforcement and implementation of our forestry laws.[29] Strong paramount public policy should not be degraded by narrow constructions of the law that frustrate its clear intent or unreasonably restrict its scope.[30] Third Issue: Estoppel In view of the foregoing, it becomes unnecessary for this Court to resolve petitioners third issue. It is no longer material to rule on whether it was erroneous for the RTC to hold that the assistant provincial prosecutors failure to comment on petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was an implied disapproval thereof. The public prosecutors disapproval does not vest in the trial court the jurisdiction or authority to release the vehicle to private respondents. WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision and Order are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. No costs. SO ORDERED. Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio, JJ., concur. 11) FIRST DIVISION [G.R. No. 155450, August 06, 2008] REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES REPRESENTED BY THE REGIONAL EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, REGIONAL OFFICE NO. 2, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS OF ANTONIO CARAG AND VICTORIA TURINGAN, THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF CAGAYAN, AND THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF CAGAYAN, RESPONDENTS. DECISION CARPIO, J.: The Case

This is a petition for review[1] of the 21 May 2001[2] and 25 September 2002[3]Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 47965. The 21 May 2001 Resolution dismissed petitioner Republic of the Philippines' (petitioner) amended complaint for reversion, annulment of decree, cancellation and declaration of nullity of titles. The 25 September 2002 Resolution denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration. The Facts On 2 June 1930, the then Court of First Instance of Cagayan (trial court) issued Decree No. 381928 [4] in favor of spouses Antonio Carag and Victoria Turingan (spouses Carag), predecessors-in-interest of private respondents Heirs of Antonio Carag and Victoria Turingan (private respondents), covering a parcel of land identified as Lot No. 2472, Cad. 151, containing an area of 7,047,673 square meters (subject property), situated in Tuguegarao, Cagayan. On 19 July 1938, pursuant to said Decree, the Register of Deeds of Cagayan issued Original Certificate of Title No. 11585[5] (OCT No. 11585) in the name of spouses Carag. On 2 July 1952, OCT No. 11585 was cancelled to discharge the encumbrance expressly stated in Decree No. 381928. Two transfer certificates of title were issued: Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-1277,[6] issued in the name of the Province of Cagayan, covering Lot 2472-B consisting of 100,000 square meters and Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-1278,[7] issued in the name of the private respondents, covering Lot 2472A consisting of 6,997,921 square meters. On 19 May 1994, Bienvenida Taguiam Vda. De Dayag and others filed with the Regional Office No. 2 of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), Tuguegarao, Cagayan, a letter-petition requesting the DENR to initiate the filing of an action for the annulment of Decree No. 381928 on the ground that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to adjudicate a portion of the subject property which was allegedly still classified as timber land at the time of the issuance of Decree No. 381928. The Regional Executive Director of the DENR created an investigating team to conduct ground verification and ocular inspection of the subject property. The investigating team reported that: A) The portion of Lot 2472 Cad-151 as shown in the Plan prepared for spouses Carag, and covered under LC Project 3-L of Tuguegarao, Cagayan, was found to be still within the timberland area at the time of the issuance of the Decree and O.C.T. of the spouses Antonio Carag and Victoria Turingan, and the same was only released as alienable and disposable on February 22, 1982, as certified by USEC Jose G. Solis of the NAMRIA on 27 May 1994. B) Petitioner Bienvenida Taguiam Vda. De Dayag and others have possessed and occupied by themselves and thru their predecessors-in-interest the portion of Lot 2472 Cad-151, covered by LC Project 3-L of LC Map 2999, since time immemorial.[8] Thus, the investigating team claimed that "a portion of Lot 2472 Cad-151" was "only released as alienable and disposable on 22 February 1982." In a Memorandum dated 9 September 1996, the Legal Division of the Land Management Bureau recommended to the Director of Lands that an action for the cancellation of OCT No. 11585, as well as its derivative titles, be filed with the proper court. The Director of Lands approved the recommendation. On 10 June 1998, or 68 years after the issuance of Decree No. 381928, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a complaint for annulment of judgment, cancellation and declaration of nullity of titles [9] on the ground that in 1930 the trial court had no jurisdiction to adjudicate a portion of the subject property, which portion consists of 2,640,000 square meters (disputed portion). The disputed portion was allegedly still classified as timber land at the time of issuance of Decree No. 381928 and, therefore, was not alienable and 9

disposable until 22 February 1982 when the disputed portion was classified as alienable and disposable. On 19 October 1998, private respondents filed a motion to dismiss.[10] Private respondents alleged that petitioner failed to comply with Rule 47 of the Rules of Court because the real ground for the complaint was mistake, not lack of jurisdiction, and that petitioner, as a party in the original proceedings, could have availed of the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies but failed to do so. Private respondents added that petitioner did not attach to the complaint a certified true copy of the decision sought to be annulled. Private respondents also maintained that the complaint was barred by the doctrines of res judicata and law of the case and by Section 38 of Act No. 496. [11] Private respondents also stated that not all the heirs of spouses Carag were brought before the Court of Appeals for an effective resolution of the case. Finally, private respondents claimed that the real party in interest was not petitioner but a certain Alfonso Bassig, who had an ax to grind against private respondents. [12] On 3 March 1999, petitioner filed an amended complaint for reversion, annulment of decree, cancellation and declaration of nullity of titles.[13] The Ruling of the Court of Appeals On 21 May 2001, the Court of Appeals dismissed the complaint because of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. The Court of Appeals declared: The rule is clear that such judgments, final orders and resolutions in civil actions which this court may annul are those which the "ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available." The Amended Complaint contains no such allegations which are jurisdictional neither can such circumstances be divined from its allegations. Furthermore, such actions for Annulment may be based only on two (2) grounds: extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. Neither ground is alleged in the Amended Complaint which is for Reversion/Annulment of Decree, Cancellation and Declaration of Nullity of Titles. It merely alleges that around 2,640,000 square meters of timberland area within Lot 2472 Cad. 151, had been erroneously included in the title of the Spouses Antonio Carag and Victoria Turingan under Decree No. 381928 and O.C.T. No. 11585 issued on June 2, 1930 and July 19, 1938, respectively; that hence, such adjudication and/or Decree and Title covering a timberland area is null and void ab initio under the provisions of the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. Finally, it is clear that the issues raised in the Amended Complaint as well as those in the Motion to dismiss are factual in nature and should be threshed out in the proper trial court in accordance with Section 101 of the Public Land Act.[14] (Citations omitted) Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 25 September 2002 Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition. The Issues Petitioner raises the following issues: Whether the allegations of the complaint clearly stated that the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief and other appropriate remedies are no longer available; Whether the amended complaint clearly alleged the ground of lack of jurisdiction; Whether the Court of Appeals may try the factual issues raised in the amended complaint and in the motion to dismiss; Whether the then Court of First Instance of Cagayan had jurisdiction to adjudicate a tract of timberland in favor of respondent spouses Antonio Carag and Victoria Turingan; Whether the fact that the Director of Lands was a party to the original proceedings changed the nature of the land and granted jurisdiction to the then Court of First Instance over the land; Whether the doctrine of res judicata applies in this case; and Whether Section 38 of Act No. 496 is applicable in this case. 10

The Ruling of the Court While the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the complaint on procedural grounds, we will still deny the petition because the complaint for annulment of decree has no merit. Petitioner Complied with Rule 47 of the Rules of Court First, the Court of Appeals ruled that petitioner failed to allege either of the grounds of extrinsic fraud or lack of jurisdiction in the complaint for annulment of decree. [15] We find otherwise. In its complaint and amended complaint, petitioner stated: 11. In view of the fact that in 1930 or in 1938, only the Executive Branch of the Government had the authority and power to declassify or reclassify land of the public domain, the Court did not, therefore, have the power and authority to adjudicate in favor of the spouses Antonio Carag and Victoria Turingan the said tract of timberland, portion of the Lot 2472 Cad-151, at the time of the issuance of the Decree and the Original Certificate of Title of the said spouses; and such adjudication and/or Decree and Title issued covering the timberland area is null and void ab initio considering the provisions of the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Philippine constitution. x x x x

15. The issuance of Decree No. 381928 and O.C.T. No. 11585 in the name of spouses Antonio Carag and Victoria Turingan, and all the derivative titles thereto in the name of the Heirs and said spouses, specifically with respect to the inclusion thereto of timberland area, by the then Court of First Instance (now the Regional Trial Court), and the Register of Deeds of Cagayan is patently illegal and erroneous for the reason that said Court and/or the Register of Deeds of Cagayan did not have any authority or jurisdiction to decree or adjudicate the said timberland area of Lot 2472 Cad-151, consequently, the same are null and void ab initio, and of no force and effect whatsoever.[16] (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted) Petitioner clearly alleged in the complaint and amended complaint that it was seeking to annul Decree No. 381928 on the ground of the trial court's lack of jurisdiction over the subject land, specifically over the disputed portion, which petitioner maintained was classified as timber land and was not alienable and disposable. Second, the Court of Appeals also dismissed the complaint on the ground of petitioner's failure to allege that the "ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available." In Ancheta v. Ancheta,[17] we ruled: In a case where a petition for annulment of judgment or final order of the RTC filed under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court is grounded on lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant/respondent or over the nature or subject of the action, the petitioner need not allege in the petition that the ordinary remedy of new trial or reconsideration of the final order or judgment or appeal therefrom are no longer available through no fault of her own. This is so because a judgment rendered or final order issued by the RTC without jurisdiction is null and void and may be assailed any time either collaterally or in a direct action or by resisting such judgment or final order in any action or proceeding whenever it is invoked, unless barred by laches.[18] Since petitioner's complaint is grounded on lack of jurisdiction over the subject of the action, petitioner need not allege that the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of petitioner. Third, the Court of Appeals ruled that the issues raised in petitioner's complaint were factual in nature and should be threshed out in the proper trial court in accordance with Section 101 of the Public Land Act. [19] 11

Section 6, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court provides: SEC. 6. Procedure. - The procedure in ordinary civil cases shall be observed. Should a trial be necessary, the reception of evidence may be referred to a member of the court or a judge of a Regional Trial Court. Therefore, the Court of Appeals may try the factual issues raised in the complaint for the complete and proper determination of the case. However, instead of remanding the complaint to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings, we shall decide the case on the merits. Complaint for Annulment of Decree Has No Merit Petitioner contends that the trial court had no jurisdiction to adjudicate to spouses Carag the disputed portion of the subject property. Petitioner claims that the disputed portion was still classified as timber land, and thus not alienable and disposable, when Decree No. 381928 was issued in 1930. In effect, petitioner admits that the adjacent 4,407,673 square meters of the subject property, outside of the disputed portion, were alienable and disposable in 1930. Petitioner argues that in 1930 or in 1938, only the Executive Branch of the Government, not the trial courts, had the power to declassify or reclassify lands of the public domain. Lack of jurisdiction, as a ground for annulment of judgment, refers to either lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defending party or over the subject matter of the claim.[20] Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law and is determined by the statute in force at the time of the filing of the action. [21] Under the Spanish regime, all Crown lands were per se alienable. In Aldecoa v. Insular Government,[22] we ruled: From the language of the foregoing provisions of law, it is deduced that, with the exception of those comprised within the mineral and timber zone, all lands owned by the State or by the sovereign nation are public in character, and per se alienable and, provided they are not destined to the use of the public in general or reserved by the Government in accordance with law, they may be acquired by any private or juridical person x x x[23] (Emphasis supplied) Thus, unless specifically declared as mineral or forest zone, or reserved by the State for some public purpose in accordance with law, all Crown lands were deemed alienable. In this case, petitioner has not alleged that the disputed portion had been declared as mineral or forest zone, or reserved for some public purpose in accordance with law, during the Spanish regime or thereafter. The land classification maps[24] petitioner attached to the complaint also do not show that in 1930 the disputed portion was part of the forest zone or reserved for some public purpose. The certification of the National Mapping and Resources Information Authority, dated 27 May 1994, contained no statement that the disputed portion was declared and classified as timber land.[25] The law prevailing when Decree No. 381928 was issued in 1930 was Act No. 2874,[26]which provides: SECTION 6. The Governor-General, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, shall from time to time classify the lands of the public domain into (a) (b) Alienable Timber or disposable and

(c) Mineral lands and may at any time and in a like manner transfer such lands from one class to another, for the purposes of their government and disposition. 12

Petitioner has not alleged that the Governor-General had declared the disputed portion of the subject property timber or mineral land pursuant to Section 6 of Act No. 2874. It is true that Section 8 of Act No. 2874 opens to disposition only those lands which have been declared alienable or disposable. Section 8 provides: SECTION 8. Only those lands shall be declared open to disposition or concession which have been officially delimited and classified and, when practicable, surveyed, and which have not been reserved for public or quasi-public uses, not appropriated by the Government, nor in any manner become private property, nor those on which a private right authorized and recognized by this Act or any other valid law may be claimed, or which, having been reserved or appropriated, have ceased to be so. However, the GovernorGeneral may, for reasons of public interest, declare lands of the public domain open to disposition before the same have had their boundaries established or been surveyed, or may, for the same reasons, suspend their concession or disposition by proclamation duly published or by Act of the Legislature. (Emphasis supplied) However, Section 8 provides that lands which are already private lands, as well as lands on which a private claim may be made under any law, are not covered by the classification requirement in Section 8 for purposes of disposition. This exclusion in Section 8 recognizes that during the Spanish regime, Crown lands were per se alienable unless falling under timber or mineral zones, or otherwise reserved for some public purpose in accordance with law. Clearly, with respect to lands excluded from the classification requirement in Section 8, trial courts had jurisdiction to adjudicate these lands to private parties. Petitioner has not alleged that the disputed portion had not become private property prior to the enactment of Act No. 2874. Neither has petitioner alleged that the disputed portion was not land on which a private right may be claimed under any existing law at that time. In Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,[27] the Republic sought to annul the judgment of the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal, sitting as a land registration court, because when the application for land registration was filed in 1927 the land was alleged to be unclassified forest land. The Republic also alleged that the CFI of Rizal had no jurisdiction to determine whether the land applied for was forest or agricultural land since the authority to classify lands was then vested in the Director of Lands as provided in Act Nos. 926[28] and 2874. The Court ruled: We are inclined to agree with the respondent that it is legally doubtful if the authority of the Governor General to declare lands as alienable and disposable would apply to lands that have become private property or lands that have been impressed with a private right authorized and recognized by Act 2874 or any valid law. By express declaration of Section 45 (b) of Act 2874 which is quoted above, those who have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership since July 26, 1894 may file an application with the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and these applicants shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title. When the land registration court issued a decision for the issuance of a decree which was the basis of an original certificate of title to the land, the court had already made a determination that the land was agricultural and that the applicant had proven that he was in open and exclusive possession of the subject land for the prescribed number of years. It was the land registration court which had the jurisdiction to determine whether the land applied for was agricultural, forest or timber taking into account the proof or evidence in each particular case. (Emphasis supplied) As with this case, when the trial court issued the decision for the issuance of Decree No. 381928 in 1930, the trial court had jurisdiction to determine whether the subject property, including the disputed portion, applied for was agricultural, timber or mineral land. The trial court determined that the land was agricultural and that spouses Carag proved that they were entitled to the decree and a certificate of title. The government, which was a party in the original proceedings in the trial court as required by law, did not 13

appeal the decision of the trial court declaring the subject land as agricultural. Since the trial court had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action, its decision rendered in 1930, or 78 years ago, is now final and beyond review. The finality of the trial court's decision is further recognized in Section 1, Article XII of the 1935 Constitution which provides: SECTION 1. All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State, and their disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease, or concession at the time of the inauguration of the Government established under this Constitution. (Emphasis supplied) Thus, even as the 1935 Constitution declared that all agricultural, timber and mineral lands of the public domain belong to the State, it recognized that these lands were"subject to any existing right, grant, lease or concession at the time of the inauguration of the Government established under this Constitution."[29]When the Commonwealth Government was established under the 1935 Constitution, spouses Carag had already an existing right to the subject land, including the disputed portion, pursuant to Decree No. 381928 issued in 1930 by the trial court. WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We DISMISS petitioner Republic of the Philippines' complaint for reversion, annulment of decree, cancellation and declaration of nullity of titles for lack of merit. SOORDERED. Puno, C.J., (Chairperson), Austria-Martinez, Corona, and Leonardo-De Castro, JJ.,concur.

12) FIRST DIVISION G.R. No. L-37995 August 31, 1987 BUREAU OF FORESTRY, BUREAU OF LANDS and PHILIPPINE FISHERIES COMMISSION, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and FILOMENO GALLO, respondents. PARAS, J.: Before Us is a petition for review on certiorari, which seeks to annul and set aside the Decision 1 (promulgated on April 11, 1973) of the respondent court in CA-G.R. No. 38163-R, affirming the decision 2 (dated April 6, 1966) of the then Court of First Instance of Iloilo in Land Registration Case No. N506, G.L.R.O. Record No. N-20783 entitled "Filomeno Gallo, Applicant vs. Bureau of Forestry, Bureau of Lands, and Philippine Fisheries Commission, oppositors. " The dispositive portion of the trial court's decision reads as follows: WHEREFORE, the court Orders the registration of Lots Nos. 2, 3, and 4 and the bigger portion of Lot No. 1 after excluding the portion Identified as Lot 1-A together with the improvements thereon in the name of Filomeno Gallo, of legal age, widower, Filipino citizen, and resident of 155 Fuentes Street, Iloilo City, Philippines. Lots Nos. 1, 2 and 3 are subject to the road right-of-way of 15 meters wide which is presently known as Sto. Rosario Rizal Montpiller provincial Road and Buenavista-Daraga provincial Road they being properties of the Province of Iloilo and should be registered in the name of said province. The oppositions of the Director of Lands, Director of Forestry and the Philippine Fisheries Commission are dismissed. Lot 1A with an area of 2.6864 hectares which is enclosed in red pencil and is found inside Lot No. 1 in the plan Exhibit is hereby declared public land. After the decision has become final let the corresponding decree be issued. SO ORDERED. (p. 38, Joint Record on Appeal Annex "A." p. 25, Rollo) This appeal also seeks to annul and set aside respondent court's resolution dated December 14, 1973 denying for lack of merit, herein petitioners' motion for reconsideration. 14

The basic issue which petitioners raise in this appeal is Whether or not the classification of lands of the public domain by the Executive Branch of the Government into agricultural, forest or mineral can be changed or varied by the court depending upon the evidence adduced before it. (p. 9, Brief for the Petitioners, p. 105, Rollo) The antecedent facts of the case are as follows: On July 11, 1961, four (4) parcels of land situated in Buenavista, Iloilo described in Plan Psu-150727, containing an approximate area of 30.5943 hectares were the subject of an application for registration by Mercedes Diago who alleged among others that she herself occupied said parcels of land having bought them from the testate estate of the late Jose Ma. Nava who, in his lifetime, had bought the lands in turn from Canuto Gustilo on June 21, 1934. The Director of Lands opposed said application on the ground that neither the applicant nor her predecessors-in-interest have sufficient title over the lands applied for, which could be registered under the Torrens systems, and that they have never been in open, continuous and exclusive possession of the said lands for at least 30 years prior to the filing of the application. The Director of Forestry on the other hand anchored his opposition principally on the ground that certain specific portions of the lands subject matter of the application, with an area of approximately 194,080 square meters are mangrove swamps and are within Timberland Block "B " L.C. Project No. 38, L.C. Map No. 1971 of Buenavista, Iloilo. On June 30, 1965, respondent Filomeno Gallo, having purchased the subject parcels of land from Mercedes Diago on April 27, 1965, moved to be substituted in place of the latter, attaching to his motion an Amended Application for Registration of Title substantially reproducing the allegations in the application of Mercedes Diago. Petitioner Philippine Fisheries Commission also moved on August 30, 1965 to be substituted in place of petitioner Bureau of Forestry as oppositor over a portion of the land sought to be registered, supervision and control of said portion having been transferred from the Bureau of Forestry to the Philippine Fisheries Commission. On April 6, 1966, the trial court rendered its decision ordering the registration of the four (4) parcels of land in the name of respondent Filomeno Gallo after excluding a portion Identified as Lot "1-A" which is the site of the municipal hall of Buenavista town, and subjecting Lots Nos. 1, 2 and 3 to the road-of-way of 15 meters width. Petitioners appealed from said decision to the respondent Court of Appeals assigning the following errors in their brief: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE REGISTRATION OF THE SUBJECT LAND WHICH CONSISTS OF TIMBERLAND, FORESHORELAND AND LAND BELONGING TO THE PUBLIC DOMAIN HENCE UNREGISTERABLE. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE POSSESSION OF THE APPLICANT-APPELLEE AND HIS PREDECESSORS-IN-INTEREST HAD BEEN PEACEFUL, OPEN, CONTINUOUS, UNINTERRUPTED AND ADVERSE TO CLAIMANTS AND IN THE CONCEPT OF OWNER. (p. 6, Brief for the Petitioners, p. 105, Rollo) Respondent court affirmed said decision and denied a motion for reconsideration of the same hence the present petition with two (2) assigned errors, basically the same issues raised with the respondent court: RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE DETERMINATION OF WHETHER A PUBLIC LAND IS AGRICULTURAL OR STILL A FOREST LAND RESTS EXCLUSIVELY UPON THE DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY (NOW DIRECTOR OF FOREST DEVELOPMENT), THE SECRETARY OF NATURAL RESOURCES) AND THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES. RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE LAND IS PRESUMED TO BELONG TO THE PUBLIC DOMAIN AND PRIVATE RESPONDENT HEREIN HAS NOT CONVINCINGLY SHOWN THAT THE REMOTE PREDECESSOR-IN-INTEREST POSSESSED THE LAND IN QUESTION SINCE TIME IMMEMORIAL. (pp. 9 & 20, Brief for the Petitioners, p. 105, Rollo) Out of the 30.5943 hectares applied for registration under the Torrens System, 11.1863 hectares are coconut lands and admittedly within the disposable portion of the public domain. These are more particularly Identified as parcels "B," B-1", "B-2" and "B-3" of the sketch plan Exh. "1-A." The rest, consisting of 19.4080 hectares and Identified as parcels A, A-1, A-2 and A-3 of the same plan Exh. "1-A," is now the center of controversy of the present appeal. 15

Petitioners contend that respondent court completely ignored the undisputed facts that 1) the controverted area is within Timberland Block "B," L.C. Project No. 38, L.C. Map No. 1971 of Buenavista, Iloilo and that 2) the certification of February 18, 1956 of the then Director of Forestry to the effect that the area in question is needed for forest purposes. Respondent court in affirming the decision of the Iloilo trial court ruled that although the controverted portion of 19.4080 hectares are mangrove and nipa swamps within Timberland Block "B," L.C. Project No. 38, same cannot be considered part of the public forest not susceptible of private ownership since petitioners failed to submit convincing proof that these lands are more valuable for forestry than for agricultural purposes, and the presumption is that these are agricultural lands. Respondent court based its conclusion upon the premise that whether or not a controverted parcel of land is forest land, is a question of fact which should be settled by competent proofs, and if such a question be an issue in a land registration proceeding, it is incumbent upon the Director of Forestry to submit to the court convincing proofs that the land in dispute is not more valuable for agriculture than for forest purposes. It is the position of respondent that respondent court did "not hesitate to apply this presumption with full force particularly where, as in the case at bar, the lands applied for have been possessed and cultivated by the applicant and his predecessors-in-interest for a long number of years without the government taking any positive step to dislodge the occupants from their holdings which have passed from one to another by inheritance or by purchase." (p. 9, Brief for private respondents) Otherwise stated, it is Our impression that private respondents claim the rule of prescription against the government. Such contentions of private respondents do not hold water. Admittedly the controversial area is within a timberland block as classification of the municipality and certified to by the Director of Forestry on February 18, 1956 as lands needed for forest purposes and hence they are portions of the public domain which cannot be the subject of registration proceedings. Clearly therefore the land is public land and there is no need for the Director of Forestry to submit to the court convincing proofs that the land in dispute is not more valuable for agriculture than for forest purposes, as there was no question of whether the land is forest land or not. Be it remembered that said forest land had been declared and certified as such by the Director of the Bureau of Forestry on February 18, 1956, several years before the original applicant of the lands for registration Mercedes Diago, filed it on July 11, 1961. In the case of Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Abella, 49 Phil. 49, cited by private respondents themselves in their brief, We held Following the decision of Ankon vs. Government of the Philippine Islands (40 Phil. 10), it is again held, that whether a particular parcel of land is more valuable for forestry purposes than for agricultural purposes, or vice versa, is a fact which must be established during the trial of the case. Whether the particular land is agricultural, forestry or mineral is a question to be settled in each particular caseunless the Bureau of Forestry has, under the authority conferred upon it by law, prior to the intervention of private interest, set aside said land for forestry or mineral resources. (Italics for emphasis) We also held in the case of Republic vs. Animas, 56 SCRA 499, 503 that... As a general rule, timber or forest lands are not alienable or disposable under either the Constitution of 1935 or the Constitution of 1973. ... It is the Bureau of Forestry that has jurisdiction and authority over the demarcation, protection, management, reproduction, occupancy and use of all public forests and forest reservations and over the granting of licenses for the taking of products therefrom, including stone and earth (Section 1816 of the Revised Administrative Code). That the area in question is a forest or timber land is clearly established by the certification made by the Bureau of Forest Development that it is within the portion of the area which was reverted to the category of forest land, approved by the President on March 7, 1958. As provided for under Sec. 6 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, which was lifted from Act No. 2874, the classification or reclassification of public lands into alienable or disposable, mineral or forest lands is now a prerogative of the Executive Department of the government and not of the courts. With these rules, there should be no more room for doubt that it is not the court which determines the classification of lands of the public domain into agricultural, forest or mineral but the Executive Branch of the Government, through the Office of the President. Hence, it was grave error and/or abuse of discretion for the respondent court to ignore the uncontroverted facts that (1) the disputed area is within a timberland block and (2) as certified to by the then Director of Forestry, the area is needed for forest purposes. 16

Furthermore, private respondents Cannot claim to have obtained their title by prescription inasmuch as the application filed by them necessarily implied an admission that the portions applied for are part of the public domain which cannot be acquired by prescription, unless the law expressly permits it. It is a rule of law that possession of forest lands, however long, cannot ripen into private ownership (Director of Forestry vs. Munoz, 23 SCRA 1184). WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the assailed decision is hereby SET ASIDE, and a new one is hereby rendered, declaring that: 1) Parcels "B," "B-1," "B-2 and "B-3" of the sketch plan Exhibit "1-A" consisting of 11.1863 hectares of coconut land and admittedly within the disposable portion of the public domain are hereby ordered registered in the name of the applicant Filomeno Gallo and/or his successors-in-interest as provided for by the Public Land Law; and 2) Parcels "A," "A-1," and "A-2," and "A-3" of the same plan Exh. "1-A," consisting of 19.4080 hectares, are forest lands or lands of the public domain of the Republic of the Philippines and are therefore inalienable. SO ORDERED. Teehankee, C.J., Narvasa, Cruz and Gancayco, JJ., concur. 14) SECOND DIVISION G.R. No. 70825 March 11, 1991 DIRECTOR OF LANDS and DIRECTOR OF FOREST DEVELOPMENT, Petitioners, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and ISIDRO ESPARTINEZ, Respondents. PARAS, J.: This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision * of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. CV No. 66710 affirming in all respects the decision ** of the then Court of First Instance of Albay, Branch IV, dated January 30, 1978, ordering the registration, in the name of Isidro Espartinez of Lot 6783, Cad 239, Ligao Cadastre, located in Agul, formerly of Ligao, Albay, now Pioduran, Albay.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The application for the registration of said lot, which allegedly contained an area of 1,036,172 square meters, was filed by Espartinez on May 17, 1972. He alleged therein that he acquired lot by purchase from Sotera Llacer. He invoked Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by Republic Act No. 1942, should the Land Registration Act be not applicable.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The jurisdictional requirements of publication of notice of initial hearing (Exhibits "A" and "C") and posting of such notices in conspicuous places in the parcel of land involved and in the municipal building (Exhibit "B") having been complied with, and considering that only the Bureau of Lands and the Bureau of Forestry represented by the fiscal had appeared, the lower court issued an order of general default with the exception of said government agencies. Thereafter, one Perpetua Llarena appeared and, together with the fiscal, she was required to file an opposition to the application.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Inasmuch as both the fiscal and Llarena failed to file their respective oppositions within the period set by the court, on December 12, 1972, it commissioned the clerk of court to receive evidence. On the same day, however, the Solicitor General entered his appearance for the government and at the same time, filed an opposition to the application for registration. He alleged therein that neither Espartinez nor his predecessors-in-interest had sufficient title to acquire ownership in fee simple of the land the same not having been acquired by means of any of the various types of title issued by the Spanish government or any other recognized mode of acquisition of title over realty under pertinent laws; that neither Espartinez nor his predecessors-in-interest were in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the land for at least thirty (30) years prior to the filing of the application; that Espartinez may not avail of the provisions of Section 48 of the Public Land Act for failure to fulfill the requisites prescribed therein; and that the parcel of land involved is part of the public domain and therefore, not subject to private appropriation.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Thereafter, seventeen (17) oppositors, claiming to be farmer-settlers on the land, flied a motion to lift the order of general default and opposition to the application for registration. Espartinez filed a motion to 17

dismiss the opposition contending that the private oppositors were, with one exception, mere homestead applicants who were barred by prior judgments in Civil Case No. 2976, which was dismissed for failure to prosecute, and in CAR Case No. 523 wherein the Court of Agrarian Relations declared Sotera Llacer as the owner of Lot 6783 and the oppositors as her tenants.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library On January 30, 1978, the lower court rendered the aforementioned decision based on the following findings of facts:chanrobles virtual law library On March 28, 1885, a parcel of land in Ligao (now Pioduran) Albay, was adjudicated to Faustino Llacer. This is evidenced by the following entry on page 424 of the Gaceta de Manila: INTENDENCIA GENERAL DE HACIENDAS DE FILIPINAS chanrobles virtual law library Indice de las resoluciones definitivas adoptadas por esa Intendencia general desde el 16 al 28 del Febrero proximo pasado, que se publica en la Gaceta, con arreglo a lo mandado en Decreto de 28 de Octubre de 1869 . . .chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Feb. 24. - Adjudicando a D. Faustino Llacer la extension de 80 hectares y 16 centiareas de terreno situado en el pueblo de Ligao, Provincia de Albay, en la cantidad de pfs. 10053.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Manila de 28 de Marzo de 1885 . . . Luna. (Exhibit "L") The same parcel of land was in turn, adjudicated after the death of Faustino Llacer, to then minor Sotera Llacer through an order of the Court of First Instance of Albay dated November 11, 1913 in Civil Case No. 422 entitled "Abintestato de los Finados Faustino Llacer y Maria Prollamante" (Exhibit "K"). Hence, the land which was earlier declared for taxation purposes in the name of "Los Herederos de los finados Faustino Llacer y Maria Prollamante" (Exhibits "P", "Q" and "R"), was so declared by Sotera Llacer in her own name (Exhibits "I", "S" and "T"). In CAR Case No. 523, Sotera Llacer and her husband, Bonifacio Viscaya were also declared by the Court of Agrarian Relations in Legazpi City as landholders of Lot 6783 (Exhibit "J").chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library On November 26, 1969, Sotera Llacer sold to Isidro Espartinez Lot 6783 which is described in the deed of absolute sale as containing an area of 1,036,172 square meters in consideration of the amount of P 8,500.00 (Exhibit "E"). So as to reflect the agreement that Espartinez would assume the responsibility and expenses in ejecting the occupants of the land pursuant to the decision in CAR Case No. 523, Espartinez and Sotera Llacer executed an amended deed of sale on June 11, 1970 (Exhibit "F"). Thereafter, Espartinez declared the property for taxation purposes (Exhibit "G") and paid the corresponding real property taxes thereon (Exhibit "H").chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Espartinez secured a survey plan of the land (Exhibit "M") and a technical description thereof (Exhibit "N") indicating that the actual area of the land is 103 hectares, 61 ares and 72 centares. He planted it to sugar cane and coconuts and used a portion as grazing area for his cattle and carabaos.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Based on these facts, the lower court concluded that the preponderance of evidence weighs heavily in favor of Espartinez. The oppositor public officials appealed to the then Intermediate Appellate Court which affirmed the lower court's decision in all respects.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The appellate court considered Exhibit "L" as a possessory information title. Citing Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141 as amended by Republic Act No. 1942, the appellate court held that Espartinez' possession and occupancy of the land may be tacked to that of his predecessors-in-interest who had possessed and occupied it from as far back as March 28, 1885 when it was adjudicated in favor of Faustino Llacer, or a period of around 87 years when the application for registration was filed.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The Director of Land and Forestry Development, through the Solicitor General, filed the instant petition for review oncertiorari contending that the Intermediate Appellate Court committed errors of law in: (a) granting the application of confirming the title of Espartinez notwithstanding the fact that he had failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that he has a registerable title to the property subject of the application, and (b) agreeing with the lower court's decision which directed the registration of subject parcel of land even in the absence of proof that the same is alienable and disposable and despite private 18

respondent's failure to adduce in evidence certain required documents.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library A crucial point to resolve is whether the appellate court correctly considered Exhibit "L" as a possessory information title. Worth noting is the fact that said document is, as the said court itself describes it, "a copy of a certificationissued by the Chief of the division of Archives of the Bureau of Public Libraries of an excerpt of an entry appearing on page 424 of the Gaceta de Manila of the year 1885 regarding some resolution(s) issued and published pursuant to a certain decree dated October 28, 1869." (Rollo, p. 29). The "excerpt of an entry" is the Spanish text quoted above.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library From said description alone, it is clear that Exhibit "L" is neither a document, deed or title evidencing ownership over Lot 6783. The entry does not even contain an accurate description of the lot setting forth its metes and bounds on which its identification may be based. Moreover, while the entry states that Faustino Llacer had been adjudicated an 80-hectare parcel of land, it does not state by what reason such adjudication was made.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Granting that there was indeed an "adjudication" or grant of the land to Llacer, still the same cannot be considered as a possessory information title which has been converted into a registration of ownership in the absence of proof that Llacer had complied with the requirements set forth in Article 393 of the Spanish Mortgage Law (Director of Lands vs. Reyes, L-27594, November 28, 1975, 68 SCRA 177, 191-192). Exhibit "L" not being either a titulo de informacion posesoria or a title by composicion con el estado, it did not establish the right of ownership of Espartinez' predecessors-in-interest (Heirs of Inocencio Santiago v. Castro, G.R. No. 62014-16, April 2, 1984, 128 SCRA 545).chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The other proofs of an alleged registerable title presented by Espartinez are likewise not of any help to him. Tax declarations or realty tax payments of property are not conclusive evidence of ownership (FerrerLopez vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 50420, May 29, 1987, 150 SCRA 393). The survey plan, Exhibit "M", which allegedly evidences the fact that the land actually contains an area of around 103 hectares instead of the 80 hectares reflected in Exhibit "L", is not even admissible in evidence because it has not been approved by the Director of Lands (Director of Lands vs. Heirs of Juana Carolino, G.R. No. 61598, December 12, 1985, 140 SCRA 396).chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library In the same vein, while the presentation of the tracing cloth plan required by Sections 1858 and 1864 of the Revised Administrative Code may now be dispensed with where there is a survey plan the correctness of which had not been overcome by clear, strong and convincing evidence (Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 56613, March 14, 1988, 158 SCRA 568, 571; Republic vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 70594, October 10, 1986, 144 SCRA 705), in this case, the tracing cloth plan assumes a great importance in view of the discrepancy between the area of the land under Exhibit "L" and that being claimed by Espartinez. Unfortunately, there seems to be no tracing plan at all, notwithstanding the allegation in the application that the same was attached thereto (Record on Appeal, p. 3). There is no proof that it had been detached and kept by the Land Registration Commission (See: Republic vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 61462, July 31, 1984, 131 SCRA 140), and, inspite of herein petitioners' repeated contention of the absence of the tracing cloth plan, Espartinez has failed to traverse such contention.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library Neither may the decision in the intestate proceedings for the estate of Faustino Llacer and Maria Prollamante be invoked by Espartinez. As earlier stated, Llacer had, in the very beginning, no transmissible rights over the property. The other cases, Civil Case No. 2976 and CAR Case No. 523, were not land registration cases and therefore, ownership of the property was not definitively passed upon.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Espartinez' reliance on Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141 is also misplaced. That law is premised on the prior classification of the land involved as a disposable agricultural land, The law states: Sec. 48 The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of title therefor, under the land Registration Act, to wit: xxx xxx xxx chanrobles virtual law library 19

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in the open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, except as against the Government since July twenty-sixth, eighteen hundred and ninety-four, except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. Anyone who applies for confirmation of imperfect title under this provision has, under the ruling in Heirs of Amunategui vs. Director of Forestry (L-30035, November 29, 1983, 126 SCRA 69) the burden of overcoming the presumption that the land sought to be registered forms part of the public domain. Although the application of said ruling should be on a case to case basis with the end in view of enhancing the very reasons behind the enactment of land registration laws (Director of Lands vs. Funtilar, G.R. No. 68533, May 23, 1986, 142 SCRA 57, 69), considering the foregoing discussion and the glaring fact that the area sought to be registered is around 23 hectares larger than that indicated in Exhibit "L" from which Espartinez' claim of ownership sprung, the ruling in the Heirs Amunategui case must be given strict application.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Espartinez having failed to present any proof that the land in question has been classified as and forms part of the disposable public domain, whatever possession he might have had, and however long, cannot ripen into private ownership (Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 58867, June 22, 1984, 129 SCRA 689 citing Adorable vs. Director of Lands, 107 Phil. 401 [1960]; Director of Forestry vs. Muoz, L-24796, June 28, 1968, 23 SCRA 1184; Director of Lands vs. Abanzadao, L-21814, July 15, 1975, 65 SCRA 5, and Republic v. Court of Appeals, L-39473, April 30, 1979, 89 SCRA 648) and his failure to adduce clear and convincing evidence of his claim over the land has given rise to the presumption that Lot 6783 is still part of the public domain (Director of Lands vs. Heirs of Juana Carolino,supra).chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library PREMISES CONSIDERED, the appealed decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the land subject of the application for registration and confirmation of imperfect title is hereby DECLARED as part of the public domain.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library SO ORDERED. Melencio-Herrera, Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Regalado, J., Pro hac vice. 15) THIRD DIVISION G.R. No. 93891 March 11, 1991 POLLUTION ADJUDICATION BOARD, petitioner vs. COURT OF APPEALS and SOLAR TEXTILE FINISHING CORPORATION, respondents. Oscar A. Pascua and Charemon Clio L. Borre for petitioner. Leonardo A. Aurelio for respondent Solar Textile Finishing Corp. RESOLUTION FELICIANO, J.:p Petitioner Pollution Adjudication Board ("Board") asks us to review the Decision and Resolution promulgated on 7 February 1990 and 10 May 1990, respectively, by the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G R. No. SP 18821 entitled "Solar Textile Finishing Corporation v. Pollution Adjudication Board." In that Decision and Resolution, the Court of Appeals reversed an order of the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 77, in Civil Case No. Q-89-2287 dismissing private respondent Solar Textile Finishing Corporation's ("Solar") petition for certiorari and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. On 22 September 1988, petitioner Board issued an ex parte Order directing Solar immediately to cease and desist from utilizing its wastewater pollution source installations which were discharging untreated 20

wastewater directly into a canal leading to the adjacent Tullahan-Tinejeros River. The Order signed by Hon. Fulgencio Factoran, Jr., as Board Chairman, reads in full as follows: Respondent, Solar Textile Finishing Corporation with plant and place of business at 999 General Pascual Avenue, Malabon, Metro Manila is involved in bleaching, rinsing and dyeing textiles with wastewater of about 30 gpm. being directly discharged untreated into the sewer. Based on findings in the Inspections conducted on 05 November 1986 and 15 November 1986, the volume of untreated wastewater discharged in the final out fall outside of the plant's compound was even greater. The result of inspection conducted on 06 September 1988 showed that respondent's Wastewater Treatment Plant was noted unoperational and the combined wastewater generated from its operation was about 30 gallons per minute and 80% of the wastewater was being directly discharged into a drainage canal leading to the Tullahan-Tinejeros River by means of a by-pass and the remaining 20% was channelled into the plant's existing Wastewater Treatment Plant (WTP). Result of the analyses of the sample taken from the by-pass showed that the wastewater is highly pollutive in terms of Color units, BOD and Suspended Solids, among others. These acts of respondent in spite of directives to comply with the requirements are clearly in violation of Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 984 and Section 103 of its Implementing Rules and Regulations and the 1982 Effluent Regulations. WHEREFORE, pursuant to Section 7 of P.D. 984 and Section 38 of its Implementing Rules and Regulations, respondent is hereby ordered to cease and desist from utilizing its wastewater pollution source installation and discharging its untreated wastewater directly into the canal leading to the Tullahan-Tinejeros River effective immediately upon receipt hereof and until such time when it has fully complied with all the requirements and until further orders from this Board. SO ORDERED. 1 We note that the above Order was based on findings of several inspections of Solar's plant: a. inspections conducted on 5 November 1986 and 12 November 1986 by the National Pollution Control Commission ("NPCC"), the predecessor of the Board ; 2 and b. the inspection conducted on 6 September 1988 by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources ("DENR"). The findings of these two (2) inspections were that Solar's wastewater treatment plant was nonoperational and that its plant generated about 30 gallons per minute of wastewater, 80% of which was being directly discharged into a drainage canal leading to the Tullahan-Tinejeros River. The remaining 20% of the wastewater was being channeled through Solar's non-operational wastewater treatment plant. Chemical analysis of samples of Solar's effluents showed the presence of pollutants on a level in excess of what was permissible under P.D. No. 984 and its Implementing Regulations. A copy of the above Order was received by Solar on 26 September 1988. A Writ of Execution issued by the Board was received by Solar on 31 March 1989. Meantime, Solar filed a motion for reconsideration/appeal with prayer for stay of execution of the Order dated 22 September 1988. Acting on this motion, the Board issued an Order dated 24 April 1989 allowing Solar to operate temporarily, to enable the Board to conduct another inspection and evaluation of Solar's wastewater treatment facilities. In the same Order, the Board directed the Regional Executive Director of the DENR/ NCR to conduct the inspection and evaluation within thirty (30) days. On 21 April 1989, however, Solar went to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 77, on petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction against the Board, the petition being docketed as Civil Case No. Q89-2287. On 21 July 1989, the Regional Trial Court dismissed Solar's petition upon two (2) grounds, i.e., that appeal and not certiorari from the questioned Order of the Board as well as the Writ of Execution was the proper remedy, and that the Board's subsequent Order allowing Solar to operate temporarily had rendered Solar's petition moot and academic. Dissatisfied, Solar went on appeal to the Court of Appeals which, in the Decision here assailed, reversed the Order of dismissal of the trial court and remanded the case to that court for further proceedings. In addition, the Court of Appeals declared the Writ of Execution null and void. At the same time, the Court of Appeals said in the dispositive portion of its Decision that: 21

. . .. Still and all, this decision is without prejudice to whatever action the appellee [Board] may take relative to the projected 'inspection and evaluation' of appellant's [Solar's] water treatment facilities. 3 The Court of Appeals, in so ruling, held that certiorari was a proper remedy since the Orders of petitioner Board may result in great and irreparable injury to Solar; and that while the case might be moot and academic, "larger issues" demanded that the question of due process be settled. Petitioner Board moved for reconsideration, without success. The Board is now before us on a Petition for Review basically arguing that: 1. its ex parte Order dated 22 September 1988 and the Writ of Execution were issued in accordance with law and were not violative of the requirements of due process; and 2. the ex parte Order and the Writ of Execution are not the proper subjects of a petition for certiorari. The only issue before us at this time is whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court on the ground that Solar had been denied due process by the Board. Petitioner Board claims that under P.D. No. 984, Section 7(a), it has legal authority to issue ex parte orders to suspend the operations of an establishment when there is prima facie evidence that such establishment is discharging effluents or wastewater, the pollution level of which exceeds the maximum permissible standards set by the NPCC (now, the Board). Petitioner Board contends that the reports before it concerning the effluent discharges of Solar into the Tullahan-Tinejeros River provided prima facie evidence of violation by Solar of Section 5 of the 1982 Effluent Code. Solar, on the other hand, contends that under the Board's own rules and regulations, an ex parte order may issue only if the effluents discharged pose an "immediate threat to life, public health, safety or welfare, or to animal and plant life." In the instant case, according to Solar, the inspection reports before the Board made no finding that Solar's wastewater discharged posed such a threat. The Court is not persuaded by Solar's contention. Section 7(a) of P.D. No. 984 authorized petitioner Board to issue ex parte cease and desist orders under the following circumstances: P.D. 984, Section 7, paragraph (a), provides: (a) Public Hearing. . . . Provided, That whenever the Commission finds prima facie evidence that the discharged sewage or wastes are of immediate threat to life, public health, safety or welfare, or to animal or plant life, or exceeds the allowable standards set by the Commission, the Commissioner may issue an ex-parte order directing the discontinuance of the same or the temporary suspension or cessation of operation of the establishment or person generating such sewage or wastes without the necessity of a prior public hearing. The said ex-parte order shall be immediately executory and shall remain in force until said establishment or person prevents or abates the said pollution within the allowable standards or modified or nullified by a competent court. (Emphasis supplied) We note that under the above-quoted portion of Section 7(a) of P.D. No. 984, an ex parte cease and desist order may be issued by the Board (a) whenever the wastes discharged by an establishment pose an "immediate threat to life, public health, safety or welfare, or to animal or plant life," or (b) whenever such discharges or wastes exceed "the allowable standards set by the [NPCC]." On the one hand, it is not essential that the Board prove that an "immediate threat to life, public health, safety or welfare, or to animal or plant life" exists before an ex parte cease and desist order may be issued. It is enough if the Board finds that the wastes discharged do exceed "the allowable standards set by the [NPCC]." In respect of discharges of wastes as to which allowable standards have been set by the Commission, the Board may issue an ex parte cease and desist order when there is prima facieevidence of an establishment exceeding such allowable standards. Where, however, the effluents or discharges have not yet been the subject matter of allowable standards set by the Commission, then the Board may act on anex parte basis when it finds at least prima facie proof that the wastewater or material involved presents an "immediate threat to life, public health, safety or welfare or to animal or plant life." Since the applicable standards set by the Commission existing at any given time may well not cover every possible or imaginable kind of effluent or waste discharge, the general standard of an "immediate threat to life, public health, safety or welfare, or to animal and plant life" remains necessary. Upon the other hand, the Court must assume that the extant allowable standards have been set by the Commission or Board precisely in order to avoid or neutralize an "immediate threat to life, public health, safety or welfare, or to animal or plant life.'' 22

Section 5 of the Effluent Regulations of 1982 4 sets out the maximum permissible levels of physical and chemical substances which effluents from domestic wastewater treatment plants and industrial plants" must not exceed "when discharged into bodies of water classified as Class A, B, C, D, SB and SC in accordance with the 1978 NPCC Rules and Regulations." The waters of Tullahan-Tinejeros River are classified as inland waters Class D under Section 68 of the 1978 NPCC Rules and Regulations 5 which in part provides that: Sec. 68. Water Usage and Classification. The quality of Philippine waters shall be maintained in a safe and satisfactory condition according to their best usages. For this purpose, all water shall be classified according to the following beneficial usages: (a) Fresh Surface Water Classification Best usage xxx xxx xxx Class D For agriculture, irrigation, livestock watering and industrial cooling and processing. xxx xxx xxx (Emphases supplied) The reports on the inspections carried on Solar's wastewater treatment facilities on 5 and 12 November 1986 and 6 September 1988 set forth the following Identical finding: a. For legal action in [view of] implementing rules and regulations of P.D. No. 984 and Section 5 of the Effluent Regulations of 1982. 6 Placing the maximum allowable standards set in Section 5 of the Effluent Regulations of 1982 alongside the findings of the November 1986 and September 1988 inspection reports, we get the following results: "Inland Waters (Class C & Station 1 Station 1 a) Color in 100 a) Color units 250 125 platinum (Apparent cobalt Color) b) pH 6-8.5 b) pH 9.3 8.7 c) Tempera- 40 c) Temperature ture in C (C) d) Phenols in 0.1 d) Phenols in mg./1. mg.1 e) Suspended 75 e) Suspended 340 80 solids in solids in mg./1. mg./1. f) BOD in 80 f) BOD (5-day) 1,100 152 mg./1. mg./1 g) oil/Grease 10 g) Oil/Grease h) Detergents 5 h) Detergents 2.93 in mg./1/" mg./1. MBAS i) Dissolved 0 oxygen, mg./1. j) Settleable 0.4 1.5 Matter, mg./1. k) Total Dis 800 610 solved Solids mg./1. l) Total Solids 1,400 690 November 1986 D7 September 1988 Report 9

