Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Series Preface xi
Notes 306
Index 322
INTRODUCTION
3
4 SEARCHING FOR PEACE
massive: over interests, who is the master in Eastern Europe; and over
values, what is the good society – multi-party/capitalist or single
party/socialist? Enacting the first narrative would have been cata-
strophic as seen in the places it was partly enacted, Korea and
Vietnam. And: no powerful intervenor would have been available.
Fortunately, what happened followed the third narrative.
There were the images of outcomes projected by the two parties:
all that is needed is that you become like me. This is not known
as an acceptable solution but as imposition, victory.
Then the idea of convergence started to take root, with social
democracy or democratic socialism (the first ideology of
Solidarnosc) as an obvious meeting ground. This was not to be,
however, because of internal processes in the US consistently
moving to the right politically relative to, say, the New Deal, and
the Soviet Union, consistently moving towards demoralization and
implosion because of its inability to overcome many contradictions.
But there was another compelling image coming out of the peace
movement and the dissident movement: no more danger of nuclear
war/human rights, and democracy for all. The movements
practised the future by depolarizing different and complementary
segments of a heavily polarized East–West system. The resistance
against nuclearism and post-Stalinism was done non-violently and
successfully so. The Berlin Wall fell. We all knew it was over.
The fourth case has a different flavour because of the time span
between the first and second narratives, and the third. The Spanish
civil war of 1936–39 between the Loyalists (to the democratically
elected Popular Front government of republicans, socialists,
communists, anarchists and nationalists in Catalonia and the
Basque Country) and the Insurgents (under Franco, supporting
and supported by los poderes fácticos, the real powers, land-owners,
military, clergy) was also based on a massive conflict between two
very different images of the good society. Put simply: communist
(but with strong anarchist elements) versus fascist, the falange.
Narrative 1 was enacted through many loops in a cruel war with
massive polarization and one million dead. Narrative 2 came with
much military aid to the Insurgents from Germany and Italy, and
an International Brigade and a trickle of aid from the Soviet Union
for the Loyalists.
Who won? In the short run Franco, of course, enacting his image
in an unstable, deeply traumatized society. But who won in the
longer run? Neither one nor the other. A very compelling image
was in the air from the Second World War, often twisted, thwarted:
multi-party democracy, human rights, self-determination for
minorities. Both sides gradually bought into this image, travelled
abroad, lived it, received testimony from visitors. But time, say
one generation, was needed to overcome the most acute phase of
CONFLICT, WAR AND PEACE: A BIRD’S EYE VIEW 13
the traumas. And that coincided roughly with the life of Franco.
When he died in November 1975, lamented by few, no night of
long knives was in sight. And the successors to the Loyalists and
the Insurgents met in a multi-party endeavour to construct, suc-
cessfully so far, non-fascist/non-Stalinist Spain, with only one small
backlash: the Tejero incident of 23 February 1981.
Why doesn’t this work in the Basque Country, in Ulster, in the
Middle East/Israel–Palestine? Why is there no peace process,
except as a propaganda term, with no real peace in sight, only some
breaks in Narrative 1 violence? And enactment of Narrative 2 by
Spanish and English police and military in the first two cases, and
a denial of Narrative 2 by Israel in the third lest the playing field
becomes level?
First answer: for lack of a compelling image of the future.
General autonomy for the Basque Country in Spain is less than
what is wanted; moreover, it does not include the French Basques.
In Northern Ireland the Good Friday Agreement does not provide
for symmetry in arms. The IRA is up against the British Army +
the Police Service for Northern Ireland (formerly the Royal Ulster
Constabulary) (made up of about 93 per cent Protestants) + the
para-military Ulster Defence Forces. And there is no serious image
of how two states, Israel and Palestine, could live side by side,
bearing in mind that any image has to be symmetric in such basics
as the right to have a state (and a capital and a right of return).
Second, a negative answer: the ritualistic demand for a cease-fire,
even disarmament, only then depolarization around the table, only
then conflict solution. Why should they do that when there is no
light at the end of the tunnel, not even an image as an anchor for
trying out of that outcome, virtually? Even if they are not planning
any major violence, arms have at least a nuisance value. Why
should they give that up?
Rather much more can be said, but let this suffice. The basic
conclusion is this: The first narrative leads to demands for revanche
and revenge. The second puts the cart before the horse by
demanding that people do at the beginning what they will only do
at the end. The peace narrative is more promising.
Which does not mean that it is infallible. Moreover, like natural
medicine it cures without doing harm but needs more time than
violent antibiotics. People have to engage in virtual tests of a
concrete peace proposal. Much psychological mobility is needed;
hence a need for something ‘compelling’, ‘irresistible’. The
proposal has to be so good that the time factor can be considerably
shortened. It defies reason to believe that such creative proposals
should emerge from a ‘table’ accommodating people who have
been in a tunnel killing each other according to Narratives 1 and
2. How can they suddenly switch to Narrative 3?
14 SEARCHING FOR PEACE
1. They leave out the unresolved conflict and polarization, and focus
only on violence, which then looks irrational, autistic.
Example: ‘Terrorism’ (see Chalmers Johnson’s Blowback).
2. They confuse conflict arena – where the violence/‘action’ is – with
conflict formation the parties with a stake in the outcome.
Example: The focus in Ulster is only on violent parties, not
on 85 per cent of the population who want peace by peaceful
means.
3. Dualism, reducing the number of conflict parties to 2 and the
number of issues to 1 as dominant discourse. not looking for
hidden parties presenting themselves as mediators and issues.
Example: Omitting Germany as major conflict party in
Yugoslavia, with her own goals (see Matthias Küntzel, Der
Weg in den Krieg); omitting class and gender as major issues
in Yugoslavia.
