Garska vs Mccoy (Presumption for Primary Caretaker) May 26, 1981.

Facts: appellant was 15 years old and her mother shared a trailer with Garska. McCoy became pregnant by Garska and she returned to her grandparents' home She received no support from the appellee during her pregnancy, but after she gave birth to baby the appellee sent a package of baby food and diapers In subsequent months the baby developed a chronic respiratory infection which required hospitalization and considerable medical attention McCoys grandfather, attempted to have his great-grandson's hospitalization and medical care paid by medical insurance but baby was ineligible unless legally adopted by the Altizers (grandparents) McCoy signed a consent in which she agreed to the adoption of Jonathan by her grandparents, the Altizers Upon learning of the adoption plan, the appellee visited the baby for the first time and began sending weekly money orders for $15. The Altizers filed a petition for adoption Garska filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus to secure custody of his son. Circuit Court decision o Adoption by grandparents: dismissed the adoption petition (by the grandparents)upon finding that the baby had not resided with the Altizers for the requisite six months before the filing of the petition o Habeas corpus: circuit court awarded custody of Jonathan McCoy to the appellee based upon the following findings of fact: Garska, is the natural father, better educated, more intelligent , better able to provide financial support and maintenance, can provide a better social and economic environment, has a somewhat better command of the English language , better appearance and demeanor than the natural mother and very highly motivated in his desire to have custody of the infant child, and the natural mother had previously executed an adoption consent, for said child. Issue: Whether or not natural father should be awarded with the custody of child Held: Negative. Decision of lower court reversed. Ratio: the absolute presumption in favor of a fit primary caretaker parent applies only to children of tender years. o Where a child is old enough to formulate an opinion about his or her own custody the trial court is entitled to receive such opinion and accord it such weight as he feels appropriate. in any custody dispute involving children of tender years it is incumbent upon the circuit court to determine as a threshold question which parent was the primary caretaker parent before the domestic strife giving rise to the proceeding began. there are certain obvious criteria to which a court must initially look (which parent has taken primary responsibility for, inter alia, the performance of the following caring and nurturing duties of a parent): (1) preparing and planning of meals; (2) bathing, grooming and dressing; (3) purchasing, cleaning, and care of clothes; (4) medical care, including nursing and trips to physicians; (5) arranging for social interaction among peers after school, i. e. transporting to friends' houses or, for example, to girl or boy scout meetings; (6) arranging alternative care, i. e. babysitting, day-care, etc.; (7) putting child to bed at night, attending to child in the middle of the night, waking child in the morning; (8) disciplining, i. e. teaching general manners and toilet training; (9) educating, i. e. religious, cultural, social, etc.; and, (10) teaching elementary skills, i. e., reading, writing and arithmetic. What if facts demonstrate that child care and custody were shared in an entirely equal way? o no presumption arises and the court must proceed to inquire further into relative degrees of parental competence In the case before us it is obvious that the petitioner was the primary caretaker parent o she mobilized all of the resources at her command: solicitous regard of her grandparents she went to extraordinary lengths to provide for him (medical attention,financial support) o While, as the trial court found, the educational and economic position of the father is superior to that of the mother, nonetheless, those factors alone pale in comparison to love, affection, concern, tolerance, and the willingness to sacrifice o record in the case before us does not demonstrate any intent by the mother to abandon the child through permitting him to be adopted by the grandparents; it is well recognized that mothers in penurious circumstances often resort to adoption in order to make the child eligible for social security or union welfare benefits, all of which significantly enhance the child's opportunities in life.

Note (also mentioned in this case(GARSKA):

1.tender years presumption- In a divorce proceeding where custody of a child of tender years is sought by both the mother and father, the Court must determine in the first instance whether the mother is a fit parent, and where the mother achieves the minimum, objective standard of behavior which qualifies her as a fit parent, the trial court must award the child to the mother. 2.best interest of the child- In making any such order respecting custody of minor children, there shall be no legal presumption that, as between the natural parents, either the father or the mother should be awarded custody of said children, but the court shall make an award of custody solely for the best interest of the children based upon the merits of each case. 3. childs preference- if child is not minor, his opinion shall be given weight by court In Garska case (di naman divorce proceeding unmarried natural parents fighting over custody( PRESUMPTION OF PRIMARY CARETAKER APPLIES!!! _____________________________________________________