Report 8

23

mg./1. m) Turbidity NTU / ppm, SiO 3 70 The November 1986 inspections report concluded that: Records of the Commission show that the plant under its previous owner, Fine Touch Finishing Corporation, was issued a Notice of Violation on 20 December 1985 directing same to cease and desist from conducting dyeing operation until such time the waste treatment plant is already completed and operational. The new owner Solar Textile Corporation informed the Commission of the plant acquisition thru its letter dated March 1986 (sic). The new owner was summoned to a hearing held on 13 October 1986 based on the adverse findings during the inspection/water sampling test conducted on 08 August 1986. As per instruction of the Legal Division a re- inspection/sampling text should be conducted first before an appropriate legal action is instituted; hence, this inspection. Based on the above findings, it is clear that the new owner continuously violates the directive of the Commission by undertaking dyeing operation without completing first and operating its existing WTP. The analysis of results on water samples taken showed that the untreated wastewater from the firm pollutes our water resources. In this connection, it is recommended that appropriate legal action be instituted immediately against the firm. . . . 10 The September 1988 inspection report's conclusions were: 1. The plant was undertaking dyeing, bleaching and rinsing operations during the inspection. The combined wastewater generated from the said operations was estimated at about 30 gallons per minute. About 80% of the wastewater was traced directly discharged into a drainage canal leading to the Tullahan-Tinejeros river by means of a bypass. The remaining 20% was channeled into the plant's existing wastewater treatment plant (WTP). 2. The WTP was noted not yet fully operational- some accessories were not yet installed. Only the sump pit and the holding/collecting tank are functional but appeared seldom used. The wastewater mentioned channeled was noted held indefinitely into the collection tank for primary treatment. There was no effluent discharge [from such collection tank]. 3. A sample from the bypass wastewater was collected for laboratory analyses. Result of the analyses show that the bypass wastewater is polluted in terms of color units, BOD and suspended solids, among others. (Please see attached laboratory resul .) 11 From the foregoing reports, it is clear to this Court that there was at least prima facie evidence before the Board that the effluents emanating from Solar's plant exceeded the maximum allowable levels of physical and chemical substances set by the NPCC and that accordingly there was adequate basis supporting the ex parte cease and desist order issued by the Board. It is also well to note that the previous owner of the plant facility Fine Touch Finishing Corporation had been issued a Notice of Violation on 20 December 1985 directing it to cease and refrain from carrying out dyeing operations until the water treatment plant was completed and operational. Solar, the new owner, informed the NPCC of the acquisition of the plant on March 1986. Solar was summoned by the NPCC to a hearing on 13 October 1986 based on the results of the sampling test conducted by the NPCC on 8 August 1986. Petitioner Board refrained from issuing an ex parte cease and desist order until after the November 1986 and September 1988 re-inspections were conducted and the violation of applicable standards was confirmed. In other words, petitioner Board appears to have been remarkably forbearing in its efforts to enforce the applicable standards vis-a-vis Solar. Solar, on the other hand, seemed very casual about its continued discharge of untreated, pollutive effluents into the Tullahan- Tinerejos River, presumably loath to spend the money necessary to put its Wastewater Treatment Plant ("WTP") in an operating condition. In this connection, we note that in Technology Developers, Inc. v. Court of appeals, et al., 12 the Court very recently upheld the summary closure ordered by the Acting Mayor of Sta. Maria, Bulacan, of a pollutioncausing establishment, after finding that the records showed that: 1. No mayor's permit had been secured. While it is true that the matter of determining whether there is a pollution of the environment that requires control if not prohibition of the operation of a business is essentially addressed to the then National Pollution Control Commission of the Ministry of Human 24

Settlements, now the Environmental Management Bureau of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, it must be recognized that the mayor of a town has as much responsibility to protect its inhabitants from pollution, and by virtue of his police power, he may deny the application for a permit to operate a business or otherwise close the same unless appropriate measures are taken to control and/or avoid injury to the health of the residents of the community from the emission in the operation of the business. 2. The Acting Mayor, in a letter of February l6, 1989, called the attention of petitioner to the pollution emitted by the fumes of its plant whose offensive odor "not only pollute the air in the locality but also affect the health of the residents in the area," so that petitioner was ordered to stop its operation until further orders and it was required to bring the following: xxx xxx xxx (3) Region III-Department of Environment and Natural Resources Anti-Pollution permit. (Annex A-2, petition) 3. This action of the Acting Mayor was in response to the complaint of the residents of Barangay Guyong, Sta. Maria, Bulacan, directed to the Provincial Governor through channels (Annex A-B, petition).. . . 4. The closure order of the Acting Mayor was issued only after an investigation was made by Marivic Guina who in her report of December 8, 1988 observed that the fumes emitted by the plant of petitioner goes directly to the surrounding houses and that no proper air pollution device has been installed. (Annex A-9, petition) xxx xxx xxx 6. While petitioner was able to present a temporary permit to operate by the then National Pollution Control Commission on December 15,1987, the permit was good only up to May 25,1988 (Annex A-12, petition). Petitioner had not exerted any effort to extend or validate its permit much less to install any device to control the pollution and prevent any hazard to the health of the residents of the community." In the instant case, the ex parte cease and desist Order was issued not by a local government official but by the Pollution Adjudication Board, the very agency of the Government charged with the task of determining whether the effluents of a particular industrial establishment comply with or violate applicable antipollution statutory and regulatory provisions. Ex parte cease and desist orders are permitted by law and regulations in situations like that here presented precisely because stopping the continuous discharge of pollutive and untreated effluents into the rivers and other inland waters of the Philippines cannot be made to wait until protracted litigation over the ultimate correctness or propriety of such orders has run its full course, including multiple and sequential appeals such as those which Solar has taken, which of course may take several years. The relevant pollution control statute and implementing regulations were enacted and promulgated in the exercise of that pervasive, sovereign power to protect the safety, health, and general welfare and comfort of the public, as well as the protection of plant and animal life, commonly designated as the police power. It is a constitutional commonplace that the ordinary requirements of procedural due process yield to the necessities of protecting vital public interests like those here involved, through the exercise of police power. The Board's ex parte Order and Writ of Execution would, of course, have compelled Solar temporarily to stop its plant operations, a state of affairs Solar could in any case have avoided by simply absorbing the bother and burden of putting its WTP on an operational basis. Industrial establishments are not constitutionally entitled to reduce their capitals costs and operating expenses and to increase their profits by imposing upon the public threats and risks to its safety, health, general welfare and comfort, by disregarding the requirements of anti- pollution statutes and their implementing regulations. It should perhaps be made clear the Court is not here saying that the correctness of the ex parte Order and Writ of Execution may not be contested by Solar in a hearing before the Board itself. Where the establishment affected by an ex parte cease and desist order contests the correctness of the prima facie findings of the Board, the Board must hold a public hearing where such establishment would have an opportunity to controvert the basis of such ex parte order. That such an opportunity is subsequently available is really all that is required by the due process clause of the Constitution in situations like that we have here. The Board's decision rendered after the public hearing may then be tested judicially by an appeal to the Court of Appeals in accordance with Section 7(c) of P.D. No. 984 and Section 42 of the 25

Implementing Rules and Regulations. A subsequent public hearing is precisely what Solar should have sought instead of going to court to seek nullification of the Board's Order and Writ of Execution and instead of appealing to the Court of Appeals. It will be recalled the at the Board in fact gave Solar authority temporarily to continue operations until still another inspection of its wastewater treatment facilities and then another analysis of effluent samples could be taken and evaluated. Solar claims finally that the petition for certiorari was the proper remedy as the questioned Order and Writ of Execution issued by the Board were patent nullities. Since we have concluded that the Order and Writ of Execution were entirely within the lawful authority of petitioner Board, the trial court did not err when it dismissed Solar's petition for certiorari. It follows that the proper remedy was an appeal from the trial court to the Court of Appeals, as Solar did in fact appeal. ACCORDINGLY, the Petition for Review is given DUE COURSE and the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 7 February 1990 and its Resolution dated 10 May 1990 in A.C.-G.R. No. SP 18821 are hereby SET ASIDE. The Order of petitioner Board dated 22 September 1988 and the Writ of Execution, as well as the decision of the trial court dated 21 July 1989, are hereby REINSTATED, without prejudice to the right of Solar to contest the correctness of the basis of the Board's Order and Writ of Execution at a public hearing before the Board. Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur. 16) THIRD DIVISION G.R. No. 110120 March 16, 1994 LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. MANUEL JN. SERAPIO, Presiding Judge RTC, Branch 127, Caloocan City, HON. MACARIO A. ASISTIO, JR., City Mayor of Caloocan and/or THE CITY GOVERNMENT OF CALOOCAN,respondents. Alberto N. Hidalgo and Ma. Teresa T. Oledan for petitioner. The City Legal Officer & Chief, Law Department for Mayor Macario A. Asistio, Jr. and the City Government of Caloocan. ROMERO, J.: The clash between the responsibility of the City Government of Caloocan to dispose off the 350 tons of garbage it collects daily and the growing concern and sensitivity to a pollution-free environment of the residents of Barangay Camarin, Tala Estate, Caloocan City where these tons of garbage are dumped everyday is the hub of this controversy elevated by the protagonists to the Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) for adjudication. The instant case stemmed from an earlier petition filed with this Court by Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA for short) docketed as G.R. No. 107542 against the City Government of Caloocan, et al. In the Resolution of November 10, 1992, this Court referred G.R. No. 107542 to the Court of Appeals for appropriate disposition. Docketed therein as CAG.R. SP 1 promulgated on January 29, 1993 ruled that the LLDA has No. 29449, the Court of Appeals, in a decision no power and authority to issue a cease and desist order enjoining the dumping of garbage in Barangay Camarin, Tala Estate, Caloocan City. The LLDA now seeks, in this petition, a review of the decision of the Court of Appeals. The facts, as disclosed in the records, are undisputed. On March 8, 1991, the Task Force Camarin Dumpsite of Our Lady of Lourdes Parish, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City, filed a letter-complaint 2 with the Laguna Lake Development Authority seeking to stop the operation of the 8.6-hectare open garbage dumpsite in Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City due to its harmful effects on the health of the residents and the possibility of pollution of the water content of the surrounding area. On November 15, 1991, the LLDA conducted an on-site investigation, monitoring and test sampling of the leachate 3 that seeps from said dumpsite to the nearby creek which is a tributary of the Marilao River. The 26

LLDA Legal and Technical personnel found that the City Government of Caloocan was maintaining an open dumpsite at the Camarin area without first securing an Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) from the Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, as required under Presidential Decree No. 1586, 4 and clearance from LLDA as required under Republic Act No. 4850, 5 as amended by Presidential Decree No. 813 and Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983. 6 After a public hearing conducted on December 4, 1991, the LLDA, acting on the complaint of Task Force Camarin Dumpsite, found that the water collected from the leachate and the receiving streams could considerably affect the quality, in turn, of the receiving waters since it indicates the presence of bacteria, other than coliform, which may have contaminated the sample during collection or handling. 7 On December 5, 1991, the LLDA issued a Cease and Desist Order 8 ordering the City Government of Caloocan, Metropolitan Manila Authority, their contractors, and other entities, to completely halt, stop and desist from dumping any form or kind of garbage and other waste matter at the Camarin dumpsite. The dumping operation was forthwith stopped by the City Government of Caloocan. However, sometime in August 1992 the dumping operation was resumed after a meeting held in July 1992 among the City Government of Caloocan, the representatives of Task Force Camarin Dumpsite and LLDA at the Office of Environmental Management Bureau Director Rodrigo U. Fuentes failed to settle the problem. After an investigation by its team of legal and technical personnel on August 14, 1992, the LLDA issued another order reiterating the December 5, 1991, order and issued an Alias Cease and Desist Order enjoining the City Government of Caloocan from continuing its dumping operations at the Camarin area. On September 25, 1992, the LLDA, with the assistance of the Philippine National Police, enforced its Alias Cease and Desist Order by prohibiting the entry of all garbage dump trucks into the Tala Estate, Camarin area being utilized as a dumpsite. Pending resolution of its motion for reconsideration earlier filed on September 17, 1992 with the LLDA, the City Government of Caloocan filed with the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City an action for the declaration of nullity of the cease and desist order with prayer for the issuance of writ of injunction, docketed as Civil Case No. C-15598. In its complaint, the City Government of Caloocan sought to be declared as the sole authority empowered to promote the health and safety and enhance the right of the people in Caloocan City to a balanced ecology within its territorial jurisdiction. 9 On September 25, 1992, the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the LLDA from enforcing its cease and desist order. Subsequently, the case was raffled to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 126 of Caloocan which, at the time, was presided over by Judge Manuel Jn. Serapio of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 127, the pairing judge of the recently-retired presiding judge. The LLDA, for its part, filed on October 2, 1992 a motion to dismiss on the ground, among others, that under Republic Act No. 3931, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 984, otherwise known as the Pollution Control Law, the cease and desist order issued by it which is the subject matter of the complaint is reviewable both upon the law and the facts of the case by the Court of Appeals and not by the Regional Trial Court. 10 On October 12, 1992 Judge Manuel Jn. Serapio issued an order consolidating Civil Case No. C-15598 with Civil Case No. C-15580, an earlier case filed by the Task Force Camarin Dumpsite entitled "Fr. John Moran, et al. vs. Hon. Macario Asistio." The LLDA, however, maintained during the trial that the foregoing cases, being independent of each other, should have been treated separately. On October 16, 1992, Judge Manuel Jn. Serapio, after hearing the motion to dismiss, issued in the consolidated cases an order 11 denying LLDA's motion to dismiss and granting the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the LLDA, its agent and all persons acting for and on its behalf, from enforcing or implementing its cease and desist order which prevents plaintiff City of Caloocan from dumping garbage at the Camarin dumpsite during the pendency of this case and/or until further orders of the court. On November 5, 1992, the LLDA filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction with prayer for restraining order with the Supreme Court, docketed as G.R. No. 107542, seeking to nullify the aforesaid order dated October 16, 1992 issued by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 127 of Caloocan City denying its motion to dismiss. 27

The Court, acting on the petition, issued a Resolution 12 on November 10, 1992 referring the case to the Court of Appeals for proper disposition and at the same time, without giving due course to the petition, required the respondents to comment on the petition and file the same with the Court of Appeals within ten (10) days from notice. In the meantime, the Court issued a temporary restraining order, effective immediately and continuing until further orders from it, ordering the respondents: (1) Judge Manuel Jn. Serapio, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 127, Caloocan City to cease and desist from exercising jurisdiction over the case for declaration of nullity of the cease and desist order issued by the Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA); and (2) City Mayor of Caloocan and/or the City Government of Caloocan to cease and desist from dumping its garbage at the Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City. Respondents City Government of Caloocan and Mayor Macario A. Asistio, Jr. filed on November 12, 1992 a motion for reconsideration and/or to quash/recall the temporary restraining order and an urgent motion for reconsideration alleging that ". . . in view of the calamitous situation that would arise if the respondent city government fails to collect 350 tons of garbage daily for lack of dumpsite (i)t is therefore, imperative that the issue be resolved with dispatch or with sufficient leeway to allow the respondents to find alternative solutions to this garbage problem." On November 17, 1992, the Court issued a Resolution 13 directing the Court of Appeals to immediately set the case for hearing for the purpose of determining whether or not the temporary restraining order issued by the Court should be lifted and what conditions, if any, may be required if it is to be so lifted or whether the restraining order should be maintained or converted into a preliminary injunction. The Court of Appeals set the case for hearing on November 27, 1992, at 10:00 in the morning at the Hearing Room, 3rd Floor, New Building, Court of Appeals. 14 After the oral argument, a conference was set on December 8, 1992 at 10:00 o'clock in the morning where the Mayor of Caloocan City, the General Manager of LLDA, the Secretary of DENR or his duly authorized representative and the Secretary of DILG or his duly authorized representative were required to appear. It was agreed at the conference that the LLDA had until December 15, 1992 to finish its study and review of respondent's technical plan with respect to the dumping of its garbage and in the event of a rejection of respondent's technical plan or a failure of settlement, the parties will submit within 10 days from notice their respective memoranda on the merits of the case, after which the petition shall be deemed submitted for resolution.15 Notwithstanding such efforts, the parties failed to settle the dispute. On April 30, 1993, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision holding that: (1) the Regional Trial Court has no jurisdiction on appeal to try, hear and decide the action for annulment of LLDA's cease and desist order, including the issuance of a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction in relation thereto, since appeal therefrom is within the exclusive and appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals under Section 9, par. (3), of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129; and (2) the Laguna Lake Development Authority has no power and authority to issue a cease and desist order under its enabling law, Republic Act No. 4850, as amended by P.D. No. 813 and Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983. The Court of Appeals thus dismissed Civil Case No. 15598 and the preliminary injunction issued in the said case was set aside; the cease and desist order of LLDA was likewise set aside and the temporary restraining order enjoining the City Mayor of Caloocan and/or the City Government of Caloocan to cease and desist from dumping its garbage at the Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City was lifted, subject, however, to the condition that any future dumping of garbage in said area, shall be in conformity with the procedure and protective works contained in the proposal attached to the records of this case and found on pages 152-160 of the Rollo, which was thereby adopted by reference and made an integral part of the decision, until the corresponding restraining and/or injunctive relief is granted by the proper Court upon LLDA's institution of the necessary legal proceedings. Hence, the Laguna Lake Development Authority filed the instant petition for review on certiorari, now docketed as G.R. No. 110120, with prayer that the temporary restraining order lifted by the Court of Appeals be re-issued until after final determination by this Court of the issue on the proper interpretation of the powers and authority of the LLDA under its enabling law. 28

On July, 19, 1993, the Court issued a temporary restraining order 16 enjoining the City Mayor of Caloocan and/or the City Government of Caloocan to cease and desist from dumping its garbage at the Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City, effective as of this date and containing until otherwise ordered by the Court. It is significant to note that while both parties in this case agree on the need to protect the environment and to maintain the ecological balance of the surrounding areas of the Camarin open dumpsite, the question as to which agency can lawfully exercise jurisdiction over the matter remains highly open to question. The City Government of Caloocan claims that it is within its power, as a local government unit, pursuant to the general welfare provision of the Local Government Code, 17 to determine the effects of the operation of the dumpsite on the ecological balance and to see that such balance is maintained. On the basis of said contention, it questioned, from the inception of the dispute before the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, the power and authority of the LLDA to issue a cease and desist order enjoining the dumping of garbage in the Barangay Camarin over which the City Government of Caloocan has territorial jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals sustained the position of the City of Caloocan on the theory that Section 7 of Presidential Decree No. 984, otherwise known as the Pollution Control law, authorizing the defunct National Pollution Control Commission to issue an ex-parte cease and desist order was not incorporated in Presidential Decree No. 813 nor in Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983. The Court of Appeals ruled that under Section 4, par. (d), of Republic Act No. 4850, as amended, the LLDA is instead required "to institute the necessary legal proceeding against any person who shall commence to implement or continue implementation of any project, plan or program within the Laguna de Bay region without previous clearance from the Authority." The LLDA now assails, in this partition for review, the abovementioned ruling of the Court of Appeals, contending that, as an administrative agency which was granted regulatory and adjudicatory powers and functions by Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendatory laws, Presidential Decree No. 813 and Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983, it is invested with the power and authority to issue a cease and desist order pursuant to Section 4 par. (c), (d), (e), (f) and (g) of Executive Order No. 927 series of 1983 which provides, thus: Sec. 4. Additional Powers and Functions. The authority shall have the following powers and functions: xxx xxx xxx (c) Issue orders or decisions to compel compliance with the provisions of this Executive Order and its implementing rules and regulations only after proper notice and hearing. (d) Make, alter or modify orders requiring the discontinuance of pollution specifying the conditions and the time within which such discontinuance must be accomplished. (e) Issue, renew, or deny permits, under such conditions as it may determine to be reasonable, for the prevention and abatement of pollution, for the discharge of sewage, industrial waste, or for the installation or operation of sewage works and industrial disposal system or parts thereof. (f) After due notice and hearing, the Authority may also revoke, suspend or modify any permit issued under this Order whenever the same is necessary to prevent or abate pollution. (g) Deputize in writing or request assistance of appropriate government agencies or instrumentalities for the purpose of enforcing this Executive Order and its implementing rules and regulations and the orders and decisions of the Authority. The LLDA claims that the appellate court deliberately suppressed and totally disregarded the above provisions of Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983, which granted administrative quasi-judicial functions to LLDA on pollution abatement cases. In light of the relevant environmental protection laws cited which are applicable in this case, and the corresponding overlapping jurisdiction of government agencies implementing these laws, the resolution of the issue of whether or not the LLDA has the authority and power to issue an order which, in its nature and effect was injunctive, necessarily requires a determination of the threshold question: Does the Laguna Lake Development Authority, under its Charter and its amendatory laws, have the authority to entertain the complaint against the dumping of garbage in the open dumpsite in Barangay Camarin authorized by the City Government of Caloocan which is allegedly endangering the health, safety, and welfare of the residents 29

therein and the sanitation and quality of the water in the area brought about by exposure to pollution caused by such open garbage dumpsite? The matter of determining whether there is such pollution of the environment that requires control, if not prohibition, of the operation of a business establishment is essentially addressed to the Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) of the DENR which, by virtue of Section 16 of Executive Order No. 192, series of 1987, 18 has assumed the powers and functions of the defunct National Pollution Control Commission created under Republic Act No. 3931. Under said Executive Order, a Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB) under the Office of the DENR Secretary now assumes the powers and functions of the National Pollution Control Commission with respect to adjudication of pollution cases. 19 As a general rule, the adjudication of pollution cases generally pertains to the Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB), except in cases where the special law provides for another forum. It must be recognized in this regard that the LLDA, as a specialized administrative agency, is specifically mandated under Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendatory laws to carry out and make effective the declared national policy 20 of promoting and accelerating the development and balanced growth of the Laguna Lake area and the surrounding provinces of Rizal and Laguna and the cities of San Pablo, Manila, Pasay, Quezon and Caloocan 21 with due regard and adequate provisions for environmental management and control, preservation of the quality of human life and ecological systems, and the prevention of undue ecological disturbances, deterioration and pollution. Under such a broad grant and power and authority, the LLDA, by virtue of its special charter, obviously has the responsibility to protect the inhabitants of the Laguna Lake region from the deleterious effects of pollutants emanating from the discharge of wastes from the surrounding areas. In carrying out the aforementioned declared policy, the LLDA is mandated, among others, to pass upon and approve or disapprove all plans, programs, and projects proposed by local government offices/agencies within the region, public corporations, and private persons or enterprises where such plans, programs and/or projects are related to those of the LLDA for the development of the region. 22 In the instant case, when the complainant Task Force Camarin Dumpsite of Our Lady of Lourdes Parish, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City, filed its letter-complaint before the LLDA, the latter's jurisdiction under its charter was validly invoked by complainant on the basis of its allegation that the open dumpsite project of the City Government of Caloocan in Barangay Camarin was undertaken without a clearance from the LLDA, as required under Section 4, par. (d), of Republic Act. No. 4850, as amended by P.D. No. 813 and Executive Order No. 927. While there is also an allegation that the said project was without an Environmental Compliance Certificate from the Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) of the DENR, the primary jurisdiction of the LLDA over this case was recognized by the Environmental Management Bureau of the DENR when the latter acted as intermediary at the meeting among the representatives of the City Government of Caloocan, Task Force Camarin Dumpsite and LLDA sometime in July 1992 to discuss the possibility of re-opening the open dumpsite. Having thus resolved the threshold question, the inquiry then narrows down to the following issue: Does the LLDA have the power and authority to issue a "cease and desist" order under Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendatory laws, on the basis of the facts presented in this case, enjoining the dumping of garbage in Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City. The irresistible answer is in the affirmative. The cease and desist order issued by the LLDA requiring the City Government of Caloocan to stop dumping its garbage in the Camarin open dumpsite found by the LLDA to have been done in violation of Republic Act No. 4850, as amended, and other relevant environment laws, 23 cannot be stamped as an unauthorized exercise by the LLDA of injunctive powers. By its express terms, Republic Act No. 4850, as amended by P.D. No. 813 and Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983, authorizes the LLDA to "make, alter or modify order requiring the discontinuance or pollution." 24 (Emphasis supplied) Section 4, par. (d) explicitly authorizes the LLDA to makewhatever order may be necessary in the exercise of its jurisdiction. To be sure, the LLDA was not expressly conferred the power "to issue and ex-parte cease and desist order" in a language, as suggested by the City Government of Caloocan, similar to the express grant to the defunct National Pollution Control Commission under Section 7 of P.D. No. 984 which, admittedly was not 30

reproduced in P.D. No. 813 and E.O. No. 927, series of 1983. However, it would be a mistake to draw therefrom the conclusion that there is a denial of the power to issue the order in question when the power "to make, alter or modify orders requiring the discontinuance of pollution" is expressly and clearly bestowed upon the LLDA by Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983. Assuming arguendo that the authority to issue a "cease and desist order" were not expressly conferred by law, there is jurisprudence enough to the effect that the rule granting such authority need not necessarily be express.25 While it is a fundamental rule that an administrative agency has only such powers as are expressly granted to it by law, it is likewise a settled rule that an administrative agency has also such powers as are necessarily implied in the exercise of its express powers. 26 In the exercise, therefore, of its express powers under its charter as a regulatory and quasi-judicial body with respect to pollution cases in the Laguna Lake region, the authority of the LLDA to issue a "cease and desist order" is, perforce, implied. Otherwise, it may well be reduced to a "toothless" paper agency. In this connection, it must be noted that in Pollution Adjudication Board v. Court of Appeals, et al., 27 the Court ruled that the Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB) has the power to issue an ex-parte cease and desist order when there is prima facie evidence of an establishment exceeding the allowable standards set by the anti-pollution laws of the country. The ponente, Associate Justice Florentino P. Feliciano, declared: Ex parte cease and desist orders are permitted by law and regulations in situations like that here presented precisely because stopping the continuous discharge of pollutive and untreated effluents into the rivers and other inland waters of the Philippines cannot be made to wait until protracted litigation over the ultimate correctness or propriety of such orders has run its full course, including multiple and sequential appeals such as those which Solar has taken, which of course may take several years. The relevant pollution control statute and implementing regulations were enacted and promulgated in the exercise of that pervasive, sovereign power to protect the safety, health, and general welfare and comfort of the public, as well as the protection of plant and animal life, commonly designated as the police power. It is a constitutional commonplace that the ordinary requirements of procedural due process yield to the necessities of protecting vital public interests like those here involved, through the exercise of police power. . . . The immediate response to the demands of "the necessities of protecting vital public interests" gives vitality to the statement on ecology embodied in the Declaration of Principles and State Policies or the 1987 Constitution. Article II, Section 16 which provides: The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature. As a constitutionally guaranteed right of every person, it carries the correlative duty of non-impairment. This is but in consonance with the declared policy of the state "to protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness among them." 28 It is to be borne in mind that the Philippines is party to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Alma Conference Declaration of 1978 which recognize health as a fundamental human right. 29 The issuance, therefore, of the cease and desist order by the LLDA, as a practical matter of procedure under the circumstances of the case, is a proper exercise of its power and authority under its charter and its amendatory laws. Had the cease and desist order issued by the LLDA been complied with by the City Government of Caloocan as it did in the first instance, no further legal steps would have been necessary. The charter of LLDA, Republic Act No. 4850, as amended, instead of conferring upon the LLDA the means of directly enforcing such orders, has provided under its Section 4 (d) the power to institute "necessary legal proceeding against any person who shall commence to implement or continue implementation of any project, plan or program within the Laguna de Bay region without previous clearance from the LLDA." Clearly, said provision was designed to invest the LLDA with sufficiently broad powers in the regulation of all projects initiated in the Laguna Lake region, whether by the government or the private sector, insofar as the implementation of these projects is concerned. It was meant to deal with cases which might possibly arise where decisions or orders issued pursuant to the exercise of such broad powers may not be obeyed, resulting in the thwarting of its laudabe objective. To meet such contingencies, then the writs of mandamus and injunction which are beyond the power of the LLDA to issue, may be sought from the proper courts. 31

Insofar as the implementation of relevant anti-pollution laws in the Laguna Lake region and its surrounding provinces, cities and towns are concerned, the Court will not dwell further on the related issues raised which are more appropriately addressed to an administrative agency with the special knowledge and expertise of the LLDA. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The temporary restraining order issued by the Court on July 19, 1993 enjoining the City Mayor of Caloocan and/or the City Government of Caloocan from dumping their garbage at the Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City is hereby made permanent. SO ORDERED. Feliciano, Bidin, Melo and Vitug, JJ., concur. 17) SECOND DIVISION THE CITY GOVERNMENT OF G.R. No. 180206 BAGUIO CITY, represented by REINALDO BAUTISTA, JR., Present: City Mayor; THE ANTI-SQUATTING COMMITTEE, represented by ATTY. QUISUMBING, J., MELCHOR CARLOS R. RAGANES, Chairperson, CITY BUILDINGS and CARPIO MORALES, ARCHITECTURE office, represented TINGA, by OSCAR FLORES; and PUBLIC VELASCO, JR., and ORDER and SAFETY OFFICE, BRION, JJ. Represented by EMMANUEL REYES, Petitioners. - versus Promulgated: ATTY. BRAIN MASWENG, Regional Officer-National Commission on Indigenous People-CAR, ELVIN GUMANGAN, NARCISO BASATAN and LAZARO BAWAS, Respondents. February 4, 2009

x--------------------------------------------------------------------------x DECISION TINGA, J.: Petitioners, the City Government of Baguio City, represented by its Mayor, Reinaldo Bautista, Jr., the AntiSquatting Committee, represented by Atty. Melchor Carlos R. Rabanes; the City Buildings and Architecture Office, represented by Oscar Flores; and the Public Order and Safety Office, represented by Emmanuel Reyes and later substituted by Gregorio Deligero, assail the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP No. 96895, dated April 16, 2007, and its Resolution[2] dated September 11, 2007, which affirmed the injunctive writ issued by the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) against the demolition orders of petitioners. 32

The following undisputed facts are culled from the assailed Decision: The case stemmed from the three (3) Demolition Orders issued by the City Mayor of Baguio City, Braulio D. Yaranon, ordering the demolition of the illegal structures constructed by Lazaro Bawas, Alexander Ampaguey, Sr. and a certain Mr. Basatan on a portion of the Busol Watershed Reservation located at Aurora Hill, Baguio City, without the required building permits and in violation of Section 69 of Presidential Decree No. 705, as amended, Presidential Decree No. 1096 and Republic Act No. 7279. Pursuant thereto, the corresponding demolition advices dated September 19, 2006 were issued informing the occupants thereon of the intended demolition of the erected structures on October 17 to 20, 2006. Consequently, Elvin Gumangan, Narciso Basatan and Lazaro Bawas (hereinafter private respondents) filed a petition for injunction with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction against the Office of the City Mayor of Baguio City through its Acting City Mayor, Reynaldo Bautista, the City Building and Architecture Office, the Anti-Squatting Task Force, and the Public Order and Safety Division, among others, (collectively called petitioners) before the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples, Cordillera Administrative Region (NCIP-CAR), Regional Hearing Office, La Trinidad, Benguet, docketed as Case No. 31-CAR-06. In their petition, private respondents basically claimed that the lands where their residential houses stand are their ancestral lands which they have been occupying and possessing openly and continuously since time immemorial; that their ownership thereof have been expressly recognized in Proclamation No. 15 dated April 27, 1922 and recommended by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) for exclusion from the coverage of the Busol Forest Reserve. They, thus, contended that the demolition of their residential houses is a violation of their right of possession and ownership of ancestral lands accorded by the Constitution and the law, perforce, must be restrained. On October 16 and 19, 2006, Regional Hearing Officer Atty. Brain S. Masweng of the NCIP issued the two (2) assailed temporary restraining orders (TRO) directing the petitioners and all persons acting for and in their behalf to refrain from enforcing Demolition Advice dated September 18, 2006; Demolition Order dated September 19, 2006; Demolition Order No. 25, Series of 2004; Demolition Order No. 33, Series of 2005; and Demolition Order No. 28, Series of 2004, for a total period of twenty (20) days. Subsequently, the NCIP issued the other assailed Resolution dated November 10, 2006 granting the private respondents application for preliminary injunction subject to the posting of an injunctive bond each in the amount of P10,000.00.[3] Acting on the petition for certiorari filed by petitioners,[4] the Court of Appeals upheld the jurisdiction of the NCIP over the action filed by private respondents and affirmed the temporary restraining orders dated October 16[5] and 19, 2006,[6] and the Resolution dated November 10, 2006,[7] granting the application for a writ of preliminary injunction, issued by the NCIP. The appellate court also ruled that Baguio City is not exempt from the coverage of Republic Act No. 8371, otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA). Petitioners assert that the NCIP has no jurisdiction to hear and decide main actions for injunction such as the one filed by private respondents. They claim that the NCIP has the authority to issue temporary restraining orders and writs of preliminary injunction only as auxiliary remedies to cases pending before it. Further, the IPRA provides that Baguio City shall be governed by its Charter. Thus, private respondents cannot claim their alleged ancestral lands under the provisions of the IPRA. 33

Petitioners contend that private respondents are not entitled to the protection of an injunctive writ because they encroached upon the Busol Forest Reservation and built structures thereon without the requisite permit. Moreover, this Court, in Heirs of Gumangan v. Court of Appeals,[8] had already declared that the Busol Forest Reservation is inalienable and possession thereof, no matter how long, cannot convert the same into private property. Even assuming that private respondents have a pending application for ancestral land claim, their right is at best contingent and cannot come under the protective mantle of injunction. Petitioners also claim that the Busol Forest Reservation is exempt from ancestral claims as it is needed for public welfare. It is allegedly one of the few remaining forests in Baguio City and is the citys main watershed. Finally, petitioners contend that the demolition orders were issued pursuant to the police power of the local government. In their Comment[9] dated March 1, 2007, private respondents defend the jurisdiction of the NCIP to take cognizance of and decide main actions for injunction arguing that the IPRA does not state that the NCIP may only issue such writs of injunction as auxiliary remedies. Private respondents also contend that the IPRA does not exempt Baguio City from its coverage nor does it state that there are no ancestral lands in Baguio City. As members of the Ibaloi Indigenous Community native to Baguio City, private respondents are treated as squatters despite the fact that they hold native title to their ancestral land. The IPRA allegedly now recognizes ancestral lands held by native title as never to have been public lands. Private respondents aver that the Busol Forest Reservation is subject to ancestral land claims. In fact, Proclamation No. 15[10]dated April 27, 1922, which declared the area a forest reserve, allegedly did not nullify the vested rights of private respondents over their ancestral lands and even identified the claimants of the particular portions within the forest reserve. This claim of ownership is an exception to the governments contention that the whole area is a forest reservation. Lastly, private respondents assert that the power of the city mayor to order the demolition of certain structures is not absolute. Regard should be taken of the fact that private respondents cannot be issued building permits precisely because they do not have paper titles over their ancestral lands, a requirement for the issuance of a building permit under the National Building Code. Petitioners Reply to Comment[11] dated June 11, 2008 merely reiterates their previous arguments. We shall first dispose of the elemental issue of the NCIPs jurisdiction. The NCIP is the primary government agency responsible for the formulation and implementation of policies, plans and programs to protect and promote the rights and well-being of indigenous cultural communities/indigenous peoples (ICCs/IPs) and the recognition of their ancestral domains as well as their rights thereto.[12] In order to fully effectuate its mandate, the NCIP is vested with jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving the rights of ICCs/IPs. The only condition precedent to the NCIPs assumption of jurisdiction over such disputes is that the parties thereto shall have exhausted all remedies provided under their customary laws and have obtained a certification from the Council of Elders/Leaders who participated in the attempt to settle the dispute that the same has not been resolved.[13] In addition, NCIP Administrative Circular No. 1-03 dated April 9, 2003, known as the Rules on Pleadings, Practice and Procedure Before the NCIP, reiterates the jurisdiction of the NCIP over claims and disputes 34

involving ancestral lands and enumerates the actions that may be brought before the commission. Sec. 5, Rule III thereof provides: Sec. 5. Jurisdiction of the NCIP.The NCIP through its Regional Hearing Offices shall exercise jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs and all cases pertaining to the implementation, enforcement, and interpretation of R.A. 8371, including but not limited to the following: (1) Original and Exclusive Jurisdiction of the Regional Hearing Office (RHO): a. Cases involving disputes and controversies over ancestral lands/domains of ICCs/IPs; b. Cases involving violations of the requirement of free and prior and informed consent of ICCs/IPs; c. Actions for enforcement of decisions of ICCs/IPs involving violations of customary laws or desecration of ceremonial sites, sacred places, or rituals; d. Actions for redemption/reconveyance under Section 8(b) of R.A. 8371; and e. Such other cases analogous to the foregoing. (2) Original Jurisdiction of the Regional Hearing Officer: a. Cases affecting property rights, claims of ownership, hereditary succession, and settlement of land disputes, between and among ICCs/IPs that have not been settled under customary laws; and b. Actions for damages arising out of any violation of Republic Act No. 8371.

(3) Exclusive and Original Jurisdiction of the Commission: a. Petition for cancellation of Certificate of Ancestral Domain Titles/Certificate of Ancestral Land Titles (CADTs/CALTs) alleged to have been fraudulently acquired by, and issued to, any person or community as provided for under Section 54 of R.A. 8371. Provided that such action is filed within one (1) year from the date of registration. In order to determine whether the NCIP has jurisdiction over the dispute in accordance with the foregoing provisions, it is necessary to resolve, on the basis of the allegations in their petition, whether private respondents are members of ICCs/IPs. In their petition[14] filed before the NCIP, private respondents, members of the Ibaloi tribe who first settled in Baguio City, were asserting ownership of portions of the Busol Forest Reservation which they claim to be their ancestral lands. Correctly denominated as a petition for injunction as it sought to prevent the enforcement of the demolition orders issued by the City Mayor, the petition traced private respondents ancestry to Molintas and Gumangan and asserted their possession, occupation and utilization of their ancestral lands. The petition also alleged that private respondents claim over these lands had been recognized by Proclamation No. 15 which mentions the names of Molintas and Gumangan as having claims over portions of the Busol Forest Reservation.[15]

Clearly then, the allegations in the petition, which axiomatically determine the nature of the action and the jurisdiction of a particular tribunal,[16] squarely qualify it as a dispute(s) or controversy(s) over ancestral lands/domains of ICCs/IPs within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the NCIP-RHO. The IPRA, furthermore, endows the NCIP with the power to issue temporary restraining orders and writs of injunction. Sec. 69 thereof states: 35

Sec. 69. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the NCIP.The NCIP shall have the power and authority: a) To promulgate rules and regulations governing the hearing and disposition of cases filed before it as well as those pertaining to its internal functions and such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act; b) To administer oaths, summon the parties to a controversy, issue subpoenas requiring the attendance and testimony of witnesses or the production of such books, papers, contracts, records, agreements, and other document of similar nature as may be material to a just determination of the matter under investigation or hearing conducted in pursuance of this Act; c) To hold any person in contempt, directly or indirectly, and impose appropriate penalties therefor; and

d) To enjoin any or all acts involving or arising from any case pending before it which, if not restrained forthwith, may cause grave or irreparable damage to any of the parties to the case or seriously affect social or economic activity. [Emphasis supplied]

NCIP Administrative Circular No. 1-03 echoes the above-quoted provision in Sec. 82, Rule XV, which provides: Sec. 82. Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order.A writ of preliminary injunction or restraining order may be granted by the Commission pursuant to the provisions of Sections 59 and 69 of R.A. [No.] 8371 when it is established, on the basis of sworn allegations in a petition, that the acts complained of involving or arising from any case, if not restrained forthwith, may cause grave or irreparable damage or injury to any of the parties, or seriously affect social or economic activity. This power may also be exercised by RHOs in cases pending before them in order to preserve the rights of the parties. As can be gleaned from the foregoing provisions, the NCIP may issue temporary restraining orders and writs of injunction without any prohibition against the issuance of the writ when the main action is for injunction. The power to issue temporary restraining orders or writs of injunction allows parties to a dispute over which the NCIP has jurisdiction to seek relief against any action which may cause them grave or irreparable damage or injury. In this case, the Regional Hearing Officer issued the injunctive writ because its jurisdiction was called upon to protect and preserve the rights of private respondents who are undoubtedly members of ICCs/IPs. Parenthetically, in order to reinforce the powers of the NCIP, the IPRA even provides that no restraining order or preliminary injunction may be issued by any inferior court against the NCIP in any case, dispute or controversy arising from or necessary to the

36

interpretation of the IPRA and other laws relating to ICCs/IPs and ancestral domains.[17] Petitioners argue that Baguio City is exempt from the provisions of the IPRA, and necessarily the jurisdiction of the NCIP, by virtue of Sec. 78 thereof, which states: SEC. 78. Special Provision.The City of Baguio shall remain to be governed by its Charter and all lands proclaimed as part of its townsite reservation shall remain as such until otherwise reclassified by appropriate legislation: Provided, That prior land rights and titles recognized and/or acquired through any judicial, administrative or other processes before the effectivity of this Act shall remain valid: Provided, further, That this provision shall not apply to any territory which becomes part of the City of Baguio after the effectivity of this Act. [Emphasis supplied] The foregoing provision indeed states that Baguio City is governed by its own charter. Its exemption from the IPRA, however, cannot ipso facto be deduced because the law concedes the validity of prior land rights recognized or acquired through any process before its effectivity. The IPRA demands that the citys charter respect the validity of these recognized land rights and titles. The crucial question to be asked then is whether private respondents ancestral land claim was indeed recognized by Proclamation No. 15, in which case, their right thereto may be protected by an injunctive writ. After all, before a writ of preliminary injunction may be issued, petitioners must show that there exists a right to be protected and that the acts against which injunction is directed are violative of said right.[18] Proclamation No. 15, however, does not appear to be a definitive recognition of private respondents ancestral land claim. The proclamation merely identifies the Molintas and Gumangan families, the predecessors-in-interest of private respondents, as claimants of a portion of the Busol Forest Reservation but does not acknowledge vested rights over the same. In fact, Proclamation No. 15 explicitly withdraws the Busol Forest Reservation from sale or settlement. It provides: Pursuant to the provisions of section eighteen hundred and twenty-six of Act Numbered Twenty-seven Hundred and eleven[,] I hereby establish the Busol Forest Reservation to be administered by the Bureau of Forestry for the purpose of conserving and protecting water and timber, the protection of the water supply being of primary importance and all other uses of the forest are to be subordinated to that purpose. I therefore withdraw from sale or settlement the following described parcels of the public domain situated in the Township of La Trinidad, City of Baguio,Mountain Province, Island of Luzon, to wit: The fact remains, too, that the Busol Forest Reservation was declared by the Court as inalienable in Heirs of Gumangan v. Court of Appeals.[19] The declaration of the Busol Forest Reservation as such precludes its conversion into private property. Relatedly, the courts are not endowed with jurisdictional competence to adjudicate forest lands. All told, although the NCIP has the authority to issue temporary restraining orders and writs of injunction, we are not convinced that private respondents are entitled to the relief granted by the Commission. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP No. 96895 datedApril 16, 2007 and its Resolution dated September 11, 2007 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Case No. 31-CAR-06 entitled,Elvin Gumangan, Narciso Basatan and Lazaro Bawas v. Office of the City Mayor of Baguio City, et al. is DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs. 37

SO ORDERED. 18) SECOND DIVISION [G.R. No. 119682. January 21, 1999] FRANCISCO BAGUIO, petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, RICARDO T. MICHAEL, in his capacity as Heir-Successor of WILLIAM MICHAEL, SR., and as President of MICHAEL SLIPWAYS, INC., and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents. DECISION MENDOZA, J.: This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals [1] affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 28, of Mandaue City, nullifying Free Patent No. 7757 and Original Certificate of Title No. 0-15457 issued in the name of petitioner Francisco Baguio. The patent and certificate of title cover a parcel of land, consisting of 5,870 sq. m., in Catarman, Liloan, Cebu. Known as Lot 1426, Case 2, Pls. 823, the land was declared by the government public land in 1963. The evidence shows that, on August 2, 1963, private respondent Ricardo Michaels predecessor-in-interest, William Michael, filed with the Bureau of Lands an application for foreshore lease of the land. The application was recommended for approval by the land investigator who also recommended that the applicant be granted a provisional permit to occupy the land for one year from October 4, 1963 to October 3, 1964. On October 8, 1963, by virtue of a permit granted to him by the Bureau of Lands, William Michael made some reclamation on the land, built a fence around the premises, and constructed a bridge over a portion which was under water. Upon the expiration of the permit on October 4, 1964, the Highways District Engineer recommended to the Director of Lands that the land be leased to Michael. On the other hand, the land investigator recommended granting Michael the authority to survey the foreshore land in view of the completion of the reclamation made by him on the premises. On February 25, 1968, Michael filed a miscellaneous sales application covering the reclaimed foreshore land. On November 9, 1976, petitioner Baguio applied to the Bureau of Lands for a free patent covering the same land. In his application, petitioner stated that the land was agricultural land and not claimed or occupied by any other person and that he had been in actual and continuous possession and cultivation of the same. On the basis of these representations, a free patent was issued to him and, on January 10, 1978, Original Certificate of Title No. 0-15457 was issued in his name by the Register of Deeds of Cebu. On April 6, 1978, petitioner demanded payment of rentals from William Michael for the use of the land occupied by Michael Slipways, Inc.. On August 4, 1981, petitioner filed an opposition to Michaels miscellaneous sales application covering the land on the ground that he was the registered owner thereof. William Michael in turn protested the issuance by the Bureau of Lands of a free patent to petitioner. He claimed that he had been in actual possession of the land since 1963 and that he had introduced substantial improvements thereon. On February 16, 1989, upon the recommendation of the Land Management Bureau of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, the government, represented by the Director of Lands, filed a petition for cancellation of title and/or reversion of land against petitioner Baguio and the Register of Deeds of Cebu. The case was filed in the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City which granted private respondent Ricardo Michael leave to intervene as heir and successor-in-interest of William Michael and as president of Michael Slipways, Inc. On July 20, 1992, the trial court rendered a decision canceling the free patent and the certificate of title of petitioner Baguio, ordering the reversion of the land to the public domain, and declaring private respondent Michael the true and lawful occupant of the land. The trial court ruled that the false statements made by petitioner Baguio in his application for free patent had the effect of ipso facto canceling the free patent and the title of petitioner. Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which, on February 28, 1995, affirmed the decision of the trial court. Hence, this petition for review. Petitioner contends that 38

1. The public respondent erred in not declaring that respondent Republic of the Philippines action was already barred by prescription. 2. Granting arguendo that respondents action was not barred by prescription, nonetheless, the Regional Trial Court, erred in finding that petitioner acted in bad faith and procured the issuance of the Free Patent (VII-I)-7757 and the Original Certificate of Title No. 0-15457 through fraud and misrepresentation. 3. Granting arguendo that respondent Republics action should prosper, nonetheless, the Regional Trial Court erred in (d)eclaring intervenor (private respondent herein) as the true and lawful possessor and occupant of the land subject of the intervention. 4. The Regional Trial court erred in finding that the land in question is a foreshore land. We find these contentions to be without merit. First. It is true that, once a patent is registered and the corresponding certificate of title is issued, the land covered by them ceases to be part of the public domain and becomes private property, and the Torrens Title issued pursuant to the patent becomes indefeasible upon the expiration of one year from the date of issuance of such patent.[2] However, as held in Director of Lands v. De Luna,[3] even after the lapse of one year, the State may still bring an action under 101[4]of Commonwealth Act No. 141 for the reversion to the public domain of land which has been fraudulently granted to private individuals.[5] Such action is not barred by prescription, and this is settled law.[6] Indeed, the indefeasibility of a certificate of title cannot be invoked by one who procured the title by means of fraud.[7] Public policy demands that one who obtains title to public land through fraud should not be allowed to benefit therefrom.[8] Second. Petitioner contends that the trial court erred in finding that he was guilty of fraud in procuring the issuance of the free patent and the corresponding certificate of title. He insists that what he stated in his application for free patent (that the subject land is agricultural land not claimed or occupied by persons other than himself and that he had been in actual and continuous possession and cultivation of the same) were all true. He also assails the finding of the trial court that the subject land is foreshore land. Petitioner puts in issue the findings of fact of the trial court. But the only errors which are reviewable by this Court in a petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals are those allegedly committed by the latter court and not those of the trial court. Petitioners assignment of errors is thus misplaced, and for this reason, the petition should be dismissed. Furthermore, only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari. In the absence of any showing of lack of basis for the conclusions made by the Court of Appeals, this Court will not disturb the factual findings of the appellate court.[9] In this case, petitioner has not shown that the decision of the Court of Appeals is not supported by substantial evidence so as to justify this Court in departing from the general rule which regards the findings of the appellate court as final. At any rate, we have decided to consider the issues raised insofar as they are pertinent to the appellate courts decision in order to put them to rest once and for all. In his free patent application, petitioner declared under oath that the land in question was an agricultural land not claimed or occupied by any other person; that he had continuously possessed and occupied it; and that he had introduced improvements thereon. These declarations constitute fraud and misrepresentation. The government has proven that, contrary to these allegations, as early as September 2, 1963, i.e., thirteen (13) years before the alleged entry of petitioner on the land, private respondents predecessor-in-interest, William Michael, had already filed a foreshore lease application over the same; that on February 25, 1968, William Michael filed a miscellaneous sales application over the land; that since 1963 up to the present, private respondent has been continuously in possession of the land on which he has been operating a drydocking service under the style of Michael Slipways, Inc.; and that private respondent Ricardo Michael had made improvements thereon consisting of the reclamation of a portion of the land, the construction of the fence thereon, and the construction of a bridge over a portion under water. In addition, it has been duly established that the land in question is foreshore land, not agricultural. The fact that the land is being used by private respondent Ricardo Michael in his drydocking operations is evidence that the land is foreshore land. Moreover, there would have been no need to reclaim a portion of the land if it had not been under seawater. 39

Petitioner is guilty of making false statements in his application for a free patent thus justifying the annulment of his title. Sec. 91 of C.A. No. 141 (Public Land Act) provides: The statements made in the application shall be considered as essential conditions and parts of any concession, title, or permit issued on the basis of such application, and any false statement therein or omission of facts altering, changing or modifying the consideration of the facts set forth in such statements, and any subsequent modification, alteration, or change of the material facts set forth in the application shall ipso facto produce the cancellation of the concession, title or permit granted. It shall be the duty of the Director of Lands, from time to time and whenever he may deem it advisable, to make the necessary investigations for the purpose of ascertaining whether the material facts set out in the application are true, or whether they continue to exist and are maintained and preserved in good faith, and for the purpose of such investigation, the Director of Lands is hereby empowered to issue subpoenas and subpoenas duces tecum and, if necessary, to obtain compulsory process from the courts. In every investigation made in accordance with this section, the existence of bad faith, fraud, concealment, or fraudulent and illegal modification of essential facts shall be presumed if the grantee or possessor of the land shall refuse or fail to obey a subpoena or subpoena duces tecum lawfully issued by the Director of Land or his authorized delegates or agents, or shall refuse or fail to give direct and specific answers to pertinent questions, and on the basis of such presumption, an order of cancellation may issue without further proceedings. As already stated, the indefeasibility of a title does not attach to titles secured by fraud and misrepresentation. The registration of a patent under the Torrens System merely confirms the registrants title. It does not vest title where there is none because registration under this system is not a mode of acquiring ownership.[10] Third. Petitioner assails the trial courts finding, as affirmed by the appellate court, that private respondent Michael is the true and lawful possessor of the subject land. He argues that private respondent, being a mere heir and successor-in-interest of William Michael and not the person who filed the foreshore lease and the miscellaneous sales applications, has no right to the land in dispute. Suffice it to state that it was clearly proven that William Michael had already been in possession of the land under a provisional permit to occupy the same in 1963. Petitioner applied for a free patent only in 1976, thirteen (13) years later. In addition, William Michael had filed a sales application covering the land in 1968,i.e., eight (8) years before petitioner filed his free patent application. The trial court and the Court of Appeals, therefore, correctly held William Michael and private respondent Ricardo Michael to be the true and rightful possessors of the land in question. The fact that private respondent Michael is merely the successor of the original foreshore lease and sales applicant, William Michael, does not make him any less entitled to the possession of the land. Sec. 105 of the Public Land Act provides that, in case of his death, the original applicant shall be succeeded in his rights and obligations by his legal heirs with respect to the land applied for or leased.[11] WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED. Bellosillo (Chairman), Puno, Quisumbing, and Buena, JJ., concur. 19) SECOND DIVISION

40

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

G.R. No. 134209 Present: PUNO, J., Chairperson, SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, CORONA, AZCUNA, and GARCIA, JJ. Promulgated:

- versus -

CELESTINA NAGUIAT, Respondent.