4. Manicheism, presenting one party as evil and the other as good,
(re)enforcing polarization, denying the ‘evil’ a voice.
Example: The standard image of Serbia, Indonesia, Saddam
Hussein; taking sides, usually same as their nation-state
government.
CONFLICT, WAR AND PEACE: A BIRD’S EYE VIEW 15
323
324 SEARCHING FOR PEACE
India 112, 136, 145, 183, 192, Iraq 124, 139, 162, 192, 201,
217–18, 244–5 225–8, 295
Indonesia 14, 46 and Kurds 135
industrialization 146–8 occupation of Kuwait 122
injustice, global 102, 304, 305 sanctions 97, 304
Inner Mongolia 136, 258 and UN resolutions 34, 42
inter-class conflict 188, 191, 212, weapons of mass destruction
282, 291–2 124, 164
inter-generation conflict 188, see also Gulf War
293–4 Islam 295, 296
International Correspondance and Christians/Christianity
League (ICL) 21, 29, 47, 64, 97–8, 186, 260–1, 262
109 fundamentalism 94
International Court of Justice Islamabad meetings 71–2
(ICJ) 96, 128, 130, 131, 158 Israel 122, 209
International Criminal Court and international law 34, 122
(ICC) 96 racism 113
international law 34–5, 46, 120–5 Israel-Palestine conflict 13, 139,
and comfort women 271 145–6, 183, 200–8, 228
great power interests 123–4 and confederation 83, 136, 201
and impartiality 125 mediation 52, 54, 55, 56–61,
impotence of 121–2 75, 205
selective application of 122–3 peace package 208, 225–6
and self-determination 266 water distribution 58, 59, 60
International Monetary Fund see also Oslo Accords; Palestine
(IMF) 117, 291 Italy 280
Internet, and peace studies 30 IUCN (International Union for
intervention 10, 15, 30–2, 110 the Conservation of Nature)
donor-directed 39 264
guidelines for xxi–xxii Izetbegovic, Alija 32, 34, 36, 38,
humanitarian 32, 37, 252 45, 63
and inadequate knowledge
38–9 Jabutinski 200, 202
legitimacy of 8–9, 94 Jafari, Taghi 260
and New Thinking 47–8 Jainism 244
and overwhelming force 10 Jakarta 46–7
peacekeeping 27, 30–1, 65, Jammu 218
106–7, 228, 252 Japan 135, 139, 192, 273–4
reversibility of xxi and comfort women 271–2
selectivity 31, 44, 46–7, 66 and Hawai’i 223
violent by US 90–4, 303 and hostage crisis 277, 278
see also acceptability; and Korea 219
reciprocity; sustainability racism 113
Intifada 56, 57, 183, 200, 203, and Russia 137, 138, 185,
205 233–4
Inuit 35, 123 treaties with US 169
IRA (Irish Republican Army) 13, and US 185, 187, 231–2
214 Jews 130, 152, 200, 202, 204
Iran 97–8, 135, 192, 262, 295, and exclusivity 113
296 Orthodox 201
330 SEARCHING FOR PEACE
Rwanda 39, 44, 106, 275–6 September 11th attack 30, 35–6,
see also Great Lakes 59–60, 68, 87–102, 303
Ryukyu Islands 273 and choice of discourse 94–8
diagnosis 87–98
SAARC (South Asian Association and prognosis 99–100
for Regional Cooperation) reactions to 95–6
138, 218, 251 retaliation discourse 90–4, 95–6
Said, Edward 60 terrorism discourse 87–9, 94,
Sami 135, 188, 249, 268, 95–6, 97
299–300 therapy 101–2
sanctions 97, 211, 304 see also Afghanistan
sarvodaya 82, 112 Serbia 14, 192, 239, 242
satyagraha 103, 112 NATO war against 36, 42,
Saudi Arabia 226, 227, 295 43–4, 45
Scheff, T.J. 167 peace formulas 47–8, 65, 160,
Schopenhauer, Arthur 182 236
Scudder, Dylan 152 Serbs 45, 63, 66, 67, 160, 242
secession 34–5, 134, 136 demonization of 33, 122–3
China and 258 refugees 44, 242
Kashmir 217 and self-determination 122,
right to 112, 122–3, 130, 131 131, 236
Tamils 248, 250 Sharon, Ariel 35, 54
see also independence; self- Shevardnadze, Edvard 176
determination Shikotan 233
Second World War 44, 74, 191 shir 170
sects 185, 246–7 sho 78
security Sicily 273
alternatives 149–50 Sikhs 212
challenges to 142, 143–4 Simla Accord 1972 217
concepts of 142–3, 144, 148–9 Sinhalas 248–51
environmental 148 slavery 17, 100
role of state 150 Slavonia 36, 44, 131, 242
security industry 145 Slovenia 131
and structural violence 144 Smith, Adam 108
as threat to Other 145–7 social democracy 112, 288
segregation/desegregation 11, society, perceptions of 80–4, 246
174, 194–5 Sodano, Angelo 260
self-determination 127–31, 134, solidarity 78, 104, 247, 252, 289,
140 303
Basques 284 global 124
Caucasus 266 inter-generational 293, 294
in China 258 municipal 237, 242
Gibraltar and Ceuta-Melilla Somalia 106, 170, 186, 252–3
286 clans 136, 186, 252, 253
Mayas 254 humanitarian aid 31, 32
Tamils 250 South Africa 11, 276
Yugoslavia 236, 262 sovereignty 126, 129, 136, 228
self-reliance 199, 222 functional 139, 140, 251
Semipalatinsk 273 joint 41, 137, 140, 234, 265,
separation, period of 38, 39, 62 286
INDEX 335