1.People vs. Vera, 65 Phil 56 2.Edu vs. Ericta, 35 SCRA 481 3.Eastern Shipping Lines vs.

POEA, 166 SCRA 533 4.Gerochi vs. Department of Energy, GR NO. 159796, July 17, 2007 5.Tatad vs. Secretary of the Department of Energy, GR NO. 124360, Nov. 5, 199 6.Serna vs. COMELEC, GR No. 177597, July 16, 2008 7.Tobias vs. Abalos, GR NO. L-114783, Dec 8, 1994 8.Mariano, Jr. vs. COMELEC GR NO. 118577, March 7, 1995 9.Quinto vs. COMELEC, GR No. 189698, Feb 22, 2010 10.League of Cities of the Philippines vs. COMELEC, GR No. 176951, August 24, 2010 11.Senator Benigno Aquino vs. COMELEC, GR No. 189793, April 7, 2010 12.Victorino Aldaba vs. COMELEC, GR No. 188078 13.Ang Ladlad LGBT vs. COMELEC, GR No. 190582, April 8, 2010 14.Veterans Federation Party vs. COMELEC, 342 SCRA 244 15.Bagong Bayani-OFW vs. COMELEC, GR No. 147589, June 26, 2001 16.Bantay Republic Act or BA-RA 7941 vs COMELEC, GR NO. 177271, May 4, 2007 17.Citizens' Battle Against Corruption vs. COMELEC, GR NO. 172103, April 13, 2007 18.Partido vs COMELEC, GR No. 164702, March 15, 2006 19.Torayno vs. COMELEC, GR No. 137329, Aug 9, 2000 20.Banat vs. COMELEC. GR No. 179271, April 21, 2009

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-45685 November 16, 1937

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS and HONGKONG & SHANGHAI BANKING CORPORATION, petitioners, vs. JOSE O. VERA, Judge . of the Court of First Instance of Manila, and MARIANO CU UNJIENG, respondents. Office of the Solicitor General Tuason and City Fiscal Diaz for the Government. De Witt, Perkins and Ponce Enrile for the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation. Vicente J. Francisco, Feria and La O, Orense and Belmonte, and Gibbs and McDonough for respondent Cu Unjieng. No appearance for respondent Judge.

LAUREL, J.: This is an original action instituted in this court on August 19, 1937, for the issuance of the writ of certiorari and of prohibition to the Court of First Instance of Manila so that this court may review the actuations of the aforesaid Court of First Instance in criminal case No. 42649 entitled "The People of the Philippine Islands vs. Mariano Cu Unjieng, et al.", more particularly the application of the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng therein for probation under the provisions of Act No. 4221, and thereafter prohibit the said Court of First Instance from taking any further action or entertaining further the aforementioned application for probation, to the end that the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng may be forthwith committed to prison in accordance with the final judgment of conviction rendered by this court in said case (G. R. No. 41200). 1 Petitioners herein, the People of the Philippine and the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, are respectively the plaintiff and the offended party, and the respondent herein Mariano Cu Unjieng is one of the defendants, in the criminal case entitled "The People of the Philippine Islands vs. Mariano Cu Unjieng, et al.", criminal case No. 42649 of the Court of First Instance of Manila and G.R. No. 41200 of this court. Respondent herein, Hon. Jose O. Vera, is the Judge ad interim of the seventh branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila, who heard the application of the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng for probation in the aforesaid criminal case. The information in the aforesaid criminal case was filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila on October 15, 1931, petitioner herein Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation intervening in the case as private prosecutor. After a protracted trial unparalleled in the annals of Philippine jurisprudence both in the length of time spent by the court as well as in the volume in the testimony and the bulk of the exhibits presented, the Court of First Instance of Manila, on January 8, 1934, rendered a judgment of conviction sentencing the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng to indeterminate penalty ranging from four years and two months of prision correccional to eight years of prision mayor, to pay the costs and with reservation of civil action to the offended party, the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation. Upon appeal, the court, on March 26, 1935, modified the sentence to an indeterminate penalty of from five years and six months of prision correccional to seven years, six months and twenty-seven days of prision mayor, but affirmed the judgment in all other respects. Mariano Cu Unjieng filed a motion for reconsideration and four successive motions for new trial which were denied on December 17, 1935, and final judgment was accordingly entered on December 18, 1935. The defendant thereupon sought to have the case elevated on certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States but the latter denied the petition for certiorari in November, 1936. This court, on November 24, 1936, denied the petition subsequently filed by the defendant for leave to file a second alternative motion for reconsideration or new trial and thereafter remanded the case to the court of origin for execution of the judgment. The instant proceedings have to do with the application for probation filed by the herein respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng on November 27, 1936, before the trial court, under the provisions of Act No. 4221 of the defunct Philippine Legislature. Herein respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng states in his petition, inter alia, that he is innocent of the crime of which he was convicted, that he has no criminal record and that he would observe good conduct in the future. The Court of First Instance of Manila, Judge Pedro Tuason presiding, referred the application for probation of the Insular Probation Office which recommended denial of the same June 18, 1937. Thereafter, the Court of First Instance of Manila, seventh branch, Judge Jose O. Vera presiding, set the petition for hearing on April 5, 1937.

On April 2, 1937, the Fiscal of the City of Manila filed an opposition to the granting of probation to the herein respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng. The private prosecution also filed an opposition on April 5, 1937, alleging, among other things, that Act No. 4221, assuming that it has not been repealed by section 2 of Article XV of the Constitution, is nevertheless violative of section 1, subsection (1), Article III of the Constitution guaranteeing equal protection of the laws for the reason that its applicability is not uniform throughout the Islands and because section 11 of the said Act endows the provincial boards with the power to make said law effective or otherwise in their respective or otherwise in their respective provinces. The private prosecution also filed a supplementary opposition on April 19, 1937, elaborating on the alleged unconstitutionality on Act No. 4221, as an undue delegation of legislative power to the provincial boards of several provinces (sec. 1, Art. VI, Constitution). The City Fiscal concurred in the opposition of the private prosecution except with respect to the questions raised concerning the constitutionality of Act No. 4221. On June 28, 1937, herein respondent Judge Jose O. Vera promulgated a resolution with a finding that "las pruebas no han establecido de unamanera concluyente la culpabilidad del peticionario y que todos los hechos probados no son inconsistentes o incongrentes con su inocencia" and concludes that the herein respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng "es inocente por duda racional" of the crime of which he stands convicted by this court in G.R. No. 41200, but denying the latter's petition for probation for the reason that: . . . Si este Juzgado concediera la poblacion solicitada por las circunstancias y la historia social que se han expuesto en el cuerpo de esta resolucion, que hacen al peticionario acreedor de la misma, una parte de la opinion publica, atizada por los recelos y las suspicacias, podria levantarse indignada contra un sistema de probacion que permite atisbar en los procedimientos ordinarios de una causa criminal perturbando la quietud y la eficacia de las decisiones ya recaidas al traer a la superficie conclusiones enteramente differentes, en menoscabo del interes publico que demanda el respeto de las leyes y del veredicto judicial. On July 3, 1937, counsel for the herein respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng filed an exception to the resolution denying probation and a notice of intention to file a motion for reconsideration. An alternative motion for reconsideration or new trial was filed by counsel on July 13, 1937. This was supplemented by an additional motion for reconsideration submitted on July 14, 1937. The aforesaid motions were set for hearing on July 31, 1937, but said hearing was postponed at the petition of counsel for the respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng because a motion for leave to intervene in the case as amici curiae signed by thirty-three (thirty-four) attorneys had just been filed with the trial court. Attorney Eulalio Chaves whose signature appears in the aforesaid motion subsequently filed a petition for leave to withdraw his appearance as amicus curiae on the ground that the motion for leave to intervene as amici curiae was circulated at a banquet given by counsel for Mariano Cu Unjieng on the evening of July 30, 1937, and that he signed the same "without mature deliberation and purely as a matter of courtesy to the person who invited me (him)." On August 6, 1937, the Fiscal of the City of Manila filed a motion with the trial court for the issuance of an order of execution of the judgment of this court in said case and forthwith to commit the herein respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng to jail in obedience to said judgment. On August 7, 1937, the private prosecution filed its opposition to the motion for leave to intervene as amici curiae aforementioned, asking that a date be set for a hearing of the same and that, at all events, said motion should be denied with respect to certain attorneys signing the same who were members of the legal staff of the several counsel for Mariano Cu Unjieng. On August 10, 1937, herein respondent Judge Jose O. Vera issued an order requiring all parties including the movants for intervention as amici curiae to appear before the court on August 14, 1937. On the last-mentioned date, the Fiscal of the City of Manila moved for the hearing of his motion for execution of judgment in preference to the motion for leave to intervene as amici curiae but, upon objection of counsel for Mariano Cu Unjieng, he moved for the postponement of the hearing of both motions. The respondent judge thereupon set the hearing of the motion for execution on August 21, 1937, but proceeded to consider the motion for leave to intervene as amici curiae as in order. Evidence as to the circumstances under which said motion for leave to intervene as amici curiae was signed and submitted to court was to have been heard on August 19, 1937. But at this juncture, herein petitioners came to this court on extraordinary legal process to put an end to what they alleged was an interminable proceeding in the Court of First Instance of Manila which fostered "the campaign of the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng for delay in the execution of the sentence imposed by this Honorable Court on him, exposing the courts to criticism and ridicule because of the apparent inability of the judicial machinery to make effective a final judgment of this court imposed on the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng." The scheduled hearing before the trial court was accordingly suspended upon the issuance of a temporary restraining order by this court on August 21, 1937. To support their petition for the issuance of the extraordinary writs of certiorari and prohibition, herein petitioners allege that the respondent judge has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of his jurisdiction:

I. Because said respondent judge lacks the power to place respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng under probation for the following reason: (1) Under section 11 of Act No. 4221, the said of the Philippine Legislature is made to apply only to the provinces of the Philippines; it nowhere states that it is to be made applicable to chartered cities like the City of Manila. (2) While section 37 of the Administrative Code contains a proviso to the effect that in the absence of a special provision, the term "province" may be construed to include the City of Manila for the purpose of giving effect to laws of general application, it is also true that Act No. 4221 is not a law of general application because it is made to apply only to those provinces in which the respective provincial boards shall have provided for the salary of a probation officer. (3) Even if the City of Manila were considered to be a province, still, Act No. 4221 would not be applicable to it because it has provided for the salary of a probation officer as required by section 11 thereof; it being immaterial that there is an Insular Probation Officer willing to act for the City of Manila, said Probation Officer provided for in section 10 of Act No. 4221 being different and distinct from the Probation Officer provided for in section 11 of the same Act. II. Because even if the respondent judge originally had jurisdiction to entertain the application for probation of the respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng, he nevertheless acted without jurisdiction or in excess thereof in continuing to entertain the motion for reconsideration and by failing to commit Mariano Cu Unjieng to prison after he had promulgated his resolution of June 28, 1937, denying Mariano Cu Unjieng's application for probation, for the reason that: (1) His jurisdiction and power in probation proceedings is limited by Act No. 4221 to the granting or denying of applications for probation. (2) After he had issued the order denying Mariano Cu Unjieng's petition for probation on June 28, 1937, it became final and executory at the moment of its rendition. (3) No right on appeal exists in such cases. (4) The respondent judge lacks the power to grant a rehearing of said order or to modify or change the same. III. Because the respondent judge made a finding that Mariano Cu Unjieng is innocent of the crime for which he was convicted by final judgment of this court, which finding is not only presumptuous but without foundation in fact and in law, and is furthermore in contempt of this court and a violation of the respondent's oath of office as ad interim judge of first instance. IV. Because the respondent judge has violated and continues to violate his duty, which became imperative when he issued his order of June 28, 1937, denying the application for probation, to commit his co-respondent to jail. Petitioners also avers that they have no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. In a supplementary petition filed on September 9, 1937, the petitioner Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation further contends that Act No. 4221 of the Philippine Legislature providing for a system of probation for persons eighteen years of age or over who are convicted of crime, is unconstitutional because it is violative of section 1, subsection (1), Article III, of the Constitution of the Philippines guaranteeing equal protection of the laws because it confers upon the provincial board of its province the absolute discretion to make said law operative or otherwise in their respective provinces, because it constitutes an unlawful and improper delegation to the provincial boards of the several provinces of the legislative power lodged by the Jones Law (section 8) in the Philippine Legislature and by the Constitution (section 1, Art. VI) in the National Assembly; and for the further reason that it gives the provincial boards, in contravention of the Constitution (section 2, Art. VIII) and the Jones Law (section 28), the authority to enlarge the powers of the Court of First Instance of different provinces without uniformity. In another supplementary petition dated September 14, 1937, the Fiscal of the City of Manila, in behalf of one of the petitioners, the People of the Philippine Islands, concurs for the first time with the issues raised by other petitioner regarding the constitutionality of Act No. 4221, and on the oral argument held on October 6, 1937, further elaborated on the theory that probation is a form of reprieve and therefore Act. No. 4221 is an encroachment on the exclusive power of the Chief Executive to grant pardons and reprieves. On October 7, 1937, the City Fiscal filed two memorandums in which he contended that Act No. 4221 not only encroaches upon the pardoning power to the executive, but also constitute an unwarranted delegation of legislative power and a denial of the equal protection of the laws. On October 9, 1937, two memorandums, signed jointly by the City Fiscal and the Solicitor-

General, acting in behalf of the People of the Philippine Islands, and by counsel for the petitioner, the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, one sustaining the power of the state to impugn the validity of its own laws and the other contending that Act No. 4221 constitutes an unwarranted delegation of legislative power, were presented. Another joint memorandum was filed by the same persons on the same day, October 9, 1937, alleging that Act No. 4221 is unconstitutional because it denies the equal protection of the laws and constitutes an unlawful delegation of legislative power and, further, that the whole Act is void: that the Commonwealth is not estopped from questioning the validity of its laws; that the private prosecution may intervene in probation proceedings and may attack the probation law as unconstitutional; and that this court may pass upon the constitutional question in prohibition proceedings. Respondents in their answer dated August 31, 1937, as well as in their oral argument and memorandums, challenge each and every one of the foregoing proposition raised by the petitioners. As special defenses, respondents allege: (1) That the present petition does not state facts sufficient in law to warrant the issuance of the writ of certiorari or of prohibition. (2) That the aforesaid petition is premature because the remedy sought by the petitioners is the very same remedy prayed for by them before the trial court and was still pending resolution before the trial court when the present petition was filed with this court. (3) That the petitioners having themselves raised the question as to the execution of judgment before the trial court, said trial court has acquired exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the same under the theory that its resolution denying probation is unappealable. (4) That upon the hypothesis that this court has concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of First Instance to decide the question as to whether or not the execution will lie, this court nevertheless cannot exercise said jurisdiction while the Court of First Instance has assumed jurisdiction over the same upon motion of herein petitioners themselves. (5) That upon the procedure followed by the herein petitioners in seeking to deprive the trial court of its jurisdiction over the case and elevate the proceedings to this court, should not be tolerated because it impairs the authority and dignity of the trial court which court while sitting in the probation cases is "a court of limited jurisdiction but of great dignity." (6) That under the supposition that this court has jurisdiction to resolve the question submitted to and pending resolution by the trial court, the present action would not lie because the resolution of the trial court denying probation is appealable; for although the Probation Law does not specifically provide that an applicant for probation may appeal from a resolution of the Court of First Instance denying probation, still it is a general rule in this jurisdiction that a final order, resolution or decision of an inferior court is appealable to the superior court. (7) That the resolution of the trial court denying probation of herein respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng being appealable, the same had not become final and executory for the reason that the said respondent had filed an alternative motion for reconsideration and new trial within the requisite period of fifteen days, which motion the trial court was able to resolve in view of the restraining order improvidently and erroneously issued by this court.lawphi1.net (8) That the Fiscal of the City of Manila had by implication admitted that the resolution of the trial court denying probation is not final and unappealable when he presented his answer to the motion for reconsideration and agreed to the postponement of the hearing of the said motion. (9) That under the supposition that the order of the trial court denying probation is not appealable, it is incumbent upon the accused to file an action for the issuance of the writ of certiorari with mandamus, it appearing that the trial court, although it believed that the accused was entitled to probation, nevertheless denied probation for fear of criticism because the accused is a rich man; and that, before a petition for certiorari grounded on an irregular exercise of jurisdiction by the trial court could lie, it is incumbent upon the petitioner to file a motion for reconsideration specifying the error committed so that the trial court could have an opportunity to correct or cure the same.

(10) That on hypothesis that the resolution of this court is not appealable, the trial court retains its jurisdiction within a reasonable time to correct or modify it in accordance with law and justice; that this power to alter or modify an order or resolution is inherent in the courts and may be exercise either motu proprio or upon petition of the proper party, the petition in the latter case taking the form of a motion for reconsideration. (11) That on the hypothesis that the resolution of the trial court is appealable as respondent allege, said court cannot order execution of the same while it is on appeal, for then the appeal would not be availing because the doors of probation will be closed from the moment the accused commences to serve his sentence (Act No. 4221, sec. 1; U.S. vs. Cook, 19 Fed. [2d], 827). In their memorandums filed on October 23, 1937, counsel for the respondents maintain that Act No. 4221 is constitutional because, contrary to the allegations of the petitioners, it does not constitute an undue delegation of legislative power, does not infringe the equal protection clause of the Constitution, and does not encroach upon the pardoning power of the Executive. In an additional memorandum filed on the same date, counsel for the respondents reiterate the view that section 11 of Act No. 4221 is free from constitutional objections and contend, in addition, that the private prosecution may not intervene in probation proceedings, much less question the validity of Act No. 4221; that both the City Fiscal and the Solicitor-General are estopped from questioning the validity of the Act; that the validity of Act cannot be attacked for the first time before this court; that probation in unavailable; and that, in any event, section 11 of the Act No. 4221 is separable from the rest of the Act. The last memorandum for the respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng was denied for having been filed out of time but was admitted by resolution of this court and filed anew on November 5, 1937. This memorandum elaborates on some of the points raised by the respondents and refutes those brought up by the petitioners. In the scrutiny of the pleadings and examination of the various aspects of the present case, we noted that the court below, in passing upon the merits of the application of the respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng and in denying said application assumed the task not only of considering the merits of the application, but of passing upon the culpability of the applicant, notwithstanding the final pronouncement of guilt by this court. (G.R. No. 41200.) Probation implies guilt be final judgment. While a probation case may look into the circumstances attending the commission of the offense, this does not authorize it to reverse the findings and conclusive of this court, either directly or indirectly, especially wherefrom its own admission reliance was merely had on the printed briefs, averments, and pleadings of the parties. As already observed by this court in Shioji vs. Harvey ([1922], 43 Phil., 333, 337), and reiterated in subsequent cases, "if each and every Court of First Instance could enjoy the privilege of overruling decisions of the Supreme Court, there would be no end to litigation, and judicial chaos would result." A becoming modesty of inferior courts demands conscious realization of the position that they occupy in the interrelation and operation of the intergrated judicial system of the nation. After threshing carefully the multifarious issues raised by both counsel for the petitioners and the respondents, this court prefers to cut the Gordian knot and take up at once the two fundamental questions presented, namely, (1) whether or not the constitutionality of Act No. 4221 has been properly raised in these proceedings; and (2) in the affirmative, whether or not said Act is constitutional. Considerations of these issues will involve a discussion of certain incidental questions raised by the parties. To arrive at a correct conclusion on the first question, resort to certain guiding principles is necessary. It is a wellsettled rule that the constitutionality of an act of the legislature will not be determined by the courts unless that question is properly raised and presented inappropriate cases and is necessary to a determination of the case; i.e., the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota presented. (McGirr vs. Hamilton and Abreu [1915], 30 Phil., 563, 568; 6 R. C. L., pp. 76, 77; 12 C. J., pp. 780-782, 783.) The question of the constitutionality of an act of the legislature is frequently raised in ordinary actions. Nevertheless, resort may be made to extraordinary legal remedies, particularly where the remedies in the ordinary course of law even if available, are not plain, speedy and adequate. Thus, in Cu Unjieng vs. Patstone ([1922]), 42 Phil., 818), this court held that the question of the constitutionality of a statute may be raised by the petitioner in mandamus proceedings (see, also, 12 C. J., p. 783); and in Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Springer ([1927], 50 Phil., 259 [affirmed in Springer vs. Government of the Philippine Islands (1928), 277 U. S., 189; 72 Law. ed., 845]), this court declared an act of the legislature unconstitutional in an action of quo warranto brought in the name of the Government of the Philippines. It has also been held that the constitutionality of a statute may be questioned in habeas corpus proceedings (12 C. J., p. 783; Bailey on Habeas Corpus, Vol. I, pp. 97, 117), although there are authorities to the contrary; on an application for injunction to restrain action under the challenged statute (mandatory, see Cruz vs. Youngberg [1931], 56 Phil., 234); and even on an application for preliminary injunction where the determination of the constitutional question is necessary to a decision of the case. (12 C. J., p. 783.) The same may be said as regards prohibition and certiorari.(Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad [1925], 47 Phil., 385; [1926], 271 U. S., 500; 70 Law. ed., 1059; Bell vs. First Judicial District Court [1905], 28 Nev., 280; 81 Pac., 875; 113 A. S. R., 854; 6 Ann. Cas., 982; 1 L. R. A. [N. S], 843, and cases cited). The case of Yu

Cong Eng vs. Trinidad, supra, decided by this court twelve years ago was, like the present one, an original action for certiorari and prohibition. The constitutionality of Act No. 2972, popularly known as the Chinese Bookkeeping Law, was there challenged by the petitioners, and the constitutional issue was not met squarely by the respondent in a demurrer. A point was raised "relating to the propriety of the constitutional question being decided in original proceedings in prohibition." This court decided to take up the constitutional question and, with two justices dissenting, held that Act No. 2972 was constitutional. The case was elevated on writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States which reversed the judgment of this court and held that the Act was invalid. (271 U. S., 500; 70 Law. ed., 1059.) On the question of jurisdiction, however, the Federal Supreme Court, though its Chief Justice, said: By the Code of Civil Procedure of the Philippine Islands, section 516, the Philippine supreme court is granted concurrent jurisdiction in prohibition with courts of first instance over inferior tribunals or persons, and original jurisdiction over courts of first instance, when such courts are exercising functions without or in excess of their jurisdiction. It has been held by that court that the question of the validity of the criminal statute must usually be raised by a defendant in the trial court and be carried regularly in review to the Supreme Court. (CadwalladerGibson Lumber Co. vs. Del Rosario, 26 Phil., 192). But in this case where a new act seriously affected numerous persons and extensive property rights, and was likely to cause a multiplicity of actions, the Supreme Court exercised its discretion to bring the issue to the act's validity promptly before it and decide in the interest of the orderly administration of justice. The court relied by analogy upon the cases of Ex parte Young (209 U. S., 123;52 Law ed., 714; 13 L. R. A. [N. S.] 932; 28 Sup. Ct. Rep., 441; 14 Ann. Ca., 764; Traux vs. Raich, 239 U. S., 33; 60 Law. ed., 131; L. R. A. 1916D, 545; 36 Sup. Ct. Rep., 7; Ann. Cas., 1917B, 283; and Wilson vs. New, 243 U. S., 332; 61 Law. ed., 755; L. R. A. 1917E, 938; 37 Sup. Ct. Rep., 298; Ann. Cas. 1918A, 1024). Although objection to the jurisdiction was raise by demurrer to the petition, this is now disclaimed on behalf of the respondents, and both parties ask a decision on the merits. In view of the broad powers in prohibition granted to that court under the Island Code, we acquiesce in the desire of the parties. The writ of prohibition is an extraordinary judicial writ issuing out of a court of superior jurisdiction and directed to an inferior court, for the purpose of preventing the inferior tribunal from usurping a jurisdiction with which it is not legally vested. (High, Extraordinary Legal Remedies, p. 705.) The general rule, although there is a conflict in the cases, is that the merit of prohibition will not lie whether the inferior court has jurisdiction independent of the statute the constitutionality of which is questioned, because in such cases the interior court having jurisdiction may itself determine the constitutionality of the statute, and its decision may be subject to review, and consequently the complainant in such cases ordinarily has adequate remedy by appeal without resort to the writ of prohibition. But where the inferior court or tribunal derives its jurisdiction exclusively from an unconstitutional statute, it may be prevented by the writ of prohibition from enforcing that statute. (50 C. J., 670; Ex parte Round tree [1874, 51 Ala., 42; In re Macfarland, 30 App. [D. C.], 365; Curtis vs. Cornish [1912], 109 Me., 384; 84 A., 799; Pennington vs. Woolfolk [1880], 79 Ky., 13; State vs. Godfrey [1903], 54 W. Va., 54; 46 S. E., 185; Arnold vs. Shields [1837], 5 Dana, 19; 30 Am. Dec., 669.) Courts of First Instance sitting in probation proceedings derived their jurisdiction solely from Act No. 4221 which prescribes in detailed manner the procedure for granting probation to accused persons after their conviction has become final and before they have served their sentence. It is true that at common law the authority of the courts to suspend temporarily the execution of the sentence is recognized and, according to a number of state courts, including those of Massachusetts, Michigan, New York, and Ohio, the power is inherent in the courts (Commonwealth vs. Dowdican's Bail [1874], 115 Mass., 133; People vs. Stickel [1909], 156 Mich., 557; 121 N. W., 497; People ex rel. Forsyth vs. Court of Session [1894], 141 N. Y., 288; Weber vs. State [1898], 58 Ohio St., 616). But, in the leading case of Ex parte United States ([1916], 242 U. S., 27; 61 Law. ed., 129; L. R. A., 1917E, 1178; 37 Sup. Ct. Rep., 72; Ann. Cas. 1917B, 355), the Supreme Court of the United States expressed the opinion that under the common law the power of the court was limited to temporary suspension, and brushed aside the contention as to inherent judicial power saying, through Chief Justice White: Indisputably under our constitutional system the right to try offenses against the criminal laws and upon conviction to impose the punishment provided by law is judicial, and it is equally to be conceded that, in exerting the powers vested in them on such subject, courts inherently possess ample right to exercise reasonable, that is, judicial, discretion to enable them to wisely exert their authority. But these concessions afford no ground for the contention as to power here made, since it must rest upon the proposition that the power to enforce begets inherently a discretion to permanently refuse to do so. And the effect of the proposition urged upon the distribution of powers made by the Constitution will become apparent when it is observed that indisputable also is it that the authority to define and fix the punishment for crime is legislative and includes the right in advance to bring within judicial discretion, for the purpose of executing the statute, elements of consideration which would be otherwise beyond the scope of judicial authority, and that the right to relieve from the punishment, fixed by law and ascertained according to the methods by it provided belongs to the executive department.

Justice Carson, in his illuminating concurring opinion in the case of Director of Prisons vs. Judge of First Instance of Cavite (29 Phil., 265), decided by this court in 1915, also reached the conclusion that the power to suspend the execution of sentences pronounced in criminal cases is not inherent in the judicial function. "All are agreed", he said, "that in the absence of statutory authority, it does not lie within the power of the courts to grant such suspensions." (at p. 278.) Both petitioner and respondents are correct, therefore, when they argue that a Court of First Instance sitting in probation proceedings is a court of limited jurisdiction. Its jurisdiction in such proceedings is conferred exclusively by Act No. 4221 of the Philippine Legislature. It is, of course, true that the constitutionality of a statute will not be considered on application for prohibition where the question has not been properly brought to the attention of the court by objection of some kind (Hill vs. Tarver [1901], 130 Ala., 592; 30 S., 499; State ex rel. Kelly vs. Kirby [1914], 260 Mo., 120; 168 S. W., 746). In the case at bar, it is unquestionable that the constitutional issue has been squarely presented not only before this court by the petitioners but also before the trial court by the private prosecution. The respondent, Hon. Jose O Vera, however, acting as judge of the court below, declined to pass upon the question on the ground that the private prosecutor, not being a party whose rights are affected by the statute, may not raise said question. The respondent judge cited Cooley on Constitutional Limitations (Vol. I, p. 339; 12 C. J., sec. 177, pp. 760 and 762), and McGlue vs. Essex County ([1916], 225 Mass., 59; 113 N. E., 742, 743), as authority for the proposition that a court will not consider any attack made on the constitutionality of a statute by one who has no interest in defeating it because his rights are not affected by its operation. The respondent judge further stated that it may not motu proprio take up the constitutional question and, agreeing with Cooley that "the power to declare a legislative enactment void is one which the judge, conscious of the fallibility of the human judgment, will shrink from exercising in any case where he can conscientiously and with due regard to duty and official oath decline the responsibility" (Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed., Vol. I, p. 332), proceeded on the assumption that Act No. 4221 is constitutional. While therefore, the court a quo admits that the constitutional question was raised before it, it refused to consider the question solely because it was not raised by a proper party. Respondents herein reiterates this view. The argument is advanced that the private prosecution has no personality to appear in the hearing of the application for probation of defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng in criminal case No. 42648 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, and hence the issue of constitutionality was not properly raised in the lower court. Although, as a general rule, only those who are parties to a suit may question the constitutionality of a statute involved in a judicial decision, it has been held that since the decree pronounced by a court without jurisdiction is void, where the jurisdiction of the court depends on the validity of the statute in question, the issue of the constitutionality will be considered on its being brought to the attention of the court by persons interested in the effect to be given the statute.(12 C. J., sec. 184, p. 766.) And, even if we were to concede that the issue was not properly raised in the court below by the proper party, it does not follow that the issue may not be here raised in an original action of certiorari and prohibitions. It is true that, as a general rule, the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity, so that if not raised by the pleadings, ordinarily it may not be raised at the trial, and if not raised in the trial court, it will not considered on appeal. (12 C. J., p. 786. See, also, Cadwallader-Gibson Lumber Co. vs. Del Rosario, 26 Phil., 192, 193-195.) But we must state that the general rule admits of exceptions. Courts, in the exercise of sounds discretion, may determine the time when a question affecting the constitutionality of a statute should be presented. (In re Woolsey [1884], 95 N. Y., 135, 144.) Thus, in criminal cases, although there is a very sharp conflict of authorities, it is said that the question may be raised for the first time at any stage of the proceedings, either in the trial court or on appeal. (12 C. J., p. 786.) Even in civil cases, it has been held that it is the duty of a court to pass on the constitutional question, though raised for the first time on appeal, if it appears that a determination of the question is necessary to a decision of the case. (McCabe's Adm'x vs. Maysville & B. S. R. Co., [1910], 136 ky., 674; 124 S. W., 892; Lohmeyer vs. St. Louis Cordage Co. [1908], 214 Mo., 685; 113 S. W. 1108; Carmody vs. St. Louis Transit Co., [1905], 188 Mo., 572; 87 S. W., 913.) And it has been held that a constitutional question will be considered by an appellate court at any time, where it involves the jurisdiction of the court below (State vs. Burke [1911], 175 Ala., 561; 57 S., 870.) As to the power of this court to consider the constitutional question raised for the first time before this court in these proceedings, we turn again and point with emphasis to the case of Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad, supra. And on the hypotheses that the Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation, represented by the private prosecution, is not the proper party to raise the constitutional question here a point we do not now have to decide we are of the opinion that the People of the Philippines, represented by the Solicitor-General and the Fiscal of the City of Manila, is such a proper party in the present proceedings. The unchallenged rule is that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustained, direct injury as a result of its enforcement. It goes without saying that if Act No. 4221 really violates the constitution, the People of the Philippines, in whose name the present action is brought, has a substantial interest in having it set aside. Of grater import than the damage caused by the illegal expenditure of public funds is the mortal wound inflicted upon the fundamental law by the enforcement of an invalid statute. Hence, the well-settled rule that the state can challenge the validity of its own laws. In Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Springer ([1927]), 50 Phil., 259 (affirmed in Springer vs. Government of the Philippine Islands [1928], 277 U.S., 189; 72 Law. ed., 845), this court declared an act of the legislature unconstitutional in an action instituted in behalf of the Government of the Philippines. In Attorney General vs. Perkins ([1889], 73 Mich., 303, 311, 312; 41 N. W. 426, 428, 429), the State of Michigan, through its Attorney General, instituted quo warranto proceedings to test the right of the respondents to renew a mining corporation, alleging that the statute under which the respondents base their right was unconstitutional because it impaired the obligation of contracts. The capacity of the chief

law officer of the state to question the constitutionality of the statute was though, as a general rule, only those who are parties to a suit may question the constitutionality of a statute involved in a judicial decision, it has been held that since the decree pronounced by a court without jurisdiction in void, where the jurisdiction of the court depends on the validity of the statute in question, the issue of constitutionality will be considered on its being brought to the attention of the court by persons interested in the effect to begin the statute. (12 C.J., sec. 184, p. 766.) And, even if we were to concede that the issue was not properly raised in the court below by the proper party, it does not follow that the issue may not be here raised in an original action of certiorari and prohibition. It is true that, as a general rule, the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity, so that if not raised by the pleadings, ordinarily it may not be raised a the trial, and if not raised in the trial court, it will not be considered on appeal. (12 C.J., p. 786. See, also, Cadwallader-Gibson Lumber Co. vs. Del Rosario, 26 Phil., 192, 193-195.) But we must state that the general rule admits of exceptions. Courts, in the exercise of sound discretion, may determine the time when a question affecting the constitutionality of a statute should be presented. (In re Woolsey [19884], 95 N.Y., 135, 144.) Thus, in criminal cases, although there is a very sharp conflict of authorities, it is said that the question may be raised for the first time at any state of the proceedings, either in the trial court or on appeal. (12 C.J., p. 786.) Even in civil cases, it has been held that it is the duty of a court to pass on the constitutional question, though raised for first time on appeal, if it appears that a determination of the question is necessary to a decision of the case. (McCabe's Adm'x vs. Maysville & B. S. R. Co. [1910], 136 Ky., 674; 124 S. W., 892; Lohmeyer vs. St. Louis, Cordage Co. [1908], 214 Mo. 685; 113 S. W., 1108; Carmody vs. St. Louis Transit Co. [1905], 188 Mo., 572; 87 S. W., 913.) And it has been held that a constitutional question will be considered by an appellate court at any time, where it involves the jurisdiction of the court below (State vs. Burke [1911], 175 Ala., 561; 57 S., 870.) As to the power of this court to consider the constitutional question raised for the first time before this court in these proceedings, we turn again and point with emphasis to the case of Yu Cong Eng. vs. Trinidad, supra. And on the hypothesis that the Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation, represented by the private prosecution, is not the proper party to raise the constitutional question here a point we do not now have to decide we are of the opinion that the People of the Philippines, represented by the Solicitor-General and the Fiscal of the City of Manila, is such a proper party in the present proceedings. The unchallenged rule is that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement. It goes without saying that if Act No. 4221 really violates the Constitution, the People of the Philippines, in whose name the present action is brought, has a substantial interest in having it set aside. Of greater import than the damage caused by the illegal expenditure of public funds is the mortal wound inflicted upon the fundamental law by the enforcement of an invalid statute. Hence, the well-settled rule that the state can challenge the validity of its own laws. In Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Springer ([1927]), 50 Phil., 259 (affirmed in Springer vs. Government of the Philippine Islands [1928], 277 U.S., 189; 72 Law. ed., 845), this court declared an act of the legislature unconstitutional in an action instituted in behalf of the Government of the Philippines. In Attorney General vs. Perkings([1889], 73 Mich., 303, 311, 312; 41 N.W., 426, 428, 429), the State of Michigan, through its Attorney General, instituted quo warranto proceedings to test the right of the respondents to renew a mining corporation, alleging that the statute under which the respondents base their right was unconstitutional because it impaired the obligation of contracts. The capacity of the chief law officer of the state to question the constitutionality of the statute was itself questioned. Said the Supreme Court of Michigan, through Champlin, J.: . . . The idea seems to be that the people are estopped from questioning the validity of a law enacted by their representatives; that to an accusation by the people of Michigan of usurpation their government, a statute enacted by the people of Michigan is an adequate answer. The last proposition is true, but, if the statute relied on in justification is unconstitutional, it is statute only in form, and lacks the force of law, and is of no more saving effect to justify action under it than if it had never been enacted. The constitution is the supreme law, and to its behests the courts, the legislature, and the people must bow . . . The legislature and the respondents are not the only parties in interest upon such constitutional questions. As was remarked by Mr. Justice Story, in speaking of an acquiescence by a party affected by an unconstitutional act of the legislature: "The people have a deep and vested interest in maintaining all the constitutional limitations upon the exercise of legislative powers." (Allen vs. Mckeen, 1 Sum., 314.) In State vs. Doane ([1916], 98 Kan., 435; 158 Pac., 38, 40), an original action (mandamus) was brought by the Attorney-General of Kansas to test the constitutionality of a statute of the state. In disposing of the question whether or not the state may bring the action, the Supreme Court of Kansas said: . . . the state is a proper party indeed, the proper party to bring this action. The state is always interested where the integrity of its Constitution or statutes is involved. "It has an interest in seeing that the will of the Legislature is not disregarded, and need not, as an individual plaintiff must, show grounds of fearing more specific injury. (State vs. Kansas City 60 Kan., 518 [57 Pac., 118])." (State vs. Lawrence, 80 Kan., 707; 103 Pac., 839.)

Where the constitutionality of a statute is in doubt the state's law officer, its Attorney-General, or county attorney, may exercise his bet judgment as to what sort of action he will bring to have the matter determined, either by quo warranto to challenge its validity (State vs. Johnson, 61 Kan., 803; 60 Pac., 1068; 49 L.R.A., 662), by mandamus to compel obedience to its terms (State vs. Dolley, 82 Kan., 533; 108 Pac., 846), or by injunction to restrain proceedings under its questionable provisions (State ex rel. vs. City of Neodesha, 3 Kan. App., 319; 45 Pac., 122). Other courts have reached the same conclusion (See State vs. St. Louis S. W. Ry. Co. [1917], 197 S. W., 1006; State vs. S.H. Kress & Co. [1934], 155 S., 823; State vs. Walmsley [1935], 181 La., 597; 160 S., 91; State vs. Board of County Comr's [1934], 39 Pac. [2d], 286; First Const. Co. of Brooklyn vs. State [1917], 211 N.Y., 295; 116 N.E., 1020; Bush vs. State {1918], 187 Ind., 339; 119 N.E., 417; State vs. Watkins [1933], 176 La., 837; 147 S., 8, 10, 11). In the case last cited, the Supreme Court of Luisiana said: It is contended by counsel for Herbert Watkins that a district attorney, being charged with the duty of enforcing the laws, has no right to plead that a law is unconstitutional. In support of the argument three decisions are cited, viz.: State ex rel. Hall, District Attorney, vs. Judge of Tenth Judicial District (33 La. Ann., 1222); State ex rel. Nicholls, Governor vs. Shakespeare, Mayor of New Orleans (41 Ann., 156; 6 So., 592); and State ex rel., Banking Co., etc. vs. Heard, Auditor (47 La. Ann., 1679; 18 So., 746; 47 L. R. A., 512). These decisions do not forbid a district attorney to plead that a statute is unconstitutional if he finds if in conflict with one which it is his duty to enforce. In State ex rel. Hall, District Attorney, vs. Judge, etc., the ruling was the judge should not, merely because he believed a certain statute to be unconstitutional forbid the district attorney to file a bill of information charging a person with a violation of the statute. In other words, a judge should not judicially declare a statute unconstitutional until the question of constitutionality is tendered for decision, and unless it must be decided in order to determine the right of a party litigant. State ex rel. Nicholls, Governor, etc., is authority for the proposition merely that an officer on whom a statute imposes the duty of enforcing its provisions cannot avoid the duty upon the ground that he considers the statute unconstitutional, and hence in enforcing the statute he is immune from responsibility if the statute be unconstitutional. State ex rel. Banking Co., etc., is authority for the proposition merely that executive officers, e.g., the state auditor and state treasurer, should not decline to perform ministerial duties imposed upon them by a statute, on the ground that they believe the statute is unconstitutional. It is the duty of a district attorney to enforce the criminal laws of the state, and, above all, to support the Constitution of the state. If, in the performance of his duty he finds two statutes in conflict with each other, or one which repeals another, and if, in his judgment, one of the two statutes is unconstitutional, it is his duty to enforce the other; and, in order to do so, he is compelled to submit to the court, by way of a plea, that one of the statutes is unconstitutional. If it were not so, the power of the Legislature would be free from constitutional limitations in the enactment of criminal laws. The respondents do not seem to doubt seriously the correctness of the general proposition that the state may impugn the validity of its laws. They have not cited any authority running clearly in the opposite direction. In fact, they appear to have proceeded on the assumption that the rule as stated is sound but that it has no application in the present case, nor may it be invoked by the City Fiscal in behalf of the People of the Philippines, one of the petitioners herein, the principal reasons being that the validity before this court, that the City Fiscal is estopped from attacking the validity of the Act and, not authorized challenge the validity of the Act in its application outside said city. (Additional memorandum of respondents, October 23, 1937, pp. 8,. 10, 17 and 23.) The mere fact that the Probation Act has been repeatedly relied upon the past and all that time has not been attacked as unconstitutional by the Fiscal of Manila but, on the contrary, has been impliedly regarded by him as constitutional, is no reason for considering the People of the Philippines estopped from nor assailing its validity. For courts will pass upon a constitutional questions only when presented before it in bona fide cases for determination, and the fact that the question has not been raised before is not a valid reason for refusing to allow it to be raised later. The fiscal and all others are justified in relying upon the statute and treating it as valid until it is held void by the courts in proper cases. It remains to consider whether the determination of the constitutionality of Act No. 4221 is necessary to the resolution of the instant case. For, ". . . while the court will meet the question with firmness, where its decision is indispensable, it is the part of wisdom, and just respect for the legislature, renders it proper, to waive it, if the case in which it arises, can be decided on other points." (Ex parte Randolph [1833], 20 F. Cas. No. 11, 558; 2 Brock., 447. Vide, also Hoover vs. wood [1857], 9 Ind., 286, 287.) It has been held that the determination of a constitutional question is necessary whenever it is essential to the decision of the case (12 C. J., p. 782, citing Long Sault Dev. Co. vs. Kennedy [1913], 158 App. Div., 398; 143 N. Y. Supp., 454 [aff. 212 N.Y., 1: 105 N. E., 849; Ann. Cas. 1915D, 56; and app dism 242 U.S., 272]; Hesse vs. Ledesma, 7 Porto Rico Fed., 520; Cowan vs. Doddridge, 22 Gratt [63 Va.], 458; Union Line Co., vs. Wisconsin R. Commn., 146 Wis., 523; 129 N. W., 605), as where the right of a party is founded solely on a statute the

validity of which is attacked. (12 C.J., p. 782, citing Central Glass Co. vs. Niagrara F. Ins. Co., 131 La., 513; 59 S., 972; Cheney vs. Beverly, 188 Mass., 81; 74 N.E., 306). There is no doubt that the respondent Cu Unjieng draws his privilege to probation solely from Act No. 4221 now being assailed. Apart from the foregoing considerations, that court will also take cognizance of the fact that the Probation Act is a new addition to our statute books and its validity has never before been passed upon by the courts; that may persons accused and convicted of crime in the City of Manila have applied for probation; that some of them are already on probation; that more people will likely take advantage of the Probation Act in the future; and that the respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng has been at large for a period of about four years since his first conviction. All wait the decision of this court on the constitutional question. Considering, therefore, the importance which the instant case has assumed and to prevent multiplicity of suits, strong reasons of public policy demand that the constitutionality of Act No. 4221 be now resolved. (Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad [1925], 47 Phil., 385; [1926], 271 U.S., 500; 70 Law. ed., 1059. See 6 R.C.L., pp. 77, 78; People vs. Kennedy [1913], 207 N.Y., 533; 101 N.E., 442, 444; Ann. Cas. 1914C, 616; Borginis vs. Falk Co. [1911], 147 Wis., 327; 133 N.W., 209, 211; 37 L.R.A. [N.S.] 489; Dimayuga and Fajardo vs. Fernandez [1922], 43 Phil., 304.) In Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad, supra, an analogous situation confronted us. We said: "Inasmuch as the property and personal rights of nearly twelve thousand merchants are affected by these proceedings, and inasmuch as Act No. 2972 is a new law not yet interpreted by the courts, in the interest of the public welfare and for the advancement of public policy, we have determined to overrule the defense of want of jurisdiction in order that we may decide the main issue. We have here an extraordinary situation which calls for a relaxation of the general rule." Our ruling on this point was sustained by the Supreme Court of the United States. A more binding authority in support of the view we have taken can not be found. We have reached the conclusion that the question of the constitutionality of Act No. 4221 has been properly raised. Now for the main inquiry: Is the Act unconstitutional? Under a doctrine peculiarly American, it is the office and duty of the judiciary to enforce the Constitution. This court, by clear implication from the provisions of section 2, subsection 1, and section 10, of Article VIII of the Constitution, may declare an act of the national legislature invalid because in conflict with the fundamental lay. It will not shirk from its sworn duty to enforce the Constitution. And, in clear cases, it will not hesitate to give effect to the supreme law by setting aside a statute in conflict therewith. This is of the essence of judicial duty. This court is not unmindful of the fundamental criteria in cases of this nature that all reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of a statute. An act of the legislature approved by the executive, is presumed to be within constitutional limitations. The responsibility of upholding the Constitution rests not on the courts alone but on the legislature as well. "The question of the validity of every statute is first determined by the legislative department of the government itself." (U.S. vs. Ten Yu [1912], 24 Phil., 1, 10; Case vs. Board of Health and Heiser [1913], 24 Phil., 250, 276; U.S. vs. Joson [1913], 26 Phil., 1.) And a statute finally comes before the courts sustained by the sanction of the executive. The members of the Legislature and the Chief Executive have taken an oath to support the Constitution and it must be presumed that they have been true to this oath and that in enacting and sanctioning a particular law they did not intend to violate the Constitution. The courts cannot but cautiously exercise its power to overturn the solemn declarations of two of the three grand departments of the governments. (6 R.C.L., p. 101.) Then, there is that peculiar political philosophy which bids the judiciary to reflect the wisdom of the people as expressed through an elective Legislature and an elective Chief Executive. It follows, therefore, that the courts will not set aside a law as violative of the Constitution except in a clear case. This is a proposition too plain to require a citation of authorities. One of the counsel for respondents, in the course of his impassioned argument, called attention to the fact that the President of the Philippines had already expressed his opinion against the constitutionality of the Probation Act, adverting that as to the Executive the resolution of this question was a foregone conclusion. Counsel, however, reiterated his confidence in the integrity and independence of this court. We take notice of the fact that the President in his message dated September 1, 1937, recommended to the National Assembly the immediate repeal of the Probation Act (No. 4221); that this message resulted in the approval of Bill No. 2417 of the Nationality Assembly repealing the probation Act, subject to certain conditions therein mentioned; but that said bill was vetoed by the President on September 13, 1937, much against his wish, "to have stricken out from the statute books of the Commonwealth a law . . . unfair and very likely unconstitutional." It is sufficient to observe in this connection that, in vetoing the bill referred to, the President exercised his constitutional prerogative. He may express the reasons which he may deem proper for taking such a step, but his reasons are not binding upon us in the determination of actual controversies submitted for our determination. Whether or not the Executive should express or in any manner insinuate his opinion on a matter encompassed within his broad constitutional power of veto but which happens to be at the same time pending determination in this court is a question of propriety for him exclusively to decide or determine. Whatever opinion is expressed by him under these circumstances, however, cannot sway our judgment on way or another and prevent us from taking what in our opinion is the proper course of action to take in a given case. It if is ever necessary for us to make any vehement affirmance during this formative period of our political history, it is that we are independent of the Executive no less than of the Legislative department of our

government independent in the performance of our functions, undeterred by any consideration, free from politics, indifferent to popularity, and unafraid of criticism in the accomplishment of our sworn duty as we see it and as we understand it. The constitutionality of Act No. 4221 is challenged on three principal grounds: (1) That said Act encroaches upon the pardoning power of the Executive; (2) that its constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power and (3) that it denies the equal protection of the laws. 1. Section 21 of the Act of Congress of August 29, 1916, commonly known as the Jones Law, in force at the time of the approval of Act No. 4221, otherwise known as the Probation Act, vests in the Governor-General of the Philippines "the exclusive power to grant pardons and reprieves and remit fines and forfeitures". This power is now vested in the President of the Philippines. (Art. VII, sec. 11, subsec. 6.) The provisions of the Jones Law and the Constitution differ in some respects. The adjective "exclusive" found in the Jones Law has been omitted from the Constitution. Under the Jones Law, as at common law, pardon could be granted any time after the commission of the offense, either before or after conviction (Vide Constitution of the United States, Art. II, sec. 2; In re Lontok [1922], 43 Phil., 293). The Governor-General of the Philippines was thus empowered, like the President of the United States, to pardon a person before the facts of the case were fully brought to light. The framers of our Constitution thought this undesirable and, following most of the state constitutions, provided that the pardoning power can only be exercised "after conviction". So, too, under the new Constitution, the pardoning power does not extend to "cases of impeachment". This is also the rule generally followed in the United States (Vide Constitution of the United States, Art. II, sec. 2). The rule in England is different. There, a royal pardon can not be pleaded in bar of an impeachment; "but," says Blackstone, "after the impeachment has been solemnly heard and determined, it is not understood that the king's royal grace is further restrained or abridged." (Vide, Ex parte Wells [1856], 18 How., 307; 15 Law. ed., 421; Com. vs. Lockwood [1872], 109 Mass., 323; 12 Am. Rep., 699; Sterling vs. Drake [1876], 29 Ohio St., 457; 23 am. Rep., 762.) The reason for the distinction is obvious. In England, Judgment on impeachment is not confined to mere "removal from office and disqualification to hold and enjoy any office of honor, trust, or profit under the Government" (Art. IX, sec. 4, Constitution of the Philippines) but extends to the whole punishment attached by law to the offense committed. The House of Lords, on a conviction may, by its sentence, inflict capital punishment, perpetual banishment, perpetual banishment, fine or imprisonment, depending upon the gravity of the offense committed, together with removal from office and incapacity to hold office. (Com. vs. Lockwood, supra.) Our Constitution also makes specific mention of "commutation" and of the power of the executive to impose, in the pardons he may grant, such conditions, restrictions and limitations as he may deem proper. Amnesty may be granted by the President under the Constitution but only with the concurrence of the National Assembly. We need not dwell at length on the significance of these fundamental changes. It is sufficient for our purposes to state that the pardoning power has remained essentially the same. The question is: Has the pardoning power of the Chief Executive under the Jones Law been impaired by the Probation Act? As already stated, the Jones Law vests the pardoning power exclusively in the Chief Executive. The exercise of the power may not, therefore, be vested in anyone else. ". . . The benign prerogative of mercy reposed in the executive cannot be taken away nor fettered by any legislative restrictions, nor can like power be given by the legislature to any other officer or authority. The coordinate departments of government have nothing to do with the pardoning power, since no person properly belonging to one of the departments can exercise any powers appertaining to either of the others except in cases expressly provided for by the constitution." (20 R.C.L., pp., , and cases cited.) " . . . where the pardoning power is conferred on the executive without express or implied limitations, the grant is exclusive, and the legislature can neither exercise such power itself nor delegate it elsewhere, nor interfere with or control the proper exercise thereof, . . ." (12 C.J., pp. 838, 839, and cases cited.) If Act No. 4221, then, confers any pardoning power upon the courts it is for that reason unconstitutional and void. But does it? In the famous Killitts decision involving an embezzlement case, the Supreme Court of the United States ruled in 1916 that an order indefinitely suspending sentenced was void. (Ex parte United States [1916], 242 U.S., 27; 61 Law. ed., 129; L.R.A. 1917E, 1178; 37 Sup. Ct. Rep., 72; Ann. Cas. 1917B, 355.) Chief Justice White, after an exhaustive review of the authorities, expressed the opinion of the court that under the common law the power of the court was limited to temporary suspension and that the right to suspend sentenced absolutely and permanently was vested in the executive branch of the government and not in the judiciary. But, the right of Congress to establish probation by statute was conceded. Said the court through its Chief Justice: ". . . and so far as the future is concerned, that is, the causing of the imposition of penalties as fixed to be subject, by probation legislation or such other means as the legislative mind may devise, to such judicial discretion as may be adequate to enable courts to meet by the exercise of an enlarged but wise discretion the infinite variations which may be presented to them for judgment, recourse must be had Congress whose legislative power on the subject is in the very nature of things adequately complete." (Quoted in Riggs vs. United States [1926], 14 F. [2d], 5, 6.) This decision led the National Probation Association and others to agitate for the enactment by Congress of a federal probation law. Such action was finally taken on March 4, 1925 (chap. 521, 43 Stat. L. 159, U.S.C.