January 24, 2006

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------x DECISION GARCIA, J.: Before the Court is this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking the reversal of the Decision[1] dated May 29, 1998 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 37001 which affirmed an earlier decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court at Iba, Zambales, Branch 69 in Land Registration Case No. N25-1. The decision under review recites the factual backdrop, as follows: This is an application for registration of title to four (4) parcels of land located in Panan, Botolan, Zambales, more particularly described in the amended application filed by Celestina Naguiat on 29 December 1989 with the Regional Trial Court of Zambales, Branch 69. Applicant [herein respondent] alleges, inter alia, that she is the owner of the said parcels of land having acquired them by purchase from the LID Corporation which likewise acquired the same from Demetria Calderon, Josefina Moraga and Fausto Monje and their predecessors-in-interest who have been in possession thereof for more than thirty (30) years; and that to the best of her knowledge, said lots suffer no mortgage or encumbrance of whatever kind nor is there any person having any interest, legal or equitable, or in possession thereof. On 29 June 1990, the Republic of the Philippines [herein petitioner]. . . filed an opposition to the application on the ground that neither the applicant nor her predecessors-in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the lands in question since 12 June 1945 or prior thereto; that the muniments of title and tax payment receipts of applicant do not constitute competent and sufficient evidence of a bona-fide acquisition of the lands applied for or of his open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation thereof in the concept of (an) owner; that the applicants claim of ownership in fee simple on the basis of Spanish title or grant can no longer be availed of . . .; and that the parcels of land applied for are part of the public domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines not subject to private appropriation. 41

On 15 October 1990, the lower court issued an order of general default as against the whole world, with the exception of the Office of the Solicitor General, and proceeded with the hearing of this registration case. After she had presented and formally offered her evidence . . . applicant rested her case. The Solicitor General, thru the Provincial Prosecutor, interposed no objection to the admission of the exhibits. Later . . . the Provincial Prosecutor manifest (sic) that the Government had no evidence to adduce. [3]

In a decision[4] dated September 30, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment for herein respondent Celestina Naguiat, adjudicating unto her the parcels of land in question and decreeing the registration thereof in her name, thus: WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court hereby adjudicates the parcels of land situated in Panan, Botolan, Zambales, appearing on Plan AP-03-003447 containing an area of 3,131 square meters, appearing on Plan AP-03-003446 containing an area of 15,322 containing an area of 15,387 square meters to herein applicant Celestina T. Naguiat, of legal age, Filipino citizen, married to Rommel Naguiat and a resident of Angeles City, Pampanga together with all the improvements existing thereon and orders and decrees registration in her name in accordance with Act No. 496, Commonwealth Act No. 14, [should be 141] as amended, and Presidential Decree No. 1529. This adjudication, however, is subject to the various easements/reservations provided for under pertinent laws, presidential decrees and/or presidential letters of instructions which should be annotated/ projected on the title to be issued. And once this decision becomes final, let the corresponding decree of registration be immediately issued. (Words in bracket added) With its motion for reconsideration having been denied by the trial court, petitioner Republic went on appeal to the CA in CA-G.R. CV No. 37001. As stated at the outset hereof, the CA, in the herein assailed decision of May 29, 1998, affirmed that of the trial court, to wit: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED. Hence, the Republics present recourse on its basic submission that the CAs decision is not in accordance with law, jurisprudence and the evidence, since respondent has not established with the required evidence her title in fee simple or imperfect title in respect of the subject lots which would warrant their registration under (P.D. 1529 or Public Land Act (C.A.) 141. In particular, petitioner Republic faults the appellate court on its finding respecting the length of respondents occupation of the property subject of her application for registration and for not considering the fact that she has not established that the lands in question have been declassified from forest or timber zone to alienable and disposable property. Public forest lands or forest reserves, unless declassified and released by positive act of the Government so that they may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, are not capable of private appropriation.[5] As to these assets, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.[6] Given this postulate,the principal issue to be addressed turns on the question of whether or not the areas in question have ceased to have the status of forest or other inalienable lands of the public domain. 42

Forests, in the context of both the Public Land Act[7] and the Constitution[8] classifying lands of the public domain into agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands and national parks, do not necessarily refer to a large tract of wooded land or an expanse covered by dense growth of trees and underbrush. As we stated in Heirs of Amunategui [9]A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such classification simply because loggers or settlers have stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. Forest lands do not have to be on mountains or in out of the way places. xxx. The classification is merely descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like. xxx Under Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution,[10] which embodies the Regalian doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the State the source of any asserted right to ownership of land.[11] All lands not appearing to be clearly of private dominion presumptively belong to the State.[12] Accordingly, public lands not shown to have been reclassified or released as alienable agricultural land or alienated to a private person by the State remain part of the inalienable public domain.[13] Under Section 6 of the Public Land Act, the prerogative of classifying or reclassifying lands of the public domain, i.e., from forest or mineral to agricultural and vice versa, belongs to the Executive Branch of the government and not the court.[14] Needless to stress, the onus to overturn, by incontrovertible evidence, the presumption that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable or disposable rests with the applicant.[15] In the present case, the CA assumed that the lands in question are already alienable and disposable. Wrote the appellate court: The theory of [petitioner] that the properties in question are lands of the public domain cannot be sustained as it is directly against the above doctrine. Said doctrine is a reaffirmation of the principle established in the earlier cases . . . that open, exclusive and undisputed possession of alienable public land for period prescribed by law creates the legal fiction whereby the land, upon completion of the requisite period, ipso jure and without the need of judicial or other sanction, ceases to be public land and becomes private property . (Word in bracket and underscoring added.) The principal reason for the appellate courts disposition, finding a registerable title for respondent, is her and her predecessor-in-interests open, continuous and exclusive occupation of the subject property for more than 30 years. Prescinding from its above assumption and finding, the appellate court went on to conclude, citing Director of Lands vs. Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC)[16] and Herico vs. DAR,[17] among other cases, that, upon the completion of the requisite period of possession, the lands in question cease to be public land and become private property. Director of Lands, Herico and the other cases cited by the CA are not, however, winning cards for the respondent, for the simple reason that, in said cases, the disposable and alienable nature of the land sought to be registered was established, or, at least, not put in issue. And there lies the difference. Here, respondent never presented the required certification from the proper government agency or official proclamation reclassifying the land applied for as alienable and disposable. Matters of land classification or reclassification cannot be assumed. It calls for proof.[18] Aside from tax receipts, respondent submitted in evidence the survey map and technical descriptions of the lands, which, needless to state, provided no information respecting the classification of the property. As the Court has held, however, these documents are not sufficient to overcome the presumption that the land sought to be registered forms part of the public domain.[19] It cannot be overemphasized that unwarranted appropriation of public lands has been a notorious practice resorted to in land registration cases.[20] For this reason, the Court has made it a point to stress, 43

when appropriate, that declassification of forest and mineral lands, as the case may be, and their conversion into alienable and disposable lands need an express and positive act from the government.[21] The foregoing considered, the issue of whether or not respondent and her predecessor-in-interest have been in open, exclusive and continuous possession of the parcels of land in question is now of little moment. For, unclassified land, as here, cannot be acquired by adverse occupation or possession; occupation thereof in the concept of owner, however long, cannot ripen into private ownership and be registered as title.[22] WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED and the assailed decision dated May 29, 1998 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 37001 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, respondents application for original registration of title in Land Registration Case No. N-25-1 of the Regional Trial Court at Iba, Zambales, Branch 69, isDENIED. No costs. SO ORDERED. 20) FIRST DIVISION [G. R. No. 107764. October 4, 2002] EDNA COLLADO, BERNARDINA TAWAS, JORETO C. TORRES, JOSE AMO, SERGIO L. MONTEALEGRE, VICENTE C. TORRES, JOSEPH L. NUEZ, GLORIA SERRANO, DANILO FABREGAS, FERNANDO T. TORRES, LUZ G. TUBUNGBANUA, CARIDAD T. TUTANA, JOSE C. TORRES, JR., IMELDA CAYLALUAD, ROSALIE TUTANA, NORMA ASTORIAS, MYRNA M. LANCION, NORBERTO CAMILOTE, CECILIA MACARANAS, PEDRO BRIONES, REMEDIOS BANTIGUE, DANTE L. MONTEALEGRE, AIDA T. GADON, ARMANDO T. TORRES and FIDELITO ECO, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, thru the Director of Lands, respondents, BOCKASANJO ISF AWARDEES ASSOCIATION, INC., LITA MENDOZA, MORADO PREFIDIGNO, TERESITA CRUZ and CALOMA MOISES, respondents/intervernors. DECISION CARPIO, J.: The Case This Petition[1] seeks to set aside the Decision of the Court of Appeals,[2] dated June 22, 1992, in CA-G.R. SP No. 25597, which declared null and void the Decision[3] dated January 30, 1991 of the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch 71, in LRC No. 269-A, LRC Rec. No. N-59179, confirming the imperfect title of petitioners over a parcel of land. The Facts On April 25, 1985, petitioner Edna T. Collado filed with the land registration court an application for registration of a parcel of land with an approximate area of 1,200,766 square meters or 120.0766 hectares (Lot for brevity). The Lot is situated in Barangay San Isidro (formerly known as Boso-boso), Antipolo, Rizal, and covered by Survey Plan Psu-162620. Attached to the application was the technical description of the Lot as Lot Psu-162620 signed by Robert C. Pangyarihan, Officer-in-Charge of the Survey Division, Bureau of Lands, which stated, [t]his survey is inside IN-12 Mariquina Watershed. On March 24, 1986, petitioner Edna T. Collado filed an Amended Application to include additional coapplicants.[4] Subsequently, more applicants joined (collectively referred to as petitioners for brevity).[5] The Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, and the Municipality of Antipolo, through its Municipal Attorney and the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal, filed oppositions to petitioners application. In due course, the land registration court issued an order of general default against the whole world with the exception of the oppositors. Petitioners alleged that they have occupied the Lot since time immemorial. Their possession has been open, public, notorious and in the concept of owners. The Lot was surveyed in the name of Sesinando Leyva, one of their predecessors-in-interest, as early as March 22, 1902. Petitioners declared the Lot for taxation purposes and paid all the corresponding real estate taxes. According to them, there are now 44

twenty-five co-owners in pro-indiviso shares of five hectares each. During the hearings, petitioners submitted evidence to prove that there have been nine transfers of rights among them and their predecessors-in-interest, as follows: 1. SESINANDO LEYVA was the earliest known predecessor-in-interest of the Applicants who was in actual, open, notorious and continuous possession of the property in the concept of owner. He had the property surveyed in his name on 22 March 1902 (Exhibit W and W-1 testimonies of J. Torres on 16 December 1987 and Mariano Leyva on 29 December 1987). 2. DIOSDADO LEYVA, is the son of Sesinando Leyva, who inherited the property. He had the property resurveyed in his name on May 21-28, 1928 (Exhibit X and X-1; testimony of Mariano Leyva, a son of Diosdado Leyva). 3. GREGORIO CAMANTIQUE bought the property from Diosdado Leyva before the Japanese Occupation of the Philippines during World War II. He owned and possessed the property until 1958. He declared the property for tax purposes, the latest of which was under Tax Declaration No. 7182 issued on 3 February 1957 (Exhibit I and testimony of Mariano Leyva, supra). 4. ANGELINA REYNOSO, bought the property from Gregorio Camantique by virtue of a Deed of Sale on 3 February 1958 (Exhibit H). During the ownership of the property by Angelina Reynoso, Mariano Leyva the grandson of Sesinando Leyva, the previous owner, attended to the farm. (Testimony of Mariano Leyva, supra). Angelina Reynoso declared the property in her name under Tax Declaration No. 7189 in4 February 1958, under Tax Declaration No. 8775 on 3 August 1965, under Tax Declaration No. 16945 on 15 December 1975, and underTax Declaration No. 03-06145 on 25 June 1978. 5. MYRNA TORRES bought the property from Angelina Reynoso on 16 October 1982 through a Deed of Sale (Exhibit G). 6. EDNA COLLADO bought the property from Myrna Torres in a Deed of Sale dated 28 April 1984 (Exhibit P-1 to P-3). 7. Additional owners BERNARDINA TAWAS, JORETO TORRES, JOSE AMO, VICENTE TORRES and SERGIO MONTEALEGRE who bought portions of the property from Edna Collado through a Deed of Sale on 6 November 1985 (Exhibit Q to Q-3). 8. And more additional Owners JOSEPH NUNEZ, DIOSDADO ARENOS, DANILO FABREGAS, FERNANDO TORRES, LUZ TUBUNGBANUA, CARIDAD TUTANA, JOSE TORRES JR., RODRIGO TUTANA, ROSALIE TUTANA, NORMA ASTORIAS, MYRNA LANCION, CHONA MARCIANO, CECILIA MACARANAS, PEDRO BRIONES, REMEDIOS BANTIQUE, DANTE MONTEALEGRE, ARMANDO TORRES, AIDA GADON and AMELIA M. MALAPAD bought portions of the property in a Deed of Sale on 12 May 1986 (Exhibit S to S-3). 9. Co-owners DIOSDADO ARENOS, RODRIGO TUTANA, CHONA MARCIANO and AMELIA MALAPAD jointly sold their shares to new OWNERS GLORIA R. SERRANO, IMELDA CAYLALUAD, NORBERTO CAMILOTE and FIDELITO ECO through a Deed of Sale dated 18 January 1987 (Exhibit T to T-9).[6] During the hearing on January 9, 1991, only the assistant provincial prosecutor appeared without the Solicitor General. For failure of the oppositors to present their evidence, the land registration court issued an order considering the case submitted for decision based on the evidence of the petitioners. The court later set aside the order and reset the hearing to January 14, 1991 for the presentation of the evidence of the oppositors. On this date, counsel for oppositors failed to appear again despite due notice. Hence, the court again issued an order submitting the case for decision based on the evidence of the petitioners. The Trial Courts Ruling After appraisal of the evidence submitted by petitioners, the land registration court held that petitioners had adduced sufficient evidence to establish their registrable rights over the Lot. Accordingly, the court rendered a decision confirming the imperfect title of petitioners. We quote the pertinent portions of the courts decision, as follows: From the evidence presented, the Court finds that from the testimony of the witnesses presented by the Applicants, the property applied for is in actual, open, public and notorious possession by the applicants and their predecessor-in-interest since time immemorial and said possession had been testified to by witnesses Jimmy Torres, Mariano Leyva, Sergio Montealegre, Jose Amo and one Chona who were all crossexamined by Counsel for Oppositor Republic of the Philippines. 45

Evidence was likewise presented that said property was declared for taxation purposes in the names of the previous owners and the corresponding taxes were paid by the Applicants and the previous owners and said property was planted to fruit bearing trees; portions to palay and portions used for grazing purposes. To the mind of the Court, Applicants have presented sufficient evidence to establish registrable title over said property applied for by them. On the claim that the property applied for is within the Marikina Watershed, the Court can only add that all Presidential Proclamations like the Proclamation setting aside the Marikina Watershed are subject to private rights. In the case of Municipality of Santiago vs. Court of Appeals, 120 SCRA 734, 1983 private rights is proof of acquisition through (sic) among means of acquisition of public lands. In the case of Director of Lands vs. Reyes, 68 SCRA 193-195, by private rights means that applicant should show clear and convincing evidence that the property in question was acquired by applicants or their ancestors either by composition title from the Spanish government or by Possessory Information title, or any other means for the acquisition of public lands xxx (underscoring supplied). The Court believes that from the evidence presented as above stated, Applicants have acquired private rights to which the Presidential Proclamation setting aside the Marikina Watershed should be subject to such private rights. At any rate, the Court notes that evidence was presented by the applicants that as per Certification issued by the Bureau of Forest Development dated March 18, 1980, the area applied for was verified to be within the area excluded from the operation of the Marikina Watershed Lands Executive Order No. 33 dated July 26, 1904 per Proclamation No. 1283 promulgated on June 21, 1974 which established the Boso-boso Town Site Reservation, amended by Proclamation No. 1637 dated April 18, 1977 known as the Lungsod Silangan Townsite Reservation. (Exhibit K).[7] In a motion dated April 5, 1991, received by the Solicitor General on April 6, 1991, petitioners alleged that the decision dated January 30, 1991 confirming their title had become final after the Solicitor General received a copy of the decision on February 18, 1991. Petitioners prayed that the land registration court order the Land Registration Authority to issue the necessary decree in their favor over the Lot. On April 11, 1991, the Solicitor General inquired from the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal whether the land registration court had already rendered a decision and if so, whether the Provincial Prosecutor would recommend an appeal. However, the Provincial Prosecutor failed to answer the query. According to the Solicitor General, he received on April 23, 1991 a copy of the land registration courts decision dated January 30, 1991, and not on February 18, 1991 as alleged by petitioners in their motion. In the meantime, on May 7, 1991, the land registration court issued an order directing the Land Regulation Authority to issue the corresponding decree of registration in favor of the petitioners. On August 6, 1991, the Solicitor General filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Annulment of Judgment pursuant to Section 9(2) of BP Blg. 129 on the ground that there had been no clear showing that the Lot had been previously classified as alienable and disposable making it subject to private appropriation. On November 29, 1991, Bockasanjo ISF Awardees Association, Inc., an association of holders of certificates of stewardship issued by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR for brevity) under its Integrated Social Forestry Program (ISF for brevity), filed with the Court of Appeals a Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Admit Petition-In-Intervention. They likewise opposed the registration and asserted that the Lot, which is situated inside the Marikina Watershed Reservation, is inalienable. They claimed that they are the actual occupants of the Lot pursuant to the certificates of stewardship issued by the DENR under the ISF for tree planting purposes. The Court of Appeals granted the motion to intervene verbally during the preliminary conference held on April 6, 1992. During the preliminary conference, all the parties as represented by their respective counsels agreed that the only issue for resolution was whether the Lot in question is part of the public domain.[8] The Court of Appeals Ruling In a decision dated June 22, 1992, the Court of Appeals granted the petition and declared null and void the decision dated January 30, 1991 of the land registration court. The Court of Appeals explained thus: 46

Under the Regalian Doctrine, which is enshrined in the 1935 (Art. XIII, Sec. 1), 1973 (Art. XIV, Sec. 8), and 1987 Constitution (Art. XII, Sec. 2), all lands of the public domain belong to the State. An applicant, like the private respondents herein, for registration of a parcel of land bears the burden of overcoming the presumption that the land sought to be registered forms part of the public domain (Director of Lands vs. Aquino, 192 SCRA 296). A positive Act of government is needed to declassify a public land and to convert it into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other purposes (Republic vs. Bacas, 176 SCRA 376). In the case at bar, the private respondents failed to present any evidence whatsoever that the land applied for as described in Psu-162620 has been segregated from the bulk of the public domain and declared by competent authority to be alienable and disposable. Worse, the technical description of Psu-162620 signed by Robert C. Pangyarihan, Officer-in-Charge, Survey Division, Bureau of Lands, which was attached to the application of private respondents, categorically stated that "This survey is inside IN-12 Mariquina Watershed." That the land in question is within the Marikina Watershed Reservation is confirmed by the Administrator of the National Land Titles and Deeds in a Report, dated March 2, 1988, submitted to the respondent Court in LR Case No. 269-A. These documents readily and effectively negate the allegation in private respondent Collados application that said parcel of land known as Psu-162620 is not covered by any form of title, nor any public land application and are not within any government reservation (Par. 8, Application; Emphasis supplied). The respondent court could not have missed the import of these vital documents which are binding upon the courts inasmuch as it is the exclusive prerogative of the Executive Department to classify public lands. They should have forewarned the respondent judge from assuming jurisdiction over the case. x x x inasmuch as the said properties applied for by petitioners are part of the public domain, it is the Director of Lands who has jurisdiction in the disposition of the same (subject to the approval of the Secretary of Natural Resources and Environment), and not the courts. x x x Even assuming that petitioners did have the said properties surveyed even before the same was declared to be part of the Busol Forest Reservation, the fact remains that it was so converted into a forest reservation,thus it is with more reason that this action must fail. Forest lands are inalienable and possession thereof, no matter how long, cannot convert the same into private property. And courts are without jurisdiction to adjudicate lands within the forest zone. (Heirs of Gumangan vs. Court of Appeals. 172 SCRA 563; Emphasis supplied). Needless to say, a final judgment may be annulled on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, fraud or that it is contrary to law (Panlilio vs. Garcia, 119 SCRA 387, 391) and a decision rendered without jurisdiction is a total nullity and may be struck down at any time (Suarez vs. Court of Appeals, 186 SCRA 339).[9] Hence, the instant petition. The Issues The issues raised by petitioners are restated as follows: I WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED OR GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT GRANTING THE APPLICATION OF THE PETITIONERS FOR CONFIRMATION OF TITLE; II WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED OR GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN GIVING DUE COURSE TO THE PETITION FOR ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT FILED BY THE REPUBLIC LONG AFTER THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT HAD BECOME FINAL; III WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED OR GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN GIVING DUE COURSE TO THE INTERVENORS PETITION FOR INTERVENTION WHICH WAS FILED OUT OF TIME OR LONG AFTER THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT HAD BECOME FINAL. The Courts Ruling The petition is bereft of merit. First Issue: whether petitioners have registrable title over the Lot. There is no dispute that Executive Order No. 33 (EO 33 for brevity) dated July 26, 1904 [10] established the Marikina Watershed Reservation (MWR for brevity) situated in the Municipality of Antipolo, 47

Rizal. Petitioners even concede that the Lot, described as Lot Psu-162620, is inside the technical, literal description of the MWR. However, the main thrust of petitioners claim over the Lot is that all Presidential proclamations like the proclamation setting aside the Marikina Watershed Reservation are subject to private rights. They point out that EO 33 contains a saving clause that the reservations are subject to existing private rights, if any there be. Petitioners contend that their claim of ownership goes all the way back to 1902, when their known predecessor-in-interest, Sesinando Leyva, laid claim and ownership over the Lot. They claim that the presumption of law then prevailing under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Public Land Act No. 926 was that the land possessed and claimed by individuals as their own are agricultural lands and therefore alienable and disposable. They conclude that private rights were vested on Sesinando Leyva before the issuance of EO 33, thus excluding the Lot from the Marikina Watershed Reservation. Petitioners arguments find no basis in law. The Regalian Doctrine: An Overview Under the Regalian Doctrine, all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State.[11]The Spaniards first introduced the doctrine to the Philippines through the Laws of the Indies and the Royal Cedulas, specifically, Law 14, Title 12, Book 4 of the Novisima Recopilacion de Leyes de las Indias[12] which laid the foundation that all lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain. [13] Upon the Spanish conquest of the Philippines, ownership of all lands, territories and possessions in the Philippines passed to the Spanish Crown.[14] The Laws of the Indies were followed by the Ley Hipotecaria or the Mortgage Law of 1893. The Spanish Mortgage Law provided for the systematic registration of titles and deeds as well as possessory claims. The Royal Decree of 1894 or the Maura Law partly amended the Mortgage Law as well as the Law of the Indies. The Maura Law was the last Spanish land law promulgated in the Philippines. It required the adjustment or registration of all agricultural lands, otherwise the lands would revert to the state.[15] Four years later, Spain ceded to the government of the United States all rights, interests and claims over the national territory of the Philippine Islands through the Treaty of Paris of December 10, 1898. In 1903, the United States colonial government, through the Philippine Commission, passed Act No. 926, the first Public Land Act, which was described as follows: Act No. 926, the first Public Land Act, was passed in pursuance of the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902. The law governed the disposition of lands of the public domain. It prescribed rules and regulations for the homesteading, selling and leasing of portions of the public domain of the Philippine Islands, and prescribed the terms and conditions to enable persons to perfect their titles to public lands in the Islands. It also provided for the issuance of patents to certain native settlers upon public lands, for the establishment of town sites and sale of lots therein, for the completion of imperfect titles, and for the cancellation or confirmation of Spanish concessions and grants in the Islands. In short, the Public Land Act operated on the assumption that title to public lands in the Philippine Islands remained in the government; and that the governments title to public land sprung from the Treaty of Paris and other subsequent treaties between Spain and the United States. The term public land referred to all lands of the public domain whose title still remained in the government and are thrown open to private appropriation and settlement, and excluded the patrimonial property of the government and the friar lands.[16] Thus, it is plain error for petitioners to argue that under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Public Land Act No. 926, mere possession by private individuals of lands creates the legal presumption that the lands are alienable and disposable. Act 2874, the second Public Land Act, superseded Act No. 926 in 1919. After the passage of the 1935 Constitution, Commonwealth Act No. 141 (CA 141 for brevity) amended Act 2874 in 1936. CA 141, as amended, remains to this day as the existing general law governing the classification and disposition of lands of the public domain other than timber and mineral lands.[17] In the meantime, in order to establish a system of registration by which recorded title becomes absolute, indefeasible and imprescriptible, the legislature passed Act 496, otherwise known as the Land Registration Act, which took effect on February 1, 1903. Act 496 placed all registered lands in the Philippines under the Torrens system.[18] The Torrens system requires the government to issue a certificate of title stating that 48

the person named in the title is the owner of the property described therein, subject to liens and encumbrances annotated on the title or reserved by law. The certificate of title is indefeasible and imprescriptible and all claims to the parcel of land are quieted upon issuance of the certificate. [19] PD 1529, known as the Property Registration Decree enacted on June 11, 1978,[20] amended and updated Act 496. The 1935, 1973, 1987 Philippine Constitutions The 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions adopted the Regalian doctrine substituting, however, the state, in lieu of the King, as the owner of all lands and waters of the public domain. [21] Justice Reynato S. Puno, in his separate opinion in Cruz vs. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources,[22] explained thus: One of the fixed and dominating objectives of the 1935 Constitutional Convention was the nationalization and conservation of the natural resources of the country. There was an overwhelming sentiment in the Convention in favor of the principle of state ownership of natural resources and the adoption of the Regalian doctrine. State ownership of natural resources was seen as a necessary starting point to secure recognition of the states power to control their disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization. The delegates to the Constitutional Convention very well knew that the concept of State ownership of land and natural resources was introduced by the Spaniards, however, they were not certain whether it was continued and applied by the Americans. To remove all doubts, the Convention approved the provision in the Constitution affirming the Regalian doctrine. Thus, Section 1, Article XIII[23] of the 1935 Constitution, on Conservation and Utilization of Natural Resources barred the alienation of all natural resources except public agricultural lands, which were the only natural resources the State could alienate. The 1973 Constitutionreiterated the Regalian doctrine in Section 8, Article XIV[24] on the National Economy and the Patrimony of the Nation. The 1987 Constitution reaffirmed the Regalian doctrine in Section 2 of Article XII[25] on National Economy and Patrimony. Both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions prohibited the alienation of all natural resources except agricultural lands of the public domain. The 1987 Constitution readopted this policy. Indeed, all lands of the public domain as well as all natural resources enumerated in the Philippine Constitution belong to the State. Watershed Reservation is a Natural Resource The term natural resource includes not only timber, gas, oil coal, minerals, lakes, and submerged lands, but also, features which supply a human need and contribute to the health, welfare, and benefit of a community, and are essential to the well-being thereof and proper enjoyment of property devoted to park and recreational purposes.[26] In Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, et al.,[27] the Court had occasion to discourse on watershed areas. The Court resolved the issue of whether the parcel of land which the Department of Environment and Natural Resources had assessed to be a watershed area is exempt from the coverage of RA No. 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL for brevity).[28] The Court defined watershed as an area drained by a river and its tributaries and enclosed by a boundary or divide which separates it from adjacent watersheds. However, the Court also recognized that: The definition does not exactly depict the complexities of a watershed. The most important product of a watershed is water which is one of the most important human necessit(ies). The protection of watershed ensures an adequate supply of water for future generations and the control of flashfloods that not only damage property but also cause loss of lives. Protection of watersheds is an intergenerational responsibility that needs to be answered now. Article 67 of the Water Code of the Philippines (PD 1067) provides: Art. 67. Any watershed or any area of land adjacent to any surface water or overlying any ground water may be declared by the Department of Natural Resources as a protected area. Rules and Regulations may be promulgated by such Department to prohibit or control such activities by the owners or occupants thereof within the protected area which may damage or cause the deterioration of the surface water or ground water or interfere with the investigation, use, control, protection, management or administration of such waters. The Court in Sta. Rosa Realty also recognized the need to protect watershed areas and took note of the report of the Ecosystems Research and Development Bureau (ERDB), a research arm of the DENR, regarding the environmental assessment of the Casile and Kabanga-an river watersheds involved in that case. That report concluded as follows: 49

The Casile barangay covered by CLOA in question is situated in the heartland of both watersheds. Considering the barangays proximity to the Matangtubig waterworks, the activities of the farmers which are in conflict with proper soil and water conservation practices jeopardize and endanger the vital waterworks. Degradation of the land would have double edge detrimental effects. On the Casile side this would mean direct siltation of the Mangumit river which drains to the water impounding reservoir below. On the Kabanga-an side, this would mean destruction of forest covers which acts as recharged areas of the Matangtubig springs. Considering that the people have little if no direct interest in the protection of the Matangtubig structures they couldnt care less even if it would be destroyed. The Casile and Kabanga-an watersheds can be considered a most vital life support system to thousands of inhabitants directly and indirectly affected by it. From these watersheds come the natural God-given precious resource water. x x x Clearing and tilling of the lands are totally inconsistent with sound watershed management. More so, the introduction of earth disturbing activities like road building and erection of permanent infrastructures. Unless the pernicious agricultural activities of the Casile farmers are immediately stopped, it would not be long before these watersheds would cease to be of value. The impact of watershed degradation threatens the livelihood of thousands of people dependent upon it. Toward this, we hope that an acceptable comprehensive watershed development policy and program be immediately formulated and implemented before the irreversible damage finally happens. The Court remanded the case to the Department of Agriculture and Adjudication Board or DARAB to reevaluate and determine the nature of the parcels of land involved in order to resolve the issue of its coverage by the CARL. Sta. Rosa Realty gives us a glimpse of the dangers posed by the misuse of natural resources such as watershed reservations which are akin to forest zones. Population growth and industrialization have taken a heavy toll on the environment. Environmental degradation from unchecked human activities could wreak havoc on the lives of present and future generations. Hence, by constitutional fiat, natural resources remain to this day inalienable properties of the State. Viewed under this legal and factual backdrop, did petitioners acquire, as they vigorously argue, private rights over the parcel of land prior to the issuance of EO 33 segregating the same as a watershed reservation? The answer is in the negative. First. An applicant for confirmation of imperfect title bears the burden of proving that he meets the requirements of Section 48 of CA 141, as amended. He must overcome the presumption that the land he is applying for is part of the public domain and that he has an interest therein sufficient to warrant registration in his name arising from an imperfect title. An imperfect title may have been derived from old Spanish grants such as a titulo real or royal grant, a concession especial or special grant, a composicion con el estado or adjustment title, or a titulo de compra or title through purchase.[29] Or, that he has had continuous, open and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership for at least thirty years preceding the filing of his application as provided by Section 48 (b) CA 141. Originally, Section 48(b) of CA 141 provided for possession and occupation of lands of the public domain since July 26, 1894. This was superseded by RA 1942 which provided for a simple thirty-year prescriptive period of occupation by an applicant for judicial confirmation of an imperfect title. The same, however, has already been amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073, approved on January 25, 1977, the law prevailing at the time petitioners application for registration was filed on April 25, 1985.[30] As amended, Section 48 (b) now reads: (b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title, except when prevented by wars or force majeure. Those shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. 50

Interpreting Section 48 (b) of CA 141, the Court stated that the Public Land Act requires that the applicant must prove the following: (a) that the land is alienable public land and (b) that his open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the same must either be since time immemorial or for the period prescribed in the Public Land Act. When the conditions set by law are complied with, the possessor of the land, by operation of law, acquires a right to a grant, a government grant, without the necessity of a certificate of title being issued.[31] Petitioners do not claim to have documentary title over the Lot. Their right to register the Lot is predicated mainly upon continuous possession since 1902. Clearly, petitioners were unable to acquire a valid and enforceable right or title because of the failure to complete the required period of possession, whether under the original Section 48 (b) of CA 141 prior to the issuance of EO 33, or under the amendment by RA 1942 and PD 1073. There is no proof that prior to the issuance of EO 33 in 1904, petitioners had acquired ownership or title to the Lot either by deed or by any other mode of acquisition from the State, as for instance by acquisitive prescription. As of 1904, Sesinando Leyva had only been in possession for two years. Verily, petitioners have not possessed the parcel of land in the manner and for the number of years required by law for the confirmation of imperfect title. Second, assuming that the Lot was alienable and disposable land prior to the issuance of EO 33 in 1904, EO 33 reserved the Lot as a watershed. Since then, the Lot became non-disposable and inalienable public land. At the time petitioners filed their application on April 25, 1985, the Lot has been reserved as a watershed under EO 33 for 81 years prior to the filing of petitioners application. The period of occupancy after the issuance of EO 33 in 1904 could no longer be counted because as a watershed reservation, the Lot was no longer susceptible of occupancy, disposition, conveyance or alienation. Section 48 (b) of CA 141, as amended, applies exclusively to alienable and disposable public agricultural land. Forest lands, including watershed reservations, are excluded. It is axiomatic that the possession of forest lands or other inalienable public lands cannot ripen into private ownership. In Municipality of Santiago, Isabela vs. Court of Appeals,[32] the Court declared that inalienable public lands x x x cannot be acquired by acquisitive prescription. Prescription, both acquisitive and extinctive, does not run against the State. The possession of public land, however long the period may have extended, never confers title thereto upon the possessor because the statute of limitations with regard to public land does not operate against the State, unless the occupant can prove possession and occupation of the same under claim of ownership for the required number of years to constitute a grant from the State. Third, Gordula vs. Court of Appeals[33] is in point. In Gordula, petitioners did not contest the nature of the land. They admitted that the land lies in the heart of the Caliraya-Lumot River Forest Reserve, which Proclamation No. 573 classified as inalienable. The petitioners inGordula contended, however, that Proclamation No. 573 itself recognizes private rights of landowners prior to the reservation. They claim to have established their private rights to the subject land. The Court ruled: We do not agree. No public land can be acquired by private persons without any grant, express or implied from the government; it is indispensable that there be a showing of a title from the state. The facts show that petitioner Gordula did not acquire title to the subject land prior to its reservation under Proclamation No. 573. He filed his application for free patent only in January, 1973, more than three (3) years after the issuance of Proclamation No. 573 in June, 1969. At that time, the land, as part of the Caliraya-Lumot River Forest Reserve, was no longer open to private ownership as it has been classified as public forest reserve for the public good. Nonetheless, petitioners insist that the term, private rights, in Proclamation No. 573, should not be interpreted as requiring a title. They opine that it suffices if the claimant had occupied and cultivated the property for so many number of years, declared the land for taxation purposes, [paid] the corresponding real estate taxes [which are] accepted by the government, and [his] occupancy and possession [is] continuous, open and unmolested and recognized by the government. Prescinding from this premise, petitioners urge that the 25-year possession by petitioner Gordula from 1944 to 1969, albeit five (5) years 51

short of the 30-year possession required under Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 141, as amended, is enough to vest upon petitioner Gordula the private rights recognized and respected in Proclamation No. 573. The case law does not support this submission. In Director of Lands vs. Reyes, we held that a settler claiming the protection of private rights to exclude his land from a military or forest reservation must show x x x by clear and convincing evidence that the property in question was acquired by [any] x x x means for the acquisition of public lands. In fine, one claiming private rights must prove that he has complied with C.A. No. 141, as amended, otherwise known as the Public Land Act, which prescribes the substantive as well as the procedural requirements for acquisition of public lands. This law requires at least thirty (30) years of open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and possession of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition, immediately preceding the filing of the application for free patent. The rationale for the 30-year period lies in the presumption that the land applied for pertains to the State, and that the occupants and/or possessors claim an interest therein only by virtue of their imperfect title or continuous, open and notorious possession. Next, petitioners argue that assuming no private rights had attached to the Lot prior to EO 33 in 1904, the President of the Philippines had subsequently segregated the Lot from the public domain and made the Lot alienable and disposable when he issued Proclamation No. 1283 on June 21, 1974. Petitioners contend that Proclamation No. 1283 expressly excluded an area of 3,780 hectares from the MWR and made the area part of the Boso-boso Townsite Reservation. Petitioners assert that Lot Psu-162620 is a small part of this excluded town site area. Petitioners further contend that town sites are considered alienable and disposable under CA 141. Proclamation No. 1283 reads thus: PROCLAMATION NO. 1283 EXCLUDING FROM THE OPERATION EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 33, DATED JULY 26, 1904, AS AMENDED BY EXECUTIVE ORDERS NOS. 14 AND 16, BOTH SERIES OF 1915, WHICH ESTABLISHED THE WATERSHED RESERVATION SITUATED IN THE MUNICIPALITY OF ANTIPOLO, PROVINCE OF RIZAL, ISLAND OF LUZON, A CERTAIN PORTION OF THE LAND EMBRACED THEREIN AND RESERVING THE SAME, TOGETHER WITH THE ADJACENT PARCEL OF LAND OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN, FOR TOWNSITE PURPOSES UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF CHAPTER XI OF THE PUBLIC LAND ACT. Upon recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and pursuant to the authority vested in me by law, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, do hereby, exclude from the operation of Executive Order No. 33 dated July 26, 1904, as amended by Executive Orders Nos. 14 and 16, both series of 1915, which established the Watershed Reservation situated in the Municipality of Antipolo, Province of Rizal, Island of Luzon, certain portions of land embraced therein and reserve the same, together with the adjacent parcel of land of the public domain, for townsite purposes under the provisions of Chapter XI of the Public Land Act, subject to private rights, if any there be, and to future subdivision survey in accordance with the development plan to be prepared and approved by the Department of Local Government and Community Development, which parcels are more particularly described as follows: Lot A (Part of Watershed Reservation) A parcel of land (Lot A of Proposed Poor Mans Baguio, being a portion of the Marikina Watershed, IN-2), situated in the municipality of Antipolo, Province of Rizal, Island of Luzon, beginning at a point marked 1 on sketch plan, being N-74-30 E, 8480.00 meters more or less, from BLLM 1, Antipolo, Rizal; thence N 33 28 W 1575.00 m. to point 2; thence N 40 26 W 1538.50 m. to point 3; thence N 30 50W 503.17 m. to point 4; thence N 75 02 W 704.33 m. to point 5; thence N 14 18 W 1399.39 m. to point 6; thence N 43 25 W 477.04 m. to point 7; thence N 71 38 W 458.36 m. to point 8; thence N 31 05 W 1025.00 m. to point 9; thence Due North 490.38 m. to point 10; thence Due North 1075.00 m. to point 11; thence Due East 1000.00 m. to point 12; thence Due East 1000.00 m. to point 13; thence Due East 1000.00 m. to point 14; thence Due East 1000.00 m. to point 15; thence Due East 1000.00 m. to point 16; thence Due East 1000.00 m. to point 17; thence Due East 1075.00 m. to point 18; thence Due South 1000.00 m. to point 19; thence Due South 1000.00 m. to point 20; thence Due South 1000.00 m. to point 21; thence Due South 1000.00 m. to point 22; thence Due South 1000.00 m. to point 23; thence Due South 1000.00 m. to point 24; thence Due South 1075.00 m. to point 25; thence Due West 1000.00 m. to point 26; thence Due West 52

1000.00 m. to point 27; thence Due West 636.56 m. to point of beginning. Containing an area of three thousand seven hundred eighty (3,780) Hectares, more or less. Lot B (Alienable and Disposable Land) A parcel of land (Lot B of Proposed Poor Mans Baguio, being a portion of alienable and disposable portion of public domain) situated in the municipality of Antipolo, Province of Rizal, Island of Luzon. Beginning at a point marked 1 on sketch plan being N 74 30 E., 8430.00 m., more or less, from BLLM 1. Antipolo, Rizal; thence Due West 363.44 m. to point 2; thence Due West 1000.00 m. to point 3; thence Due West 100.00 m. to point 4; thence Due West 1000.00 m. to point 5; thence Due West 1075.00 m. to point 6; thence Due North 1000.00 m. to point 7; thence Due North 1000.00 m. to point 8; thence Due North 1000.00 m. to point 9; thence Due North 1000.00 m. to point 10; thence Due North 1000.00 m. to point 11; thence Due North 509.62 m. to point 12; thence S. 31 05 E 1025.00 m. to point 13; thence S 71 38 E 458.36 m. to point 14; thence S 43 25 E 477.04 m. to point 15; thence S 14 18 E 1399.39 m. to point 16; thence S 75 02 E 704.33 m. to point 17; thence S. 30 50 E 503.17 m. to point 18; thence S 40 26 E 1538.50 m. to point 19; thence s 33 23 e 1575.00 m to point of beginning. Containing an area of one thousand two hundred twenty five (1,225) Hectares, more or less. Note: All data are approximate and subject to change based on future survey. IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I Have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the Republic of the Philippines to be affixed. Done in the City of Manila, this 21st day of June, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and seventy-four. (Sgd.) FERDINAND E. MARCOS President Republic of the Philippines Proclamation No. 1283 has since been amended by Proclamation No. 1637 issued on April 18, 1977. Proclamation No. 1637 revised the area and location of the proposed townsite. According to then DENR Secretary Victor O. Ramos, Proclamation No. 1637 excluded Lot A (of which the Lot claimed by petitioners is part) for townsite purposes and reverted it to MWR coverage.[34] Proclamation No. 1637 reads: PROCLAMATION NO. 1637 AMENDING PROCLAMATION NO. 1283, DATED JUNE 21, 1974, WHICH ESTABLISHED THE TOWNSITE RESERVATION IN THE MUNICIPALITIES OF ANTIPOLO AND SAN MATEO, PROVINCE OF RIZAL, ISLAND OF LUZON BY INCREASING THE AREA AND REVISING THE TECHNICAL DESCRIPTION OF THE LAND EMBRACED THEREIN, AND REVOKING PROCLAMATION NO. 765 DATED OCTOBER 26, 1970 THAT RESERVED PORTIONS OF THE AREA AS RESETTLEMENT SITE. Upon recommendation of the Secretary of Natural Resources and pursuant to the authority vested in me by law, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, do hereby amend Proclamation No. 1283, dated June 21, 1974 which established the townsite reservation in the municipalities of Antipolo and San Mateo, Province of Rizal, Island of Luzon, by increasing the area and revising the technical descriptions of the land embraced therein, subject to private rights, if any there be, which parcel of land is more particularly described as follows: (Proposed Lungsod Silangan Townsite) A PARCEL OF LAND (Proposed Lungsod Silangan Townsite Reservation amending the area under SWO41762 establishing the Bagong Silangan Townsite Reservation) situated in the Municipalities of Antipolo, San Mateo, and Montalban, Province of Rizal, Island of Luzon. Bounded on the E., along lines 1-2-3-4-5-6-78-9-10-11-12-13-14-15-16-17-18-19-20-21-22-23 by the Marikina Watershed Reservation (IN-12); on the S., along lines 23-24-25 by the portion of Antipolo; on the W., along lines 25-26-27-28-29-30 by the Municipalities of Montalban, San Mateo; and on the N., along lines 30-31-32-33-34-35-36-37-38-39-40-4142-43-44 by the Angat Watershed Reservation. Beginning at a point marked 1 on the Topographic Maps with the Scale of 1:50,000 which is the identical corner 38 IN-12, Marikina Watershed Reservation. xxx xxx xxx NOTE: All data are approximate and subject to change based on future survey. Proclamation No. 765 dated October 26, 1970, which covered areas entirely within the herein Lungsod Silangan Townsite, is hereby revoked accordingly. 53