Salientes vs Abanilla August 29, 2006 (Other Rights and Duties in exercise of Parental Authority) Facts: Loran Abanilla(Abanilla for brevity) and petitioner Marie Salientes(Salientes for brevity) are parents of the minor Lorenzo Spouses(Abanilla and Salientes) lived with Salientes parents Due to in-laws problems, Abanilla suggested to his wife that they transfer to their own house, wife refused he alone left the house of the Salientes Thereafter, he was prevented from seeing his son Later, Abanilla in his personal capacity and as the representative of his son, filed a Petition for o Habeas Corpus o Custody trial court issued the following order: mother, and parents of the mother directed to produce and bring before Court the body of minor Lorenzo Court of appeals dismissed petition for certiorari by petitioners against TCs order Salientes appealed before SC

Contention of petitioner mother: 1. Article 213[7] of the Family Code, no child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother unless the court finds compelling reasons >They maintain that Abanilla failed to present prima facie proof of compelling reasons assuming that there were compelling reasons, the proper remedy for private respondent was simply an action for custody, but not habeas corpus Petitioners(mother and parents) assert that habeas corpus is unavailable against the mother who, under the law, has the right of custody of the minor.

2.

Respondent father claims: 1. Article 213 of the Family Code applies only to the second part of his petition regarding the custody of his son. (Note: husbands petition is 1)for habeas corpus and 2)custody, the order by tc is for mother to comply with habeas corpus) It does not address the first part, which pertains to his right as the father to see his son. He asserts that the writ of habeas corpus is available against any person who restrains the minor's right to see his father and vice versa. under the law, he and wife have shared custody and parental authority over their son at times when wife is out of the country as required of her job as an international flight stewardess, he, the father, should have custody of their son and not the maternal grandparents.

2.

Issue: Did the Court of Appeals err when it dismissed the petition for certiorari against the trial court's orders dated January 23, 2003 and February 24, 2003? Held: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Ratio:

trial court did not grant custody of the minor to any of the parties but merely directed petitioners to produce the minor in court and explain why they are restraining his liberty The assailed order was an interlocutory order precedent to the trial court's full inquiry into the issue of custody, which was still pending before it. Under Rule 41, Section 1[8] of the Rules of Court: o an interlocutory order is not appealable but the aggrieved party may file an appropriate special action under Rule 65 o it is incumbent upon petitioners to show that the trial court gravely abused its discretion in issuing the order. Habeas corpus may be resorted to in cases where rightful custody is withheld from a person entitled thereto. Under Article 211[10] of the Family Code, Salientes and Abanilla have joint parental authority over their son and consequently joint custody. o although the couple is separated de facto, the issue of custody has yet to be adjudicated by the court o In the absence of a judicial grant of custody to one parent, both parents are still entitled to the custody of their child o In the present case, Abanillas cause of action is the deprivation of his right to see his child as alleged in his petition o Hence, the remedy of habeas corpus is available to him.

CABANAS vs.PILAPIL (July 25, 1974) Other Rights and Duties in exercise of Parental Authority Facts:

Issue: Whether the mother should be entitled to act as a trustee of a minor beneficiary of the proceeds of an insurance policy from the deceased. Held: Mother should be entitled to act as the trustee Ratio: With the provisions Articles 320 and 321 of the Civil Code as basis, the decision is affirmed o Article 320 states that : the father, or in his absence the mother, is the legal administrator of the property pertaining to the child under parental authority. If the property is worth more than two thousand pesos, the father or mother shall give a bond subject to the approval of the Court of First Instance." o And Article 321 states that: "The property which the child has acquired or may acquire with his work or industry, or byany lucrative title, belongs to the child in ownership, and in usufruct to the father or mother under whom he is under parental authority and whose company he lives. With the added condition that the child stays with the mother, not the uncle, without any evidence of lack of maternal care, the decision arrived at stand the test of the strictest scrutiny. The appealed decision is supported by another rational consideration. It is reinforced by its adherence to the concept that the judiciary, as an agency of the State acting as parens patriae, is called upon whenever a pending suit of litigation affects one who is a minor to accord priority to his best interest This prerogative of parens patriae is inherent in the supreme power of every State, whether that power is lodged in a royal person or in the legislature, and has no affinity to those arbitrary powers which are sometimes exerted by irresponsible monarchs to the great detriment of the people and the destruction of their liberties." There is a constitutional provision vitalizing this concept that "The State shall strengthen the family as a basic social institution." If, as the Constitution so wisely dictates, it is the family as a unit that has to be strengthened, it does not admit of doubt that even if a stronger case were presented for the uncle, still deference to a constitutional mandate would have led the lower court to decide as it did. The trust, insofar as it is in conflict with the above quoted provision of law, is pro tanto null andvoid.