title 18, sec. 724). This was followed by an appropriation to defray the salaries and expenses of a certain number of probation officers chosen by civil service. (Johnson, Probation for Juveniles and Adults, p. 14.) In United States vs. Murray ([1925], 275 U.S., 347; 48 Sup. Ct. Rep., 146; 72 Law. ed., 309), the Supreme Court of the United States, through Chief Justice Taft, held that when a person sentenced to imprisonment by a district court has begun to serve his sentence, that court has no power under the Probation Act of March 4, 1925 to grant him probation even though the term at which sentence was imposed had not yet expired. In this case of Murray, the constitutionality of the probation Act was not considered but was assumed. The court traced the history of the Act and quoted from the report of the Committee on the Judiciary of the United States House of Representatives (Report No. 1377, 68th Congress, 2 Session) the following statement: Prior to the so-called Killitts case, rendered in December, 1916, the district courts exercised a form of probation either, by suspending sentence or by placing the defendants under state probation officers or volunteers. In this case, however (Ex parte United States, 242 U.S., 27; 61 L. Ed., 129; L.R.A., 1917E, 1178; 37 Sup. Ct. Rep., 72 Ann. Cas. 1917B, 355), the Supreme Court denied the right of the district courts to suspend sentenced. In the same opinion the court pointed out the necessity for action by Congress if the courts were to exercise probation powers in the future . . . Since this decision was rendered, two attempts have been made to enact probation legislation. In 1917, a bill was favorably reported by the Judiciary Committee and passed the House. In 1920, the judiciary Committee again favorably reported a probation bill to the House, but it was never reached for definite action. If this bill is enacted into law, it will bring the policy of the Federal government with reference to its treatment of those convicted of violations of its criminal laws in harmony with that of the states of the Union. At the present time every state has a probation law, and in all but twelve states the law applies both to adult and juvenile offenders. (see, also, Johnson, Probation for Juveniles and Adults [1928], Chap. I.) The constitutionality of the federal probation law has been sustained by inferior federal courts. In Riggs vs. United States supra, the Circuit Court of Appeals of the Fourth Circuit said: Since the passage of the Probation Act of March 4, 1925, the questions under consideration have been reviewed by the Circuit Court of Appeals of the Ninth Circuit (7 F. [2d], 590), and the constitutionality of the act fully sustained, and the same held in no manner to encroach upon the pardoning power of the President. This case will be found to contain an able and comprehensive review of the law applicable here. It arose under the act we have to consider, and to it and the authorities cited therein special reference is made (Nix vs. James, 7 F. [2d], 590, 594), as is also to a decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals of the Seventh Circuit (Kriebel vs. U.S., 10 F. [2d], 762), likewise construing the Probation Act. We have seen that in 1916 the Supreme Court of the United States; in plain and unequivocal language, pointed to Congress as possessing the requisite power to enact probation laws, that a federal probation law as actually enacted in 1925, and that the constitutionality of the Act has been assumed by the Supreme Court of the United States in 1928 and consistently sustained by the inferior federal courts in a number of earlier cases. We are fully convinced that the Philippine Legislature, like the Congress of the United States, may legally enact a probation law under its broad power to fix the punishment of any and all penal offenses. This conclusion is supported by other authorities. In Ex parte Bates ([1915], 20 N. M., 542; L.R.A. 1916A, 1285; 151 Pac., 698, the court said: "It is clearly within the province of the Legislature to denominate and define all classes of crime, and to prescribe for each a minimum and maximum punishment." And in State vs. Abbott ([1910], 87 S.C., 466; 33 L.R.A. [N. S.], 112; 70 S. E., 6; Ann. Cas. 1912B, 1189), the court said: "The legislative power to set punishment for crime is very broad, and in the exercise of this power the general assembly may confer on trial judges, if it sees fit, the largest discretion as to the sentence to be imposed, as to the beginning and end of the punishment and whether it should be certain or indeterminate or conditional." (Quoted in State vs. Teal [1918], 108 S. C., 455; 95 S. E., 69.) Indeed, the Philippine Legislature has defined all crimes and fixed the penalties for their violation. Invariably, the legislature has demonstrated the desire to vest in the courts particularly the trial courts large discretion in imposing the penalties which the law prescribes in particular cases. It is believed that justice can best be served by vesting this power in the courts, they being in a position to best determine the penalties which an individual convict, peculiarly circumstanced, should suffer. Thus, while courts are not allowed to refrain from imposing a sentence merely because, taking into consideration the degree of malice and the injury caused by the offense, the penalty provided by law is clearly excessive, the courts being allowed in such case to submit to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, such statement as it may deem proper (see art. 5, Revised Penal Code), in cases where both mitigating and aggravating circumstances are attendant in the commission of a crime and the law

provides for a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, the courts may allow such circumstances to offset one another in consideration of their number and importance, and to apply the penalty according to the result of such compensation. (Art. 63, rule 4, Revised Penal Code; U.S. vs. Reguera and Asuategui [1921], 41 Phil., 506.) Again, article 64, paragraph 7, of the Revised Penal Code empowers the courts to determine, within the limits of each periods, in case the penalty prescribed by law contains three periods, the extent of the evil produced by the crime. In the imposition of fines, the courts are allowed to fix any amount within the limits established by law, considering not only the mitigating and aggravating circumstances, but more particularly the wealth or means of the culprit. (Art. 66, Revised Penal Code.) Article 68, paragraph 1, of the same Code provides that "a discretionary penalty shall be imposed" upon a person under fifteen but over nine years of age, who has not acted without discernment, but always lower by two degrees at least than that prescribed by law for the crime which he has committed. Article 69 of the same Code provides that in case of "incomplete self-defense", i.e., when the crime committed is not wholly excusable by reason of the lack of some of the conditions required to justify the same or to exempt from criminal liability in the several cases mentioned in article 11 and 12 of the Code, "the courts shall impose the penalty in the period which may be deemed proper, in view of the number and nature of the conditions of exemption present or lacking." And, in case the commission of what are known as "impossible" crimes, "the court, having in mind the social danger and the degree of criminality shown by the offender," shall impose upon him either arresto mayor or a fine ranging from 200 to 500 pesos. (Art. 59, Revised Penal Code.) Under our Revised Penal Code, also, one-half of the period of preventive imprisonment is deducted form the entire term of imprisonment, except in certain cases expressly mentioned (art. 29); the death penalty is not imposed when the guilty person is more than seventy years of age, or where upon appeal or revision of the case by the Supreme Court, all the members thereof are not unanimous in their voting as to the propriety of the imposition of the death penalty (art. 47, see also, sec. 133, Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 3); the death sentence is not to be inflicted upon a woman within the three years next following the date of the sentence or while she is pregnant, or upon any person over seventy years of age (art. 83); and when a convict shall become insane or an imbecile after final sentence has been pronounced, or while he is serving his sentenced, the execution of said sentence shall be suspended with regard to the personal penalty during the period of such insanity or imbecility (art. 79). But the desire of the legislature to relax what might result in the undue harshness of the penal laws is more clearly demonstrated in various other enactments, including the probation Act. There is the Indeterminate Sentence Law enacted in 1933 as Act No. 4103 and subsequently amended by Act No. 4225, establishing a system of parole (secs. 5 to 100 and granting the courts large discretion in imposing the penalties of the law. Section 1 of the law as amended provides; "hereafter, in imposing a prison sentence for an offenses punished by the Revised Penal Code, or its amendments, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of the said Code, and to a minimum which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense; and if the offense is punished by any other law, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the minimum shall not be less than the minimum term prescribed by the same." Certain classes of convicts are, by section 2 of the law, excluded from the operation thereof. The Legislature has also enacted the Juvenile Delinquency Law (Act No. 3203) which was subsequently amended by Act No. 3559. Section 7 of the original Act and section 1 of the amendatory Act have become article 80 of the Revised Penal Code, amended by Act No. 4117 of the Philippine Legislature and recently reamended by Commonwealth Act No. 99 of the National Assembly. In this Act is again manifested the intention of the legislature to "humanize" the penal laws. It allows, in effect, the modification in particular cases of the penalties prescribed by law by permitting the suspension of the execution of the judgment in the discretion of the trial court, after due hearing and after investigation of the particular circumstances of the offenses, the criminal record, if any, of the convict, and his social history. The Legislature has in reality decreed that in certain cases no punishment at all shall be suffered by the convict as long as the conditions of probation are faithfully observed. It this be so, then, it cannot be said that the Probation Act comes in conflict with the power of the Chief Executive to grant pardons and reprieves, because, to use the language of the Supreme Court of New Mexico, "the element of punishment or the penalty for the commission of a wrong, while to be declared by the courts as a judicial function under and within the limits of law as announced by legislative acts, concerns solely the procedure and conduct of criminal causes, with which the executive can have nothing to do." (Ex parte Bates, supra.) In Williams vs. State ([1926], 162 Ga., 327; 133 S.E., 843), the court upheld the constitutionality of the Georgia probation statute against the contention that it attempted to delegate to the courts the pardoning power lodged by the constitution in the governor alone is vested with the power to pardon after final sentence has been imposed by the courts, the power of the courts to imposed any penalty which may be from time to time prescribed by law and in such manner as may be defined cannot be questioned." We realize, of course, the conflict which the American cases disclose. Some cases hold it unlawful for the legislature to vest in the courts the power to suspend the operation of a sentenced, by probation or otherwise, as to do so would encroach upon the pardoning power of the executive. (In re Webb [1895], 89 Wis., 354; 27 L.R.A., 356; 46 Am. St. Rep., 846; 62 N.W., 177; 9 Am. Crim., Rep., 702; State ex rel. Summerfield vs. Moran [1919], 43 Nev., 150; 182 Pac., 927; Ex parte Clendenning [1908], 22 Okla., 108; 1 Okla. Crim. Rep., 227; 19 L.R.A. [N.S.], 1041; 132 Am. St. Rep., 628;

97 Pac., 650; People vs. Barrett [1903], 202 Ill, 287; 67 N.E., 23; 63 L.R.A., 82; 95 Am. St. Rep., 230; Snodgrass vs. State [1912], 67 Tex. Crim. Rep., 615; 41 L. R. A. [N. S.], 1144; 150 S. W., 162; Ex parte Shelor [1910], 33 Nev., 361;111 Pac., 291; Neal vs. State [1898], 104 Ga., 509; 42 L. R. A., 190; 69 Am. St. Rep., 175; 30 S. E. 858; State ex rel. Payne vs. Anderson [1921], 43 S. D., 630; 181 N. W., 839; People vs. Brown, 54 Mich., 15; 19 N. W., 571; States vs. Dalton [1903], 109 Tenn., 544; 72 S. W., 456.) Other cases, however, hold contra. (Nix vs. James [1925; C. C. A., 9th], 7 F. [2d], 590; Archer vs. Snook [1926; D. C.], 10 F. [2d], 567; Riggs. vs. United States [1926; C. C. A. 4th], 14]) [2d], 5; Murphy vs. States [1926], 171 Ark., 620; 286 S. W., 871; 48 A. L. R., 1189; Re Giannini [1912], 18 Cal. App., 166; 122 Pac., 831; Re Nachnaber [1928], 89 Cal. App., 530; 265 Pac., 392; Ex parte De Voe [1931], 114 Cal. App., 730; 300 Pac., 874; People vs. Patrick [1897], 118 Cal., 332; 50 Pac., 425; Martin vs. People [1917], 69 Colo., 60; 168 Pac., 1171; Belden vs. Hugo [1914], 88 Conn., 50; 91 A., 369, 370, 371; Williams vs. State [1926], 162 Ga., 327; 133 S. E., 843; People vs. Heise [1913], 257 Ill., 443; 100 N. E., 1000; Parker vs. State [1893], 135 Ind., 534; 35 N. E., 179; 23 L. R. A., 859; St. Hillarie, Petitioner [1906], 101 Me., 522; 64 Atl., 882; People vs. Stickle [1909], 156 Mich., 557; 121 N. W., 497; State vs. Fjolander [1914], 125 Minn., 529; State ex rel. Bottomnly vs. District Court [1925], 73 Mont., 541; 237 Pac., 525; State vs. Everitt [1913], 164 N. C., 399; 79 S. E., 274; 47 L. R. A. [N. S.], 848; State ex rel. Buckley vs. Drew [1909], 75 N. H., 402; 74 Atl., 875; State vs. Osborne [1911], 79 N. J. Eq., 430; 82 Atl. 424; Ex parte Bates [1915], 20 N. M., 542; L. R. A., 1916 A. 1285; 151 Pac., 698; People vs. ex rel. Forsyth vs. Court of Session [1894], 141 N. Y., 288; 23 L. R. A., 856; 36 N. E., 386; 15 Am. Crim. Rep., 675; People ex rel. Sullivan vs. Flynn [1907], 55 Misc., 639; 106 N. Y. Supp., 928; People vs. Goodrich [1914], 149 N. Y. Supp., 406; Moore vs. Thorn [1935], 245 App. Div., 180; 281 N. Y. Supp., 49; Re Hart [1914], 29 N. D., 38; L. R. A., 1915C, 1169; 149 N. W., 568; Ex parte Eaton [1925], 29 Okla., Crim. Rep., 275; 233 P., 781; State vs. Teal [1918], 108 S. C., 455; 95 S. E., 69; State vs. Abbot [1910], 87 S. C., 466; 33 L.R.A., [N. S.], 112; 70 S. E., 6; Ann. Cas., 1912B, 1189; Fults vs. States [1854],34 Tenn., 232; Woods vs. State [1814], 130 Tenn., 100; 169 S. W., 558; Baker vs. State [1814], 130 Tenn., 100; 169 S. W., 558; Baker vs. State [1913],70 Tex., Crim. Rep., 618; 158 S. W., 998; Cook vs. State [1914], 73 Tex. Crim. Rep., 548; 165 S. W., 573; King vs. State [1914], 72 Tex. Crim. Rep., 394; 162 S. W., 890; Clare vs. State [1932], 122 Tex. Crim. Rep., 394; 162 S. W., 890; Clare vs. State [1932], 122 Tex. Crim. Rep., 211; 54 S. W. [2d], 127; Re Hall [1927], 100 Vt., 197; 136 A., 24; Richardson vs. Com. [1921], 131 Va., 802; 109 S.E., 460; State vs. Mallahan [1911], 65 Wash., 287; 118 Pac., 42; State ex rel. Tingstand vs. Starwich [1922], 119 Wash., 561; 206 Pac., 29; 26 A. L. R., 393; 396.) We elect to follow this long catena of authorities holding that the courts may be legally authorized by the legislature to suspend sentence by the establishment of a system of probation however characterized. State ex rel. Tingstand vs. Starwich ([1922], 119 Wash., 561; 206 Pac., 29; 26 A. L. R., 393), deserved particular mention. In that case, a statute enacted in 1921 which provided for the suspension of the execution of a sentence until otherwise ordered by the court, and required that the convicted person be placed under the charge of a parole or peace officer during the term of such suspension, on such terms as the court may determine, was held constitutional and as not giving the court a power in violation of the constitutional provision vesting the pardoning power in the chief executive of the state. (Vide, also, Re Giannini [1912], 18 Cal App., 166; 122 Pac., 831.) Probation and pardon are not coterminous; nor are they the same. They are actually district and different from each other, both in origin and in nature. In People ex rel. Forsyth vs. Court of Sessions ([1894], 141 N. Y., 288, 294; 36 N. E., 386, 388; 23 L. R. A., 856; 15 Am. Crim. Rep., 675), the Court of Appeals of New York said: . . . The power to suspend sentence and the power to grant reprieves and pardons, as understood when the constitution was adopted, are totally distinct and different in their nature. The former was always a part of the judicial power; the latter was always a part of the executive power. The suspension of the sentence simply postpones the judgment of the court temporarily or indefinitely, but the conviction and liability following it, and the civil disabilities, remain and become operative when judgment is rendered. A pardon reaches both the punishment prescribed for the offense and the guilt of the offender. It releases the punishment, and blots out of existence the guilt, so that in the eye of the law, the offender is as innocent as if he had never committed the offense. It removes the penalties and disabilities, and restores him to all his civil rights. It makes him, as it were, a new man, and gives him a new credit and capacity. (Ex parte Garland, 71 U. S., 4 Wall., 333; 18 Law. ed., 366; U. S. vs. Klein, 80 U. S., 13 Wall., 128; 20 Law. ed., 519; Knote vs. U. S., 95 U. S., 149; 24 Law. ed., 442.) The framers of the federal and the state constitutions were perfectly familiar with the principles governing the power to grant pardons, and it was conferred by these instruments upon the executive with full knowledge of the law upon the subject, and the words of the constitution were used to express the authority formerly exercised by the English crown, or by its representatives in the colonies. (Ex parte Wells, 59 U. S., 18 How., 307; 15 Law. ed., 421.) As this power was understood, it did not comprehend any part of the judicial functions to suspend sentence, and it was never intended that the authority to grant reprieves and pardons should abrogate, or in any degree restrict, the exercise of that power in regard to its own judgments, that criminal courts has so long maintained. The two powers, so distinct and different in their nature and character, were still left separate and distinct, the one to be exercised by the executive, and the other by the judicial department. We therefore conclude

that a statute which, in terms, authorizes courts of criminal jurisdiction to suspend sentence in certain cases after conviction, a power inherent in such courts at common law, which was understood when the constitution was adopted to be an ordinary judicial function, and which, ever since its adoption, has been exercised of legislative power under the constitution. It does not encroach, in any just sense, upon the powers of the executive, as they have been understood and practiced from the earliest times. (Quoted with approval in Directors of Prisons vs. Judge of First Instance of Cavite [1915], 29 Phil., 265, Carson, J., concurring, at pp. 294, 295.) In probation, the probationer is in no true sense, as in pardon, a free man. He is not finally and completely exonerated. He is not exempt from the entire punishment which the law inflicts. Under the Probation Act, the probationer's case is not terminated by the mere fact that he is placed on probation. Section 4 of the Act provides that the probation may be definitely terminated and the probationer finally discharged from supervision only after the period of probation shall have been terminated and the probation officer shall have submitted a report, and the court shall have found that the probationer has complied with the conditions of probation. The probationer, then, during the period of probation, remains in legal custody subject to the control of the probation officer and of the court; and, he may be rearrested upon the nonfulfillment of the conditions of probation and, when rearrested, may be committed to prison to serve the sentence originally imposed upon him. (Secs. 2, 3, 5 and 6, Act No. 4221.) The probation described in the act is not pardon. It is not complete liberty, and may be far from it. It is really a new mode of punishment, to be applied by the judge in a proper case, in substitution of the imprisonment and find prescribed by the criminal laws. For this reason its application is as purely a judicial act as any other sentence carrying out the law deemed applicable to the offense. The executive act of pardon, on the contrary, is against the criminal law, which binds and directs the judges, or rather is outside of and above it. There is thus no conflict with the pardoning power, and no possible unconstitutionality of the Probation Act for this cause. (Archer vs. Snook [1926], 10 F. [2d], 567, 569.) Probation should also be distinguished from reprieve and from commutation of the sentence. Snodgrass vs. State ([1912], 67 Tex. Crim. Rep., 615;41 L. R. A. [N. S.], 1144; 150 S. W., 162), is relied upon most strongly by the petitioners as authority in support of their contention that the power to grant pardons and reprieves, having been vested exclusively upon the Chief Executive by the Jones Law, may not be conferred by the legislature upon the courts by means of probation law authorizing the indefinite judicial suspension of sentence. We have examined that case and found that although the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas held that the probation statute of the state in terms conferred on the district courts the power to grant pardons to persons convicted of crime, it also distinguished between suspensions sentence on the one hand, and reprieve and commutation of sentence on the other. Said the court, through Harper, J.: That the power to suspend the sentence does not conflict with the power of the Governor to grant reprieves is settled by the decisions of the various courts; it being held that the distinction between a "reprieve" and a suspension of sentence is that a reprieve postpones the execution of the sentence to a day certain, whereas a suspension is for an indefinite time. (Carnal vs. People, 1 Parker, Cr. R., 262; In re Buchanan, 146 N. Y., 264; 40 N. E., 883), and cases cited in 7 Words & Phrases, pp. 6115, 6116. This law cannot be hold in conflict with the power confiding in the Governor to grant commutations of punishment, for a commutations is not but to change the punishment assessed to a less punishment. In State ex rel. Bottomnly vs. District Court ([1925], 73 Mont., 541; 237 Pac., 525), the Supreme Court of Montana had under consideration the validity of the adult probation law of the state enacted in 1913, now found in sections 1207812086, Revised Codes of 1921. The court held the law valid as not impinging upon the pardoning power of the executive. In a unanimous decision penned by Justice Holloway, the court said: . . . . the term "pardon", "commutation", and "respite" each had a well understood meaning at the time our Constitution was adopted, and no one of them was intended to comprehend the suspension of the execution of the judgment as that phrase is employed in sections 12078-12086. A "pardon" is an act of grace, proceeding from the power intrusted with the execution of the laws which exempts the individual on whom it is bestowed from the punishment the law inflicts for a crime he has committed (United States vs. Wilson, 7 Pet., 150; 8 Law. ed., 640); It is a remission of guilt (State vs. Lewis, 111 La., 693; 35 So., 816), a forgiveness of the offense (Cook vs. Middlesex County, 26 N. J. Law, 326; Ex parte Powell, 73 Ala., 517; 49 Am. Rep., 71). "Commutation" is a remission of a part of the punishment; a substitution of a less penalty for the one originally imposed (Lee vs. Murphy, 22 Grat. [Va.] 789; 12 Am. Rep., 563; Rich vs. Chamberlain, 107 Mich., 381; 65 N. W., 235). A "reprieve" or "respite" is the withholding of the sentence for an interval of time (4 Blackstone's Commentaries, 394), a postponement of execution (Carnal vs. People, 1 Parker, Cr. R. [N. Y.], 272), a temporary suspension of execution (Butler vs. State, 97 Ind., 373).

Few adjudicated cases are to be found in which the validity of a statute similar to our section 12078 has been determined; but the same objections have been urged against parole statutes which vest the power to parole in persons other than those to whom the power of pardon is granted, and these statutes have been upheld quite uniformly, as a reference to the numerous cases cited in the notes to Woods vs. State (130 Tenn., 100; 169 S. W.,558, reported in L. R. A., 1915F, 531), will disclose. (See, also, 20 R. C. L., 524.) We conclude that the Probation Act does not conflict with the pardoning power of the Executive. The pardoning power, in respect to those serving their probationary sentences, remains as full and complete as if the Probation Law had never been enacted. The President may yet pardon the probationer and thus place it beyond the power of the court to order his rearrest and imprisonment. (Riggs vs. United States [1926], 14 F. [2d], 5, 7.) 2. But while the Probation Law does not encroach upon the pardoning power of the executive and is not for that reason void, does section 11 thereof constitute, as contended, an undue delegation of legislative power? Under the constitutional system, the powers of government are distributed among three coordinate and substantially independent organs: the legislative, the executive and the judicial. Each of these departments of the government derives its authority from the Constitution which, in turn, is the highest expression of popular will. Each has exclusive cognizance of the matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. The power to make laws the legislative power is vested in a bicameral Legislature by the Jones Law (sec. 12) and in a unicamiral National Assembly by the Constitution (Act. VI, sec. 1, Constitution of the Philippines). The Philippine Legislature or the National Assembly may not escape its duties and responsibilities by delegating that power to any other body or authority. Any attempt to abdicate the power is unconstitutional and void, on the principle that potestas delegata non delegare potest. This principle is said to have originated with the glossators, was introduced into English law through a misreading of Bracton, there developed as a principle of agency, was established by Lord Coke in the English public law in decisions forbidding the delegation of judicial power, and found its way into America as an enlightened principle of free government. It has since become an accepted corollary of the principle of separation of powers. (5 Encyc. of the Social Sciences, p. 66.) The classic statement of the rule is that of Locke, namely: "The legislative neither must nor can transfer the power of making laws to anybody else, or place it anywhere but where the people have." (Locke on Civil Government, sec. 142.) Judge Cooley enunciates the doctrine in the following oft-quoted language: "One of the settled maxims in constitutional law is, that the power conferred upon the legislature to make laws cannot be delegated by that department to any other body or authority. Where the sovereign power of the state has located the authority, there it must remain; and by the constitutional agency alone the laws must be made until the Constitution itself is charged. The power to whose judgment, wisdom, and patriotism this high prerogative has been intrusted cannot relieve itself of the responsibilities by choosing other agencies upon which the power shall be devolved, nor can it substitute the judgment, wisdom, and patriotism of any other body for those to which alone the people have seen fit to confide this sovereign trust." (Cooley on Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed., Vol. I, p. 224. Quoted with approval in U. S. vs. Barrias [1908], 11 Phil., 327.) This court posits the doctrine "on the ethical principle that such a delegated power constitutes not only a right but a duty to be performed by the delegate by the instrumentality of his own judgment acting immediately upon the matter of legislation and not through the intervening mind of another. (U. S. vs. Barrias, supra, at p. 330.) The rule, however, which forbids the delegation of legislative power is not absolute and inflexible. It admits of exceptions. An exceptions sanctioned by immemorial practice permits the central legislative body to delegate legislative powers to local authorities. (Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro [1919], 39 Phil., 660; U. S. vs. Salaveria [1918], 39 Phil., 102; Stoutenburgh vs. Hennick [1889], 129 U. S., 141; 32 Law. ed., 637; 9 Sup. Ct. Rep., 256; State vs. Noyes [1855], 30 N. H., 279.) "It is a cardinal principle of our system of government, that local affairs shall be managed by local authorities, and general affairs by the central authorities; and hence while the rule is also fundamental that the power to make laws cannot be delegated, the creation of the municipalities exercising local self government has never been held to trench upon that rule. Such legislation is not regarded as a transfer of general legislative power, but rather as the grant of the authority to prescribed local regulations, according to immemorial practice, subject of course to the interposition of the superior in cases of necessity." (Stoutenburgh vs. Hennick, supra.) On quite the same principle, Congress is powered to delegate legislative power to such agencies in the territories of the United States as it may select. A territory stands in the same relation to Congress as a municipality or city to the state government. (United States vs. Heinszen [1907], 206 U. S., 370; 27 Sup. Ct. Rep., 742; 51 L. ed., 1098; 11 Ann. Cas., 688; Dorr vs. United States [1904], 195 U.S., 138; 24 Sup. Ct. Rep., 808; 49 Law. ed., 128; 1 Ann. Cas., 697.) Courts have also sustained the delegation of legislative power to the people at large. Some authorities maintain that this may not be done (12 C. J., pp. 841, 842; 6 R. C. L., p. 164, citing People vs. Kennedy [1913], 207 N. Y., 533; 101 N. E., 442; Ann. Cas., 1914C, 616). However, the question of whether or not a state has ceased to be republican in form because of its adoption of the initiative and referendum has been held not to be a judicial but a political question (Pacific States Tel. & Tel. Co. vs. Oregon [1912], 223 U. S., 118; 56 Law. ed., 377; 32 Sup. Cet. Rep., 224), and as the constitutionality of such laws has been looked upon with favor by certain progressive

courts, the sting of the decisions of the more conservative courts has been pretty well drawn. (Opinions of the Justices [1894], 160 Mass., 586; 36 N. E., 488; 23 L. R. A., 113; Kiernan vs. Portland [1910], 57 Ore., 454; 111 Pac., 379; 1132 Pac., 402; 37 L. R. A. [N. S.], 332; Pacific States Tel. & Tel. Co. vs. Oregon, supra.) Doubtless, also, legislative power may be delegated by the Constitution itself. Section 14, paragraph 2, of article VI of the Constitution of the Philippines provides that "The National Assembly may by law authorize the President, subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, to fix within specified limits, tariff rates, import or export quotas, and tonnage and wharfage dues." And section 16 of the same article of the Constitution provides that "In times of war or other national emergency, the National Assembly may by law authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribed, to promulgate rules and regulations to carry out a declared national policy." It is beyond the scope of this decision to determine whether or not, in the absence of the foregoing constitutional provisions, the President could be authorized to exercise the powers thereby vested in him. Upon the other hand, whatever doubt may have existed has been removed by the Constitution itself. The case before us does not fall under any of the exceptions hereinabove mentioned. The challenged section of Act No. 4221 in section 11 which reads as follows: This Act shall apply only in those provinces in which the respective provincial boards have provided for the salary of a probation officer at rates not lower than those now provided for provincial fiscals. Said probation officer shall be appointed by the Secretary of Justice and shall be subject to the direction of the Probation Office. (Emphasis ours.) In testing whether a statute constitute an undue delegation of legislative power or not, it is usual to inquire whether the statute was complete in all its terms and provisions when it left the hands of the legislature so that nothing was left to the judgment of any other appointee or delegate of the legislature. (6 R. C. L., p. 165.) In the United States vs. Ang Tang Ho ([1922], 43 Phil., 1), this court adhered to the foregoing rule when it held an act of the legislature void in so far as it undertook to authorize the Governor-General, in his discretion, to issue a proclamation fixing the price of rice and to make the sale of it in violation of the proclamation a crime. (See and cf. Compaia General de Tabacos vs. Board of Public Utility Commissioners [1916], 34 Phil., 136.) The general rule, however, is limited by another rule that to a certain extent matters of detail may be left to be filled in by rules and regulations to be adopted or promulgated by executive officers and administrative boards. (6 R. C. L., pp. 177-179.) For the purpose of Probation Act, the provincial boards may be regarded as administrative bodies endowed with power to determine when the Act should take effect in their respective provinces. They are the agents or delegates of the legislature in this respect. The rules governing delegation of legislative power to administrative and executive officers are applicable or are at least indicative of the rule which should be here adopted. An examination of a variety of cases on delegation of power to administrative bodies will show that the ratio decidendi is at variance but, it can be broadly asserted that the rationale revolves around the presence or absence of a standard or rule of action or the sufficiency thereof in the statute, to aid the delegate in exercising the granted discretion. In some cases, it is held that the standard is sufficient; in others that is insufficient; and in still others that it is entirely lacking. As a rule, an act of the legislature is incomplete and hence invalid if it does not lay down any rule or definite standard by which the administrative officer or board may be guided in the exercise of the discretionary powers delegated to it. (See Schecter vs. United States [1925], 295 U. S., 495; 79 L. ed., 1570; 55 Sup. Ct. Rep., 837; 97 A.L.R., 947; People ex rel. Rice vs. Wilson Oil Co. [1936], 364 Ill., 406; 4 N. E. [2d], 847; 107 A.L.R., 1500 and cases cited. See also R. C. L., title "Constitutional Law", sec 174.) In the case at bar, what rules are to guide the provincial boards in the exercise of their discretionary power to determine whether or not the Probation Act shall apply in their respective provinces? What standards are fixed by the Act? We do not find any and none has been pointed to us by the respondents. The probation Act does not, by the force of any of its provisions, fix and impose upon the provincial boards any standard or guide in the exercise of their discretionary power. What is granted, if we may use the language of Justice Cardozo in the recent case of Schecter, supra, is a "roving commission" which enables the provincial boards to exercise arbitrary discretion. By section 11 if the Act, the legislature does not seemingly on its own authority extend the benefits of the Probation Act to the provinces but in reality leaves the entire matter for the various provincial boards to determine. In other words, the provincial boards of the various provinces are to determine for themselves, whether the Probation Law shall apply to their provinces or not at all. The applicability and application of the Probation Act are entirely placed in the hands of the provincial boards. If the provincial board does not wish to have the Act applied in its province, all that it has to do is to decline to appropriate the needed amount for the salary of a probation officer. The plain language of the Act is not susceptible of any other interpretation. This, to our minds, is a virtual surrender of legislative power to the provincial boards. "The true distinction", says Judge Ranney, "is between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made." (Cincinnati, W.

& Z. R. Co. vs. Clinton County Comrs. [1852]; 1 Ohio St., 77, 88. See also, Sutherland on Statutory Construction, sec 68.) To the same effect are the decision of this court in Municipality of Cardona vs. Municipality of Binangonan ([1917], 36 Phil., 547); Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro ([1919],39 Phil., 660) and Cruz vs. Youngberg ([1931], 56 Phil., 234). In the first of these cases, this court sustained the validity of the law conferring upon the Governor-General authority to adjust provincial and municipal boundaries. In the second case, this court held it lawful for the legislature to direct nonChristian inhabitants to take up their habitation on unoccupied lands to be selected by the provincial governor and approved by the provincial board. In the third case, it was held proper for the legislature to vest in the Governor-General authority to suspend or not, at his discretion, the prohibition of the importation of the foreign cattle, such prohibition to be raised "if the conditions of the country make this advisable or if deceased among foreign cattle has ceased to be a menace to the agriculture and livestock of the lands." It should be observed that in the case at bar we are not concerned with the simple transference of details of execution or the promulgation by executive or administrative officials of rules and regulations to carry into effect the provisions of a law. If we were, recurrence to our own decisions would be sufficient. (U. S. vs. Barrias [1908], 11 Phil., 327; U.S. vs. Molina [1914], 29 Phil., 119; Alegre vs. Collector of Customs [1929], 53 Phil., 394; Cebu Autobus Co. vs. De Jesus [1931], 56 Phil., 446; U. S. vs. Gomez [1915], 31 Phil., 218; Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro [1919], 39 Phil., 660.) It is connected, however, that a legislative act may be made to the effect as law after it leaves the hands of the legislature. It is true that laws may be made effective on certain contingencies, as by proclamation of the executive or the adoption by the people of a particular community (6 R. C. L., 116, 170-172; Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed., Vol. I, p. 227). In Wayman vs. Southard ([1825], 10 Wheat. 1; 6 Law. ed., 253), the Supreme Court of the United State ruled that the legislature may delegate a power not legislative which it may itself rightfully exercise.(Vide, also, Dowling vs. Lancashire Ins. Co. [1896], 92 Wis., 63; 65 N. W., 738; 31 L. R. A., 112.) The power to ascertain facts is such a power which may be delegated. There is nothing essentially legislative in ascertaining the existence of facts or conditions as the basis of the taking into effect of a law. That is a mental process common to all branches of the government. (Dowling vs. Lancashire Ins. Co., supra; In re Village of North Milwaukee [1896], 93 Wis., 616; 97 N.W., 1033; 33 L.R.A., 938; Nash vs. Fries [1906], 129 Wis., 120; 108 N.W., 210; Field vs. Clark [1892], 143 U.S., 649; 12 Sup. Ct., 495; 36 Law. ed., 294.) Notwithstanding the apparent tendency, however, to relax the rule prohibiting delegation of legislative authority on account of the complexity arising from social and economic forces at work in this modern industrial age (Pfiffner, Public Administration [1936] ch. XX; Laski, "The Mother of Parliaments", foreign Affairs, July, 1931, Vol. IX, No. 4, pp. 569-579; Beard, "Squirt-Gun Politics", in Harper's Monthly Magazine, July, 1930, Vol. CLXI, pp. 147, 152), the orthodox pronouncement of Judge Cooley in his work on Constitutional Limitations finds restatement in Prof. Willoughby's treatise on the Constitution of the United States in the following language speaking of declaration of legislative power to administrative agencies: "The principle which permits the legislature to provide that the administrative agent may determine when the circumstances are such as require the application of a law is defended upon the ground that at the time this authority is granted, the rule of public policy, which is the essence of the legislative act, is determined by the legislature. In other words, the legislature, as it its duty to do, determines that, under given circumstances, certain executive or administrative action is to be taken, and that, under other circumstances, different of no action at all is to be taken. What is thus left to the administrative official is not the legislative determination of what public policy demands, but simply the ascertainment of what the facts of the case require to be done according to the terms of the law by which he is governed." (Willoughby on the Constitution of the United States, 2nd ed., Vol. II, p. 1637.) In Miller vs. Mayer, etc., of New York [1883], 109 U.S., 3 Sup. Ct. Rep., 228; 27 Law. ed., 971, 974), it was said: "The efficiency of an Act as a declaration of legislative will must, of course, come from Congress, but the ascertainment of the contingency upon which the Act shall take effect may be left to such agencies as it may designate." (See, also, 12 C.J., p. 864; State vs. Parker [1854], 26 Vt., 357; Blanding vs. Burr [1859], 13 Cal., 343, 258.) The legislature, then may provide that a contingencies leaving to some other person or body the power to determine when the specified contingencies has arisen. But, in the case at bar, the legislature has not made the operation of the Prohibition Act contingent upon specified facts or conditions to be ascertained by the provincial board. It leaves, as we have already said, the entire operation or non-operation of the law upon the provincial board. the discretion vested is arbitrary because it is absolute and unlimited. A provincial board need not investigate conditions or find any fact, or await the happening of any specified contingency. It is bound by no rule, limited by no principle of expendiency announced by the legislature. It may take into consideration certain facts or conditions; and, again, it may not. It may have any purpose or no purpose at all. It need not give any reason whatsoever for refusing or failing to appropriate any funds for the salary of a probation officer. This is a matter which rest entirely at its pleasure. The fact that at some future time we cannot say when the provincial boards may appropriate funds for the salaries of probation officers and thus put the law into operation in the various provinces will not save the statute. The time of its taking into effect, we reiterate, would yet be based solely upon the will of the provincial boards and not upon the happening of a certain specified contingency, or upon the ascertainment of certain facts or conditions by a person or body other than legislature itself.