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the Republic of the Philippines to be affixed. Done in the City of Manila, this 18th day of April, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and seventyseven. (Sgd.) FERDINAND E. MARCOS President of the Philippines A positive act (e.g., an official proclamation) of the Executive Department is needed to declassify land which had been earlier classified as a watershed reservation and to convert it into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other purposes.[35] Unless and until the land classified as such is released in an official proclamation so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.[36] The principal document presented by petitioners to prove the private character of the Lot is the Certification of the Bureau of Forest Development dated March 18, 1986 that the Lot is excluded from the Marikina Watershed (Exh. R). The Certification reads: Republic of the Philippines Ministry of Natural Resources BUREAU OF FOREST DEVELOPMENT REGION IV EL AL Building 100 Quezon Avenue, Quezon City MAR 18 1986 VERIFICATION ON THE STATUS OF LAND: TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN: This is to certify that the tract of land situated in Barangay San Isidro, Antipolo, Rizal, containing an area of 1,269,766 square meters, as shown and described on the reverse side hereof, surveyed by Geodetic Engineer Telesforo Cabading for Angelina C. Reynoso, is verified to be within the area excluded from the operation of Marikina Watershed Reservation established under Executive Order No. 33 dated July 26, 1904 per Proclamation No. 1283, promulgated on June 21, 1974, which established the Boso-Boso Townsite Reservation, amended by proclamation No. 1637 dated April 18, 1977 known as Lungsod Silangan Townsite Reservation. Subject area also falls within the bounds of Bagong Lipunan Site under P.D. 1396 dated June 2, 1978 under the sole jurisdiction of the Ministry of Human Settlements, to the exclusion of any other government agencies. This verification is made upon the request of the Chief, Legal Staff, R-4 as contained in his internal memorandum dated March 18, 1986. Verified by: (Sgd) ROMEO C. PASCUBILLO Cartographer II Checked by: (Sgd) ARMENDO R. CRUZ Supervising Cartographer ATTESTED: (Sgd) LUIS G. DACANAY Chief, Forest Engineering & Infrastructure Section The above certification on which petitioners rely that a reclassification had occurred, and that the Lot is covered by the reclassification, is contradicted by several documents submitted by the Solicitor General before the land registration court. The Solicitor General submitted to the land registration court a Report[37] dated March 2, 1988, signed by Administrator Teodoro G. Bonifacio of the then National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration, confirming that the Lot described in Psu-162620 forms part of the MWR. He thus recommended the dismissal of the application for registration. The Report states: 54

COMES NOW the Administrator of the National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Commission and to this Honorable Court respectfully reports that: 1. A parcel of land described in plan Psu-162620 situated in the Barrio of San Isidro, Municipality of Antipolo, Province of Rizal, is applied for registration of title in the case at bar. 2. After plotting plan Psu-162620 in our Municipal Index Map it was found that a portion of the SW, described as Lot 3 in plan Psu-173790 was previously the subject of registration in Land Reg. Case No. N9578, LRC Record No. N-55948 and was issued Decree No. N-191242 on April 4, 1986 in the name of Apolonia Garcia, et al., pursuant to the Decision and Order for Issuance of the Decree dated February 8, 1984 and March 6, 1984, respectively, and the remaining portion of plan Psu-162620 is inside IN-12, Marikina Watershed. x x x WHEREFORE, this matter is respectfully submitted to the Honorable Court for its information and guidance with the recommendation that the application in the instant proceedings be dismissed, after due hearing (Underlining supplied). Likewise, in a letter[38] dated November 11, 1991, the Deputy Land Inspector, DENR, Region IV, Community Environment and Natural Resources Office, Antipolo, Rizal, similarly confirmed that the Lot is within the MWR. The letter states: That the land sought to be registered is situated at San Isidro (Boso-boso), Antipolo, Rizal, with an area of ONE HUNDRED TWENTY SIX POINT ZERO SEVEN SIXTY SIX (126.0766) hectares, more particularly described in Psu-162620, which is within the Marikina Watershed Reservation under Executive Order No. 33 dated July 2, 1904 which established the Marikina Watershed Reservation (IN-12) x x x. x x x That the land sought to be registered is not a private property of the Registration Applicant but part of the public domain, not subjected to disposition and is covered by Proclamation No. 585 for Integrated Social Forestry Program hence, L.R.C. No. 269-A is recommended for rejection (Underlining supplied). Copy of the letter is attached herewith as Annex 3 and made an integral part hereof. Lastly, the Solicitor General pointed out that attached to petitioner Edna T. Collados [as original applicant] application is the technical description[39] of the Lot signed by Robert C. Pangyarihan, Officer-in-Charge of the Survey Division of the Bureau of Lands. This technical description categorically stated that the Lot is inside IN-12 Mariquina Watershed. The evidence of record thus appears unsatisfactory and insufficient to show clearly and positively that the Lot had been officially released from the Marikina Watershed Reservation to form part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. We hold that once a parcel of land is included within a watershed reservation duly established by Executive Proclamation, as in the instant case, a presumption arises that the land continues to be part of such Reservation until clear and convincing evidence of subsequent declassification is shown. It is obvious, based on the facts on record that neither petitioners nor their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the Lot for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title. Even if they submitted sufficient proof that the Lot had been excluded from the MWR upon the issuance of Proclamation No. 1283 on June 21, 1974, petitioners possession as of the filing of their application on April 25, 1985 would have been only eleven years counted from the issuance of the proclamation in 1974. The result will not change even if we tack in the two years Sesinando Leyva allegedly possessed the Lot from 1902 until the issuance of EO 33 in 1904. Petitioners case falters even more because of the issuance of Proclamation No. 1637 on April 18, 1977. According to then DENR Secretary Victor Ramos, Proclamation No. 1637 reverted Lot A or the townsite reservation, where petitioners' Lot is supposedly situated, back to the MWR. Finally, it is of no moment if the areas of the MWR are now fairly populated and vibrant communities as claimed by petitioners. The following ruling may be applied to this case by analogy: A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such classification simply because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. Forest lands do not have to be on mountains or in out of the way places. Swampy areas covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms and other trees growing in brackish or sea water may also be classified as forest 55

land. The classification is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like. Unless and until the land classified as forest is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.[40] Second Issue: Whether the petition for annulment of judgment should have been given due course. Petitioners fault the Court of Appeals for giving due course to the Republics petition for annulment of judgment which was filed long after the decision of the land registration court had allegedly become final and executory. The land registration court rendered its decision on January 30, 1991 and the Solicitor General received a copy of the decision on April 23, 1991.[41] Petitioners point out that the Solicitor General filed with the Court of Appeals the petition for annulment of judgment invoking Section 9(2) of BP Blg. 129[42] only on August 6, 1991, after the decision had supposedly become final and executory. Moreover, petitioners further point out that the Solicitor General filed the petition for annulment after the land registration court issued its order of May 6, 1991 directing the Land Registration Authority to issue the corresponding decree of registration. The Solicitor General sought the annulment of the decision on the ground that the land registration court had no jurisdiction over the case, specifically, over the Lot which was not alienable and disposable. The Solicitor General maintained that the decision was null and void. Petitioners argue that the remedy of annulment of judgment is no longer available because it is barred by the principle of res judicata. They insist that the land registration court had jurisdiction over the case which involves private land. They also argue that the Republic is estopped from questioning the land registration courts jurisdiction considering that the Republic participated in the proceedings before the court. It is now established that the Lot, being a watershed reservation, is not alienable and disposable public land. The evidence of the petitioners do not clearly and convincingly show that the Lot, described as Lot Psu-162620, ceased to be a portion of the area classified as a watershed reservation of the public domain. Any title to the Lot is void ab initio. In view of this, the alleged procedural infirmities attending the filing of the petition for annulment of judgment are immaterial since the land registration court never acquired jurisdiction over the Lot. All proceedings of the land registration court involving the Lot are therefore null and void. We apply our ruling in Martinez vs. Court of Appeals,[43] as follows: The Land Registration Court has no jurisdiction over non-registrable properties, such as public navigable rivers which are parts of the public domain, and cannot validly adjudge the registration of title in favor of private applicant. Hence, the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga as regards the Lot No. 2 of certificate of Title No. 15856 in the name of petitioners may be attacked at any time, either directly or collaterally, by the State which is not bound by any prescriptive period provided for by the Statute of Limitations. We also hold that environmental consequences in this case override concerns over technicalities and rules of procedure. In Republic vs. De los Angeles,[44] which involved the registration of public lands, specifically parts of the sea, the Court rejected the principle of res judicata and estoppel to silence the Republics claim over public lands. The Court said: It should be noted further that the doctrine of estoppel or laches does not apply when the Government sues as a sovereign or asserts governmental rights, nor does estoppel or laches validate an act that contravenes law or public policy, and that res judicata is to be disregarded if its application would involve the sacrifice of justice to technicality. The Court further held that the right of reversion or reconveyance to the State of the public properties registered and which are not capable of private appropriation or private acquisition does not prescribe. Third issue: Whether the petition-in-intervention is proper. The Bockasanjo ISF Awardees Association, Inc., an association of holders of certificates of stewardship issued by the DENR under its Integrated Social Forestry Program, filed with the Court of Appeals on November 29, 1991 a Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Admit Petition-In-Intervention. 56

According to intervenors, they are the actual occupants of the Lot which petitioners sought to register. Aware that the parcels of land which their forefathers had occupied, developed and tilled belong to the Government, they filed a petition with then President Corazon C. Aquino and then DENR Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, to award the parcels of land to them. Secretary Factoran directed the Director of Forest Management Bureau to take steps for the segregation of the aforementioned area from the MWR for development under the DENRs ISF Programs. Subsequently, then President Aquino issued Proclamation No. 585 dated June 5, 1990 excluding 1,430 hectares from the operation of EO 33 and placed the same under the DENRs Integrated Social Forestry Program. Proclamation No. 585 reads: PROCLAMATION NO. 585 AMENDING FURTHER EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 33, DATED JULY 26, 1904 WHICH ESTABLISHED THE MARIKINA WATERSHED RESERVATION (IN-12) AS AMENDED, BY EXCLUDING CERTAIN PORTIONS OF LANDS EMBRACED THEREIN SITUATED AT SITIOS BOSOBOSO, KILINGAN, VETERANS, BARANGAYS SAN JOSEPH AND PAENAAN, MUNICIPALITY OF ANTIPOLO, PROVINCE OF RIZAL, ISLAND OF LUZON. Upon recommendation of the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources and pursuant to the authority vested in me by law, I, CORAZON C. AQUINO, President of the Philippines, do hereby exclude from the operation of Executive Order No. 33, which established the Marikina Watershed Reservation, certain parcel of land of the public domain embraced therein situated in Sitios Bosoboso, Veterans, Kilingan and Barangay San Joseph and Paenaan, Municipality of Antipolo, Province of Rizal and place the same under the Integrated Social Forestry Program of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources in accordance with existing laws, rules and regulations, which parcel of land is more particularly described as follows: A PARCEL OF LAND, within the Marikina Watershed Reservation situated in the Municipality of Antipolo, Province of Rizal, beginning at point 1 on plan, being identical to corner 1 of Marikina Watershed Reservation; thence xxx xxx xxx Containing an area of One Thousand Four Hundred Thirty (1,430) Hectares. All other lands covered and embraced under Executive Order No. 33 as amended, not otherwise affected by this Proclamation, shall remain in force and effect. IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the Republic of the Philippines to be affixed. Done in the City of Manila, this 5th day of June, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and ninety. (Sgd.) CORAZON C. AQUINO President of the Philippines Pursuant to Proclamation No. 585, the chief of the ISF Unit, acting through the Regional Executive Director of the DENR (Region IV), issued sometime between the years 1989 to 1991 certificates of stewardship contracts to bona fide residents of the barangays mentioned in the proclamation as qualified recipients of the ISF programs. Among those awarded were intervenors. The certificates of stewardship are actually contracts of lease granted by the DENR to actual occupants of parcels of land under its ISF programs for a period of twenty-five (25) years, renewable for another twenty-five (25) years.[45] The DENR awarded contracts of stewardship to ISF participants in Barangay San Isidro (or Boso-boso) and the other barangays based on the Inventory of Forest Occupants the DENR had conducted.[46] According to intervenors, they learned only on July 31, 1991 about the pendency of LRC Case No. 269-A before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal. On August 8, 1991, they filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Admit Opposition in Intervention before the land registration court to assert their rights and to protect their interests. However, shortly after the filing of their opposition, intervenors learned that the land registration court had already rendered a decision on January 30, 1991 confirming petitioners imperfect title. Intervenors counsel received a copy of the decision on August 9, 1991. On August 14, 1991, intervenors filed a motion to vacate judgment and for new trial before the land registration court. According to intervenors, the land registration court could not act on its motions due to the restraining order issued by the Court of Appeals on August 8, 1991, enjoining the land registration 57

court from executing its decision, as prayed for by the Solicitor General in its petition for annulment of judgment. The intervenors were thus constrained to file a petition for intervention before the Court of Appeals which allowed the same. Rule 19 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure[47] provides in pertinent parts: Section 1. Who may intervene. A person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court, or an officer thereof may, with leave of court, be allowed to intervene in the action. The Court shall consider whether or not the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties, and whether or not the inertvenors rights may be fully protected in a separate proceeding. Sec. 2. Time to intervene. The motion to intervene may be filed at any time before rendition of judgment by the trial court. A copy of the pleading-in-intervention shall be attached to the motion and served on the original parties. As a rule, intervention is allowed before rendition of judgment by the trial court, as Section 2, Rule 19 expressly provides. However, the Court has recognized exceptions to this rule in the interest of substantial justice. Mago vs. Court of Appeals[48] reiterated the ruling in Directorof Lands vs. Court of Appeals, where the Court allowed the motions for intervention even when the case had already reached this Court. Thus, in Mago the Court held that: It is quite clear and patent that the motions for intervention filed by the movants at this stage of the proceedings where trial had already been concluded x x x and on appeal x x x the same affirmed by the Court of Appeals and the instant petition for certiorari to review said judgment is already submitted for decision by the Supreme Court, are obviously and, manifestly late, beyond the period prescribed under x x x Section 2, Rule 12 of the rules of Court. But Rule 12 of the Rules of Court, like all other Rules therein promulgated, is simply a rule of procedure, the whole purpose and object of which is to make the powers of the Court fully and completely available for justice. The purpose of procedure is not to thwart justice. Its proper aim is to facilitate the application of justice to the rival claims of contending parties. It was created not to hinder and delay but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice. It does not constitute the thing itself which courts are always striving to secure to litigants. It is designed as the means best adopted to obtain that thing. In other words, it is a means to an end. To be sure, the Court of Appeals did not pass upon the actual status of intervenors in relation to the Lot as this was not in issue. Neither was the validity of the certificates of stewardship contracts which intervenors allegedly possessed inquired into considering this too was not in issue. In fact, intervenors did not specifically seek any relief apart from a declaration that the Lot in question remains inalienable land of the public domain. We cannot fault the Court of Appeals for allowing the intervention, if only to provide the rival groups a peaceful venue for ventilating their sides. This case has already claimed at least five lives due to the raging dispute between the rival camps of the petitioners on one side and those of the DENR awardees on the other. It also spawned a number of criminal cases between the two rival groups including malicious mischief, robbery and arson. A strict application of the rules would blur this bigger, far more important picture. WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated June 22, 1992 declaring null and void the Decision dated January 30, 1991 of Branch 71, Regional Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal, in LRC No. 269-A, LRC Rec. No. N-59179 is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED. Vitug, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur. Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), on official leave. 22) SECOND DIVISION G.R. No. 131501 July 14, 2004 FRANCISCO ZARATE, petitioner, vs. THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, PRECIOSA T. DAVILA, REGALADO TORIAGA, PATRIA TORIAGA, 58

RENATO TORIAGA, ROSALINDA TORIAGA, RYL TORIAGA, PROBO TORIAGA, JOSE CORPUS, MARCELINITO HONORIO, JOSE MELO, LOLITO TALAGA, FELIPE VILLANUEVA, DOMINADOR TAGBALAY, MAXIMO VILLANUEVA, and the DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. DECISION CALLEJO, SR., J.: This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 28241 affirming the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court of Kalibo, Aklan, Branch 3, in Land Registration Case No. 273. The Antecedents As gleaned from the decision of the Court of Appeals, the factual backdrop and antecedental proceedings are as follows: This is an application for registration of title filed by appellant Francisco Zarate on 27 December 1976 to have his three parcels of land brought under the operation of the Land Registration Act. The subject parcels of land contain a land area of 68.2787 hectares and 10.5135 hectares, located at Dumatiad, Tangalan, Aklan, and of 3.8500 hectares, located at Afga, Tangalan, Aklan. The said parcels have been subdivided into six (6) lots. Appellant claims that the first two parcels of land which formed only one parcel of land consisting of about 78.7922 hectares originally belonged to the spouses Solomon Tirol and Venancia Hontiveros. When they died in 1905 and 1913, respectively, the said parcels of land were inherited by their children Gregorio, Ignacio, Lamberto, Eleanor and Carmen, all surnamed Tirol. On 26 May 1923, they donated said parcel to Josefino Tirol, son of Gregorio, and Angeles Arcenas in consideration of their marriage (Exhs. (sic) "Z"). Said land was later subdivided into two, one with an area of 68.2787 hectares and the other 10.5135 hectares which was later sold to herein appellant on 7 January 1976 (Exh. "HH"). The third parcel (with an area of 3.8500 hectares) was inherited by Gregorio Tirol, father of Josefino, from his ancestors. When Gregorio died, Josefino inherited the same. He later sold the said land to herein appellant on 11 March 1976. Applicant claims that he and his predecessors-in-interest have been in peaceful possession and usufruct of the property for over eighty (80) years, religiously paying the taxes thereon. Nobody disturbed their possession and usufruct for more than fifty (50) years, until oppositors Maximo Villanueva, Jose Corpuz, Dominador Tagbalay, Marcelinito Honorio, Lolito Talaga, Felipe Villanueva and Jose Molo, entered and occupied portions of the land sometime in 1970. Oppositors Preciosa Tirol Davila, on the other hand, contends that Lot 1, Plan Psu-06-000253 with an area of 530,310 sq. meters situated in Tangalan, Aklan, owned by her, was previously the property of Ignacio Tirol, her father. When Ignacio died, the said lot was entrusted to Josefino Tirol, who was his lawyer and first cousin. She did not have any tax declarations because Josefino assured her that he would be responsible for them. Preciosa denied that the said property was donated by his father to Josefino and that the signature appearing on the deed of donation was forged. Oppositor Development Bank of the Philippines gave another version. It claims that the questioned lots are owned by spouses Valeriano Molo and Lutgarda Molo. The said parcel which consists of about 190,922 square meters located at Afga, Tangalan, Aklan, was mortgaged to the bank. When the couple failed to pay their indebtedness, the mortgage was foreclosed and the land became the property of the bank in whose name the land is now declared for taxation purposes. Oppositors Regalado, Patria, Renato, Rosalinda, Ryl and Probo, all surnamed Toriaga, likewise, contend that the land claimed by them which is about 4 hectares in area and situated in Afga, Tangalan, Aklan, originally belonged to Eulalio Tanasa, who possessed it before 1949. When he died, the land was inherited by his daughter Prima who was married to Probio (sic) Toriaga. 59

Prima continuously resided on the land until her death in 1977. The land passed to her son, Regalado Toriaga, Sr., husband of oppositor Patria and father of the other oppositors. The said land is declared in the name of the Toriagas. All the oppositors claim that the land applied for by appellant was unoccupied and covered with wild trees and cogon. They cleared the land, built their houses and planted mangoes, casoy, jackfruit, bananas, camote, and cassava. Neither Josefino Tirol nor Francisco Zarate possessed the land nor enjoyed the products thereof. Oppositor Republic of the Philippines, for its part, claims that the subject land was timberland or unclassified forest. In 1970, at the time of oppositors occupation, the lands were covered with wild trees and thickets and was (sic) released as alienable and disposable under Land Classification Map No. 2779, Project 10-A only on 16 April 1973. Since there were many claimants, the trial court commissioned a geodetic engineer to determine the different portions claimed by the applicant and the oppositors. The commissioners report shows the following claims: Regalado Toriaga, et al. Maximo Villanueva Jose Molo Jose Corpuz Marcelino (sic) Honorio Dominador Tagbalay - 4.1444 hec. - 4.3572 " - 3.7575" - 6.3555" - 7.5123" - 2.6496"

(pp. 1,310-1,313, Vol. IV, Record) Oppositor DBP also claimed an area of 19.092 hectares while Preciosa Davila is also claiming an area of 53.0310 hectares of Lot 1. After the contending parties presented their evidence, the trial court on 26 April 1990 rendered judgment dismissing the application of title filed by applicant Francisco Zarate, and the claims of private oppositors. Not satisfied with the aforesaid decision, applicant filed this appeal assigning the following errors: I THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE ADVERSE CLAIMS OF OWNERSHIP OF THE LANDS IN QUESTION OF THE DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES AND ALL THE OTHER OPPOSITORS ARE FALSE AND FRAUDULENT WITHOUT BASIS IN FACT AND LAW. II THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE APPLICANT-APPELLANT, INCLUDING THE POSSESSIONS AND USUFRUCTS OF HIS PREDECESSORS-IN-INTEREST, HAS BEEN IN POSSESSION AND USUFRUCT OF THE LANDS SUBJECT MATTER OF THIS PROCEEDING FOR OVER 80 YEARS AND FROM TIME IMMEMORIAL AND HE, THEREFORE, ACQUIRED VESTED RIGHTS THEREON. III THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT APPROVING THE APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION OF TITLE TO LAND WHICH THE APPLICANT BROUGHT (sic) TO HAVE HIS THREE PARCELS OF LAND BROUGHT UNDER THE OPERATION OF THE LAND REGISTRATION ACT AND TO HAVE THE TITLES THERETO IN THE EXCLUSIVE NAME OF THE APPLICANT REGISTERED AND CONFIRMED.3 On February 18, 1997, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment affirming the decision of the trial court. The applicant-appellant, now the petitioner, filed a petition for review contending that: 60

I THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN GIVING FULL CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF GEODETIC ENGINEER RONDARIO AND RESPONDENT (OPPOSITOR) MAXIMO VILLANUEVA AND NOT TO THAT OF THE PETITIONER (APPLICANT) AND HIS WITNESSES, RELATIVE TO THE TRUE CLASSIFICATION OF THE SUBJECT PARCELS OF LAND. II THE CLAIMS OF THE RESPONDENTS (OPPOSITORS) ARE RIDDLED WITH INCONSISTENCIES AND IMPROBABILITIES, WHICH INCONSISTENCIES AND IMPROBABILITIES ONLY STRENGTHEN PETITIONERS (APPLICANTS) CLAIMS. III A STRICT APPLICATION OF THE RULE REGARDING THE RELEASE OF PUBLIC LANDS AS EMBODIED IN THE CASE OF VALLARTA V. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, 151 SCRA 679 (1987), WOULD WORK SERIOUS AND IRREPARABLE INJUSTICE TO THE PETITIONER APPLICANT).4 The petitioner avers that the Court of Appeals erred in giving credence and probative weight to the testimony of Geodetic Engineer Jose Rondario and his Certification that the subject property was within the alienable and disposable area of Tangalan, Aklan, certified and released as such under Land Classification Map No. 2779, Project 10-A on April 16, 1973. He asserts that the appellate court should have considered his testimonial and documentary evidence, that the property subject of his application hardly comes close to being a forest or timberland, and that there were hardly any big trees on the property. The petitioner and his predecessors-in-interest even planted bananas, cassava, coconut trees, and camotes on the property. The petitioner contends that the ruling of this Court in Vallarta vs. Intermediate Appellate Court,5 should not be applied so as to prejudice his vested rights over the subject property. The petitioner asserts that for a period of eighty years before 1973, he and his predecessors-ininterest had been in public, continuous, adverse and exclusive possession of the property. He cites the ruling of this Court in Ankron vs. Government of the Philippine Islands to fortify his plea.6 On the other hand, the trial court declared that: To find out the real nature of the lands, the Court examined the testimony of the witnesses Witness Jose Rondario, for the oppositor Development Bank of the Philippines, and surveyor of the lands of the applicant, testified as follows: ATTY. TEJADA: Q You stated that you have gone over the property that you have surveyed for Valeriano Molo, can you tell the court what [were the] improvements, if there are (sic) any, during the survey in 1974? A When I execute[d] my survey, I found out that there is no(t) any (sic) plant only kaingin. xxx Q When you conducted the survey for Valeriano Molo in 1974, were you approached by any person? A There is (sic) nobody questioning me during my survey because actually there was a (were) people making kaingin there I think that (sic) was the tenant of Valeriano Molo." (Tsn, Melgar, November 5, 1987, pp. 7 and 13). Witness Maximo Villanueva (one of the oppositors) declared: ATTY. TAPLAC: Q When you first occupied this land in question, what was the condition of the land? A Filled with thickets and second group forest. Q How big are (sic) the trees found when you first occupied this land? A Some were big trees because we used to get (sic) our materials in building our house. Q Were there signs of occupation when you first entered the land? A There was no sign that there was a previous occupation (sic)." xxx COURT: 61

Q What kind of trees were existing on the land when you occupied it? A Wild trees not planted by people. Q There were no coconut trees existing at the time you occupied the land? A No, Your Honor." (TSN, Peniano, January 31, 1990, pp. 9-10 and 17). Witness Agustin Bautista, an employee of the Forest Management Sector of the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office, Kalibo, Aklan, testifying for the oppositor Director of Lands, averred: ATTY. TORRE: Q In this land classification map 10-A, which is described as alienable and disposable, would you mind informing this Court as to what is the status of this Project No. 10-A previously classified as alienable and disposable? A That is timberland. Previously, it is not being classified alienable and disposable. xxx Q But previous to April 16, 1973, what is (sic) the status of the land then? A It is (sic) timberland. It is (sic) not classified as alienable and disposable." (Tsn, Gonzales, February 1, 1990, pp. 3 and 5). Evidently, the three parcels of land in question were forest lands. The applicants predecessorin-interest, Josefino Tirol, and the private oppositors, who claimed possession over the area did not and could not have acquired ownership over the said lands considering that the area was then inalienable and non-disposable. In the present case, the lands applied for title were released as alienable and disposable only on April 16, 1973 (Exhs. "5-RP" and "6-RP") as per Project No. 10-A, Land Classification Map No. 2779. The application for registration was filed on December 27, 1976. Since the applicant, and likewise, the private oppositors, possessed the land from the time of release on April 16, 1973, for only three (3) years and eight (8) months prior to the filing of the application, the thirty (30) year possession required by law was not complied with.7 Moreover, to warrant registration, proof of possession must be "conclusive" (Municipality of Santiago vs. Court of Appeals, 120 SCRA 734), or "well-nigh incontrovertible" (Santiago vs. de los Santos, 61 SCRA 146). The applicant was not able to prove such possession. The bulk of the evidence submitted revealed numerous occupants on the lands. The survey plan submitted by Reynaldo Lopez, a geodetic engineer commissioned by the Court to determine the different portions claimed by the applicant and the oppositors (Records, p. 1,314), showed that of the three parcels of land with a total area of eighty one (81) hectares, the private oppositors claim the following: Regalado (Lot A); Maximo (Lot B); Jose (Lot C); Jose (Lot D); Marcelinito (Lot E); and Dominador Toriaga, et al. 4.1554 hectares 4.3572 hectares 3.7575 hectares 6.3556 hectares 7.5123 hectares 2.6496 hectares 62

Villanueva Molo Corpus Honorio Tagbalay

(Lot F). The evidence likewise showed that Valeriano Molo, now substituted by the Development Bank of the Philippines, claims 19.092 hectares, and oppositor Preciosa Tirol Davila, 53.0310 hectares. The aforementioned oppositors claim that they are in actual, physical possession of their respective portions. It is admitted by the applicant in his amended application and in his evidence presented during the trial that oppositors Maximo Villanueva, Jose Corpus, Marcelinito Honorio, Joselito Honorio, Dominador Tagbalay, Jose Molo, Valeriano Molo (now substituted by the Development Bank of the Philippines), and the heirs of Regalado Toriaga, Sr., occupy portions of the land through "illegal entry, unauthorized squatting or usurpation." More than one-half (1/2) of the total area applied for registration not being in the possession of the applicant, he cannot, thus, claim exclusive and notorious possession under claim of ownership, nor can he support his claim of title through acquisitive prescription. The Court, therefore, holds that the applicant, as well as the private oppositors, failed to prove by sufficient evidence that they have complied with the requisites provided by law to warrant registration of title to the three (3) parcels of land.8 The Court of Appeals concurred in toto with the findings of the trial court and cited the ruling of this Court in Vallarta vs. Intermediate Appellate Court9 in ruling against the appellants. We find the petition to be barren of merit. The decisive issue for resolution is whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the appealed decision dismissing the petitioners application, on the ground that he failed to prove ownership of the three parcels of land subject of his application under Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended. The question raised by the petitioner, whether the parcels of land subject of his application are forest lands, and whether the petitioner, by himself, and his predecessors-in-interest were in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession under a bona fide claim of ownership for at least thirty (30) years immediately preceding his application in 1976, are questions of fact which the trial court and the Court of Appeals resolved in the negative. Such factual findings are generally conclusive in this Court and will not be reviewed on appeal.10 This Court is not a trier of facts in a case appealed to it under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as amended. There are, to be sure, exceptions to this rule. However, we have carefully reviewed the records and find no justification to deviate from the findings of the trial and appellate courts that the subject property was, before April 16, 1973, forest land, and that the petitioner failed to prove his claim of title over the parcels of land subject of his application under Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, and the legal conclusions based on their findings. Under the Regalian doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the State, and that the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land and charged with the conservation of such patrimony. The same doctrine also states that all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State.11 Consequently, the burden of proof to overcome the presumption of ownership of lands of the public domain is on the person applying for registration.12 Unless public land is shown to have been reclassified and alienated by the State to a private person, it remains part of the inalienable public domain.13 Section 48 of the Public Land Act, as amended by P.D. No. 1073, provides: SEC. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit: xxx xxx xxx (b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty years 63

immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. The petitioner was burdened to prove, by positive and incontrovertible evidence, two legal requirements: (1) the land applied for was alienable and disposable; and, (2) the applicant and his predecessors-in-interest had occupied and possessed the land openly, continuously, exclusively, and adversely for thirty (30) years immediately preceding the filing of his application on December 26, 1976. One claiming private rights must prove that he has complied with the legal requirements of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, which prescribes the substantive as well as procedural requirements for acquisition of public lands. 14 When the conditions set forth by law are complied with, the possessor of the land, by operation of the law, acquires a right to grant, a government grant, without the necessity of a certificate of title being issued.15 Under Section 6 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, the classification and reclassification of public lands into alienable or disposable, mineral or forest land is the prerogative of the Executive Department.16 In Bracewell vs. Court of Appeals,17 we held that the rule on the confirmation of imperfect title does not apply unless and until the land classified as forest land is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain. The applicant must secure a certification from the Government that the lands applied for by the applicants are alienable and disposable.18 The petitioner failed to discharge his burden. First. The petitioner failed to adduce in evidence any certification from the Bureau of Lands or the Bureau of Forestry to the effect that the property is alienable or disposable. On the other hand, the respondents adduced evidence that the property applied for by the petitioner was classified by the Director of Forestry as disposable and alienable only under Forestry Administrative Order No. 4-1295 issued on April 16, 1973, and Land Classification No. 2779 and Project No. 10-A. This is gleaned from the Certification of the Director of Forestry, viz: I hereby certify that this is the correct map of the areas demarcated as timberlands pursuant to Section 1816 of the Revised Administrative Code and those set aside as Alienable or Disposable under Forestry Administrative Order No. 4-1295 dated April 16, 1973. These areas were surveyed and the field notes plotted in accordance with the standard procedure and mapping instruction of the Bureau of Forestry. Therefore, this map is hereby approved. The original reports, field notes and computations in connection herewith are on file in this Office. Manila, Philippines. April 16, 1973. NOTE: FAO No. 4-1295 Approved on (Sgd.) JOSE VIADO June 19, 1973. Actg. Director of Forestry19 Geodetic Engr. Jose R. Rondario, who was commissioned by the petitioner to prepare the survey plan for the subject parcels of land certified, thus: I hereby certify that this area surveyed is within the alienable and disposable area of Tangalan, Aklan, certified and released as such on April 16, 1973 per L.C. No. 2779 and Project No. 10-A. I further certify that this Lot surveyed is outside civil and military reservation. (Sgd.) JOSE R. RONDARIO Geodetic Engineer20 The petitioner cannot denigrate the verisimilitude of the contents of the Certification of Engr. Rondario because the same was offered as his evidence and is based on the records of the Bureau of Forestry. Since the property was reclassified as alienable and disposable only on April 16, 1973 and the petitioner filed his application only on December 27, 1976, or only less than four years after the said reclassification. He irrefragably failed to prove his possession of the property for the 64

requisite thirty (30)-year period. The possession of the land by the applicant and his predecessors-in-interest, even assuming that his predecessors had been in possession of the property prior to the reclassification thereof as alienable or disposable, cannot be credited as part of the thirty (30)-year period required under Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended.21 Indeed, in Bracewell vs. Court of Appeals,22 we held that: Clear from the above is the requirement that the applicant must prove that the land is alienable public land. On this score, we agree with the respondents that the petitioner failed to show that the parcels of land subject of his application are alienable or disposable. On the contrary, it was conclusively shown by the government that the same were only classified as alienable or disposable on March 27, 1972. Thus, even granting that [the] petitioner and his predecessors-ininterest had occupied the same since 1908, he still cannot claim title thereto by virtue of such possession since the subject parcels of land were not yet alienable land at that time nor capable of private appropriation. The adverse possession which may be the basis of a grant of title or confirmation of an imperfect title refers only to alienable or disposable portions of the public domain Prior to March 27, 1972, when the subject parcels of land were classified as inalienable or indisposable, therefore, the same could not be the subject of confirmation of imperfect title. There can be no imperfect title to be confirmed over lands not yet classified as disposable or alienable. In the absence of such classification, the land remains unclassified public land until released therefrom and open to disposition. Indeed, it has been held that the rules on [the] confirmation of imperfect title do not apply unless and until the land classified as forest land is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain.23 The ruling of the Court in Ankron vs. Government of the Philippine Island24 has no application in this case because in that case, the Court ruled that the property was "indisputably" agricultural land. The petitioners bare claims, even if true, that no big trees could be found in the property and that he and his predecessors planted bananas, camotes and other fruit trees on portions of the property, do not divest the property of its classification as forest land. A similar issue was raised in Heirs of Jose Amunategui vs. Director of Forestry,25 where we held that: A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such classification simply because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. "Forest lands" do not have to be on mountains or in out of the way places. Swampy areas covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms and other trees growing in brackish or sea water may also be classified as forest land. The classification is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like. Unless and until the land classified as "forest" is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply. This Court ruled in the leading case of Director of Forestry v. Muoz (23 SCRA 1184 [sic]) that possession of forest lands, no matter how long, cannot ripen into private ownership. And in Republic v. Animas (56 SCRA 499), we granted the petition on the ground that the area covered by the patent and title was not disposable public land, it being a part of the forest zone and any patent and title to said area is void ab initio. It bears emphasizing that a positive act of Government is needed to declassify land which is classified as forest and to convert it into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other purposes. The findings of the Court of Appeals are particularly well-grounded in the instant petition. The fact that no trees enumerated in Section 1821 of the Revised Administrative Code are found in Lot No. 885 does not divest such land of its being classified as forest land, much less as land of the public domain. 26 We reject the claim of the petitioner that he had acquired vested rights over the property, on his 65

assertion that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the property for decades before he filed his application in the trial court. It is a rule of law that possession of forest lands, however long, cannot ripen into private ownership.27 Such lands are not capable of private appropriation, and possession thereof, no matter how long, cannot ripen into ownership.28 IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED DUE COURSE for lack of merit. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 28241 is AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner. SO ORDERED. Puno, (Chairman), Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez, and Tinga, JJ., concur. 23) THIRD DIVISION [G.R. No. 148376. March 31, 2005] LEONARDO ACABAL and RAMON NICOLAS, petitioners, vs. VILLANER ACABAL, EDUARDO ACABAL, SOLOMON ACABAL, GRACE ACABAL, MELBA ACABAL, EVELYN ACABAL, ARMIN ACABAL, RAMIL ACABAL, and BYRON ACABAL, respondents. DECISION CARPIO MORALES, J.: Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the February 15, 2001 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals reversing that of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dumaguete City, Branch 35.[2] In dispute is the exact nature of the document[3] which respondent Villaner Acabal (Villaner) executed in favor of his godson-nephew-petitioner Leonardo Acabal (Leonardo) on April 19, 1990. Villaners parents, Alejandro Acabal and Felicidad Balasabas, owned a parcel of land situated in Barrio Tanglad, Manjuyod, Negros Oriental, containing an area of 18.15 hectares more or less, described in Tax Declaration No. 15856.[4] By a Deed of Absolute Sale dated July 6, 1971,[5] his parents transferred for P2,000.00 ownership of the said land to him, who was then married to Justiniana Lipajan.[6] Sometime after the foregoing transfer, it appears that Villaner became a widower. Subsequently, he executed on April 19, 1990 a deed[7] conveying the same property[8] in favor of Leonardo. Villaner was later to claim that while the April 19, 1990 document he executed now appears to be a Deed of Absolute Sale purportedly witnessed by a Bais City trial court clerk Carmelo Cadalin and his wife Lacorte, what he signed was a document captioned Lease Contract[9](modeled after a July 1976 lease agreement[10] he had previously executed with previous lessee, Maria Luisa Montenegro[11]) wherein he leased for 3 years the property to Leonardo at P1,000.00 per hectare[12] and which was witnessed by two women employees of one Judge Villegas of Bais City. Villaner thus filed on October 11, 1993 a complaint[13] before the Dumaguete RTC against Leonardo and Ramon Nicolas to whom Leonardo in turn conveyed the property, for annulment of the deeds of sale. At the witness stand, Villaner declared: Q: It appears, Mr. Acabal, that you have signed a document of sale with the defendant Leonardo Acabal on April 19, 1990, please tell the court whether you have really agreed to sell this property to the defendant on or before April 19, 1990? A: We had some agreement but not about the selling of this property. Q: What was your agreement with the defendant Leonardo Acabal? A: Our agreement [was] that he will just rent.[14] x x x Q: Now, please tell the court how were you able to sign this document on April 19, 1990? A: I do not know why I signed that, that is why I am puzzled. Q: Why, did you not read the contents of this document? A: I have not read that. I only happened to read the title of the Lease Contract. Q: And do you recall who were the witnesses of the document which you signed in favor of Leonardo Acabal? A: Employees of Judge Villegas of Bais City. Q: Did you see them sign that document? A: Yes, sir. 66

Q: These signatures appearing in this document marked as Exhibit C for the plaintiff and Exhibit 1 for the defendant, please examine over (sic) these signatures if these were the signatures of these witnesses who signed this document? A: These are not the signatures of the two women. Q: And after signing this document on April 19, 1990, did you appear before a notary public to have this notarized? A: No, I went home to San Carlos.[15] x x x Q: According to this document, you sell (sic) this property at P10,000.00, did you sell this property to Leonardo Acabal? A: No, sir. Q: How about after April 19, 1990, did you receive this amount from Leonardo Acabal? A: No, sir.[16] x x x Q: Now you said that on May 25, 1990, Leonardo Acabal did not pay the amount that he promised to you, what did you do of (sic) his refusal to pay that amount? A: I went to Mr. [Carmelo] Mellie Cadalin because he was the one who prepared the papers and to ask Leonardo Acabal why he will not comply with our agreement. Q: By the way, who is this Mellie Cadalin? A: Mellie Cadalin is also working in the sala of Judge Villegas. Q: Who requested Mellie Cadalin to prepare this document? A: Maybe it was Leonardo Acabal. Q: By the way, when for the first time did you talk to Leonardo Acabal regarding your agreement to lease this property to him? A: March 14, 1990, in San Carlos. Q: And what document did you give to him in order that that document will be prepared? A: I have given (sic) some papers and contract of lease that I have signed to (sic) Mrs. Montenegro.[17] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) x x x Q: Now, Carmelo Cadalin [Mellie] also testified before this court that in fact he identified the document marked as Exhibit C for the plaintiff that what you executed on April 19, 1990 was a deed of sale and not a contract of lease, what can you say to that statement? A: That is a lie. Q: And whats the truth then? A: What really (sic) I have signed was the document of lease contract. Q: Now, can you explain to the Honorable Court why it so happened that on April 19, you were able to sign a deed of sale? A: What I can see now is that perhaps those copies of the deed of sale were placed by Mr. Cadalin under the documents which I signed the lease contract. But why is it that it has already a deed of sale when what I have signed was only the lease of contract or the contract of lease. Q: Now, Mr. Cadalin also stated before this court that he handed over to you this Deed of Sale marked as Exhibit C and according to him you read this document, what can you say to this statement? A: Yes, there was a document that he gave me to read it (sic)but it was a contract of lease. Q: How sure are you that what you signed on April 19, 1990 was really a contract of lease and not a contract of sale? A: Because when I signed the contract of lease the witnesses that witnessed my signing the document were the employees of Judge Villegas and then I am now surprised why in the deed of sale which I purportedly signed are witnessed by Carmelo Cadalin and his wife Lacorte.[18] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) On the other hand, Leonardo asserts that what Villaner executed was a Deed of Absolute Sale for a consideration of P10,000.00 which he had already paid,[19] and as he had become the absolute owner of the property, he validly transferred it to Ramon Nicolas on May 19, 1990.[20] 67

Carmelo Cadalin who admittedly prepared the deed of absolute sale and who appears as a witness, along with his wife, to the execution of the document corroborated Leonardos claim: Q: Mr. Cadalin, do you know the plaintiff Villaner Acabal? A: Yes, I know.[21] x x x Q: And I would like to ask you Mr. witness why do you know Villaner Acabal? A: At the time that he went to our house together with Leonardo Acabal he requested me to prepare a deed of sale as regards to a sale of the property.[22] x x x Q: And after they requested you to prepare a document of sale, what did you do? A: At first I refused to [do] it because I have so many works to do, but then they insisted so I prepared the deed. Q: After you prepared the document, what did you do? A: After I prepared it I gave it to him so that he could read the same. Q: When you say him, whom do you refer to? A: Villaner Acabal. Q: And did Villaner Acabal read the document you prepared? A: Yes, he read it. Q: And after reading it what did Villaner Acabal do? A: He signed the document. Q: Showing to you a document which is marked Exhibit C for the plaintiff and Exhibit 1 for the defendants, please tell the Honorable Court what relation this document has to the document which you described earlier? COURT INTERPRETER: Witness is confronted with the said document earlier marked as Exhibit C for the prosecution and Exhibit 1 for the defense. A: Yes, this is the one.[23] x x x Q: Also stated in the document is the phrase Signed in the presence of and there is a number and then two signatures, could you please examine the document and say whether these signatures are familiar to you? A: Yes, number one is my signature and number 2 is the signature of my wife as witness.[24] x x x Q: After Villaner Acabal signed the document, what did Villaner Acabal do? A: He was given the payment by Leonardo Acabal.[25] x x x Q: Aside from the document, deed of absolute sale, that you mentioned earlier that you prepared for Villaner Acabal and Leonardo Acabal, what other documents, if any, did you prepare for them? A: Affidavit of non-tenancy and aggregate area.[26] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) The complaint was later amended[27] to implead Villaners eight children as party plaintiffs, they being heirs of his deceased wife. By Decision of August 8, 1996, the trial court found for the therein defendants-herein petitioners Leonardo and Ramon Nicolas and accordingly dismissed the complaint. Villaner et al. thereupon brought the case on appeal to the Court of Appeals which reversed the trial court, it holding that the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Villaner in favor of Leonardo was simulated and fictitious.[28] Hence, Leonardo and Ramon Nicolas present petition for review on certiorari,[29] anchored on the following assignments of error: I. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT RULED THAT RESPONDENT VILLANER ACABAL WAS DECEIVED INTO SIGNING THE DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE WHEN THE LATTER 68

