MACEDA V VASQUEZ BONIFACIO SANZ MACEDA, Presiding Judge, Branch 12, Regional Trial Court, Antique, petitioner, vs.

HON. OMBUDSMAN CONRADO M. VASQUEZ AND ATTY. NAPOLEON A. ABIERA, respondents FACTS: Respondent Napoleon A. Abiera of the Public Attorney's Office alleged that petitioner had falsified his Certificate of Service dated February 6, 1989, by certifying "that all civil and criminal cases which have been submitted for decision or determination for a period of 90 days have been determined and decided on or before January 31, 1998," when in truth and in fact, petitioner knew that no decision had been rendered in five (5) civil and ten (10) criminal cases that have been submitted for decision. Respondent Abiera further alleged that petitioner similarly falsified his certificates of service for the months of February, April, May, June, July and August, all in 1989; and the months beginning January up to September 1990, or for a total of seventeen (17) months. On the other hand, petitioner contends that he had been granted by this Court an extension of ninety (90) days to decide the aforementioned cases. Petitioner contends that the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over said case despite this Court's ruling in Orap vs. Sandiganbayan, since the offense charged arose from the judge's performance of his official duties, which is under the control and supervision of the Supreme Court. Furthermore, the investigation of the Ombudsman constitutes an encroachment into the Supreme Court's constitutional duty of supervision over all inferior courts. This is a petition for certiorari with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction and/or restraining order ISSUE: Whether or not the investigation made by the Ombudsman constitutes an encroachment into the SCs constitutional duty of supervision over all inferior courts HELD: The Court disagrees with the first Part of petitioner's basic argument. There is nothing in the decision in Orap that would restrict it only to offenses committed by a judge unrelated to his official duties. However, the Court agrees that in the absence of any administrative action taken against him by this Court with regard to his certificates of service, the investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman encroaches into the Court's power of administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel, in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers. Article VIII, section 6 of the 1987 Constitution exclusively vests in the Supreme Court administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals down to the lowest municipal trial court clerk. By virtue of this power, it is only the Supreme Court that can oversee the judges' and court personnel's compliance with all laws, and take the proper administrative action against them if they commit any violation thereof. No other branch of government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers. The rationale for the foregoing pronouncement is this. Administratively, the question before the court is: should a judge, having been granted by this Court an extension of time to decide cases before him, report these cases in his certificate of service? As this question had not yet been raised with, much less resolved by, this Court. How could the Ombudsman resolve the present criminal complaint that requires the resolution of said question? In fine, where a criminal complaint against a Judge or other court employee arises from their administrative duties, the Ombudsman must defer action on said complaint and refer the same to this Court for determination whether said Judge or court employee had acted within the scope of their administrative duties PETITION is hereby GRANTED.

Samson v Court of Appeals Facts: Feliciano C. Talens (private respondent), was appointed by City Mayor Macario Asistio of Caloocan City as Assistant Secretary to the Mayor. The succeeding Mayor, Marcial F. Samson provided to Talens A.O. No. 3, terminating him due to lack and loss of confidence. Pursuant to sec 5 of RA 2206 (Civil Service Act) the services of respondent are considered by petitioner as under non-competitive services on account of the inherent nature of his position as primarily and highly confidential. Appointed in his place is Hermogenes Liwag (petitioner). Private respondent objected on the ground that Sec. 5 of RA 2206, states as non-competitive only the positions of secretaries. A petition was filed by the private respondent in order to annul the disputed administrative order, to enjoin the petitioners from enforcing the same, and to compel all of them to pay to private respondent the salaries and emoluments due to him as Assistant Secretary to the Mayor. He also sought the ouster from the disputed position of Hermogenes Liwag. The Court of First Instance ruled in favor of the plaintiff Talens, by declaring Administrative Order No. 3 null and void, and granting all the reliefs claimed by Feliciano C. Talens. On Appeal of the said judgment to the Court of Appeals, the decision of the trial court was affirmed. Issue: whether or not Administrative Order No. 3 issued by Mayor Samson to Talens is legal Held: Section 5 of Republic Act No. 2260, as amended by Republic Act No. 6040 provides that "That non-competitive service shall be composed of positions expressly declared by law to be in the non-competitive service and those which are policy-determining, primarily confidential or highly technical in nature" and continues with an enumeration of specific officers and employees embraced within the scope of non-competitive service. Among those included in the enumeration are heads of departments created in charters of cities and secretaries of provincial governors, city mayors and municipal mayors. Petitioners' contention is that the termination of private respondent's services is authorized by Section 5 of Republic Act No. 2260 which declares the position of Secretaries of City Mayors as belonging to the non-competitive service and it is justified by the fact that the disputed position of Assistant Secretary to the Mayor is inherently and primarily highly confidential in nature, arguing also that an assistant secretary is also a secretary thus included in the general term secretaries mentioned as non-competitive in Sec 5 RA 2260. As a general rule, position in all branches, subdivisions and instrumentalities of the government, including those in government owned or controlled corporations belong to the competitive service. The only exceptions are those expressly declared by law to be in the non-competitive service and those which are policy-determining, primarily confidential or highly technical in nature. Under the rules of statutory construction, exceptions, as a general rule, should be strictly, but reasonably construed; they extend only so far as their language fairly warrants, and all doubts should be resolved in favor of the general provisions rather than the exception. Where a general rule is established by statute with exceptions, the court will not curtail the former nor add to the latter by implication. Where a statute enumerates the subjects or things on which it is to operate, it is to be construed as excluding from its effects all those not expressly mentioned The parties agree therefore that it is the nature of the position which finally determines a position to be primarily confidential and not the powers and duties exercised and discharged by the Assistant Secretary to the Mayor. While the duties may involve confidential matters it does not necessarily transform the nature of the position. The position of Secretary to the Mayor and that of Assistant Secretary to the Mayor are two separate and distinct positions. While both individuals may be called "secretary," nevertheless, one is certainly of a higher category and rank than the other, a Secretary must enjoy the confidence of the Mayor and the Assistant Sec does not. An "assistant" merely helps, aids, or serves in a subordinate capacity to the person who is actually clothed with all the duties and responsibilities of "secretary." The decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED but considering the notice of death given to this Court of the death of the herein private respondent it is MODIFIED (1) declaring AO No. 3 null and void ordering respondents except Liwag to pay to Talens all the salaries and emoluments appurtenant to and due to the him for a limited period of 3 years