The various provincial boards are, in practical effect, endowed with the power of suspending the operation of the Probation Law in their respective provinces. In some jurisdiction, constitutions provided that laws may be suspended only by the legislature or by its authority. Thus, section 28, article I of the Constitution of Texas provides that "No power of suspending laws in this state shall be exercised except by the legislature"; and section 26, article I of the Constitution of Indiana provides "That the operation of the laws shall never be suspended, except by authority of the General Assembly." Yet, even provisions of this sort do not confer absolute power of suspension upon the legislature. While it may be undoubted that the legislature may suspend a law, or the execution or operation of a law, a law may not be suspended as to certain individuals only, leaving the law to be enjoyed by others. The suspension must be general, and cannot be made for individual cases or for particular localities. In Holden vs. James ([1814], 11 Mass., 396; 6 Am. Dec., 174, 177, 178), it was said: By the twentieth article of the declaration of rights in the constitution of this commonwealth, it is declared that the power of suspending the laws, or the execution of the laws, ought never to be exercised but by the legislature, or by authority derived from it, to be exercised in such particular cases only as the legislature shall expressly provide for. Many of the articles in that declaration of rights were adopted from the Magna Charta of England, and from the bill of rights passed in the reign of William and Mary. The bill of rights contains an enumeration of the oppressive acts of James II, tending to subvert and extirpate the protestant religion, and the laws and liberties of the kingdom; and the first of them is the assuming and exercising a power of dispensing with and suspending the laws, and the execution of the laws without consent of parliament. The first article in the claim or declaration of rights contained in the statute is, that the exercise of such power, by legal authority without consent of parliament, is illegal. In the tenth section of the same statute it is further declared and enacted, that "No dispensation by non obstante of or to any statute, or part thereof, should be allowed; but the same should be held void and of no effect, except a dispensation be allowed of in such statute." There is an implied reservation of authority in the parliament to exercise the power here mentioned; because, according to the theory of the English Constitution, "that absolute despotic power, which must in all governments reside somewhere," is intrusted to the parliament: 1 Bl. Com., 160. The principles of our government are widely different in this particular. Here the sovereign and absolute power resides in the people; and the legislature can only exercise what is delegated to them according to the constitution. It is obvious that the exercise of the power in question would be equally oppressive to the subject, and subversive of his right to protection, "according to standing laws," whether exercised by one man or by a number of men. It cannot be supposed that the people when adopting this general principle from the English bill of rights and inserting it in our constitution, intended to bestow by implication on the general court one of the most odious and oppressive prerogatives of the ancient kings of England. It is manifestly contrary to the first principles of civil liberty and natural justice, and to the spirit of our constitution and laws, that any one citizen should enjoy privileges and advantages which are denied to all others under like circumstances; or that ant one should be subject to losses, damages, suits, or actions from which all others under like circumstances are exempted. To illustrate the principle: A section of a statute relative to dogs made the owner of any dog liable to the owner of domestic animals wounded by it for the damages without proving a knowledge of it vicious disposition. By a provision of the act, power was given to the board of supervisors to determine whether or not during the current year their county should be governed by the provisions of the act of which that section constituted a part. It was held that the legislature could not confer that power. The court observed that it could no more confer such a power than to authorize the board of supervisors of a county to abolish in such county the days of grace on commercial paper, or to suspend the statute of limitations. (Slinger vs. Henneman [1875], 38 Wis., 504.) A similar statute in Missouri was held void for the same reason in State vs. Field ([1853, 17 Mo., 529;59 Am. Dec., 275.) In that case a general statute formulating a road system contained a provision that "if the county court of any county should be of opinion that the provisions of the act should not be enforced, they might, in their discretion, suspend the operation of the same for any specified length of time, and thereupon the act should become inoperative in such county for the period specified in such order; and thereupon order the roads to be opened and kept in good repair, under the laws theretofore in force." Said the court: ". . . this act, by its own provisions, repeals the inconsistent provisions of a former act, and yet it is left to the county court to say which act shall be enforce in their county. The act does not submit the question to the county court as an original question, to be decided by that tribunal, whether the act shall commence its operation within the county; but it became by its own terms a law in every county not excepted by name in the act. It did not, then, require the county court to do any act in order to give it effect. But being the law in the county, and having by its provisions superseded and abrogated the inconsistent provisions of previous laws, the county court is . . . empowered, to suspend this act and revive the repealed provisions of the former act. When the question is before the county court for that tribunal to determine which law shall be in force, it is urge before us that the power then to be exercised by the court is strictly legislative power, which under our constitution, cannot be delegated to that tribunal or to any other body of men in the state. In the present case, the question is not presented in the abstract; for the county court of Saline county, after the act had been for several months in force in that county, did by

order suspend its operation; and during that suspension the offense was committed which is the subject of the present indictment . . . ." (See Mitchell vs. State [1901], 134 Ala., 392; 32 S., 687.) True, the legislature may enact laws for a particular locality different from those applicable to other localities and, while recognizing the force of the principle hereinabove expressed, courts in may jurisdiction have sustained the constitutionality of the submission of option laws to the vote of the people. (6 R.C.L., p. 171.) But option laws thus sustained treat of subjects purely local in character which should receive different treatment in different localities placed under different circumstances. "They relate to subjects which, like the retailing of intoxicating drinks, or the running at large of cattle in the highways, may be differently regarded in different localities, and they are sustained on what seems to us the impregnable ground, that the subject, though not embraced within the ordinary powers of municipalities to make by-laws and ordinances, is nevertheless within the class of public regulations, in respect to which it is proper that the local judgment should control." (Cooley on Constitutional Limitations, 5th ed., p. 148.) So that, while we do not deny the right of local self-government and the propriety of leaving matters of purely local concern in the hands of local authorities or for the people of small communities to pass upon, we believe that in matters of general of general legislation like that which treats of criminals in general, and as regards the general subject of probation, discretion may not be vested in a manner so unqualified and absolute as provided in Act No. 4221. True, the statute does not expressly state that the provincial boards may suspend the operation of the Probation Act in particular provinces but, considering that, in being vested with the authority to appropriate or not the necessary funds for the salaries of probation officers, they thereby are given absolute discretion to determine whether or not the law should take effect or operate in their respective provinces, the provincial boards are in reality empowered by the legislature to suspend the operation of the Probation Act in particular provinces, the Act to be held in abeyance until the provincial boards should decide otherwise by appropriating the necessary funds. The validity of a law is not tested by what has been done but by what may be done under its provisions. (Walter E. Olsen & Co. vs. Aldanese and Trinidad [1922], 43 Phil., 259; 12 C. J., p. 786.) It in conceded that a great deal of latitude should be granted to the legislature not only in the expression of what may be termed legislative policy but in the elaboration and execution thereof. "Without this power, legislation would become oppressive and yet imbecile." (People vs. Reynolds, 5 Gilman, 1.) It has been said that popular government lives because of the inexhaustible reservoir of power behind it. It is unquestionable that the mass of powers of government is vested in the representatives of the people and that these representatives are no further restrained under our system than by the express language of the instrument imposing the restraint, or by particular provisions which by clear intendment, have that effect. (Angara vs. Electoral Commission [1936], 35 Off. Ga., 23; Schneckenburger vs. Moran [1936], 35 Off. Gaz., 1317.) But, it should be borne in mind that a constitution is both a grant and a limitation of power and one of these time-honored limitations is that, subject to certain exceptions, legislative power shall not be delegated. We conclude that section 11 of Act No. 4221 constitutes an improper and unlawful delegation of legislative authority to the provincial boards and is, for this reason, unconstitutional and void. 3. It is also contended that the Probation Act violates the provisions of our Bill of Rights which prohibits the denial to any person of the equal protection of the laws (Act. III, sec. 1 subsec. 1. Constitution of the Philippines.) This basic individual right sheltered by the Constitution is a restraint on all the tree grand departments of our government and on the subordinate instrumentalities and subdivision thereof, and on many constitutional power, like the police power, taxation and eminent domain. The equal protection of laws, sententiously observes the Supreme Court of the United States, "is a pledge of the protection of equal laws." (Yick Wo vs. Hopkins [1886], 118 U. S., 356; 30 Law. ed., 220; 6 Sup. Ct. Rep., 10464; Perley vs. North Carolina, 249 U. S., 510; 39 Sup. Ct. Rep., 357; 63 Law. ed., 735.) Of course, what may be regarded as a denial of the equal protection of the laws in a question not always easily determined. No rule that will cover every case can be formulated. (Connolly vs. Union Sewer Pipe Co. [1902], 184, U. S., 540; 22 Sup. Ct., Rep., 431; 46 Law. ed., 679.) Class legislation discriminating against some and favoring others in prohibited. But classification on a reasonable basis, and nor made arbitrarily or capriciously, is permitted. (Finely vs. California [1911], 222 U. S., 28; 56 Law. ed., 75; 32 Sup. Ct. Rep., 13; Gulf. C. & S. F. Ry Co. vs. Ellis [1897], 165 U. S., 150; 41 Law. ed., 666; 17 Sup. Ct. Rep., 255; Smith, Bell & Co. vs. Natividad [1919], 40 Phil., 136.) The classification, however, to be reasonable must be based on substantial distinctions which make real differences; it must be germane to the purposes of the law; it must not be limited to existing conditions only, and must apply equally to each member of the class. (Borgnis vs. Falk. Co. [1911], 147 Wis., 327, 353; 133 N. W., 209; 3 N. C. C. A., 649; 37 L. R. A. [N. S.], 489; State vs. Cooley, 56 Minn., 540; 530-552; 58 N. W., 150; Lindsley vs. Natural Carbonic Gas Co.[1911], 220 U. S., 61, 79, 55 Law. ed., 369, 377; 31 Sup. Ct. Rep., 337; Ann. Cas., 1912C, 160; Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. vs. Clough [1917], 242 U.S., 375; 37 Sup. Ct. Rep., 144; 61 Law. ed., 374; Southern Ry. Co. vs. Greene [1910], 216 U. S., 400; 30 Sup. Ct. Rep., 287; 54 Law. ed., 536; 17 Ann. Cas., 1247; Truax vs. Corrigan [1921], 257 U. S., 312; 12 C. J., pp. 1148, 1149.) In the case at bar, however, the resultant inequality may be said to flow from the unwarranted delegation of legislative power, although perhaps this is not necessarily the result in every case. Adopting the example given by one of

the counsel for the petitioners in the course of his oral argument, one province may appropriate the necessary fund to defray the salary of a probation officer, while another province may refuse or fail to do so. In such a case, the Probation Act would be in operation in the former province but not in the latter. This means that a person otherwise coming within the purview of the law would be liable to enjoy the benefits of probation in one province while another person similarly situated in another province would be denied those same benefits. This is obnoxious discrimination. Contrariwise, it is also possible for all the provincial boards to appropriate the necessary funds for the salaries of the probation officers in their respective provinces, in which case no inequality would result for the obvious reason that probation would be in operation in each and every province by the affirmative action of appropriation by all the provincial boards. On that hypothesis, every person coming within the purview of the Probation Act would be entitled to avail of the benefits of the Act. Neither will there be any resulting inequality if no province, through its provincial board, should appropriate any amount for the salary of the probation officer which is the situation now and, also, if we accept the contention that, for the purpose of the Probation Act, the City of Manila should be considered as a province and that the municipal board of said city has not made any appropriation for the salary of the probation officer. These different situations suggested show, indeed, that while inequality may result in the application of the law and in the conferment of the benefits therein provided, inequality is not in all cases the necessary result. But whatever may be the case, it is clear that in section 11 of the Probation Act creates a situation in which discrimination and inequality are permitted or allowed. There are, to be sure, abundant authorities requiring actual denial of the equal protection of the law before court should assume the task of setting aside a law vulnerable on that score, but premises and circumstances considered, we are of the opinion that section 11 of Act No. 4221 permits of the denial of the equal protection of the law and is on that account bad. We see no difference between a law which permits of such denial. A law may appear to be fair on its face and impartial in appearance, yet, if it permits of unjust and illegal discrimination, it is within the constitutional prohibitions. (By analogy, Chy Lung vs. Freeman [1876], 292 U. S., 275; 23 Law. ed., 550; Henderson vs. Mayor [1876], 92 U. S., 259; 23 Law. ed., 543; Ex parte Virginia [1880], 100 U. S., 339; 25 Law. ed., 676; Neal vs. Delaware [1881], 103 U. S., 370; 26 Law. ed., 567; Soon Hing vs. Crowley [1885], 113 U. S., 703; 28 Law. ed., 1145, Yick Wo vs. Hopkins [1886],118 U. S., 356; 30 Law. ed., 220; Williams vs. Mississippi [1897], 170 U. S., 218; 18 Sup. Ct. Rep., 583; 42 Law. ed., 1012; Bailey vs. Alabama [1911], 219 U. S., 219; 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 145; 55 Law. ed., Sunday Lake Iron Co. vs. Wakefield [1918], 247 U. S., 450; 38 Sup. Ct. Rep., 495; 62 Law. ed., 1154.) In other words, statutes may be adjudged unconstitutional because of their effect in operation (General Oil Co. vs. Clain [1907], 209 U. S., 211; 28 Sup. Ct. Rep., 475; 52 Law. ed., 754; State vs. Clement Nat. Bank [1911], 84 Vt., 167; 78 Atl., 944; Ann. Cas., 1912D, 22). If the law has the effect of denying the equal protection of the law it is unconstitutional. (6 R. C. L. p. 372; Civil Rights Cases, 109 U. S., 3; 3 Sup. Ct. Rep., 18; 27 Law. ed., 835; Yick Wo vs. Hopkins, supra; State vs. Montgomery, 94 Me., 192; 47 Atl., 165; 80 A. S. R., 386; State vs. Dering, 84 Wis., 585; 54 N. W., 1104; 36 A. S. R., 948; 19 L. R. A., 858.) Under section 11 of the Probation Act, not only may said Act be in force in one or several provinces and not be in force in other provinces, but one province may appropriate for the salary of the probation officer of a given year and have probation during that year and thereafter decline to make further appropriation, and have no probation is subsequent years. While this situation goes rather to the abuse of discretion which delegation implies, it is here indicated to show that the Probation Act sanctions a situation which is intolerable in a government of laws, and to prove how easy it is, under the Act, to make the guaranty of the equality clause but "a rope of sand". (Brewer, J. Gulf C. & S. F. Ry. Co. vs. Ellis [1897], 165 U. S., 150 154; 41 Law. ed., 666; 17 Sup. Ct. Rep., 255.)lawph!1.net Great reliance is placed by counsel for the respondents on the case of Ocampo vs. United States ([1914], 234 U. S., 91; 58 Law. ed., 1231). In that case, the Supreme Court of the United States affirmed the decision of this court (18 Phil., 1) by declining to uphold the contention that there was a denial of the equal protection of the laws because, as held in Missouri vs. Lewis (Bowman vs. Lewis) decided in 1880 (101 U. S., 220; 25 Law. ed., 991), the guaranty of the equality clause does not require territorial uniformity. It should be observed, however, that this case concerns the right to preliminary investigations in criminal cases originally granted by General Orders No. 58. No question of legislative authority was involved and the alleged denial of the equal protection of the laws was the result of the subsequent enactment of Act No. 612, amending the charter of the City of Manila (Act No. 813) and providing in section 2 thereof that "in cases triable only in the court of first instance of the City of Manila, the defendant . . . shall not be entitled as of right to a preliminary examination in any case where the prosecuting attorney, after a due investigation of the facts . . . shall have presented an information against him in proper form . . . ." Upon the other hand, an analysis of the arguments and the decision indicates that the investigation by the prosecuting attorney although not in the form had in the provinces was considered a reasonable substitute for the City of Manila, considering the peculiar conditions of the city as found and taken into account by the legislature itself. Reliance is also placed on the case of Missouri vs. Lewis, supra. That case has reference to a situation where the constitution of Missouri permits appeals to the Supreme Court of the state from final judgments of any circuit court, except those in certain counties for which counties the constitution establishes a separate court of appeals called St. Louis Court of Appeals. The provision complained of, then, is found in the constitution itself and it is the constitution that makes the apportionment of territorial jurisdiction.

We are of the opinion that section 11 of the Probation Act is unconstitutional and void because it is also repugnant to equal-protection clause of our Constitution. Section 11 of the Probation Act being unconstitutional and void for the reasons already stated, the next inquiry is whether or not the entire Act should be avoided. In seeking the legislative intent, the presumption is against any mutilation of a statute, and the courts will resort to elimination only where an unconstitutional provision is interjected into a statute otherwise valid, and is so independent and separable that its removal will leave the constitutional features and purposes of the act substantially unaffected by the process. (Riccio vs. Hoboken, 69 N. J. Law., 649, 662; 63 L. R. A., 485; 55 Atl., 1109, quoted in Williams vs. Standard Oil Co. [1929], 278 U.S., 235, 240; 73 Law. ed., 287, 309; 49 Sup. Ct. Rep., 115; 60 A. L. R., 596.) In Barrameda vs. Moir ([1913], 25 Phil., 44, 47), this court stated the well-established rule concerning partial invalidity of statutes in the following language: . . . where part of the a statute is void, as repugnant to the Organic Law, while another part is valid, the valid portion, if separable from the valid, may stand and be enforced. But in order to do this, the valid portion must be in so far independent of the invalid portion that it is fair to presume that the Legislative would have enacted it by itself if they had supposed that they could not constitutionally enact the other. (Mutual Loan Co. vs. Martell, 200 Mass., 482; 86 N. E., 916; 128 A. S. R., 446; Supervisors of Holmes Co. vs. Black Creek Drainage District, 99 Miss., 739; 55 Sou., 963.) Enough must remain to make a complete, intelligible, and valid statute, which carries out the legislative intent. (Pearson vs. Bass. 132 Ga., 117; 63 S. E., 798.) The void provisions must be eliminated without causing results affecting the main purpose of the Act, in a manner contrary to the intention of the Legislature. (State vs. A. C. L. R., Co., 56 Fla., 617, 642; 47 Sou., 969; Harper vs. Galloway, 58 Fla., 255; 51 Sou., 226; 26 L. R. A., N. S., 794; Connolly vs. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U. S., 540, 565; People vs. Strassheim, 240 Ill., 279, 300; 88 N. E., 821; 22 L. R. A., N. S., 1135; State vs. Cognevich, 124 La., 414; 50 Sou., 439.) The language used in the invalid part of a statute can have no legal force or efficacy for any purpose whatever, and what remains must express the legislative will, independently of the void part, since the court has no power to legislate. (State vs. Junkin, 85 Neb., 1; 122 N. W., 473; 23 L. R. A., N. S., 839; Vide, also,. U. S., vs. Rodriguez [1918], 38 Phil., 759; Pollock vs. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co. [1895], 158 U. S., 601, 635; 39 Law. ed., 1108, 1125; 15 Sup. Ct. Rep., 912; 6 R.C.L., 121.) It is contended that even if section 11, which makes the Probation Act applicable only in those provinces in which the respective provincial boards provided for the salaries of probation officers were inoperative on constitutional grounds, the remainder of the Act would still be valid and may be enforced. We should be inclined to accept the suggestions but for the fact that said section is, in our opinion, is inseparably linked with the other portions of the Act that with the elimination of the section what would be left is the bare idealism of the system, devoid of any practical benefit to a large number of people who may be deserving of the intended beneficial result of that system. The clear policy of the law, as may be gleaned from a careful examination of the whole context, is to make the application of the system dependent entirely upon the affirmative action of the different provincial boards through appropriation of the salaries for probation officers at rates not lower than those provided for provincial fiscals. Without such action on the part of the various boards, no probation officers would be appointed by the Secretary of Justice to act in the provinces. The Philippines is divided or subdivided into provinces and it needs no argument to show that if not one of the provinces and this is the actual situation now appropriate the necessary fund for the salary of a probation officer, probation under Act No. 4221 would be illusory. There can be no probation without a probation officer. Neither can there be a probation officer without the probation system. Section 2 of the Acts provides that the probation officer shall supervise and visit the probationer. Every probation officer is given, as to the person placed in probation under his care, the powers of the police officer. It is the duty of the probation officer to see that the conditions which are imposed by the court upon the probationer under his care are complied with. Among those conditions, the following are enumerated in section 3 of the Act: That the probationer (a) shall indulge in no injurious or vicious habits; (b) Shall avoid places or persons of disreputable or harmful character; (c) Shall report to the probation officer as directed by the court or probation officers; (d) Shall permit the probation officer to visit him at reasonable times at his place of abode or elsewhere;

(e) Shall truthfully answer any reasonable inquiries on the part of the probation officer concerning his conduct or condition; "(f) Shall endeavor to be employed regularly; "(g) Shall remain or reside within a specified place or locality; (f) Shall make reparation or restitution to the aggrieved parties for actual damages or losses caused by his offense; (g) Shall comply with such orders as the court may from time to time make; and (h) Shall refrain from violating any law, statute, ordinance, or any by-law or regulation, promulgated in accordance with law. The court is required to notify the probation officer in writing of the period and terms of probation. Under section 4, it is only after the period of probation, the submission of a report of the probation officer and appropriate finding of the court that the probationer has complied with the conditions of probation that probation may be definitely terminated and the probationer finally discharged from supervision. Under section 5, if the court finds that there is non-compliance with said conditions, as reported by the probation officer, it may issue a warrant for the arrest of the probationer and said probationer may be committed with or without bail. Upon arraignment and after an opportunity to be heard, the court may revoke, continue or modify the probation, and if revoked, the court shall order the execution of the sentence originally imposed. Section 6 prescribes the duties of probation officers: "It shall be the duty of every probation officer to furnish to all persons placed on probation under his supervision a statement of the period and conditions of their probation, and to instruct them concerning the same; to keep informed concerning their conduct and condition; to aid and encourage them by friendly advice and admonition, and by such other measures, not inconsistent with the conditions imposed by court as may seem most suitable, to bring about improvement in their conduct and condition; to report in writing to the court having jurisdiction over said probationers at least once every two months concerning their conduct and condition; to keep records of their work; make such report as are necessary for the information of the Secretary of Justice and as the latter may require; and to perform such other duties as are consistent with the functions of the probation officer and as the court or judge may direct. The probation officers provided for in this Act may act as parole officers for any penal or reformatory institution for adults when so requested by the authorities thereof, and, when designated by the Secretary of Justice shall act as parole officer of persons released on parole under Act Number Forty-one Hundred and Three, without additional compensation." It is argued, however, that even without section 11 probation officers maybe appointed in the provinces under section 10 of Act which provides as follows: There is hereby created in the Department of Justice and subject to its supervision and control, a Probation Office under the direction of a Chief Probation Officer to be appointed by the Governor-General with the advise and consent of the Senate who shall receive a salary of four eight hundred pesos per annum. To carry out this Act there is hereby appropriated out of any funds in the Insular Treasury not otherwise appropriated, the sum of fifty thousand pesos to be disbursed by the Secretary of Justice, who is hereby authorized to appoint probation officers and the administrative personnel of the probation officer under civil service regulations from among those who possess the qualifications, training and experience prescribed by the Bureau of Civil Service, and shall fix the compensation of such probation officers and administrative personnel until such positions shall have been included in the Appropriation Act. But the probation officers and the administrative personnel referred to in the foregoing section are clearly not those probation officers required to be appointed for the provinces under section 11. It may be said, reddendo singula singulis, that the probation officers referred to in section 10 above-quoted are to act as such, not in the various provinces, but in the central office known as the Probation Office established in the Department of Justice, under the supervision of the Chief Probation Officer. When the law provides that "the probation officer" shall investigate and make reports to the court (secs. 1 and 4); that "the probation officer" shall supervise and visit the probationer (sec. 2; sec. 6, par. d); that the probationer shall report to the "probationer officer" (sec. 3, par. c.), shall allow "the probationer officer" to visit him (sec. 3, par. d), shall truthfully answer any reasonable inquiries on the part of "the probation officer" concerning his conduct or condition (sec. 3, par. 4); that the court shall notify "the probation officer" in writing of the period and terms of probation (sec. 3, last par.), it means the probation officer who is in charge of a particular probationer in a particular province. It never could have been intention of the legislature, for instance, to require the probationer in Batanes, to report to a probationer officer in the City of Manila, or to require a probation officer in Manila to visit the probationer in the said province of Batanes, to place him under his care, to supervise his conduct, to instruct him concerning the conditions of his probation or to perform such other functions as are assigned to him by law.

That under section 10 the Secretary of Justice may appoint as many probation officers as there are provinces or groups of provinces is, of course possible. But this would be arguing on what the law may be or should be and not on what the law is. Between is and ought there is a far cry. The wisdom and propriety of legislation is not for us to pass upon. We may think a law better otherwise than it is. But much as has been said regarding progressive interpretation and judicial legislation we decline to amend the law. We are not permitted to read into the law matters and provisions which are not there. Not for any purpose not even to save a statute from the doom of invalidity. Upon the other hand, the clear intention and policy of the law is not to make the Insular Government defray the salaries of probation officers in the provinces but to make the provinces defray them should they desire to have the Probation Act apply thereto. The sum of P50,000, appropriated "to carry out the purposes of this Act", is to be applied, among other things, for the salaries of probation officers in the central office at Manila. These probation officers are to receive such compensations as the Secretary of Justice may fix "until such positions shall have been included in the Appropriation Act". It was the intention of the legislature to empower the Secretary of Justice to fix the salaries of the probation officers in the provinces or later on to include said salaries in an appropriation act. Considering, further, that the sum of P50,000 appropriated in section 10 is to cover, among other things, the salaries of the administrative personnel of the Probation Office, what would be left of the amount can hardly be said to be sufficient to pay even nominal salaries to probation officers in the provinces. We take judicial notice of the fact that there are 48 provinces in the Philippines and we do not think it is seriously contended that, with the fifty thousand pesos appropriated for the central office, there can be in each province, as intended, a probation officer with a salary not lower than that of a provincial fiscal. If this a correct, the contention that without section 11 of Act No. 4221 said act is complete is an impracticable thing under the remainder of the Act, unless it is conceded that in our case there can be a system of probation in the provinces without probation officers. Probation as a development of a modern penology is a commendable system. Probation laws have been enacted, here and in other countries, to permit what modern criminologist call the "individualization of the punishment", the adjustment of the penalty to the character of the criminal and the circumstances of his particular case. It provides a period of grace in order to aid in the rehabilitation of a penitent offender. It is believed that, in any cases, convicts may be reformed and their development into hardened criminals aborted. It, therefore, takes advantage of an opportunity for reformation and avoids imprisonment so long as the convicts gives promise of reform. (United States vs. Murray [1925], 275 U. S., 347 357, 358; 72 Law. ed., 309; 312, 313; 48 Sup. Ct. Rep., 146; Kaplan vs. Hecht, 24 F. [2d], 664, 665.) The Welfare of society is its chief end and aim. The benefit to the individual convict is merely incidental. But while we believe that probation is commendable as a system and its implantation into the Philippines should be welcomed, we are forced by our inescapable duty to set the law aside because of the repugnancy to our fundamental law. In arriving at this conclusion, we have endeavored to consider the different aspects presented by able counsel for both parties, as well in their memorandums as in their oral argument. We have examined the cases brought to our attention, and others we have been able to reach in the short time at our command for the study and deliberation of this case. In the examination of the cases and in then analysis of the legal principles involved we have inclined to adopt the line of action which in our opinion, is supported better reasoned authorities and is more conducive to the general welfare. (Smith, Bell & Co. vs. Natividad [1919], 40 Phil., 136.) Realizing the conflict of authorities, we have declined to be bound by certain adjudicated cases brought to our attention, except where the point or principle is settled directly or by clear implication by the more authoritative pronouncements of the Supreme Court of the United States. This line of approach is justified because: (a) The constitutional relations between the Federal and the State governments of the United States and the dual character of the American Government is a situation which does not obtain in the Philippines; (b) The situation of s state of the American Union of the District of Columbia with reference to the Federal Government of the United States is not the situation of the province with respect to the Insular Government (Art. I, sec. 8 cl. 17 and 10th Amendment, Constitution of the United States; Sims vs. Rives, 84 Fed. [2d], 871), (c) The distinct federal and the state judicial organizations of the United States do not embrace the integrated judicial system of the Philippines (Schneckenburger vs. Moran [1936], 35 Off. Gaz., p. 1317); (d) "General propositions do not decide concrete cases" (Justice Holmes in Lochner vs. New York [1904], 198 U. S., 45, 76; 49 Law. ed., 937, 949) and, "to keep pace with . . . new developments of times and circumstances" (Chief Justice Waite in Pensacola Tel. Co. vs. Western Union Tel. Co. [1899], 96 U. S., 1, 9; 24 Law. ed., 708; Yale Law Journal, Vol. XXIX, No. 2, Dec. 1919, 141, 142), fundamental principles should be interpreted having in view existing local conditions and environment. Act No. 4221 is hereby declared unconstitutional and void and the writ of prohibition is, accordingly, granted. Without any pronouncement regarding costs. So ordered.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-32096 October 24, 1970 ROMEO F. EDU, in his capacity as Land Transportation Commissioner, petitioner, vs. HON. VICENTE G. ERICTA in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Br. XVIII, Quezon City, and TEDDY C. GALO respondents. FERNANDO, J.:. Petitioner Romeo F. Edu, the Land Transportation Commissioner, would have us rule squarely on the constitutionality of the Reflector Law1 in this proceeding for certiorari and prohibition against respondent Judge, the Honorable Vicente G. Ericta of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch, to annul and set aside his order for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction directed against Administrative Order No. 2 of petitioner for the enforcement of the aforesaid statute, in a pending suit in his court for certiorari and prohibition, filed by the other respondent Teddy C. Galo assailing; the validity of such enactment as well as such administrative order. Respondent Judge, in his answer, would join such a plea asking that the constitutional and legal questions raised be decided "once and for all." Respondent Teddy C. Galo who was quite categorical in his assertion that both the challenged legislation and the administrative order transgress the constitutional requirements of due process and non-delegation, is not averse either to such a definitive ruling. Considering the great public interest involved and the reliance by respondent Galo and the allegation that the repugnancy to the fundamental law could be discerned on the face of the statute as enacted and the executive order as promulgated, this Court, sees no obstacle to the determination in this proceeding of the constitutional questions raised. For reasons to be hereafter stated, we sustain the validity of the Reflector Law and Administrative Order No. 2 issued in the implementation thereof, the imputation of constitutional infirmity being at best flimsy and insubstantial. As noted in the answer of respondent Judge, respondent Galo on his behalf and that of other motorist filed on May 20, 1970 a suit for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction assailing the validity of the challenged Act as an invalid exercise of the police power, for being violative of the due process clause. This he followed on May 28, 1970 with a manifestation wherein he sought as an alternative remedy that, in the event that respondent Judge would hold said statute constitutional, Administrative Order No. 2 of the Land Transportation Commissioner, now petitioner, implementing such legislation be nullified as an undue exercise of legislative power. There was a hearing on the plea for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction held on May 27. 1970 where both parties were duly represented, but no evidence was presented. The next day, on May 28, 1970, respondent Judge ordered the issuance of a preliminary injunction directed against the enforcement of such administrative order. There was the day after, a motion for its reconsideration filed by the Solicitor General representing petitioner. In the meanwhile, the clerk of court of respondent Judge issued, on June 1, 1970 the writ of preliminary injunction upon the filing of the required bond. The answer before the lower court was filed by petitioner Edu on June 4, 1970. Thereafter, on June 9, 1970, respondent Judge denied the motion for reconsideration of the order of injunction. Hence this petition for certiorari and prohibition filed with this court on June 18, 1970. In a resolution of June 22, 1970, this Court required respondents to file an answer to the petition for certiorari and prohibition. Respondent Judge, the Honorable Vicente G. Ericta, did file his answer on June 30, 1970 explaining why he restrained the enforcement of Administrative Order No. 2 and, as noted at the outset, joining the Solicitor General in seeking that the legal questions raised namely the constitutionality of the Reflector Law and secondly the validity of Administrative Order No. 2 alleged to be in excess of the authority conferred on petitioner and therefore violative of the principle of non-delegation of legislative power be definitely decided. It was on until July 6, 1970 that respondent Galo filed his answer seeking the dismissal of this petition concentrating on what he considered to be the patent invalidity of Administrative Order No. 2 as it went beyond the authority granted by the Reflector Law, even assuming that it is constitutional. In the meanwhile, on July 2, 1970, the petition was called for hearing with Solicitor Vicente Torres appearing for petitioner and respondent Galo for himself. It was made clear during the course of such argumentation that the matter of the constitutionality of the Reflector Law was likewise under consideration by this Court. The case is thus ripe for decision. We repeat that we find for petitioner and sustain the Constitutionality of the Reflector Law as well as the validity of Administrative Order No. 2.

1. The threshold question is whether on the basis of the petition, the answers, and the oral argument, it would be proper for this Court to resolve the issue of the constitutionality of the Reflector Law. Our answer, as indicated, is in the affirmative. It is to be noted that the main thrust of the petition before us is to demonstrate in a rather convincing fashion that the challenged legislation does not suffer from the alleged constitutional infirmity imputed to it by the respondent Galo. Since the special civil action for certiorari and prohibition filed before him before respondent Judge would seek a declaration of nullity of such enactment by the attribution of the violation the face thereof of the due process guarantee in the deprivation of property rights, it would follow that there is sufficient basis for us to determine which view should prevail. Moreover, any further hearing by respondent Judge would likewise to limited to a discussion of the constitutional issues raised, no allegations of facts having made. This is one case then where the question of validity is ripe for determination. If we do so, further effort need not be wasted and time is saved moreover, the officials concerned as well as the public, both vitally concerned with a final resolution of questions of validity, could know the definitive answer and could act accordingly. There is a great public interest, as was mentioned, to be served by the final disposition of such crucial issue, petitioner praying that respondent Galo be declared having no cause of action with respondent Judge being accordingly directed to dismiss his suit. There is another reinforcement to this avenue of approach. We have done so before in a suit, Climaco v. Macadaeg, 2 involving the legality of a presidential directive. That was a petition for the review and reversal of a writ of preliminary injunction issued by the then Judge Macadaeg. We there announced that we "have decided to pass upon the question of the validity of the presidential directive ourselves, believing that by doing so we would be putting an end to a dispute, a delay in the disposition of which has caused considerable damage and injury to the Government and to the tobacco planters themselves." There is no principle of constitutional adjudication that bars this Court from similarly passing upon the question of the validity of a legislative enactment in a proceeding before it to test the propriety of the issuance of a preliminary injunction. The same felt need for resolving once and for all the vexing question as to the constitutionality of a challenged enactment and thus serve public interest exists. What we have done in the case of an order proceeding from one of the coordinate branches, the executive, we can very well do in the matter before us involving the alleged nullity of a legislative act. Accordingly, there is nothing to preclude the grant of the writs prayed for, the burden of showing the constitutionality of the act having proved to be as will now be shown too much for respondent Galo. 2. The Reflector Law reads in full: "(g) Lights and reflector when parked or disabled. Appropriate parking lights or flares visible one hundred meters away shall be displayed at a corner of the vehicle whenever such vehicle is parked on highways or in places that are not well-lighted or is placed in such manner as to endanger passing traffic. Furthermore, every motor vehicle shall be provided at all times with built-in reflectors or other similar warning devices either pasted, painted or attached to its front and back which shall likewise be visible at light at least one hundred meters away. No vehicle not provided with any of the requirements mentioned in this subsection shall be registered."3 It is thus obvious that the challenged statute is a legislation enacted under the police power to promote public safety. Justice Laurel, in the first leading decision after the Constitution came to force, Calalang v. Williams,4 identified police power with state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare. Persons and property could thus "be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the general comfort, health and prosperity of the state." Shortly after independence in 1948, Primicias v. Fugoso,5 reiterated the doctrine, such a competence being referred to as "the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety, and general welfare of the people." The concept was set forth in negative terms by Justice Malcolm in a pre-Commonwealth decision as "that inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of society."6 In that sense it could be hardly distinguishable as noted by this Court in Morfe v. Mutuc7 with the totality of legislative power. It is in the above sense the greatest and most powerful attribute of government. It is to quote Justice Malcolm anew "the most essential, insistent, and at least illimitable of powers," 8 extending as Justice Holmes aptly pointed out "to all the great public needs." 9 Its scope, ever-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future where it could be done, provides enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits. In the language of Justice Cardozo: "Needs that were narrow or parochial in the past may be interwoven in the present with the well-being of the nation. What is critical or urgent changes with the time." 10 The police power is thus a dynamic agency, suitably vague and far from precisely defined, rooted in the conception that men in organizing the state and imposing upon its government limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did not intend thereby to enable an individual citizen or a group of citizens to obstruct unreasonably the enactment of such salutary measures calculated to insure communal peace, safety, good order, and welfare. It would then be to overturn a host of decisions impressive for their number and unanimity were this Court to sustain respondent Galo. 11 That we are not disposed to do, especially so as the attack on the challenged statute ostensibly for

disregarding the due process safeguard is angularly unpersuasive. It would be to close one's eyes to the hazards of traffic in the evening to condemn a statute of this character. Such an attitude betrays lack of concern for public safety. How can it plausibly alleged then that there was no observance of due process equated as it has always been with that is reasonable? The statute assailed is not infected with arbitrariness. It is not the product of whim or caprice. It is far from oppressive. It is a legitimate response to a felt public need. It can stand the test of the most unsymphatetic appraisal. Respondent Galo is of a different mind, having been unable to resist the teaching of many American State Court decisions referred to in the secondary source, American Jurisprudence principally relied upon by him. He ought to have been cautioned against an indiscriminate acceptance of such doctrines predicated on what was once a fundamental postulate in American public law, laissez faire. It is to be admitted that there was a period when such a concept did influence American court decisions on constitutional law. As was explicitly stated by Justice Cardozo speaking of that era: "Laissez-faire was not only a counsel of caution which would do well to heed. It was a categorical imperative which statesmen as well as judges must obey." 12 For a long time legislation tending to reduce economic inequality foundered on the rock that was the due process clause, enshrining as it did the liberty of contract, based on such a basic assumption. The New Deal administration of President Roosevelt more responsive to the social and economic forces at work changed matters greatly. By 1937, there was a greater receptivity by the American Supreme Court to an approach not too reverential of property rights. Even earlier, in 1935, Professor Coker of Yale, speaking as a historian, could already discern a contrary drift. He did note the expending range of governmental activity in the United States. 13 What is undeniable is that by 1943, laissez-faire was no longer the dominant theory. In the language of Justice Jackson in the leading case of West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette: 14 "We must, transplant these rights to a soil in which the laissez-faire concept or non-interference has withered at least as to economic affairs, and social advancements are increasingly sought through closer integration of society and through expanded and strengthened governmental controls." While authoritative precedents from the United States federal and state jurisdictions were deferred to when the Philippines was still under American rule, it cannot be said that the laissez-faire principle was invariably adhered to by us even then As early as 1919, in the leading case of Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro, 15 Justice Malcolm already had occasion to affirm: "The doctrines of laissez-faire and of unrestricted freedom of the individual, as axioms of economic and political theory, are of the past. The modern period has shown a widespread belief in the amplest possible demonstration of government activity. The Courts unfortunately have sometimes seemed to trail after the other two branches of the Government in this progressive march." People v. Pomar, 16 a 1924 decision which held invalid under the due process clause a provision providing for maternity leave with pay thirty days before and thirty days after confinement could be cited to show that such a principle did have its day. It is to be remembered though that our Supreme Court had no other choice as the Philippines was then under the United States, and only recently the year before, the American Supreme Court in Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 17 in line with the laissez-faire theory, did hold that a statute providing for minimum wages was constitutionally infirm. What is more, to erase any doubts, the Constitutional Convention saw to it that the concept of laissez-faire was rejected. It entrusted to our government the responsibility of coping with social and economic problems with the commensurate power of control over economic affairs. Thereby it could live up to its commitment to promote the general welfare through state action. No constitutional objection to regulatory measures adversely affecting property rights, especially so when public safety is the aim, is likely to be heeded, unless of course on the clearest and most satisfactory proof of invasion of rights guaranteed by the Constitution. On such a showing, there may be a declaration of nullity, but not because the laissez-faire principle was disregarded but because the due process, equal protection, or non-impairment guarantees would call for vindication. To repeat, our Constitution which took effect in 1935 erased whatever doubts there might be on that score. Its philosophy is a repudiation of laissez-faire. One of the leading members of the Constitutional Convention, Manuel A. Roxas, later the first President of the Republic, made it clear when he disposed of the objection of Delegate Jose Reyes of Sorsogon, who noted the "vast extensions in the sphere of governmental functions" and the "almost unlimited power to interfere in the affairs of industry and agriculture as well as to compete with existing business" as "reflections of the fascination exerted by [the then] current tendencies" in other jurisdictions. 18 He spoke thus: "My answer is that this constitution has definite and well defined philosophy not only political but social and economic. ... If in this Constitution the gentlemen will find declarations of economic policy they are there because they are necessary to safeguard the interests and welfare of the Filipino people because we believe that the days have come when in self-defense, a nation may provide in its constitution those safeguards, the patrimony, the freedom to grow, the freedom to develop national aspirations and national interests, not to be hampered by the artificial boundaries which a constitutional provision automatically imposes. 19

It was not expected then when in a concurring opinion, Justice Laurel, who likewise sat in the Constitutional Convention and was one of its leading lights, explicitly affirmed in a concurring opinion, later quoted with approval in the leading case of Antamok Goldfields Mining Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations, 20 that the Constitution did away with the laissez-faire doctrine. In the course of such concurring opinion and after noting the changes that have taken place calling for a more affirmative role by the government and its undeniable power to curtail property rights, he categorically declared the doctrine in People v. Pomar no longer retains "its virtuality as a living principle." 21 It is in the light of such rejection of the laissez-faire principle that during the Commonwealth era, no constitutional infirmity was found to have attached to legislation covering such subjects as collective bargaining, 22 security of tenure, 23 minimum wages, 24 compulsory arbitration, 25 the regulation of tenancy 26 as well as the issuance of securities, 27 and control of public services. 28 So it is likewise under the Republic this Court having given the seal of approval to more favorable tenancy laws, 29 nationalization of the retail trade, 30 limitation of the hours of labor, 31 imposition of price control, 32 requirement of separation pay for one month, 33 and social security scheme. 34 Respondent Galo thus could have profited by a little more diligence in the scrutiny of Philippine decisions rendered with not unexpected regularity, during all the while our Constitution has been in force attesting to the demise of such a shibboleth as laissez-faire. It was one of those fighting faiths that time and circumstances had upset, to paraphrase Holmes. Yet respondent Galo would seek to vivify and resurrect it. That, it would appear, is a vain quest, a futile undertaking. The Reflector Law is thus immune from the attack so recklessly hurled against it. It can survive, and quite easily too, the constitutional test. 3. The same lack of success marks the effort of respondent Galo to impugn the validity of Administrative Order No. 2 issued by petitioner in his official capacity, duly approved by the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, for being contrary to the principle of non-delegation of legislative power. Such administrative order, which took effect on April 17, 1970, has a provision on reflectors in effect reproducing what was set forth in the Act. Thus: "No motor vehicles of whatever style, kind, make, class or denomination shall be registered if not equipped with reflectors. Such reflectors shall either be factory built-in-reflector commercial glass reflectors, reflection tape or luminous paint. The luminosity shall have an intensity to be maintained visible and clean at all times such that if struck by a beam of light shall be visible 100 meters away at night." 35 Then came a section on dimensions, placement and color. As to dimensions the following is provided for: "Glass reflectors Not less than 3 inches in diameter or not less than 3 inches square; Reflectorized Tape At least 3 inches wide and 12 inches long. The painted or taped area may be bigger at the discretion of the vehicle owner." 36 Provision is then made as to how such reflectors are to be "placed, installed, pasted or painted." 37 There is the further requirement that in addition to such reflectors there shall be installed, pasted or painted four reflectors on each side of the motor vehicle parallel to those installed, pasted or painted in front and those in the rear end of the body thereof. 38 The color required of each reflectors, whether built-in, commercial glass, reflectorized tape or reflectorized paint placed in the front part of any motor vehicle shall be amber or yellow and those placed on the sides and in the rear shall all be red. 39 Penalties resulting from a violation thereof could be imposed. Thus: "Non-compliance with the requirements contained in this Order shall be sufficient cause to refuse registration of the motor vehicle affected and if already registered, its registration maybe suspended in pursuance of the provisions of Section 16 of RA 4136; [Provided], However, that in the case of the violation of Section 1(a) and (b) and paragraph (8) Section 3 hereof, a fine of not less than ten nor more than fifty pesos shall be imposed. 40 It is not to be lost sight of that under Republic Act No. 4136, of which the Reflector Law is an amendment, petitioner, as the Land Transportation Commissioner, may, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, issue rules and regulations for its implementation as long as they do not conflict with its provisions. 41 It is likewise an express provision of the above statute that for a violation of any of its provisions or regulations promulgated pursuant thereto a fine of not less than P10 nor not less than P50 could be imposed. 42 It is a fundamental principle flowing from the doctrine of separation of powers that Congress may not delegate its legislative power to the two other branches of the government, subject to the exception that local governments may over local affairs participate in its exercise. What cannot be delegated is the authority under the Constitution to make laws and to alter and repeal them; the test is the completeness of the statute in all its term and provisions when it leaves the hands of the legislature. To determine whether or not there is an undue delegation of legislative power the inquiry must be directed to the scope and definiteness of the measure enacted. The legislature does not abdicate its functions when it describes what job must be done, who is to do it, and what is the scope of his authority. For a complex economy, that may indeed be the only way in which the legislative process can go forward. A distinction has rightfully been made between delegation of power to make the laws which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, which constitutionally may not be done, and delegation of authority or discretion as to its execution to exercised under and in pursuance of the law, to which no valid objection call be made. The Constitution is thus not to be regarded as denying the legislature the necessary resources of flexibility and practicability.

To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there must be a standard, which implies at the very least that the legislature itself determines matters of principle and lay down fundamental policy. Otherwise, the charge of complete abdication may be hard to repel. A standard thus defines legislative policy, marks its limits, its maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative command is to be effected. It is the criterion by which legislative purpose may be carried out. Thereafter, the executive or administrative office designated may in pursuance of the above guidelines promulgate supplemental rules and regulations. The standard may be either express or implied. If the former, the non-delegation objection is easily met. The standard though does not have to be spelled out specifically. It could be implied from the policy and purpose of the act considered as a whole. In the Reflector Law, clearly the legislative objective is public safety. That is sought to be attained as in Calalang v. Williams is "safe transit upon the roads." 43 This is to adhere to the recognition given expression by Justice Laurel in a decision announced not long after the Constitution came into force and effect that the principle of non-delegation "has been made to adapt itself the complexities of modern governments, giving rise to the adoption, within certain limits, of the principle of "subordinate legislation" not only in the United States and England but in practically all modern governments." 44 He continued: "Accordingly, with the growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulation, and the increased difficulty of administering the laws, there is a constantly growing tendency toward the delegation of greater powers by the legislature and toward the approval of the practice by the courts." 45 Consistency with the conceptual approach requires the reminder that what is delegated is authority non-legislative in character, the completeness of the statute when it leaves the hands of Congress being assumed. Our later decisions speak to the same effect. Thus from, Justice J. B. L. Reyes in People vs. Exconde: 46 "It is well establish in this jurisdiction that, while the making of laws is a non-delegable activity that corresponds exclusively to Congress, nevertheless the latter may constitutionally delegate authority to promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given legislation and effectuate its policies, for the reason that the legislature often finds it impracticable (if not impossible) to anticipate and proved for the multifarious and complex situations that may be met in carrying the law in effect. All that is required is that the regulation should germane to the objects and purposes of the law; that the regulation be not in contradiction with it; but conform to the standards that the law prescribes ... " 47 An even more explicit formulation of the controlling principle comes from the pen of the then Justice, now Chief Justice, Concepcion: "Lastly, the legality of Circular No. 21 is assailed upon the ground that the grant of authority to issue the same constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power. It is true that, under our system of government, said power may not be delegated except to local governments. However, one thing is to delegate the power to determine what the law shall be, and another thing to delegate the authority to fix the details in the execution of enforcement of a policy set out in the law itself. Briefly stated, the rule is that the delegated powers fall under the second category, if the law authorizing the, delegation furnishes a reasonable standard which "sufficiently marks the field within which the Administrator is to act so that it may be known whether he has kept within it in compliance with the legislative will." (Yakus vs. United States, 88 L. ed. 848) ... It should be noted, furthermore, that these powers must be construed and exercised in relation to the objectives of the law creating the Central Bank, which are, among others, "to maintain monetary stability in the Philippines," and "to promote a rising level of production, employment and real income in the Philippines." (Section 2, Rep. Act No. 265). These standards are sufficiently concrete and definite to vest in the delegated authority, the character of administrative details in the enforcement of the law and to place the grant said authority beyond the category of a delegation of legislative powers ... " 48 It bears repeating that the Reflector Law construed together with the Land Transportation Code. Republic Act No. 4136, of which it is an amendment, leaves no doubt as to the stress and emphasis on public safety which is the prime consideration in statutes of this character. There is likewise a categorical affirmation Of the power of petitioner as Land Transportation Commissioner to promulgate rules and regulations to give life to and translate into actuality such fundamental purpose. His power is clear. There has been no abuse. His Administrative Order No. 2 can easily survive the attack, far-from-formidable, launched against it by respondent Galo. WHEREFORE, the writs of certiorari and prohibition prayed for are granted, the orders of May 28, 1970 of respondent Judge for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, the writ of preliminary injunction of June 1, 1970 and his order of June 9, 1970 denying reconsideration are annulled and set aside. Respondent Judge is likewise directed to dismiss the petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by respondent Teddy C. Galo, there being no cause of action as the Reflector Law and Administrative Order No. 2 of petitioner have not been shown to be tainted by invalidity. Without pronouncement as to costs.