KNOWINGLY, FREELY AND VOLUNTARILY EXECUTED THE SAME IN FAVOR OF PETITIONER LEONARDO ACABAL. II. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT THE CONSIDERATION OF THE DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE IN THE AMOUNT OF TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,0000.00) WAS UNUSUALLY LOW AND INADEQUATE, ESPECIALLY TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE LOCATION OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY. III. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO CONSIDER WHY RESPONDENT VILLANER ACABAL ONLY QUESTIONED THE POSSESSION AND OWNERSHIP OF PETITIONER RAMON NICOLAS IN COURT AFTER THE LATTER WAS IN OPEN, CONTINUOUS AND PEACEFUL POSSESSION OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY FOR ALMOST THREE (3) YEARS. IV. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN LAW WHEN IT FAILED TO DECLARE PETITIONER RAMON NICOLAS AS A BUYER IN GOOD FAITH AS THE LATTER TOOK THE NECESSARY STEPS AN ORDINARY AND PRUDENT MAN WOULD HAVE TAKEN BEFORE BUYING THE QUESTIONED PROPERTY. V. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENT VILLANER ACABAL WHEN THE LATTER DID NOT PRESENT A SINGLE WITNESS TO TESTIFY ON THE ALLEGED CONTRACT OF LEASE WHICH HE ALLEGEDLY SIGNED AND WITNESSED BY THE EMPLOYEES OF JUDGE VILLEGAS. VI. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN LAW WHEN IT RULED THAT RULE 8, SECTION 8 OF THE 1987 (sic) RULE (sic) OF CIVIL PROCEDURE IS NOT APPLICABLE IN THE CASE AT BAR, CONTRARY TO THE RULING OF THE LOWER COURT. VII. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT ORDERED PETITIONERS TO PAY RESPONDENTS JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY BY WAY OF RENTAL THE SUM OF P10,000.00 PER YEAR FROM 1990 UP TO THE TIME THEY VACATE THE PREMISES.[30] Procedurally, petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals erred when it failed to apply Section 8, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court, respondent Villaner having failed to deny under oath the genuineness and due execution of the April 19, 1990 Deed of Absolute Sale. Petitioners contention does not persuade. The failure to deny the genuineness and due execution of an actionable document does not preclude a party from arguing against it by evidence of fraud, mistake, compromise, payment, statute of limitations, estoppel, and want of consideration.[31] On the merits, this Court rules in petitioners favor. It is a basic rule in evidence that the burden of proof lies on the party who makes the allegations [32] ei incumbit probatio, qui dicit, non qui negat; cum per rerum naturam factum negantis probatio nulla sit.[33] If he claims a right granted by law, he must prove it by competent evidence, relying on the strength of his own evidence and not upon the weakness of that of his opponent. More specifically, allegations of a defect in or lack of valid consent to a contract by reason of fraud or undue influence are never presumed but must be established not by mere preponderance of evidence but by clear and convincing evidence.[34] For the circumstances evidencing fraud and misrepresentation are as varied as the people who perpetrate it in each case, assuming different shapes and forms and may be committed in as many different ways.[35] In the case at bar, it was incumbent on the plaintiff-herein respondent Villaner to prove that he was deceived into executing the Deed of Absolute Sale. Except for his bare allegation that the transaction was one of lease, he failed to adduce evidence in support thereof. His conjecture that perhaps those copies of the deed of sale were placed by Mr. Cadalin under the documents which I signed the contract of lease,[36] must fail, for facts not conjectures decide cases. Attempting to seek corroboration of his account, Villaner presented Atty. Vicente Real who notarized the document. While on direct examination, Atty. Real virtually corroborated Villaners claim that he did not 69

bring the document to him for notarization,[37] on cross-examination, Atty. Real conceded that it was impossible to remember every person who would ask him to notarize documents: Q: And in the course of your notarization, can you remember each and every face that come (sic) to you for notarization? A: No, it is impossible. Q: In the case of Villaner Acabal which you have his document notarized (sic) in 1990, can you remember his face when he came to you? A: No. Q: And can you also say, if a person who came to you having a document to be notarized and if he will appear again after a month, can you remember whether he was the one who came to you? A: Not so much because everyday there are many people who appear with documents to be notarized, Q: So, it is safe to say that if Villaner Acabal came to you on April 25 or rather April 16, 1990 andhave (sic) his document notarized if he comes back in, say May 25, can you still remember if he was the one who came to you? A: I cannot be sure but at least, there are times I can remember persons because he seems to be close to me already. Q: Is this Villaner close to you? A: Because he has been frequenting the house/asking for a copy of the document. Q: So, he became close to you after you notarized the document? A: Yes.[38] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) On Villaners claim that two women employees of Judge Villegas signed as witnesses to the deed[39] but that the signatures appearing thereon are not those of said witnesses,[40] the same must be discredited in light of his unexplained failure to present such alleged women employee-witnesses. In another vein, Villaner zeroes in on the purchase price of the property P10,000.00 which to him was unusually low if the transaction were one of sale. To substantiate his claim, Villaner presented Tax Declarations covering the property for the years 1971,[41] 1974,[42] 1977,[43]1980,[44] 1983,[45] 1985,[46] as well as a Declaration of Real Property executed in 1994.[47] It bears noting, however, that Villaner failed to present evidence on the fair market value of the property as of April 19, 1990, the date of execution of the disputed deed. Absent any evidence of the fair market value of a land as of the time of its sale, it cannot be concluded that the price at which it was sold was inadequate.[48] Inadequacy of price must be proven because mere speculation or conjecture has no place in our judicial system.[49] Victor Ragay, who was appointed by the trial court to conduct an ocular inspection[50] of the property and to investigate matters relative to the case,[51] gave an instructive report dated December 3, 1994,[52] the pertinent portions of which are hereby reproduced verbatim: a) Only three (3) to four (4) hectares of the eighteen (18) were planted to sugar cane, the rest was never cultivated; b) the soil is reddish and somewhat sandy in composition; c) the soil contains so much limestones (rocks consisting mainly of calcium carbonate); d) no part of the land in question is plain or flat, contrary to claim of the plaintiff that almost 10 hectares of the land in question is plain or flat; e) some areas, eastward of and adjacent of the land in question (mistakenly to be owned by the defendant Nicolas) were planted to sugar cane by the owners Kadusales; f) the road going to the land in question (as claimed to be the road) is no longer passable because it has been abandoned and not maintained by anyone, thus it makes everything impossible for anybody to get and haul the sugar cane from the area; g) the Commissioner has discovered some stockpiles of abandoned harvested sugar canes left to rot, along the side of the road, undelivered to the milling site because of the difficulty in bringing up trucks to the scene of the harvest; h) the sugarcanes presently planted on the land in question at the time of the ocular inspection were three (3) feet in height and their structural built was thin or lean; 70

i) Most of the part of the 18 hectares is not planted or cultivated because the same is too rocky and not suitable for planting to sugarcane.[53] Additionally, Ragay reported that one Anatolio Cabusog recently purchased a 6-hectare property adjoining that of the subject property for only P1,600.00[54] or P266.67 per hectare. Given that, had the 18-hectare subject property been sold at about the same time, it would have fetched the amount of P4,800.00,[55] hence, the P10,000.00 purchase price appearing in the questioned April 19, 1990 document is more than reasonable. Even, however, on the assumption that the price of P10,000.00 was below the fair market value of the property in 1990, mere inadequacy of the price per se will not rule out the transaction as one of sale. For the price must be grossly inadequate or shocking to the conscience such that the mind revolts at it and such that a reasonable man would neither directly nor indirectly be likely to consent to it.[56] Still in another vein, Villaner submits that Leonardos transfer of the property to Nicolas in a span of one month for a profit of P30,000.00 conclusively reflects Leonardos fraudulent intent. This submission is a non sequitur. As for Villaners argument that the sale of the property to Leonardo and the subsequent sale thereof to Nicolas are void for being violative of the retention limits imposed by Republic Act No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, the same fails. The pertinent provisions of said law read: SECTION 6. Retention Limits. Except as otherwise provided in this Act, no person may retain, directly or indirectly, any public or agricultural land, the size of which may vary according to factors governing a viable family-sized farm, such as commodity produced, terrain, infrastructure, and soil fertility as determined by the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC) created hereunder, but in no case shall retention by the landowner exceed five (5) hectares. Three (3) hectares may be awarded to each child of the landowner, subject to the following qualifications: (1) that he is at least fifteen (15) years of age; and (2) that he is tilling the land or directly managing the farm: Provided, That landowners whose lands have been covered by Presidential Decree No. 27 shall be allowed to keep the areas originally retained by them thereunder:[57] Provided further, That original homestead grantees or direct compulsory heirs who still own the original homestead at the time of the approval of this Act shall retain the same areas as long as they continue to cultivate said homestead. x x x Upon the effectivity of this Act, any sale, disposition, lease, management, contract or transfer of possession of private lands executed by the original landowner in violation of this Act shall be null and void: Provided, however, that those executed prior to this Act shall be valid only when registered with the Register of Deeds within a period of three (3) months after the effectivity of this Act. Thereafter, all Registers of Deeds shall inform the DAR within thirty (30) days of any transaction involving agricultural lands in excess of five (5) hectares. x x x SECTION 70. Disposition of Private Agricultural Lands. The sale or disposition of agricultural lands retained by a land owner as a consequence of Section 6 hereof shall be valid as long as the total landholdings that shall be owned by the transferee thereof inclusive of the land to be acquired shall not exceed the landholding ceilings provided for in this Act. Any sale or disposition of agricultural lands after the effectivity of this Act found to be contrary to the provisions hereof shall be null and void. Transferees of agricultural lands shall furnish the appropriate Register of Deeds and the BARC an affidavit attesting that his total landholdings as a result of the said acquisition do not exceed the landholding ceiling. The Register of Deeds shall not register the transfer of any agricultural land without the submission of his sworn statement together with proof of service of a copy thereof to the BARC. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) As the above-quoted provisions of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law show, only those private lands devoted to or suitable for agriculture are covered by it.[58] As priorly related, Victor Ragay, who was appointed by the trial court to conduct an ocular inspection of the property, observed in his report that only three (3) to four (4) hectares were planted with sugarcane while the rest of the property was not 71

suitable for planting as the soil was full of limestone.[59] He also remarked that the sugarcanes were only 3 feet in height and very lean,[60] whereas sugarcanes usually grow to a height of 3 to 6 meters (about 8 to 20 feet) and have stems 2 to 5 centimeters (1-2 inches) thick.[61] It is thus gathered that the property was not suitable for agricultural purposes. In any event, since the area devoted to the planting of sugarcane, hence, suitable for agricultural purposes, comprises only 4 hectares at the most, it is less than the maximum retention limit prescribed by law. There was then no violation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. Even assuming that the disposition of the property by Villaner was contrary to law, he would still have no remedy under the law as he and Leonardo were in pari delicto, hence, he is not entitled to afirmative relief one who seeks equity and justice must come to court with clean hands. In pari delicto potior est conditio defendentis.[62] The proposition is universal that no action arises, in equity or at law, from an illegal contract; no suit can be maintained for its specific performance, or to recover the property agreed to be sold or delivered, or the money agreed to be paid, or damages for its violation. The rule has sometimes been laid down as though it were equally universal, that where the parties are in pari delicto, no affirmative relief of any kind will be given to one against the other.[63] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) The principle of pari delicto is grounded on two premises: first, that courts should not lend their good offices to mediating disputes among wrongdoers;[64] and second, that denying judicial relief to an admitted wrongdoer is an effective means of deterring illegality.[65] This doctrine of ancient vintage is not a principle of justice but one of policy as articulated in 1775 by Lord Mansfield in Holman v. Johnson:[66] The objection, that a contract is immoral or illegal as between the plaintiff and defendant, sounds at all times very ill in the mouth of the defendant. It is not for his sake, however, that the objection is ever allowed; but it is founded in general principles of policy, which the defendant has the advantage of, contrary to the real justice, as between him and the plaintiff, by accident, if I may so say. The principle of public policy is this; ex dolo malo non oritur actio.[67] No court will lend its aid to a man who founds his cause of action upon an immoral or an illegal act. If, from the plaintiffs own stating or otherwise, the cause of action appears to arise ex turpi causa,[68] or the transgression of a positive law of this country, there the court says he has no right to be assisted. It is upon that ground the court goes; not for the sake of the defendant, but because they will not lend their aid to such a plaintiff. So if the plaintiff and the defendant were to change sides, and the defendant was to bring his action against the plaintiff, the latter would then have the advantage of it; for where both are equally in fault potior est conditio defendentis.[69] Thus, to serve as both a sanction and as a deterrent, the law will not aid either party to an illegal agreement and will leave them where it finds them. The principle of pari delicto, however, is not absolute, admitting an exception under Article 1416 of the Civil Code. ART. 1416. When the agreement is not illegal per se but is merely prohibited, and the prohibition by the law is designed for the protection of the plaintiff, he may, if public policy is thereby enhanced, recover what he has paid or delivered. Under this article, recovery for what has been paid or delivered pursuant to an inexistent contract is allowed only when the following requisites are met: (1) the contract is not illegal per se but merely prohibited; (2) the prohibition is for the protection of the plaintiffs; and (3) if public policy is enhanced thereby.[70] The exception is unavailing in the instant case, however, since the prohibition is clearly not for the protection of the plaintiff-landowner but for the beneficiary farmers.[71] In fine, Villaner is estopped from assailing and annulling his own deliberate acts.[72] More. Villaner cannot feign ignorance of the law, nor claim that he acted in good faith, let alone assert that he is less guilty than Leonardo. Under Article 3 of the Civil Code, ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith. And now, Villaners co-heirs claim that as co-owners of the property, the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Villaner in favor of Leonardo does not bind them as they did not consent to such an undertaking. There is no question that the property is conjugal. Article 160 of the Civil Code[73] provides: ART. 160. All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.[74] 72

The presumption, this Court has held, applies to all properties acquired during marriage. For the presumption to be invoked, therefore, the property must be shown to have been acquired during the marriage.[75] In the case at bar, the property was acquired on July 6, 1971 during Villaners marriage with Justiniana Lipajan. It cannot be seriously contended that simply because the tax declarations covering the property was solely in the name of Villaner it is his personal and exclusive property. In Bucoy v. Paulino[76] and Mendoza v. Reyes[77] which both apply by analogy, this Court held that registration alone of the properties in the name of the husband does not destroy the conjugal nature of the properties.[78] What is material is the time when the land was acquired by Villaner, and that was during the lawful existence of his marriage to Justiniana. Since the property was acquired during the existence of the marriage of Villaner and Justiniana, the presumption under Article 160 of the Civil Code is that it is the couples conjugal property. The burden is on petitioners then to prove that it is not. This they failed to do. The property being conjugal, upon the death of Justiniana Lipajan, the conjugal partnership was terminated.[79] With the dissolution of the conjugal partnership, Villaners interest in the conjugal partnership became actual and vested with respect to an undivided one-half portion.[80]Justiniana's rights to the other half, in turn, vested upon her death to her heirs[81] including Villaner who is entitled to the same share as that of each of their eight legitimate children.[82] As a result then of the death of Justiniana, a regime of co-ownership arose between Villaner and his co-heirs in relation to the property.[83] With respect to Justinianas one-half share in the conjugal partnership which her heirs inherited, applying the provisions on the law of succession, her eight children and Villaner each receives one-ninth (1/9) thereof. Having inherited one-ninth (1/9) of his wifes share in the conjugal partnership or one eighteenth (1/18)[84] of the entire conjugal partnership and is himself already the owner of one half (1/2) or nineeighteenths (9/18), Villaners total interest amounts to ten-eighteenths (10/18) or five-ninths (5/9). While Villaner owns five-ninths (5/9) of the disputed property, he could not claim title to any definite portion of the community property until its actual partition by agreement or judicial decree. Prior to partition, all that he has is an ideal or abstract quota or proportionate share in the property. [85] Villaner, however, as a co-owner of the property has the right to sell his undivided share thereof. The Civil Code provides so: ART. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership. Thus, every co-owner has absolute ownership of his undivided interest in the co-owned property and is free to alienate, assign or mortgage his interest except as to purely personal rights. While a co-owner has the right to freely sell and dispose of his undivided interest, nevertheless, as a co-owner, he cannot alienate the shares of his other co-owners nemo dat qui non habet.[86] Villaner, however, sold the entire property without obtaining the consent of the other co-owners. Following the well-established principle that the binding force of a contract must be recognized as far as it is legally possible to do so quando res non valet ut ago, valeat quantum valere potest[87] the disposition affects only Villaners share pro indiviso, and the transferee gets only what corresponds to his grantors share in the partition of the property owned in common.[88] As early as 1923, this Court has ruled that even if a co-owner sells the whole property as his, the sale will affect only his own share but not those of the other co-owners who did not consent to the sale. This is because under the aforementioned codal provision, the sale or other disposition affects only his undivided share and the transferee gets only what would correspond to this grantor in the partition of the thing owned in common. Consequently, by virtue of the sales made by Rosalia and Gaudencio Bailon which are valid with respect to their proportionate shares, and the subsequent transfers which culminated in the sale to private respondent Celestino Afable, the said Afable thereby became a co-owner of the disputed parcel of land as correctly held by the lower court since the sales produced the effect of substituting the buyers in the enjoyment thereof. 73

From the foregoing, it may be deduced that since a co-owner is entitled to sell his undivided share, a sale of the entire property by one co-owner without the consent of the other co-owners is not null and void. However, only the rights of the co-owner-seller are transferred., thereby making the buyer a co-owner of the property. The proper action in cases like this is not for the nullification of the sale or the recovery of possession of the thing owned in common from the third person who substituted the co-owner or co-owners who alienated their shares, but the DIVISION of the common property as if it continued to remain in the possession of the coowners who possessed and administered it.[89] Thus, it is now settled that the appropriate recourse of co-owners in cases where their consent were not secured in a sale of the entire property as well as in a sale merely of the undivided shares of some of the coowners is an action for PARTITION under Rule 69 of the Revised Rules of Court. Neither recovery of possession nor restitution can be granted since the defendant buyers are legitimate proprietors and possessors in joint ownership of the common property claimed.[90] (Italics in the original; citations omitted; underscoring supplied) This Court is not unmindful of its ruling in Cruz v. Leis[91] where it held: It is conceded that, as a rule, a co-owner such as Gertrudes could only dispose of her share in the property owned in common. Article 493 of the Civil Code provides: x x x Unfortunately for private respondents, however, the property was registered in TCT No. 43100 solely in the name of Gertrudes Isidro, widow. Where a parcel of land, forming part of the undistributed properties of the dissolved conjugal partnership of gains, is sold by a widow to a purchaser who merely relied on the face of the certificate of title thereto, issued solely in the name of the widow, the purchaser acquires a valid title to the land even as against the heirs of the deceased spouse. The rationale for this rule is that a person dealing with registered land is not required to go behind the register to determine the condition of the property. He is only charged with notice of the burdens on the property which are noted on the face of the register or the certificate of title. To require him to do more is to defeat one of the primary objects of the Torrens system.[92] (Citation omitted) Cruz, however, is not applicable for the simple reason that in the case at bar the property in dispute is unregistered. The issue of good faith or bad faith of a buyer is relevant only where the subject of the sale is a registered land but not where the property is an unregistered land.[93] One who purchases an unregistered land does so at his peril.[94] Nicolas claim of having bought the land in good faith is thus irrelevant.[95] WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals February 15, 2001 Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 56148 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and another is rendered declaring the sale in favor of petitioner Leonardo Acabal and the subsequent sale in favor of petitioner Ramon Nicolas valid but only insofar as five-ninths (5/9) of the subject property is concerned. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. Panganiban, (Chairman), Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, and Garcia, JJ., concur. 24) FIRST DIVISION ROGELIO, GEORGE, LOLITA, G.R. No. 159494 ROSALINDA, and JOSEPHINE, all surnamed PASIO, represented by Present: their father and attorney-in-fact JOSE PASIO, PUNO, C.J., Chairperson, Petitioners, CARPIO, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,* CORONA, and - versus LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, JJ.

74

DR. TEOFILO EDUARDO F. MONTERROYO, substituted by ROMUALDO MONTERROYO, MARIA TERESA MONTERROYO, and STEPHEN MONTERROYO, Respondents.

Promulgated: July 31, 2008

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x DECISION CARPIO, J.: The Case Before the Court is a petition for review[1] assailing the 31 January 2003 Decision[2] and the 5 August 2003 Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 63199. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Decision[4] dated 2 February 1999 of theRegional Trial Court of Iligan City, Branch 6 (trial court), in Civil Case No. 06-3060. The Antecedent Facts This case originated from an action for recovery of possession and damages, with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, filed by Rogelio, George, Lolita, Rosalinda and Josephine, all surnamed Pasio, represented by their father and attorney-infact Jose Pasio (petitioners) against Dr. Teofilo Eduardo F. Monterroyo (Dr. Monterroyo), later substituted by his heirs Romualdo, Maria Teresa and Stephen, all surnamed Monterroyo (respondents). Cad. Lot No. 2139 of Cad. 292, Iligan Cadastre (Lot No. 2139), with an area of 19,979 square meters, located at Panul-iran, Abuno, Iligan City, was part of a 24-hectare land occupied, cultivated and cleared by Laureano Pasio (Laureano) in 1933. The 24-hectare land formed part of the public domain which was later declared alienable and disposable. On 18 February 1935, Laureano filed a homestead application over the entire 24-hectare land under Homestead Application No. 205845.[5] On 22 April 1940, the Bureau of Forestry wrote Laureano and informed him that the tract of land covered by his application was not needed for forest purposes.[6] On 11 September 1941, the Director of Lands issued an Order[7] approving Laureanos homestead application and stating that Homestead Entry No. 154651 was recorded in his name for the land applied for by him.

Laureano died on 24 March 1950. On 15 April 1952, the Director of Lands issued an Order[8] for the issuance of a homestead patent in favor of Laureano, married to Graciana Herbito[9] (Graciana). Laureanos heirs did not receive the order and consequently, the land was not registered under Laureanos name or under that of his heirs. In 1953, the property was covered by Tax Declaration No. 11102[10] in the name of Laureano with Graciana[11] as administrator. Between 1949 and 1954, a Cadastral Survey was conducted in Iligan City. The surveyor found that a small creek divided the 24-hectare parcel of land into two portions, identified as Lot No. 2138 and Lot No. 2139. 75

Petitioners claimed that Laureanos heirs, headed by his son Jose, continuously possessed and cultivated both lots. On 16 October 1962, Joses co-heirs executed a Deed of Quitclaim renouncing their rights and interest over the land in favor of Jose. Jose secured a title in his name for Lot No. 2138. Later, Jose alienated Lot No. 2139 in favor of his children (petitioners in this case) who, on 8 January 1994, simultaneously filed applications for grant of Free Patent Titles over their respective shares of Lot No. 2139 before the Land Management Bureau of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). On 22 August 1994, the DENR granted petitioners applications and issued Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-1322 (a.f.) in favor of Rogelio Pasio, OCT No. P-1318 (a.f.) in favor of George Pasio, OCT No. P-1317 (a.f.) in favor of Lolita Pasio, OCT No. P-1321 (a.f.) in favor of Josephine Pasio, and OCT No. P-1319 (a.f.) in favor of Rosalinda Pasio. Petitioners alleged that their possession of Lot No. 2139 was interrupted on 3 January 1993 when respondents forcibly took possession of the property. Respondents alleged that they had been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of Lot No. 2139, by themselves and through their predecessors-in-interest, since 10 July 1949. They alleged that on 10 July 1949, Rufo Larumbe (Larumbe) sold Lot No. 2139 to Petra Teves (Petra). On 27 February 1984, Petra executed a deed of sale over Lot No. 2139 in favor of Vicente Teves (Vicente). On 20 February 1985, Vicente executed a pacto de retro sale over the land in favor of Arturo Teves (Arturo). In 1992, Arturo sold Lot No. 2139 in favor of respondents father, Dr. Monterroyo, by virtue of an oral contract. On 5 January 1995, Arturo executed a Deed of Confirmation of Absolute Sale of Unregistered Land in favor of Dr. Monterroyos heirs. Respondents alleged that Jose was not the owner of Lot No. 2139 and as such, he could not sell the land to his children. They alleged that petitioners OCTs were null and void for having been procured in violation of the Public Land Act. They further alleged that the Land Management Bureau had no authority to issue the free patent titles because Lot No. 2139 was a private land. The Ruling of the Trial Court In its 2 February 1999 Decision, the trial court ruled, as follows: WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered in favor of all the defendants and against the plaintiffs: 1. Dismissing the complaint;

2. Declaring Lot No. 2139, Iligan Cadastre 292, located at Panul-iran, Abuno, Iligan City to have acquired the character of a private land over which the Land Management Bureau has been divested of jurisdiction; 3. Declaring the defendants to be the owners and possessors of the said lot; 4. Declaring OCT Nos. P-1322 (a.f.) of Rogelio Pasio, P-1318 (a.f.) of George Pasio, P-1317 (a.f.) of Lolita Pasio, P-1321 (a.f.) of Josephine Pasio and P-1319 (a.f.) of Rosalinda Pasio to be null and void for having been procured by fraud and for having been issued by the Land Management Bureau which has been divested of jurisdiction over said lot; 5. Declaring the defendants to be entitled to the sum of P6,000.00 deposited with the Office of the Clerk of Court under O.R. No. 1487777; 6. Dismissing the defendants counterclaim for attorneys fees. Costs against the plaintiffs. SO ORDERED.[12] 76

The trial court ruled that as of January 1994, Lot No. 2139 had already acquired the character of a private land by operation of law. Since Lot No. 2139 had already ceased to be a public land, the Land Management Bureau had no power or authority to dispose of it by issuing free patent titles. The trial court ruled that respondents counterclaim stands on the same footing as an independent action. Thus, it could not be considered a collateral attack on petitioners titles. The trial court further ruled that respondents filed their counterclaim within one year from the grant of petitioners titles, which was the reglementary period for impugning a title. The trial court ruled that the order for the issuance of a patent in favor of Laureano lapsed and became functus officio when itwas not registered with the Director of Deeds. The trial court ruled that while Laureano was the original claimant of the entire 24 hectares, he ceded the right to possession over half of the property, denominated as Lot No. 2139, to Larumbe sometime in 1947. The trial court found that Laureano offered to sell half of the land to his tenant Gavino Quinaquin (Gavino) but he did not have money. Later, Gavino learned from Larumbe that he (Larumbe) acquired half of the land from Laureano. Gavino then started delivering the owners share of the harvest to Larumbe. Laureano never contested Gavinos action nor did he demand that Gavino deliver to him the owners share of the harvest and not to Larumbe. When Lot No. 2139 was sold, Gavino and his successors delivered the owners share of the harvest to Petra, Vicente, Arturo, Dr. Monterroyo, and Dindo Monterroyo, successively. The trial court also found that the other tenants had never given any share of the harvest to Jose. The trial court ruled that petitioners had failed to present convincing evidence that they and their predecessors-ininterest were in possession of Lot No. 2139 from 1947 to 1994 when they filed their application for free patent. The trial court ruled that petitioners committed actual fraud when they misrepresented in their free patent applications that they were in possession of the property continuously and publicly. Petitioners appealed from the trial courts Decision. The Ruling of the Court of Appeals In its 31 January 2003 Decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts Decision. The Court of Appeals ruled that the trial court did not err in allowing respondents counterclaim despite the non-appearance of Dr. Monterroyo, the original defendant, at the barangay conciliation proceedings. The Court of Appeals ruled that petitioners themselves did not personally appear. They were represented by their attorney-in-fact although they were all of legal age, which was a violation of the Katarungang Pambarangay proceedings requiring the personal appearance of the parties. Hence, the Court of Appeals ruled that there was never a valid conciliation proceeding. However, while this would have been a ground for the dismissal of the complaint, the issue was deemed waived because respondents did not raise it in their answer before the trial court. The Court of Appeals ruled that the validity of petitioners titles could be attacked in a counterclaim. The Court of Appeals ruled that respondents counterclaim was a compulsory counterclaim. The Court of Appeals sustained the trial courts ruling that the Land Management Bureau had been divested of jurisdiction to grant the patent because the land already acquired the character of a private land. While the homestead patent was issued in favor of Laureano, the issuance of patent order became functus officio when it was not registered. The Court of Appeals further sustained the trial courts finding that respondents were in physical, open, public, adverse and continuous possession of Lot No. 2139 in the concept of owner for at least 30 years prior to petitioners application for free patent titles over the land. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration. 77

In its 5 August 2003 Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied petitioners motion for reconsideration. Hence, the petition before this Court.

The Issue Petitioners raised the sole issue of whether the Court of Appeals erred in sustaining the trial courts Decision declaring respondents as the rightful owners and possessors of Lot No. 2139.[13] The Ruling of this Court The petition has no merit. Land Management Bureau Had No Jurisdiction To Issue Free Patent Titles In Director of Lands v. IAC,[14] the Court ruled: [A]lienable public land held by a possessor, continuously or through his predecessors-in-interest, openly, continuously and exclusively for the prescribed statutory period (30 years under The Public Land Act, as amended) is converted to private property by the mere lapse or completion of the period, ipso jure.[15] In Magistrado v. Esplana,[16] the Court ruled that so long as there is a clear showing of open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession, and hence, a registrable possession, by present or previous occupants, by any proof that would be competent and admissible, the property must be considered to be private. In this case, the trial court found that the preponderance of evidence favors respondents as the possessors of Lot No. 2139 for over 30 years, by themselves and through their predecessors-ininterest. The question of who between petitioners and respondents had prior possession of the property is a factual question whose resolution is the function of the lower courts. [17] When the factual findings of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals are supported by substantial evidence, they are conclusive and binding on the parties and are not reviewable by this Court.[18] While the rule is subject to exceptions, no exception exists in this case. Respondents were able to present the original Deed of Absolute Sale, dated 10 July 1949, executed by Larumbe in favor of Petra.[19] Respondents also presented the succeeding Deeds of Sale showing the transfer of Lot No. 2139 from Petra to Vicente[20] and from Vicente to Arturo[21] and the Deed of Confirmation of Absolute Sale of Unregistered Real Property executed by Arturo in favor of respondents.[22] Respondents also presented a certification[23] executed by P/Sr. Superintendent Julmunier Akbar Jubail, City Director of Iligan City Police Command and verified from the Log Book records by Senior Police Officer Betty Dalongenes Mab-Abo confirming that Andres Quinaquin made a report that Jose, Rogelio and Luciana Pasio, Lucino Pelarion and Nando Avilo forcibly took his copra. This belied petitioners allegation that they were in possession of Lot No. 2139 and respondents forcibly took possession of the property only in January 1993.

78

Considering that petitioners application for free patent titles was filed only on 8 January 1994, when Lot No. 2139 had already become private land ipso jure, the Land Management Bureau had no jurisdiction to entertain petitioners application. Non-Registration of Homestead Patent Rendered it Functus Officio Once a homestead patent granted in accordance with law is registered, the certificate of title issued by virtue of the patent has the force and effect of a Torrens title issued under the land registration law.[24] In this case, the issuance of a homestead patent in 1952 in favor of Laureano was not registered. Section 103 of Presidential Decree No. 1529[25] mandates the registration of patents, and registration is the operative act to convey the land to the patentee, thus: Sec. 103. x x x x. The deed, grant, patent or instrument of conveyance from the Government to the grantee shall not take effect as a conveyance or bind the land but shall operate only as a contract between the Government and the grantee and as evidence of authority to the Register of Deeds to make registration. It is the act of registration that shall be the operative act to affect and convey the land, and in all cases under this Decree, registration shall be made in the office of the Register of Deeds of the province or city where the land lies. The fees for registration shall be paid by the grantee. After due registration and issuance of the certificate of title, such land shall be deemed to be registered land to all intents and purposes under this Decree. (Emphasis supplied) Further, in this case, Laureano already conveyed Lot No. 2139 to Larumbe in 1947 before the approval of his homestead application. In fact, Larumbe already sold the land to Petra in 1949, three years before the issuance of the homestead patent in favor of Laureano. The trial court found that since 1947, the tenants of Lot No. 2139 had been delivering the owners share of the harvest, successively, to Larumbe, Petra, Vicente and Arturo Teves, Dr. Monterroyo and Dindo Monterroyo. The trial court found no instance when the owners share of the harvest was delivered to Jose Pasio. Hence, we sustain the trial court that the non-registration of Laureanos homestead patent had rendered it functus officio. A Counterclaim is Not a Collateral Attack on the Title It is already settled that a counterclaim is considered an original complaint and as such, the attack on the title in a case originally for recovery of possession cannot be considered as a collateral attack on the title.[26] Development Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals[27] is similar to the case before us insofar as petitioner in that case filed an action for recovery of possession against respondent who, in turn, filed a counterclaim claiming ownership of the land. In that case, the Court ruled: Nor is there any obstacle to the determination of the validity of TCT No. 10101. It is true that the indefeasibility of torrens title cannot be collaterally attacked. In the instant case, the original complaint is for recovery of possession filed by petitioner against private respondent, not an original action filed by the latter to question the validity of TCT No. 10101 on which petitioner bases its right. To rule on the issue of validity in a case for recovery of possession is tantamount to a collateral attack. However, it should not [b]e overlooked that private respondent filed a counterclaim against petitioner, claiming ownership over the land and seeking damages. Hence, we could rule on the question of the validity of TCT No. 10101 for the counterclaim can be considered a direct attack on the same. A counterclaim is considered a complaint, only this time, it is the original defendant who becomes the plaintiff... It stands on the same footing and is to be tested by the same rules as if it were an independent action. x x x.[28] As such, we sustain both the trial court and the Court of Appeals on this issue. 79

Principle of Constructive Trust Applies Under the principle of constructive trust, registration of property by one person in his name, whether by mistake or fraud, the real owner being another person, impresses upon the title so acquired the character of a constructive trust for the real owner, which would justify an action for reconveyance. [29] In the action for reconveyance, the decree of registration is respected as incontrovertible but what is sought instead is the transfer of the property wrongfully or erroneously registered in anothers name to its rightful owner or to one with a better right.[30] If the registration of the land is fraudulent, the person in whose name the land is registered holds it as a mere trustee, and the real owner is entitled to file an action for reconveyance of the property.[31] In the case before us, respondents were able to establish that they have a better right to Lot No. 2139 since they had long been in possession of the property in the concept of owners, by themselves and through their predecessors-in-interest. Hence, despite the irrevocability of the Torrens titles issued in their names and even if they are already the registered owners under the Torrens system, petitioners may still be compelled under the law to reconvey the property to respondents.[32] WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the 31 January 2003 Decision and the 5 August 2003 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 63199. Costs against petitioners. SO ORDERED. 25) THIRD DIVISION [G.R. No. 100709. November 14, 1997] REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, JOSEFINA L. MORATO, SPOUSES NENITA CO and ANTONIO QUILATAN AND THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF QUEZON PROVINCE, respondents. DECISION PANGANIBAN, J.: Will the lease and/or mortgage of a portion of a realty acquired through free patent constitute sufficient ground for the nullification of such land grant? Should such property revert to the State once it is invaded by the sea and thus becomes foreshore land? The Case These are the two questions raised in the petition before us assailing the Court of Appeals [1] Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 02667 promulgated on June 13, 1991 which answered the said questions in the negative.[2] Respondent Courts Decision dismissed[3] petitioners appeal and affirmed in toto the decision of the Regional Trial Court[4] of Calauag, Quezon, dated December 28, 1983 in Civil Case No. C-608. In turn, the Regional Trial Courts decision dismissed petitioners complaint for cancellation of the Torrens Certificate of Title of Respondent Morato and for reversion of the parcel of land subject thereof to the public domain. The Facts The petition of the solicitor general, representing the Republic of the Philippines, recites the following facts:[5] Sometime in December, 1972, respondent Morato filed a Free Patent Application No. III-3-8186-B on a parcel of land with an area of 1,265 square meters situated at Pinagtalleran, Calauag, Quezon. On January 16, 1974, the patent was approved and the Register of Deeds of Quezon at Lucena City issued on February 4, 1974 Original Certificate of Title No. P-17789. Both the free patent and the title specifically mandate that the land shall not be alienated nor encumbered within five (5) years from the date of the issuance of the patent (Sections 118 and 124 of CA No. 141, as amended). Subsequently, the District Land Officer in Lucena City, acting upon reports that respondent Morato had encumbered the land in violation of the condition of the patent, conducted an investigation. Thereafter, it was established that the subject land is a portion of the Calauag Bay, five (5) to six (6) feet deep under water during high tide and two (2) feet deep at low tide, and not suitable to vegetation. Moreover, on 80

October 24, 1974, a portion of the land was mortgaged by respondent Morato to respondents Nenita Co and Antonio Quilatan for P10,000.00 (pp. 2, 25, Folder of Exhibits). The spouses Quilatan constructed a house on the land. Another portion of the land was leased to Perfecto Advincula on February 2, 1976 at P100.00 a month, where a warehouse was constructed. On November 5, 1978, petitioner filed an amended complaint against respondents Morato, spouses Nenita Co and Antonio Quilatan, and the Register of Deeds of Quezon for the cancellation of title and reversion of a parcel of land to the public domain, subject of a free patent in favor of respondent Morato, on the grounds that the land is a foreshore land and was mortgaged and leased within the five-year prohibitory period (p. 46, Records). After trial, the lower court, on December 28, 1983, rendered a decision dismissing petitioners complaint. In finding for private respondents, the lower court ruled that there was no violation of the 5year period ban against alienating or encumbering the land, because the land was merely leased and not alienated. It also found that the mortgage to Nenita Co and Antonio Quilatan covered only the improvement and not the land itself. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. Thereafter, the Republic of the Philippines filed the present petition.[6] The Issues Petitioner alleges that the following errors were committed by Respondent Court:[7] I Respondent Court erred in holding that the patent granted and certificate of title issued to Respondent Morato cannot be cancelled and annulled since the certificate of title becomes indefeasible after one year from the issuance of the title. II Respondent Court erred in holding that the questioned land is part of a disposable public land and not a foreshore land. The Courts Ruling The petition is meritorious. First Issue: Indefeasibility of a Free Patent Title In resolving the first issue against petitioner, Respondent Court held:[8] x x x. As ruled in Heirs of Gregorio Tengco vs. Heirs of Jose Alivalas, 168 SCRA 198. x x. The rule is wellsettled that an original certificate of title issued on the strength of a homestead patent partakes of the nature of a certificate of title issued in a judicial proceeding, as long as the land disposed of is really part of the disposable land of the public domain, and becomes indefeasible and incontrovertible upon the expiration of one year from the date of promulgation of the order of the Director of Lands for the issuance of the patent. (Republic v. Heirs of Carle, 105 Phil. 1227 (1959); Ingaran v. Ramelo, 107 Phil. 498 (1960); Lopez v. Padilla, (G.R. No. L-27559, May 18, 1972, 45 SCRA 44). A homestead patent, one registered under the Land Registration Act, becomes as indefeasible as a Torrens Title. (Pamintuan v. San Agustin, 43 Phil. 558 (1982); El Hogar Filipino v. Olviga, 60 Phil. 17 (1934); Duran v. Oliva, 113 Phil. 144 (1961); Pajomayo v. Manipon, G.R. No. L-33676, June 30, 1971, 39 SCRA 676). (p. 203). Again, in Lopez vs. Court of Appeals, 169 SCRA 271, citing Iglesia ni Cristo v. Hon. Judge, CFI of Nueva Ecija, Branch I, (123 SCRA 516 (1983) and Pajomayo, et al. v. Manipon, et al. (39 SCRA 676 (1971) held that once a homestead patent granted in accordance with the Public Land Act is registered pursuant to Section 122 of Act 496, the certificate of title issued in virtue of said patent has the force and effect of a Torrens Title issued under the Land Registration Act. Indefeasibility of the title, however, may not bar the State, thru the Solicitor General, from filing an action for reversion, as ruled in Heirs of Gregorio Tengo v. Heirs of Jose Aliwalas, (supra), as follows: But, as correctly pointed out by the respondent Court of Appeals, Dr. Aliwalas title to the property having become incontrovertible, such may no longer be collaterally attacked. If indeed there had been any fraud or misrepresentation in obtaining the title, an action for reversion instituted by the Solicitor General would be the proper remedy (Sec. 101, C.A. No. 141; Director of Lands v. Jugado, G.R. No. L-14702, May 21, 1961, 2 SCRA 32; Lopez v. Padilla, supra). (p. 204). 81

Petitioner contends that the grant of Free Patent (IV-3) 275 and the subsequent issuance of Original Certificate of Title No. P-17789 to Respondent Josefina L. Morato were subject to the conditions provided for in Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 141. It alleges that on October 24, 1974, or nine (9) months and eight (8) days after the grant of the patent, Respondent Morato, in violation of the terms of the patent, mortgaged a portion of the land to Respondent Nenita Co, who thereafter constructed a house thereon. Likewise, on February 2, 1976 and within the five-year prohibitory period, Respondent Morato leased a portion of the land to Perfecto Advincula at a monthly rent of P100.00 who, shortly thereafter, constructed a house of concrete materials on the subject land.[9] Further, petitioner argues that the defense of indefeasibility of title is inaccurate. The original certificate of title issued to Respondent Morato contains the seeds of its own cancellation: such certificate specifically states on its face that it is subject to the provisions of Sections 118, 119, 121, 122, 124 of CA No. 141, as amended.[10] Respondent Morato counters by stating that although a portion of the land was previously leased, it resulted from the fact that Perfecto Advincula built a warehouse in the subject land without [her] prior consent. The mortgage executed over the improvement cannot be considered a violation of the said grant since it can never affect the ownership.[11] She states further: x x x. the appeal of the petitioner was dismissed not because of the principle of indefeasibility of title but mainly due to failure of the latter to support and prove the alleged violations of respondent Morato. The records of this case will readily show that although petitioner was able to establish that Morato committed some acts during the prohibitory period of 5 years, a perusal thereof will also show that what petitioner was able to prove never constituted a violation of the grant.[12] Respondent-Spouses Quilatan, on the other hand, state that the mortgage contract they entered into with Respondent Morato can never be considered as [an] alienation inasmuch as the ownership over the property remains with the owner.[13] Besides, it is the director of lands and not the Republic of the Philippines who is the real party in interest in this case, contrary to the provision of the Public Land Act which states that actions for reversion should be instituted by the solicitor general in the name of Republic of the Philippines.[14] We find for petitioner. Quoted below are relevant sections of Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise known as the Public Land Act: Sec. 118. Except in favor of the Government or any of its branches, units or institutions, or legally constituted banking corporations, lands acquired under free patent or homestead provisions shall not be subject to encumbrance or alienation from the date of the approval of the application and for a term of five years from and after the date of issuance of the patent or grant nor shall they become liable to the satisfaction of any debt contracted prior to the expiration of said period; but the improvements or crops on the land may be mortgaged or pledged to qualified persons, associations, or corporations. No alienation, transfer, or conveyance of any homestead after five years and before twenty-five years after issuance of title shall be valid without the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, which approval shall not be denied except on constitutional and legal grounds. (As amended by Com. Act No. 456, approved June 8, 1939.) xxx xxx xxx Sec. 121. Except with the consent of the grantee and the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, and solely for educational, religious, or charitable purposes or for a right of way, no corporation, association, or partnership may acquire or have any right, title, interest, or property right whatsoever to any land granted under the free patent, homestead, or individual sale provisions of this Act or to any permanent improvement on such land. (As amended by Com. Act No. 615, approved May 5, 1941) Sec. 122. No land originally acquired in any manner under the provisions of this Act, nor any permanent improvement on such land, shall be encumbered, alienated or transferred, except to persons, corporations, association, or partnerships who may acquire lands of the public domain under this Act or to corporations organized in the Philippines authorized therefore by their charters. Except in cases of hereditary successions, no land or any portion thereof originally acquired under the free patent, homestead, or individual sale provisions of this Act, or any permanent improvement on such land, shall be transferred or assigned to any individual, nor shall such land or any permanent improvement 82

thereon be leased to such individual, when the area of said land, added to that of his own, shall exceed one hundred and forty-four hectares. Any transfer, assignment, or lease made in violation hereto shall be null and void. (As amended by Com. Act No. 615, Id.) xxx xxx xxx Sec. 124. Any acquisition, conveyance, alienation, transfer, or other contract made or executed in violation of any of the provisions of sections one hundred and eighteen, one hundred and twenty, one hundred and twenty-one, one hundred and twenty-two, and one hundred and twenty-three of this Act shall be unlawful and null and void from its execution and shall produce the effect of annulling and cancelling the grant, title, patent, or permit originally issued, recognized or confirmed, actually or presumptively, and cause the reversion of the property and its improvements to the State. (Underscoring supplied.) The foregoing legal provisions clearly proscribe the encumbrance of a parcel of land acquired under a free patent or homestead within five years from the grant of such patent. Furthermore, such encumbrance results in the cancellation of the grant and the reversion of the land to the public domain. Encumbrance has been defined as [a]nything that impairs the use or transfer of property; anything which constitutes a burden on the title; a burden or charge upon property; a claim or lien upon property. It may be a legal claim on an estate for the discharge of which the estate is liable; an embarrassment of the estate or property so that it cannot be disposed of without being subject to it; an estate, interest, or right in lands, diminishing their value to the general owner; a liability resting upon an estate.[15] Do the contracts of lease and mortgage executed within five (5) years from the issuance of the patent constitute an encumbrance and violate the terms and conditions of such patent? Respondent Court answered in the negative:[16] From the evidence adduced by both parties, it has been proved that the area of the portion of the land, subject matter of the lease contract (Exh. B) executed by and between Perfecto Advincula and Josefina L. Morato is only 10 x 12 square meters, whereas the total area of the land granted to Morato is 1,265 square meters. It is clear from this that the portion of the land leased by Advincula does not significantly affect Moratos ownership and possession. Above all, the circumstances under which the lease was executed do not reflect a voluntary and blatant intent to violate the conditions provided for in the patent issued in her favor. On the contrary, Morato was compelled to enter into that contract of lease out of sympathy and the goodness of her heart to accommodate a fellow man. x x x It is indisputable, however, that Respondent Morato cannot fully use or enjoy the land during the duration of the lease contract. This restriction on the enjoyment of her property sufficiently meets the definition of an encumbrance under Section 118 of the Public Land Act, because such contract impairs the use of the property by the grantee. In a contract of lease which is consensual, bilateral, onerous and commutative, the owner temporarily grants the use of his or her property to another who undertakes to pay rent therefor.[17] During the term of the lease, the grantee of the patent cannot enjoy the beneficial use of the land leased. As already observed, the Public Land Act does not permit a grantee of a free patent from encumbering any portion of such land. Such encumbrance is a ground for the nullification of the award. Moratos resort to equity, i.e. that the lease was executed allegedly out of the goodness of her heart without any intention of violating the law, cannot help her. Equity, which has been aptly described as justice outside legality, is applied only in the absence of, and never against, statutory law or judicial rules of procedure. Positive rules prevail over all abstract arguments based on equity contra legem.[18] Respondents failed to justify their position that the mortgage should not be considered an encumbrance. Indeed, we do not find any support for such contention. The questioned mortgage falls squarely within the term encumbrance proscribed by Section 118 of the Public Land Act. [19]Verily, a mortgage constitutes a legal limitation on the estate, and the foreclosure of such mortgage would necessarily result in the auction of the property.[20] Even if only part of the property has been sold or alienated within the prohibited period of five years from the issuance of the patent, such alienation is a sufficient cause for the reversion of the whole estate to the State. As a condition for the grant of a free patent to an applicant, the law requires that the land should not be encumbered, sold or alienated within five years from the issuance of the patent. The sale or the alienation of part of the homestead violates that condition.[21] The prohibition against the encumbrance -- lease and mortgage included -- of a homestead which, by analogy applies to a free patent, is mandated by the rationale for the grant, viz.:[22] 83

It is well-known that the homestead laws were designed to distribute disposable agricultural lots of the State to land-destitute citizens for their home and cultivation. Pursuant to such benevolent intention the State prohibits the sale or encumbrance of the homestead (Section 116) within five years after the grant of the patent. After that five-year period the law impliedly permits alienation of the homestead; but in line with the primordial purpose to favor the homesteader and his family the statute provides that such alienation or conveyance (Section 117) shall be subject to the right of repurchase by the homesteader, his widow or heirs within five years. This section 117 is undoubtedly a complement of section 116. It aims to preserve and keep in the family of the homesteader that portion of public land which the State had gratuitously given to him. It would, therefore, be in keeping with this fundamental idea to hold, as we hold, that the right to repurchase exists not only when the original homesteader makes the conveyance, but also when it is made by his widow or heirs. This construction is clearly deducible from the terms of the statute. By express provision of Section 118 of Commonwealth Act 141 and in conformity with the policy of the law, any transfer or alienation of a free patent or homestead within five years from the issuance of the patent is proscribed. Such transfer nullifies said alienation and constitutes a cause for the reversion of the property to the State. The prohibition against any alienation or encumbrance of the land grant is a proviso attached to the approval of every application.[23] Prior to the fulfillment of the requirements of law, Respondent Morato had only an inchoate right to the property; such property remained part of the public domain and, therefore, not susceptible to alienation or encumbrance. Conversely, when a homesteader has complied with all the terms and conditions which entitled him to a patent for [a] particular tract of public land, he acquires a vested interest therein and has to be regarded an equitable owner thereof.[24] However, for Respondent Moratos title of ownership over the patented land to be perfected, she should have complied with the requirements of the law, one of which was to keep the property for herself and her family within the prescribed period of five (5) years. Prior to the fulfillment of all requirements of the law, Respondent Moratos title over the property was incomplete. Accordingly, if the requirements are not complied with, the State as the grantor could petition for the annulment of the patent and the cancellation of the title. Respondent Morato cannot use the doctrine of the indefeasibility of her Torrens title to bar the state from questioning its transfer or encumbrance. The certificate of title issued to her clearly stipulated that its award was subject to the conditions provided for in Sections 118, 119, 121, 122 and 124 of Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 141. Because she violated Section 118, the reversion of the property to the public domain necessarily follows, pursuant to Section 124. Second Issue: Foreshore Land Reverts to the Public Domain There is yet another reason for granting this petition. Although Respondent Court found that the subject land was foreshore land, it nevertheless sustained the award thereof to Respondent Morato:[25] First of all, the issue here is whether the land in question, is really part of the foreshore lands. The Supreme Court defines foreshore land in the case of Republic vs.Alagad, 169 SCRA 455, 464, as follows: Otherwise, where the rise in water level is due to, the extraordinary action of nature, rainful, for instance, the portions inundated thereby are not considered part of the bed or basin of the body of water in question. It cannot therefore be said to be foreshore land but land outside of the public dominion, and land capable of registration as private property. A foreshore land, on the other hand has been defined as follows: ... that part of (the land) which is between high and low water and left dry by the flux and reflux of the tides x x x x (Republic vs. C.A., Nos. L-43105, L-43190, August 31, 1984, 131 SCRA 532; Government vs. Colegio de San Jose, 53 Phil 423) The strip of land that lies between the high and low water marks and that is alternatively wet and dry according to the flow of the tide. (Rep. vs. CA, supra, 539). The factual findings of the lower court regarding the nature of the parcel of land in question reads: Evidence disclose that the marginal area of the land radically changed sometime in 1937 up to 1955 due to a strong earthquake followed by frequent storms eventually eroding the land. From 1955 to 1968, however, gradual reclamation was undertaken by the lumber company owned by the Moratos. Having thus restored the land thru mostly human hands employed by the lumber company, the area continued to be 84

utilized by the owner of the sawmill up to the time of his death in 1965. On or about March 17, 1973, there again was a strong earthquake unfortunately causing destruction to hundreds of residential houses fronting the Calauag Bay including the Santiago Building, a cinema house constructed of concrete materials. The catastrophe totally caused the sinking of a concrete bridge at Sumulong river also in the municipality of Calauag, Quezon. On November 13, 1977 a typhoon code named Unding wrought havoc as it lashed the main land of Calauag, Quezon causing again great erosion this time than that which the area suffered in 1937. The Court noted with the significance of the newspaper clipping entitled Baryo ng Mangingisda Kinain ng Dagat (Exh. 11). xxx xxx xxx Evidently this was the condition of the land when on or about December 5, 1972 defendant Josefina L. Morato filed with the Bureau of Lands her free patent application. The defendant Josefina Morato having taken possession of the land after the demise of Don Tomas Morato, she introduced improvement and continued developing the area, planted it to coconut trees. Having applied for a free patent, defendant had the land area surveyed and an approved plan (Exh. 9) based on the cadastral survey as early as 1927 (Exh. 10) was secured. The area was declared for taxation purposes in the name of defendant Josefina Morato denominated as Tax Declaration No. 4115 (Exh. 8) and the corresponding realty taxes religiously paid as shown by Exh. 8-A). (pp. 12-14, DECISION). Being supported by substantial evidence and for failure of the appellant to show cause which would warrant disturbance, the afore-cited findings of the lower court, must be respected. Petitioner correctly contends, however, that Private Respondent Morato cannot own foreshore land: Through the encroachment or erosion by the ebb and flow of the tide, a portion of the subject land was invaded by the waves and sea advances. During high tide, at least half of the land (632.5 square meters) is 6 feet deep under water and three (3) feet deep during low tide. The Calauag Bay shore has extended up to a portion of the questioned land. While at the time of the grant of free patent to respondent Morato, the land was not reached by the water, however, due to gradual sinking of the land caused by natural calamities, the sea advances had permanently invaded a portion of subject land. As disclosed at the trial, through the testimony of the courtappointed commissioner, Engr. Abraham B. Pili, the land was under water during high tide in the month of August 1978. The water margin covers half of the property, but during low tide, the water is about a kilometer (TSN, July 19, 1979, p. 12). Also, in 1974, after the grant of the patent, the land was covered with vegetation, but it disappeared in 1978 when the land was reached by the tides (Exhs. E-1; E-14). In fact, in its decision dated December 28, 1983, the lower court observed that the erosion of the land was caused by natural calamities that struck the place in 1977 (Cf. Decision, pp. 17-18).[26] Respondent-Spouses Quilatan argue, however, that it is unfair and unjust if Josefina Morato will be deprived of the whole property just because a portion thereof was immersed in water for reasons not her own doing.[27] As a general rule, findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are binding and conclusive upon this Court, unless such factual findings are palpably unsupported by the evidence on record or unless the judgment itself is based on a misapprehension of facts.[28] The application for a free patent was made in 1972. From the undisputed factual findings of the Court of Appeals, however, the land has since become foreshore. Accordingly, it can no longer be subject of a free patent under the Public Land Act. Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Cabagis[29]explained the rationale for this proscription: Article 339, subsection 1, of the Civil Code, reads: Art. 339. Property of public ownership is 1. That devoted to public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State, riverbanks, shores, roadsteads, and that of a similar character. ** * * * * * * Article 1, case 3, of the Law of Waters of August 3, 1866, provides as follows: ARTICLE 1. The following are part of the national domain open to public use: ** * * * * * * 85