Florentino Pilapil, deceased, left an insurance having his child, Millian Pilapil, as the beneficiaryand authorized his brother, Francisco Pilapil, to act as trustee during his daughters minority. Thelower court decided to give the mother of the child, Melchora Cabanas, the right to act as trustee citing the appropriate provisions in the Civil Code and the consideration of the childs welfare. The defendant appealed for the case. He claims the retention of the amount in question by invoking the terms of the insurance policy. He is the rightful trustee of the insurance policy.

LIBI VS IAC (September 18, 1992) Other Rights and Duties in exercise of Parental Authority Facts:

Julie Ann Gotiong, daughter of respondent spouses and Wendell Libi, son of petitionesrs,were sweethearts for more than two years before their death. Julie broke up with Wendell upon finding out of his sadistic and irresponsible character

Wendell kept on pestering Julie Ann with demands for reconciliation but her persistent refusal caused hi m to threaten her Julie Ann and Wendell died, each from a single gunshot wound of the same firearm Private respondents claimed that it was Wendell who deliberately caused their daughters death and his respectively Spouses Libi contended that a third party, probably a person related to Wendells work as a constabulary anti-narcotics unit agent, must have casued his death and Julies Gotiong spouses filed a case against the Libi spouses to recover damages arising from the latters vicarious liability under Article 2180 of the Civil Code The court dismissed plaintiffs (Gotiong spouses) complaint for insufficiency of evidence, and denied defendants counterclaim for lack of sufficient merit On appeal to respondent court, the lower courts decision was set aside Petitioners seek for the reversal of judgment of respondent court sentencing spouses Libi to pay damages to Gotiong spouses Issues: whether or not article 2180 of the civil code was correctly interpreted by respondent court to make petitioners liable for vicarious liability Held: Decision of CA is affirmed Ratio: The court ruled that the Libi spouses are and should be held primarily liable for the civil liability arising from the criminal offenses committed by their minor son under their legal authority or control, and who lives int heir company It is also proven that the Libi spouses utterly failed to exercise the requisite diligentissimi patris familias in preventing their minor son from committing this crime by means of the gun of Libi spouses which was freely accessible to Wendell. They have not regularly checked whether the gun was still under lock They only learned that it was missing from safety deposit box after the crime was committed LINDAIN VS CA August 20, 1992 Other Rights and Duties in exercise of Parental Authority Facts When the plaintiffs were minors, they were already the registered owners of a parcel of land their mother(widow and acting as guardian of minor children), sold land for P2k to spouses Valiente and Ila (buyers for brevity) The buyers admitted that the property in question was sold to them by the mother of the minors at first they were reluctant to buy the property as the sale would not be legal, the registered owners thereof being all minors, upon advice of their counsel, the late Atty. Pascual, and the counsel of the mother, Atty. Ramos, who notarized the documents, that the property could be sold without the written authority of the court, considering that its value was less than P2,000, Plaintiff Contention (the owners of land): o sale of the lot by their mother to the defendants is null and void -was made without judicial authority and/or court approval Defendants Contention: o the value of the property less than P2k o right to rescind the contract which should have been exercised four (4) years after reaching the age of majority, has already prescribed. Regional Trial Court rendered decision in favor of plaintiffs: deed of sale to buyers null and void Court of Appeals reversed decision of TC and applied the ruling of this Court in Ortaez vs. Dela Cruz: o A father or mother acting as legal administrator of the property of the child under parental authority cannot, therefore, dispose of the child's property without judicial authority if it is worth more than P2,000.00, notwithstanding the bond that he has filed for the protection of the child's property. o But when the value of such property is less than P2,000.00, the permission of the court for its alienation or disposition may be dispensed with. o The father or mother, as the case may be, is allowed by law to alienate or dispose of the same freely, subject only to the restrictions imposed by the scruples of conscience. Issues: whether judicial approval was necessary for the sale of the minors' property by their mother Held: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. decision of the Court of Appeals is set aside and that of the Regional Trial Court is REINSTATED. Ratio Art. 320 of the New Civil Code, which was already in force when the assailed transaction occurred, provides: Art. 320.- The father, or in his absence the mother, is the legal administrator of the property pertaining to the child under parental authority. If the property is worth more than two thousand pesos, the father or mother shall give a bond subject to the approval of the Court of First Instance. LEGAL VS JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATOR Under the law, a parent, acting merely as the legal (as distinguished from judicial) administrator of the property of his/her minor children, does not have the power to dispose of, or alienate, the property of said children without judicial approval.