G.R. No. 76633 October 18, 1988 EASTERN SHIPPING LINES, INC., petitioner, vs. PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION (POEA), MINISTER OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, HEARING OFFICER ABDUL BASAR and KATHLEEN D. SACO, respondents. Jimenea, Dala & Zaragoza Law Office for petitioner. The Solicitor General for public respondent. Dizon Law Office for respondent Kathleen D. Saco.

CRUZ, J.: The private respondent in this case was awarded the sum of P192,000.00 by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) for the death of her husband. The decision is challenged by the petitioner on the principal ground that the POEA had no jurisdiction over the case as the husband was not an overseas worker. Vitaliano Saco was Chief Officer of the M/V Eastern Polaris when he was killed in an accident in Tokyo, Japan, March 15, 1985. His widow sued for damages under Executive Order No. 797 and Memorandum Circular No. 2 of the POEA. The petitioner, as owner of the vessel, argued that the complaint was cognizable not by the POEA but by the Social Security System and should have been filed against the State Insurance Fund. The POEA nevertheless assumed jurisdiction and after considering the position papers of the parties ruled in favor of the complainant. The award consisted of P180,000.00 as death benefits and P12,000.00 for burial expenses. The petitioner immediately came to this Court, prompting the Solicitor General to move for dismissal on the ground of nonexhaustion of administrative remedies. Ordinarily, the decisions of the POEA should first be appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission, on the theory inter alia that the agency should be given an opportunity to correct the errors, if any, of its subordinates. This case comes under one of the exceptions, however, as the questions the petitioner is raising are essentially questions of law. 1 Moreover, the private respondent himself has not objected to the petitioner's direct resort to this Court, observing that the usual procedure would delay the disposition of the case to her prejudice. The Philippine Overseas Employment Administration was created under Executive Order No. 797, promulgated on May 1, 1982, to promote and monitor the overseas employment of Filipinos and to protect their rights. It replaced the National Seamen Board created earlier under Article 20 of the Labor Code in 1974. Under Section 4(a) of the said executive order, the POEA is vested with "original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases, including money claims, involving employeeemployer relations arising out of or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino contract workers, including seamen." These cases, according to the 1985 Rules and Regulations on Overseas Employment issued by the POEA, include "claims for death, disability and other benefits" arising out of such employment. 2 The petitioner does not contend that Saco was not its employee or that the claim of his widow is not compensable. What it does urge is that he was not an overseas worker but a 'domestic employee and consequently his widow's claim should have been filed with Social Security System, subject to appeal to the Employees Compensation Commission. We see no reason to disturb the factual finding of the POEA that Vitaliano Saco was an overseas employee of the petitioner at the time he met with the fatal accident in Japan in 1985. Under the 1985 Rules and Regulations on Overseas Employment, overseas employment is defined as "employment of a worker outside the Philippines, including employment on board vessels plying international waters, covered by a valid contract. 3 A contract worker is described as "any person working or who has worked overseas under a valid employment contract and shall include seamen" 4 or "any person working overseas or who has been employed by another which may be a local employer, foreign employer, principal or partner under a valid employment contract and shall include seamen." 5 These definitions clearly apply to Vitaliano Saco for it is not disputed that he died while under a contract of employment with the petitioner and alongside the petitioner's vessel, the M/V Eastern Polaris, while berthed in a foreign country. 6

It is worth observing that the petitioner performed at least two acts which constitute implied or tacit recognition of the nature of Saco's employment at the time of his death in 1985. The first is its submission of its shipping articles to the POEA for processing, formalization and approval in the exercise of its regulatory power over overseas employment under Executive Order NO. 797. 7 The second is its payment 8 of the contributions mandated by law and regulations to the Welfare Fund for Overseas Workers, which was created by P.D. No. 1694 "for the purpose of providing social and welfare services to Filipino overseas workers." Significantly, the office administering this fund, in the receipt it prepared for the private respondent's signature, described the subject of the burial benefits as "overseas contract worker Vitaliano Saco." 9 While this receipt is certainly not controlling, it does indicate, in the light of the petitioner's own previous acts, that the petitioner and the Fund to which it had made contributions considered Saco to be an overseas employee. The petitioner argues that the deceased employee should be likened to the employees of the Philippine Air Lines who, although working abroad in its international flights, are not considered overseas workers. If this be so, the petitioner should not have found it necessary to submit its shipping articles to the POEA for processing, formalization and approval or to contribute to the Welfare Fund which is available only to overseas workers. Moreover, the analogy is hardly appropriate as the employees of the PAL cannot under the definitions given be considered seamen nor are their appointments coursed through the POEA. The award of P180,000.00 for death benefits and P12,000.00 for burial expenses was made by the POEA pursuant to its Memorandum Circular No. 2, which became effective on February 1, 1984. This circular prescribed a standard contract to be adopted by both foreign and domestic shipping companies in the hiring of Filipino seamen for overseas employment. A similar contract had earlier been required by the National Seamen Board and had been sustained in a number of cases by this Court. 10 The petitioner claims that it had never entered into such a contract with the deceased Saco, but that is hardly a serious argument. In the first place, it should have done so as required by the circular, which specifically declared that "all parties to the employment of any Filipino seamen on board any ocean-going vessel are advised to adopt and use this employment contract effective 01 February 1984 and to desist from using any other format of employment contract effective that date." In the second place, even if it had not done so, the provisions of the said circular are nevertheless deemed written into the contract with Saco as a postulate of the police power of the State. 11 But the petitioner questions the validity of Memorandum Circular No. 2 itself as violative of the principle of non-delegation of legislative power. It contends that no authority had been given the POEA to promulgate the said regulation; and even with such authorization, the regulation represents an exercise of legislative discretion which, under the principle, is not subject to delegation. The authority to issue the said regulation is clearly provided in Section 4(a) of Executive Order No. 797, reading as follows: ... The governing Board of the Administration (POEA), as hereunder provided shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to govern the exercise of the adjudicatory functions of the Administration (POEA). Similar authorization had been granted the National Seamen Board, which, as earlier observed, had itself prescribed a standard shipping contract substantially the same as the format adopted by the POEA. The second challenge is more serious as it is true that legislative discretion as to the substantive contents of the law cannot be delegated. What can be delegated is the discretion to determine how the law may be enforced, not what the law shall be. The ascertainment of the latter subject is a prerogative of the legislature. This prerogative cannot be abdicated or surrendered by the legislature to the delegate. Thus, in Ynot v. Intermediate Apellate Court 12 which annulled Executive Order No. 626, this Court held: We also mark, on top of all this, the questionable manner of the disposition of the confiscated property as prescribed in the questioned executive order. It is there authorized that the seized property shall be distributed to charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection Commission may see fit, in the case of carabaos.' (Italics supplied.) The phrase "may see fit" is an extremely generous and dangerous condition, if condition it is. It is laden with perilous opportunities for partiality and abuse, and even corruption. One searches in vain for the usual standard and the reasonable guidelines, or better still, the limitations that the officers must observe when they make their distribution. There is none. Their options are apparently boundless. Who shall be the fortunate beneficiaries of their generosity and by what criteria shall they be chosen? Only the officers named can supply the answer,

they and they alone may choose the grantee as they see fit, and in their own exclusive discretion. Definitely, there is here a 'roving commission a wide and sweeping authority that is not canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing,' in short a clearly profligate and therefore invalid delegation of legislative powers. There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation of legislative power, viz, the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Under the first test, the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the delegate the only thing he will have to do is enforce it. 13 Under the sufficient standard test, there must be adequate guidelines or stations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. 14 Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative authority to the delegate, who is not allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature and exercise a power essentially legislative. The principle of non-delegation of powers is applicable to all the three major powers of the Government but is especially important in the case of the legislative power because of the many instances when its delegation is permitted. The occasions are rare when executive or judicial powers have to be delegated by the authorities to which they legally certain. In the case of the legislative power, however, such occasions have become more and more frequent, if not necessary. This had led to the observation that the delegation of legislative power has become the rule and its non-delegation the exception. The reason is the increasing complexity of the task of government and the growing inability of the legislature to cope directly with the myriad problems demanding its attention. The growth of society has ramified its activities and created peculiar and sophisticated problems that the legislature cannot be expected reasonably to comprehend. Specialization even in legislation has become necessary. To many of the problems attendant upon present-day undertakings, the legislature may not have the competence to provide the required direct and efficacious, not to say, specific solutions. These solutions may, however, be expected from its delegates, who are supposed to be experts in the particular fields assigned to them. The reasons given above for the delegation of legislative powers in general are particularly applicable to administrative bodies. With the proliferation of specialized activities and their attendant peculiar problems, the national legislature has found it more and more necessary to entrust to administrative agencies the authority to issue rules to carry out the general provisions of the statute. This is called the "power of subordinate legislation." With this power, administrative bodies may implement the broad policies laid down in a statute by "filling in' the details which the Congress may not have the opportunity or competence to provide. This is effected by their promulgation of what are known as supplementary regulations, such as the implementing rules issued by the Department of Labor on the new Labor Code. These regulations have the force and effect of law. Memorandum Circular No. 2 is one such administrative regulation. The model contract prescribed thereby has been applied in a significant number of the cases without challenge by the employer. The power of the POEA (and before it the National Seamen Board) in requiring the model contract is not unlimited as there is a sufficient standard guiding the delegate in the exercise of the said authority. That standard is discoverable in the executive order itself which, in creating the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, mandated it to protect the rights of overseas Filipino workers to "fair and equitable employment practices." Parenthetically, it is recalled that this Court has accepted as sufficient standards "Public interest" in People v. Rosenthal 15 "justice and equity" in Antamok Gold Fields v. CIR 16 "public convenience and welfare" in Calalang v. Williams 17 and "simplicity, economy and efficiency" in Cervantes v. Auditor General, 18 to mention only a few cases. In the United States, the "sense and experience of men" was accepted in Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 19 and "national security" in Hirabayashi v. United States. 20 It is not denied that the private respondent has been receiving a monthly death benefit pension of P514.42 since March 1985 and that she was also paid a P1,000.00 funeral benefit by the Social Security System. In addition, as already observed, she also received a P5,000.00 burial gratuity from the Welfare Fund for Overseas Workers. These payments will not preclude allowance of the private respondent's claim against the petitioner because it is specifically reserved in the standard contract of employment for Filipino seamen under Memorandum Circular No. 2, Series of 1984, that Section C. Compensation and Benefits.

1. In case of death of the seamen during the term of his Contract, the employer shall pay his beneficiaries the amount of: a. P220,000.00 for master and chief engineers b. P180,000.00 for other officers, including radio operators and master electrician c. P 130,000.00 for ratings. 2. It is understood and agreed that the benefits mentioned above shall be separate and distinct from, and will be in addition to whatever benefits which the seaman is entitled to under Philippine laws. ... 3. ... c. If the remains of the seaman is buried in the Philippines, the owners shall pay the beneficiaries of the seaman an amount not exceeding P18,000.00 for burial expenses. The underscored portion is merely a reiteration of Memorandum Circular No. 22, issued by the National Seamen Board on July 12,1976, providing an follows: Income Benefits under this Rule Shall be Considered Additional Benefits. All compensation benefits under Title II, Book Four of the Labor Code of the Philippines (Employees Compensation and State Insurance Fund) shall be granted, in addition to whatever benefits, gratuities or allowances that the seaman or his beneficiaries may be entitled to under the employment contract approved by the NSB. If applicable, all benefits under the Social Security Law and the Philippine Medicare Law shall be enjoyed by the seaman or his beneficiaries in accordance with such laws. The above provisions are manifestations of the concern of the State for the working class, consistently with the social justice policy and the specific provisions in the Constitution for the protection of the working class and the promotion of its interest. One last challenge of the petitioner must be dealt with to close t case. Its argument that it has been denied due process because the same POEA that issued Memorandum Circular No. 2 has also sustained and applied it is an uninformed criticism of administrative law itself. Administrative agencies are vested with two basic powers, the quasi-legislative and the quasi-judicial. The first enables them to promulgate implementing rules and regulations, and the second enables them to interpret and apply such regulations. Examples abound: the Bureau of Internal Revenue adjudicates on its own revenue regulations, the Central Bank on its own circulars, the Securities and Exchange Commission on its own rules, as so too do the Philippine Patent Office and the Videogram Regulatory Board and the Civil Aeronautics Administration and the Department of Natural Resources and so on ad infinitum on their respective administrative regulations. Such an arrangement has been accepted as a fact of life of modern governments and cannot be considered violative of due process as long as the cardinal rights laid down by Justice Laurel in the landmark case of Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations 21 are observed. Whatever doubts may still remain regarding the rights of the parties in this case are resolved in favor of the private respondent, in line with the express mandate of the Labor Code and the principle that those with less in life should have more in law. When the conflicting interests of labor and capital are weighed on the scales of social justice, the heavier influence of the latter must be counter-balanced by the sympathy and compassion the law must accord the underprivileged worker. This is only fair if he is to be given the opportunity and the right to assert and defend his cause not as a subordinate but as a peer of management, with which he can negotiate on even plane. Labor is not a mere employee of capital but its active and equal partner. WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, with costs against the petitioner. The temporary restraining order dated December 10, 1986 is hereby LIFTED. It is so ordered.

ROMEO P. GEROCHI, KATULONG NG BAYAN (KB) and ENVIRONMENTALIST CONSUMERS NETWORK, INC. (ECN), Petitioners,

G.R. No. 159796

Present:

-versus-

PUNO, C.J., QUISUMBING,

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY (DOE), ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION (ERC), NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION (NPC), POWER SECTOR ASSETS AND LIABILITIES MANAGEMENT GROUP (PSALM Corp.), STRATEGIC POWER UTILITIES GROUP (SPUG), and PANAY ELECTRIC COMPANY INC. (PECO), Respondents.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, CARPIO, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CORONA, CARPIO MORALES, AZCUNA, TINGA, CHICO-NAZARIO, GARCIA, VELASCO, JR. and NACHURA, JJ.

Promulgated:

July 17, 2007 x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x DECISION Petitioners Romeo P. Gerochi, Katulong Ng Bayan (KB), and Environmentalist Consumers Network, Inc. (ECN) (petitioners), come before this Court in this original action praying that Section 34 of Republic Act (RA) 9136, otherwise known as the Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001 (EPIRA), imposing the Universal Charge,1[1] and Rule 18 of the Rules and Regulations (IRR)2[2] which seeks to implement the said imposition, be declared unconstitutional. Petitioners also pray that the Universal Charge imposed upon the consumers be refunded and that a preliminary

1 2

injunction and/or temporary restraining order (TRO) be issued directing the respondents to refrain from implementing, charging, and collecting the said charge.3[3] The assailed provision of law reads: SECTION 34. Universal Charge. Within one (1) year from the effectivity of this Act, a universal charge to be determined, fixed and approved by the ERC, shall be imposed on all electricity end-users for the following purposes: (a) Payment for the stranded debts4[4] in excess of the amount assumed by the National Government and stranded contract costs of NPC5[5] and as well as qualified stranded contract costs of distribution utilities resulting from the restructuring of the industry; Missionary electrification;6[6] The equalization of the taxes and royalties applied to indigenous or renewable sources of energy vis--vis imported energy fuels;

(b) (c)

(d) An environmental charge equivalent to one-fourth of one centavo per kilowatt-hour (P0.0025/kWh), which shall accrue to an environmental fund to be used solely for watershed rehabilitation and management. Said fund shall be managed by NPC under existing arrangements; and (e) A charge to account for all forms of cross-subsidies for a period not exceeding three (3) years. The universal charge shall be a non-bypassable charge which shall be passed on and collected from all end-users on a monthly basis by the distribution utilities. Collections by the distribution utilities and the TRANSCO in any given month shall be remitted to the PSALM Corp. on or before the fifteenth (15th) of the succeeding month, net of any amount due to the distribution utility. Any end-user or self-generating entity not connected to a distribution utility shall remit its corresponding universal charge directly to the TRANSCO. The PSALM Corp., as administrator of the fund, shall create a Special Trust Fund which shall be disbursed only for the purposes specified herein in an open and transparent manner. All amount collected for the universal charge shall be distributed to the respective beneficiaries within a reasonable period to be provided by the ERC.

The Facts Congress enacted the EPIRA on June 8, 2001; on June 26, 2001, it took effect.7[7] On April 5, 2002, respondent National Power Corporation-Strategic Power Utilities Group8[8] (NPC-SPUG) filed with respondent Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC) a petition for the availment from the Universal Charge of its share for Missionary Electrification, docketed as ERC Case No. 2002-165.9[9] On May 7, 2002, NPC filed another petition with ERC, docketed as ERC Case No. 2002-194, praying that the proposed share from the Universal Charge for the Environmental charge of P0.0025 per kilowatt-hour (/kWh), or a total of P119,488,847.59, be approved for withdrawal from the Special Trust Fund (STF) managed by respondent Power Sector Assets and

3 4 5 6 7 8 9

Liabilities Management Group (PSALM)10[10] for the rehabilitation and management of watershed areas.11[11] On December 20, 2002, the ERC issued an Order12[12] in ERC Case No. 2002-165 provisionally approving the computed amount of P0.0168/kWh as the share of the NPC-SPUG from the Universal Charge for Missionary Electrification and authorizing the National Transmission Corporation (TRANSCO) and Distribution Utilities to collect the same from its end-users on a monthly basis. On June 26, 2003, the ERC rendered its Decision13[13] (for ERC Case No. 2002-165) modifying its Order of December 20, 2002, thus: WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the provisional authority granted to petitioner National Power Corporation-Strategic Power Utilities Group (NPC-SPUG) in the Order dated December 20, 2002 is hereby modified to the effect that an additional amount of P0.0205 per kilowatt-hour should be added to the P0.0168 per kilowatt-hour provisionally authorized by the Commission in the said Order. Accordingly, a total amount of P0.0373 per kilowatt-hour is hereby APPROVED for withdrawal from the Special Trust Fund managed by PSALM as its share from the Universal Charge for Missionary Electrification (UC-ME) effective on the following billing cycles: (a) (b) June 26-July 25, 2003 for National Transmission Corporation (TRANSCO); and July 2003 for Distribution Utilities (Dus).

Relative thereto, TRANSCO and Dus are directed to collect the UC-ME in the amount of P0.0373 per kilowatt-hour and remit the same to PSALM on or before the 15th day of the succeeding month. In the meantime, NPC-SPUG is directed to submit, not later than April 30, 2004, a detailed report to include Audited Financial Statements and physical status (percentage of completion) of the projects using the prescribed format. Let copies of this Order be furnished petitioner NPC-SPUG and all distribution utilities (Dus). SO ORDERED.

On August 13, 2003, NPC-SPUG filed a Motion for Reconsideration asking the ERC, among others, 14[14] to set aside the above-mentioned Decision, which the ERC granted in its Order dated October 7, 2003, disposing: WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioner National Power Corporation-Small Power Utilities Group (NPC-SPUG) is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the Decision dated June 26, 2003 is hereby modified accordingly. Relative thereto, NPC-SPUG is directed to submit a quarterly report on the following: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. Projects for CY 2002 undertaken; Location Actual amount utilized to complete the project; Period of completion; Start of Operation; and Explanation of the reallocation of UC-ME funds, if any.

10 11 12 13 14

SO ORDERED.15[15] Meanwhile, on April 2, 2003, ERC decided ERC Case No. 2002-194, authorizing the NPC to draw up to P70,000,000.00 from PSALM for its 2003 Watershed Rehabilitation Budget subject to the availability of funds for the Environmental Fund component of the Universal Charge.16[16] On the basis of the said ERC decisions, respondent Panay Electric Company, Inc. (PECO) charged petitioner Romeo P. Gerochi and all other end-users with the Universal Charge as reflected in their respective electric bills starting from the month of July 2003.17[17] Hence, this original action. Petitioners submit that the assailed provision of law and its IRR which sought to implement the same are unconstitutional on the following grounds: 1) The universal charge provided for under Sec. 34 of the EPIRA and sought to be implemented under Sec. 2, Rule 18 of the IRR of the said law is a tax which is to be collected from all electric end-users and self-generating entities. The power to tax is strictly a legislative function and as such, the delegation of said power to any executive or administrative agency like the ERC is unconstitutional, giving the same unlimited authority. The assailed provision clearly provides that the Universal Charge is to be determined, fixed and approved by the ERC, hence leaving to the latter complete discretionary legislative authority. The ERC is also empowered to approve and determine where the funds collected should be used. The imposition of the Universal Charge on all end-users is oppressive and confiscatory and amounts to taxation without representation as the consumers were not given a chance to be heard and represented.18[18]

2) 3)

Petitioners contend that the Universal Charge has the characteristics of a tax and is collected to fund the operations of the NPC. They argue that the cases19[19] invoked by the respondents clearly show the regulatory purpose of the charges imposed therein, which is not so in the case at bench. In said cases, the respective funds20[20] were created in order to balance and stabilize the prices of oil and sugar, and to act as buffer to counteract the changes and adjustments in prices, peso devaluation, and other variables which cannot be adequately and timely monitored by the legislature. Thus, there was a need to delegate powers to administrative bodies. 21[21] Petitioners posit that the Universal Charge is imposed not for a similar purpose. On the other hand, respondent PSALM through the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC) contends that unlike a tax which is imposed to provide income for public purposes, such as support of the government, administration of the law, or payment of public expenses, the assailed Universal Charge is levied for a specific regulatory purpose, which is to ensure the viability of the country's electric power industry. Thus, it is exacted by the State in the exercise of its inherent police power. On this premise, PSALM submits that there is no undue delegation of legislative

15 16 17 18 19 20 21

power to the ERC since the latter merely exercises a limited authority or discretion as to the execution and implementation of the provisions of the EPIRA.22[22] Respondents Department of Energy (DOE), ERC, and NPC, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), share the same view that the Universal Charge is not a tax because it is levied for a specific regulatory purpose, which is to ensure the viability of the country's electric power industry, and is, therefore, an exaction in the exercise of the State's police power. Respondents further contend that said Universal Charge does not possess the essential characteristics of a tax, that its imposition would redound to the benefit of the electric power industry and not to the public, and that its rate is uniformly levied on electricity end-users, unlike a tax which is imposed based on the individual taxpayer's ability to pay. Moreover, respondents deny that there is undue delegation of legislative power to the ERC since the EPIRA sets forth sufficient determinable standards which would guide the ERC in the exercise of the powers granted to it. Lastly, respondents argue that the imposition of the Universal Charge is not oppressive and confiscatory since it is an exercise of the police power of the State and it complies with the requirements of due process.23[23] On its part, respondent PECO argues that it is duty-bound to collect and remit the amount pertaining to the Missionary Electrification and Environmental Fund components of the Universal Charge, pursuant to Sec. 34 of the EPIRA and the Decisions in ERC Case Nos. 2002-194 and 2002-165. Otherwise, PECO could be held liable under Sec. 46 24[24] of the EPIRA, which imposes fines and penalties for any violation of its provisions or its IRR.25[25] The Issues The ultimate issues in the case at bar are: 1) 2) Whether or not, the Universal Charge imposed under Sec. 34 of the EPIRA is a tax; and Whether or not there is undue delegation of legislative power to tax on the part of the ERC.26[26]

Before we discuss the issues, the Court shall first deal with an obvious procedural lapse. Petitioners filed before us an original action particularly denominated as a Complaint assailing the constitutionality of Sec. 34 of the EPIRA imposing the Universal Charge and Rule 18 of the EPIRA's IRR. No doubt, petitioners have locus standi. They impugn the constitutionality of Sec. 34 of the EPIRA because they sustained a direct injury as a result of the imposition of the Universal Charge as reflected in their electric bills. However, petitioners violated the doctrine of hierarchy of courts when they filed this Complaint directly with us. Furthermore, the Complaint is bereft of any allegation of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the ERC or any of the public respondents, in order for the Court to consider it as a petition for certiorari or prohibition.

22 23 24 25 26

Article VIII, Section 5(1) and (2) of the 1987 Constitution27[27] categorically provides that: SECTION 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers: 1. 2. Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus. Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the rules of court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in: (a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question. But this Court's jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus, while concurrent with that of the regional trial courts and the Court of Appeals, does not give litigants unrestrained freedom of choice of forum from which to seek such relief. 28[28] It has long been established that this Court will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts, or where exceptional and compelling circumstances justify availment of a remedy within and call for the exercise of our primary jurisdiction.29[29] This circumstance alone warrants the outright dismissal of the present action. This procedural infirmity notwithstanding, we opt to resolve the constitutional issue raised herein. We are aware that if the constitutionality of Sec. 34 of the EPIRA is not resolved now, the issue will certainly resurface in the near future, resulting in a repeat of this litigation, and probably involving the same parties. In the public interest and to avoid unnecessary delay, this Court renders its ruling now. The instant complaint is bereft of merit. The First Issue To resolve the first issue, it is necessary to distinguish the States power of taxation from the police power. The power to tax is an incident of sovereignty and is unlimited in its range, acknowledging in its very nature no limits, so that security against its abuse is to be found only in the responsibility of the legislature which imposes the tax on the constituency that is to pay it.30[30] It is based on the principle that taxes are the lifeblood of the government, and their prompt and certain availability is an imperious need.31[31] Thus, the theory behind the exercise of the power to tax emanates from necessity; without taxes, government cannot fulfill its mandate of promoting the general welfare and wellbeing of the people.32[32] On the other hand, police power is the power of the state to promote public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property.33[33] It is the most pervasive, the least limitable, and the most demanding of the three

27 28 29 30 31 32 33

fundamental powers of the State. The justification is found in the Latin maxims salus populi est suprema lex (the welfare of the people is the supreme law) and sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas (so use your property as not to injure the property of others). As an inherent attribute of sovereignty which virtually extends to all public needs, police power grants a wide panoply of instruments through which the State, as parens patriae, gives effect to a host of its regulatory powers. 34 [34] We have held that the power to "regulate" means the power to protect, foster, promote, preserve, and control, with due regard for the interests, first and foremost, of the public, then of the utility and of its patrons.35[35] The conservative and pivotal distinction between these two powers rests in the purpose for which the charge is made. If generation of revenue is the primary purpose and regulation is merely incidental, the imposition is a tax; but if regulation is the primary purpose, the fact that revenue is incidentally raised does not make the imposition a tax.36[36] In exacting the assailed Universal Charge through Sec. 34 of the EPIRA, the State's police power, particularly its regulatory dimension, is invoked. Such can be deduced from Sec. 34 which enumerates the purposes for which the Universal Charge is imposed37[37] and which can be amply discerned as regulatory in character. The EPIRA resonates such regulatory purposes, thus: SECTION 2. (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k) Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared the policy of the State:

To ensure and accelerate the total electrification of the country; To ensure the quality, reliability, security and affordability of the supply of electric power; To ensure transparent and reasonable prices of electricity in a regime of free and fair competition and full public accountability to achieve greater operational and economic efficiency and enhance the competitiveness of Philippine products in the global market; To enhance the inflow of private capital and broaden the ownership base of the power generation, transmission and distribution sectors; To ensure fair and non-discriminatory treatment of public and private sector entities in the process of restructuring the electric power industry; To protect the public interest as it is affected by the rates and services of electric utilities and other providers of electric power; To assure socially and environmentally compatible energy sources and infrastructure; To promote the utilization of indigenous and new and renewable energy resources in power generation in order to reduce dependence on imported energy; To provide for an orderly and transparent privatization of the assets and liabilities of the National Power Corporation (NPC); To establish a strong and purely independent regulatory body and system to ensure consumer protection and enhance the competitive operation of the electricity market; and To encourage the efficient use of energy and other modalities of demand side management.

From the aforementioned purposes, it can be gleaned that the assailed Universal Charge is not a tax, but an exaction in the exercise of the State's police power. Public welfare is surely promoted.

34 35 36 37

Moreover, it is a well-established doctrine that the taxing power may be used as an implement of police power. 38 [38] In Valmonte v. Energy Regulatory Board, et al.39[39] and in Gaston v. Republic Planters Bank,40[40] this Court held that the Oil Price Stabilization Fund (OPSF) and the Sugar Stabilization Fund (SSF) were exactions made in the exercise of the police power. The doctrine was reiterated in Osmea v. Orbos41[41] with respect to the OPSF. Thus, we disagree with petitioners that the instant case is different from the aforementioned cases. With the Universal Charge, a Special Trust Fund (STF) is also created under the administration of PSALM.42[42] The STF has some notable characteristics similar to the OPSF and the SSF, viz.: 1) In the implementation of stranded cost recovery, the ERC shall conduct a review to determine whether there is under-recovery or over recovery and adjust (true-up) the level of the stranded cost recovery charge. In case of an over-recovery, the ERC shall ensure that any excess amount shall be remitted to the STF. A separate account shall be created for these amounts which shall be held in trust for any future claims of distribution utilities for stranded cost recovery. At the end of the stranded cost recovery period, any remaining amount in this account shall be used to reduce the electricity rates to the end-users.43[43] With respect to the assailed Universal Charge, if the total amount collected for the same is greater than the actual availments against it, the PSALM shall retain the balance within the STF to pay for periods where a shortfall occurs.44[44] Upon expiration of the term of PSALM, the administration of the STF shall be transferred to the DOF or any of the DOF attached agencies as designated by the DOF Secretary.45[45]

2)

3)

The OSG is in point when it asseverates:

Evidently, the establishment and maintenance of the Special Trust Fund, under the last paragraph of Section 34, R.A. No. 9136, is well within the pervasive and non-waivable power and responsibility of the government to secure the physical and economic survival and well-being of the community, that comprehensive sovereign authority we designate as the police power of the State.46[46]

This feature of the Universal Charge further boosts the position that the same is an exaction imposed primarily in pursuit of the State's police objectives. The STF reasonably serves and assures the attainment and perpetuity of the purposes for which the Universal Charge is imposed, i.e., to ensure the viability of the country's electric power industry. The Second Issue The principle of separation of powers ordains that each of the three branches of government has exclusive cognizance of and is supreme in matters falling within its own constitutionally allocated sphere. A logical corollary to the doctrine of separation of powers is the principle of non-delegation of powers, as expressed in the Latin maxim potestas delegata non delegari potest (what has been delegated cannot be delegated). This is based on the ethical principle that

38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46

such delegated power constitutes not only a right but a duty to be performed by the delegate through the instrumentality of his own judgment and not through the intervening mind of another. 47[47] In the face of the increasing complexity of modern life, delegation of legislative power to various specialized administrative agencies is allowed as an exception to this principle.48[48] Given the volume and variety of interactions in today's society, it is doubtful if the legislature can promulgate laws that will deal adequately with and respond promptly to the minutiae of everyday life. Hence, the need to delegate to administrative bodies - the principal agencies tasked to execute laws in their specialized fields - the authority to promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given statute and effectuate its policies. All that is required for the valid exercise of this power of subordinate legislation is that the regulation be germane to the objects and purposes of the law and that the regulation be not in contradiction to, but in conformity with, the standards prescribed by the law. These requirements are denominated as the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Under the first test, the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the delegate, the only thing he will have to do is to enforce it. The second test mandates adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to determine the boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from running riot.49[49] The Court finds that the EPIRA, read and appreciated in its entirety, in relation to Sec. 34 thereof, is complete in all its essential terms and conditions, and that it contains sufficient standards. Although Sec. 34 of the EPIRA merely provides that within one (1) year from the effectivity thereof, a Universal Charge to be determined, fixed and approved by the ERC, shall be imposed on all electricity end-users, and therefore, does not state the specific amount to be paid as Universal Charge, the amount nevertheless is made certain by the legislative parameters provided in the law itself. For one, Sec. 43(b)(ii) of the EPIRA provides: SECTION 43. Functions of the ERC. The ERC shall promote competition, encourage market development, ensure customer choice and penalize abuse of market power in the restructured electricity industry. In appropriate cases, the ERC is authorized to issue cease and desist order after due notice and hearing. Towards this end, it shall be responsible for the following key functions in the restructured industry: xxxx (b) Within six (6) months from the effectivity of this Act, promulgate and enforce, in accordance with law, a National Grid Code and a Distribution Code which shall include, but not limited to the following: xxxx (ii) Financial capability standards for the generating companies, the TRANSCO, distribution utilities and suppliers: Provided, That in the formulation of the financial capability standards, the nature and function of the entity shall be considered: Provided, further, That such standards are set to ensure that the electric power industry participants meet the minimum financial standards to protect the public interest. Determine, fix, and approve, after due notice and public hearings the universal charge, to be imposed on all electricity end-users pursuant to Section 34 hereof;

47 48 49

Moreover, contrary to the petitioners contention, the ERC does not enjoy a wide latitude of discretion in the determination of the Universal Charge. Sec. 51(d) and (e) of the EPIRA50[50] clearly provides: SECTION 51. Powers. The PSALM Corp. shall, in the performance of its functions and for the attainment of its objective, have the following powers: xxxx (d) To calculate the amount of the stranded debts and stranded contract costs of NPC which shall form the basis for ERC in the determination of the universal charge; (e) To liquidate the NPC stranded contract costs, utilizing the proceeds from sales and other property contributed to it, including the proceeds from the universal charge.

Thus, the law is complete and passes the first test for valid delegation of legislative power

As to the second test, this Court had, in the past, accepted as sufficient standards the following: "interest of law and order;"51[51] "adequate and efficient instruction;"52[52] "public interest;"53[53] "justice and equity;"54[54] "public convenience and welfare;"55[55] "simplicity, economy and efficiency;"56[56] "standardization and regulation of medical education;"57[57] and "fair and equitable employment practices."58[58] Provisions of the EPIRA such as, among others, to ensure the total electrification of the country and the quality, reliability, security and affordability of the supply of electric power59[59] and watershed rehabilitation and management60[60] meet the requirements for valid delegation, as they provide the limitations on the ERCs power to formulate the IRR. These are sufficient standards. It may be noted that this is not the first time that the ERC's conferred powers were challenged. In Freedom from Debt Coalition v. Energy Regulatory Commission,61[61] the Court had occasion to say: In determining the extent of powers possessed by the ERC, the provisions of the EPIRA must not be read in separate parts. Rather, the law must be read in its entirety, because a statute is passed as a whole, and is animated by one general purpose and intent. Its meaning cannot to be extracted from any single part thereof but from a general consideration of the statute as a whole. Considering the intent of Congress in enacting the EPIRA and reading the statute in its entirety, it is plain to see that the law has expanded the jurisdiction of the regulatory body, the ERC in this case, to enable the latter to implement the reforms sought to be accomplished by the EPIRA. When the legislators decided to broaden the jurisdiction of the ERC, they did not intend to abolish or reduce the powers already conferred upon ERC's predecessors. To sustain the view that the ERC possesses only the powers and functions listed under Section 43 of the EPIRA is to frustrate the objectives of the law.

50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61

In his Concurring and Dissenting Opinion62[62] in the same case, then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice, Reynato S. Puno described the immensity of police power in relation to the delegation of powers to the ERC and its regulatory functions over electric power as a vital public utility, to wit: Over the years, however, the range of police power was no longer limited to the preservation of public health, safety and morals, which used to be the primary social interests in earlier times. Police power now requires the State to "assume an affirmative duty to eliminate the excesses and injustices that are the concomitants of an unrestrained industrial economy." Police power is now exerted "to further the public welfare a concept as vast as the good of society itself." Hence, "police power is but another name for the governmental authority to further the welfare of society that is the basic end of all government." When police power is delegated to administrative bodies with regulatory functions, its exercise should be given a wide latitude. Police power takes on an even broader dimension in developing countries such as ours, where the State must take a more active role in balancing the many conflicting interests in society. The Questioned Order was issued by the ERC, acting as an agent of the State in the exercise of police power. We should have exceptionally good grounds to curtail its exercise. This approach is more compelling in the field of rate-regulation of electric power rates. Electric power generation and distribution is a traditional instrument of economic growth that affects not only a few but the entire nation. It is an important factor in encouraging investment and promoting business. The engines of progress may come to a screeching halt if the delivery of electric power is impaired. Billions of pesos would be lost as a result of power outages or unreliable electric power services. The State thru the ERC should be able to exercise its police power with great flexibility, when the need arises.

This was reiterated in National Association of Electricity Consumers for Reforms v. Energy Regulatory Commission63[63] where the Court held that the ERC, as regulator, should have sufficient power to respond in real time to changes wrought by multifarious factors affecting public utilities. From the foregoing disquisitions, we therefore hold that there is no undue delegation of legislative power to the ERC. Petitioners failed to pursue in their Memorandum the contention in the Complaint that the imposition of the Universal Charge on all end-users is oppressive and confiscatory, and amounts to taxation without representation. Hence, such contention is deemed waived or abandoned per Resolution64[64] of August 3, 2004.65[65] Moreover, the determination of whether or not a tax is excessive, oppressive or confiscatory is an issue which essentially involves questions of fact, and thus, this Court is precluded from reviewing the same.66[66] As a penultimate statement, it may be well to recall what this Court said of EPIRA: One of the landmark pieces of legislation enacted by Congress in recent years is the EPIRA. It established a new policy, legal structure and regulatory framework for the electric power industry. The new thrust is to tap private capital for the expansion and improvement of the industry as the large government debt and the highly capital-intensive character of the industry itself have long been acknowledged as the critical constraints to the program. To attract private investment, largely foreign, the jaded structure of the industry had to be addressed. While the generation and transmission sectors were centralized and monopolistic, the distribution side was fragmented with over 130 utilities, mostly small and uneconomic. The pervasive flaws have caused a low utilization of existing generation capacity; extremely high and uncompetitive power rates; poor quality of service to consumers; dismal to forgettable performance of the government power sector; high system losses; and an inability to develop a clear strategy for overcoming these shortcomings.

62 63 64 65 66

Thus, the EPIRA provides a framework for the restructuring of the industry, including the privatization of the assets of the National Power Corporation (NPC), the transition to a competitive structure, and the delineation of the roles of various government agencies and the private entities. The law ordains the division of the industry into four (4) distinct sectors, namely: generation, transmission, distribution and supply. Corollarily, the NPC generating plants have to privatized and its transmission business spun off and privatized thereafter.67[67]

Finally, every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality, and to justify its nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution and not one that is doubtful, speculative, or argumentative.68[68] Indubitably, petitioners failed to overcome this presumption in favor of the EPIRA. We find no clear violation of the Constitution which would warrant a pronouncement that Sec. 34 of the EPIRA and Rule 18 of its IRR are unconstitutional and void. WHEREFORE, the instant case is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

67 68

G.R. No. 124360 November 5, 1997 FRANCISCO S. TATAD, petitioner, vs. THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY AND THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE, respondents. G.R. No. 127867 November 5, 1997 EDCEL C. LAGMAN, JOKER P. ARROYO, ENRIQUE GARCIA, WIGBERTO TANADA, FLAG HUMAN RIGHTS FOUNDATION, INC., FREEDOM FROM DEBT COALITION (FDC), SANLAKAS, petitioners, vs. HON. RUBEN TORRES in his capacity as the Executive Secretary, HON. FRANCISCO VIRAY, in his capacity as the Secretary of Energy, CALTEX Philippines, Inc., PETRON Corporation and PILIPINAS SHELL Corporation, respondents.