3. The Shores. By the shore is understood that space covered and uncovered by the movement of the tide. Its interior or terrestrial limit is the line reached by the highest equinoctal tides. Where the tides are not appreciable, the shore begins on the land side at the line reached by the sea during ordinary storms or tempests. In the case of Aragon vs. Insular Government (19 Phil. 223), with reference to article 339 of the Civil Code just quoted, this Court said: We should not be understood, by this decision, to hold that in a case of gradual encroachment or erosion by the ebb and flow of the tide, private property may not become property of public ownership. as defined in article 339 of the code, where it appear that the owner has to all intents and purposes abandoned it and permitted it to be totally destroyed, so as to become a part of the playa (shore of the sea), rada (roadstead), or the like. * * * In the Enciclopedia Jurdica Espaola, volume XII, page 558, we read the following: With relative frequency the opposite phenomenon occurs; that is, the sea advances and private properties are permanently invaded by the waves, and in this case they become part of the shore or beach. They then pass to the public domain, but the owner thus dispossessed does not retain any right to the natural products resulting from their new nature; it is a de facto case of eminent domain, and not subject to indemnity. In comparison, Article 420 of the Civil Code provides: Art. 420. The following things are property of public dominion: (1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character; (2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some public service or for the development of the national wealth. When the sea moved towards the estate and the tide invaded it, the invaded property became foreshore land and passed to the realm of the public domain. In fact, the Court in Government vs. Cabangis[30] annulled the registration of land subject of cadastral proceedings when the parcel subsequently became foreshore land.[31] In another case, the Court voided the registration decree of a trial court and held that said court had no jurisdiction to award foreshore land to any private person or entity.[32] The subject land in this case, being foreshore land, should therefore be returned to the public domain. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. This Court hereby REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the assailed Decision of Respondent Court and ORDERS the CANCELLATION of Free Patent No. (IV-3) 275 issued to Respondent Morato and the subsequent Original Certificate of Title No. P-17789. The subject land therefore REVERTS to the State. No costs. SO ORDERED. Romero, Melo, and Francisco, JJ., concur. Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), on leave. 26) Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila FIRST DIVISION G.R. No. 168464 January 23, 2006 ZENAIDA RAMOS-BALALIO, Petitioner, vs. ROLANDO RAMOS, EUSEBIO I. RAMOS EVANGELISTO GARCIA, Respondents. DECISION YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: This petition assails the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated February 16, 2005 in CA-G.R. CV No. 58644 reversing the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Roxas, Isabela, Branch 23, dated July 17, 1996, in Civil Case No. Br. 23-357 which ruled that herein petitioner Zenaida Ramos-Balalio had a superior right to possess Lot No. 204, Pls-15, situated at Muoz, Roxas, Isabela, as well as its Resolution3dated June 14, 2005 denying the motion for reconsideration. 86

As culled from the records, petitioner Zenaida and her brother Alexander (now deceased) are the children of spouses Susana Bueno and Abundio Ramos. The spouses started occupying Lot No. 204 in 1938. Abundio died in 1944. Susana met her second husband, respondent Eusebio Ramos in 1946, with whom she had five children, one of whom is respondent Rolando. In the interim, prior to 1958, Susana discovered that Felimon Domingo applied for a sales patent over the subject parcel of land which she opposed. The Bureau of Lands resolved the dispute, thus: In the light of the foregoing facts, it is clear that Felimon B. Domingo has not entered, possessed or cultivated the land in question and therefore he has not acquired any preference right thereto. Upon the other hand contestant Susana Bueno Vda. de Ramos and her children have sufficiently established their right of preference over the land except the one hectare Cemetery site, on the basis of their continuous occupation and cultivation and their valuable improvements introduced thereon. Wherefore, it is ordered that the Sales Application No. 21992 of Felimon B. Domingo be as hereby it is rejected, forfeiting in favor of the Government whatever amount have been paid on account thereof. The land in question shall be subdivided so as to exclude therefrom the one hectare portion in the northwestern part of the land, which shall be reserved as barrio cemetery site, while the remaining area is hereby allocated to SUSANA BUENO VDA DE RAMOS who shall file an appropriate application therefore within sixty (60) days after the survey thereof at her own expense, it not appearing that this Office has received the homestead (new) application allegedly filed by her for the same land. SO ORDERED.4 It was alleged that as Susana accompanied her husband Eusebio, a soldier, wherever he was assigned, Susanas father, George Bueno, and daughter, petitioner Zenaida continued the cultivation and possession of the subject land. Sometime later, Susana sold the land to petitioner who, in turn, partitioned it among herself, her brother, Alexander, and respondent Rolando and his siblings. The partition was not registered but Deeds of Sale were executed in favor of Rolando and Alexander. Petitioner thereafter mortgaged her share; however, it came to her knowledge that respondents Rolando and Eusebio had usurped her share and deprived the mortgagees of possession over the land. After settling the mortgage, petitioner filed a case for recovery of inheritance, possession and damages with a petition for preliminary mandatory injunction. The trial court had the land surveyed. Subdividing the land into Lots 204-A to 204-H5 based on the actual possessor or occupant, the survey plan revealed the following: 1. Plaintiff Zenaida Ramos Balalio has no possession, occupation, and cultivation whatsoever of lot 204, Pls15; 2. Rolando Ramos is in possession and cultivation of lot 204-F, lot 204-G and lot 204-C, with a total area of 43,957 sq. m., more or less; 3. Eusebio Ramos is occupying and cultivating lot 204-A with an area of 4,994 sq. m., more or less; 4. Lot 204-B consisting of 17,685 sq. m., more or less, is possessed and cultivated by Evangelisto Garcia, another intervenor. His occupation is very much less than the two (2) hectares sold to him by Alexander Ramos. It is short by 2,311 sq. m., more or less; 5. The total area of the land in question, after deducting one (1) hectare occupied by the cemetery is 73,150 sq. m., more or less.6 On July 17, 1996, the trial court rendered its decision holding that petitioner was deprived of her right to cultivation and possession of her share of Lot No. 204 and thus ruled: AS A CONSEQUENCE OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff, Zenaida Ramos and against Rolando Ramos, defendant, and Eusebio Ramos, intervenor. 1. Ordering Eusebio Ramos to vacate lot 204-A and surrender it to Evangelisto Garcia because he is not entitled to any portion of the lot in question, it being the conjugal property of the first marriage of Susana Bueno to Abundio Ramos; 2. Evangelisto Garcia is adjudicated the first two (2) hectares from the North and East of the cemetery, as he validly bought the area from Alexander Ramos. He is presently occupying only 17,689 sq. m., more or less. His possession now is increased to two (2) hectares which includes the area being possessed by Eusebio Ramos; 87

3. The remaining portion of the share of Alexander Ramos is 4,410 sq. m., more or less. This is adjudicated in favor of his heirs. This portion now corresponds to the area immediately South of the area of Evangelisto Garcia, the partition being from East to West; 4. The middle portion consisting of 24,410 sq. m., more or less, and immediately South of the cemetery, and also South of the portion adjudicated to the heirs of Alexander is now given to Zenaida Ramos Balalio as her valid share of lot 204, the partition being also East to West; 5. South of the share of Zenaida consisting also of 24,410 sq. m., more or less, is the valid share of Rolando Ramos and his full blooded brother and sisters namely Robin, Corazon, Myrna and Mila, all surnamed Ramos; 6. Rolando Ramos and Eusebio Ramos are ordered jointly and severally to pay Zenaida Ramos: a. Ten Thousand (P10,000.00) Pesos as attorneys fees; b. One thousand Five Hundred (P1,500.00) Pesos as appearance fees of her lawyer; c. Ten Thousand (P10,000.00) Pesos as incidental expenses relative to the case; d. One Hundred Thousand Eight Hundred (P100,800.00) Pesos as the reasonable owners share of the produce of the land of Zenaida Ramos from 1975 to the present, with an interest of 6% per annum until fully paid; 7. The Clerk of Court and the Sheriff are ordered to repair to the land in question and partition said land in accordance with the tenor of this decision; 8. And to pay the cost. SO ORDERED.7 On appeal, the Court of Appeals found that neither Zenaida nor Alexander complied with the homestead application requirements in order to acquire superior vested right. As a consequence, it reversed the decision of the trial court, to wit: As a consequence of the foregoing, the Court rules in favor of appellants as to the fourth error and finds that the contract supposedly dividing that property among Zenaida, Rolando Ramos and Alexander Ramos cannot be enforced because neither of the parties therein can claim any vested right over the subject parcel land which is still part of the public domain. Also, prescinding from the above ruling, the intervention of Eusebio Ramos and Evangelisto Garcia should likewise be dismissed. As to Eusebio, since Susana never filed an application for homestead, her right never ripened to ownership which she could have transmitted to her heirs. As to Evangelisto Garcia who supposedly purchased that share of Alexander (an heir of Susana), since the vendor never inherited anything from Susana there was nothing which he (Evangelisto) could have bought. In fine, neither of the intervenors could claim any right which they can enforce in court. WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Roxas, Isabela, Branch 23, in Civil Case No. Br. 23357 is REVERSED and the "Complaint" filed by plaintiff-appellee as well as the respective "Answer in Intervention" of Eusebio Ramos and Evangelisto Garcia are all hereby ordered DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.8 Hence, this petition on the following assigned errors: 7.1. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN REVERSING THE TRIAL COURTS DECISION AND DISMISSING THE PETITIONERS COMPLAINT. 7.2. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER IS NOT IN PRIOR POSSESSION OF THE SAID LAND, AND DECLARING THAT SHE HAS NO RIGHT WHATSOEVER TO THE DISPUTED LAND. 7.3. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN IGNORING THE ISSUE OF ACCION PUBLICIANA IN THE CASE AT BAR AND CONFINED ITSELF TO THE CLAIM OF RECOVERY OF INHERITANCE.9 The petition is partly meritorious. Under the Regalian doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the State and those lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State.10 Lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and national parks. Alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to agricultural lands.11 Commonwealth Act No. 141 (1936), or the Public Land Act, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073 (1977), remains to be the general law governing the classification and disposition of alienable lands of the 88

public domain. It enumerates the different modes of acquisition of these lands and prescribes the terms and conditions to enable private persons to perfect their title to them. It is, therefore, the applicable law to the case before us. A homestead patent, such as the subject of the instant case, is one of the modes to acquire title to public lands suitable for agricultural purposes. Under the Public Land Act, a homestead patent is one issued to any citizen of this country, over the age of 18 years or the head of a family, and who is not the owner of more than 2412 hectares of land in the country.13 To be qualified, the applicant must show that he has resided continuously for at least one year in the municipality where the land is situated and must have cultivated at least one-fifth of the land applied for.14 In the case at bar, petitioner Zenaida asserts her right to a parcel of agricultural land that her parents Susana and Abundio had possessed since 1938. She claims that, for some time, the cultivation of this land was left to her and her grandfather and that, following the death of her father Abundio, the land was allegedly sold to her by her mother Susana. Zenaidas argument is flawed because it assumes that her parents had perfected their title over the land and that they could validly convey the same to third persons, whether by sale or by inheritance. However, a careful examination of the records shows that petitioner has not satisfactorily established that a valid application for homestead patent was filed by her parents. The decision of the Bureau of Lands in 1958 only addressed Zenaidas familys right of preference over the land, in view of their possession and cultivation of the land. Nonetheless, the Bureau of Lands ordered the filing of an appropriate application for its registration which indicates that as of that time, there was as yet no valid application filed.15 The purported sale, therefore, between petitioner and her mother cannot be given effect, nor can it be a source of right for Zenaida, because Susana did not have the authority to sell what did not belong to her. The invalidation of the sale consequently nullifies the partition of the property among Zenaida, Alexander, and Rolando and his siblings because Zenaida could not have disposed of the land which she did not own. For the same reason, neither Eusebio nor Rolando can claim any right whatsoever as heirs of Susana. Their claim evidently relies on the provision of the Public Land Act which states: Section 105. If at any time the applicant or grantee shall die before the issuance of the patent or the final grant of the land, or during the life of the lease, or while the applicant or grantee still has obligations pending towards the Government, in accordance with this Act, he shall be succeeded in his rights and obligations with respect to the land applied for or granted or leased under this Act by his heirs in law, who shall be entitled to have issued to them the patent or final concession if they show that they have complied with the requirements therefor, and who shall be subrogated in all his rights and obligations for the purposes of this Act. (Emphasis added) The reliance is misplaced because the cited provision speaks of an applicant, grantee, or lessee. Susana was not one of these. In her lifetime, despite her possession and cultivation of the land, she failed to apply for a homestead patent and to acquire any vested right that Eusebio or Rolando can inherit. As such, the land remains part of the public domain. Furthermore, Eusebio and Rolando cannot invoke their prior possession and occupation of the land because the same cannot be considered as adverse, open, public, peaceful and to the exclusion of all. Hence, the subject land remains to be part of the public domain and rightfully belongs to the State. As held by the Court of Appeals, none of the parties obtained a defensible title to the property which can be upheld by the Court. Nonetheless, the possession of the land is different from the issue of its ownership. Petitioner argues that her petition may be treated as an accion publiciana and not merely an action for recovery of inheritance. An accion publiciana is an action for the recovery of the right to possess and is a plenary action in an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of possession of realty independently of title.16 In this case, the issue is whether Zenaida, as an applicant for public land, may be considered as having any right to the land occupied, which may entitle her to sue in courts for the return of the possession thereof. We find that Zenaida has proven prior possession of the portion of land she claims as her share, which possession antedates the filing of the homestead application. She produced evidence showing that she has filed a verified application for the registration of the land with the Bureau of Lands on August 10, 1971,17 which is still pending. The documents remain uncontested and the application has not been 89

assailed by any of the parties to the case. She alleged that during the lifetime of her mother, she and her maternal grandfather cultivated and occupied the land. Moreover, Zenaida presented tax declarations both in her name and that of her predecessor-in-interest (mother Susana Bueno) covering the property. Time and again, we have held that although tax declarations or realty tax payments of property are not conclusive evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they are good indicia of possession in the concept of owner for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or at least constructive possession.18 They constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim of title over the property. The voluntary declaration of a piece of property for taxation purposes manifests not only ones sincere and honest desire to obtain title to the property and announces his adverse claim against the State and all other interested parties, but also the intention to contribute needed revenues to the Government.19 All told, petitioner Zenaidas uncontested and verified application for a homestead patent coupled with her open and notorious occupation of the land convinces us of her preferential right to possess the land claimed, which entitles her to be protected by the law in such possession. WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated February 16, 2005 is MODIFIED, insofar as to grant petitioner Zenaida Ramos-Balalio preferential possession of the portion of Lot 204, Pls-15, situated in Muoz, Roxas, Isabela, as delineated in the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Roxas, Isabela, Branch 23, dated July 17, 1996. SO ORDERED. 27) FIRST DIVISION [G.R. No. 161317, July 16, 2008]

CRISTITA ALEGRIA, JOINED BY HER HUSBAND BIBIANO ALEGRIA, PRAXEDES BANQUERIGO, JOINED BY HER HUSBAND ROLANDO CABUNILAS, EDUARDO DRILON, JOINED BY HER WIFE TURTILLANA DRILON, ESTERLORE DRILON, JOINED BY HER HUSBAND JERRY DRILON, JUANITA DRILON, JOINED BY HER HUSBAND AND DEMETRIO DRILON, CEFERINA FORASTEROS, ARITA MANSING, JOINED BY HER HUSBAND APOLONIO MANSING, AND GAVINA OLLENA, PETITIONERS, VS. EUSTAQUIA DRILON AND SPOUSES ALFREDO AND FREDESWENDA YBIOSA, RESPONDENTS. RESOLUTION CARPIO, J.: Before this Court is a petition for review[1] assailing the Decision[2] dated 27 February 2003 and Resolution dated 20 November 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 70671. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for certiorari filed by Cristita Alegria et al. (petitioners) questioning the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Dumaguete City, Branch 40 (trial court) in Civil Case No. 11821. Petitioners claim they are the actual occupants and tillers of two parcels of land identified as Lot No. 3658 and Lot No. 3660, Cad. 141, with an area of 1,986 and 3,703 square meters, respectively, located in Ajong, Sibulan, Negros Oriental. On 4 June 1992, Gabriel Drilon, husband of respondent Eustaquia Drilon, applied for the issuance of titles by Free Patent over the properties. On 10 September 1993, Katibayan ng Orihinal na Titulo Blg. Fv.-36316 with Patente Blg. 074620-92-985, and Titulo Blg. Fv.-36315 with Patente Blg. 074620-92-986 were issued for Lot Nos. 3658 and 3660, respectively, in the name of Gabriel Drilon. On 8 October 1993, spouses Drilon sold the properties to respondent spouses Alfredo and Fredeswenda Ybiosa (spouses Ybiosa). Sometime in 1996, Eustaquia Drilon[3] and spouses Ybiosa demanded that petitioners vacate Lot Nos. 3658 and 3660. This prompted petitioners to file, on 23 January 1997, an action for reconveyance and 90

declaration

of

nullity

of

the

sale

of

Lot

No.

3658

and

Lot

No.

3660.

In their complaint, petitioners alleged that Gabriel Drilon obtained the free patents through fraud. According to petitioners, Gabriel Drilon made it appear in his application for free patent that he had continuously occupied and cultivated Lot Nos. 3658 and 3660. Petitioners further claimed that the sale of Lot Nos. 3658 and 3660 on 8 October 1993 was void because the sale was made within five years from the issuance of the patents. Petitioners alleged that spouses Ybiosa were in bad faith when they bought the properties as they were fully aware that petitioners were actually and continuously occupying, cultivating and claiming portions of the properties. In a decision dated 26 February 2001, the trial court dismissed the complaint. The dispositive portion of the decision reads: WHEREFORE, the petition for reconveyance, declaration of nullity of sale of parcels of land and damages filed by plaintiffs against the defendants is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.[4] The trial court ruled that although the title to the properties was secured by Gabriel Drilon without disclosing that allegedly third parties were in possession of the properties applied for, petitioners were unable to establish their claim over Lot Nos. 3658 and 3660. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court, thus: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated February 26, 2001 of the Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete City, Seventh Judicial Region, Branch 40, in Civil Case No. 11821, is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against the appellants. SO ORDERED.[5] The appellate court ruled that it is only the State, as the owner of the property allegedly taken by Gabriel Drilon through misrepresentation, which can assail the sale made by spouses Drilon to spouses Ybiosa. Petitioners, although occupants of the properties, have no legal personality to assail the patents issued to Gabriel Drilon as well as the sale of the properties to spouses Ybiosa. Hence, this petition. Petitioners raise the following issues: Whether the sale of Lot Nos. 3658 and 3660 by spouses Drilon to spouses Ybiosa is valid; and Whether petitioners may question the validity of the sale and ask for reconveyance of the properties.[6] The petition is without merit. Before the Court can rule on the validity of the sale made by spouses Drilon to spouses Ybiosa, it is first necessary to resolve whether petitioners have the right to question the validity of the sale and ask for reconveyance of the properties. We rule in the negative.

Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court provides that every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-interest, or in the name of one who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit. A suit filed by one who is not a real party-in-interest must be dismissed. In Caro v. Sucaldito,[7] the Court held that an applicant for a free patent cannot be considered a party-ininterest with personality to file an action for reconveyance.Citing Spouses Tankiko v. Cezar,[8] the Court stated: 91

[O]nly the State can file a suit for reconveyance of a public land. Therefore, not being the owners of the land but mere applicants for sales patents thereon, respondents have no personality to file the suit. Neither will they be directly affected by the judgment in such suit.[9] In point is De la Pea v. Court of Appeals,[10] which likewise involved an action for reconveyance and annulment of title on the ground that the free patent and title over a parcel of land were allegedly obtained through fraud. Like the present case, the petitioner in De la Pea claimed that private respondent fraudulently stated in his application for free patent that "the land applied for is not claimed or occupied by any other person." The Court ruled that petitioner had no standing to file the case since reconveyance is a remedy granted only to the owner of the property alleged to be erroneously titled in another's name. In such instances, it is the State which is the proper party to file suit, thus: Persons who have not obtained title to public lands could not question the titles legally issued by the State. In such cases, the real party-in-interest is the Republic of the Philippines to whom the property would revert if it is ever established, after appropriate proceedings, that the free patent issued to the grantee is indeed vulnerable to annulment on the ground that the grantee failed to comply with the conditions imposed by the law. Not being an applicant, much less a grantee, petitioner cannot ask for reconveyance.[11] Further, Section 101 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 provides that actions for reversion of public lands fraudulently awarded must be instituted by the Solicitor General in the name of the Republic of the Philippines: Section 101. All actions for the reversion to the government of lands of the public domain or improvements thereon shall be instituted by the Solicitor General or the officer acting in his stead, in the proper courts, in the name of the Commonwealth of the Philippines. Thus, in Garingan v. Garingan,[12] the Court held that only the State may file a case for cancellation of title due to the grantee's violation of the conditions imposed by law: A certificate of title issued pursuant to a homestead patent partakes of the nature of a certificate issued in a judicial proceeding, as long as the land disposed of is really a part of the disposable land of the public domain and becomes indefeasible and incontrovertible after one year from issuance. x x x. The only instance when a certificate of title covering a tract of land, formerly a part of the patrimonial property of the State, could be cancelled, is for failure on the part of the grantee to comply with the conditions imposed by law, and in such case the proper party to bring the action would be the Government to which the property would revert.[13] Petitioners, however, argue that although it is only the government that may institute reversion proceedings, they as persons whose rights are affected by the assailed sale may pray for the declaration of nullity of the sale. Petitioners invoke Arsenal v. IAC[14] and claim that under the ruling of the Court, the sale of a homestead land within the prohibited period is void, and that third persons affected by the void contract may set up its nullity.[15] In Arsenal, the Court stated: The above provisions of law are clear and explicit. A contract which purports to alienate, transfer, convey or encumber any homestead within the prohibitory period of five years from the date of the issuance of the patent is void from its execution. In a number of cases, this Court has held that such provision is mandatory (De los Santos v. Roman Catholic Church of Midsayap, 94 Phil. 405). Under the provisions of the Civil Code, a void contract is inexistent from the beginning. It cannot be ratified neither can the right to set up the defense of its illegality be waived. (Art. 1409, Civil Code). To further distinguish this contract from the other kinds of contract, a commentator has stated that: The right to set up the nullity of a void or non-existent contract is not limited to the parties as in the case of annullable or voidable contracts; it is extended to third persons who are directly affected by the contract. (Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. IV, p. 604, [1973]). Any person may invoke the inexistence of the contract whenever juridical effects founded thereon are asserted against him. (Id. p. 595). 92

Concededly, the contract of sale executed between the respondents Palaos and Suralta in 1957 is void. It was entered into three (3) years and eight (8) months after the grant of the homestead patent to the respondent Palaos in 1954. Being void, the foregoing principles and rulings are applicable. Thus, it was erroneous for the trial court to declare tha t the benefit of the prohibition in the Public Land Act does not inure to any third party. Such a sweeping declaration does not find support in the law or in precedents.A third person who is directly affected by a void contract may set up its nullity. In this case, it is precisely the petitioners' interest in the disputed land which is in question.[16] Petitioners reliance on Arsenal is misplaced. Arsenal involved the double sale of a homestead property. The homestead grantee sold the property during the prohibited period. Afterwards, the grantee again sold the same property, and title to the homestead property was issued to the second buyer. The first buyer sought to annul the title of the second buyer. The second buyer merely raised the nullity of the first sale but did not seek to annul the title of the homestead grantee for selling the property within the prohibited period. The factual circumstances of the present case are clearly different from Arsenal. Here, petitioners filed an action for reconveyance on the ground that titles to the properties were obtained through fraud. Moreover, petitioners seek to have the titles of the Drilons annulled for selling the properties during the prohibited period. As found by the trial court, petitioners have not shown any proof of title over the properties. They are not even applicants for free patent over the properties. Since petitioners failed to show proof that they have title to the properties, the trial and appellate courts correctly ruled that petitioners have no legal personality to file a case for reconveyance of Lot Nos. 3658 and 3660. WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition for lack of merit. We AFFIRM the Decision dated 27 February 2003 and Resolution dated 20 November 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 70671. Costs against petitioners. SO 28) EN BANC HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN, Petitioner, G.R. No. 179987 Present: PUNO, C.J., QUISUMBING, YNARES-SANTIAGO, CARPIO, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CORONA, CARPIO MORALES, TINGA, ORDERED.

- versus -

CHICO-NAZARIO, VELASCO, JR., NACHURA,

LEONARDO DE CASTRO, BRION, 93

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PERALTA, and Respondent. BERSAMIN, JJ. Promulgated: April 29, 2009 x--------------------------------------------------------------------------- x DECISION TINGA, J.: One main reason why the informal sector has not become formal is that from Indonesia to Brazil, 90 percent of the informal lands are not titled and registered. This is a generalized phenomenon in the socalled Third World. And it has many consequences. xxx The question is: How is it that so many governments, from Suharto's in Indonesia to Fujimori's in Peru, have wanted to title these people and have not been able to do so effectively? One reason is that none of the state systems in Asia or Latin America can gather proof of informal titles. InPeru, the informals have means of proving property ownership to each other which are not the same means developed by the Spanish legal system. The informals have their own papers, their own forms of agreements, and their own systems of registration, all of which are very clearly stated in the maps which they use for their own informal business transactions. If you take a walk through the countryside, from Indonesia to Peru, and you walk by field after field--in each field a different dog is going to bark at you. Even dogs know what private property is all about. The only one who does not know it is the government. The issue is that there exists a "common law" and an "informal law" which the Latin American formal legal system does not know how to recognize. - Hernando De Soto[1] This decision inevitably affects all untitled lands currently in possession of persons and entities other than the Philippine government. The petition, while unremarkable as to the facts, was accepted by the Court en banc in order to provide definitive clarity to the applicability and scope of original registration proceedings under Sections 14(1) and 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree. In doing so, the Court confronts not only the relevant provisions of the Public Land Act and the Civil Code, but also the reality on the ground. The countrywide phenomenon of untitled lands, as well as the problem of informal settlement it has spawned, has unfortunately been treated with benign neglect. Yet our current laws are hemmed in by their own circumscriptions in addressing the phenomenon. Still, the duty on our part is primarily to decide cases before us in accord with the Constitution and the legal principles that have developed our public land law, though our social obligations dissuade us from casting a blind eye on the endemic problems. I. On 20 February 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an application for land registration covering a parcel of land identified as Lot9864-A, Cad-452-D, Silang Cadastre,[2] situated in Barangay Tibig, Silang Cavite, and consisting of 71,324 square meters. Malabanan claimed that he had purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco,[3] and that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open, notorious, and continuous adverse and peaceful possession of the land for more than thirty (30) years. 94

The application was raffled to the Regional Trial Court of (RTC) Cavite-Tagaytay City, Branch 18. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) duly designated the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Cavite, Jose Velazco, Jr., to appear on behalf of the State.[4]Apart from presenting documentary evidence, Malabanan himself and his witness, Aristedes Velazco, testified at the hearing. Velazco testified that the property was originally belonged to a twenty-two hectare property owned by his great-grandfather, Lino Velazco. Lino had four sons Benedicto, Gregorio, Eduardo and Estebanthe fourth being Aristedess grandfather. Upon Linos death, his four sons inherited the property and divided it among themselves. But by 1966, Estebans wife, Magdalena, had become the administrator of all the properties inherited by the Velazco sons from their father, Lino. After the death of Esteban and Magdalena, their son Virgilio succeeded them in administering the properties, including Lot 9864-A, which originally belonged to his uncle, Eduardo Velazco. It was this property that was sold by Eduardo Velazco to Malabanan.[5] Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Jose Velazco, Jr. did not cross-examine Aristedes Velazco. He further manifested that he also [knew] the property and I affirm the truth of the testimony given by Mr. Velazco.[6] The Republic of the Philippines likewise did not present any evidence to controvert the application. Among the evidence presented by Malabanan during trial was a Certification dated 11 June 2001, issued by the Community Environment & Natural Resources Office, Department of Environment and Natural Resources (CENRO-DENR), which stated that the subject property was verified to be within the Alienable or Disposable land per Land Classification Map No. 3013 established under Project No. 20-A and approved as such under FAO 4-1656 on March 15, 1982.[7] On 3 December 2002, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of Malabanan, the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, this Court hereby approves this application for registration and thus places under the operation of Act 141, Act 496 and/or P.D. 1529, otherwise known as Property Registration Law, the lands described in Plan Csd-04-0173123-D, Lot 9864-A and containing an area of Seventy One Thousand Three Hundred Twenty Four (71,324) Square Meters, as supported by its technical description now forming part of the record of this case, in addition to other proofs adduced in the name of MARIO MALABANAN, who is of legal age, Filipino, widower, and with residence at Munting Ilog, Silang, Cavite. Once this Decision becomes final and executory, the corresponding decree of registration shall forthwith issue. SO ORDERED. The Republic interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals, arguing that Malabanan had failed to prove that the property belonged to the alienable and disposable land of the public domain, and that the RTC had erred in finding that he had been in possession of the property in the manner and for the length of time required by law for confirmation of imperfect title. On 23 February 2007, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision[8] reversing the RTC and dismissing the application of Malabanan. The appellate court held that under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree any period of possession prior to the classification of the lots as alienable and disposable was inconsequential and should be excluded from the computation of the period of possession. Thus, the appellate court noted that since the CENRO-DENR certification had verified that the property was declared alienable and disposable only on 15 March 1982, the Velazcos possession prior to that date could not 95

be factored in the computation of the period of possession. This interpretation of the Court of Appeals of Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree was based on the Courts ruling in Republic v. Herbieto.[9] Malabanan died while the case was pending with the Court of Appeals;[10] hence, it was his heirs who appealed the decision of the appellate court. Petitioners, before this Court, rely on our ruling in Republic v. Naguit,[11] which was handed down just four months prior to Herbieto. Petitioners suggest that the discussion in Herbieto cited by the Court of Appeals is actually obiter dictumsince the Metropolitan Trial Court therein which had directed the registration of the property had no jurisdiction in the first place since the requisite notice of hearing was published only after the hearing had already begun. Naguit, petitioners argue, remains the controlling doctrine, especially when the property in question is agricultural land. Therefore, with respect to agricultural lands, any possession prior to the declaration of the alienable property as disposable may be counted in reckoning the period of possession to perfect title under the Public Land Act and the Property Registration Decree.

The petition was referred to the Court en banc,[12] and on 11 November 2008, the case was heard on oral arguments. The Court formulated the principal issues for the oral arguments, to wit: 1. In order that an alienable and disposable land of the public domain may be registered under Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, should the land be classified as alienable and disposable as of June 12, 1945 or is it sufficient that such classification occur at any time prior to the filing of the applicant for registration provided that it is established that the applicant has been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier? 2. For purposes of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree may a parcel of land classified as alienable and disposable be deemed private land and therefore susceptible to acquisition by prescription in accordance with the Civil Code? 3. May a parcel of land established as agricultural in character either because of its use or because its slope is below that of forest lands be registrable under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree in relation to the provisions of the Civil Code on acquisitive prescription? 4. Are petitioners entitled to the registration of the subject land in their names under Section 14(1) or Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree or both?[13] Based on these issues, the parties formulated their respective positions. With respect to Section 14(1), petitioners reiterate that the analysis of the Court in Naguit is the correct interpretation of the provision. The seemingly contradictory pronouncement in Herbieto, it is submitted, should be considered obiter dictum, since the land registration proceedings therein was void ab initio due to lack of publication of the notice of initial hearing. Petitioners further point out that in Republic v. Bibonia,[14] promulgated in June of 2007, the Court applied Naguit and adopted the same observation that the preferred interpretation by the OSG of Section 14(1) was patently absurd. For its part, the OSG remains insistent that for Section 14(1) to apply, the land should have been classified as alienable and disposable as of 12 June 1945. Apart from Herbieto, the OSG also cites the subsequent rulings in Buenaventura v. Republic,[15] Fieldman Agricultural Trading v. Republic[16] andRepublic v. Imperial Credit Corporation,[17] as well as the earlier case of Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals.[18] With respect to Section 14(2), petitioners submit that open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of an alienable land of the public domain for more than 30 years ipso jure converts the land into private 96

property, thus placing it under the coverage of Section 14(2). According to them, it would not matter whether the land sought to be registered was previously classified as agricultural land of the public domain so long as, at the time of the application, the property had already been converted into private property through prescription. To bolster their argument, petitioners cite extensively from our 2008 ruling in Republic v. T.A.N. Properties.[19] The arguments submitted by the OSG with respect to Section 14(2) are more extensive. The OSG notes that under Article 1113 of the Civil Code, the acquisitive prescription of properties of the State refers to patrimonial property, while Section 14(2) speaks of private lands. It observes that the Court has yet to decide a case that presented Section 14(2) as a ground for application for registration, and that the 30-year possession period refers to the period of possession under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, and not the concept of prescription under the Civil Code. The OSG further submits that, assuming that the 30-year prescriptive period can run against public lands, said period should be reckoned from the time the public land was declared alienable and disposable. Both sides likewise offer special arguments with respect to the particular factual circumstances surrounding the subject property and the ownership thereof. II. First, we discuss Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree. For a full understanding of the provision, reference has to be made to the Public Land Act. A. Commonwealth Act No. 141, also known as the Public Land Act, has, since its enactment, governed the classification and disposition of lands of the public domain. The President is authorized, from time to time, to classify the lands of the public domain into alienable and disposable, timber, or mineral lands.[20] Alienable and disposable lands of the public domain are further classified according to their uses into (a) agricultural; (b) residential, commercial, industrial, or for similar productive purposes; (c) educational, charitable, or other similar purposes; or (d) reservations for town sites and for public and quasi-public uses.[21] May a private person validly seek the registration in his/her name of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain? Section 11 of the Public Land Act acknowledges that public lands suitable for agricultural purposes may be disposed of by confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles through judicial legalization.[22] Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by P.D. No. 1073, supplies the details and unmistakably grants that right, subject to the requisites stated therein: Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such land or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit: xxx (b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These 97

shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. Section 48(b) of Com. Act No. 141 received its present wording in 1977 when the law was amended by P.D. No. 1073. Two significant amendments were introduced by P.D. No. 1073. First, the term agricultural lands was changed to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. The OSG submits that this amendment restricted the scope of the lands that may be registered.[23] This is not actually the case. Under Section 9 of the Public Land Act, agricultural lands are a mere subset of lands of the public domain alienable or open to disposition. Evidently, alienable and disposable lands of the public domain are a larger class than only agricultural lands. Second, the length of the requisite possession was changed from possession for thirty (30) years immediately preceding the filing of the application to possession since June 12, 1945 or earlier. The Court in Naguit explained: When the Public Land Act was first promulgated in 1936, the period of possession deemed necessary to vest the right to register their title to agricultural lands of the public domain commenced from July 26, 1894. However, this period was amended by R.A. No. 1942, which provided that the bona fide claim of ownership must have been for at least thirty (30) years. Then in 1977, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act was again amended, this time by P.D. No. 1073, which pegged the reckoning date at June 12, 1945. xxx It bears further observation that Section 48(b) of Com. Act No, 141 is virtually the same as Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree. Said Decree codified the various laws relative to the registration of property, including lands of the public domain. It is Section 14(1) that operationalizes the registration of such lands of the public domain. The provision reads: SECTION 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives: (1) those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier. Notwithstanding the passage of the Property Registration Decree and the inclusion of Section 14(1) therein, the Public Land Act has remained in effect. Both laws commonly refer to persons or their predecessors-in-interest who have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier. That circumstance may have led to the impression that one or the other is a redundancy, or that Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act has somehow been repealed or mooted. That is not the case. The opening clauses of Section 48 of the Public Land Act and Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree warrant comparison: Sec. 48 [of the Public Land Act]. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such land or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located 98

for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit: xxx Sec. 14 [of the Property Registration Decree]. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives: xxx It is clear that Section 48 of the Public Land Act is more descriptive of the nature of the right enjoyed by the possessor than Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree, which seems to presume the pre-existence of the right, rather than establishing the right itself for the first time. It is proper to assert that it is the Public Land Act, as amended by P.D. No. 1073 effective 25 January 1977, that has primarily established the right of a Filipino citizen who has been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945 to perfect or complete his title by applying with the proper court for the confirmation of his ownership claim and the issuance of the corresponding certificate of title. Section 48 can be viewed in conjunction with the afore-quoted Section 11 of the Public Land Act, which provides that public lands suitable for agricultural purposes may be disposed of by confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles, and given the notion that both provisions declare that it is indeed the Public Land Act that primarily establishes the substantive ownership of the possessor who has been in possession of the property since 12 June 1945. In turn, Section 14(a) of the Property Registration Decree recognizes the substantive right granted under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as well provides the corresponding original registration procedure for the judicial confirmation of an imperfect or incomplete title. There is another limitation to the right granted under Section 48(b). Section 47 of the Public Land Act limits the period within which one may exercise the right to seek registration under Section 48. The provision has been amended several times, most recently by Rep. Act No. 9176 in 2002. It currently reads thus: Section 47. The persons specified in the next following section are hereby granted time, not to extend beyond December 31, 2020 within which to avail of the benefits of this Chapter: Provided, That this period shall apply only where the area applied for does not exceed twelve (12) hectares: Provided, further, That the several periods of time designated by the President in accordance with Section Forty-Five of this Act shall apply also to the lands comprised in the provisions of this Chapter, but this Section shall not be construed as prohibiting any said persons from acting under this Chapter at any time prior to the period fixed by the President.[24] Accordingly under the current state of the law, the substantive right granted under Section 48(b) may be availed of only until 31 December 2020. B. Despite the clear text of Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended and Section 14(a) of the Property Registration Decree, the OSG has adopted the position that for one to acquire the right to seek registration of an alienable and disposable land of the public domain, it is not enough that the applicant and his/her predecessors-in-interest be in possession under a bona fide claim of ownership since 12 June 1945; the 99

alienable and disposable character of the property must have been declared also as of 12 June 1945. Following the OSGs approach, all lands certified as alienable and disposable after 12 June 1945 cannot be registered either under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree or Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act as amended. The absurdity of such an implication was discussed in Naguit. Petitioner suggests an interpretation that the alienable and disposable character of the land should have already been established since June 12, 1945 or earlier. This is not borne out by the plain meaning of Section 14(1). Since June 12, 1945, as used in the provision, qualifies its antecedent phrase under a bonafide claim of ownership. Generally speaking, qualifying words restrict or modify only the words or phrases to which they are immediately associated, and not those distantly or remotely located.[25] Ad proximum antecedents fiat relation nisi impediatur sentencia. Besides, we are mindful of the absurdity that would result if we adopt petitioners position. Absent a legislative amendment, the rule would be, adopting the OSGs view, that all lands of the public domain which were not declared alienable or disposable before June 12, 1945 would not be susceptible to original registration, no matter the length of unchallenged possession by the occupant. Such interpretation renders paragraph (1) of Section 14 virtually inoperative and even precludes the government from giving it effect even as it decides to reclassify public agricultural lands as alienable and disposable. The unreasonableness of the situation would even be aggravated considering that before June 12, 1945, the Philippines was not yet even considered an independent state. Accordingly, the Court in Naguit explained: [T]he more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) is that it merely requires the property sought to be registered as already alienable and disposable at the time the application for registration of title is filed. If the State, at the time the application is made, has not yet deemed it proper to release the property for alienation or disposition, the presumption is that the government is still reserving the right to utilize the property; hence, the need to preserve its ownership in the State irrespective of the length of adverse possession even if in good faith. However, if the property has already been classified as alienable and disposable, as it is in this case, then there is already an intention on the part of the State to abdicate its exclusive prerogative over the property. The Court declares that the correct interpretation of Section 14(1) is that which was adopted in Naguit. The contrary pronouncement in Herbieto, as pointed out in Naguit, absurdly limits the application of the provision to the point of virtual inutility since it would only cover lands actually declared alienable and disposable prior to 12 June 1945, even if the current possessor is able to establish open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession under a bona fide claim of ownership long before that date. Moreover, the Naguit interpretation allows more possessors under a bona fide claim of ownership to avail of judicial confirmation of their imperfect titles than what would be feasible under Herbieto. This balancing fact is significant, especially considering our forthcoming discussion on the scope and reach of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree. Petitioners make the salient observation that the contradictory passages from Herbieto are obiter dicta since the land registration proceedings therein is void ab initio in the first place due to lack of the requisite publication of the notice of initial hearing. There is no need to explicitly overturn Herbieto, as it suffices that the Courts acknowledgment that the particular line of argument used therein concerning Section 14(1) is indeed obiter. It may be noted that in the subsequent case of Buenaventura,[26] the Court, citing Herbieto, again stated that [a]ny period of possession prior to the date when the [s]ubject [property was] classified as alienable and disposable is inconsequential and should be excluded from the computation of the period of possession 100

That statement, in the context of Section 14(1), is certainly erroneous. Nonetheless, the passage as cited in Buenaventura should again be considered as obiter. The application therein was ultimately granted, citing Section 14(2). The evidence submitted by petitioners therein did not establish any mode of possession on their part prior to 1948, thereby precluding the application of Section 14(1). It is not even apparent from the decision whether petitioners therein had claimed entitlement to original registration following Section 14(1), their position being that they had been in exclusive possession under a bona fide claim of ownership for over fifty (50) years, but not before 12 June 1945. Thus, neither Herbieto nor its principal discipular ruling Buenaventura has any precedental value with respect to Section 14(1). On the other hand, the ratio of Naguit is embedded in Section 14(1), since it precisely involved situation wherein the applicant had been in exclusive possession under a bona fide claim of ownership prior to 12 June 1945. The Courts interpretation of Section 14(1) therein was decisive to the resolution of the case. Any doubt as to which between Naguit or Herbieto provides the final word of the Court on Section 14(1) is now settled in favor of Naguit. We noted in Naguit that it should be distinguished from Bracewell v. Court of Appeals[27] since in the latter, the application for registration had been filed before the land was declared alienable or disposable. The dissent though pronounces Bracewell as the better rule between the two. Yet two years after Bracewell, its ponente, the esteemed Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, penned the ruling in Republic v. Ceniza,[28] which involved a claim of possession that extended back to 1927 over a public domain land that was declared alienable and disposable only in 1980. Ceniza cited Bracewell, quoted extensively from it, and following the mindset of the dissent, the attempt at registration in Ceniza should have failed. Not so. To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, an applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute. In this case, private respondents presented a certification dated November 25, 1994, issued by Eduardo M. Inting, the Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer in the Department of Environment and Natural Resources Office in Cebu City, stating that the lots involved were "found to be within the alienable and disposable (sic) Block-I, Land Classification Project No. 32-A, per map 2962 4-I555 dated December 9, 1980." This is sufficient evidence to show the real character of the land subject of private respondents application. Further, the certification enjoys a presumption of regularity in the absence of contradictory evidence, which is true in this case. Worth noting also was the observation of the Court of Appeals stating that: [n]o opposition was filed by the Bureaus of Lands and Forestry to contest the application of appellees on the ground that the property still forms part of the public domain. Nor is there any showing that the lots in question are forestal land.... Thus, while the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that mere possession of public land for the period required by law would entitle its occupant to a confirmation of imperfect title, it did not err in ruling in favor of private respondents as far as the first requirement in Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is concerned, for they were able to overcome the burden of proving the alienability of the land subject of their application. As correctly found by the Court of Appeals, private respondents were able to prove their open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the subject land even before the year 1927. As a rule, we are bound by the factual findings of the Court of Appeals. Although there are exceptions, petitioner did not show that this is one of them.[29]

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Why did the Court in Ceniza, through the same eminent member who authored Bracewell, sanction the registration under Section 48(b) of public domain lands declared alienable or disposable thirty-five (35) years and 180 days after 12 June 1945? The telling difference is that in Ceniza, the application for registration was filed nearly six (6) years after the land had been declared alienable or disposable, while in Bracewell, the application was filed nine (9) years before the land was declared alienable or disposable. That crucial difference was also stressed in Naguit to contradistinguish it from Bracewell, a difference which the dissent seeks to belittle. III. We next ascertain the correct framework of analysis with respect to Section 14(2). The provision reads:

SECTION 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives: xxx (2) Those who have acquired ownership over private lands by prescription under the provisions of existing laws. The Court in Naguit offered the following discussion concerning Section 14(2), which we did even then recognize, and still do, to be an obiter dictum, but we nonetheless refer to it as material for further discussion, thus: Did the enactment of the Property Registration Decree and the amendatory P.D. No. 1073 preclude the application for registration of alienable lands of the public domain, possession over which commenced only after June 12, 1945? It did not, considering Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, which governs and authorizes the application of those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the provisions of existing laws. Prescription is one of the modes of acquiring ownership under the Civil Code.[[30]] There is a consistent jurisprudential rule that properties classified as alienable public land may be converted into private property by reason of open, continuous and exclusive possession of at least thirty (30) years.[[31]] With such conversion, such property may now fall within the contemplation of private lands under Section 14(2), and thus susceptible to registration by those who have acquired ownership through prescription. Thus, even if possession of the alienable public land commenced on a date later than June 12, 1945, and such possession being been open, continuous and exclusive, then the possessor may have the right to register the land by virtue of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree. Naguit did not involve the application of Section 14(2), unlike in this case where petitioners have based their registration bid primarily on that provision, and where the evidence definitively establishes their claim of possession only as far back as 1948. It is in this case that we can properly appreciate the nuances of the provision. A.