The powers and duties of the widow as legal administrator of her minor children's property as provided in Rule 84 by the Rules of Court entitled, "General Powers and Duties of Executors and Administrators" are only powers of possession and management. Her power to sell, mortgage, encumber or otherwise dispose of the property of her minor children must proceed from the court, as provided in Rule 89 which requires court authority and approval.

In a case: It is true that under Art. 320 of the new Civil Code the mother, was the legal administrator of the property of her minor children. o But as such legal administrator she had no power to compromise their claims, for compromise has always been deemed equivalent to an alienation (transigere est alienare), and is an act of strict ownership that goes beyond mere administration. Hence, Art. 2032 of the new Civil Code provides: o The Court's approval is necessary in compromises entered into by guardians, parents, absentee's representatives and administrators or executors of decedent's estates. (Emphasis supplied.) This restriction on the power of parents to compromise claims affecting their children is in contrast to the terms of Art. 1810 of the old Civil Code that empowered parents to enter into such compromises, without requiring court approval unless the amount involved was in excess of 2000 pesetas. o At present, the Court['s] approval is indispensable regardless of the amount involved.

PEOPLE VS SILVANO June 29, 1999 Other Rights and Duties in exercise of Parental Authority While daughter was sleeping in her room(16 years old) , she was awakened by her father who scolded her for coming late. The accused who appeared tipsy, started undressing Sheryl by lifting her T-shirt, as a form of punishment for her coming home late, which punishment she has been experiencing from the accused since she was 13 years old. Father raped her that night despite of her pleas for him to stop. Daughter who could longer bear the punishment in the form of sexual abuse she had been getting from her father as in fact she was first raped when she was thirteen (13) years of age, left their house and stayed at her maternal grandmother's house When she was asked to go back to her parents' house at and settle her differences with the accused, Sheryl confided to her mother and grandmother the real reason why she did not like to go back to their house. Father was charged with rape by his own daughter to which he pleaded not guilty when arraigned.

Lower court: held father guilty for crime of rape Issue: DUTIES IN EXERCISE OF PARENTAL AUTHORITY Held: The death penalty shall be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any the following attendant circumstances: 1.) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim; 1. Appellant alludes as rather unusual for him to rape his own daughter by scolding her first, as it would certainly cause some noise. Precisely, he scolded her to make a good pretext that any noise created thereafter was nothing but part of the parental sanction and discipline on an allegedly erring child and thus, distract, if not mislead, possible assistance once he performs his evil instincts. When charged before the court, appellant denied the accusation and prefaced such denial with the assertion that he is giving her financial, material and educational support. His excuse regarding support is non-sequitur. The fact that he supports her does not give him the license to rape her The victim testified that appellant told her that she will be punished for coming home late at night and the punishment is to have sex with him. This ratiocination is the product of a sick mind of an equally sick parent who does not deserve to be such. It is clear from the provisions of Article 209 of the Family Code that from the mere status of being a parent flows ones natural right and duty not only of the caring for and the rearing of their unemancipated children but above all the development of their moral, mental, and physical character and well-being. Although the Family Code recognizes the parents rights and duties to impose discipline on their unemancipated children; Supervise their activities, recreation and association with others x x x; and prevent them from acquiring habits detrimental to their x x x morals it does not authorize them to force their offspring to copulate with them under the mask of discipline, or invade their honor and violate their dignity nor does it give them the license to ravish the product of their marital union. Appellants way of punishment comes not in the form of correction but of an insane sexual gratification. Sex with ones own child is per se abhorrent and can never be justified as a form of parental punishment.

2.

3.

The practice of sexual exploitation of the youth in the guise of disciplinary action is not a solution to juvenile curiosity which is part of growing up. His gratification instills an unnamed trauma in the childs innocent mind when she still cannot understand the meaning of sexual behavior. Moreover, instead of instructing and educating his own daughter with the right precept and good example, appellant provided her with perversed and distorted moral and spiritual guidance to the extent of brainwashing her that sex with ones father is nothing but a disciplinary sanction and part of sex education which the latter teaches her. Worse, the daughter herein even entertained doubts as to the normality and abnormality of her fathers deplorable acts. It is also appellants duty under the Family Code to give her love and affection, advice and counsel, companionship and understanding. Yet what she got was the humiliation and the destruction of her life, good future and the very essence of her existence.

Such relationship of father-daughter in rape cases is considered an aggravating circumstance under Article 15 of the RPC.