PUNO, J.: The petitions at bar challenge the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 8180 entitled "An Act Deregulating the Downstream Oil Industry and For Other Purposes". 1 R.A. No. 8180 ends twenty six (26) years of government regulation of the downstream oil industry. Few cases carry a surpassing importance on the life of every Filipino as these petitions for the upswing and downswing of our economy materially depend on the oscillation of oil. First, the facts without the fat. Prior to 1971, there was no government agency regulating the oil industry other than those dealing with ordinary commodities. Oil companies were free to enter and exit the market without any government interference. There were four (4) refining companies (Shell, Caltex, Bataan Refining Company and Filoil Refining) and six (6) petroleum marketing companies (Esso, Filoil, Caltex, Getty, Mobil and Shell), then operating in the country. 2 In 1971, the country was driven to its knees by a crippling oil crisis. The government, realizing that petroleum and its products are vital to national security and that their continued supply at reasonable prices is essential to the general welfare, enacted the Oil Industry Commission Act. 3 It created the Oil Industry Commission (OIC) to regulate the business of importing, exporting, re-exporting, shipping, transporting, processing, refining, storing, distributing, marketing and selling crude oil, gasoline, kerosene, gas and other refined petroleum products. The OIC was vested with the power to fix the market prices of petroleum products, to regulate the capacities of refineries, to license new refineries and to regulate the operations and trade practices of the industry. 4 In addition to the creation of the OIC, the government saw the imperious need for a more active role of Filipinos in the oil industry. Until the early seventies, the downstream oil industry was controlled by multinational companies. All the oil refineries and marketing companies were owned by foreigners whose economic interests did not always coincide with the interest of the Filipino. Crude oil was transported to the country by foreign-controlled tankers. Crude processing was done locally by foreign-owned refineries and petroleum products were marketed through foreign-owned retail outlets. On November 9, 1973, President Ferdinand E. Marcos boldly created the Philippine National Oil Corporation (PNOC) to break the control by foreigners of our oil industry. 5 PNOC engaged in the business of refining, marketing, shipping, transporting, and storing petroleum. It acquired ownership of ESSO Philippines and Filoil to serve as its marketing arm. It bought the controlling shares of Bataan Refining Corporation, the largest refinery in the country. 6 PNOC later put up its own marketing subsidiary Petrophil. PNOC operated under the business name PETRON Corporation. For the first time, there was a Filipino presence in the Philippine oil market. In 1984, President Marcos through Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 1956, created the Oil Price Stabilization Fund (OPSF) to cushion the effects of frequent changes in the price of oil caused by exchange rate adjustments or increase in the world market prices of crude oil and imported petroleum products. The fund is used (1) to reimburse the oil companies for cost increases in crude oil and imported petroleum products resulting from exchange rate adjustment and/or increase in world market prices of crude oil, and (2) to reimburse oil companies for cost underrecovery incurred as a result of the reduction of domestic prices of petroleum products. Under the law, the OPSF may be sourced from: 1. any increase in the tax collection from ad valorem tax or customs duty imposed on petroleum products subject to tax under P.D. No. 1956 arising from exchange rate adjustment,

2. any increase in the tax collection as a result of the lifting of tax exemptions of government corporations, as may be determined by the Minister of Finance in consultation with the Board of Energy, 3. any additional amount to be imposed on petroleum products to augment the resources of the fund through an appropriate order that may be issued by the Board of Energy requiring payment of persons or companies engaged in the business of importing, manufacturing and/or marketing petroleum products, or 4. any resulting peso costs differentials in case the actual peso costs paid by oil companies in the importation of crude oil and petroleum products is less than the peso costs computed using the reference foreign exchange rate as fixed by the Board of Energy. 7 By 1985, only three (3) oil companies were operating in the country Caltex, Shell and the government-owned PNOC. In May, 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino signed Executive Order No. 172 creating the Energy Regulatory Board to regulate the business of importing, exporting, re-exporting, shipping, transporting, processing, refining, marketing and distributing energy resources "when warranted and only when public necessity requires." The Board had the following powers and functions: 1. Fix and regulate the prices of petroleum products; 2. Fix and regulate the rate schedule or prices of piped gas to be charged by duly franchised gas companies which distribute gas by means of underground pipe system; 3. Fix and regulate the rates of pipeline concessionaries under the provisions of R.A. No. 387, as amended . . . ; 4. Regulate the capacities of new refineries or additional capacities of existing refineries and license refineries that may be organized after the issuance of (E.O. No. 172) under such terms and conditions as are consistent with the national interest; and 5. Whenever the Board has determined that there is a shortage of any petroleum product, or when public interest so requires, it may take such steps as it may consider necessary, including the temporary adjustment of the levels of prices of petroleum products and the payment to the Oil Price Stabilization Fund . . . by persons or entities engaged in the petroleum industry of such amounts as may be determined by the Board, which may enable the importer to recover its cost of importation. 8 On December 9, 1992, Congress enacted R.A. No. 7638 which created the Department of Energy to prepare, integrate, coordinate, supervise and control all plans, programs, projects, and activities of the government in relation to energy exploration, development, utilization, distribution and conservation. 9 The thrust of the Philippine energy program under the law was toward privatization of government agencies related to energy, deregulation of the power and energy industry and reduction of dependency on oil-fired plants. 10 The law also aimed to encourage free and active participation and investment by the private sector in all energy activities. Section 5(e) of the law states that "at the end of four (4) years from the effectivity of this Act, the Department shall, upon approval of the President, institute the programs and timetable of deregulation of appropriate energy projects and activities of the energy industry." Pursuant to the policies enunciated in R.A. No. 7638, the government approved the privatization of Petron Corporation in 1993. On December 16, 1993, PNOC sold 40% of its equity in Petron Corporation to the Aramco Overseas Company. In March 1996, Congress took the audacious step of deregulating the downstream oil industry. It enacted R.A. No. 8180, entitled the "Downstream Oil Industry Deregulation Act of 1996." Under the deregulated environment, "any person or entity may import or purchase any quantity of crude oil and petroleum products from a foreign or domestic source, lease or own and operate refineries and other downstream oil facilities and market such crude oil or use the same for his own requirement," subject only to monitoring by the Department of Energy. 11

The deregulation process has two phases: the transition phase and the full deregulation phase. During the transition phase, controls of the non-pricing aspects of the oil industry were to be lifted. The following were to be accomplished: (1) liberalization of oil importation, exportation, manufacturing, marketing and distribution, (2) implementation of an automatic pricing mechanism, (3) implementation of an automatic formula to set margins of dealers and rates of haulers, water transport operators and pipeline concessionaires, and (4) restructuring of oil taxes. Upon full deregulation, controls on the price of oil and the foreign exchange cover were to be lifted and the OPSF was to be abolished. The first phase of deregulation commenced on August 12, 1996. On February 8, 1997, the President implemented the full deregulation of the Downstream Oil Industry through E.O. No. 372. The petitions at bar assail the constitutionality of various provisions of R.A No. 8180 and E.O. No. 372. In G.R. No. 124360, petitioner Francisco S. Tatad seeks the annulment of section 5(b) of R.A. No. 8180. Section 5(b) provides: b) Any law to the contrary notwithstanding and starting with the effectivity of this Act, tariff duty shall be imposed and collected on imported crude oil at the rate of three percent (3%) and imported refined petroleum products at the rate of seven percent (7%), except fuel oil and LPG, the rate for which shall be the same as that for imported crude oil: Provided, That beginning on January 1, 2004 the tariff rate on imported crude oil and refined petroleum products shall be the same: Provided, further, That this provision may be amended only by an Act of Congress. The petition is anchored on three arguments: First, that the imposition of different tariff rates on imported crude oil and imported refined petroleum products violates the equal protection clause. Petitioner contends that the 3%-7% tariff differential unduly favors the three existing oil refineries and discriminates against prospective investors in the downstream oil industry who do not have their own refineries and will have to source refined petroleum products from abroad. Second, that the imposition of different tariff rates does not deregulate the downstream oil industry but instead controls the oil industry, contrary to the avowed policy of the law. Petitioner avers that the tariff differential between imported crude oil and imported refined petroleum products bars the entry of other players in the oil industry because it effectively protects the interest of oil companies with existing refineries. Thus, it runs counter to the objective of the law "to foster a truly competitive market." Third, that the inclusion of the tariff provision in section 5(b) of R.A. No. 8180 violates Section 26(1) Article VI of the Constitution requiring every law to have only one subject which shall be expressed in its title. Petitioner contends that the imposition of tariff rates in section 5(b) of R.A. No. 8180 is foreign to the subject of the law which is the deregulation of the downstream oil industry. In G.R. No. 127867, petitioners Edcel C. Lagman, Joker P. Arroyo, Enrique Garcia, Wigberto Tanada, Flag Human Rights Foundation, Inc., Freedom from Debt Coalition (FDC) and Sanlakas contest the constitutionality of section 15 of R.A. No. 8180 and E.O. No. 392. Section 15 provides: Sec. 15. Implementation of Full Deregulation. Pursuant to Section 5(e) of Republic Act No. 7638, the DOE shall, upon approval of the President, implement the full deregulation of the downstream oil industry not later than March 1997. As far as practicable, the DOE shall time the full deregulation when the prices of crude oil and petroleum products in the world market are declining and when the exchange rate of the peso in relation to the US dollar is stable. Upon the implementation of the full deregulation as provided herein, the transition phase is deemed terminated and the following laws are deemed repealed: xxx xxx xxx E.O. No. 372 states in full, viz.: WHEREAS, Republic Act No. 7638, otherwise known as the "Department of Energy Act of 1992," provides that, at the end of four years from its effectivity last December 1992, "the Department (of Energy) shall, upon approval of

the President, institute the programs and time table of deregulation of appropriate energy projects and activities of the energy sector;" WHEREAS, Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8180, otherwise known as the "Downstream Oil Industry Deregulation Act of 1996," provides that "the DOE shall, upon approval of the President, implement full deregulation of the downstream oil industry not later than March, 1997. As far as practicable, the DOE shall time the full deregulation when the prices of crude oil and petroleum products in the world market are declining and when the exchange rate of the peso in relation to the US dollar is stable;" WHEREAS, pursuant to the recommendation of the Department of Energy, there is an imperative need to implement the full deregulation of the downstream oil industry because of the following recent developments: (i) depletion of the buffer fund on or about 7 February 1997 pursuant to the Energy Regulatory Board's Order dated 16 January 1997; (ii) the prices of crude oil had been stable at $21-$23 per barrel since October 1996 while prices of petroleum products in the world market had been stable since mid-December of last year. Moreover, crude oil prices are beginning to soften for the last few days while prices of some petroleum products had already declined; and (iii) the exchange rate of the peso in relation to the US dollar has been stable for the past twelve (12) months, averaging at around P26.20 to one US dollar; WHEREAS, Executive Order No. 377 dated 31 October 1996 provides for an institutional framework for the administration of the deregulated industry by defining the functions and responsibilities of various government agencies; WHEREAS, pursuant to Republic Act No. 8180, the deregulation of the industry will foster a truly competitive market which can better achieve the social policy objectives of fair prices and adequate, continuous supply of environmentally-clean and high quality petroleum products; NOW, THEREFORE, I, FIDEL V. RAMOS, President of the Republic of the Philippines, by the powers vested in me by law, do hereby declare the full deregulation of the downstream oil industry. In assailing section 15 of R.A. No. 8180 and E.O. No. 392, petitioners offer the following submissions: First, section 15 of R.A. No. 8180 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power to the President and the Secretary of Energy because it does not provide a determinate or determinable standard to guide the Executive Branch in determining when to implement the full deregulation of the downstream oil industry. Petitioners contend that the law does not define when it is practicable for the Secretary of Energy to recommend to the President the full deregulation of the downstream oil industry or when the President may consider it practicable to declare full deregulation. Also, the law does not provide any specific standard to determine when the prices of crude oil in the world market are considered to be declining nor when the exchange rate of the peso to the US dollar is considered stable. Second, petitioners aver that E.O. No. 392 implementing the full deregulation of the downstream oil industry is arbitrary and unreasonable because it was enacted due to the alleged depletion of the OPSF fund a condition not found in R.A. No. 8180. Third, section 15 of R.A. No. 8180 and E.O. No. 392 allow the formation of a de facto cartel among the three existing oil companies Petron, Caltex and Shell in violation of the constitutional prohibition against monopolies, combinations in restraint of trade and unfair competition. Respondents, on the other hand, fervently defend the constitutionality of R.A. No. 8180 and E.O. No. 392. In addition, respondents contend that the issues raised by the petitions are not justiciable as they pertain to the wisdom of the law. Respondents further aver that petitioners have no locus standi as they did not sustain nor will they sustain direct injury as a result of the implementation of R.A. No. 8180. The petitions were heard by the Court on September 30, 1997. On October 7, 1997, the Court ordered the private respondents oil companies "to maintain the status quo and to cease and desist from increasing the prices of gasoline and other petroleum fuel products for a period of thirty (30) days . . . subject to further orders as conditions may warrant." We shall now resolve the petitions on the merit. The petitions raise procedural and substantive issues bearing on the constitutionality of R.A. No. 8180 and E.O. No. 392. The procedural issues are: (1) whether or not the petitions raise a justiciable controversy, and (2) whether or not the petitioners have the standing to assail the validity of the subject law and executive order. The substantive issues are: (1) whether or not section 5 (b) violates the one title one subject

requirement of the Constitution; (2) whether or not the same section violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution; (3) whether or not section 15 violates the constitutional prohibition on undue delegation of power; (4) whether or not E.O. No. 392 is arbitrary and unreasonable; and (5) whether or not R.A. No. 8180 violates the constitutional prohibition against monopolies, combinations in restraint of trade and unfair competition. We shall first tackle the procedural issues. Respondents claim that the avalanche of arguments of the petitioners assail the wisdom of R.A. No. 8180. They aver that deregulation of the downstream oil industry is a policy decision made by Congress and it cannot be reviewed, much less be reversed by this Court. In constitutional parlance, respondents contend that the petitions failed to raise a justiciable controversy. Respondents' joint stance is unnoteworthy. Judicial power includes not only the duty of the courts to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, but also the duty to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government. 12 The courts, as guardians of the Constitution, have the inherent authority to determine whether a statute enacted by the legislature transcends the limit imposed by the fundamental law. Where a statute violates the Constitution, it is not only the right but the duty of the judiciary to declare such act as unconstitutional and void. 13 We held in the recent case of Tanada v. Angara: 14 xxx xxx xxx In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravenes the Constitution, the petition no doubt raises a justiciable controversy. Where an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. The question thus posed is judicial rather than political. The duty to adjudicate remains to assure that the supremacy of the Constitution is upheld. Once a controversy as to the application or interpretation of a constitutional provision is raised before this Court, it becomes a legal issue which the Court is bound by constitutional mandate to decide. Even a sideglance at the petitions will reveal that petitioners have raised constitutional issues which deserve the resolution of this Court in view of their seriousness and their value as precedents. Our statement of facts and definition of issues clearly show that petitioners are assailing R.A. No. 8180 because its provisions infringe the Constitution and not because the law lacks wisdom. The principle of separation of power mandates that challenges on the constitutionality of a law should be resolved in our courts of justice while doubts on the wisdom of a law should be debated in the halls of Congress. Every now and then, a law may be denounced in court both as bereft of wisdom and constitutionally infirmed. Such denunciation will not deny this Court of its jurisdiction to resolve the constitutionality of the said law while prudentially refusing to pass on its wisdom. The effort of respondents to question the locus standi of petitioners must also fall on barren ground. In language too lucid to be misunderstood, this Court has brightlined its liberal stance on a petitioner's locus standi where the petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental significance to the people. 15 In Kapatiran ng mga Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas, Inc. v. Tan, 16 we stressed: xxx xxx xxx Objections to taxpayers' suit for lack of sufficient personality, standing or interest are, however, in the main procedural matters. Considering the importance to the public of the cases at bar, and in keeping with the Court's duty, under the 1987 Constitution, to determine whether or not the other branches of government have kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the laws and that they have not abused the discretion given to them, the Court has brushed aside technicalities of procedure and has taken cognizance of these petitions. There is not a dot of disagreement between the petitioners and the respondents on the far reaching importance of the validity of RA No. 8180 deregulating our downstream oil industry. Thus, there is no good sense in being hypertechnical on the standing of petitioners for they pose issues which are significant to our people and which deserve our forthright resolution. We shall now track down the substantive issues. In G.R. No. 124360 where petitioner is Senator Tatad, it is contended that section 5(b) of R.A. No. 8180 on tariff differential violates the provision 17 of the Constitution requiring every law to have only one subject which should be expressed in its title. We do not concur with this contention. As a policy, this Court has adopted a liberal construction of the one title one subject rule. We have consistently ruled 18 that the title need not mirror, fully index or catalogue all contents and minute details of a law. A law having a single general subject indicated in

the title may contain any number of provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, and may be considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for the method and means of carrying out the general subject. 19 We hold that section 5(b) providing for tariff differential is germane to the subject of R.A. No. 8180 which is the deregulation of the downstream oil industry. The section is supposed to sway prospective investors to put up refineries in our country and make them rely less on imported petroleum. 20 We shall, however, return to the validity of this provision when we examine its blocking effect on new entrants to the oil market. We shall now slide to the substantive issues in G.R. No. 127867. Petitioners assail section 15 of R.A. No. 8180 which fixes the time frame for the full deregulation of the downstream oil industry. We restate its pertinent portion for emphasis, viz.: Sec. 15. Implementation of Full Deregulation Pursuant to section 5(e) of Republic Act No. 7638, the DOE shall, upon approval of the President, implement the full deregulation of the downstream oil industry not later than March 1997. As far as practicable, the DOE shall time the full deregulation when the prices of crude oil and petroleum products in the world market are declining and when the exchange rate of the peso in relation to the US dollar is stable . . . Petitioners urge that the phrases "as far as practicable," "decline of crude oil prices in the world market" and "stability of the peso exchange rate to the US dollar" are ambivalent, unclear and inconcrete in meaning. They submit that they do not provide the "determinate or determinable standards" which can guide the President in his decision to fully deregulate the downstream oil industry. In addition, they contend that E.O. No. 392 which advanced the date of full deregulation is void for it illegally considered the depletion of the OPSF fund as a factor. The power of Congress to delegate the execution of laws has long been settled by this Court. As early as 1916 in Compania General de Tabacos de Filipinas vs. The Board of Public Utility Commissioners, 21 this Court thru, Mr. Justice Moreland, held that "the true distinction is between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made." Over the years, as the legal engineering of men's relationship became more difficult, Congress has to rely more on the practice of delegating the execution of laws to the executive and other administrative agencies. Two tests have been developed to determine whether the delegation of the power to execute laws does not involve the abdication of the power to make law itself. We delineated the metes and bounds of these tests in Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. VS. POEA, 22 thus: There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation of legislative power, viz: the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Under the first test, the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislative such that when it reaches the delegate the only thing he will have to do is to enforce it. Under the sufficient standard test, there must be adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative authority to the delegate, who is not allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature and exercise a power essentially legislative. The validity of delegating legislative power is now a quiet area in our constitutional landscape. As sagely observed, delegation of legislative power has become an inevitability in light of the increasing complexity of the task of government. Thus, courts bend as far back as possible to sustain the constitutionality of laws which are assailed as unduly delegating legislative powers. Citing Hirabayashi v. United States 23 as authority, Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz states "that even if the law does not expressly pinpoint the standard, the courts will bend over backward to locate the same elsewhere in order to spare the statute, if it can, from constitutional infirmity." 24 Given the groove of the Court's rulings, the attempt of petitioners to strike down section 15 on the ground of undue delegation of legislative power cannot prosper. Section 15 can hurdle both the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. It will be noted that Congress expressly provided in R.A. No. 8180 that full deregulation will start at the end of March 1997, regardless of the occurrence of any event. Full deregulation at the end of March 1997 is mandatory and the Executive has no discretion to postpone it for any purported reason. Thus, the law is complete on the question of the final date of full deregulation. The discretion given to the President is to advance the date of full deregulation before the end of March 1997. Section 15 lays down the standard to guide the judgment of the President he is to time it as far as practicable when the prices of crude oil and petroleum products in the world market are declining and when the exchange rate of the peso in relation to the US dollar is stable. Petitioners contend that the words "as far as practicable," "declining" and "stable" should have been defined in R.A. No. 8180 as they do not set determinate or determinable standards. The stubborn submission deserves scant consideration.

The dictionary meanings of these words are well settled and cannot confuse men of reasonable intelligence. Webster defines "practicable" as meaning possible to practice or perform, "decline" as meaning to take a downward direction, and "stable" as meaning firmly established. 25 The fear of petitioners that these words will result in the exercise of executive discretion that will run riot is thus groundless. To be sure, the Court has sustained the validity of similar, if not more general standards in other cases. 26 It ought to follow that the argument that E.O. No. 392 is null and void as it was based on indeterminate standards set by R.A. 8180 must likewise fail. If that were all to the attack against the validity of E.O. No. 392, the issue need not further detain our discourse. But petitioners further posit the thesis that the Executive misapplied R.A. No. 8180 when it considered the depletion of the OPSF fund as a factor in fully deregulating the downstream oil industry in February 1997. A perusal of section 15 of R.A. No. 8180 will readily reveal that it only enumerated two factors to be considered by the Department of Energy and the Office of the President, viz.: (1) the time when the prices of crude oil and petroleum products in the world market are declining, and (2) the time when the exchange rate of the peso in relation to the US dollar is stable. Section 15 did not mention the depletion of the OPSF fund as a factor to be given weight by the Executive before ordering full deregulation. On the contrary, the debates in Congress will show that some of our legislators wanted to impose as a pre-condition to deregulation a showing that the OPSF fund must not be in deficit. 27 We therefore hold that the Executive department failed to follow faithfully the standards set by R.A. No. 8180 when it considered the extraneous factor of depletion of the OPSF fund. The misappreciation of this extra factor cannot be justified on the ground that the Executive department considered anyway the stability of the prices of crude oil in the world market and the stability of the exchange rate of the peso to the dollar. By considering another factor to hasten full deregulation, the Executive department rewrote the standards set forth in R.A. 8180. The Executive is bereft of any right to alter either by subtraction or addition the standards set in R.A. No. 8180 for it has no power to make laws. To cede to the Executive the power to make law is to invite tyranny, indeed, to transgress the principle of separation of powers. The exercise of delegated power is given a strict scrutiny by courts for the delegate is a mere agent whose action cannot infringe the terms of agency. In the cases at bar, the Executive co-mingled the factor of depletion of the OPSF fund with the factors of decline of the price of crude oil in the world market and the stability of the peso to the US dollar. On the basis of the text of E.O. No. 392, it is impossible to determine the weight given by the Executive department to the depletion of the OPSF fund. It could well be the principal consideration for the early deregulation. It could have been accorded an equal significance. Or its importance could be nil. In light of this uncertainty, we rule that the early deregulation under E.O. No. 392 constitutes a misapplication of R.A. No. 8180. We now come to grips with the contention that some provisions of R.A. No. 8180 violate section 19 of Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. These provisions are: (1) Section 5 (b) which states "Any law to the contrary notwithstanding and starting with the effectivity of this Act, tariff duty shall be imposed and collected on imported crude oil at the rate of three percent (3%) and imported refined petroleum products at the rate of seven percent (7%) except fuel oil and LPG, the rate for which shall be the same as that for imported crude oil. Provided, that beginning on January 1, 2004 the tariff rate on imported crude oil and refined petroleum products shall be the same. Provided, further, that this provision may be amended only by an Act of Congress." (2) Section 6 which states "To ensure the security and continuity of petroleum crude and products supply, the DOE shall require the refiners and importers to maintain a minimum inventory equivalent to ten percent (10%) of their respective annual sales volume or forty (40) days of supply, whichever is lower," and (3) Section 9 (b) which states "To ensure fair competition and prevent cartels and monopolies in the downstream oil industry, the following acts shall be prohibited: xxx xxx xxx (b) Predatory pricing which means selling or offering to sell any product at a price unreasonably below the industry average cost so as to attract customers to the detriment of competitors. On the other hand, section 19 of Article XII of the Constitution allegedly violated by the aforestated provisions of R.A. No. 8180 mandates: "The State shall regulate or prohibit monopolies when the public interest so requires. No combinations in restraint of trade or unfair competition shall be allowed." A monopoly is a privilege or peculiar advantage vested in one or more persons or companies, consisting in the exclusive right or power to carry on a particular business or trade, manufacture a particular article, or control the sale or the whole supply of a particular commodity. It is a form of market structure in which one or only a few firms dominate the total sales

of a product or service. 28 On the other hand, a combination in restraint of trade is an agreement or understanding between two or more persons, in the form of a contract, trust, pool, holding company, or other form of association, for the purpose of unduly restricting competition, monopolizing trade and commerce in a certain commodity, controlling its, production, distribution and price, or otherwise interfering with freedom of trade without statutory authority. 29 Combination in restraint of trade refers to the means while monopoly refers to the end. 30 Article 186 of the Revised Penal Code and Article 28 of the New Civil Code breathe life to this constitutional policy. Article 186 of the Revised Penal Code penalizes monopolization and creation of combinations in restraint of trade, 31 while Article 28 of the New Civil Code makes any person who shall engage in unfair competition liable for damages. 32 Respondents aver that sections 5(b), 6 and 9(b) implement the policies and objectives of R.A. No. 8180. They explain that the 4% tariff differential is designed to encourage new entrants to invest in refineries. They stress that the inventory requirement is meant to guaranty continuous domestic supply of petroleum and to discourage fly-by-night operators. They also submit that the prohibition against predatory pricing is intended to protect prospective entrants. Respondents manifested to the Court that new players have entered the Philippines after deregulation and have now captured 3% 5% of the oil market. The validity of the assailed provisions of R.A. No. 8180 has to be decided in light of the letter and spirit of our Constitution, especially section 19, Article XII. Beyond doubt, the Constitution committed us to the free enterprise system but it is a system impressed with its own distinctness. Thus, while the Constitution embraced free enterprise as an economic creed, it did not prohibit per se the operation of monopolies which can, however, be regulated in the public interest. 33 Thus too, our free enterprise system is not based on a market of pure and unadulterated competition where the State pursues a strict hands-off policy and follows the let-the-devil devour the hindmost rule. Combinations in restraint of trade and unfair competitions are absolutely proscribed and the proscription is directed both against the State as well as the private sector. 34 This distinct free enterprise system is dictated by the need to achieve the goals of our national economy as defined by section 1, Article XII of the Constitution which are: more equitable distribution of opportunities, income and wealth; a sustained increase in the amount of goods and services produced by the nation for the benefit of the people; and an expanding productivity as the key to raising the quality of life for all, especially the underprivileged. It also calls for the State to protect Filipino enterprises against unfair competition and trade practices. Section 19, Article XII of our Constitution is anti-trust in history and in spirit. It espouses competition. The desirability of competition is the reason for the prohibition against restraint of trade, the reason for the interdiction of unfair competition, and the reason for regulation of unmitigated monopolies. Competition is thus the underlying principle of section 19, Article XII of our Constitution which cannot be violated by R.A. No. 8180. We subscribe to the observation of Prof. Gellhorn that the objective of anti-trust law is "to assure a competitive economy, based upon the belief that through competition producers will strive to satisfy consumer wants at the lowest price with the sacrifice of the fewest resources. Competition among producers allows consumers to bid for goods and services, and thus matches their desires with society's opportunity costs." 35 He adds with appropriateness that there is a reliance upon "the operation of the 'market' system (free enterprise) to decide what shall be produced, how resources shall be allocated in the production process, and to whom the various products will be distributed. The market system relies on the consumer to decide what and how much shall be produced, and on competition, among producers to determine who will manufacture it." Again, we underline in scarlet that the fundamental principle espoused by section 19, Article XII of the Constitution is competition for it alone can release the creative forces of the market. But the competition that can unleash these creative forces is competition that is fighting yet is fair. Ideally, this kind of competition requires the presence of not one, not just a few but several players. A market controlled by one player (monopoly) or dominated by a handful of players (oligopoly) is hardly the market where honest-to-goodness competition will prevail. Monopolistic or oligopolistic markets deserve our careful scrutiny and laws which barricade the entry points of new players in the market should be viewed with suspicion. Prescinding from these baseline propositions, we shall proceed to examine whether the provisions of R.A. No. 8180 on tariff differential, inventory reserves, and predatory prices imposed substantial barriers to the entry and exit of new players in our downstream oil industry. If they do, they have to be struck down for they will necessarily inhibit the formation of a truly competitive market. Contrariwise, if they are insignificant impediments, they need not be stricken down. In the cases at bar, it cannot be denied that our downstream oil industry is operated and controlled by an oligopoly, a foreign oligopoly at that. Petron, Shell and Caltex stand as the only major league players in the oil market. All other players belong to the lilliputian league. As the dominant players, Petron, Shell and Caltex boast of existing refineries of various capacities. The tariff differential of 4% therefore works to their immense benefit. Yet, this is only one edge of the tariff differential. The other edge cuts and cuts deep in the heart of their competitors. It erects a high barrier to the entry of new players. New players that intend to equalize the market power of Petron, Shell and Caltex by building refineries of

their own will have to spend billions of pesos. Those who will not build refineries but compete with them will suffer the huge disadvantage of increasing their product cost by 4%. They will be competing on an uneven field. The argument that the 4% tariff differential is desirable because it will induce prospective players to invest in refineries puts the cart before the horse. The first need is to attract new players and they cannot be attracted by burdening them with heavy disincentives. Without new players belonging to the league of Petron, Shell and Caltex, competition in our downstream oil industry is an idle dream. The provision on inventory widens the balance of advantage of Petron, Shell and Caltex against prospective new players. Petron, Shell and Caltex can easily comply with the inventory requirement of R.A. No. 8180 in view of their existing storage facilities. Prospective competitors again will find compliance with this requirement difficult as it will entail a prohibitive cost. The construction cost of storage facilities and the cost of inventory can thus scare prospective players. Their net effect is to further occlude the entry points of new players, dampen competition and enhance the control of the market by the three (3) existing oil companies. Finally, we come to the provision on predatory pricing which is defined as ". . . selling or offering to sell any product at a price unreasonably below the industry average cost so as to attract customers to the detriment of competitors." Respondents contend that this provision works against Petron, Shell and Caltex and protects new entrants. The ban on predatory pricing cannot be analyzed in isolation. Its validity is interlocked with the barriers imposed by R.A. No. 8180 on the entry of new players. The inquiry should be to determine whether predatory pricing on the part of the dominant oil companies is encouraged by the provisions in the law blocking the entry of new players. Text-writer Hovenkamp, 36 gives the authoritative answer and we quote: xxx xxx xxx The rationale for predatory pricing is the sustaining of losses today that will give a firm monopoly profits in the future. The monopoly profits will never materialize, however, if the market is flooded with new entrants as soon as the successful predator attempts to raise its price. Predatory pricing will be profitable only if the market contains significant barriers to new entry. As aforediscsussed, the 4% tariff differential and the inventory requirement are significant barriers which discourage new players to enter the market. Considering these significant barriers established by R.A. No. 8180 and the lack of players with the comparable clout of PETRON, SHELL and CALTEX, the temptation for a dominant player to engage in predatory pricing and succeed is a chilling reality. Petitioners' charge that this provision on predatory pricing is anti-competitive is not without reason. Respondents belittle these barriers with the allegation that new players have entered the market since deregulation. A scrutiny of the list of the alleged new players will, however, reveal that not one belongs to the class and category of PETRON, SHELL and CALTEX. Indeed, there is no showing that any of these new players intends to install any refinery and effectively compete with these dominant oil companies. In any event, it cannot be gainsaid that the new players could have been more in number and more impressive in might if the illegal entry barriers in R.A. No. 8180 were not erected. We come to the final point. We now resolve the total effect of the untimely deregulation, the imposition of 4% tariff differential on imported crude oil and refined petroleum products, the requirement of inventory and the prohibition on predatory pricing on the constitutionality of R.A. No. 8180. The question is whether these offending provisions can be individually struck down without invalidating the entire R.A. No. 8180. The ruling case law is well stated by author Agpalo, 37 viz.: xxx xxx xxx The general rule is that where part of a statute is void as repugnant to the Constitution, while another part is valid, the valid portion, if separable from the invalid, may stand and be enforced. The presence of a separability clause in a statute creates the presumption that the legislature intended separability, rather than complete nullity of the statute. To justify this result, the valid portion must be so far independent of the invalid portion that it is fair to presume that the legislature would have enacted it by itself if it had supposed that it could not constitutionally enact the other. Enough must remain to make a complete, intelligible and valid statute, which carries out the legislative intent. . . . The exception to the general rule is that when the parts of a statute are so mutually dependent and connected, as conditions, considerations, inducements, or compensations for each other, as to warrant a belief that the legislature intended them as a whole, the nullity of one part will vitiate the rest. In making the parts of the statute

dependent, conditional, or connected with one another, the legislature intended the statute to be carried out as a whole and would not have enacted it if one part is void, in which case if some parts are unconstitutional, all the other provisions thus dependent, conditional, or connected must fall with them. R.A. No. 8180 contains a separability clause. Section 23 provides that "if for any reason, any section or provision of this Act is declared unconstitutional or invalid, such parts not affected thereby shall remain in full force and effect." This separability clause notwithstanding, we hold that the offending provisions of R.A. No. 8180 so permeate its essence that the entire law has to be struck down. The provisions on tariff differential, inventory and predatory pricing are among the principal props of R.A. No. 8180. Congress could not have deregulated the downstream oil industry without these provisions. Unfortunately, contrary to their intent, these provisions on tariff differential, inventory and predatory pricing inhibit fair competition, encourage monopolistic power and interfere with the free interaction of market forces. R.A. No. 8180 needs provisions to vouchsafe free and fair competition. The need for these vouchsafing provisions cannot be overstated. Before deregulation, PETRON, SHELL and CALTEX had no real competitors but did not have a free run of the market because government controls both the pricing and non-pricing aspects of the oil industry. After deregulation, PETRON, SHELL and CALTEX remain unthreatened by real competition yet are no longer subject to control by government with respect to their pricing and non-pricing decisions. The aftermath of R.A. No. 8180 is a deregulated market where competition can be corrupted and where market forces can be manipulated by oligopolies. The fall out effects of the defects of R.A. No. 8180 on our people have not escaped Congress. A lot of our leading legislators have come out openly with bills seeking the repeal of these odious and offensive provisions in R.A. No. 8180. In the Senate, Senator Freddie Webb has filed S.B. No. 2133 which is the result of the hearings conducted by the Senate Committee on Energy. The hearings revealed that (1) there was a need to level the playing field for the new entrants in the downstream oil industry, and (2) there was no law punishing a person for selling petroleum products at unreasonable prices. Senator Alberto G. Romulo also filed S.B. No. 2209 abolishing the tariff differential beginning January 1, 1998. He declared that the amendment ". . . would mean that instead of just three (3) big oil companies there will be other major oil companies to provide more competitive prices for the market and the consuming public." Senator Heherson T . Alvarez, one of the principal proponents of R.A. No. 8180, also filed S.B. No. 2290 increasing the penalty for violation of its section 9. It is his opinion as expressed in the explanatory note of the bill that the present oil companies are engaged in cartelization despite R.A. No. 8180, viz,: xxx xxx xxx Since the downstream oil industry was fully deregulated in February 1997, there have been eight (8) fuel price adjustments made by the three oil majors, namely: Caltex Philippines, Inc.; Petron Corporation; and Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation. Very noticeable in the price adjustments made, however, is the uniformity in the pump prices of practically all petroleum products of the three oil companies. This, despite the fact, that their selling rates should be determined by a combination of any of the following factors: the prevailing peso-dollar exchange rate at the time payment is made for crude purchases, sources of crude, and inventory levels of both crude and refined petroleum products. The abovestated factors should have resulted in different, rather than identical prices. The fact that the three (3) oil companies' petroleum products are uniformly priced suggests collusion, amounting to cartelization, among Caltex Philippines, Inc., Petron Corporation and Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation to fix the prices of petroleum products in violation of paragraph (a), Section 9 of R.A. No. 8180. To deter this pernicious practice and to assure that present and prospective players in the downstream oil industry conduct their business with conscience and propriety, cartel-like activities ought to be severely penalized. Senator Francisco S. Tatad also filed S.B. No. 2307 providing for a uniform tariff rate on imported crude oil and refined petroleum products. In the explanatory note of the bill, he declared in no uncertain terms that ". . . the present set-up has raised serious public concern over the way the three oil companies have uniformly adjusted the prices of oil in the country, an indication of a possible existence of a cartel or a cartel-like situation within the downstream oil industry. This situation is mostly attributed to the foregoing provision on tariff differential, which has effectively discouraged the entry of new players in the downstream oil industry." In the House of Representatives, the moves to rehabilitate R.A. No. 8180 are equally feverish. Representative Leopoldo E. San Buenaventura has filed H.B. No. 9826 removing the tariff differential for imported crude oil and imported refined petroleum products. In the explanatory note of the bill, Rep. Buenaventura explained: xxx xxx xxx

As we now experience, this difference in tariff rates between imported crude oil and imported refined petroleum products, unwittingly provided a built-in-advantage for the three existing oil refineries in the country and eliminating competition which is a must in a free enterprise economy. Moreover, it created a disincentive for other players to engage even initially in the importation and distribution of refined petroleum products and ultimately in the putting up of refineries. This tariff differential virtually created a monopoly of the downstream oil industry by the existing three oil companies as shown by their uniform and capricious pricing of their products since this law took effect, to the great disadvantage of the consuming public. Thus, instead of achieving the desired effects of deregulation, that of free enterprise and a level playing field in the downstream oil industry, R.A. 8180 has created an environment conducive to cartelization, unfavorable, increased, unrealistic prices of petroleum products in the country by the three existing refineries. Representative Marcial C. Punzalan, Jr., filed H.B. No. 9981 to prevent collusion among the present oil companies by strengthening the oversight function of the government, particularly its ability to subject to a review any adjustment in the prices of gasoline and other petroleum products. In the explanatory note of the bill, Rep. Punzalan, Jr., said: xxx xxx xxx To avoid this, the proposed bill seeks to strengthen the oversight function of government, particularly its ability to review the prices set for gasoline and other petroleum products. It grants the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) the authority to review prices of oil and other petroleum products, as may be petitioned by a person, group or any entity, and to subsequently compel any entity in the industry to submit any and all documents relevant to the imposition of new prices. In cases where the Board determines that there exist collusion, economic conspiracy, unfair trade practice, profiteering and/or overpricing, it may take any step necessary to protect the public, including the readjustment of the prices of petroleum products. Further, the Board may also impose the fine and penalty of imprisonment, as prescribed in Section 9 of R.A. 8180, on any person or entity from the oil industry who is found guilty of such prohibited acts. By doing all of the above, the measure will effectively provide Filipino consumers with a venue where their grievances can be heard and immediately acted upon by government. Thus, this bill stands to benefit the Filipino consumer by making the price-setting process more transparent and making it easier to prosecute those who perpetrate such prohibited acts as collusion, overpricing, economic conspiracy and unfair trade. Representative Sergio A.F . Apostol filed H.B. No. 10039 to remedy an omission in R.A. No. 8180 where there is no agency in government that determines what is "reasonable" increase in the prices of oil products. Representative Dente O. Tinga, one of the principal sponsors of R.A. No. 8180, filed H.B. No. 10057 to strengthen its anti-trust provisions. He elucidated in its explanatory note: xxx xxx xxx The definition of predatory pricing, however, needs to be tightened up particularly with respect to the definitive benchmark price and the specific anti-competitive intent. The definition in the bill at hand which was taken from the Areeda-Turner test in the United States on predatory pricing resolves the questions. The definition reads, "Predatory pricing means selling or offering to sell any oil product at a price below the average variable cost for the purpose of destroying competition, eliminating a competitor or discouraging a competitor from entering the market." The appropriate actions which may be resorted to under the Rules of Court in conjunction with the oil deregulation law are adequate. But to stress their availability and dynamism, it is a good move to incorporate all the remedies in the law itself. Thus, the present bill formalizes the concept of government intervention and private suits to address the problem of antitrust violations. Specifically, the government may file an action to prevent or restrain any act of cartelization or predatory pricing, and if it has suffered any loss or damage by reason of the antitrust violation it may recover damages. Likewise, a private person or entity may sue to prevent or restrain any such violation which will result in damage to his business or property, and if he has already suffered damage he shall recover treble damages. A class suit may also be allowed. To make the DOE Secretary more effective in the enforcement of the law, he shall be given additional powers to gather information and to require reports.

Representative Erasmo B. Damasing filed H.B. No. 7885 and has a more unforgiving view of R.A. No. 8180. He wants it completely repealed. He explained: xxx xxx xxx Contrary to the projections at the time the bill on the Downstream Oil Industry Deregulation was discussed and debated upon in the plenary session prior to its approval into law, there aren't any new players or investors in the oil industry. Thus, resulting in practically a cartel or monopoly in the oil industry by the three (3) big oil companies, Caltex, Shell and Petron. So much so, that with the deregulation now being partially implemented, the said oil companies have succeeded in increasing the prices of most of their petroleum products with little or no interference at all from the government. In the month of August, there was an increase of Fifty centavos (50) per liter by subsidizing the same with the OPSF, this is only temporary as in March 1997, or a few months from now, there will be full deregulation (Phase II) whereby the increase in the prices of petroleum products will be fully absorbed by the consumers since OPSF will already be abolished by then. Certainly, this would make the lives of our people, especially the unemployed ones, doubly difficult and unbearable. The much ballyhooed coming in of new players in the oil industry is quite remote considering that these prospective investors cannot fight the existing and well established oil companies in the country today, namely, Caltex, Shell and Petron. Even if these new players will come in, they will still have no chance to compete with the said three (3) existing big oil companies considering that there is an imposition of oil tariff differential of 4% between importation of crude oil by the said oil refineries paying only 3% tariff rate for the said importation and 7% tariff rate to be paid by businessmen who have no oil refineries in the Philippines but will import finished petroleum/oil products which is being taxed with 7% tariff rates. So, if only to help the many who are poor from further suffering as a result of unmitigated increase in oil products due to deregulation, it is a must that the Downstream Oil Industry Deregulation Act of 1996, or R.A. 8180 be repealed completely. Various resolutions have also been filed in the Senate calling for an immediate and comprehensive review of R.A. No. 8180 to prevent the downpour of its ill effects on the people. Thus, S. Res. No. 574 was filed by Senator Gloria M. Macapagal entitled Resolution "Directing the Committee on Energy to Inquire Into The Proper Implementation of the Deregulation of the Downstream Oil Industry and Oil Tax Restructuring As Mandated Under R.A. Nos. 8180 and 8184, In Order to Make The Necessary Corrections In the Apparent Misinterpretation Of The Intent And Provision Of The Laws And Curb The Rising Tide Of Disenchantment Among The Filipino Consumers And Bring About The Real Intentions And Benefits Of The Said Law." Senator Blas P. Ople filed S. Res. No. 664 entitled resolution "Directing the Committee on Energy To Conduct An Inquiry In Aid Of Legislation To Review The Government's Oil Deregulation Policy In Light Of The Successive Increases In Transportation, Electricity And Power Rates, As well As Of Food And Other Prime Commodities And Recommend Appropriate Amendments To Protect The Consuming Public." Senator Ople observed: xxx xxx xxx WHEREAS, since the passage of R.A. No. 8180, the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) has imposed successive increases in oil prices which has triggered increases in electricity and power rates, transportation fares, as well as in prices of food and other prime commodities to the detriment of our people, particularly the poor; WHEREAS, the new players that were expected to compete with the oil cartel-Shell, Caltex and Petron-have not come in; WHEREAS, it is imperative that a review of the oil deregulation policy be made to consider appropriate amendments to the existing law such as an extension of the transition phase before full deregulation in order to give the competitive market enough time to develop; WHEREAS, the review can include the advisability of providing some incentives in order to attract the entry of new oil companies to effect a dynamic competitive market; WHEREAS, it may also be necessary to defer the setting up of the institutional framework for full deregulation of the oil industry as mandated under Executive Order No. 377 issued by President Ramos last October 31, 1996 . . .

Senator Alberto G. Romulo filed S. Res. No. 769 entitled resolution "Directing the Committees on Energy and Public Services In Aid Of Legislation To Assess The Immediate Medium And Long Term Impact of Oil Deregulation On Oil Prices And The Economy." Among the reasons for the resolution is the finding that "the requirement of a 40-day stock inventory effectively limits the entry of other oil firms in the market with the consequence that instead of going down oil prices will rise." Parallel resolutions have been filed in the House of Representatives. Representative Dante O. Tinga filed H. Res. No. 1311 "Directing The Committee on Energy To Conduct An Inquiry, In Aid of Legislation, Into The Pricing Policies And Decisions Of The Oil Companies Since The Implementation of Full Deregulation Under the Oil Deregulation Act (R.A. No. 8180) For the Purpose of Determining In the Context Of The Oversight Functions Of Congress Whether The Conduct Of The Oil Companies, Whether Singly Or Collectively, Constitutes Cartelization Which Is A Prohibited Act Under R.A. No. 8180, And What Measures Should Be Taken To Help Ensure The Successful Implementation Of The Law In Accordance With Its Letter And Spirit, Including Recommending Criminal Prosecution Of the Officers Concerned Of the Oil Companies If Warranted By The Evidence, And For Other Purposes." Representatives Marcial C. Punzalan, Jr. Dante O. Tinga and Antonio E. Bengzon III filed H.R. No. 894 directing the House Committee on Energy to inquire into the proper implementation of the deregulation of the downstream oil industry. House Resolution No. 1013 was also filed by Representatives Edcel C. Lagman, Enrique T . Garcia, Jr. and Joker P. Arroyo urging the President to immediately suspend the implementation of E.O. No. 392. In recent memory there is no law enacted by the legislature afflicted with so much constitutional deformities as R.A. No. 8180. Yet, R.A. No. 8180 deals with oil, a commodity whose supply and price affect the ebb and flow of the lifeblood of the nation. Its shortage of supply or a slight, upward spiral in its price shakes our economic foundation. Studies show that the areas most impacted by the movement of oil are food manufacture, land transport, trade, electricity and water. 38 At a time when our economy is in a dangerous downspin, the perpetuation of R.A. No. 8180 threatens to multiply the number of our people with bent backs and begging bowls. R.A. No. 8180 with its anti-competition provisions cannot be allowed by this Court to stand even while Congress is working to remedy its defects. The Court, however, takes note of the plea of PETRON, SHELL and CALTEX to lift our restraining order to enable them to adjust upward the price of petroleum and petroleum products in view of the plummeting value of the peso. Their plea, however, will now have to be addressed to the Energy Regulatory Board as the effect of the declaration of unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 8180 is to revive the former laws it repealed. 39 The length of our return to the regime of regulation depends on Congress which can fasttrack the writing of a new law on oil deregulation in accord with the Constitution. With this Decision, some circles will chide the Court for interfering with an economic decision of Congress. Such criticism is charmless for the Court is annulling R.A. No. 8180 not because it disagrees with deregulation as an economic policy but because as cobbled by Congress in its present form, the law violates the Constitution. The right call therefor should be for Congress to write a new oil deregulation law that conforms with the Constitution and not for this Court to shirk its duty of striking down a law that offends the Constitution. Striking down R.A. No. 8180 may cost losses in quantifiable terms to the oil oligopolists. But the loss in tolerating the tampering of our Constitution is not quantifiable in pesos and centavos. More worthy of protection than the supra-normal profits of private corporations is the sanctity of the fundamental principles of the Constitution. Indeed when confronted by a law violating the Constitution, the Court has no option but to strike it down dead. Lest it is missed, the Constitution is a covenant that grants and guarantees both the political and economic rights of the people. The Constitution mandates this Court to be the guardian not only of the people's political rights but their economic rights as well. The protection of the economic rights of the poor and the powerless is of greater importance to them for they are concerned more with the exoterics of living and less with the esoterics of liberty. Hence, for as long as the Constitution reigns supreme so long will this Court be vigilant in upholding the economic rights of our people especially from the onslaught of the powerful. Our defense of the people's economic rights may appear heartless because it cannot be half-hearted. IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petitions are granted. R.A. No. 8180 is declared unconstitutional and E.O. No. 372 void. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 177597

July 16, 2008

BAI SANDRA S. A. SEMA, Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and DIDAGEN P. DILANGALEN, Respondents. x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x G.R. No. 178628 PERFECTO F. MARQUEZ, Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent. DECISION CARPIO, J.: The Case These consolidated petitions1 seek to annul Resolution No. 7902, dated 10 May 2007, of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) treating Cotabato City as part of the legislative district of the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan.2 The Facts The Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution apportioned two legislative districts for the Province of Maguindanao. The first legislative district consists of Cotabato City and eight municipalities.3 Maguindanao forms part of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), created under its Organic Act, Republic Act No. 6734 (RA 6734), as amended by Republic Act No. 9054 (RA 9054).4 Although under the Ordinance, Cotabato City forms part of Maguindanaos first legislative district, it is not part of the ARMM but of Region XII, having voted against its inclusion in the ARMM in the plebiscite held in November 1989. On 28 August 2006, the ARMMs legislature, the ARMM Regional Assembly, exercising its power to create provinces under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054,5 enacted Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 (MMA Act 201) creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan composed of the eight municipalities in the first district of Maguindanao. MMA Act 201 provides: Section 1. The Municipalities of Barira, Buldon, Datu Odin Sinsuat, Kabuntalan, Matanog, Parang, Sultan Kudarat, Sultan Mastura, and Upi are hereby separated from the Province of Maguindanao and constituted into a distinct and independent province, which is hereby created, to be known as the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan. xxxx Sec. 5. The corporate existence of this province shall commence upon the appointment by the Regional Governor or election of the governor and majority of the regular members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. The incumbent elective provincial officials of the Province of Maguindanao shall continue to serve their unexpired terms in the province that they will choose or where they are residents: Provided, that where an elective position in both provinces becomes vacant as a consequence of the creation of the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan, all incumbent elective provincial officials shall have preference for appointment to a higher elective vacant position and for the time being be appointed by the Regional Governor, and shall hold office until their successors shall have been elected and qualified in the next local elections; Provided, further, that they shall continue to receive the salaries they are receiving at the time of the approval of this Act until the new readjustment of salaries in accordance with law. Provided, furthermore, that there shall be no diminution in the number of the members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the mother province. Except as may be provided by national law, the existing legislative district, which includes Cotabato as a part thereof, shall remain.