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The obiter in Naguit cited the Civil Code provisions on prescription as the possible basis for application for original registration under Section 14(2). Specifically, it is Article 1113 which provides legal foundation for the application. It reads: All things which are within the commerce of men are susceptible of prescription, unless otherwise provided. Property of the State or any of its subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of prescription. It is clear under the Civil Code that where lands of the public domain are patrimonial in character, they are susceptible to acquisitive prescription. On the other hand, among the public domain lands that are not susceptible to acquisitive prescription are timber lands and mineral lands. The Constitution itself proscribes private ownership of timber or mineral lands. There are in fact several provisions in the Civil Code concerning the acquisition of real property through prescription. Ownership of real property may be acquired by ordinary prescription of ten (10) years,[32] or through extraordinary prescription of thirty (30) years.[33] Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession in good faith,[34] as well as just title.[35] When Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree explicitly provides that persons who have acquired ownership over private lands by prescription under the provisions of existing laws, it unmistakably refers to the Civil Code as a valid basis for the registration of lands. The Civil Code is the only existing law that specifically allows the acquisition by prescription of private lands, including patrimonial property belonging to the State. Thus, the critical question that needs affirmation is whether Section 14(2) does encompass original registration proceedings over patrimonial property of the State, which a private person has acquired through prescription. The Naguit obiter had adverted to a frequently reiterated jurisprudence holding that properties classified as alienable public land may be converted into private property by reason of open, continuous and exclusive possession of at least thirty (30) years.[36] Yet if we ascertain the source of the thirty-year period, additional complexities relating to Section 14(2) and to how exactly it operates would emerge. For there are in fact two distinct origins of the thirty (30)-year rule. The first source is Rep. Act No. 1942, enacted in 1957, which amended Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act by granting the right to seek original registration of alienable public lands through possession in the concept of an owner for at least thirty years. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit: xxx xxx xxx

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title, except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this Chapter. (emphasis supplied)[37]

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This provision was repealed in 1977 with the enactment of P.D. 1073, which made the date 12 June 1945 the reckoning point for the first time. Nonetheless, applications for registration filed prior to 1977 could have invoked the 30-year rule introduced by Rep. Act No. 1942. The second source is Section 14(2) of P.D. 1529 itself, at least by implication, as it applies the rules on prescription under the Civil Code, particularly Article 1113 in relation to Article 1137. Note that there are two kinds of prescription under the Civil Codeordinary acquisitive prescription and extraordinary acquisitive prescription, which, under Article 1137, is completed through uninterrupted adverse possession for thirty years, without need of title or of good faith. Obviously, the first source of the thirty (30)-year period rule, Rep. Act No. 1942, became unavailable after 1977. At present, the only legal basis for the thirty (30)-year period is the law on prescription under the Civil Code, as mandated under Section 14(2). However, there is a material difference between how the thirty (30)-year rule operated under Rep. Act No. 1942 and how it did under the Civil Code. Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by Rep. Act No. 1942, did not refer to or call into application the Civil Code provisions on prescription. It merely set forth a requisite thirty-year possession period immediately preceding the application for confirmation of title, without any qualification as to whether the property should be declared alienable at the beginning of, and continue as such, throughout the entire thirty-(30) years. There is neither statutory nor jurisprudential basis to assert Rep. Act No. 1942 had mandated such a requirement,[38] similar to our earlier finding with respect to the present language of Section 48(b), which now sets 12 June 1945 as the point of reference. Then, with the repeal of Rep. Act No. 1942, the thirty-year possession period as basis for original registration became Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, which entitled those who have acquired ownership over private lands by prescription under the provisions of existing laws to apply for original registration. Again, the thirty-year period is derived from the rule on extraordinary prescription under Article 1137 of the Civil Code. At the same time, Section 14(2) puts into operation the entire regime of prescription under the Civil Code, a fact which does not hold true with respect to Section 14(1). B. Unlike Section 14(1), Section 14(2) explicitly refers to the principles on prescription under existing laws. Accordingly, we are impelled to apply the civil law concept of prescription, as set forth in the Civil Code, in our interpretation of Section 14(2). There is no similar demand on our part in the case of Section 14(1). The critical qualification under Article 1113 of the Civil Code is thus: [p]roperty of the State or any of its subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of prescription. The identification what consists of patrimonial property is provided by Articles 420 and 421, which we quote in full: Art. 420. The following things are property of public dominion: (1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character; (2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some public service or for the development of the national wealth. Art. 421. All other property of the State, which is not of the character stated in the preceding article, is patrimonial property

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It is clear that property of public dominion, which generally includes property belonging to the State, cannot be the object of prescription or, indeed, be subject of the commerce of man. [39] Lands of the public domain, whether declared alienable and disposable or not, are property of public dominion and thus insusceptible to acquisition by prescription. Let us now explore the effects under the Civil Code of a declaration by the President or any duly authorized government officer of alienability and disposability of lands of the public domain. Would such lands so declared alienable and disposable be converted, under the Civil Code, from property of the public dominion into patrimonial property? After all, by connotative definition, alienable and disposable lands may be the object of the commerce of man; Article 1113 provides that all things within the commerce of man are susceptible to prescription; and the same provision further provides that patrimonial property of the State may be acquired by prescription. Nonetheless, Article 422 of the Civil Code states that [p]roperty of public dominion, when no longer intended for public use or for public service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State. It is this provision that controls how public dominion property may be converted into patrimonial property susceptible to acquisition by prescription. After all, Article 420 (2) makes clear that those property which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some public service or for the development of the national wealth are public dominion property. For as long as the property belongs to the State, although already classified as alienable or disposable, it remains property of the public dominion if when it is intended for some public service or for the development of the national wealth. Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the State that the public dominion property is no longer intended for public service or the development of the national wealth or that the property has been converted into patrimonial. Without such express declaration, the property, even if classified as alienable or disposable, remains property of the public dominion, pursuant to Article 420(2), and thus incapable of acquisition by prescription. It is only when such alienable and disposable lands are expressly declared by the State to be no longer intended for public service or for the development of the national wealth that the period of acquisitive prescription can begin to run. Such declaration shall be in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or a Presidential Proclamation in cases where the President is duly authorized by law. It is comprehensible with ease that this reading of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree limits its scope and reach and thus affects the registrability even of lands already declared alienable and disposable to the detriment of the bona fide possessors or occupants claiming title to the lands. Yet this interpretation is in accord with the Regalian doctrine and its concomitant assumption that all lands owned by the State, although declared alienable or disposable, remain as such and ought to be used only by the Government. Recourse does not lie with this Court in the matter. The duty of the Court is to apply the Constitution and the laws in accordance with their language and intent. The remedy is to change the law, which is the province of the legislative branch. Congress can very well be entreated to amend Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree and pertinent provisions of the Civil Code to liberalize the requirements for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles. The operation of the foregoing interpretation can be illustrated by an actual example. Republic Act No. 7227, entitled An Act Accelerating The Conversion Of Military Reservations Into Other Productive Uses, etc., is more commonly known as the BCDA law. Section 2 of the law authorizes the sale of certain military reservations and portions of military camps in Metro Manila, includingFort Bonifacio and Villamor Air Base. For purposes of effecting the sale of the military camps, the law mandates the President to transfer such military lands to the Bases Conversion Development Authority (BCDA)[40] which in turn is authorized to own, hold and/or administer them.[41] The President is authorized to sell portions of the military camps, in whole or in part.[42] Accordingly, the BCDA law itself declares that the military lands subject thereof are 105

alienable and disposable pursuant to the provisions of existing laws and regulations governing sales of government properties.[43] From the moment the BCDA law was enacted the subject military lands have become alienable and disposable. However, said lands did not become patrimonial, as the BCDA law itself expressly makes the reservation that these lands are to be sold in order to raise funds for the conversion of the former American bases at Clark and Subic.[44] Such purpose can be tied to either public service or the development of national wealth under Article 420(2). Thus, at that time, the lands remained property of the public dominion under Article 420(2), notwithstanding their status as alienable and disposable. It is upon their sale as authorized under the BCDA law to a private person or entity that such lands become private property and cease to be property of the public dominion. C. Should public domain lands become patrimonial because they are declared as such in a duly enacted law or duly promulgated proclamation that they are no longer intended for public service or for the development of the national wealth, would the period of possession prior to the conversion of such public dominion into patrimonial be reckoned in counting the prescriptive period in favor of the possessors? We rule in the negative. The limitation imposed by Article 1113 dissuades us from ruling that the period of possession before the public domain land becomes patrimonial may be counted for the purpose of completing the prescriptive period. Possession of public dominion property before it becomes patrimonial cannot be the object of prescription according to the Civil Code. As the application for registration under Section 14(2) falls wholly within the framework of prescription under the Civil Code, there is no way that possession during the time that the land was still classified as public dominion property can be counted to meet the requisites of acquisitive prescription and justify registration. Are we being inconsistent in applying divergent rules for Section 14(1) and Section 14(2)? There is no inconsistency. Section 14(1) mandates registration on the basis of possession, while Section 14(2) entitles registration on the basis ofprescription. Registration under Section 14(1) is extended under the aegis of the Property Registration Decree and the Public Land Act while registration under Section 14(2) is made available both by the Property Registration Decree and the Civil Code. In the same manner, we can distinguish between the thirty-year period under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by Rep. Act No. 1472, and the thirty-year period available through Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree in relation to Article 1137 of the Civil Code. The period under the former speaks of a thirty-year period of possession, while the period under the latter concerns a thirty-year period of extraordinary prescription. Registration under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act as amended by Rep. Act No. 1472 is based on thirty years of possession alone without regard to the Civil Code, while the registration under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree is founded on extraordinary prescription under the Civil Code. It may be asked why the principles of prescription under the Civil Code should not apply as well to Section 14(1). Notwithstanding the vaunted status of the Civil Code, it ultimately is just one of numerous statutes, neither superior nor inferior to other statutes such as the Property Registration Decree. The legislative branch is not bound to adhere to the framework set forth by the Civil Code when it enacts subsequent legislation. Section 14(2) manifests a clear intent to interrelate the registration allowed under that provision with the Civil Code, but no such intent exists with respect to Section 14(1). IV. 106

One of the keys to understanding the framework we set forth today is seeing how our land registration procedures correlate with our law on prescription, which, under the Civil Code, is one of the modes for acquiring ownership over property. The Civil Code makes it clear that patrimonial property of the State may be acquired by private persons through prescription. This is brought about by Article 1113, which states that [a]ll things which are within the commerce of man are susceptible to prescription, and that [p]roperty of the State or any of its subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of prescription. There are two modes of prescription through which immovables may be acquired under the Civil Code. The first is ordinary acquisitive prescription, which, under Article 1117, requires possession in good faith and with just title; and, under Article 1134, is completed through possession of ten (10) years. There is nothing in the Civil Code that bars a person from acquiring patrimonial property of the State through ordinary acquisitive prescription, nor is there any apparent reason to impose such a rule. At the same time, there are indispensable requisitesgood faith and just title. The ascertainment of good faith involves the application of Articles 526, 527, and 528, as well as Article 1127 of the Civil Code,[45] provisions that more or less speak for themselves. On the other hand, the concept of just title requires some clarification. Under Article 1129, there is just title for the purposes of prescription when the adverse claimant came into possession of the property through one of the modes recognized by law for the acquisition of ownership or other real rights, but the grantor was not the owner or could not transmit any right. Dr. Tolentino explains: Just title is an act which has for its purpose the transmission of ownership, and which would have actually transferred ownership if the grantor had been the owner. This vice or defect is the one cured by prescription. Examples: sale with delivery, exchange, donation, succession, and dacion in payment.[46] The OSG submits that the requirement of just title necessarily precludes the applicability of ordinary acquisitive prescription to patrimonial property. The major premise for the argument is that the State, as the owner and grantor, could not transmit ownership to the possessor before the completion of the required period of possession.[47] It is evident that the OSG erred when it assumed that the grantor referred to in Article 1129 is the State. The grantor is the one from whom the person invoking ordinary acquisitive prescription derived the title, whether by sale, exchange, donation, succession or any other mode of the acquisition of ownership or other real rights. Earlier, we made it clear that, whether under ordinary prescription or extraordinary prescription, the period of possession preceding the classification of public dominion lands as patrimonial cannot be counted for the purpose of computing prescription. But after the property has been become patrimonial, the period of prescription begins to run in favor of the possessor. Once the requisite period has been completed, two legal events ensue: (1) the patrimonial property is ipso jure converted into private land; and (2) the person in possession for the periods prescribed under the Civil Code acquires ownership of the property by operation of the Civil Code. It is evident that once the possessor automatically becomes the owner of the converted patrimonial property, the ideal next step is the registration of the property under the Torrens system. It should be remembered that registration of property is not a mode of acquisition of ownership, but merely a mode of confirmation of ownership.[48] Looking back at the registration regime prior to the adoption of the Property Registration Decree in 1977, it is apparent that the registration system then did not fully accommodate the acquisition of ownership of patrimonial property under the Civil Code. What the system accommodated was the confirmation of 107

imperfect title brought about by the completion of a period of possession ordained under the Public Land Act (either 30 years following Rep. Act No. 1942, or since 12 June 1945 following P.D. No. 1073). The Land Registration Act[49] was noticeably silent on the requisites for alienable public lands acquired through ordinary prescription under the Civil Code, though it arguably did not preclude such registration.[50] Still, the gap was lamentable, considering that the Civil Code, by itself, establishes ownership over the patrimonial property of persons who have completed the prescriptive periods ordained therein. The gap was finally closed with the adoption of the Property Registration Decree in 1977, with Section 14(2) thereof expressly authorizing original registration in favor of persons who have acquired ownership over private lands by prescription under the provisions of existing laws, that is, the Civil Code as of now. V. We synthesize the doctrines laid down in this case, as follows: (1) In connection with Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act recognizes and confirms that those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945 have acquired ownership of, and registrable title to, such lands based on the length and quality of their possession. (a) Since Section 48(b) merely requires possession since 12 June 1945 and does not require that the lands should have been alienable and disposable during the entire period of possession, the possessor is entitled to secure judicial confirmation of his title thereto as soon as it is declared alienable and disposable, subject to the timeframe imposed by Section 47 of the Public Land Act.[51] (b) The right to register granted under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is further confirmed by Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree. (2) In complying with Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, consider that under the Civil Code, prescription is recognized as a mode of acquiring ownership of patrimonial property. However, public domain lands become only patrimonial property not only with a declaration that these are alienable or disposable. There must also be an express government manifestation that the property is already patrimonial or no longer retained for public service or the development of national wealth, under Article 422 of the Civil Code. And only when the property has become patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the acquisition of property of the public dominion begin to run. (a) Patrimonial property is private property of the government. The person acquires ownership of patrimonial property by prescription under the Civil Code is entitled to secure registration thereof under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree. (b) There are two kinds of prescription by which patrimonial property may be acquired, one ordinary and other extraordinary. Under ordinary acquisitive prescription, a person acquires ownership of a patrimonial property through possession for at least ten (10) years, in good faith and with just title. Under extraordinary acquisitive prescription, a persons uninterrupted adverse possession of patrimonial property for at least thirty (30) years, regardless of good faith or just title, ripens into ownership. B. We now apply the above-stated doctrines to the case at bar. 108

It is clear that the evidence of petitioners is insufficient to establish that Malabanan has acquired ownership over the subject property under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. There is no substantive evidence to establish that Malabanan or petitioners as his predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the property since 12 June 1945 or earlier. The earliest that petitioners can date back their possession, according to their own evidencethe Tax Declarations they presented in particularis to the year 1948. Thus, they cannot avail themselves of registration under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree. Neither can petitioners properly invoke Section 14(2) as basis for registration. While the subject property was declared as alienable or disposable in 1982, there is no competent evidence that is no longer intended for public use service or for the development of the national evidence, conformably with Article 422 of the Civil Code. The classification of the subject property as alienable and disposable land of the public domain does not change its status as property of the public dominion under Article 420(2) of the Civil Code. Thus, it is insusceptible to acquisition by prescription. VI. A final word. The Court is comfortable with the correctness of the legal doctrines established in this decision. Nonetheless, discomfiture over the implications of todays ruling cannot be discounted. For, every untitled property that is occupied in the country will be affected by this ruling. The social implications cannot be dismissed lightly, and the Court would be abdicating its social responsibility to the Filipino people if we simply levied the law without comment. The informal settlement of public lands, whether declared alienable or not, is a phenomenon tied to long-standing habit and cultural acquiescence, and is common among the so-called Third World countries. This paradigm powerfully evokes the disconnect between a legal system and the reality on the ground. The law so far has been unable to bridge that gap. Alternative means of acquisition of these public domain lands, such as through homestead or free patent, have

109

proven unattractive due to limitations imposed on the grantee in the encumbrance or alienation of said properties.[52] Judicial confirmation of imperfect title has emerged as the most viable, if not the most attractive means to regularize the informal settlement of alienable or disposable lands of the public domain, yet even that system, as revealed in this decision, has considerable limits. There are millions upon millions of Filipinos who have individually or exclusively held residential lands on which they have lived and raised their families. Many more have tilled and made productive idle lands of the State with their hands. They have been regarded for generation by their families and their communities as common law owners. There is much to be said about the virtues of according them legitimate states. Yet such virtues are not for the Court to translate into positive law, as the law itself considered such lands as property of the public dominion. It could only be up to Congress to set forth a new phase of land reform to sensibly regularize and formalize the settlement of such lands which in legal theory are lands of the public domain before the problem becomes insoluble. This could be accomplished, to cite two examples, by liberalizing the standards for judicial confirmation of imperfect title, or amending the Civil Code itself to ease the requisites for the conversion of public dominion property into patrimonial. Ones sense of security over land rights infuses into every aspect of well-being not only of that individual, but also to the persons family. Once that sense of security is deprived, life and livelihood are put on stasis. It is for the political branches to bring welcome closure to the long pestering problem. WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 23 February 2007 and Resolution dated 2 October 2007 are AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. 29) Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila FIRST DIVISION G.R. No. 146459 June 8, 2006 HEIRS OF DICMAN, namely: ERNESTO DICMAN, PAUL DICMAN, FLORENCE DICMAN FELICIANO TORRES, EMILY TORRES, TOMASITO TORRES and HEIRS OF CRISTINA ALAWAS and BABING COSIL, * Petitioners, vs. JOSE CARIO and COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents. DECISION AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.: This refers to the petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court questioning the Decision1 dated June 30, 2000 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 33731, which affirmed in toto the Decision dated November 28, 1990 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 7 (Baguio City), La Trinidad, Benguet; and the CA Resolution dated December 15, 2000 which denied the petitioners motion for reconsideration. The petition originated from an action for recovery of possession of the eastern half of a parcel of land situated in Residence Section "J", Camp Seven, Baguio City, consisting of 101,006 square meters, more or less, and identified as Lot 46, Ts-39, Plan SWO-37115.2 The antecedent facts are clear: The subject land, at the turn of the 20th century, had been part of the land claim of Mateo Cario. Within this site, a sawmill and other buildings had been constructed by H.C. Heald in connection with his lumber business. On March 14, 1916, H.C. Heald sold the buildings to Sioco Cario, son of Mateo Cario and grandfather of private respondent Jose Cario. Sioco Cario then took possession of the buildings and the land on which the buildings were situated. Ting-el Dicman,3 predecessor-in-interest of the petitioners, namely, Ernesto Dicman, Paul Dicman, Florence Dicman, Babing Cosil, Feliciano Torres, Cristina Alawas, Emily Torres and Tomasito Torres, and resident of 110

Atab, a sitio within the City of Baguio but located at some distance from the land in controversy, had been employed by Sioco Cario as his cattle herder. On the advice of his lawyers, and because there were already many parcels of land recorded in his name,4 Sioco Cario caused the survey of the land in controversy in the name of Ting-el Dicman. On October 22, 1928, Ting-el Dicman executed a public instrument entitled "Deed of Conveyance of Part Rights and Interests in Agricultural Land" with Sioco Cario. The deed reads: DEED OF CONVEYANCE OF PART RIGHTS AND INTERESTS IN AGRICULTURAL LAND. KNOW ALL PERSONS BY THESE PRESENTS: That I, Ting-el Diac-man, of legal age, widower, and resident of the sitio known as "Atab", near Camp Seven, City of Baguio, Philippine Islands, DO HEREBY STATE, viz: That I am the applicant for a free-patent of a parcel of land (public), having a surface of over ten (10) hectares, surveyed by the District Land Office of Baguio for me, and located in the place known as Camp Seven, Baguio; That to-date I have not as yet received the plan for said survey; That Mr. Sioco Cario has advanced all expenses for said survey for me and in my name, and also all other expenses for the improvement of said land, to date; That for and in consideration of said advance expenses, to me made and delivered by said Mr. Sioco Cario, I hereby pledge and promise to convey, deliver and transfer unto said Sioco Cario, of legal age, married to Guilata Acop, and resident of Baguio, P.I., his heirs and assigns, one half (1/2) of my title, rights, and interest to and in the aforesaid parcel of land; same to be delivered, conveyed and transferred in a final form, according to law, to him, his heirs and assigns, by me, my heirs, and assigns, as soon as title for the same is issued to me by proper authorities. That this conveyance, transfer, or assignment, notwithstanding its temporary nature, shall have legal force and effect; once it is approved by the approving authorities all the final papers and documents, this instrument shall be considered superseded. After I have received my title to said parcel of land I bind myself, my heirs and assigns, to execute the final papers and forward same for approval of the competent authorities at Mr. Sioco Carios expense. WITNESS MY HAND in the City of Baguio, P.I., this, the 22nd day of October, 1928, A.D. his right thumbmark5 TING-EL DIAC-MAN After the execution of the foregoing deed, Sioco Cario, who had been in possession of the land in controversy since 1916, continued to stay thereon. On January 10, 1938, Sioco Cario executed, as seller, a public instrument entitled "Deed of Absolute Sale" covering the subject land and its improvements with his son, Guzman Cario, as buyer. The contract states in part: x x x for and in consideration of the sum of ONE PESO (P 1.00) Philippine Currency and other valuable considerations which I had received from my son, Guzman A. Cario x x x have ceded, transferred and conveyed as by these presents do hereby cede, convey and transfer unto the [sic] said Guzman A. Cario, his heirs, executors, administrators and assigns, all my rights, title, interests in and participation to that parcel of land (public) covered by an application for free patent with a surface area of Ten (10) hectares, surveyed by the District Land Office of Baguio in the name of Pingel Dicman, and who ceded, conveyed and transferred one half of his title, rights and interests to me under an instrument executed by the said owner in the city of Baguio, Philippines, on the 22nd day of October, 1928 A.D. and duly ratified before Notary Public x x x together with all improvements therein, consisting of oranges, mangoes, and other fruit trees and a building of strong materials (half finished) x x x, which building was purchased by me from H.C. Heald on March 14, 1916, free from all liens and encumbrances, with full rights and authority to the said Guzman A. Cario to perfect his claim with any government agency the proper issuance of such patent or title as may be permitted to him under existing laws. x x x x6 In a letter dated January 15, 1938, Sioco Cario asked his son, Guzman Cario, who had been doing business in Damortis, Sto. Tomas, La Union, to take possession of the subject land and building. 7 Guzman 111

Cario moved to Baguio as requested and occupied the property. Evidence was adduced in the RTC to the effect that Guzman Cario took possession of the property publicly, peacefully, and in the concept of owner: the directory of Baguio Telephones published in October 1940 lists the residence of Guzman A. Cario at Camp 7, Baguio City, along with his telephone number; pictures were taken of him and his family, including the private respondent who was then an infant, depicting the property in the background; U.S. Army authorities obtained permission from Guzman Cario to use a part of the land in question after the war; he introduced various improvements on the property over the years and exercised acts of ownership over them; he permitted the use of portions of the land to Governor Eulogio Rodriguez, Jr. and the Boy Scouts of Rizal Province; he leased out portions of the land to Bayani Pictures, Inc.; and his neighbors confirmed the possession and occupation over the property of Guzman Cario and, after him, his son, herein private respondent Jose Cario. These findings of fact were either confirmed or uncontroverted by the CA.8 On July 27, 1954, Guzman Cario had the entire Lot 46 resurveyed so as to indicate the half portion that belonged to him and the other half that belonged to the petitioners. The resurvey evenly divided the lot into Lot 76-A and 76-B, and purportedly indicated that Lot 76-A, consisting of 50,953 square meters, belonged to the petitioners, while Lot 76-B, also consisting of 50,953 square meters, formerly pertained to Sioco Cario and, later, to Guzman Cario. Additionally, the resurvey indicated the house where private respondent Jose Cario resided and, before him, where his predecessors-in-interest, Sioco and Guzman Cario, also resided. On May 23, 1955, Guzman Cario filed a Free Patent Application over the land in question. The application was given due course, but Guzman later withdrew it when he decided to file his opposition to the petition later filed by the heirs of Ting-el Dicman. This petition, entitled "Petition of the Heirs of Dicman to Reopen Civil Reservation Case No. 1, G.L.R.O. 211," was filed by Felipe Dicman, Bobing Dicman and Cating Dicman, in their capacity as compulsory heirs of Ting-el Dicman on April 24, 1959 with the Court of First Instance of Baguio. The petition sought to establish ownership over Lot 76-A and Lot 76-B which, taken together, covered an area of 10.1006 hectares. Guzman Cario opposed the petition insofar as he insisted ownership over Lot 76-B, the land in controversy. The Estate of Sioco Cario likewise filed an opposition. On March 6, 1963, the trial court rendered a partial judgment and confirmed that the title over Lot 76-A belonged to the heirs of Ting-el Dicman, there having been no adverse claim. But as to Lot 76-B, the trial court found it necessary to hold further hearing in order to decide on the adverse claims of the parties. Meanwhile, on January 8, 1960, while the foregoing petition was pending in the trial court, President Carlos P. Garcia issued Proclamation No. 628 "excluding from the operation of the Baguio Townsite Reservation certain parcels of public land known as Igorot Claims situated in the City of Baguio and declaring the same open to disposition under the provisions of Chapter VII of the Public Land Act." The Proclamation further provided that the "Igorot Claims" enumerated therein shall be "subject to the condition that except in favor of the government or any of its branches, units, or institutions, lands acquired by virtue of this proclamation shall not be encumbered or alienated within a period of fifteen years from and after the date of issuance of patent." One such claim pertained to the "Heirs of Dicman," to wit: Name Lot No. Survey Plan Residence Section Area (Sq.m.) Heirs of 46 Swo-37115 "J" 101,006 Dicman Before the trial court could dispose of the case, the Supreme Court promulgated Republic v. Marcos 9 which held that Courts of First Instance of Baguio have no jurisdiction to reopen judicial proceedings on the basis of Republic Act No. 931. As a consequence, on July 28, 1978, the trial court dismissed the petition to reopen Civil Reservation Case No. 1, G.L.R.O. 211 insofar as Lot 76-B was concerned, and the certificate of title issued pursuant to the partial decision involving Lot 76-A was invalidated. The trial court stated that the remedy for those who were issued titles was to file a petition for revalidation under Presidential Decree No. 1271, as amended by Presidential Decrees No. 1311 and 2034. After the dismissal of the case, Guzman Cario was left undisturbed in his possession of the subject property until his death on August 19, 1982. His remains are buried on the land in question, next to the large house purchased in 1916 by his father, Sioco Cario (the grandfather of private respondent), from H.C. Heald. Guzmans widow and son, private respondent Jose Sioco C. Cario, continued possession of the subject property.10 112

On April 20, 1983, petitioners, suing as compulsory heirs of Ting-el Dicman, revived the foregoing case by filing a complaint for recovery of possession with damages involving the subject property with the RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. 59-R. As earlier stated, petitioners, then complainants, originally sought to recover possession of the eastern half of the parcel of land situated in Residence Section "J", Camp Seven, Baguio City, consisting of 101,006 square meters, more or less, and identified as Lot 46, Ts-39, Plan SWO37115. Petitioners, then plaintiffs, averred in their complaint: 10. That however, this Honorable Court was not able to decide the [ ] petition for reopening as far as the remaining eastern half portion of the above-described property is concerned due to the fact that the said petition was dismissed for alleged lack of jurisdiction; x x x 11. That because of the above-mentioned dismissal, the conflict between herein plaintiffs and defendant over the half eastern portion of the above-described property which was one of the issues supposed to be decided in the said judicial reopening case remains undecided; 12. That after the dismissal of the abovementioned petition and before the dispute between herein plaintiffs and defendant over the eastern half portion of the above-described property, defendant unlawfully and illegally continue to occupy portion [sic] of the above-described property to the clear damage and prejudice of herein plaintiffs; 13. That the defendant has no valid claim of ownership and possession over any of the portions of the above-described property; 14. That plaintiffs and their predecessors-in-interest have been religiously paying the realty taxes covering the above-described property x x x11 Private respondent Jose Cario filed his answer and prayed for dismissal. He alleged that his predecessorsin-interest had acquired the land by onerous title through the "Deed of Absolute Sale" dated January 10, 1938 executed by his grandfather, Sioco Cario, as seller, and his father, Guzman Cario, as buyer; that the property was earlier acquired by Sioco Cario by virtue of the "Deed of Conveyance of Part Rights and Interests in Agricultural Land" dated October 22, 1928 executed between Sioco Cario and Ting-el Dicman; and that he has been in possession of the subject property for 55 years peacefully, in good faith, and in concept of owner and therefore perfected title over the same through acquisitive prescription. On June 13, 1983, the administratrix of the Estate of Sioco Cario filed a motion to intervene with the RTC. On July 1, 1983, the RTC granted said motion. On July 11, 1983, the Estate of Sioco Cario filed its Complaint-in-Intervention, praying for quieting of title among the adverse claimants. The RTC, through an ocular inspection on February 15, 1984, found that the larger building still stands on the land in controversy and, together with the surrounding area, constituted the residence and was in the possession of private respondent and his family. On November 28, 1990, the RTC rendered its decision in favor of private respondent, the dispositive portion of which states: IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered as follows: 1. Plaintiffs complaint is hereby DISMISSED; 2. Plaintiffs-Intervenors complaint-in-intervention is hereby dismissed; 3. Defendant is hereby declared the lawful possessor and as the party who has the better right over the land subject matter [sic] of this action and as such he may apply for the confirmation of his title thereto in accordance with law (R.A. No. 894012 )[.] Defendants counterclaim is dismissed; 4. Costs is [sic] adjudged against the plaintiff and plaintiff-intervenor. SO ORDERED. To support its ruling, the RTC found that the tax declarations and their revisions submitted as evidence by the petitioners made no reference to the land in question;13 that no tax declaration over the land declared in the name of the Estate of Sioco Cario had been submitted as evidence, and that the intervenor-estate presented tax declarations over the building only; that it was Guzman Cario alone who declared for taxation purposes both the land and the improvements thereon in his name;14 that there is no evidence to the effect that petitioners ever filed any action to challenge the validity of the "Deed of Conveyance of Part Rights and Interests in Agricultural Land" dated October 22, 1928; that even assuming that this instrument 113

may be invalid for whatever reason, the fact remains that Sioco Cario and his successors-in-interest had been in possession of the subject property publicly, adversely, continuously and in concept of owner for at least 55 years before the filing of the action;15 that Siocos successor, Guzman Cario, had been in open and continuous possession of the property in good faith and in the concept of owner from 1938 until his death in 1982 and, hence, the Estate of Sioco Cario has lost all rights to recover possession from Guzman Cario or his heirs and assigns; and that although the Estate of Sioco Cario attempted to assail the genuineness and due execution of the "Deed of Absolute Sale" dated January 10, 1938 executed by Sioco Cario in favor of his son, Guzman Cario, the challenge failed since no evidence had been adduced to support the allegation of forgery.16 On January 23, 1991, petitioners seasonably filed their notice of appeal. The RTC, however, denied the motion for reconsideration and motion to admit appeal filed by the Estate of Sioco Cario on July 3, 1991 for being filed out of time. Petitioners raised the following issues before the Court of Appeals: 1. THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THE DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE OF THE PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS AND THE STRAIGHTFORWARD DECLARATIONS OF THEIR WITNESS. 2. THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONSIDERING THE DEED OF CONVEYANCE [OF] PART RIGHTS AND INTERESTS IN AGRICULTURAL LAND EXECUTED BY DICMAN IN FAVOR OF SIOCO CARIO DESPITE ITS NULLITY. 3. THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DECLARING DEFENDANT-APPELLEE TO HAVE A BETTER RIGHT TO THE PROPERTY IN DISPUTE. 4. THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT AND NOT GRANTING THE RELIEFS PRAYED FOR THEREIN. On June 30, 2000, the CA dismissed the petition and affirmed in toto the ruling of the RTC. On December 15, 2000, the CA issued a Resolution denying petitioners motion for reconsideration. The CA based its ruling on the following reasons: that the petitioners raised for the first time on appeal the issue on whether the "Deed of Conveyance of Part Rights and Interests in Agricultural Land" is void ab initio under Sections 145 and 146 of the Administrative Code of Mindanao and Sulu17 (which was made applicable later to the Mountain Province and Nueva Viscaya by Act 2798, as amended by Act 2913, and then to all other cultural minorities found within the national territory by virtue of Section 120 of the Public Land Act18 ) and, hence, cannot be considered by the reviewing court;19 that, even if this issue were considered, the records fail to show that Ting-el Dicman, though an Igorot, is a non-Christian and, hence, the foregoing laws are not applicable;20 that there was sufficient proof of consideration for the said deed;21 and that even if the deed were a mere contract to sell and not an absolute sale, under Borromeo v. Franco22 the obligation on the part of the purchaser to perfect the title papers within a certain time is not a condition subsequent nor essential to the obligation to sell, but rather the same is an incidental undertaking the failure to comply therewith not being a bar to the sale agreed upon.23 On February 12, 2001, petitioners, through newly retained counsel, filed their petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. Petitioners raise the following grounds for the petition: A. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE PROVISIONS OF ACT NO. 2798 ARE NOT APPLICABLE TO THE "DEED OF CONVEYANCE" EXECUTED BY PING-EL DICMAN ON THE GROUNDS THAT THERE IS NO PROOF THAT HE WAS A NON-CHRISTIAN AND THAT BAGUIO CITY IS NOT COVERED BY THE SAID ACT. B. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN THE APPLICATION OF THE RULING IN BORROMEO V. FRANCO (5 PHIL 49 [1905]) THAT AN AGREEMENT ON THE PART OF THE PARTY TO A CONTRACT TO PERFECT THE TITLE PAPERS TO A CERTAIN PROPERTY WITHIN A CERTAIN TIME IS NOT A CONDITION SUBSEQUENT OR ESSENTIAL OF THE OBLIGATION TO SELL [sic]. C. 114

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE PROPERTY SUBJECT OF LITIGATION AND OVER WHICH RESPONDENTS IMPROVEMENTS ARE BUILT BELONGS TO RESPONDENT NOTWITHSTANDING UNCONTROVERTED EVIDENCE THAT PETITIONERS PREDECESSOR-IN-INTEREST PING-EL DICMAN HAD APPLIED FOR FREE PATENT OVER THE SUBJECT AREA AND HAD BEEN ISSUED PLAN SWO-37115 IN HIS NAME BY THE BUREAU OF LANDS IN 1954 AND HAD BEEN IN ACTUAL, OPEN, PEACEFUL, ADVERSE AND CONTINUOUS POSSESSION OF THE PROPERTY SINCE THE EARLY 1900s UNTIL HIS DEATH WHEN HIS GRANCHILDREN AND SUCCESSORS-IN-INTEREST, THE PETITIONERS, TOOK OVER AND CONTINUED THE POSSESSION OF THEIR GRANDFATHER, PING-EL DICMAN. On March 2, 2001, petitioners filed their Manifestation and Motion to Substitute Babing Cosil and Cristina Alawas With Their Respective Heirs stating, among others, that Julio F. Dicman, son of petitioner Ernesto Dicman, had been appointed by the petitioners to sign the petition for and in their behalf, but due to distance and time constraints between Makati City and Baguio, he was not able to submit the same in time for the deadline for the petition on February 12, 2001. Petitioners attached the Special Power of Attorney seeking to formalize the appointment of Julio F. Dicman as their attorney-in-fact and to ratify his execution of the verification and certification of non-forum shopping for and on behalf of the petitioners. On March 15, 2001, private respondent filed with this Court a Motion for Leave of Court to File Motion to Dismiss and/or Deny Due Course, arguing that the petition failed to comply with the requirements for verification and certification of non-forum shopping. The affiant of the petition, according to private respondent, is not a principal party in the case; rather, he is merely the son of Ernesto Dicman, one of the petitioners. The verification and certification reads: VERIFICATION AND CERTIFICATION I, JULIO F. DICMAN, of legal age, Filipino, with residence address at Camp 7, Montecillo Road, Baguio City, after being first duly sworn in accordance with law, do hereby depose and state: 1. I am one of the petitioners in the above-entitled case; x x x (emphasis supplied) To private respondent, since Ernesto Dicman, one of the petitioners, appears to be alive, he excludes his son as the successor-in-interest of Ting-el Dicman. The verification, therefore, is false in view of the statement under oath that Julio F. Dicman is a petitioner when in fact he is not, and should be cause for the dismissal of the case and indirect contempt of court, without prejudice to administrative and criminal action. On May 2, 2001, in their Manifestation and Motion for Leave to File the Attached Reply and Reply, petitioners argued that while it may be true that the verification and certification to the petition were signed by Julio F. Dicman, the son of one of the petitioners, they subsequently confirmed his authority to sign on behalf of all the petitioners through the Special Power of Attorney submitted to the Court in a Manifestation and Motion to Substitute Babing Cosil and Cristina Alawas With Their Respective Heirs filed on March 2, 2001. Petitioners invoked substantial compliance and prayed that the Court overlook the procedural lapse in the interest of substantial justice. The parties thereafter submitted their respective memoranda. The petition must be dismissed on the following grounds: 1. Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires the pleader to submit a certificate of non-forum shopping to be executed by the plaintiff or principal party, is mandatory, and non-compliance therewith is a sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition.24 The forum shopping certification must be signed by the party himself as he has personal knowledge of the facts therein stated. 25Obviously, it is the plaintiff or principal party who is in the best position to know whether he actually filed or caused the filing of a petition in the case.26 Where there are two or more plaintiffs or petitioners, all of them must sign the verification and non-forum certification, and the signature of only one of them is insufficient, 27 unless the one who signs the verification and certification has been authorized to execute the same by, and on behalf of, the co-plaintiff or co-petitioner.28 But it must be stressed that the requirement the principal party himself should sign the certification applies only to a natural person and not to a juridical person which can only act through its officer or duly authorized agent.29 However, the Court has also held that the rules on forum shopping were designed to promote and facilitate the orderly administration of justice and thus should not be interpreted with such absolute literalness as to 115

subvert its own ultimate and legitimate objective. The rule of substantial compliance may be availed of with respect to the contents of the certification. This is because the requirement of strict compliance with the provisions regarding the certification of non-forum shopping merely underscores its mandatory nature in that the certification cannot be altogether dispensed with or its requirements completely disregarded.30 Thus, under justifiable circumstances, the Court has relaxed the rule requiring the submission of such certification considering that although it is obligatory, it is not jurisdictional.31lawphil.net But a perusal of the relevant decisions handed down by this Court consistently shows that substantial compliance may be invoked and the procedural lapse overlooked provided that, where the petitioner is a natural person as in the case at bar, the authorized signatory must also be a principal party or copetitioner.32 Petitioners, as natural persons, cannot therefore appoint a non-party to sign for them, especially since only the petitioners occupy the best position to know whether they actually filed or caused the filing of a petition in this case and who personally know the facts stated in the petition. On this point alone the petition should be dismissed. 2. It is a settled rule that in the exercise of the Supreme Courts power of review, the Court is not a trier of facts and does not normally undertake the re-examination of the evidence presented by the contending parties during the trial of the case considering that the findings of facts of the CA are conclusive and binding on the Court. While jurisprudence has recognized several exceptions in which factual issues may be resolved by this Court, namely: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of facts are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the CA went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; and (11) when the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, could justify a different conclusion,33 none of these exceptions has been shown to apply in the present case and, hence, this Court may not review the findings of fact made by the lower courts. 3. Petitioners argue on appeal that the "Deed of Conveyance of Part Rights and Interests in Agricultural Land" dated October 22, 1928 executed between Sioco Cario and Ting-el Dicman is void ab initio for lack of approval of competent authorities as required under Section 145 in relation to Section 146 of the Administrative Code of Mindanao and Sulu, the application of which was later extended to the Mountain Province and Nueva Viscaya and, thereafter, throughout the entire national territory;34 that the sale was without valid consideration; and that the said deed is not an absolute sale but merely a contract to sell subject to the suspensive condition that the papers evidencing the title must first be perfected. These arguments were lumped under the following issue in their appeal to the CA: 2. THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONSIDERING THE DEED OF CONVEYANCE [OF] PART RIGHTS AND INTERESTS IN AGRICULTURAL LAND EXECUTED BY DICMAN IN FAVOR OF SIOCO CARIO DESPITE ITS NULLITY. The foregoing issue and the incidents thereunder were never raised by the petitioners during the proceedings before the RTC. Suffice it to say that issues raised for the first time on appeal and not raised timely in the proceedings in the lower court are barred by estoppel. 35Matters, theories or arguments not brought out in the original proceedings cannot be considered on review or appeal where they are raised for the first time. To consider the alleged facts and arguments raised belatedly would amount to trampling on the basic principles of fair play, justice and due process.36 4. Even if this Court should declare the sale null and void or the agreement merely a contract to sell subject to a suspensive condition that has yet to occur, private respondent nonetheless acquired ownership over the land in question through acquisitive prescription.37 The records show that as early as 1938, the land in controversy had been in the possession of Guzman Cario, predecessor-in-interest of private respondent, continuously, publicly, peacefully, in concept of 116

owner, and in good faith with just title, to the exclusion of the petitioners and their predecessors-ininterest, well beyond the period required under law to acquire title by acquisitive prescription which, in this case, is 10 years.38 The findings of fact of the lower courts, and which this Court has no reason to disturb, inescapably point to this conclusion: immediately after the "Deed of Absolute Sale," a public instrument dated January 10, 1938, had been executed by Sioco Cario in favor of his son, Guzman Cario (the father of private respondent), the latter immediately occupied the property; the 1940 directory of Baguio Telephones lists his residence at Camp 7, Baguio City along with his telephone number; his permitting the use of portions of the property to various third parties; his introduction of improvements over the land in controversy; the testimonial accounts of his neighbors; and that it was Guzman Cario alone who declared for tax purposes both the land and the improvements thereon in his name, while the tax declarations of the other claimants made no reference to the subject property. 39 Although arguably Sioco Cario may not have been the owner of the subject property when he executed the "Deed of Absolute Sale" in 1938 in favor of his son, the requirement of just title is nonetheless satisfied, which means that the mode of transferring ownership should ordinarily have been valid and true, had the grantor been the owner.40 By the time the successors-in-interest of Ting-el Dicman sought to establish ownership over the land in controversy by filing their "Petition of the Heirs of Dicman to Reopen Civil Reservation Case No. 1, G.L.R.O. 211" on April 24, 1959 with the trial court, and which Guzman timely opposed, more than 20 years had already elapsed. Thus, the 10-year period for acquisitive prescription is deemed satisfied well before Guzmans possession can be said to be civilly interrupted by the filing of the foregoing petition to reopen.41 After the dismissal of that case on July 28, 1978, Guzman Cario was left undisturbed in his possession of the subject property until his death on August 19, 1982. His remains are buried on the land in question. Thereafter, Guzmans widow and son, herein private respondent, continued possession of the subject property in the same manner. When petitioners, heirs of Ting-el Dicman, tried to revive the case on April 20, 1983, they had, far before that time, lost all rights to recover possession or ownership. 5. Prescinding from the issue on prescription, the petitioners and their predecessors-in-interest are nonetheless guilty of laches. Laches has been defined as such neglect or omission to assert a right, taken in conjunction with the lapse of time and other circumstances causing prejudice to an adverse party, as will operate as a bar in equity. 42 It is a delay in the assertion of a right which works disadvantage to another43 because of the inequity founded on some change in the condition or relations of the property or parties.44 It is based on public policy which, for the peace of society,45 ordains that relief will be denied to a stale demand which otherwise could be a valid claim.46 It is different from and applies independently of prescription. While prescription is concerned with the fact of delay, laches is concerned with the effect of delay. Prescription is a matter of time; laches is principally a question of inequity of permitting a claim to be enforced, this inequity being founded on some change in the condition of the property or the relation of the parties. Prescription is statutory; laches is not. Laches applies in equity, whereas prescription applies at law. Prescription is based on a fixed time, laches is not.47 Laches means the failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting the presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned or declined to assert it.48 It has been held that even a registered owner of property under the Torrens Title system may be barred from recovering possession of property by virtue of laches.49 Given the foregoing findings of fact, all the four (4) elements of laches, as prescribed by the decisions of this Court, are present in the case, to wit: 1. a. Conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one under whom he claims, giving rise to the situation of which complaint is made and for which the complaint seeks a remedy; 2. b. Delay in asserting the complainants rights, the complainant having had knowledge or notice, of the defendants conduct and having been afforded an opportunity to institute a suit; 3. c. Lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the complainant would assert the right on which he bases his suit; and d. Injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to the complainant, or the suit is not held to be barred.50 117

As correctly held by the RTC, there is no evidence to the effect that Ting-el Dicman or his successors-ininterest ever filed any action to question the validity of the "Deed of Conveyance of Part Rights and Interests in Agricultural Land" after its execution on October 22, 192851despite having every opportunity to do so. Nor was any action to recover possession of the property from Guzman Cario instituted anytime prior to April 24, 1959, a time when the period for acquisitive prescription, reckoned from Guzmans occupation of the property in 1938, had already transpired in his favor. No evidence likewise appears on the record that Sioco Cario or his Estate ever filed any action to contest the validity of the "Deed of Absolute Sale" dated January 10, 1938.52 Though counsel for the Estate of Sioco Cario tried to assail the deed as a forgery in the trial court, the attempt failed and no appeal was lodged therefrom. It will be difficult for this Court to assume that the petitioners and their predecessors were all the while ignorant of the adverse possession of private respondent and his predecessors given the publicity of their conduct and the nature of their acts. Private respondent and his predecessors-in-interest were made to feel secure in the belief that no action would be filed against them by such passivity. There is no justifiable reason for petitioners delay in asserting their rightsthe facts in their entirety show that they have slept on them. For over 30 years reckoned from the "Deed of Conveyance of Part Rights and Interests in Agricultural Land" dated October 22, 1928, or 20 years reckoned from the "Deed of Absolute Sale" dated January 10, 1938, they neglected to take positive steps to assert their dominical claim over the property. With the exception of forgery, all other issues concerning the validity of the two instruments abovementioned, as well as the averment that the former was in the nature of a contract to sell, were issues raised only for the first time on appeal and cannot therefore be taken up at this late a stage. The features of this case are not new. The Court has on several occasions held in particular that despite the judicial pronouncement that the sale of real property by illiterate ethnic minorities is null and void for lack of approval of competent authorities, the right to recover possession has nonetheless been barred through the operation of the equitable doctrine of laches.53 6. Petitioners argue that Proclamation No. 628 issued by then President Carlos P. Garcia on January 8, 1960 had the effect of "segregating" and "reserving" certain Igorot claims identified therein, including one purportedly belonging to the "Heirs of Dicman," and prohibiting any encumbrance or alienation of these claims for a period of 15 years from acquisition of patent. But by the time the Proclamation had been issued, all rights over the property in question had already been vested in private respondent. The executive issuance can only go so far as to classify public land, but it cannot be construed as to prejudice vested rights. Moreover, property rights may not be altered or deprived by executive fiat alone without contravening the due process guarantees54 of the Constitution and may amount to unlawful taking of private property to be redistributed for public use without just compensation.55 The recognition, respect, and protection of the rights of indigenous peoples to preserve and develop their cultures, traditions, and institutions are vital concerns of the State and constitute important public policies which bear upon this case. To give life and meaning unto these policies the legislature saw it fit to enact Republic Act No. 8371, otherwise known as The Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997, as a culminating measure to affirm the views and opinions of indigenous peoples and ethnic minorities on matters that affect their life and culture.56 The provisions of that law unify an otherwise fragmented account of constitutional, jurisprudential and statutory doctrine which enjoins the organs of government to be vigilant for the protection of indigenous cultural communities as a marginalized sector, 57 to protect their ancestral domain and ancestral lands and ensure their economic, social, and cultural well-being,58 and to guard their patrimony from those inclined to prey upon their ignorance or ductility. 59 As the final arbiter of disputes and the last bulwark of the Rule of Law this Court has always been mindful of the highest edicts of social justice especially where doubts arise in the interpretation and application of the law. But when in the pursuit of the loftiest ends ordained by the Constitution this Court finds that the law is clear and leaves no room for doubt, it shall decide according to the principles of right and justice as all people conceive them to be, and with due appreciation of the rights of all persons concerned. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. 118

30) EN BANC METROPOLITAN MANILA G.R. Nos. 171947-48 DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, Present: DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS,[1] PUNO, C.J., DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, QUISUMBING, DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, YNARES-SANTIAGO, DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC CARPIO, WORKS AND HIGHWAYS, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND CORONA, MANAGEMENT, PHILIPPINE CARPIO MORALES, COAST GUARD, PHILIPPINE AZCUNA, NATIONAL POLICE MARITIME TINGA, GROUP, and DEPARTMENT OF CHICO-NAZARIO, THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL VELASCO, JR., GOVERNMENT, NACHURA, Petitioners, REYES, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and - versus BRION, JJ. CONCERNED RESIDENTS OF MANILA BAY, represented and joined by DIVINA V. ILAS, SABINIANO ALBARRACIN, MANUEL SANTOS, JR., DINAH DELA PEA, PAUL DENNIS QUINTERO, MA. VICTORIA LLENOS, DONNA CALOZA, FATIMA QUITAIN, VENICE SEGARRA, FRITZIE TANGKIA, SARAH JOELLE LINTAG, HANNIBAL AUGUSTUS BOBIS, FELIMON SANTIAGUEL, and Promulgated: JAIME AGUSTIN R. OPOSA, Respondents. December 18, 2008 x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x DECISION VELASCO, JR., J.: The need to address environmental pollution, as a cause of climate change, has of late gained the attention of the international community. Media have finally trained their sights on the ill effects of pollution, the destruction of forests and other critical habitats, oil spills, and the unabated improper disposal of garbage. And rightly so, for the magnitude of environmental destruction is now on a scale few ever foresaw and the wound no longer simply heals by itself.[2] But amidst hard evidence and clear signs of a climate crisis that need bold action, the voice of cynicism, naysayers, and procrastinators can still be heard. 119

This case turns on government agencies and their officers who, by the nature of their respective offices or by direct statutory command, are tasked to protect and preserve, at the first instance, our internal waters, rivers, shores, and seas polluted by human activities. To most of these agencies and their official complement, the pollution menace does not seem to carry the high national priority it deserves, if their track records are to be the norm. Their cavalier attitude towards solving, if not mitigating, the environmental pollution problem, is a sad commentary on bureaucratic efficiency and commitment. At the core of the case is the Manila Bay, a place with a proud historic past, once brimming with marine life and, for so many decades in the past, a spot for different contact recreation activities, but now a dirty and slowly dying expanse mainly because of the abject official indifference of people and institutions that could have otherwise made a difference. This case started when, on January 29, 1999, respondents Concerned Residents of Manila Bay filed a complaint before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Imus, Cavite against several government agencies, among them the petitioners, for the cleanup, rehabilitation, and protection of the Manila Bay. Raffled to Branch 20 and docketed as Civil Case No. 1851-99 of the RTC, the complaint alleged that the water quality of the Manila Bay had fallen way below the allowable standards set by law, specifically Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1152 or the Philippine Environment Code. This environmental aberration, the complaint stated, stemmed from: x x x [The] reckless, wholesale, accumulated and ongoing acts of omission or commission [of the defendants] resulting in the clear and present danger to public health and in the depletion and contamination of the marine life of Manila Bay, [for which reason] ALL defendants must be held jointly and/or solidarily liable and be collectively ordered to clean up Manila Bay and to restore its water quality to class B waters fit for swimming, skin-diving, and other forms of contact recreation.[3] In their individual causes of action, respondents alleged that the continued neglect of petitioners in abating the pollution of theManila Bay constitutes a violation of, among others: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) Respondents constitutional right to life, health, and a balanced ecology; The Environment Code (PD 1152); The Pollution Control Law (PD 984); The Water Code (PD 1067); The Sanitation Code (PD 856); The Illegal Disposal of Wastes Decree (PD 825); The Marine Pollution Law (PD 979); Executive Order No. 192; The Toxic and Hazardous Wastes Law (Republic Act No. 6969); Civil Code provisions on nuisance and human relations; The Trust Doctrine and the Principle of Guardianship; and International Law

Inter alia, respondents, as plaintiffs a quo, prayed that petitioners be ordered to clean the Manila Bay and submit to the RTC a concerted concrete plan of action for the purpose. The trial of the case started off with a hearing at the Manila Yacht Club followed by an ocular inspection of the Manila Bay. Renato T. Cruz, the Chief of the Water Quality Management Section, Environmental Management Bureau, Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), testifying for petitioners, stated that water samples collected from different beaches around the Manila Bay showed that the amount 120

of fecal coliform content ranged from 50,000 to 80,000 most probable number (MPN)/ml when what DENR Administrative Order No. 34-90 prescribed as a safe level for bathing and other forms of contact recreational activities, or the SB level, is one not exceeding 200 MPN/100 ml.[4] Rebecca de Vera, for Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS) and in behalf of other petitioners, testified about the MWSS efforts to reduce pollution along the Manila Bay through the Manila Second Sewerage Project. For its part, the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) presented, as part of its evidence, its memorandum circulars on the study being conducted on ship-generated waste treatment and disposal, and its Linis Dagat (Clean the Ocean) project for the cleaning of wastes accumulated or washed to shore. The RTC Ordered Petitioners to Clean Up and Rehabilitate Manila Bay On September 13, 2002, the RTC rendered a Decision[5] in favor of respondents. The dispositive portion reads: WHEREFORE, finding merit in the complaint, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the abovenamed defendant-government agencies, jointly and solidarily, to clean up and rehabilitate Manila Bay and restore its waters to SB classification to make it fit for swimming, skin-diving and other forms of contact recreation. To attain this, defendant-agencies, with defendant DENR as the lead agency, are directed, within six (6) months from receipt hereof, to act and perform their respective duties by devising a consolidated, coordinated and concerted scheme of action for the rehabilitation and restoration of the bay. In particular: Defendant MWSS is directed to install, operate and maintain adequate [sewerage] treatment facilities in strategic places under its jurisdiction and increase their capacities. Defendant LWUA, to see to it that the water districts under its wings, provide, construct and operate sewage facilities for the proper disposal of waste. Defendant DENR, which is the lead agency in cleaning up Manila Bay, to install, operate and maintain waste facilities to rid the bay of toxic and hazardous substances. Defendant PPA, to prevent and also to treat the discharge not only of ship-generated wastes but also of other solid and liquid wastes from docking vessels that contribute to the pollution of the bay. Defendant MMDA, to establish, operate and maintain an adequate and appropriate sanitary landfill and/or adequate solid waste and liquid disposal as well as other alternative garbage disposal system such as re-use or recycling of wastes. Defendant DA, through the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources, to revitalize the marine life in Manila Bay and restock its waters with indigenous fish and other aquatic animals. Defendant DBM, to provide and set aside an adequate budget solely for the purpose of cleaning up and rehabilitation of Manila Bay. Defendant DPWH, to remove and demolish structures and other nuisances that obstruct the free flow of waters to the bay. These nuisances discharge solid and liquid wastes which eventually end up in Manila Bay. As the construction and engineering arm of the government, DPWH is ordered to actively participate in removing debris, such as carcass of sunken vessels, and other non-biodegradable garbage in the bay. 121

Defendant DOH, to closely supervise and monitor the operations of septic and sludge companies and require them to have proper facilities for the treatment and disposal of fecal sludge and sewage coming from septic tanks. Defendant DECS, to inculcate in the minds and hearts of the people through education the importance of preserving and protecting the environment. Defendant Philippine Coast Guard and the PNP Maritime Group, to protect at all costs the Manila Bay from all forms of illegal fishing. No pronouncement as to damages and costs. SO ORDERED. The MWSS, Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA), and PPA filed before the Court of Appeals (CA) individual Notices of Appeal which were eventually consolidated and docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 76528. On the other hand, the DENR, Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA), Philippine Coast Guard (PCG), Philippine National Police (PNP) Maritime Group, and five other executive departments and agencies filed directly with this Court a petition for review under Rule 45. The Court, in a Resolution of December 9, 2002, sent the said petition to the CA for consolidation with the consolidated appeals of MWSS, LWUA, and PPA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 74944. Petitioners, before the CA, were one in arguing in the main that the pertinent provisions of the Environment Code (PD 1152) relate only to the cleaning of specific pollution incidents and do not cover cleaning in general. And apart from raising concerns about the lack of funds appropriated for cleaning purposes, petitioners also asserted that the cleaning of the Manila Bay is not a ministerial act which can be compelled by mandamus. The CA Sustained the RTC By a Decision[6] of September 28, 2005, the CA denied petitioners appeal and affirmed the Decision of the RTC in toto,stressing that the trial courts decision did not require petitioners to do tasks outside of their usual basic functions under existing laws.[7] Petitioners are now before this Court praying for the allowance of their Rule 45 petition on the following ground and supporting arguments: THE [CA] DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE NOT HERETOFORE PASSED UPON BY THE HONORABLE COURT, I.E., IT AFFIRMED THE TRIAL COURTS DECISION DECLARING THAT SECTION 20 OF [PD] 1152 REQUIRES CONCERNED GOVERNMENT AGENCIES TO REMOVE ALL POLLUTANTS SPILLED AND DISCHARGED IN THE WATER SUCH AS FECAL COLIFORMS. ARGUMENTS I [SECTIONS] 17 AND 20 OF [PD] 1152 RELATE ONLY TO THE CLEANING OF SPECIFIC POLLUTION INCIDENTS AND [DO] NOT COVER CLEANING IN GENERAL II THE CLEANING OR REHABILITATION OF THE MANILA BAY IS NOT A MINISTERIAL ACT OF PETITIONERS THAT CAN BE COMPELLED BY MANDAMUS. 122

The issues before us are two-fold. First, do Sections 17 and 20 of PD 1152 under the headings, Upgrading of Water Qualityand Clean-up Operations, envisage a cleanup in general or are they limited only to the cleanup of specific pollution incidents? Andsecond, can petitioners be compelled by mandamus to clean up and rehabilitate the Manila Bay? On August 12, 2008, the Court conducted and heard the parties on oral arguments. Our Ruling We shall first dwell on the propriety of the issuance of mandamus under the premises. The Cleaning or Rehabilitation of Manila Bay Can be Compelled by Mandamus Generally, the writ of mandamus lies to require the execution of a ministerial duty.[8] A ministerial duty is one that requires neither the exercise of official discretion nor judgment. [9] It connotes an act in which nothing is left to the discretion of the person executing it. It is a simple, definite duty arising under conditions admitted or proved to exist and imposed by law.[10] Mandamus is available to compel action, when refused, on matters involving discretion, but not to direct the exercise of judgment or discretion one way or the other. Petitioners maintain that the MMDAs duty to take measures and maintain adequate solid waste and liquid disposal systems necessarily involves policy evaluation and the exercise of judgment on the part of the agency concerned. They argue that the MMDA, in carrying out its mandate, has to make decisions, including choosing where a landfill should be located by undertaking feasibility studies and cost estimates, all of which entail the exercise of discretion. Respondents, on the other hand, counter that the statutory command is clear and that petitioners duty to comply with and act according to the clear mandate of the law does not require the exercise of discretion. According to respondents, petitioners, the MMDA in particular, are without discretion, for example, to choose which bodies of water they are to clean up, or which discharge or spill they are to contain. By the same token, respondents maintain that petitioners are bereft of discretion on whether or not to alleviate the problem of solid and liquid waste disposal; in other words, it is the MMDAs ministerial duty to attend to such services. We agree with respondents. First off, we wish to state that petitioners obligation to perform their duties as defined by law, on one hand, and how they are to carry out such duties, on the other, are two different concepts. While the implementation of the MMDAs mandated tasks may entail a decision-making process, the enforcement of the law or the very act of doing what the law exacts to be done is ministerial in nature and may be compelled by mandamus. We said so in Social Justice Society v. Atienza[11] in which the Court directed the City of Manila to enforce, as a matter of ministerial duty, its Ordinance No. 8027 directing the three big local oil players to cease and desist from operating their business in the so-called Pandacan Terminals within six months from the effectivity of the ordinance. But to illustrate with respect to the instant case, the MMDAs duty to put up an adequate and appropriate sanitary landfill and solid waste and liquid disposal as well as other alternative garbage disposal systems is ministerial, its duty being a statutory imposition. The MMDAs duty in this regard is spelled out in Sec. 3(c) of Republic Act No. (RA) 7924 creating the MMDA. This section defines and delineates the scope of the MMDAs waste disposal services to include: 123

Solid waste disposal and management which include formulation and implementation of policies, standards, programs and projects for proper and sanitary waste disposal. It shall likewise include the establishment and operation of sanitary land fill and related facilities and the implementation of other alternative programs intended to reduce, reuse and recycle solid waste. (Emphasis added.) The MMDA is duty-bound to comply with Sec. 41 of the Ecological Solid Waste Management Act (RA 9003) which prescribes the minimum criteria for the establishment of sanitary landfills and Sec. 42 which provides the minimum operating requirements that each site operator shall maintain in the operation of a sanitary landfill. Complementing Sec. 41 are Secs. 36 and 37 of RA 9003,[12] enjoining the MMDA and local government units, among others, after the effectivity of the law on February 15, 2001, from using and operating open dumps for solid waste and disallowing, five years after such effectivity, the use of controlled dumps. The MMDAs duty in the area of solid waste disposal, as may be noted, is set forth not only in the Environment Code (PD 1152) and RA 9003, but in its charter as well. This duty of putting up a proper waste disposal system cannot be characterized as discretionary, for, as earlier stated, discretion presupposes the power or right given by law to public functionaries to act officially according to their judgment or conscience.[13] A discretionary duty is one that allows a person to exercise judgment and choose to perform or not to perform.[14] Any suggestion that the MMDA has the option whether or not to perform its solid waste disposal-related duties ought to be dismissed for want of legal basis. A perusal of other petitioners respective charters or like enabling statutes and pertinent laws would yield this conclusion: these government agencies are enjoined, as a matter of statutory obligation, to perform certain functions relating directly or indirectly to the cleanup, rehabilitation, protection, and preservation of the Manila Bay. They are precluded from choosing not to perform these duties. Consider: (1) The DENR, under Executive Order No. (EO) 192,[15] is the primary agency responsible for the conservation, management, development, and proper use of the countrys environment and natural resources. Sec. 19 of the Philippine Clean Water Act of 2004 (RA 9275), on the other hand, designates the DENR as the primary government agency responsible for its enforcement and implementation, more particularly over all aspects of water quality management. On water pollution, the DENR, under the Acts Sec. 19(k), exercises jurisdiction over all aspects of water pollution, determine[s] its location, magnitude, extent, severity, causes and effects and other pertinent information on pollution, and [takes] measures, using available methods and technologies, to prevent and abate such pollution. The DENR, under RA 9275, is also tasked to prepare a National Water Quality Status Report, an Integrated Water Quality Management Framework, and a 10-year Water Quality Management Area Action Plan which is nationwide in scope covering theManila Bay and adjoining areas. Sec. 19 of RA 9275 provides: Sec. 19 Lead Agency.The [DENR] shall be the primary government agency responsible for the implementation and enforcement of this Act x x x unless otherwise provided herein. As such, it shall have the following functions, powers and responsibilities: a) Prepare a National Water Quality Status report within twenty-four (24) months from the effectivity of this Act: Provided, That the Department shall thereafter review or revise and publish annually, or as the need arises, said report; b) Prepare an Integrated Water Quality Management Framework within twelve (12) months following the completion of the status report;

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c) Prepare a ten (10) year Water Quality Management Area Action Plan within 12 months following the completion of the framework for each designated water management area. Such action plan shall be reviewed by the water quality management area governing board every five (5) years or as need arises. The DENR has prepared the status report for the period 2001 to 2005 and is in the process of completing the preparation of the Integrated Water Quality Management Framework.[16] Within twelve (12) months thereafter, it has to submit a final Water Quality Management Area Action Plan. [17] Again, like the MMDA, the DENR should be made to accomplish the tasks assigned to it under RA 9275. Parenthetically, during the oral arguments, the DENR Secretary manifested that the DENR, with the assistance of and in partnership with various government agencies and non-government organizations, has completed, as of December 2005, the final draft of a comprehensive action plan with estimated budget and time frame, denominated as Operation Plan for the Manila Bay Coastal Strategy, for the rehabilitation, restoration, and rehabilitation of the Manila Bay. The completion of the said action plan and even the implementation of some of its phases should more than ever prod the concerned agencies to fast track what are assigned them under existing laws. (2) The MWSS, under Sec. 3 of RA 6234,[18] is vested with jurisdiction, supervision, and control over all waterworks and sewerage systems in the territory comprising what is now the cities of Metro Manila and several towns of the provinces of Rizal andCavite, and charged with the duty: (g) To construct, maintain, and operate such sanitary sewerages as may be necessary for the proper sanitation and other uses of the cities and towns comprising the System; x x x (3) The LWUA under PD 198 has the power of supervision and control over local water districts. It can prescribe the minimum standards and regulations for the operations of these districts and shall monitor and evaluate local water standards. The LWUA can direct these districts to construct, operate, and furnish facilities and services for the collection, treatment, and disposal of sewerage, waste, and storm water. Additionally, under RA 9275, the LWUA, as attached agency of the DPWH, is tasked with providing sewerage and sanitation facilities, inclusive of the setting up of efficient and safe collection, treatment, and sewage disposal system in the different parts of the country.[19] In relation to the instant petition, the LWUA is mandated to provide sewerage and sanitation facilities in Laguna, Cavite, Bulacan, Pampanga, and Bataan to prevent pollution in the Manila Bay. (4) The Department of Agriculture (DA), pursuant to the Administrative Code of 1987 (EO 292),[20] is designated as the agency tasked to promulgate and enforce all laws and issuances respecting the conservation and proper utilization of agricultural and fishery resources. Furthermore, the DA, under the Philippine Fisheries Code of 1998 (RA 8550), is, in coordination with local government units (LGUs) and other concerned sectors, in charge of establishing a monitoring, control, and surveillance system to ensure that fisheries and aquatic resources in Philippine waters are judiciously utilized and managed on a sustainable basis.[21] Likewise under RA 9275, the DA is charged with coordinating with the PCG and DENR for the enforcement of water quality standards in marine waters.[22] More specifically, its Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR) under Sec. 22(c) of RA 9275 shall primarily be responsible for the prevention and control of water pollution for the development, management, and conservation of the fisheries and aquatic resources. (5) The DPWH, as the engineering and construction arm of the national government, is tasked under EO 292[23] to provide integrated planning, design, and construction services for, among others, flood control and water resource development systems in accordance with national development objectives and approved government plans and specifications. 125

In Metro Manila, however, the MMDA is authorized by Sec. 3(d), RA 7924 to perform metro-wide services relating to flood control and sewerage management which include the formulation and implementation of policies, standards, programs and projects for an integrated flood control, drainage and sewerage system. On July 9, 2002, a Memorandum of Agreement was entered into between the DPWH and MMDA, whereby MMDA was made the agency primarily responsible for flood control in Metro Manila. For the rest of the country, DPWH shall remain as the implementing agency for flood control services. The mandate of the MMDA and DPWH on flood control and drainage services shall include the removal of structures, constructions, and encroachments built along rivers, waterways, and esteros (drainages) in violation of RA 7279, PD 1067, and other pertinent laws. (6) The PCG, in accordance with Sec. 5(p) of PD 601, or the Revised Coast Guard Law of 1974, and Sec. 6 of PD 979,[24]or the Marine Pollution Decree of 1976, shall have the primary responsibility of enforcing laws, rules, and regulations governing marine pollution within the territorial waters of the Philippines. It shall promulgate its own rules and regulations in accordance with the national rules and policies set by the National Pollution Control Commission upon consultation with the latter for the effective implementation and enforcement of PD 979. It shall, under Sec. 4 of the law, apprehend violators who: a. discharge, dump x x x harmful substances from or out of any ship, vessel, barge, or any other floating craft, or other man-made structures at sea, by any method, means or manner, into or upon the territorial and inland navigable waters of the Philippines; b. throw, discharge or deposit, dump, or cause, suffer or procure to be thrown, discharged, or deposited either from or out of any ship, barge, or other floating craft or vessel of any kind, or from the shore, wharf, manufacturing establishment, or mill of any kind, any refuse matter of any kind or description whatever other than that flowing from streets and sewers and passing therefrom in a liquid state into tributary of any navigable water from which the same shall float or be washed into such navigable water; and c. deposit x x x material of any kind in any place on the bank of any navigable water or on the bank of any tributary of any navigable water, where the same shall be liable to be washed into such navigable water, either by ordinary or high tides, or by storms or floods, or otherwise, whereby navigation shall or may be impeded or obstructed or increase the level of pollution of such water. (7) When RA 6975 or the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG) Act of 1990 was signed into law onDecember 13, 1990, the PNP Maritime Group was tasked to perform all police functions over the Philippine territorial waters and rivers. Under Sec. 86, RA 6975, the police functions of the PCG shall be taken over by the PNP when the latter acquires the capability to perform such functions. Since the PNP Maritime Group has not yet attained the capability to assume and perform the police functions of PCG over marine pollution, the PCG and PNP Maritime Group shall coordinate with regard to the enforcement of laws, rules, and regulations governing marine pollution within the territorial waters of the Philippines. This was made clear in Sec. 124, RA 8550 or the Philippine Fisheries Code of 1998, in which both the PCG and PNP Maritime Group were authorized to enforce said law and other fishery laws, rules, and regulations.[25] (8) In accordance with Sec. 2 of EO 513, the PPA is mandated to establish, develop, regulate, manage and operate a rationalized national port system in support of trade and national development.[26] Moreover, Sec. 6-c of EO 513 states that the PPA has police authority within the

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ports administered by it as may be necessary to carry out its powers and functions and attain its purposes and objectives, without prejudice to the exercise of the functions of the Bureau of Customs and other law enforcement bodies within the area. Such police authority shall include the following: xxxx b) To regulate the entry to, exit from, and movement within the port, of persons and vehicles, as well as movement within the port of watercraft.[27] Lastly, as a member of the International Marine Organization and a signatory to the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, as amended by MARPOL 73/78, [28] the Philippines, through the PPA, must ensure the provision of adequate reception facilities at ports and terminals for the reception of sewage from the ships docking in Philippine ports. Thus, the PPA is tasked to adopt such measures as are necessary to prevent the discharge and dumping of solid and liquid wastes and other shipgenerated wastes into the Manila Bay waters from vessels docked at ports and apprehend the violators. When the vessels are not docked at ports but within Philippine territorial waters, it is the PCG and PNP Maritime Group that have jurisdiction over said vessels. (9) The MMDA, as earlier indicated, is duty-bound to put up and maintain adequate sanitary landfill and solid waste and liquid disposal system as well as other alternative garbage disposal systems. It is primarily responsible for the implementation and enforcement of the provisions of RA 9003, which would necessary include its penal provisions, within its area of jurisdiction.[29] Among the prohibited acts under Sec. 48, Chapter VI of RA 9003 that are frequently violated are dumping of waste matters in public places, such as roads, canals or esteros, open burning of solid waste, squatting in open dumps and landfills, open dumping, burying of biodegradable or non- biodegradable materials in flood-prone areas, establishment or operation of open dumps as enjoined in RA 9003, and operation of waste management facilities without an environmental compliance certificate. Under Sec. 28 of the Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992 (RA 7279), eviction or demolition may be allowed when persons or entities occupy danger areas such as esteros, railroad tracks, garbage dumps, riverbanks, shorelines, waterways, and other public places such as sidewalks, roads, parks and playgrounds. The MMDA, as lead agency, in coordination with the DPWH, LGUs, and concerned agencies, can dismantle and remove all structures, constructions, and other encroachments built in breach of RA 7279 and other pertinent laws along the rivers, waterways, and esteros in Metro Manila. With respect to rivers, waterways, andesteros in Bulacan, Bataan, Pampanga, Cavite, and Laguna that discharge wastewater directly or eventually into the Manila Bay, the DILG shall direct the concerned LGUs to implement the demolition and removal of such structures, constructions, and other encroachments built in violation of RA 7279 and other applicable laws in coordination with the DPWH and concerned agencies. (10) The Department of Health (DOH), under Article 76 of PD 1067 (the Water Code), is tasked to promulgate rules and regulations for the establishment of waste disposal areas that affect the source of a water supply or a reservoir for domestic or municipal use. And under Sec. 8 of RA 9275, the DOH, in coordination with the DENR, DPWH, and other concerned agencies, shall formulate guidelines and standards for the collection, treatment, and disposal of sewage and the establishment and operation of a centralized sewage treatment system. In areas not considered as highly urbanized cities, septage or a mix sewerage-septage management system shall be employed. In accordance with Sec. 72[30] of PD 856, the Code of Sanitation of the Philippines, and Sec. 5.1.1[31] of Chapter XVII of its implementing rules, the DOH is also ordered to ensure the regulation and monitoring of the proper disposal of wastes by private sludge companies through the strict enforcement of the 127

requirement to obtain an environmental sanitation clearance of sludge collection treatment and disposal before these companies are issued their environmental sanitation permit. (11) The Department of Education (DepEd), under the Philippine Environment Code (PD 1152), is mandated to integrate subjects on environmental education in its school curricula at all levels. [32] Under Sec. 118 of RA 8550, the DepEd, in collaboration with the DA, Commission on Higher Education, and Philippine Information Agency, shall launch and pursue a nationwide educational campaign to promote the development, management, conservation, and proper use of the environment. Under the Ecological Solid Waste Management Act (RA 9003), on the other hand, it is directed to strengthen the integration of environmental concerns in school curricula at all levels, with an emphasis on waste management principles.[33] (12) The Department of Budget and Management (DBM) is tasked under Sec. 2, Title XVII of the Administrative Code of 1987 to ensure the efficient and sound utilization of government funds and revenues so as to effectively achieve the countrys development objectives.[34] One of the countrys development objectives is enshrined in RA 9275 or the Philippine Clean Water Act of 2004. This law stresses that the State shall pursue a policy of economic growth in a manner consistent with the protection, preservation, and revival of the quality of our fresh, brackish, and marine waters. It also provides that it is the policy of the government, among others, to streamline processes and procedures in the prevention, control, and abatement of pollution mechanisms for the protection of water resources; to promote environmental strategies and use of appropriate economic instruments and of control mechanisms for the protection of water resources; to formulate a holistic national program of water quality management that recognizes that issues related to this management cannot be separated from concerns about water sources and ecological protection, water supply, public health, and quality of life; and to provide a comprehensive management program for water pollution focusing on pollution prevention. Thus, the DBM shall then endeavor to provide an adequate budget to attain the noble objectives of RA 9275 in line with the countrys development objectives. All told, the aforementioned enabling laws and issuances are in themselves clear, categorical, and complete as to what are the obligations and mandate of each agency/petitioner under the law. We need not belabor the issue that their tasks include the cleanup of the Manila Bay. Now, as to the crux of the petition. Do Secs. 17 and 20 of the Environment Code encompass the cleanup of water pollution in general, not just specific pollution incidents? Secs. 17 and 20 of the Environment Code Include Cleaning in General The disputed sections are quoted as follows: Section 17. Upgrading of Water Quality.Where the quality of water has deteriorated to a degree where its state will adversely affect its best usage, the government agencies concerned shall take such measures as may be necessary to upgrade the quality of such water to meet the prescribed water quality standards. Section 20. Clean-up Operations.It shall be the responsibility of the polluter to contain, remove and cleanup water pollution incidents at his own expense. In case of his failure to do so, the government agencies concerned shall undertake containment, removal and clean-up operations and expenses incurred in said operations shall be charged against the persons and/or entities responsible for such pollution. 128

When the Clean Water Act (RA 9275) took effect, its Sec. 16 on the subject, Cleanup Operations, amended the counterpart provision (Sec. 20) of the Environment Code (PD 1152). Sec. 17 of PD 1152 continues, however, to be operational. The amendatory Sec. 16 of RA 9275 reads: SEC. 16. Cleanup Operations.Notwithstanding the provisions of Sections 15 and 26 hereof, any person who causes pollution in or pollutes water bodies in excess of the applicable and prevailing standards shall be responsible to contain, remove and clean up any pollution incident at his own expense to the extent that the same water bodies have been rendered unfit for utilization and beneficial use: Provided, That in the event emergency cleanup operations are necessary and the polluter fails to immediately undertake the same, the [DENR] in coordination with other government agencies concerned, shall undertake containment, removal and cleanup operations. Expenses incurred in said operations shall be reimbursed by the persons found to have caused such pollution under proper administrative determination x x x. Reimbursements of the cost incurred shall be made to the Water Quality Management Fund or to such other funds where said disbursements were sourced. As may be noted, the amendment to Sec. 20 of the Environment Code is more apparent than real since the amendment, insofar as it is relevant to this case, merely consists in the designation of the DENR as lead agency in the cleanup operations. Petitioners contend at every turn that Secs. 17 and 20 of the Environment Code concern themselves only with the matter of cleaning up in specific pollution incidents, as opposed to cleanup in general. They aver that the twin provisions would have to be read alongside the succeeding Sec. 62(g) and (h), which defines the terms cleanup operations and accidental spills, as follows: g. Clean-up Operations [refer] to activities conducted in removing the spilled in water to restore it to pre-spillcondition. pollutants discharged or

h. Accidental Spills [refer] to spills of oil or other hazardous substances in water that result from accidents such as collisions and groundings. Petitioners proffer the argument that Secs. 17 and 20 of PD 1152 merely direct the government agencies concerned to undertake containment, removal, and cleaning operations of a specific polluted portion or portions of the body of water concerned. They maintain that the application of said Sec. 20 is limited only to water pollution incidents, which are situations that presuppose the occurrence of specific, isolated pollution events requiring the corresponding containment, removal, and cleaning operations. Pushing the point further, they argue that the aforequoted Sec. 62(g) requires cleanup operations to restore the body of water to pre-spill condition, which means that there must have been a specific incident of either intentional or accidental spillage of oil or other hazardous substances, as mentioned in Sec. 62(h). As a counterpoint, respondents argue that petitioners erroneously read Sec. 62(g) as delimiting the application of Sec. 20 to the containment, removal, and cleanup operations for accidental spills only. Contrary to petitioners posture, respondents assert that Sec. 62(g), in fact, even expanded the coverage of Sec. 20. Respondents explain that without its Sec. 62(g), PD 1152 may have indeed covered only pollution accumulating from the day-to-day operations of businesses around the Manila Bay and other sources of pollution that slowly accumulated in the bay. Respondents, however, emphasize that Sec. 62(g), far from 129

being a delimiting provision, in fact even enlarged the operational scope of Sec. 20, by including accidental spills as among the water pollution incidents contemplated in Sec. 17 in relation to Sec. 20 of PD 1152. To respondents, petitioners parochial view on environmental issues, coupled with their narrow reading of their respective mandated roles, has contributed to the worsening water quality of the Manila Bay. Assuming, respondents assert, that petitioners are correct in saying that the cleanup coverage of Sec. 20 of PD 1152 is constricted by the definition of the phrase cleanup operations embodied in Sec. 62(g), Sec. 17 is not hobbled by such limiting definition. As pointed out, the phrases cleanup operations and accidental spills do not appear in said Sec. 17, not even in the chapter where said section is found. Respondents are correct. For one thing, said Sec. 17 does not in any way state that the government agencies concerned ought to confine themselves to the containment, removal, and cleaning operations when a specific pollution incident occurs. On the contrary, Sec. 17 requires them to act even in the absence of a specific pollution incident, as long as water quality has deteriorated to a degree where its state will adversely affect its best usage. This section, to stress, commands concerned government agencies, when appropriate, to take such measures as may be necessary to meet the prescribed water quality standards. In fine, the underlying duty to upgrade the quality of water is not conditional on the occurrence of any pollution incident. For another, a perusal of Sec. 20 of the Environment Code, as couched, indicates that it is properly applicable to a specific situation in which the pollution is caused by polluters who fail to clean up the mess they left behind. In such instance, the concerned government agencies shall undertake the cleanup work for the polluters account. Petitioners assertion, that they have to perform cleanup operations in the Manila Bay only when there is a water pollution incident and the erring polluters do not undertake the containment, removal, and cleanup operations, is quite off mark. As earlier discussed, the complementary Sec. 17 of the Environment Code comes into play and the specific duties of the agencies to clean up come in even if there are no pollution incidents staring at them. Petitioners, thus, cannot plausibly invoke and hide behind Sec. 20 of PD 1152 or Sec. 16 of RA 9275 on the pretext that their cleanup mandate depends on the happening of a specific pollution incident. In this regard, what the CA said with respect to the impasse over Secs. 17 and 20 of PD 1152 is at once valid as it is practical. The appellate court wrote: PD 1152 aims to introduce a comprehensive program of environmental protection and management. This is better served by making Secs. 17 & 20 of general application rather than limiting them to specific pollution incidents.[35] Granting arguendo that petitioners position thus described vis--vis the implementation of Sec. 20 is correct, they seem to have overlooked the fact that the pollution of the Manila Bay is of such magnitude and scope that it is well-nigh impossible to draw the line between a specific and a general pollution incident. And such impossibility extends to pinpointing with reasonable certainty who the polluters are. We note that Sec. 20 of PD 1152 mentions water pollution incidents which may be caused by polluters in the waters of the Manila Bay itself or by polluters in adjoining lands and in water bodies or waterways that empty into the bay. Sec. 16 of RA 9275, on the other hand, specifically adverts to any person who causes pollution in or pollutes water bodies, which may refer to an individual or an establishment that pollutes the land mass near the Manila Bay or the waterways, such that the contaminants eventually end up in the bay. In this situation, the water pollution incidents are so numerous and involve nameless and faceless polluters that they can validly be categorized as beyond the specific pollution incident level. Not to be ignored of course is the reality that the government agencies concerned are so undermanned that it would be almost impossible to apprehend the numerous polluters of the Manila Bay. It may perhaps not be amiss to say that the apprehension, if any, of the Manila Bay polluters has been few and far between. Hence, practically nobody has been required to contain, remove, or clean up a given water pollution incident. In this kind of setting, it behooves the Government to step in and undertake cleanup operations. Thus, Sec. 16 of RA 9275, previously Sec. 20 of PD 1152, covers for all intents and purposes a general cleanup situation. 130

The cleanup and/or restoration of the Manila Bay is only an aspect and the initial stage of the longterm solution. The preservation of the water quality of the bay after the rehabilitation process is as important as the cleaning phase. It is imperative then that the wastes and contaminants found in the rivers, inland bays, and other bodies of water be stopped from reaching the ManilaBay. Otherwise, any cleanup effort would just be a futile, cosmetic exercise, for, in no time at all, the Manila Bay water quality would again deteriorate below the ideal minimum standards set by PD 1152, RA 9275, and other relevant laws. It thus behooves the Court to put the heads of the petitioner-department-agencies and the bureaus and offices under them on continuing notice about, and to enjoin them to perform, their mandates and duties towards cleaning up the Manila Bay and preserving the quality of its water to the ideal level. Under what other judicial discipline describes as continuing mandamus, [36] the Court may, under extraordinary circumstances, issue directives with the end in view of ensuring that its decision would not be set to naught by administrative inaction or indifference. In India, the doctrine of continuing mandamus was used to enforce directives of the court to clean up the length of the Ganges River from industrial and municipal pollution.[37] The Court can take judicial notice of the presence of shanties and other unauthorized structures which do not have septic tanks along the Pasig-Marikina-San Juan Rivers, the National Capital Region (NCR) (Paraaque-Zapote, Las Pias) Rivers, the Navotas-Malabon-Tullahan-Tenejeros Rivers, the MeycuayanMarilao-Obando (Bulacan) Rivers, the Talisay (Bataan) River, the Imus (Cavite) River, the Laguna De Bay, and other minor rivers and connecting waterways, river banks, and esteros which discharge their waters, with all the accompanying filth, dirt, and garbage, into the major rivers and eventually the Manila Bay. If there is one factor responsible for the pollution of the major river systems and the Manila Bay, these unauthorized structures would be on top of the list. And if the issue of illegal or unauthorized structures is not seriously addressed with sustained resolve, then practically all efforts to cleanse these important bodies of water would be for naught. The DENR Secretary said as much.[38] Giving urgent dimension to the necessity of removing these illegal structures is Art. 51 of PD 1067 or the Water Code,[39]which prohibits the building of structures within a given length along banks of rivers and other waterways. Art. 51 reads: The banks of rivers and streams and the shores of the seas and lakes throughout their entire length and within a zone of three (3) meters in urban areas, twenty (20) meters in agricultural areas and forty (40) meters in forest areas, along their margins, are subject to the easement of public use in the interest of recreation, navigation, floatage, fishing and salvage. No person shall be allowed to stay in this zone longer than what is necessary for recreation, navigation, floatage, fishing or salvage or to build structures of any kind. (Emphasis added.) Judicial notice may likewise be taken of factories and other industrial establishments standing along or near the banks of thePasig River, other major rivers, and connecting waterways. But while they may not be treated as unauthorized constructions, some of these establishments undoubtedly contribute to the pollution of the Pasig River and waterways. The DILG and the concerned LGUs, have, accordingly, the duty to see to it that non-complying industrial establishments set up, within a reasonable period, the necessary waste water treatment facilities and infrastructure to prevent their industrial discharge, including their sewage waters, from flowing into the Pasig River, other major rivers, and connecting waterways. After such period, non-complying establishments shall be shut down or asked to transfer their operations. At this juncture, and if only to dramatize the urgency of the need for petitioners-agencies to comply with their statutory tasks, we cite the Asian Development Bank-commissioned study on the garbage problem in Metro Manila, the results of which are embodied in the The Garbage Book. As there reported, the garbage crisis in the metropolitan area is as alarming as it is shocking. Some highlights of the report: 131

1. As early as 2003, three land-filled dumpsites in Metro Manila - the Payatas, Catmon and Rodriquez dumpsites - generate an alarming quantity of lead and leachate or liquid run-off. Leachate are toxic liquids that flow along the surface and seep into the earth and poison the surface and groundwater that are used for drinking, aquatic life, and the environment. 2. The high level of fecal coliform confirms the presence of a large amount of human waste in the dump sites and surrounding areas, which is presumably generated by households that lack alternatives to sanitation. To say that Manila Bay needs rehabilitation is an understatement. 3. Most of the deadly leachate, lead and other dangerous contaminants and possibly strains of pathogens seeps untreated into ground water and runs into the Marikina and Pasig River systems and Manila Bay.[40] Given the above perspective, sufficient sanitary landfills should now more than ever be established as prescribed by the Ecological Solid Waste Management Act (RA 9003). Particular note should be taken of the blatant violations by some LGUs and possibly the MMDA of Sec. 37, reproduced below: Sec. 37. Prohibition against the Use of Open Dumps for Solid Waste.No open dumps shall be established and operated, nor any practice or disposal of solid waste by any person, including LGUs which [constitute] the use of open dumps for solid waste, be allowed after the effectivity of this Act: Provided, further that no controlled dumps shall be allowed (5) years following the effectivity of this Act. (Emphasis added.) RA 9003 took effect on February 15, 2001 and the adverted grace period of five (5) years which ended on February 21, 2006has come and gone, but no single sanitary landfill which strictly complies with the prescribed standards under RA 9003 has yet been set up. In addition, there are rampant and repeated violations of Sec. 48 of RA 9003, like littering, dumping of waste matters in roads, canals, esteros, and other public places, operation of open dumps, open burning of solid waste, and the like. Some sludge companies which do not have proper disposal facilities simply discharge sludge into the Metro Manila sewerage system that ends up in the Manila Bay. Equally unabated are violations of Sec. 27 of RA 9275, which enjoins the pollution of water bodies, groundwater pollution, disposal of infectious wastes from vessels, and unauthorized transport or dumping into sea waters of sewage or solid waste and of Secs. 4 and 102 of RA 8550 which proscribes the introduction by human or machine of substances to the aquatic environment including dumping/disposal of waste and other marine litters, discharge of petroleum or residual products of petroleum of carbonaceous materials/substances [and other] radioactive, noxious or harmful liquid, gaseous or solid substances, from any water, land or air transport or other human-made structure. In the light of the ongoing environmental degradation, the Court wishes to emphasize the extreme necessity for all concerned executive departments and agencies to immediately act and discharge their respective official duties and obligations. Indeed, time is of the essence; hence, there is a need to set timetables for the performance and completion of the tasks, some of them as defined for them by law and the nature of their respective offices and mandates. The importance of the Manila Bay as a sea resource, playground, and as a historical landmark cannot be over-emphasized. It is not yet too late in the day to restore the Manila Bay to its former splendor and bring back the plants and sea life that once thrived in its blue waters. But the tasks ahead, daunting as they may be, could only be accomplished if those mandated, with the help and cooperation of all civic-minded individuals, would put their minds to these tasks and take responsibility. This means that the State, through petitioners, has to take the lead in the preservation and protection of the Manila Bay.

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The era of delays, procrastination, and ad hoc measures is over. Petitioners must transcend their limitations, real or imaginary, and buckle down to work before the problem at hand becomes unmanageable. Thus, we must reiterate that different government agencies and instrumentalities cannot shirk from their mandates; they must perform their basic functions in cleaning up and rehabilitating the Manila Bay. We are disturbed by petitioners hiding behind two untenable claims: (1) that there ought to be a specific pollution incident before they are required to act; and (2) that the cleanup of the bay is a discretionary duty. RA 9003 is a sweeping piece of legislation enacted to radically transform and improve waste management. It implements Sec. 16, Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, which explicitly provides that the State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature. So it was that in Oposa v. Factoran, Jr. the Court stated that the right to a balanced and healthful ecology need not even be written in the Constitution for it is assumed, like other civil and political rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, to exist from the inception of mankind and it is an issue of transcendental importance with intergenerational implications.[41] Even assuming the absence of a categorical legal provision specifically prodding petitioners to clean up the bay, they and the men and women representing them cannot escape their obligation to future generations of Filipinos to keep the waters of the Manila Bay clean and clear as humanly as possible. Anything less would be a betrayal of the trust reposed in them. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The September 28, 2005 Decision of the CA in CA-G.R. CV No. 76528 and SP No. 74944 and the September 13, 2002 Decision of the RTC in Civil Case No. 1851-99 are AFFIRMED but withMODIFICATIONS in view of subsequent developments or supervening events in the case. The fallo of the RTC Decision shall now read: WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the abovenamed defendant-government agencies to clean up, rehabilitate, and preserve Manila Bay, and restore and maintain its waters to SB level (Class B sea waters per Water Classification Tables under DENR Administrative Order No. 34 [1990]) to make them fit for swimming, skin-diving, and other forms of contact recreation. In particular: (1) Pursuant to Sec. 4 of EO 192, assigning the DENR as the primary agency responsible for the conservation, management, development, and proper use of the countrys environment and natural resources, and Sec. 19 of RA 9275, designating the DENR as the primary government agency responsible for its enforcement and implementation, the DENR is directed to fully implement itsOperational Plan for the Manila Bay Coastal Strategy for the rehabilitation, restoration, and conservation of the Manila Bay at the earliest possible time. It is ordered to call regular coordination meetings with concerned government departments and agencies to ensure the successful implementation of the aforesaid plan of action in accordance with its indicated completion schedules. (2) Pursuant to Title XII (Local Government) of the Administrative Code of 1987 and Sec. 25 of the Local Government Code of 1991,[42] the DILG, in exercising the Presidents power of general supervision and its duty to promulgate guidelines in establishing waste management programs under Sec. 43 of the Philippine Environment Code (PD 1152), shall direct all LGUs in Metro Manila, Rizal, Laguna, Cavite, Bulacan, Pampanga, and Bataan to inspect all factories, commercial establishments, and private homes along the banks of the major river systems in their respective areas of jurisdiction, such as but not limited to the Pasig-Marikina-San Juan Rivers, the NCR (Paraaque-Zapote, Las Pias) Rivers, the NavotasMalabon-Tullahan-Tenejeros Rivers, the Meycauayan-Marilao-Obando (Bulacan) Rivers, the Talisay (Bataan) River, the Imus (Cavite) River, the Laguna De Bay, and other minor rivers and waterways that 133

eventually discharge water into the Manila Bay; and the lands abutting the bay, to determine whether they have wastewater treatment facilities or hygienic septic tanks as prescribed by existing laws, ordinances, and rules and regulations. If none be found, these LGUs shall be ordered to require non-complying establishments and homes to set up said facilities or septic tanks within a reasonable time to prevent industrial wastes, sewage water, and human wastes from flowing into these rivers, waterways, esteros, and the Manila Bay, under pain of closure or imposition of fines and other sanctions. (3) As mandated by Sec. 8 of RA 9275,[43] the MWSS is directed to provide, install, operate, and maintain the necessary adequate waste water treatment facilities in Metro Manila, Rizal, and Cavite where needed at the earliest possible time. (4) Pursuant to RA 9275,[44] the LWUA, through the local water districts and in coordination with the DENR, is ordered to provide, install, operate, and maintain sewerage and sanitation facilities and the efficient and safe collection, treatment, and disposal of sewage in the provinces of Laguna, Cavite, Bulacan, Pampanga, and Bataan where needed at the earliest possible time. (5) Pursuant to Sec. 65 of RA 8550,[45] the DA, through the BFAR, is ordered to improve and restore the marine life of theManila Bay. It is also directed to assist the LGUs in Metro Manila, Rizal, Cavite, Laguna, Bulacan, Pampanga, and Bataan in developing, using recognized methods, the fisheries and aquatic resources in the Manila Bay. (6) The PCG, pursuant to Secs. 4 and 6 of PD 979, and the PNP Maritime Group, in accordance with Sec. 124 of RA 8550, in coordination with each other, shall apprehend violators of PD 979, RA 8550, and other existing laws and regulations designed to prevent marine pollution in the Manila Bay. (7) Pursuant to Secs. 2 and 6-c of EO 513[46] and the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, the PPA is ordered to immediately adopt such measures to prevent the discharge and dumping of solid and liquid wastes and other ship-generated wastes into the Manila Bay waters from vessels docked at ports and apprehend the violators. (8) The MMDA, as the lead agency and implementor of programs and projects for flood control projects and drainage services in Metro Manila, in coordination with the DPWH, DILG, affected LGUs, PNP Maritime Group, Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council (HUDCC), and other agencies, shall dismantle and remove all structures, constructions, and other encroachments established or built in violation of RA 7279, and other applicable laws along the Pasig-Marikina-San Juan Rivers, the NCR (Paraaque-Zapote, Las Pias) Rivers, the Navotas-Malabon-Tullahan-Tenejeros Rivers, and connecting waterways and esteros in Metro Manila. The DPWH, as the principal implementor of programs and projects for flood control services in the rest of the country more particularly in Bulacan, Bataan, Pampanga, Cavite, and Laguna, in coordination with the DILG, affected LGUs, PNP Maritime Group, HUDCC, and other concerned government agencies, shall remove and demolish all structures, constructions, and other encroachments built in breach of RA 7279 and other applicable laws along the Meycauayan-MarilaoObando (Bulacan) Rivers, the Talisay (Bataan) River, the Imus (Cavite) River, the Laguna De Bay, and other rivers, connecting waterways, and esteros that discharge wastewater into the Manila Bay. In addition, the MMDA is ordered to establish, operate, and maintain a sanitary landfill, as prescribed by RA 9003, within a period of one (1) year from finality of this Decision. On matters within its territorial jurisdiction and in connection with the discharge of its duties on the maintenance of sanitary landfills and like undertakings, it is also ordered to cause the apprehension and filing of the appropriate criminal cases against violators of the respective penal provisions of RA 9003,[47] Sec. 27 of RA 9275 (the Clean Water Act), and other existing laws on pollution.

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(9) The DOH shall, as directed by Art. 76 of PD 1067 and Sec. 8 of RA 9275, within one (1) year from finality of this Decision, determine if all licensed septic and sludge companies have the proper facilities for the treatment and disposal of fecal sludge and sewage coming from septic tanks. The DOH shall give the companies, if found to be non-complying, a reasonable time within which to set up the necessary facilities under pain of cancellation of its environmental sanitation clearance. (10) Pursuant to Sec. 53 of PD 1152,[48] Sec. 118 of RA 8550, and Sec. 56 of RA 9003,[49] the DepEd shall integrate lessons on pollution prevention, waste management, environmental protection, and like subjects in the school curricula of all levels to inculcate in the minds and hearts of students and, through them, their parents and friends, the importance of their duty toward achieving and maintaining a balanced and healthful ecosystem in the Manila Bay and the entire Philippine archipelago. (11) The DBM shall consider incorporating an adequate budget in the General Appropriations Act of 2010 and succeeding years to cover the expenses relating to the cleanup, restoration, and preservation of the water quality of the Manila Bay, in line with the countrys development objective to attain economic growth in a manner consistent with the protection, preservation, and revival of our marine waters. (12) The heads of petitioners-agencies MMDA, DENR, DepEd, DOH, DA, DPWH, DBM, PCG, PNP Maritime Group, DILG, and also of MWSS, LWUA, and PPA, in line with the principle of continuing mandamus, shall, from finality of this Decision, each submit to the Court a quarterly progressive report of the activities undertaken in accordance with this Decision. No costs. SO ORDERED.

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