Later, three new municipalities6 were carved out of the original nine municipalities constituting Shariff Kabunsuan, bringing its total number of municipalities to 11. Thus, what was left of Maguindanao were the municipalities constituting its second legislative district. Cotabato City, although part of Maguindanaos first legislative district, is not part of the Province of Maguindanao. The voters of Maguindanao ratified Shariff Kabunsuans creation in a plebiscite held on 29 October 2006. On 6 February 2007, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cotabato City passed Resolution No. 3999 requesting the COMELEC to "clarify the status of Cotabato City in view of the conversion of the First District of Maguindanao into a regular province" under MMA Act 201. In answer to Cotabato Citys query, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 07-0407 on 6 March 2007 "maintaining the status quo with Cotabato City as part of Shariff Kabunsuan in the First Legislative District of Maguindanao." Resolution No. 07-0407, which adopted the recommendation of the COMELECs Law Department under a Memorandum dated 27 February 2007,7 provides in pertinent parts: Considering the foregoing, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby resolves, to adopt the recommendation of the Law Department that pending the enactment of the appropriate law by Congress, to maintain the status quo with Cotabato City as part of Shariff Kabunsuan in the First Legislative District of Maguindanao. (Emphasis supplied) However, in preparation for the 14 May 2007 elections, the COMELEC promulgated on 29 March 2007 Resolution No. 7845 stating that Maguindanaos first legislative district is composed only of Cotabato City because of the enactment of MMA Act 201.8 On 10 May 2007, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 7902, subject of these petitions, amending Resolution No. 070407 by renaming the legislative district in question as "Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City (formerly First District of Maguindanao with Cotabato City)."91avvphi1 In G.R. No. 177597, Sema, who was a candidate in the 14 May 2007 elections for Representative of "Shariff Kabunsuan with Cotabato City," prayed for the nullification of COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 and the exclusion from canvassing of the votes cast in Cotabato City for that office. Sema contended that Shariff Kabunsuan is entitled to one representative in Congress under Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution10 and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution.11 Thus, Sema asserted that the COMELEC acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in issuing Resolution No. 7902 which maintained the status quo in Maguindanaos first legislative district despite the COMELECs earlier directive in Resolution No. 7845 designating Cotabato City as the lone component of Maguindanaos reapportioned first legislative district.12 Sema further claimed that in issuing Resolution No. 7902, the COMELEC usurped Congress power to create or reapportion legislative districts. In its Comment, the COMELEC, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), chose not to reach the merits of the case and merely contended that (1) Sema wrongly availed of the writ of certiorari to nullify COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 because the COMELEC issued the same in the exercise of its administrative, not quasi-judicial, power and (2) Semas prayer for the writ of prohibition in G.R. No. 177597 became moot with the proclamation of respondent Didagen P. Dilangalen (respondent Dilangalen) on 1 June 2007 as representative of the legislative district of Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City. In his Comment, respondent Dilangalen countered that Sema is estopped from questioning COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 because in her certificate of candidacy filed on 29 March 2007, Sema indicated that she was seeking election as representative of "Shariff Kabunsuan including Cotabato City." Respondent Dilangalen added that COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 is constitutional because it did not apportion a legislative district for Shariff Kabunsuan or reapportion the legislative districts in Maguindanao but merely renamed Maguindanaos first legislative district. Respondent Dilangalen further claimed that the COMELEC could not reapportion Maguindanaos first legislative district to make Cotabato City its sole component unit as the power to reapportion legislative districts lies exclusively with Congress, not to mention that Cotabato City does not meet the minimum population requirement under Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution for the creation of a legislative district within a city.13 Sema filed a Consolidated Reply controverting the matters raised in respondents Comments and reiterating her claim that the COMELEC acted ultra vires in issuing Resolution No. 7902. In the Resolution of 4 September 2007, the Court required the parties in G.R. No. 177597 to comment on the issue of whether a province created by the ARMM Regional Assembly under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is entitled to one

representative in the House of Representatives without need of a national law creating a legislative district for such new province. The parties submitted their compliance as follows: (1) Sema answered the issue in the affirmative on the following grounds: (a) the Court in Felwa v. Salas14 stated that "when a province is created by statute, the corresponding representative district comes into existence neither by authority of that statute which cannot provide otherwise nor by apportionment, but by operation of the Constitution, without a reapportionment"; (b) Section 462 of Republic Act No. 7160 (RA 7160) "affirms" the apportionment of a legislative district incident to the creation of a province; and (c) Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution mandate the apportionment of a legislative district in newly created provinces. (2) The COMELEC, again represented by the OSG, apparently abandoned its earlier stance on the propriety of issuing Resolution Nos. 07-0407 and 7902 and joined causes with Sema, contending that Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution is "self-executing." Thus, every new province created by the ARMM Regional Assembly is ipso facto entitled to one representative in the House of Representatives even in the absence of a national law; and (3) Respondent Dilangalen answered the issue in the negative on the following grounds: (a) the "province" contemplated in Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution is one that is created by an act of Congress taking into account the provisions in RA 7160 on the creation of provinces; (b) Section 3, Article IV of RA 9054 withheld from the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to enact measures relating to national elections, which encompasses the apportionment of legislative districts for members of the House of Representatives; (c) recognizing a legislative district in every province the ARMM Regional Assembly creates will lead to the disproportionate representation of the ARMM in the House of Representatives as the Regional Assembly can create provinces without regard to the requirements in Section 461 of RA 7160; and (d) Cotabato City, which has a population of less than 250,000, is not entitled to a representative in the House of Representatives. On 27 November 2007, the Court heard the parties in G.R. No. 177597 in oral arguments on the following issues: (1) whether Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, delegating to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provinces, is constitutional; and (2) if in the affirmative, whether a province created under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is entitled to one representative in the House of Representatives without need of a national law creating a legislative district for such new province.15 In compliance with the Resolution dated 27 November 2007, the parties in G.R. No. 177597 filed their respective Memoranda on the issues raised in the oral arguments.16 On the question of the constitutionality of Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, the parties in G.R. No. 177597 adopted the following positions: (1) Sema contended that Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is constitutional (a) as a valid delegation by Congress to the ARMM of the power to create provinces under Section 20 (9), Article X of the Constitution granting to the autonomous regions, through their organic acts, legislative powers over "other matters as may be authorized by law for the promotion of the general welfare of the people of the region" and (b) as an amendment to Section 6 of RA 7160.17 However, Sema concedes that, if taken literally, the grant in Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 to the ARMM Regional Assembly of the power to "prescribe standards lower than those mandated" in RA 7160 in the creation of provinces contravenes Section 10, Article X of the Constitution.18 Thus, Sema proposed that Section 19 "should be construed as prohibiting the Regional Assembly from prescribing standards x x x that do not comply with the minimum criteria" under RA 7160.19 (2) Respondent Dilangalen contended that Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is unconstitutional on the following grounds: (a) the power to create provinces was not among those granted to the autonomous regions under Section 20, Article X of the Constitution and (b) the grant under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 to the ARMM Regional Assembly of the power to prescribe standards lower than those mandated in Section 461 of RA 7160 on the creation of provinces contravenes Section 10, Article X of the Constitution and the Equal Protection Clause; and (3) The COMELEC, through the OSG, joined causes with respondent Dilangalen (thus effectively abandoning the position the COMELEC adopted in its Compliance with the Resolution of 4 September 2007) and contended that Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is unconstitutional because (a) it contravenes Section 10 and Section 6,20 Article X of the Constitution and (b) the power to create provinces was withheld from the autonomous regions under Section 20, Article X of the Constitution.

On the question of whether a province created under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is entitled to one representative in the House of Representatives without need of a national law creating a legislative district for such new province, Sema and respondent Dilangalen reiterated in their Memoranda the positions they adopted in their Compliance with the Resolution of 4 September 2007. The COMELEC deemed it unnecessary to submit its position on this issue considering its stance that Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is unconstitutional. The pendency of the petition in G.R. No. 178628 was disclosed during the oral arguments on 27 November 2007. Thus, in the Resolution of 19 February 2008, the Court ordered G.R. No. 178628 consolidated with G.R. No. 177597. The petition in G.R. No. 178628 echoed Sema's contention that the COMELEC acted ultra vires in issuing Resolution No. 7902 depriving the voters of Cotabato City of a representative in the House of Representatives. In its Comment to the petition in G.R. No. 178628, the COMELEC, through the OSG, maintained the validity of COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 as a temporary measure pending the enactment by Congress of the "appropriate law." The Issues The petitions raise the following issues: I. In G.R. No. 177597: (A) Preliminarily (1) whether the writs of Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus are proper to test the constitutionality of COMELEC Resolution No. 7902; and (2) whether the proclamation of respondent Dilangalen as representative of Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City mooted the petition in G.R. No. 177597. (B) On the merits (1) whether Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, delegating to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays, is constitutional; and (2) if in the affirmative, whether a province created by the ARMM Regional Assembly under MMA Act 201 pursuant to Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is entitled to one representative in the House of Representatives without need of a national law creating a legislative district for such province. II. In G.R No. 177597 and G.R No. 178628, whether COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 is valid for maintaining the status quo in the first legislative district of Maguindanao (as "Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City [formerly First District of Maguindanao with Cotabato City]"), despite the creation of the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan out of such district (excluding Cotabato City). The Ruling of the Court The petitions have no merit. We rule that (1) Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provinces and cities; (2) MMA Act 201 creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan is void; and (3) COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 is valid. On the Preliminary Matters The Writ of Prohibition is Appropriate to Test the Constitutionality of Election Laws, Rules and Regulations The purpose of the writ of Certiorari is to correct grave abuse of discretion by "any tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions."21 On the other hand, the writ of Mandamus will issue to compel a tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person to perform an act "which the law specifically enjoins as a duty."22 True, the COMELEC did not issue Resolution No. 7902 in the exercise of its judicial or quasi-judicial functions.23 Nor is there a law which specifically enjoins the COMELEC to exclude from canvassing the votes cast in Cotabato City for representative of "Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City." These, however, do not justify the outright dismissal of the petition in G.R. No.

177597 because Sema also prayed for the issuance of the writ of Prohibition and we have long recognized this writ as proper for testing the constitutionality of election laws, rules, and regulations.24 Respondent Dilangalens Proclamation Does Not Moot the Petition There is also no merit in the claim that respondent Dilangalens proclamation as winner in the 14 May 2007 elections for representative of "Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City" mooted this petition. This case does not concern respondent Dilangalens election. Rather, it involves an inquiry into the validity of COMELEC Resolution No. 7902, as well as the constitutionality of MMA Act 201 and Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054. Admittedly, the outcome of this petition, one way or another, determines whether the votes cast in Cotabato City for representative of the district of "Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City" will be included in the canvassing of ballots. However, this incidental consequence is no reason for us not to proceed with the resolution of the novel issues raised here. The Courts ruling in these petitions affects not only the recently concluded elections but also all the other succeeding elections for the office in question, as well as the power of the ARMM Regional Assembly to create in the future additional provinces. On the Main Issues Whether the ARMM Regional Assembly Can Create the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan The creation of local government units is governed by Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, which provides: Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished or its boundary substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected. Thus, the creation of any of the four local government units province, city, municipality or barangay must comply with three conditions. First, the creation of a local government unit must follow the criteria fixed in the Local Government Code. Second, such creation must not conflict with any provision of the Constitution. Third, there must be a plebiscite in the political units affected. There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant of authority in the Constitution for Congress to delegate to regional or local legislative bodies the power to create local government units. However, under its plenary legislative powers, Congress can delegate to local legislative bodies the power to create local government units, subject to reasonable standards and provided no conflict arises with any provision of the Constitution. In fact, Congress has delegated to provincial boards, and city and municipal councils, the power to create barangays within their jurisdiction,25 subject to compliance with the criteria established in the Local Government Code, and the plebiscite requirement in Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. However, under the Local Government Code, "only x x x an Act of Congress" can create provinces, cities or municipalities.261avvphi1 Under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, Congress delegated to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays within the ARMM. Congress made the delegation under its plenary legislative powers because the power to create local government units is not one of the express legislative powers granted by the Constitution to regional legislative bodies.27 In the present case, the question arises whether the delegation to the ARMM Regional Assembly of the power to create provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays conflicts with any provision of the Constitution. There is no provision in the Constitution that conflicts with the delegation to regional legislative bodies of the power to create municipalities and barangays, provided Section 10, Article X of the Constitution is followed. However, the creation of provinces and cities is another matter. Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution provides, "Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative" in the House of Representatives. Similarly, Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution provides, "Any province that may hereafter be created, or any city whose population may hereafter increase to more than two hundred fifty thousand shall be entitled in the immediately following election to at least one Member x x x." Clearly, a province cannot be created without a legislative district because it will violate Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution as well as Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. For the same reason, a city with a population of 250,000 or more cannot also be created without a legislative district. Thus, the power to create a province, or a city with a population of 250,000 or more, requires also the power to create a legislative district. Even the creation of a city with a population of less than 250,000 involves the power to create a legislative district because once the citys

population reaches 250,000, the city automatically becomes entitled to one representative under Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. Thus, the power to create a province or city inherently involves the power to create a legislative district. For Congress to delegate validly the power to create a province or city, it must also validly delegate at the same time the power to create a legislative district. The threshold issue then is, can Congress validly delegate to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create legislative districts for the House of Representatives? The answer is in the negative. Legislative Districts are Created or Reapportioned Only by an Act of Congress Under the present Constitution, as well as in past28 Constitutions, the power to increase the allowable membership in the House of Representatives, and to reapportion legislative districts, is vested exclusively in Congress. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides: SECTION 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations. xxxx (3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative. (4) Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standards provided in this section. (Emphasis supplied) Section 5 (1), Article VI of the Constitution vests in Congress the power to increase, through a law, the allowable membership in the House of Representatives. Section 5 (4) empowers Congress to reapportion legislative districts. The power to reapportion legislative districts necessarily includes the power to create legislative districts out of existing ones. Congress exercises these powers through a law that Congress itself enacts, and not through a law that regional or local legislative bodies enact. The allowable membership of the House of Representatives can be increased, and new legislative districts of Congress can be created, only through a national law passed by Congress. In Montejo v. COMELEC,29 we held that the "power of redistricting x x x is traditionally regarded as part of the power (of Congress) to make laws," and thus is vested exclusively in Congress. This textual commitment to Congress of the exclusive power to create or reapportion legislative districts is logical. Congress is a national legislature and any increase in its allowable membership or in its incumbent membership through the creation of legislative districts must be embodied in a national law. Only Congress can enact such a law. It would be anomalous for regional or local legislative bodies to create or reapportion legislative districts for a national legislature like Congress. An inferior legislative body, created by a superior legislative body, cannot change the membership of the superior legislative body. The creation of the ARMM, and the grant of legislative powers to its Regional Assembly under its organic act, did not divest Congress of its exclusive authority to create legislative districts. This is clear from the Constitution and the ARMM Organic Act, as amended. Thus, Section 20, Article X of the Constitution provides: SECTION 20. Within its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of this Constitution and national laws, the organic act of autonomous regions shall provide for legislative powers over: (1) Administrative organization; (2) Creation of sources of revenues; (3) Ancestral domain and natural resources;

(4) Personal, family, and property relations; (5) Regional urban and rural planning development; (6) Economic, social, and tourism development; (7) Educational policies; (8) Preservation and development of the cultural heritage; and (9) Such other matters as may be authorized by law for the promotion of the general welfare of the people of the region. Nothing in Section 20, Article X of the Constitution authorizes autonomous regions, expressly or impliedly, to create or reapportion legislative districts for Congress. On the other hand, Section 3, Article IV of RA 9054 amending the ARMM Organic Act, provides, "The Regional Assembly may exercise legislative power x x x except on the following matters: x x x (k) National elections. x x x." Since the ARMM Regional Assembly has no legislative power to enact laws relating to national elections, it cannot create a legislative district whose representative is elected in national elections. Whenever Congress enacts a law creating a legislative district, the first representative is always elected in the "next national elections" from the effectivity of the law.30 Indeed, the office of a legislative district representative to Congress is a national office, and its occupant, a Member of the House of Representatives, is a national official.31 It would be incongruous for a regional legislative body like the ARMM Regional Assembly to create a national office when its legislative powers extend only to its regional territory. The office of a district representative is maintained by national funds and the salary of its occupant is paid out of national funds. It is a self-evident inherent limitation on the legislative powers of every local or regional legislative body that it can only create local or regional offices, respectively, and it can never create a national office. To allow the ARMM Regional Assembly to create a national office is to allow its legislative powers to operate outside the ARMMs territorial jurisdiction. This violates Section 20, Article X of the Constitution which expressly limits the coverage of the Regional Assemblys legislative powers "[w]ithin its territorial jurisdiction x x x." The ARMM Regional Assembly itself, in creating Shariff Kabunsuan, recognized the exclusive nature of Congress power to create or reapportion legislative districts by abstaining from creating a legislative district for Shariff Kabunsuan. Section 5 of MMA Act 201 provides that: Except as may be provided by national law, the existing legislative district, which includes Cotabato City as a part thereof, shall remain. (Emphasis supplied) However, a province cannot legally be created without a legislative district because the Constitution mandates that "each province shall have at least one representative." Thus, the creation of the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan without a legislative district is unconstitutional. Sema, petitioner in G.R. No. 177597, contends that Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution, which provides: Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative. (Emphasis supplied) and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution, which states: Any province that may hereafter be created, or any city whose population may hereafter increase to more than two hundred fifty thousand shall be entitled in the immediately following election to at least one Member or such number of Members as it may be entitled to on the basis of the number of its inhabitants and according to the standards set forth in paragraph (3), Section 5 of Article VI of the Constitution. The number of Members apportioned to the province out of which such new province was created or where the city, whose population has so increased, is geographically located shall be correspondingly adjusted by the Commission on Elections but such adjustment shall not be made within one hundred and twenty days before the election. (Emphasis supplied)

serve as bases for the conclusion that the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan, created on 29 October 2006, is automatically entitled to one member in the House of Representatives in the 14 May 2007 elections. As further support for her stance, petitioner invokes the statement in Felwa that "when a province is created by statute, the corresponding representative district comes into existence neither by authority of that statute which cannot provide otherwise nor by apportionment, but by operation of the Constitution, without a reapportionment." The contention has no merit. First. The issue in Felwa, among others, was whether Republic Act No. 4695 (RA 4695), creating the provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, and Kalinga-Apayao and providing for congressional representation in the old and new provinces, was unconstitutional for "creati[ng] congressional districts without the apportionment provided in the Constitution." The Court answered in the negative, thus: The Constitution ordains: "The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than one hundred and twenty Members who shall be apportioned among the several provinces as nearly as may be according to the number of their respective inhabitants, but each province shall have at least one Member. The Congress shall by law make an apportionment within three years after the return of every enumeration, and not otherwise. Until such apportionment shall have been made, the House of Representatives shall have the same number of Members as that fixed by law for the National Assembly, who shall be elected by the qualified electors from the present Assembly districts. Each representative district shall comprise as far as practicable, contiguous and compact territory." Pursuant to this Section, a representative district may come into existence: (a) indirectly, through the creation of a province for "each province shall have at least one member" in the House of Representatives; or (b) by direct creation of several representative districts within a province. The requirements concerning the apportionment of representative districts and the territory thereof refer only to the second method of creation of representative districts, and do not apply to those incidental to the creation of provinces, under the first method. This is deducible, not only from the general tenor of the provision above quoted, but, also, from the fact that the apportionment therein alluded to refers to that which is made by an Act of Congress. Indeed, when a province is created by statute, the corresponding representative district, comes into existence neither by authority of that statute which cannot provide otherwise nor by apportionment, but by operation of the Constitution, without a reapportionment. There is no constitutional limitation as to the time when, territory of, or other conditions under which a province may be created, except, perhaps, if the consequence thereof were to exceed the maximum of 120 representative districts prescribed in the Constitution, which is not the effect of the legislation under consideration. As a matter of fact, provinces have been created or subdivided into other provinces, with the consequent creation of additional representative districts, without complying with the aforementioned requirements.32 (Emphasis supplied) Thus, the Court sustained the constitutionality of RA 4695 because (1) it validly created legislative districts "indirectly" through a special law enacted by Congress creating a province and (2) the creation of the legislative districts will not result in breaching the maximum number of legislative districts provided under the 1935 Constitution. Felwa does not apply to the present case because in Felwa the new provinces were created by a national law enacted by Congress itself. Here, the new province was created merely by a regional law enacted by the ARMM Regional Assembly. What Felwa teaches is that the creation of a legislative district by Congress does not emanate alone from Congress power to reapportion legislative districts, but also from Congress power to create provinces which cannot be created without a legislative district. Thus, when a province is created, a legislative district is created by operation of the Constitution because the Constitution provides that "each province shall have at least one representative" in the House of Representatives. This does not detract from the constitutional principle that the power to create legislative districts belongs exclusively to Congress. It merely prevents any other legislative body, except Congress, from creating provinces because for a legislative body to create a province such legislative body must have the power to create legislative districts. In short, only an act of Congress can trigger the creation of a legislative district by operation of the Constitution. Thus, only Congress has the power to create, or trigger the creation of, a legislative district. Moreover, if as Sema claims MMA Act 201 apportioned a legislative district to Shariff Kabunsuan upon its creation, this will leave Cotabato City as the lone component of the first legislative district of Maguindanao. However, Cotabato City cannot constitute a legislative district by itself because as of the census taken in 2000, it had a population of only 163,849. To constitute Cotabato City alone as the surviving first legislative district of Maguindanao will violate Section 5 (3), Article

VI of the Constitution which requires that "[E]ach city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand x x x, shall have at least one representative." Second. Semas theory also undermines the composition and independence of the House of Representatives. Under Section 19,33 Article VI of RA 9054, the ARMM Regional Assembly can create provinces and cities within the ARMM with or without regard to the criteria fixed in Section 461 of RA 7160, namely: minimum annual income of P20,000,000, and minimum contiguous territory of 2,000 square kilometers or minimum population of 250,000.34 The following scenarios thus become distinct possibilities: (1) An inferior legislative body like the ARMM Regional Assembly can create 100 or more provinces and thus increase the membership of a superior legislative body, the House of Representatives, beyond the maximum limit of 250 fixed in the Constitution (unless a national law provides otherwise); (2) The proportional representation in the House of Representatives based on one representative for at least every 250,000 residents will be negated because the ARMM Regional Assembly need not comply with the requirement in Section 461(a)(ii) of RA 7160 that every province created must have a population of at least 250,000; and (3) Representatives from the ARMM provinces can become the majority in the House of Representatives through the ARMM Regional Assemblys continuous creation of provinces or cities within the ARMM. The following exchange during the oral arguments of the petition in G.R. No. 177597 highlights the absurdity of Semas position that the ARMM Regional Assembly can create provinces: Justice Carpio: So, you mean to say [a] Local Government can create legislative district[s] and pack Congress with their own representatives [?] Atty. Vistan II:35 Yes, Your Honor, because the Constitution allows that. Justice Carpio: So, [the] Regional Assembly of [the] ARMM can create and create x x x provinces x x x and, therefore, they can have thirty-five (35) new representatives in the House of Representatives without Congress agreeing to it, is that what you are saying? That can be done, under your theory[?] Atty. Vistan II: Yes, Your Honor, under the correct factual circumstances. Justice Carpio: Under your theory, the ARMM legislature can create thirty-five (35) new provinces, there may be x x x [only] one hundred thousand (100,000) [population], x x x, and they will each have one representative x x x to Congress without any national law, is that what you are saying? Atty. Vistan II: Without law passed by Congress, yes, Your Honor, that is what we are saying. xxxx Justice Carpio:

So, they can also create one thousand (1000) new provinces, sen[d] one thousand (1000) representatives to the House of Representatives without a national law[,] that is legally possible, correct? Atty. Vistan II: Yes, Your Honor.36 (Emphasis supplied) Neither the framers of the 1987 Constitution in adopting the provisions in Article X on regional autonomy,37 nor Congress in enacting RA 9054, envisioned or intended these disastrous consequences that certainly would wreck the tri-branch system of government under our Constitution. Clearly, the power to create or reapportion legislative districts cannot be delegated by Congress but must be exercised by Congress itself. Even the ARMM Regional Assembly recognizes this. The Constitution empowered Congress to create or reapportion legislative districts, not the regional assemblies. Section 3 of the Ordinance to the Constitution which states, "[A]ny province that may hereafter be created x x x shall be entitled in the immediately following election to at least one Member," refers to a province created by Congress itself through a national law. The reason is that the creation of a province increases the actual membership of the House of Representatives, an increase that only Congress can decide. Incidentally, in the present 14th Congress, there are 21938 district representatives out of the maximum 250 seats in the House of Representatives. Since party-list members shall constitute 20 percent of total membership of the House, there should at least be 50 party-list seats available in every election in case 50 party-list candidates are proclaimed winners. This leaves only 200 seats for district representatives, much less than the 219 incumbent district representatives. Thus, there is a need now for Congress to increase by law the allowable membership of the House, even before Congress can create new provinces. It is axiomatic that organic acts of autonomous regions cannot prevail over the Constitution. Section 20, Article X of the Constitution expressly provides that the legislative powers of regional assemblies are limited "[w]ithin its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of the Constitution and national laws, x x x." The Preamble of the ARMM Organic Act (RA 9054) itself states that the ARMM Government is established "within the framework of the Constitution." This follows Section 15, Article X of the Constitution which mandates that the ARMM "shall be created x x x within the framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines." The present case involves the creation of a local government unit that necessarily involves also the creation of a legislative district. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of the creation of municipalities and barangays that does not comply with the criteria established in Section 461 of RA 7160, as mandated in Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, because the creation of such municipalities and barangays does not involve the creation of legislative districts. We leave the resolution of this issue to an appropriate case. In summary, we rule that Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, insofar as it grants to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provinces and cities, is void for being contrary to Section 5 of Article VI and Section 20 of Article X of the Constitution, as well as Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. Only Congress can create provinces and cities because the creation of provinces and cities necessarily includes the creation of legislative districts, a power only Congress can exercise under Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. The ARMM Regional Assembly cannot create a province without a legislative district because the Constitution mandates that every province shall have a legislative district. Moreover, the ARMM Regional Assembly cannot enact a law creating a national office like the office of a district representative of Congress because the legislative powers of the ARMM Regional Assembly operate only within its territorial jurisdiction as provided in Section 20, Article X of the Constitution. Thus, we rule that MMA Act 201, enacted by the ARMM Regional Assembly and creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan, is void. Resolution No. 7902 Complies with the Constitution Consequently, we hold that COMELEC Resolution No. 7902, preserving the geographic and legislative district of the First District of Maguindanao with Cotabato City, is valid as it merely complies with Section 5 of Article VI and Section 20 of Article X of the Constitution, as well as Section 1 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. WHEREFORE, we declare Section 19, Article VI of Republic Act No. 9054 UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it grants to the Regional Assembly of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao the power to create provinces and cities. Thus, we declare VOID Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan. Consequently, we rule that COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 is VALID. Let a copy of this ruling be served on the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-114783 December 8, 1994 ROBERT V. TOBIAS, RAMON M. GUZMAN, TERRY T. LIM, GREGORIO D. GABRIEL, and ROBERTO R. TOBIAS, JR. petitioners, vs. HON. CITY MAYOR BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, CITY TREASURER WILLIAM MARCELINO, and THE SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD, all of the City of Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, respondents. Estrella, Bautista & Associates for petitioners.

BIDIN, J.: Invoking their rights as taxpayers and as residents of Mandaluyong, herein petitioners assail the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7675, otherwise known as "An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Mandaluyong." Prior to the enactment of the assailed statute, the municipalities of Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to only one legislative district. Hon. Ronaldo Zamora, the incumbent congressional representative of this legislative district, sponsored the bill which eventually became R.A. No. 7675. President Ramos signed R.A. No. 7675 into law on February 9, 1994. Pursuant to the Local Government Code of 1991, a plebiscite was held on April 10, 1994. The people of Mandaluyong were asked whether they approved of the conversion of the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city as provided under R.A. No. 7675. The turnout at the plebiscite was only 14.41% of the voting population. Nevertheless, 18,621 voted "yes" whereas 7,911 voted "no." By virtue of these results, R.A. No. 7675 was deemed ratified and in effect. Petitioners now come before this Court, contending that R.A. No. 7675, specifically Article VIII, Section 49 thereof, is unconstitutional for being violative of three specific provisions of the Constitution. Article VIII, Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 provides: As a highly-urbanized city, the City of Mandaluyong shall have its own legislative district with the first representative to be elected in the next national elections after the passage of this Act. The remainder of the former legislative district of San Juan/Mandaluyong shall become the new legislative district of San Juan with its first representative to be elected at the same election. Petitioner's first objection to the aforequoted provision of R.A. No. 7675 is that it contravenes the "one subject-one bill" rule, as enunciated in Article VI, Section 26(1) of the Constitution, to wit: Sec. 26(1). Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof. Petitioners allege that the inclusion of the assailed Section 49 in the subject law resulted in the latter embracing two principal subjects, namely: (1) the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city; and (2) the division of the congressional district of San Juan/Mandaluyong into two separate districts. Petitioners contend that the second aforestated subject is not germane to the subject matter of R.A. No. 7675 since the said law treats of the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city, as expressed in the title of the law. Therefore, since Section 49 treats of a subject distinct from that stated in the title of the law, the "one subject-one bill" rule has not been complied with. Petitioners' second and third objections involve Article VI, Sections 5(1) and (4) of the Constitution, which provide, to wit: Sec. 5(1). The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall

be elected through a party list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations. Sec. 5(4). Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standard provided in this section. Petitioners argue that the division of San Juan and Mandaluyong into separate congressional districts under Section 49 of the assailed law has resulted in an increase in the composition of the House of Representatives beyond that provided in Article VI, Sec. 5(1) of the Constitution. Furthermore, petitioners contend that said division was not made pursuant to any census showing that the subject municipalities have attained the minimum population requirements. And finally, petitioners assert that Section 49 has the effect of preempting the right of Congress to reapportion legislative districts pursuant to Sec. 5(4) as aforecited. The contentions are devoid of merit. Anent the first issue, we agree with the observation of the Solicitor General that the statutory conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city with a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand indubitably ordains compliance with the "one city-one representative" proviso in the Constitution: . . . Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative" (Article VI, Section 5(3), Constitution). Hence, it is in compliance with the aforestated constitutional mandate that the creation of a separate congressional district for the City of Mandaluyong is decreed under Article VIII, Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675. Contrary to petitioners' assertion, the creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a subject separate and distinct from the subject of its conversion into a highly urbanized city but is a natural and logical consequence of its conversion into a highly urbanized city. Verily, the title of R.A. No. 7675, "An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong Into a Highly Urbanized City of Mandaluyong" necessarily includes and contemplates the subject treated under Section 49 regarding the creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong. Moreover, a liberal construction of the "one title-one subject" rule has been invariably adopted by this court so as not to cripple or impede legislation. Thus, in Sumulong v. Comelec (73 Phil. 288 [1941]), we ruled that the constitutional requirement as now expressed in Article VI, Section 26(1) "should be given a practical rather than a technical construction. It should be sufficient compliance with such requirement if the title expresses the general subject and all the provisions are germane to that general subject." The liberal construction of the "one title-one subject" rule had been further elucidated in Lidasan v. Comelec (21 SCRA 496 [1967]), to wit: Of course, the Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the title of an enactment, language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein. It suffices if the title should serve the purpose of the constitutional demand that it inform the legislators, the persons interested in the subject of the bill and the public, of the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation" (emphasis supplied). Proceeding now to the other constitutional issues raised by petitioners to the effect that there is no mention in the assailed law of any census to show that Mandaluyong and San Juan had each attained the minimum requirement of 250,000 inhabitants to justify their separation into two legislative districts, the same does not suffice to strike down the validity of R.A. No. 7675. The said Act enjoys the presumption of having passed through the regular congressional processes, including due consideration by the members of Congress of the minimum requirements for the establishment of separate legislative districts. At any rate, it is not required that all laws emanating from the legislature must contain all relevant data considered by Congress in the enactment of said laws. As to the contention that the assailed law violates the present limit on the number of representatives as set forth in the Constitution, a reading of the applicable provision, Article VI, Section 5(1), as aforequoted, shows that the present limit of 250 members is not absolute. The Constitution clearly provides that the House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than 250 members, "unless otherwise provided by law." The inescapable import of the latter clause is that the present composition of Congress may be increased, if Congress itself so mandates through a legislative enactment. Therefore, the increase in congressional representation mandated by R.A. No. 7675 is not unconstitutional.

Thus, in the absence of proof that Mandaluyong and San Juan do not qualify to have separate legislative districts, the assailed Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 must be allowed to stand. As to the contention that Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 in effect preempts the right of Congress to reapportion legislative districts, the said argument borders on the absurd since petitioners overlook the glaring fact that it was Congress itself which drafted, deliberated upon and enacted the assailed law, including Section 49 thereof. Congress cannot possibly preempt itself on a right which pertains to itself. Aside from the constitutional objections to R.A. No. 7675, petitioners present further arguments against the validity thereof. Petitioners contend that the people of San Juan should have been made to participate in the plebiscite on R.A. No. 7675 as the same involved a change in their legislative district. The contention is bereft of merit since the principal subject involved in the plebiscite was the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city. The matter of separate district representation was only ancillary thereto. Thus, the inhabitants of San Juan were properly excluded from the said plebiscite as they had nothing to do with the change of status of neighboring Mandaluyong. Similarly, petitioners' additional argument that the subject law has resulted in "gerrymandering," which is the practice of creating legislative districts to favor a particular candidate or party, is not worthy of credence. As correctly observed by the Solicitor General, it should be noted that Rep. Ronaldo Zamora, the author of the assailed law, is the incumbent representative of the former San Juan/Mandaluyong district, having consistently won in both localities. By dividing San Juan/Mandaluyong, Rep. Zamora's constituency has in fact been diminished, which development could hardly be considered as favorable to him. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 118577 March 7, 1995 JUANITO MARIANO, JR. et al., petitioners, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI, HON. JEJOMAR BINAY, THE MUNICIPAL TREASURER, AND SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF MAKATI, respondents. G.R. No. 118627 March 7, 1995 JOHN R. OSMEA, petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI, HON. JEJOMAR BINAY, MUNICIPAL TREASURER, AND SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF MAKATI, respondents.

PUNO, J.: At bench are two (2) petitions assailing certain provisions of Republic Act No. 7854 as unconstitutional. R.A. No. 7854 as unconstitutional. R.A. No. 7854 is entitled, "An Act Converting the Municipality of Makati Into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Makati." 1 G.R. No. 118577 involves a petition for prohibition and declaratory relief. It was filed by petitioners Juanito Mariano, Jr., Ligaya S. Bautista, Teresita Tibay, Camilo Santos, Frankie Cruz, Ricardo Pascual, Teresita Abang, Valentina Pitalvero, Rufino Caldoza, Florante Alba, and Perfecto Alba. Of the petitioners, only Mariano, Jr., is a resident of Makati. The others are residents of Ibayo Ususan, Taguig, Metro Manila. Suing as taxpayers, they assail as unconstitutional sections 2, 51, and 52 of R.A. No. 7854 on the following grounds: 1. Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 did not properly identify the land area or territorial jurisdiction of Makati by metes and bounds, with technical descriptions, in violation of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, in relation to Sections 7 and 450 of the Local Government Code; 2. Section 51 of R.A. No. 7854 attempts to alter or restart the "three consecutive term" limit for local elective officials, in violation of Section 8, Article X and Section 7, Article VI of the Constitution. 3. Section 52 of R.A. No. 7854 is unconstitutional for: (a) it increased the legislative district of Makati only by special law (the Charter in violation of the constitutional provision requiring a general reapportionment law to be passed by Congress within three (3) years following the return of every census; (b) the increase in legislative district was not expressed in the title of the bill; and (c) the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accord with Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution for as of the latest survey (1990 census), the population of Makati stands at only 450,000. G.R. No. 118627 was filed by the petitioner John H. Osmea as senator, taxpayer, and concerned citizen. Petitioner assails section 52 of R.A. No. 7854 as unconstitutional on the same grounds as aforestated. We find no merit in the petitions. I Section 2, Article I of R.A. No. 7854 delineated the land areas of the proposed city of Makati, thus: Sec. 2. The City of Makati. The Municipality of Makati shall be converted into a highly urbanized city to be known as the City of Makati, hereinafter referred to as the City, which shall comprise the present

territory of the Municipality of Makati in Metropolitan Manila Area over which it has jurisdiction bounded on the northeast by Pasig River and beyond by the City of Mandaluyong and the Municipality of Pasig; on the southeast by the municipalities of Pateros and Taguig; on the southwest by the City of Pasay and the Municipality of Taguig; and, on the northwest, by the City of Manila. The foregoing provision shall be without prejudice to the resolution by the appropriate agency or forum of existing boundary disputes or cases involving questions of territorial jurisdiction between the City of Makati and the adjoining local government units. (Emphasis supplied) In G.R. No. 118577, petitioners claim that this delineation violates sections 7 and 450 of the Local Government Code which require that the area of a local government unit should be made by metes and bounds with technical descriptions. 2 The importance of drawing with precise strokes the territorial boundaries of a local unit of government cannot be overemphasized. The boundaries must be clear for they define the limits of the territorial jurisdiction of a local government unit. It can legitimately exercise powers of government only within the limits, its acts are ultra vires. Needless to state, any uncertainty in the boundaries of local government units will sow costly conflicts in the exercise of governmental powers which ultimately will prejudice the people's welfare. This is the evil sought to avoided by the Local Government Code in requiring that the land area of a local government unit must be spelled out in metes and bounds, with technical descriptions. Given the facts of the cases at bench, we cannot perceive how this evil can be brought about by the description made in section 2 of R.A. No. 7854, Petitioners have not demonstrated that the delineation of the land area of the proposed City of Makati will cause confusion as to its boundaries. We note that said delineation did not change even by an inch the land area previously covered by Makati as a municipality. Section 2 did not add, subtract, divide, or multiply the established land area of Makati. In language that cannot be any clearer, section 2 stated that, the city's land area "shall comprise the present territory of the municipality." The deliberations of Congress will reveal that there is a legitimate reason why the land area of the proposed City of Makati was not defined by metes and bounds, with technical descriptions. At the time of the consideration of R.A. No. 7854, the territorial dispute between the municipalities of Makati and Taguig over Fort Bonifacio was under court litigation. Out of a becoming sense of respect to co-equal department of government, legislators felt that the dispute should be left to the courts to decide. They did not want to foreclose the dispute by making a legislative finding of fact which could decide the issue. This would have ensued if they defined the land area of the proposed city by its exact metes and bounds, with technical descriptions. 3 We take judicial notice of the fact that Congress has also refrained from using the metes and bounds description of land areas of other local government units with unsettled boundary disputes. 4 We hold that the existence of a boundary dispute does not per se present an insurmountable difficulty which will prevent Congress from defining with reasonable certitude the territorial jurisdiction of a local government unit. In the cases at bench, Congress maintained the existing boundaries of the proposed City of Makati but as an act of fairness, made them subject to the ultimate resolution by the courts. Considering these peculiar circumstances, we are not prepared to hold that section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 is unconstitutional. We sustain the submission of the Solicitor General in this regard, viz.: Going now to Sections 7 and 450 of the Local Government Code, it is beyond cavil that the requirement stated therein, viz.: "the territorial jurisdiction of newly created or converted cities should be described by meted and bounds, with technical descriptions" was made in order to provide a means by which the area of said cities may be reasonably ascertained. In other words, the requirement on metes and bounds was meant merely as tool in the establishment of local government units. It is not an end in itself. Ergo, so long as the territorial jurisdiction of a city may be reasonably ascertained, i.e., by referring to common boundaries with neighboring municipalities, as in this case, then, it may be concluded that the legislative intent behind the law has been sufficiently served. Certainly, Congress did not intends that laws creating new cities must contain therein detailed technical descriptions similar to those appearing in Torrens titles, as petitioners seem to imply. To require such description in the law as a condition sine qua non for its validity would be to defeat the very purpose which the Local Government Code to seeks to serve. The manifest intent of the Code is to empower local government units and to give them their rightful due. It seeks to make local governments more responsive to the needs of their constituents while at the same time serving as a vital cog in national development. To invalidate R.A. No. 7854 on the mere ground that no cadastral type of description was used in the law would serve the letter but defeat the spirit of the Code. It then becomes a case of the master serving the slave, instead of the other way around. This could not be the intendment of the law.

Too well settled is the rule that laws must be enforced when ascertained, although it may not be consistent with the strict letter of the statute. Courts will not follow the letter of the statute when to do so would depart from the true intent of the legislature or would otherwise yield conclusions inconsistent with the general purpose of the act. (Torres v. Limjap, 56 Phil., 141; Taada v. Cuenco, 103 Phil. 1051; Hidalgo v. Hidalgo, 33 SCRA 1105). Legislation is an active instrument of government, which, for purposes of interpretation, means that laws have ends to achieve, and statutes should be so construed as not to defeat but to carry out such ends and purposes (Bocolbo v. Estanislao, 72 SCRA 520). The same rule must indubitably apply to the case at bar. II Petitioners in G.R. No. 118577 also assail the constitutionality of section 51, Article X of R.A. No. 7854. Section 51 states: Sec. 51. Officials of the City of Makati. The represent elective officials of the Municipality of Makati shall continue as the officials of the City of Makati and shall exercise their powers and functions until such time that a new election is held and the duly elected officials shall have already qualified and assume their offices: Provided, The new city will acquire a new corporate existence. The appointive officials and employees of the City shall likewise continues exercising their functions and duties and they shall be automatically absorbed by the city government of the City of Makati. They contend that this section collides with section 8, Article X and section 7, Article VI of the Constitution which provide: Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected. xxx xxx xxx Sec. 7. The Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected for a term of three years which shall begin, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election. No Member of the House of Representatives shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected. Petitioners stress that under these provisions, elective local officials, including Members of the House of Representative, have a term of three (3) years and are prohibited from serving for more than three (3) consecutive terms. They argue that by providing that the new city shall acquire a new corporate existence, section 51 of R.A. No. 7854 restarts the term of the present municipal elective officials of Makati and disregards the terms previously served by them. In particular, petitioners point that section 51 favors the incumbent Makati Mayor, respondent Jejomar Binay, who has already served for two (2) consecutive terms. They further argue that should Mayor Binay decide to run and eventually win as city mayor in the coming elections, he can still run for the same position in 1998 and seek another three-year consecutive term since his previous three-year consecutive term as municipal mayor would not be counted. Thus, petitioners conclude that said section 51 has been conveniently crafted to suit the political ambitions of respondent Mayor Binay. We cannot entertain this challenge to the constitutionality of section 51. The requirements before a litigant can challenge the constitutionality of a law are well delineated. They are: 1) there must be an actual case or controversy; (2) the question of constitutionality must be raised by the proper party; (3) the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the decision on the constitutional question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself. 5 Petitioners have far from complied with these requirements. The petition is premised on the occurrence of many contingent events, i.e., that Mayor Binay will run again in this coming mayoralty elections; that he would be re-elected in said elections; and that he would seek re-election for the same position in the 1998 elections. Considering that these contingencies may or may not happen, petitioners merely pose a hypothetical issue which has yet to ripen to an actual case or controversy. Petitioners who are residents of Taguig (except Mariano) are not also the proper parties to raise this abstract issue. Worse, they hoist this futuristic issue in a petition for declaratory relief over which this Court has no jurisdiction.

III Finally, petitioners in the two (2) cases at bench assail the constitutionality of section 52, Article X of R.A. No. 7854. Section 52 of the Charter provides: Sec. 52. Legislative Districts. Upon its conversion into a highly-urbanized city, Makati shall thereafter have at least two (2) legislative districts that shall initially correspond to the two (2) existing districts created under Section 3(a) of Republic Act. No. 7166 as implemented by the Commission on Elections to commence at the next national elections to be held after the effectivity of this Act. Henceforth, barangays Magallanes, Dasmarias and Forbes shall be with the first district, in lieu of Barangay Guadalupe-Viejo which shall form part of the second district. (emphasis supplied) They contend. that the addition of another legislative district in Makati is unconstitutional for: (1) reapportionment 6 cannot made by a special law, (2) the addition of a legislative district is not expressed in the title of the bill 7 and (3) Makati's population, as per the 1990 census, stands at only four hundred fifty thousand (450,000). These issues have been laid to rest in the recent case of Tobias v. Abalos. 8 In said case, we ruled that reapportionment of legislative districts may be made through a special law, such as in the charter of a new city. The Constitution 9 clearly provides that Congress shall be composed of not more than two hundred fifty (250) members, unless otherwise fixed by law. As thus worded, the Constitution did not preclude Congress from increasing its membership by passing a law, other than a general reapportionment of the law. This is its exactly what was done by Congress in enacting R.A. No. 7854 and providing for an increase in Makati's legislative district. Moreover, to hold that reapportionment can only be made through a general apportionment law, with a review of all the legislative districts allotted to each local government unit nationwide, would create an inequitable situation where a new city or province created by Congress will be denied legislative representation for an indeterminate period of time. 10 The intolerable situations will deprive the people of a new city or province a particle of their sovereignty. 11 Sovereignty cannot admit of any kind of subtraction. It is indivisible. It must be forever whole or it is not sovereignty. Petitioners cannot insist that the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accord with section 5(3), Article VI 12 of the Constitution for as of the latest survey (1990 census), the population of Makati stands at only four hundred fifty thousand (450,000). 13 Said section provides, inter alia, that a city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall have at least one representative. Even granting that the population of Makati as of the 1990 census stood at four hundred fifty thousand (450,000), its legislative district may still be increased since it has met the minimum population requirement of two hundred fifty thousand (250,000). In fact, section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution provides that a city whose population has increased to more than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall be entitled to at least one congressional representative. 14 Finally, we do not find merit in petitioners' contention that the creation of an additional legislative district in Makati should have been expressly stated in the title of the bill. In the same case of Tobias v. Abalos, op cit., we reiterated the policy of the Court favoring a liberal construction of the "one title-one subject" rule so as not to impede legislation. To be sure, with Constitution does not command that the title of a law should exactly mirror, fully index, or completely catalogue all its details. Hence, we ruled that "it should be sufficient compliance if the title expresses the general subject and all the provisions are germane to such general subject." WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit No costs. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 189698

December 1, 2009

ELEAZAR P. QUINTO and GERINO A. TOLENTINO, JR., Petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent. DECISION NACHURA, J.: In our predisposition to discover the "original intent" of a statute, courts become the unfeeling pillars of the status quo. Little do we realize that statutes or even constitutions are bundles of compromises thrown our way by their framers. Unless we exercise vigilance, the statute may already be out of tune and irrelevant to our day.1 It is in this light that we should address the instant case. Before the Court is a petition for prohibition and certiorari, with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction, assailing Section 4(a) of Resolution No. 8678 of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). In view of pressing contemporary events, the petition begs for immediate resolution. The Antecedents This controversy actually stems from the law authorizing the COMELEC to use an automated election system (AES). On December 22, 1997, Congress enacted Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8436, entitled "AN ACT AUTHORIZING THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS TO USE AN AUTOMATED ELECTION SYSTEM IN THE MAY 11, 1998 NATIONAL OR LOCAL ELECTIONS AND IN SUBSEQUENT NATIONAL AND LOCAL ELECTORAL EXERCISES, PROVIDING FUNDS THEREFOR AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES." Section 11 thereof reads: SEC. 11. Official Ballot.- The Commission shall prescribe the size and form of the official ballot which shall contain the titles of the positions to be filled and/or the propositions to be voted upon in an initiative, referendum or plebiscite. Under each position, the names of candidates shall be arranged alphabetically by surname and uniformly printed using the same type size. A fixed space where the chairman of the Board of Election inspectors shall affix his/her signature to authenticate the official ballot shall be provided. Both sides of the ballots may be used when necessary. For this purpose, the deadline for the filing of certificate of candidacy/petition for registration/manifestation to participate in the election shall not be later than one hundred twenty (120) days before the elections: - Provided, That, any elective official, whether national or local, running for any office other than the one which he/she is holding in a permanent capacity, except for president and vice president, shall be deemed resigned only upon the start of the campaign period corresponding to the position for which he/she is running: Provided, further, That, unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall take effect upon the start of the aforesaid campaign period: Provided, finally, That, for purposes of the May 11, 1998 elections, the deadline for filing of the certificate of candidacy for the positions of President, Vice President, Senators and candidates under the Party-List System as well as petitions for registration and/or manifestation to participate in the Party-List System shall be on February 9, 1998 while the deadline for the filing of certificate of candidacy for other positions shall be on March 27, 1998. The official ballots shall be printed by the National Printing Office and/or the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas at the price comparable with that of private printers under proper security measures which the Commission shall adopt. The Commission may contract the services of private printers upon certification by the National Printing Office/Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas that it cannot meet the printing requirements. Accredited political parties and deputized citizens' arms of the Commission may assign watchers in the printing, storage and distribution of official ballots. To prevent the use of fake ballots, the Commission through the Committee shall ensure that the serial number on the ballot stub shall be printed in magnetic ink that shall be easily detectable by inexpensive hardware and shall be impossible to reproduce on a photocopying machine and that identification marks, magnetic strips, bar codes and other technical and security markings, are provided on the ballot.

The official ballots shall be printed and distributed to each city/municipality at the rate of one (1) ballot for every registered voter with a provision of additional four (4) ballots per precinct.2 Almost a decade thereafter, Congress amended the law on January 23, 2007 by enacting R.A. No. 9369, entitled "AN ACT AMENDING REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8436, ENTITLED "AN ACT AUTHORIZING THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS TO USE AN AUTOMATED ELECTION SYSTEM IN THE MAY 11, 1998 NATIONAL OR LOCAL ELECTIONS AND IN SUBSEQUENT NATIONAL AND LOCAL ELECTORAL EXERCISES, TO ENCOURAGE TRANSPARENCY, CREDIBILITY, FAIRNESS AND ACCURACY OF ELECTIONS, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE BATAS PAMPANSA BLG. 881, AS AMEMDED, REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7166 AND OTHER RELATED ELECTION LAWS, PROVIDING FUNDS THEREFOR AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES." Section 13 of the amendatory law modified Section 11 of R.A. No. 8436, thus: SEC. 13. Section 11 of Republic Act No. 8436 is hereby amended to read as follows: Section 15. Official Ballot.- The Commission shall prescribe the format of the electronic display and/or the size and form of the official ballot, which shall contain the titles of the position to be filled and/or the propositions to be voted upon in an initiative, referendum or plebiscite. Where practicable, electronic displays must be constructed to present the names of all candidates for the same position in the same page or screen, otherwise, the electronic displays must be constructed to present the entire ballot to the voter, in a series of sequential pages, and to ensure that the voter sees all of the ballot options on all pages before completing his or her vote and to allow the voter to review and change all ballot choices prior to completing and casting his or her ballot. Under each position to be filled, the names of candidates shall be arranged alphabetically by surname and uniformly indicated using the same type size. The maiden or married name shall be listed in the official ballot, as preferred by the female candidate. Under each proposition to be vote upon, the choices should be uniformly indicated using the same font and size. A fixed space where the chairman of the board of election inspectors shall affix his/her signature to authenticate the official ballot shall be provided. For this purpose, the Commission shall set the deadline for the filing of certificate of candidacy/petition of registration/manifestation to participate in the election. Any person who files his certificate of candidacy within this period shall only be considered as a candidate at the start of the campaign period for which he filed his certificate of candidacy: Provided, That, unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the aforesaid campaign period: Provided, finally, That any person holding a public appointive office or position, including active members of the armed forces, and officers and employees in government-owned or -controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his/her office and must vacate the same at the start of the day of the filing of his/her certificate of candidacy. Political parties may hold political conventions to nominate their official candidates within thirty (30) days before the start of the period for filing a certificate of candidacy. With respect to a paper-based election system, the official ballots shall be printed by the National Printing Office and/or the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas at the price comparable with that of private printers under proper security measures which the Commission shall adopt. The Commission may contract the services of private printers upon certification by the National Printing Office/Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas that it cannot meet the printing requirements. Accredited political parties and deputized citizens' arms of the Commission shall assign watchers in the printing, storage and distribution of official ballots. To prevent the use of fake ballots, the Commission through the Committee shall ensure that the necessary safeguards, such as, but not limited to, bar codes, holograms, color shifting ink, microprinting, are provided on the ballot. The official ballots shall be printed and distributed to each city/municipality at the rate of one ballot for every registered voter with a provision of additional three ballots per precinct.3 Pursuant to its constitutional mandate to enforce and administer election laws, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8678,4 the Guidelines on the Filing of Certificates of Candidacy (CoC) and Nomination of Official Candidates of Registered Political Parties in Connection with the May 10, 2010 National and Local Elections. Sections 4 and 5 of Resolution No. 8678 provide: SEC. 4. Effects of Filing Certificates of Candidacy.- a) Any person holding a public appointive office or position including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and other officers and employees in government-owned or

controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy. b) Any person holding an elective office or position shall not be considered resigned upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy for the same or any other elective office or position. SEC. 5. Period for filing Certificate of Candidacy.- The certificate of candidacy shall be filed on regular days, from November 20 to 30, 2009, during office hours, except on the last day, which shall be until midnight. Alarmed that they will be deemed ipso facto resigned from their offices the moment they file their CoCs, petitioners Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr., who hold appointive positions in the government and who intend to run in the coming elections,5 filed the instant petition for prohibition and certiorari, seeking the declaration of the afore-quoted Section 4(a) of Resolution No. 8678 as null and void. The Petitioners' Contention Petitioners contend that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it issued the assailed Resolution. They aver that the advance filing of CoCs for the 2010 elections is intended merely for the purpose of early printing of the official ballots in order to cope with time limitations. Such advance filing does not automatically make the person who filed the CoC a candidate at the moment of filing. In fact, the law considers him a candidate only at the start of the campaign period. Petitioners then assert that this being so, they should not be deemed ipso facto resigned from their government offices when they file their CoCs, because at such time they are not yet treated by law as candidates. They should be considered resigned from their respective offices only at the start of the campaign period when they are, by law, already considered as candidates.6 Petitioners also contend that Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369, the basis of the assailed COMELEC resolution, contains two conflicting provisions. These must be harmonized or reconciled to give effect to both and to arrive at a declaration that they are not ipso facto resigned from their positions upon the filing of their CoCs.7 Petitioners further posit that the provision considering them as ipso facto resigned from office upon the filing of their CoCs is discriminatory and violates the equal protection clause in the Constitution.8 The Respondent's Arguments On the procedural aspect of the petition, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), representing respondent COMELEC, argues that petitioners have no legal standing to institute the suit." Petitioners have not yet filed their CoCs, hence, they are not yet affected by the assailed provision in the COMELEC resolution. The OSG further claims that the petition is premature or unripe for judicial determination." Petitioners have admitted that they are merely planning to file their CoCs for the coming 2010 elections. Their interest in the present controversy is thus merely speculative and contingent upon the filing of the same. The OSG likewise contends that petitioners availed of the wrong remedy. They are questioning an issuance of the COMELEC made in the exercise of the latter's rule-making power. Certiorari under Rule 65 is then an improper remedy.9 On the substantive aspect, the OSG maintains that the COMELEC did not gravely abuse its discretion in phrasing Section 4(a) of Resolution No. 8678 for it merely copied what is in the law. The OSG, however, agrees with petitioners that there is a conflict in Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369 that should be resolved. According to the OSG, there seems to be no basis to consider appointive officials as ipso facto resigned and to require them to vacate their positions on the same day that they file their CoCs, because they are not yet considered as candidates at that time. Further, this - deemed resigned- provision existed in Batas Pambansa Bilang (B.P. Blg.) 881, and no longer finds a place in our present election laws with the innovations brought about by the automated system.10 Our Ruling I. At first glance, the petition suffers from an incipient procedural defect. What petitioners assail in their petition is a resolution issued by the COMELEC in the exercise of its quasi-legislative power. Certiorari under Rule 65, in relation to Rule 64, cannot be availed of, because it is a remedy to question decisions, resolutions and issuances made in the exercise of a judicial or quasi-judicial function.11 Prohibition is also an inappropriate remedy, because what petitioners

actually seek from the Court is a determination of the proper construction of a statute and a declaration of their rights thereunder. Obviously, their petition is one for declaratory relief,12 over which this Court does not exercise original jurisdiction.13 However, petitioners raise a challenge on the constitutionality of the questioned provisions of both the COMELEC resolution and the law. Given this scenario, the Court may step in and resolve the instant petition. The transcendental nature and paramount importance of the issues raised and the compelling state interest involved in their early resolution the period for the filing of CoCs for the 2010 elections has already started and hundreds of civil servants intending to run for elective offices are to lose their employment, thereby causing imminent and irreparable damage to their means of livelihood and, at the same time, crippling the government's manpowerfurther dictate that the Court must, for propriety, if only from a sense of obligation, entertain the petition so as to expedite the adjudication of all, especially the constitutional, issues. In any event, the Court has ample authority to set aside errors of practice or technicalities of procedure and resolve the merits of a case. Repeatedly stressed in our prior decisions is the principle that the Rules were promulgated to provide guidelines for the orderly administration of justice, not to shackle the hand that dispenses it. Otherwise, the courts would be consigned to being mere slaves to technical rules, deprived of their judicial discretion.14 II. To put things in their proper perspective, it is imperative that we trace the brief history of the assailed provision. Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 is a reproduction of the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369, which for ready reference is quoted as follows: For this purpose, the Commission shall set the deadline for the filing of certificate of candidacy/petition for registration/manifestation to participate in the election. Any person who files his certificate of candidacy within this period shall only be considered as a candidate at the start of the campaign period for which he filed his certificate of candidacy: Provided, That, unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the aforesaid campaign period: Provided, finally, That any person holding a public appointive office or position, including active members of the armed forces, and officers and employees in government-owned or -controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his/her office and must vacate the same at the start of the day of the filing of his/her certificate of candidacy.15 Notably, this proviso is not present in Section 11 of R.A. No. 8436, the law amended by R.A. No. 9369. The proviso was lifted from Section 66 of B.P. Blg. 881 or the Omnibus Election Code (OEC) of the Philippines, which reads: Sec. 66. Candidates holding appointive office or position.- Any person holding a public appointive office or position, including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and officers and employees in government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy. It may be recalled-in inverse chronology-that earlier, Presidential Decree No. 1296, or the 1978 Election Code, contained a similar provision, thus' SECTION 29. Candidates holding appointive office or position. - Every person holding a public appointive office or position, including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and officers and employees in governmentowned or controlled corporations, shall ipso facto cease in his office or position on the date he files his certificate of candidacy. Members of the Cabinet shall continue in the offices they presently hold notwithstanding the filing of certificate of candidacy, subject to the pleasure of the President of the Philippines. Much earlier, R.A. No. 6388, or the Election Code of 1971, likewise stated in its Section 23 the following: SECTION 23. Candidates Holding Appointive Office or Position. - Every person holding a public appointive office or position, including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and every officer or employee in governmentowned or controlled corporations, shall ipso facto cease in his office or position on the date he files his certificate of candidacy: Provided, That the filing of a certificate of candidacy shall not affect whatever civil, criminal or administrative liabilities which he may have incurred.

Going further back in history, R.A. No. 180, or the Revised Election Code approved on June 21, 1947, also provided that SECTION 26. Automatic cessation of appointive officers and employees who are candidates. - Every person holding a public appointive office or position shall ipso facto cease in his office or position on the date he files his certificate of candidacy. During the Commonwealth era, Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 725, entitled "AN ACT TO PROVIDE FOR THE NEXT ELECTION FOR PRESIDENT AND VICE-PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES, SENATORS AND MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, AND APPROPRIATING THE NECESSARY FUNDS THEREFOR," approved on January 5, 1946, contained, in the last paragraph of its Section 2, the following: A person occupying any civil office by appointment in the government or any of its political subdivisions or agencies or government-owned or controlled corporations, whether such office by appointive or elective, shall be considered to have resigned from such office from the moment of the filing of such certificate of candidacy. Significantly, however, C.A. No. 666, entitled "AN ACT TO PROVIDE FOR THE FIRST ELECTION FOR PRESIDENT AND VICE-PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES, SENATORS, AND MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, UNDER THE CONSTITUTION AND THE AMENDMENTS THEREOF," enacted without executive approval on June 22, 1941, the precursor of C.A. No. 725, only provided for automatic resignation of elective, but not appointive, officials. Nevertheless, C.A. No. 357, or the Election Code approved on August 22, 1938, had, in its Section 22, the same verbatim provision as Section 26 of R.A. No. 180. The earliest recorded Philippine law on the subject is Act No. 1582, or the Election Law enacted by the Philippine Commission in 1907, the last paragraph of Section 29 of which reads: Sec. 29. Penalties upon officers.- x x x. No public officer shall offer himself as a candidate for election, nor shall he be eligible during the time that he holds said public office to election, at any municipal, provincial or Assembly election, except for reelection to the position which he may be holding, and no judge of the Court of First Instance, justice of the peace, provincial fiscal, or officer or employee of the Bureau of Constabulary or of the Bureau of Education shall aid any candidate or influence in any manner or take any part in any municipal, provincial, or Assembly election under penalty of being deprived of his office and being disqualified to hold any public office whatever for a term of five years: Provided, however, That the foregoing provisions shall not be construed to deprive any person otherwise qualified of the right to vote at any election. From this brief historical excursion, it may be gleaned that the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369- that any person holding a public appointive office or position, including active members of the armed forces, and officers, and employees in government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his/her office and must vacate the same at the start of the day of the filing of his/her certificate of candidacy- traces its roots to the period of the American occupation. In fact, during the deliberations of Senate Bill No. 2231, the bill later to be consolidated with House Bill No. 5352 and enacted as R.A. No. 9369, Senator Richard Gordon, the principal author of the bill, acknowledged that the said proviso in the proposed legislative measure is an old provision which was merely copied from earlier existing legislation, thus' Senator Osmea.- May I just opine here and perhaps obtain the opinion of the good Sponsor.- This reads like, "ANY PERSON HOLDING [means currently] A PUBLIC APPOINTIVE POSITION" SHALL BE CONSIDERED IPSO FACTO RESIGNED- [which means that the prohibition extends only to appointive officials] "INCLUDING ACTIVE MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES, OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES"- This is a prohibition, Mr. President.- This means if one is chairman of SSS or PDIC, he is deemed ipso facto resigned when he files his certificate of candidacy.- Is that the intention Senator Gordon.- This is really an old provision, Mr. President. Senator Osmea.- It is in bold letters, so I think it was a Committee amendment. Senator Gordon.- No, it has always been there.

Senator Osmea.- I see. Senator Gordon.- I guess the intention is not to give them undue advantage, especially certain people. Senator Osmea.- All right.16 In that Senate deliberation, however, Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago expressed her concern over the inclusion of the said provision in the new law, given that the same would be disadvantageous and unfair to potential candidates holding appointive positions, while it grants a consequent preferential treatment to elective officials, thus' Senator Santiago.- On page 15, line 31, I know that this is a losing cause, so I make this point more as a matter of record than of any feasible hope that it can possibly be either accepted or if we come to a division of the House, it will be upheld by the majority. I am referring to page 15, line 21.- The proviso begins: "PROVIDED FINALLY, THAT ANY PERSON HOLDING A PUBLIC APPOINTIVE OFFICE - SHALL BE CONSIDERED IPSO FACTO RESIGNED FROM HIS/HER OFFICE." The point that I made during the appropriate debate in the past in this Hall is that there is, for me, no valid reason for exempting elective officials from this inhibition or disqualification imposed by the law.- If we are going to consider appointive officers of the government, including AFP members and officers of government-owned and controlled corporations, or any other member of the appointive sector of the civil service, why should it not apply to the elective sector for, after all, even senators and congressmen are members of the civil service as well Further, it is self-serving for the Senate, or for the Congress in general, to give an exception to itself which is not available to other similarly situated officials of government. Of course, the answer is, the reason why we are special is that we are elected. Since we are imposing a disqualification on all other government officials except ourselves, I think, it is the better part of delicadeza to inhibit ourselves as well, so that if we want to stay as senators, we wait until our term expires. But if we want to run for some other elective office during our term, then we have to be considered resigned just like everybody else. That is my proposed amendment. But if it is unacceptable to the distinguished Sponsor, because of sensitivity to the convictions of the rest of our colleagues, I will understand. Senator Gordon. Mr. President, I think the suggestion is well-thought of.- It is a good policy.- However, this is something that is already in the old law which was upheld by the Supreme court in a recent case that the rider was not upheld and that it was valid.17 The obvious inequality brought about by the provision on automatic resignation of appointive civil servants must have been the reason why Senator Recto proposed the inclusion of the following during the period of amendments: "ANY PERSON WHO FILES HIS CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY WITHIN THIS PERIOD SHALL ONLY BE CONSIDERED AS A CANDIDATE AT THE START OF THE CAMPAIGN PERIOD FOR WHICH HE FILED HIS COC."18 The said proviso seems to mitigate the situation of disadvantage afflicting appointive officials by considering persons who filed their CoCs as candidates only at the start of the campaign period, thereby, conveying the tacit intent that persons holding appointive positions will only be considered as resigned at the start of the campaign period when they are already treated by law as candidates. Parenthetically, it may be remembered that Section 67 of the OEC and Section 11 of R.A. No. 8436 contained a similar provision on automatic resignation of elective officials upon the filing of their CoCs for any office other than that which they hold in a permanent capacity or for President or Vice-President. However, with the enactment of R.A. No. 9006, or the Fair Election Act,19 in 2001, this provision was repealed by Section 1420 of the said act. There was, thus, created a situation of obvious discrimination against appointive officials who were deemed ipso facto resigned from their offices upon the filing of their CoCs, while elective officials were not. This situation was incidentally addressed by the Court in Fariv. The Executive Secretary21 when it ruled that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 Is Not Violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution

The petitioners' contention, that the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code pertaining to elective officials gives undue benefit to such officials as against the appointive ones and violates the equal protection clause of the constitution, is tenuous. The equal protection of the law clause in the Constitution is not absolute, but is subject to reasonable classification.- If the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that make real differences, one class may be treated and regulated differently from the other. The Court has explained the nature of the equal protection guarantee in this manner: The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality.- It is not intended to prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by territory within which it is to operate.- It does not demand absolute equality among residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced.- The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not. Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and appointive officials. The former occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. They are elected to an office for a definite term and may be removed therefrom only upon stringent conditions. On the other hand, appointive officials hold their office by virtue of their designation thereto by an appointing authority.- Some appointive officials hold their office in a permanent capacity and are entitled to security of tenure while others serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority. Another substantial distinction between the two sets of officials is that under Section 55, Chapter 8, Title I, Subsection A. Civil Service Commission, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292), appointive officials, as officers and employees in the civil service, are strictly prohibited from engaging in any partisan political activity or take part in any election except to vote.- Under the same provision, elective officials, or officers or employees holding political offices, are obviously expressly allowed to take part in political and electoral activities. By repealing Section 67 but retaining Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, the legislators deemed it proper to treat these two classes of officials differently with respect to the effect on their tenure in the office of the filing of the certificates of candidacy for any position other than those occupied by them.- Again, it is not within the power of the Court to pass upon or look into the wisdom of this classification. Since the classification justifying Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, i.e., elected officials vis-a-vis appointive officials, is anchored upon material and significant distinctions and all the persons belonging under the same classification are similarly treated, the equal protection clause of the Constitution is, thus, not infringed.22 However, it must be remembered that the Court, in Fari/i>, was intently focused on the main issue of whether the repealing clause in the Fair Election Act was a constitutionally proscribed rider, in that it unwittingly failed to ascertain with stricter scrutiny the impact of the retention of the provision on automatic resignation of persons holding appointive positions (Section 66) in the OEC, vis-is the equal protection clause.- Moreover, the Court's vision in Fari/i> was shrouded by the fact that petitioners therein, Fariet al., never posed a direct challenge to the constitutionality of Section 66 of the OEC. Fariet al. rather merely questioned, on constitutional grounds, the repealing clause, or Section 14 of the Fair Election Act. The Court's afore-quoted declaration in Fari/i> may then very well be considered as an obiter dictum. III. The instant case presents a rare opportunity for the Court, in view of the constitutional challenge advanced by petitioners, once and for all, to settle the issue of whether the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369, a reproduction of Section 66 of the OEC, which, as shown above, was based on provisions dating back to the American occupation, is violative of the equal protection clause. But before delving into the constitutional issue, we shall first address the issues on legal standing and on the existence of an actual controversy. Central to the determination of locus standi is the question of whether a party has alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.23 In this case, petitioners allege that they will be directly affected by COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 for they intend, and they all have the qualifications, to run

in the 2010 elections. The OSG, for its part, contends that since petitioners have not yet filed their CoCs, they are not yet candidates; hence, they are not yet directly affected by the assailed provision in the COMELEC resolution. The Court, nevertheless, finds that, while petitioners are not yet candidates, they have the standing to raise the constitutional challenge, simply because they are qualified voters. A restriction on candidacy, such as the challenged measure herein, affects the rights of voters to choose their public officials. The rights of voters and the rights of candidates do not lend themselves to neat separation; laws that affect candidates always have at least some theoretical, correlative effect on voters.24 The Court believes that both candidates and voters may challenge, on grounds of equal protection, the assailed measure because of its impact on voting rights.25 In any event, in recent cases, this Court has relaxed the stringent direct injury test and has observed a liberal policy allowing ordinary citizens, members of Congress, and civil organizations to prosecute actions involving the constitutionality or validity of laws, regulations and rulings.26 We have also stressed in our prior decisions that the exercise by this Court of judicial power is limited to the determination and resolution of actual cases and controversies.27 The Court, in this case, finds that an actual case or controversy exists between the petitioners and the COMELEC, the body charged with the enforcement and administration of all election laws. Petitioners have alleged in a precise manner that they would engage in the very acts that would trigger the enforcement of the provisionthey would file their CoCs and run in the 2010 elections. Given that the assailed provision provides for ipso facto resignation upon the filing of the CoC, it cannot be said that it presents only a speculative or hypothetical obstacle to petitioners' candidacy.28 IV. Having hurdled what the OSG posed as obstacles to judicial review, the Court now delves into the constitutional challenge. It is noteworthy to point out that the right to run for public office touches on two fundamental freedoms, those of expression and of association. This premise is best explained in Mancuso v. Taft,29 viz.: Freedom of expression guarantees to the individual the opportunity to write a letter to the local newspaper, speak out in a public park, distribute handbills advocating radical reform, or picket an official building to seek redress of grievances. All of these activities are protected by the First Amendment if done in a manner consistent with a narrowly defined concept of public order and safety. The choice of means will likely depend on the amount of time and energy the individual wishes to expend and on his perception as to the most effective method of projecting his message to the public. But interest and commitment are evolving phenomena. What is an effective means for protest at one point in time may not seem so effective at a later date. The dilettante who participates in a picket line may decide to devote additional time and resources to his expressive activity. As his commitment increases, the means of effective expression changes, but the expressive quality remains constant. He may decide to lead the picket line, or to publish the newspaper. At one point in time he may decide that the most effective way to give expression to his views and to get the attention of an appropriate audience is to become a candidate for public office-means generally considered among the most appropriate for those desiring to effect change in our governmental systems. He may seek to become a candidate by filing in a general election as an independent or by seeking the nomination of a political party. And in the latter instance, the individual's expressive activity has two dimensions: besides urging that his views be the views of the elected public official, he is also attempting to become a spokesman for a political party whose substantive program extends beyond the particular office in question. But Cranston has said that a certain type of its citizenry, the public employee, may not become a candidate and may not engage in any campaign activity that promotes himself as a candidate for public office. Thus the city has stifled what may be the most important expression an individual can summon, namely that which he would be willing to effectuate, by means of concrete public action, were he to be selected by the voters. It is impossible to ignore the additional fact that the right to run for office also affects the freedom to associate. In Williams v. Rhodes, supra, the Court used strict review to invalidate an Ohio election system that made it virtually impossible for third parties to secure a place on the ballot. The Court found that the First Amendment protected the freedom to associate by forming and promoting a political party and that that freedom was infringed when the state effectively denied a party access to its electoral machinery. The Cranston charter provision before us also affects associational rights, albeit in a slightly different way. An individual may decide to join or participate in an organization or political party that shares his beliefs. He may even form a new group to forward his ideas. And at some juncture his supporters and fellow party members may decide that he is the ideal person to carry the group's standard into the electoral fray. To thus restrict the options available to political organization as the Cranston charter provision has done is to limit the effectiveness of association; and the freedom to associate is intimately related with the concept of making expression effective. Party

access to the ballot becomes less meaningful if some of those selected by party machinery to carry the party's programs to the people are precluded from doing so because those nominees are civil servants. Whether the right to run for office is looked at from the point of view of individual expression or associational effectiveness, wide opportunities exist for the individual who seeks public office. The fact of candidacy alone may open previously closed doors of the media. The candidate may be invited to discuss his views on radio talk shows; he may be able to secure equal time on television to elaborate his campaign program; the newspapers may cover his candidacy; he may be invited to debate before various groups that had theretofore never heard of him or his views. In short, the fact of candidacy opens up a variety of communicative possibilities that are not available to even the most diligent of picketers or the most loyal of party followers. A view today, that running for public office is not an interest protected by the First Amendment, seems to us an outlook stemming from an earlier era when public office was the preserve of the professional and the wealthy. Consequently we hold that candidacy is both a protected First Amendment right and a fundamental interest. Hence any legislative classification that significantly burdens that interest must be subjected to strict equal protection review.30 Here, petitioners' interest in running for public office, an interest protected by Sections 4 and 8 of Article III of the Constitution, is breached by the proviso in Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369. It is now the opportune time for the Court to strike down the said proviso for being violative of the equal protection clause and for being overbroad. In considering persons holding appointive positions as ipso facto resigned from their posts upon the filing of their CoCs, but not considering as resigned all other civil servants, specifically the elective ones, the law unduly discriminates against the first class. The fact alone that there is substantial distinction between those who hold appointive positions and those occupying elective posts, does not justify such differential treatment. In order that there can be valid classification so that a discriminatory governmental act may pass the constitutional norm of equal protection, it is necessary that the four (4) requisites of valid classification be complied with, namely: (1) It must be based upon substantial distinctions; (2) It must be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) It must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It must apply equally to all members of the class. The first requirement means that there must be real and substantial differences between the classes treated differently. As illustrated in the fairly recent Mirasol v. Department of Public Works and Highways,31 a real and substantial distinction exists between a motorcycle and other motor vehicles sufficient to justify its classification among those prohibited from plying the toll ways. Not all motorized vehicles are created equal a two-wheeled vehicle is less stable and more easily overturned than a four-wheel vehicle. Nevertheless, the classification would still be invalid if it does not comply with the second requirement if it is not germane to the purpose of the law. Justice Isagani A. Cruz (Ret.), in his treatise on constitutional law, explains, The classification, even if based on substantial distinctions, will still be invalid if it is not germane to the purpose of the law. To illustrate, the accepted difference in physical stamina between men and women will justify the prohibition of the latter from employment as miners or stevedores or in other heavy and strenuous work. On the basis of this same classification, however, the law cannot provide for a lower passing average for women in the bar examinations because physical strength is not the test for admission to the legal profession. Imported cars may be taxed at a higher rate than locally assembled automobiles for the protection of the national economy, but their difference in origin is no justification for treating them differently when it comes to punishing violations of traffic regulations. The source of the vehicle has no relation to the observance of these rules.32 The third requirement means that the classification must be enforced not only for the present but as long as the problem sought to be corrected continues to exist. And, under the last requirement, the classification would be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not treated similarly, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed.33 Applying the four requisites to the instant case, the Court finds that the differential treatment of persons holding appointive offices as opposed to those holding elective ones is not germane to the purposes of the law.

The obvious reason for the challenged provision is to prevent the use of a governmental position to promote one's candidacy, or even to wield a dangerous or coercive influence on the electorate. The measure is further aimed at promoting the efficiency, integrity, and discipline of the public service by eliminating the danger that the discharge of official duty would be motivated by political considerations rather than the welfare of the public.34 The restriction is also justified by the proposition that the entry of civil servants to the electoral arena, while still in office, could result in neglect or inefficiency in the performance of duty because they would be attending to their campaign rather than to their office work. If we accept these as the underlying objectives of the law, then the assailed provision cannot be constitutionally rescued on the ground of valid classification. Glaringly absent is the requisite that the classification must be germane to the purposes of the law. Indeed, whether one holds an appointive office or an elective one, the evils sought to be prevented by the measure remain. For example, the Executive Secretary, or any Member of the Cabinet for that matter, could wield the same influence as the Vice-President who at the same time is appointed to a Cabinet post (in the recent past, elected Vice-Presidents were appointed to take charge of national housing, social welfare development, interior and local government, and foreign affairs). With the fact that they both head executive offices, there is no valid justification to treat them differently when both file their CoCs for the elections. Under the present state of our law, the Vice-President, in the example, running this time, let us say, for President, retains his position during the entire election period and can still use the resources of his office to support his campaign. As to the danger of neglect, inefficiency or partisanship in the discharge of the functions of his appointive office, the inverse could be just as true and compelling. The public officer who files his certificate of candidacy would be driven by a greater impetus for excellent performance to show his fitness for the position aspired for. Mancuso v. Taft,35 cited above, explains that the measure on automatic resignation, which restricts the rights of civil servants to run for officea right inextricably linked to their freedom of expression and association, is not reasonably necessary to the satisfaction of the state interest. Thus, in striking down a similar measure in the United States, Mancuso succinctly declares' In proceeding to the second stage of active equal protection review, however, we do see some contemporary relevance of the Mitchell decision. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, supra. In order for the Cranston charter provision to withstand strict scrutiny, the city must show that the exclusion of all government employees from candidacy is necessary to achieve a compelling state interest. And, as stated in Mitchell and other cases dealing with similar statutes, see Wisconsin State Employees, supra; Broadrick, supra, government at all levels has a substantial interest in protecting the integrity of its civil service. It is obviously conceivable that the impartial character of the civil service would be seriously jeopardized if people in positions of authority used their discretion to forward their electoral ambitions rather than the public welfare. Similarly if a public employee pressured other fellow employees to engage in corrupt practices in return for promises of post-election reward, or if an employee invoked the power of the office he was seeking to extract special favors from his superiors, the civil service would be done irreparable injury. Conversely, members of the public, fellow-employees, or supervisors might themselves request favors from the candidate or might improperly adjust their own official behavior towards him. Even if none of these abuses actually materialize, the possibility of their occurrence might seriously erode the public's confidence in its public employees. For the reputation of impartiality is probably as crucial as the impartiality itself; the knowledge that a clerk in the assessor's office who is running for the local zoning board has access to confidential files which could provide pressure points for furthering his campaign is destructive regardless of whether the clerk actually takes advantage of his opportunities. For all of these reasons we find that the state indeed has a compelling interest in maintaining the honesty and impartiality of its public work force. We do not, however, consider the exclusionary measure taken by Cranston-a flat prohibition on office-seeking of all kinds by all kinds of public employees-as even reasonably necessary to satisfaction of this state interest. As Justice Marshall pointed out in Dunn v. Blumstein, [s]tatutes affecting constitutional rights must be drawn with precision. For three sets of reasons we conclude that the Cranston charter provision pursues its objective in a far too heavy-handed manner and hence must fall under the equal protection clause. First, we think the nature of the regulation-a broad prophylactic rulemay be unnecessary to fulfillment of the city's objective. Second, even granting some sort of prophylactic rule may be required, the provision here prohibits candidacies for all types of public office, including many which would pose none of the problems at which the law is aimed. Third, the provision excludes the candidacies of all types of public employees, without any attempt to limit exclusion to those employees whose positions make them vulnerable to corruption and conflicts of interest. There is thus no valid justification to treat appointive officials differently from the elective ones. The classification simply fails to meet the test that it should be germane to the purposes of the law. The measure encapsulated in the second proviso of the third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369 and in Section 66 of the OEC violates the equal protection clause.

V. The challenged provision also suffers from the infirmity of being overbroad. First, the provision pertains to all civil servants holding appointive posts without distinction as to whether they occupy high positions in government or not. Certainly, a utility worker in the government will also be considered as ipso facto resigned once he files his CoC for the 2010 elections. This scenario is absurd for, indeed, it is unimaginable how he can use his position in the government to wield influence in the political world. While it may be admitted that most appointive officials who seek public elective office are those who occupy relatively high positions in government, laws cannot be legislated for them alone, or with them alone in mind. For the right to seek public elective office is universal, open and unrestrained, subject only to the qualification standards prescribed in the Constitution and in the laws. These qualifications are, as we all know, general and basic so as to allow the widest participation of the citizenry and to give free rein for the pursuit of one's highest aspirations to public office. Such is the essence of democracy. Second, the provision is directed to the activity of seeking any and all public offices, whether they be partisan or nonpartisan in character, whether they be in the national, municipal or barangay level. Congress has not shown a compelling state interest to restrict the fundamental right involved on such a sweeping scale.36 Specific evils require specific treatments, not through overly broad measures that unduly restrict guaranteed freedoms of the citizenry. After all, sovereignty resides in the people, and all governmental power emanates from them. Mancuso v. Taft,37 on this point, instructs As to approaches less restrictive than a prophylactic rule, there exists the device of the leave of absence. Some system of leaves of absence would permit the public employee to take time off to pursue his candidacy while assuring him his old job should his candidacy be unsuccessful. Moreover, a leave of absence policy would eliminate many of the opportunities for engaging in the questionable practices that the statute is designed to prevent. While campaigning, the candidate would feel no conflict between his desire for election and his publicly entrusted discretion, nor any conflict between his efforts to persuade the public and his access to confidential documents. But instead of adopting a reasonable leave of absence policy, Cranston has chosen a provision that makes the public employee cast off the security of hard-won public employment should he desire to compete for elected office. The city might also promote its interest in the integrity of the civil service by enforcing, through dismissal, discipline, or criminal prosecution, rules or statutes that treat conflict of interests, bribery, or other forms of official corruption. By thus attacking the problem directly, instead of using a broad prophylactic rule, the city could pursue its objective without unduly burdening the First Amendment rights of its employees and the voting rights of its citizens. Last term in Dunn v. Blumstein, the Supreme Court faced an analogous question when the State of Tennessee asserted that the interest of ballot box purity justified its imposition of one year and three month residency requirements before a citizen could vote. Justice Marshall stated, inter alia, that Tennessee had available a number of criminal statutes that could be used to punish voter fraud without unnecessary infringement on the newcomer's right to vote. Similarly, it appears from the record in this case that the Cranston charter contains some provisions that might be used against opportunistic public employees. Even if some sort of prophylactic rule is necessary, we cannot say that Cranston has put much effort into tailoring a narrow provision that attempts to match the prohibition with the problem. The charter forbids a Cranston public employee from running for any office, anywhere. The prohibition is not limited to the local offices of Cranston, but rather extends to statewide offices and even to national offices. It is difficult for us to see that a public employee running for the United States Congress poses quite the same threat to the civil service as would the same employee if he were running for a local office where the contacts and information provided by his job related directly to the position he was seeking, and hence where the potential for various abuses was greater. Nor does the Cranston charter except the public employee who works in Cranston but aspires to office in another local jurisdiction, most probably his town of residence. Here again the charter precludes candidacies which can pose only a remote threat to the civil service. Finally, the charter does not limit its prohibition to partisan office-seeking, but sterilizes also those public employees who would seek nonpartisan elective office. The statute reviewed in Mitchell was limited to partisan political activity, and since that time other courts have found the partisan-nonpartisan distinction a material one. See Kinnear, supra; Wisconsin State Employees, supra; Gray v. Toledo, supra. While the line between nonpartisan and partisan can often be blurred by systems whose true characters are disguised by the names given them by their architects, it seems clear that the concerns of a truly partisan office and the temptations it fosters are sufficiently different from those involved in an office removed from regular party politics to warrant distinctive treatment in a charter of this sort.

The third and last area of excessive and overinclusive coverage of the Cranston charter relates not to the type of office sought, but to the type of employee seeking the office. As Justice Douglas pointed out in his dissent in Mitchell, 330 U.S. at 120-126, 67 S.Ct. 556, restrictions on administrative employees who either participate in decision-making or at least have some access to information concerning policy matters are much more justifiable than restrictions on industrial employees, who, but for the fact that the government owns the plant they work in, are, for purposes of access to official information, identically situated to all other industrial workers. Thus, a worker in the Philadelphia mint could be distinguished from a secretary in an office of the Department of Agriculture; so also could a janitor in the public schools of Cranston be distinguished from an assistant comptroller of the same city. A second line of distinction that focuses on the type of employee is illustrated by the cases of Kinnear and Minielly, supra. In both of these cases a civil service deputy decided to run for the elected office of sheriff. The courts in both cases felt that the no-candidacy laws in question were much too broad and indicated that perhaps the only situation sensitive enough to justify a flat rule was one in which an inferior in a public office electorally challenged his immediate superior. Given all these considerations, we think Cranston has not given adequate attention to the problem of narrowing the terms of its charter to deal with the specific kinds of conflict-of-interest problems it seeks to avoid. We also do not find convincing the arguments that after-hours campaigning will drain the energy of the public employee to the extent that he is incapable of performing his job effectively and that inevitable on-the-job campaigning and discussion of his candidacy will disrupt the work of others. Although it is indisputable that the city has a compelling interest in the performance of official work, the exclusion is not well-tailored to effectuate that interest. Presumably the city could fire the individual if he clearly shirks his employment responsibilities or disrupts the work of others. Also, the efficiency rationale common to both arguments is significantly underinclusive. It applies equally well to a number of non-political, extracurricular activities that are not prohibited by the Cranston charter. Finally, the connection between after-hours campaigning and the state interest seems tenuous; in many cases a public employee would be able to campaign aggressively and still continue to do his job well.38 Incidentally, Clements v. Fashing39 sustained as constitutional a provision on the automatic resignation of District Clerks, County Clerks, County Judges, County Treasurers, Criminal District Attorneys, County Surveyors, Inspectors of Hides and Animals, County Commissioners, Justices of the Peace, Sheriffs, Assessors and Collectors of Taxes, District Attorneys, County Attorneys, Public Weighers, and Constables if they announce their candidacy or if they become candidates in any general, special or primary election. In Clements, it may be readily observed that a provision treating differently particular officials, as distinguished from all others, under a classification that is germane to the purposes of the law, merits the stamp of approval from American courts. Not, however, a general and sweeping provision, and more so one violative of the second requisite for a valid classification, which is on its face unconstitutional. On a final note, it may not be amiss to state that the Americans, from whom we copied the provision in question, had already stricken down a similar measure for being unconstitutional. It is high-time that we, too, should follow suit and, thus, uphold fundamental liberties over age-old, but barren, restrictions to such freedoms. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of Republic Act No. 9369, Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code and Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 are declared as UNCONSTITUTIONAL. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 176951

April 12, 2011

LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP), represented by LCP National President Jerry P. Treas; City of Calbayog, represented by Mayor Mel Senen S. Sarmiento; and Jerry P. Treas, in his personal capacity as Taxpayer, Petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; Municipality of Baybay, Province of Leyte; Municipality of Bogo, Province of Cebu; Municipality of Catbalogan, Province of Western Samar; Municipality of Tandag, Province of Surigao del Sur; Municipality of Borongan, Province of Eastern Samar; and Municipality of Tayabas, Province of Quezon, Respondents. RESOLUTION BERSAMIN, J.: We consider and resolve the Ad Cautelam Motion for Reconsideration filed by the petitioners vis--vis the Resolution promulgated on February 15, 2011. To recall, the Resolution promulgated on February 15, 2011 granted the Motion for Reconsideration of the respondents presented against the Resolution dated August 24, 2010, reversed the Resolution dated August 24, 2010, and declared the 16 Cityhood Laws Republic Acts Nos. 9389, 9390, 9391, 9392, 9393, 9394, 9398, 9404, 9405, 9407, 9408, 9409, 9434, 9435, 9436, and 9491 constitutional. Now, the petitioners anchor their Ad Cautelam Motion for Reconsideration upon the primordial ground that the Court could no longer modify, alter, or amend its judgment declaring the Cityhood Laws unconstitutional due to such judgment having long become final and executory. They submit that the Cityhood Laws violated Section 6 and Section 10 of Article X of the Constitution, as well as the Equal Protection Clause. The petitioners specifically ascribe to the Court the following errors in its promulgation of the assailed February 15, 2011 Resolution, to wit: I. THE HONORABLE COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION TO PROMULGATE THE RESOLUTION OF 15 FEBRUARY 2011 BECAUSE THERE IS NO LONGER ANY ACTUAL CASE OR CONTROVERSY TO SETTLE. II. THE RESOLUTION CONTRAVENES THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AND RELEVANT SUPREME COURT ISSUANCES. III. THE RESOLUTION UNDERMINES THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM IN ITS DISREGARD OF THE PRINCIPLES OF RES JUDICATA AND THE DOCTRINE OF IMMUTABILITY OF FINAL JUDGMENTS. IV. THE RESOLUTION ERRONEOUSLY RULED THAT THE SIXTEEN (16) CITYHOOD BILLS DO NOT VIOLATE ARTICLE X, SECTIONS 6 AND 10 OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION. V. THE SIXTEEN (16) CITYHOOD LAWS VIOLATE THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION AND THE RIGHT OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS TO A JUST SHARE IN THE NATIONAL TAXES. Ruling Upon thorough consideration, we deny the Ad Cautelam Motion for Reconsideration for its lack of merit. I. Procedural Issues With respect to the first, second, and third assignments of errors, supra, it appears that the petitioners assail the jurisdiction of the Court in promulgating the February 15, 2011 Resolution, claiming that the decision herein had long become final and executory. They state that the Court thereby violated rules of procedure, and the principles of res judicata and immutability of final judgments.

The petitioners posit that the controversy on the Cityhood Laws ended with the April 28, 2009 Resolution denying the respondents second motion for reconsideration vis--vis the November 18, 2008 Decision for being a prohibited pleading, and in view of the issuance of the entry of judgment on May 21, 2009. The Court disagrees with the petitioners. In the April 28, 2009 Resolution, the Court ruled: By a vote of 6-6, the Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of 31 March 2009 is DENIED for lack of merit. The motion is denied since there is no majority that voted to overturn the Resolution of 31 March 2009. The Second Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision of 18 November 2008 is DENIED for being a prohibited pleading, and the Motion for Leave to Admit Attached Petition in Intervention dated 20 April 2009 and the Petition in Intervention dated 20 April 2009 filed by counsel for Ludivina T. Mas, et al. are also DENIED in view of the denial of the second motion for reconsideration. No further pleadings shall be entertained. Let entry of judgment be made in due course. Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. wrote a Dissenting Opinion, joined by Justices Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, Renato C. Corona, Minita Chico-Nazario, Teresita Leonardo-De Castro, and Lucas P. Bersamin. Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno and Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura took no part. Justice Leonardo A. Quisumbing is on leave.1 Within 15 days from receipt of the April 28, 2009 Resolution, the respondents filed a Motion To Amend Resolution Of April 28, 2009 By Declaring Instead That Respondents "Motion for Reconsideration Of the Resolution Of March 31, 2009" And "Motion For Leave To File, And To Admit Attached Second Motion For Reconsideration Of The Decision Dated November 18, 2008 Remain Unresolved And To Conduct Further Proceedings Thereon, arguing therein that a determination of the issue of constitutionality of the 16 Cityhood Laws upon a motion for reconsideration by an equally divided vote was not binding on the Court as a valid precedent, citing the separate opinion of then Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno in Lambino v. Commission on Elections.2 Thus, in its June 2, 2009 Resolution, the Court issued the following clarification of the April 28, 2009 Resolution, viz: As a rule, a second motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading pursuant to Section 2, Rule 52 of the Rules of Civil Procedure which provides that: "No second motion for reconsideration of a judgment or final resolution by the same party shall be entertained." Thus, a decision becomes final and executory after 15 days from receipt of the denial of the first motion for reconsideration. However, when a motion for leave to file and admit a second motion for reconsideration is granted by the Court, the Court therefore allows the filing of the second motion for reconsideration. In such a case, the second motion for reconsideration is no longer a prohibited pleading. In the present case, the Court voted on the second motion for reconsideration filed by respondent cities. In effect, the Court allowed the filing of the second motion for reconsideration. Thus, the second motion for reconsideration was no longer a prohibited pleading. However, for lack of the required number of votes to overturn the 18 November 2008 Decision and 31 March 2009 Resolution, the Court denied the second motion for reconsideration in its 28 April 2009 Resolution.3 As the result of the aforecited clarification, the Court resolved to expunge from the records several pleadings and documents, including respondents Motion To Amend Resolution Of April 28, 2009 etc. The respondents thus filed their Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of June 2, 2009, asseverating that their Motion To Amend Resolution Of April 28, 2009 etc. was not another motion for reconsideration of the November 18, 2008 Decision, because it assailed the April 28, 2009 Resolution with respect to the tie-vote on the respondents Second Motion For Reconsideration. They pointed out that the Motion To Amend Resolution Of April 28, 2009 etc. was filed on May 14, 2009, which was within the 15-day period from their receipt of the April 28, 2009 Resolution; thus, the entry of judgment had been prematurely made. They reiterated their arguments with respect to a tie-vote upon an issue of constitutionality. In the September 29, 2009 Resolution,4 the Court required the petitioners to comment on the Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of June 2, 2009 within 10 days from receipt. As directed, the petitioners filed their Comment Ad Cautelam With Motion to Expunge.

The respondents filed their Motion for Leave to File and to Admit Attached "Reply to Petitioners Comment Ad Cautelam With Motion to Expunge", together with the Reply. On November 17, 2009, the Court resolved to note the petitioners Comment Ad Cautelam With Motion to Expunge, to grant the respondents Motion for Leave to File and Admit Reply to Petitioners Comment Ad Cautelam with Motion to Expunge, and to note the respondents Reply to Petitioners Comment Ad Cautelam with Motion to Expunge. On December 21, 2009, the Court, resolving the Motion To Amend Resolution Of April 28, 2009 etc. and voting anew on the Second Motion For Reconsideration in order to reach a concurrence of a majority, promulgated its Decision granting the motion and declaring the Cityhood Laws as constitutional,5 disposing thus: WHEREFORE, respondent LGUs Motion for Reconsideration dated June 2, 2009, their "Motion to Amend the Resolution of April 28, 2009 by Declaring Instead that Respondents Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of March 31, 2009 and Motion for Leave to File and to Admit Attached Second Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision Dated November 18, 2008 Remain Unresolved and to Conduct Further Proceedings," dated May 14, 2009, and their second Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision dated November 18, 2008 are GRANTED. The June 2, 2009, the March 31, 2009, and April 31, 2009 Resolutions are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The entry of judgment made on May 21, 2009 must accordingly be RECALLED. The instant consolidated petitions and petitions-in-intervention are DISMISSED. The cityhood laws, namely Republic Act Nos. 9389, 9390, 9391, 9392, 9393, 9394, 9398, 9404, 9405, 9407, 9408, 9409, 9434, 9435, 9436, and 9491 are declared VALID and CONSTITUTIONAL. SO ORDERED. On January 5, 2010, the petitioners filed an Ad Cautelam Motion for Reconsideration against the December 21, 2009 Decision.6 On the same date, the petitioners also filed a Motion to Annul Decision of 21 December 2009.7 On January 12, 2010, the Court directed the respondents to comment on the motions of the petitioners.8 On February 4, 2010, petitioner-intervenors City of Santiago, City of Legazpi, and City of Iriga filed their separate Manifestations with Supplemental Ad Cautelam Motions for Reconsideration.9 Similar manifestations with supplemental motions for reconsideration were filed by other petitioner-intervenors, specifically: City of Cadiz on February 15, 2010;10 City of Batangas on February 17, 2010;11 and City of Oroquieta on February 24, 2010.12 The Court required the adverse parties to comment on the motions.13 As directed, the respondents complied. On August 24, 2010, the Court issued its Resolution reinstating the November 18, 2008 Decision.14 On September 14, 2010, the respondents timely filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the "Resolution" Dated August 24, 2010.15 They followed this by filing on September 20, 2010 a Motion to Set "Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated August 24, 2010" for Hearing.16 On November 19, 2010, the petitioners sent in their Opposition [To the "Motion for Reconsideration of Resolution dated August 24, 2010"].17 On November 30, 2010,18 the Court noted, among others, the petitioners Opposition. On January 18, 2011,19 the Court denied the respondents Motion to Set "Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated August 24, 2010" for Hearing. Thereafter, on February 15, 2011, the Court issued the Resolution being now challenged. It can be gleaned from the foregoing that, as the June 2, 2009 Resolution clarified, the respondents Second Motion For Reconsideration was not a prohibited pleading in view of the Courts voting and acting on it having the effect of allowing the Second Motion For Reconsideration; and that when the respondents filed their Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of June 2, 2009 questioning the expunging of their Motion To Amend Resolution Of April 28, 2009 etc. (which had been filed within the 15-day period from receipt of the April 28, 2009 Resolution), the Court opted to act on the Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of June 2, 2009 by directing the adverse parties through its September 29, 2009 Resolution to comment. The same permitting effect occurred when the Court, by its November 17, 2009 Resolution, granted the respondents Motion for Leave to File and Admit Reply to Petitioners Comment Ad Cautelam with Motion to Expunge, and noted the attached Reply.

Moreover, by issuing the Resolutions dated September 29, 2009 and November 17, 2009, the Court: (a) rendered ineffective the tie-vote under the Resolution of April 28, 2009 and the ensuing denial of the Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of March 31, 2009 for lack of a majority to overturn; (b), re-opened the Decision of November 18, 2008 for a second look under reconsideration; and (c) lifted the directive that no further pleadings would be entertained. The Court in fact entertained and acted on the respondents Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of June 2, 2009. Thereafter, the Court proceeded to deliberate anew on the respondents Second Motion for Reconsideration and ended up with the promulgation of the December 21, 2009 Decision (declaring the Cityhood Laws valid and constitutional). It is also inaccurate for the petitioners to insist that the December 21, 2009 Decision overturned the November 18, 2008 Decision on the basis of the mere Reflections of the Members of the Court. To be sure, the Reflections were the legal opinions of the Members and formed part of the deliberations of the Court. The reference in the December 21, 2009 Decision to the Reflections pointed out that there was still a pending incident after the April 28, 2009 Resolution that had been timely filed within 15 days from its receipt,20 pursuant to Section 10, Rule 51,21 in relation to Section 1, Rule 52,22 of the Rules of Court. Again, the Court did act and deliberate upon this pending incident, leading to the issuance of the December 21, 2009 Decision (declaring the Cityhood Laws free from constitutional infirmity). It was thereafter that the Court rendered its August 24, 2010 Resolution (reinstating the November 18, 2008 Decision), to correct which the respondents Motion for Reconsideration of the "Resolution" Dated August 24, 2010 was filed. And, finally, the Court issued its February 15, 2011 Resolution, reversing and setting aside the August 24, 2010 Resolution. It is worth repeating that the actions taken herein were made by the Court en banc strictly in accordance with the Rules of Court and its internal procedures. There has been no irregularity attending or tainting the proceedings. It also relevant to state that the Court has frequently disencumbered itself under extraordinary circumstances from the shackles of technicality in order to render just and equitable relief.23 On whether the principle of immutability of judgments and bar by res judicata apply herein, suffice it to state that the succession of the events recounted herein indicates that the controversy about the 16 Cityhood Laws has not yet been resolved with finality. As such, the operation of the principle of immutability of judgments did not yet come into play. For the same reason is an adherence to the doctrine of res judicata not yet warranted, especially considering that the precedential ruling for this case needed to be revisited and set with certainty and finality. II. Substantive Issues The petitioners reiterate their position that the Cityhood Laws violate Section 6 and Section 10 of Article X of the Constitution, the Equal Protection Clause, and the right of local governments to a just share in the national taxes. The Court differs. Congress clearly intended that the local government units covered by the Cityhood Laws be exempted from the coverage of R.A. No. 9009. The apprehensions of the then Senate President with respect to the considerable disparity between the income requirement of P20 million under the Local Government Code (LGC) prior to its amendment, and the P100 million under the amendment introduced by R.A. No. 9009 were definitively articulated in his interpellation of Senator Pimentel during the deliberations on Senate Bill No. 2157. The then Senate President was cognizant of the fact that there were municipalities that then had pending conversion bills during the 11th Congress prior to the adoption of Senate Bill No. 2157 as R.A. No. 9009,24 including the municipalities covered by the Cityhood Laws. It is worthy of mention that the pertinent deliberations on Senate Bill No. 2157 occurred on October 5, 2000 while the 11th Congress was in session, and the conversion bills were then pending in the Senate. Thus, the responses of Senator Pimentel made it obvious that R.A. No. 9009 would not apply to the conversion bills then pending deliberation in the Senate during the 11th Congress. R.A. No. 9009 took effect on June 30, 2001, when the 12th Congress was incipient. By reason of the clear legislative intent to exempt the municipalities covered by the conversion bills pending during the 11th Congress, the House of Representatives adopted Joint Resolution No. 29, entitled Joint Resolution to Exempt Certain Municipalities Embodied in Bills Filed in Congress before June 30, 2001 from the coverage of Republic Act No. 9009. However, the Senate failed to act on Joint Resolution No. 29. Even so, the House of Representatives readopted Joint Resolution No. 29 as

Joint Resolution No. 1 during the 12th Congress,25 and forwarded Joint Resolution No. 1 to the Senate for approval. Again, the Senate failed to approve Joint Resolution No. 1. At this juncture, it is worthwhile to consider the manifestation of Senator Pimentel with respect to Joint Resolution No. 1, to wit: MANIFESTATION OF SENATOR PIMENTEL House Joint Resolution No. 1 seeks to exempt certain municipalities seeking conversion into cities from the requirement that they must have at least P100 million in income of locally generated revenue, exclusive of the internal revenue share that they received from the central government as required under Republic Act No. 9009. The procedure followed by the House is questionable, to say the least. The House wants the Senate to do away with the income requirement of P100 million so that, en masse, the municipalities they want exempted could now file bills specifically converting them into cities. The reason they want the Senate to do it first is that Cong. Dodo Macias, chair of the House Committee on Local Governments, I am told, will not entertain any bill for the conversion of municipalities into cities unless the issue of income requirement is first hurdled. The House leadership therefore wants to shift the burden of exempting certain municipalities from the income requirement to the Senate rather than do it itself. That is most unusual because, in effect, the House wants the Senate to pass a blanket resolution that would qualify the municipalities concerned for conversion into cities on the matter of income alone. Then, at a later date, the House would pass specific bills converting the municipalities into cities. However, income is not only the requirement for municipalities to become cities. There are also the requirements on population and land area. In effect, the House wants the Senate to tackle the qualification of the municipalities they want converted into cities piecemeal and separately, first is the income under the joint resolution, then the other requirements when the bills are file to convert specific municipalities into cities. To repeat, this is a most unusual manner of creating cities. My respectful suggestion is for the Senate to request the House to do what they want to do regarding the applications of certain municipalities to become cities pursuant to the requirements of the Local Government Code. If the House wants to exempt certain municipalities from the requirements of the Local Government Code to become cities, by all means, let them do their thing. Specifically, they should act on specific bills to create cities and cite the reasons why the municipalities concerned are qualified to become cities. Only after the House shall have completed what they are expected to do under the law would it be proper for the Senate to act on specific bills creating cities. In other words, the House should be requested to finish everything that needs to be done in the matter of converting municipalities into cities and not do it piecemeal as they are now trying to do under the joint resolution. In my long years in the Senate, this is the first time that a resort to this subterfuge is being undertaken to favor the creation of certain cities. I am not saying that they are not qualified. All I am saying is, if the House wants to pass and create cities out of certain municipalities, by all means let them do that. But they should do it following the requirements of the Local Government Code and, if they want to make certain exceptions, they can also do that too. But they should not use the Senate as a ploy to get things done which they themselves should do. Incidentally, I have recommended this mode of action verbally to some leaders of the House. Had they followed the recommendation, for all I know, the municipalities they had envisioned to be covered by House Joint Resolution No. 1 would, by now if not all, at least some have been converted into cities. House Joint Resolution No. 1, the House, in effect, caused the delay in the approval in the applications for cityhood of the municipalities concerned. Lastly, I do not have an amendment to House Joint Resolution No. 1. What I am suggesting is for the Senate to request the House to follow the procedure outlined in the Local Government Code which has been respected all through the years. By doing so, we uphold the rule of law and minimize the possibilities of power play in the approval of bills converting municipalities into cities.26 Thereafter, the conversion bills of the respondents were individually filed in the House of Representatives, and were all unanimously and

favorably voted upon by the Members of the House of Representatives.27 The bills, when forwarded to the Senate, were likewise unanimously approved by the Senate.28 The acts of both Chambers of Congress show that the exemption clauses ultimately incorporated in the Cityhood Laws are but the express articulations of the clear legislative intent to exempt the respondents, without exception, from the coverage of R.A. No. 9009. Thereby, R.A. No. 9009, and, by necessity, the LGC, were amended, not by repeal but by way of the express exemptions being embodied in the exemption clauses. The petitioners further contend that the new income requirement of P100 million from locally generated sources is not arbitrary because it is not difficult to comply with; that there are several municipalities that have already complied with the requirement and have, in fact, been converted into cities, such as Sta. Rosa in Laguna (R.A. No 9264), Navotas (R.A. No. 9387) and San Juan (R.A. No. 9388) in Metro Manila, Dasmarias in Cavite (R.A. No. 9723), and Bian in Laguna (R.A. No. 9740); and that several other municipalities have supposedly reached the income of P100 million from locally generated sources, such as Bauan in Batangas, Mabalacat in Pampanga, and Bacoor in Cavite. The contention of the petitioners does not persuade. As indicated in the Resolution of February 15, 2011, fifty-nine (59) existing cities had failed as of 2006 to post an average annual income of P100 million based on the figures contained in the certification dated December 5, 2008 by the Bureau of Local Government. The large number of existing cities, virtually 50% of them, still unable to comply with the P100 million threshold income five years after R.A. No. 9009 took effect renders it fallacious and probably unwarranted for the petitioners to claim that the P100 million income requirement is not difficult to comply with. In this regard, the deliberations on Senate Bill No. 2157 may prove enlightening, thus: Senator Osmea III. And could the gentleman help clarify why a municipality would want to be converted into a city? Senator Pimentel. There is only one reason, Mr. President, and it is not hidden. It is the fact that once converted into a city, the municipality will have roughly more than three times the share that it would be receiving over the internal revenue allotment than it would have if it were to remain a municipality. So more or less three times or more. Senator Osmea III. Is it the additional funding that they will be able to enjoy from a larger share from the internal revenue allocations? Senator Pimentel. Yes, Mr. President. Senator Osmea III. Now, could the gentleman clarify, Mr. President, why in the original Republic Act No. 7160, known as the Local Government Code of 1991, such a wide gap was made between a municipalitywhat a municipality would earn and a city? Because essentially, to a persons mind, even with this new requirement, if approved by Congress, if a municipality is earning P100 million and has a population of more than 150,000 inhabitants but has less than 100 square kilometers, it would not qualify as a city. Senator Pimentel. Yes. Senator Osmea III. Now would that not be quite arbitrary on the part of the municipality? Senator Pimentel. In fact, Mr. President, the House version restores the "or". So, this is a matter that we can very well take up as a policy issue. The chair of the committee does not say that we should, as we know, not listen to arguments for the restoration of the word "or" in the population or territorial requirement. Senator Osmea III. Mr. President, my point is that, I agree with the gentlemans "and", but perhaps we should bring down the area. There are certainly very crowded places in this country that are less than 10,000 hectares100 square kilometers is 10,000 hectares. There might only be 9,000 hectares or 8,000 hectares. And it would be unfair if these municipalities already earning P100,000,000 in locally generated funds and have a population of over 150,000 would not be qualified because of the simple fact that the physical area does not cover 10,000 hectares. Senator Pimentel. Mr. President, in fact, in Metro Manila there are any number of municipalities. San Juan is a specific example which, if we apply the present requirements, would not qualify: 100 square kilometers and a population of not less than 150,000. But my reply to that, Mr. President, is that they do not have to become a city?

Senator Osmea III. Because of the income. Senator Pimentel. But they are already earning a lot, as the gentleman said. Otherwise, the danger here, if we become lax in the requirements, is the metropolis-located local governments would have more priority in terms of funding because they would have more qualifications to become a city compared to far-flung areas in Mindanao or in the Cordilleras, or whatever. Therefore, I think we should not probably ease up on the requirements. Maybe we can restore the word "or" so that if they do not have the 100 square kilometers of territory, then if they qualify in terms of population and income, that would be all right, Mr. President. Senator Osmea III. Mr. President, I will not belabor the point at this time. I know that the distinguished gentleman is considering several amendments to the Local Government Code. Perhaps this is something that could be further refined at a later time, with his permission. So I would like to thank the gentleman for his graciousness in answering our questions. Senator Pimentel. I also thank the gentleman, Mr. President.29 The Court takes note of the fact that the municipalities cited by the petitioners as having generated the threshold income of P100 million from local sources, including those already converted into cities, are either in Metro Manila or in provinces close to Metro Manila. In comparison, the municipalities covered by the Cityhood Laws are spread out in the different provinces of the Philippines, including the Cordillera and Mindanao regions, and are considerably very distant from Metro Manila. This reality underscores the danger the enactment of R.A. No. 9009 sought to prevent, i.e., that "the metropolislocated local governments would have more priority in terms of funding because they would have more qualifications to become a city compared to the far-flung areas in Mindanao or in the Cordilleras, or whatever," actually resulting from the abrupt increase in the income requirement. Verily, this result is antithetical to what the Constitution and LGC have nobly envisioned in favor of countryside development and national growth. Besides, this result should be arrested early, to avoid the unwanted divisive effect on the entire country due to the local government units closer to the National Capital Region being afforded easier access to the bigger share in the national coffers than other local government units. There should also be no question that the local government units covered by the Cityhood Laws belong to a class of their own. They have proven themselves viable and capable to become component cities of their respective provinces. They are and have been centers of trade and commerce, points of convergence of transportation, rich havens of agricultural, mineral, and other natural resources, and flourishing tourism spots. In his speech delivered on the floor of the Senate to sponsor House Joint Resolution No. 1, Senator Lim recognized such unique traits,30 viz: It must be noted that except for Tandag and Lamitan, which are both second-class municipalities in terms of income, all the rest are categorized by the Department of Finance as first-class municipalities with gross income of at least P70 million as per Commission of Audit Report for 2005. Moreover, Tandag and Lamitan, together with Borongan, Catbalogan, and Tabuk, are all provincial capitals. The more recent income figures of the 12 municipalities, which would have increased further by this time, indicate their readiness to take on the responsibilities of cityhood. Moreover, the municipalities under consideration are leading localities in their respective provinces. Borongan, Catbalogan, Tandag, Batac and Tabuk are ranked number one in terms of income among all the municipalities in their respective provinces; Baybay and Bayugan are number two; Bogo and Lamitan are number three; Carcar, number four; and Tayabas, number seven. Not only are they pacesetters in their respective provinces, they are also among the frontrunners in their regions Baybay, Bayugan and Tabuk are number two income-earners in Regions VIII, XIII, and CAR, respectively; Catbalogan and Batac are number three in Regions VIII and I, respectively; Bogo, number five in Region VII; Borongan and Carcar are both number six in Regions VIII and VII, respectively. This simply shows that these municipalities are viable. Petitioner League of Cities argues that there exists no issue with respect to the cityhood of its member cities, considering that they became cities in full compliance with the criteria for conversion at the time of their creation. The Court considers the argument too sweeping. What we pointed out was that the previous income requirement of P20 million was definitely not insufficient to provide the essential government facilities, services, and special functions vis--vis the population of a component city. We also stressed that the increased income requirement of P100 million was not the

only conclusive indicator for any municipality to survive and remain viable as a component city. These observations were unerringly reflected in the respective incomes of the fifty-nine (59) members of the League of Cities that have still failed, remarkably enough, to be compliant with the new requirement of the P100 million threshold income five years after R.A. No. 9009 became law. Undoubtedly, the imposition of the income requirement of P100 million from local sources under R.A. No. 9009 was arbitrary. When the sponsor of the law chose the specific figure of P100 million, no research or empirical data buttressed the figure. Nor was there proof that the proposal took into account the after-effects that were likely to arise. As already mentioned, even the danger the passage of R.A. No. 9009 sought to prevent might soon become a reality. While the Constitution mandates that the creation of local government units must comply with the criteria laid down in the LGC, it cannot be justified to insist that the Constitution must have to yield to every amendment to the LGC despite such amendment imminently producing effects contrary to the original thrusts of the LGC to promote autonomy, decentralization, countryside development, and the concomitant national growth. Moreover, if we were now to adopt the stringent interpretation of the Constitution the petitioners are espousing, we may have to apply the same restrictive yardstick against the recently converted cities cited by the petitioners, and find two of them whose conversion laws have also to be struck down for being unconstitutional. The two laws are R.A. No. 938731 and R.A. No. 9388,32 respectively converting the municipalities of San Juan and Navotas into highly urbanized cities. A cursory reading of the laws indicates that there is no indication of compliance with the requirements imposed by the LGC, for, although the two local government units concerned presumably complied with the income requirement of P50 million under Section 452 of the LGC and the income requirement of P100 million under the amended Section 450 of the LGC, they obviously did not meet the requirements set forth under Section 453 of the LGC, to wit: Section 453. Duty to Declare Highly Urbanized Status.It shall be the duty of the President to declare a city as highly urbanized within thirty (30) days after it shall have met the minimum requirements prescribed in the immediately preceding Section, upon proper application therefor and ratification in a plebiscite by the qualified voters therein. Indeed, R.A. No. 9387 and R.A. No. 9388 evidently show that the President had not classified San Juan and Navotas as highly urbanized cities upon proper application and ratification in a plebiscite by the qualified voters therein. A further perusal of R.A. No. 9387 reveals that San Juan did not qualify as a highly urbanized city because it had a population of only 125,558, contravening the required minimum population of 200,000 under Section 452 of the LGC. Such nonqualification as a component city was conceded even by Senator Pimentel during the deliberations on Senate Bill No. 2157. The petitioners contention that the Cityhood Laws violated their right to a just share in the national taxes is not acceptable. In this regard, it suffices to state that the share of local government units is a matter of percentage under Section 285 of the LGC, not a specific amount. Specifically, the share of the cities is 23%, determined on the basis of population (50%), land area (25%), and equal sharing (25%). This share is also dependent on the number of existing cities, such that when the number of cities increases, then more will divide and share the allocation for cities. However, we have to note that the allocation by the National Government is not a constant, and can either increase or decrease. With every newly converted city becoming entitled to share the allocation for cities, the percentage of internal revenue allotment (IRA) entitlement of each city will decrease, although the actual amount received may be more than that received in the preceding year. That is a necessary consequence of Section 285 and Section 286 of the LGC. As elaborated here and in the assailed February 15, 2011 Resolution, the Cityhood Laws were not violative of the Constitution and the LGC. The respondents are thus also entitled to their just share in the IRA allocation for cities. They have demonstrated their viability as component cities of their respective provinces and are developing continuously, albeit slowly, because they had previously to share the IRA with about 1,500 municipalities. With their conversion into component cities, they will have to share with only around 120 cities. Local government units do not subsist only on locally generated income, but also depend on the IRA to support their development. They can spur their own developments and thereby realize their great potential of encouraging trade and commerce in the far-flung regions of the country. Yet their potential will effectively be stunted if those already earning more will still receive a bigger share from the national coffers, and if commercial activity will be more or less concentrated only in and near Metro Manila. III. Conclusion

We should not ever lose sight of the fact that the 16 cities covered by the Cityhood Laws not only had conversion bills pending during the 11th Congress, but have also complied with the requirements of the LGC prescribed prior to its amendment by R.A. No. 9009. Congress undeniably gave these cities all the considerations that justice and fair play demanded. Hence, this Court should do no less by stamping its imprimatur to the clear and unmistakable legislative intent and by duly recognizing the certain collective wisdom of Congress. WHEREFORE, the Ad Cautelam Motion for Reconsideration (of the Decision dated 15 February 2011) is denied with finality. SO ORDERED. LUCAS P. BERSAMIN Associate Justice WE CONCUR: RENATO C. CORONA Chief Justice ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Associate Justice DIOSDADO M. PERALTA Associate Justice ROBERTO A. ABAD Associate Justice JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ Associate Justice CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice ARTURO D. BRION Associate Justice MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO Associate Justice MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. Associate Justice JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA Associate Justice

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO Associate Justice CERTIFICATION Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court. RENATO C. CORONA Chief Justice

Footnotes
1

Rollo (G.R. No. 176951), Vol. 5, p. 4483. G.R. No. 174153, October 25, 2006, 505 SCRA 160, 290. Rollo (G.R. No. 176951), Vol. 5, pp. 4667-4668 (bold underscoring added for emphasis).

Id., p. 4880. Rollo (G.R. No. 176951), Vol. 6, p. 5081. Id., pp. 5106-5238. Id., pp. 5139-5160. Id., p. 5161. Id., pp. 5196-5200, 5202-5210, & 5212-5217, respectively. Id., pp. 5346-5351. Id., pp. 5365-5369. Id., pp. 5420-5427.

10

11

12

13

Id., p. 5342 (February 9, 2010 Resolution Re: Manifestations & Motions of the Cities of Santiago, Legazpi, & Iriga); p. 5353 (February 16, 2010 Resolution Re: Manifestation & Motion of Cadiz City); p. 5397 (February 23, 2010 Resolution Re: Manifestation & Motion of Batangas City); and p. 5536 (March 2, 2010 Resolution Re: Manifestation & Motion of Oroquieta City).
14

Id., pp. 5846-5861. Id., pp. 5879-5849. Id., pp.6369-6379. Id., pp. 6388-6402. Id., p. 5998. Id., p. 6338.

15

16

17

18

19

20

The incident was the Motion To Amend Resolution Of April 28, 2009 By Declaring Instead That Respondents "Motion for Reconsideration Of the Resolution Of March 31, 2009" And "Motion For Leave To File, And To Admit Attached Second Motion For Reconsideration Of The Decision Dated November 18, 2008 Remain Unresolved And To Conduct Further Proceedings Thereon.
21

Section 10. Entry of judgments and final resolutions.If no appeal or motion for new trial or reconsideration is filed within the time provided in these Rules, the judgment or final resolution shall forthwith be entered by the clerk in the book of entries of judgments. The date when the judgment or final resolution becomes executory shall be deemed as the date of its entry. The record shall contain the dispositive part of the judgment or final resolution and shall be signed by the clerk, with a certificate that such judgment or final resolution has become final and executory.
22

Section 1. Period for filing.A party may file a motion for reconsideration of a judgment or final resolution within fifteen (15) days from notice thereof, with proof of service on the adverse party.
23

See Manotok IV v. Heirs of Barque, G.R. Nos. 162335 & 162605, December 18, 2008, 574 SCRA 468; Province of North Cotabato v. Government of the Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain (GRP), G.R. Nos. 183591, 183752, 183893, 183951, and 183962, October 14, 2008, 568 SCRA 402; Manalo v. Calderon, G.R. No. 178920, October 15, 2007, 536 SCRA 290; David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006, 489 SCRA 160; and Province of Batangas v. Romulo, G.R. No. 152774, May 27, 2004, 429 SCRA 736.
24

June 1998-June 2001.

25

June 2001-June 2004.

26

Journal, Senate, 13th Congress, pp. 651-652 (November 7, 2006); see rollo (G.R. No. 176951), Vol. 5, pp. 3783-3784 (bold underscoring added for emphasis).
27

Certification dated December 6, 2008, issued by the House of Representatives Plenary Affairs Bureau signed by Atty. Cesar S. Pareja, Executive Director of the House of Representatives Plenary Affairs Bureau and noted by Atty. Marilyn B. Barua-Yap, Secretary General of the House of Representatives; rollo (G.R. No. 176951), Vol. 5, pp. 3799-3801.
28

"Legislative History" of House Bill No. (HBN) 5973 (Republic Act [R.A.] No. 9389); HBN-5997 (R.A. No. 9390); HBN-5998 (R.A. No. 9391); HBN-5999 (R.A. No. 9392); HBN-6001 (R.A. No. 9393); HBN-5990 (R.A. No. 9394); HBN-5930 (R.A. No. 9398); HBN-6005 (R.A. No. 9404); HBN-6023 (R.A. No. 9408); HBN-6024 (R.A. No. 9409); HBN-5992 (R.A. No. 9434); HBN-6003 (R.A. No. 9435); HBN-6002 (R.A. No. 9436); and HBN-6041 (R.A. No. 9491); Senate Legislative Information System, last accessed on March 25, 2011 at http://202.57.33.10/plis/Public/PB_leghist.asp.
29

II Record, Senate, 13th Congress, p. 167 (October 5, 2000); rollo (G.R. No. 176951), Vol. 5, p. 3768. Journal, Senate, 13th Congress, p. 1240 (January 29, 2007); rollo, (G.R. No. 176951), Vol. 5, p. 3775.

30

31

An Act Converting the Municipality of San Juan into a Highly Urbanized City to be Known as the City of San Juan.
32

An Act Converting the Municipality of Navotas into a Highly Urbanized City to be Known as the City of Navotas.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

DISSENTING OPINION CARPIO, J.: This Court has made history with its repeated flip-flopping1 in this case. On 18 November 2008, the Court rendered a decision declaring unconstitutional the 16 Cityhood Laws. The decision became final after the denial of two motions for reconsideration filed by the 16 municipalities. An Entry of Judgment was made on 21 May 2009. The decision was executed (1) when the Department of Budget and Management issued LBM (Local Budget Memorandum) No. 61 on 30 June 2009, providing for the final Internal Revenue Allotment for 2009 due to the reversion of 16 newly created cities to municipalities; and (2) when the Commission on Elections issued Resolution No. 8670 on 22 September 2009, directing that voters in the 16 municipalities shall vote not as cities but as municipalities in the 10 May 2010 elections. In addition, fourteen Congressmen, having jurisdiction over the 16 respondent municipalities, filed House Bill 6303 seeking to amend Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 9009. The proposed amendment was intended to correct the infirmities in the Cityhood Laws as cited by this Court in its 18 November 2008 Decision.2 Subsequently, the Court rendered three more decisions: (1) 21 December 2009, declaring the Cityhood Laws constitutional; (2) 24 August 2010, declaring the Cityhood Laws unconstitutional; and (3) 15 February 2011 declaring the Cityhood Laws constitutional. Clearly, there were three reversals or flip-flops in this case. In the Resolution of 15 February 2011, the majority upheld the constitutionality of the 16 Cityhood Laws, declaring that (1) the Cityhood Laws do not violate Section 10, Article X of the Constitution; and (2) the Cityhood Laws do not violate Section 6, Article X and the equal protection clause of the Constitution. I reiterate my unwavering position from the start that the 16 Cityhood Laws are unconstitutional. I. The Cityhood Laws are laws other than the Local Government Code.

In sustaining the constitutionality of the 16 Cityhood Laws, the majority ruled in the Resolution of 15 February 2011 that "in effect, the Cityhood Laws amended RA No. 9009 through the exemption clauses found therein. Since the Cityhood Laws explicitly exempted the concerned municipalities from the amendatory RA No. 9009, such Cityhood Laws are, therefore, also amendments to the LGC itself." In the Resolution denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration, the majority stated that "RA 9009, and, by necessity, the LGC, were amended, x x x by way of the express exemptions embodied in the exemption clauses." This is egregious error. Nowhere in the plain language of the Cityhood Laws can this interpretation be discerned. Neither the title nor the body of the Cityhood Laws sustains such conclusion. Simply put, there is absolutely nothing in the Cityhood Laws to support the majority decision that the Cityhood Laws further amended the Local Government Code, which exclusively embodies the essential requirements for the creation of cities, including the conversion of a municipality into a city. An "amendment" refers to a change or modification to a previously adopted law.3 An amendatory law merely modifies a specific provision or provisions of a previously adopted law.4 Indisputably, an amendatory law becomes an integral part of the law it seeks to amend. On the contrary, each Cityhood Law contains a uniformly worded Separability Clause which expressly states: Separability Clause. - If, for any reason or reasons, any part or provision of this Charter shall be held unconstitutional, invalid or inconsistent with the Local Government Code of 1991, the other parts or provisions hereof which are not affected thereby shall continue to be in full force and effect. Moreover, in cases where this Charter is silent or unclear, the pertinent provisions of the Local Government Code shall govern, if so provided therein.5 (Emphasis supplied) Each Cityhood Law states that if any of its provisions is "inconsistent with the Local Government Code," the other consistent provisions "shall continue to be in full force and effect." The clear and inescapable implication is that any provision in each Cityhood Law that is "inconsistent with the Local Government Code" has no force and effect in short, void and ineffective. Each Cityhood Law expressly and unequivocally acknowledges the superiority of the Local Government Code, and that in case of conflict, the Local Government Code shall prevail over the Cityhood Law. Clearly, the Cityhood Laws do not amend the Local Government Code, and the Legislature never intended the Cityhood Laws to amend the Local Government Code. The clear intent and express language of the Cityhood Laws is for these laws to conform to the Local Government Code and not the other way around. To repeat, every Cityhood Law unmistakably provides that any provision in the Cityhood Law that is inconsistent with the Local Government Code is void. It follows that the Cityhood Laws cannot be construed to authorize the creation of cities that have not met the prevailing P100 million income requirement prescribed without exception in the Local Government Code. Moreover, Congress, in providing in the Separability Clause that the Local Government Code shall prevail over the Cityhood Laws, treats the Cityhood Laws as separate and distinct from the Local Government Code. In other words, the Cityhood Laws do not form integral parts of the Local Government Code but are separate and distinct laws. There is therefore no question that the Cityhood Laws are laws other than the Local Government Code. As such, the Cityhood Laws cannot stipulate an exception from the requirements for the creation of cities, prescribed in the Local Government Code, without running afoul of the explicit mandate of Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution. This constitutional provision reads: No province, city, municipality, or barangay shall be created, divided, merged, abolished or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected. (Emphasis supplied) The Constitution is clear. The creation of local government units must follow the criteria established in the Local Government Code itself and not in any other law. There is only one Local Government Code.6 To avoid discrimination and ensure uniformity and equality, the Constitution expressly requires Congress to stipulate in the Local Government Code itself all the criteria necessary for the creation of a city, including the conversion of a municipality into a city. Congress cannot write such criteria in any other law, like the Cityhood Laws.

II. The increased income requirement of P100 million is neither arbitrary nor difficult to comply. The majority resolution of 15 February 2011 states that "the imposition of the P100 million average annual income requirement for the creation of component cities was arbitrarily made." The majority resolution further declares: "x x x there was no evidence or empirical data, such as inflation rates, to support the choice of this amount. The imposition of a very high income requirement of P100 million, increased from P20 million, was simply to make it extremely difficult for municipalities to become component cities." This is glaring error. In stating that there is no evidence to support the increased income requirement, the majority is requiring the Legislature, the sole law-making body under the Constitution, to provide evidence justifying the economic rationale, like inflation rates, for the increase in income requirement. The Legislature, in enacting RA No. 9009, is not required by the Constitution to show the courts data like inflation figures to support the increased income requirement. Besides, even assuming the inflation rate is zero, this Court cannot invalidate the increase in income requirement on such ground. A zero inflation rate does not bar the Legislature from increasing the income requirement to convert a municipality into a city, or increasing taxes or tax rates, or increasing capital requirements for businesses. This Court should not venture into areas of analyses obviously beyond its competence. As long as the increased income requirement is not impossible to comply, such increase is a policy determination involving the wisdom of the law, which exclusively lies within the province of the Legislature. When the Legislature enacts laws increasing taxes, tax rates, or capital requirements for businesses, the Court cannot refuse to apply such laws on the ground that there is no economic justification for such increases. Economic, political or social justifications for the enactment of laws go into the wisdom of the law, outside the purview of judicial review. This Court cannot refuse to apply the law unless the law violates a specific provision of the Constitution. There is plainly nothing unconstitutional in increasing the income requirement from P20 million to P100 million because such increase does not violate any express or implied provision of the Constitution. The majority declares that the P100 million income requirement under RA No. 9009 was imposed "simply to make it extremely difficult for the municipalities to become component cities." In short, the majority is saying that the Legislature, out of sheer whim or spite at municipalities, increased the income requirement from P20 million to P100 million. Thus, the majority applied the P20 million income requirement under the repealed law, not the P100 million income requirement under the prevailing law. Yet, the majority does not state that the P100 million income requirement is unconstitutional. The majority simply refuses to apply the prevailing law, choosing instead to apply a repealed law. There is neither law nor logic in the majority decision. The majority's conclusion that the Legislature increased the income requirement from P20 million to P100 million "simply to make it difficult for the municipalities to become component cities" is not only unfair to the Legislature, it is also grossly erroneous. Contrary to the majority's baseless conclusion, the increased income requirement of P100 million is not at all difficult to comply. As pointed out by petitioner, the cities of San Juan7 and Navotas,8 which met the P100 million income requirement, were created at the same time as the enactment of the Cityhood Laws by the same 13th Congress.9 Prior to this, the City of Sta. Rosa, which also met the P100 million income requirement, was created through Republic Act No. 9264.10 Subsequently, the cities of Dasmarias in Cavite11 and Bian in Laguna12 were created in full compliance with the P100 million income criterion. Further disproving the majority's erroneous conclusion, an additional twenty-one (21) municipalities have satisfied the P100 million income requirement for the creation of cities.13 Accordingly, petitioner League of Cities has endorsed the cityhood application of these 21 municipalities.14 These municipalities are: Cabuyao and San Pedro (Laguna) Cainta, Taytay, and Binangonan (Rizal) Bacoor, Gen. Trias, Imus, Carmona, and Silang (Cavite) San Pedro (Laguna) Pantabangan (Nueva Ecija)

 Calaca, Sto. Tomas, Bauan and Nasugbu ( Batangas) Mauban in (Quezon) Marilao, Sta. Maria and Norzagaray (Bulacan) Limay (Bataan) Compliance by these municipalities with the P100 million income requirement underscores the fact that the P100 million income requirement is not difficult to comply at all, contrary to the baseless and speculative conclusion in the majority decision. In short, the majority decision is based on patently and undeniably false and erroneous premises. Indisputably, right after the enactment of RA No. 9009, Congress passed laws converting municipalities into cities using the new P100 million income requirement. Subsequently, Congress enacted the 16 Cityhood Laws using the old P20 million income requirement. Thereafter, Congress again passed laws converting additional municipalities into cities using the P100 million income requirement. The 16 Cityhood Laws stick out like a sore thumb, starkly showing an obvious violation of the equal protection clause. The Cityhood Laws create distinctly privileged cities with only P20 million annual income, discriminating against cities with P100 million annual income created before and after the enactment of the Cityhood Laws. This kind of discrimination is precisely what Section 10, Article X of the Constitution seeks to prohibit when it commands that "no x x x city x x x shall be created x x x except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code." The majority harp on the fact that 59 existing cities had failed as of 2006 to post an average annual income of P100 million. Suffice it to state that there is no Constitutional or statutory requirement for the 59 existing cities to comply with the P100 million income requirement. Obviously, these cities were already cities prior to the amendment of the Local Government Code providing for the increased income requirement of P100 million. In other words, at the time of their creation, these cities have complied with the criteria prescribed under the old Local Government Code for the creation of cities, and thus are not required to comply with the P100 million income requirement of the prevailing Local Government Code. It is utterly misplaced and grossly erroneous to cite the "non-compliance" by the 59 existing cities with the increased income requirement of P100 million to conclude that the P100 million income requirement is arbitrary and difficult to comply. Moreover, as stated, the majority do not find the increased income requirement of P100 million unconstitutional or unlawful. Unless the P100 million income requirement violates a provision of the Constitution or a law, such requirement for the creation of a city must be strictly complied with. Any local government unit applying for cityhood, whether located in or outside the metropolis and whether within the National Capital Region or not, must meet the P100 million income requirement prescribed by the prevailing Local Government Code. There is absolutely nothing unconstitutional or unlawful if the P100 million income requirement is easily complied with by local government units within or near the National Capital Region. The majority's groundless and unfair discrimination against these metropolis-located local government units must necessarily fail. Further, that San Juan and Navotas had not allegedly been classified by the President as highly urbanized cities, pursuant to Section 453 of the Local Government Code, does not signify that these cities do not meet the P100 million income requirement. In fact, the majority concedes that it is presumed that San Juan and Navotas cities have complied with the P100 million income requirement. Besides, it is totally pointless to fault the cities of San Juan and Navotas for an unperformed duty of the President. III. The reduction of the share in the Internal Revenue Allotment will adversely affect the cities' economic situation. In the Resolution of 15 February 2011, the majority declared that petitioner's protest against the reduction of their just share in the Internal Revenue Allotment "all boils down to money," criticizing petitioners for overlooking the alleged need of respondent municipalities to become channels of economic growth in the countryside. The majority gravely loses sight of the fact that "the members of petitioner League of Cities are also in need of the same resources, and are responsible for development imperatives that need to be done for almost 40 million Filipinos, as compared to only 1.3 million Filipinos in the respondent municipalities." As pointed out by petitioner, "this is just about

equal to the population of Davao City, whose residents, on a per capita basis, receive less than half of what respondent municipalities' residents would receive if they become cities. Stated otherwise, for every peso that each Davaoeo receives, his counterpart in the respondent municipality will receive more than two pesos." In addition, the majority conveniently forgets that members of the LCP have more projects, more contractual obligations, and more employees than respondent municipalities. If their share in the Internal Revenue Allotment is unreasonably reduced, it is possible, even expected, that these cities may have to lay-off workers and abandon projects, greatly hampering, or worse paralyzing, the delivery of much needed public services in their respective territorial jurisdictions. Obviously, petitioner's protest does not boil down to money. It boils down to equity and fairness, rational allocation of scarce resources, and above all, faithful compliance with an express mandatory provision of the Constitution. No one should put a monetary value to compliance with an express command of the Constitution. Neither should any one, least of all this Court, disregard a patent violation of the Constitution just because the issue also involves monetary recovery. To do so would expose the stability of the Constitution to the corrosive vagaries of the marketplace. IV. Not substantial compliance, but outright violation of the Constitution. In his Concurring Opinion to the Resolution of 15 February 2011, Justice Roberto A. Abad stated, "These new cities have not altogether been exempted from the operation of the Local Government Code covering income requirement. They have been expressly made subject to the lower income requirement of the old code. There remains, therefore, substantial compliance with the provision of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution." This is gross error. There is a wide disparity an P80 million difference in the income requirement of P20 million under the old Local Government Code and the P100 million requirement under the prevailing Local Government Code. By any reasonable yardstick known to man since the dawn of civilization, compliance with the old income requirement, which is only 20% compliance with the new income requirement under the prevailing law, cannot be deemed "substantial compliance." It is like saying that those who obtain a general average of 20% in the Bar Examinations are in "substantial compliance" with the requirement for admission to the Bar where the highest possible score is 100%. RA No. 9009 amended the Local Government Code precisely because the criteria in the old Local Government Code were no longer sufficient. In short, RA No. 9009 repealed the old income requirement of P20 million, a requirement that no longer exists in our statute books. Compliance with the old income requirement is compliance with a repealed, dead, and non-existent law a totally useless, futile, and empty act. Worse, compliance with the old requirement is an outright violation of the Constitution which expressly commands that "no x x x city x x x shall be created x x x except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code." To repeat, applying what Justice Abad calls "the lower income requirement of the old code" is applying a repealed, dead, and non-existent law, which is exactly what the majority decision has done. The invocation here of "substantial compliance" of the Constitution reminds us of what Justice Calixto Zaldivar wrote in his dissenting opinion in Javellana v. Executive Secretary:15 "It would be indulging in sophistry to maintain that the voting in the citizens assemblies amounted to a substantial compliance with the requirements prescribed in Section 1 of Article XV of the 1935 Constitution." The same can be said in this case. A final point. There must be strict compliance with the express command of the Constitution that "no city x x x shall be created x x x except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code." Substantial compliance is insufficient because it will discriminate against all other cities that were created before and after the enactment of the Cityhood Laws in strict compliance with the criteria in the Local Government Code, as amended by RA No. 9009. The conversion of municipalities into new cities means an increase in the Internal Revenue Allotment of the former municipalities and a corresponding decrease in the Internal Revenue Allotment of all other existing cities. There must be strict, not only substantial, compliance with the constitutional requirement because the economic lifeline of existing cities may be seriously affected. Thus, the invocation of "substantial compliance" with constitutional requirements is clearly misplaced in this case. V. Conclusion

To repeat, the Constitution expressly requires Congress to stipulate in the Local Government Code itself all the criteria necessary for the creation of a city, including the conversion of a municipality into a city. To avoid discrimination and ensure uniformity and equality, such criteria cannot be embodied in any other law except the Local Government Code. In this case, the Cityhood Laws, which are unmistakably laws other than the Local Government Code, provide an exemption from the increased income requirement for the creation of cities under Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA No. 9009. Clearly, the Cityhood Laws contravene the letter and intent of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. Moreover, by express provision in the Separability Clause of each Cityhood Law, in case of inconsistency between the Cityhood Law and the Local Government Code, the latter shall prevail. Thus, the P100 million income requirement in the Local Government Code prevails over the P20 million income requirement under the Cityhood Laws.1avvphil Finally, this Court must be true to its sworn duty to uphold, defend, and protect the Constitution fully and faithfully, without "indulging in sophistry" or seeking refuge behind a patently dubious invocation of "substantial compliance" with the Constitution. Accordingly, I vote to GRANT the motion for reconsideration of the League of Cities of the Philippines. ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice

Footnotes
1

"Flip-flop" is defined as "an abrupt reversal of policy: the candidate flip-flopped on a number of issues" (The New Oxford Dictionary of English, 1998); "a sudden reversal (as of policy or strategy)" (Merriam-Webster Unabridged Dictionary Version 3.0, 2003); "A reversal, as of a stand or position; a foreign policy flip-flop" (American Heritage Talking Dictionary, 1997); "A decision to reverse an earlier decision" (WordWeb Pro Version 6.4, 2011); "an abrupt reversal of policy" (Oxford Dictionaries Online, accessed 4 April 2011).
2

http://www.congress.gov.ph/committees/commnews/commnews_det.php?newsid=1162

See Commissioner of Customs v. Court of Tax Appeals, G.R. Nos. 48886-88, 21 July 1993, where the Court stated that "The change in phraseology by amendment of a provision of law indicates a legislative intent to change the meaning of the provision from that it originally had."
4

See Agpalo, Ruben E., Statutory Construction, Second Edition, 1990, pp. 278-279, citing David v. Dancel, G.R. No. 21485, 25 July 1966, 17 SCRA 696 (1966).
5

Section 63, Republic Act No. 9389 (Baybay, Leyte); Section 61, Republic Act No. 9390 (Bogo, Cebu); Section 62, Republic Act No. 9391 (Catbalogan, Samar); Section 63, Republic Act No. 9392 (Tandag , Surigao del Sur); Section 63, Republic Act No. 9393 (Lamitan, Basilan); Section 61, Republic Act No. 9394 (Borongan, Samar); Section 63, Republic Act No. 9398 (Tayabas, Quezon); Section 57, Republic Act No. 9404 (Tabuk, Kalinga); Section 62, Republic Act No. 9405 (Bayugan, Agusan del Sur); Section 63, Republic Act No. 9407 (Batac, Ilocos Norte); Section 62, Republic Act No. 9408 (Mati, Davao Oriental); Section 62, Republic Act No. 9409 (Guihulngan, Negros Oriental); Section 61, Republic Act No. 9434 (Cabadbaran, Agusan del Norte); Section 64, Republic Act No. 9435 (El Salvador, Misamis Oriental); Section 63, Republic Act No. 9436 (Carcar, Cebu); and Section 65, Republic Act No. 9491 (Naga, Cebu).
6

Republic Act No. 7160, as amended. Through Republic Act No. 9388. Approved on 11 March 2007. Through Republic Act No. 9387. Approved on 10 March 2007.

Republic Act No. 9356, converting the municipality of Meycauayan, Bulacan into a city, was enacted on 2 October 2006 also during the 13th Congress.

10

Enacted 10 March 2004. Through Republic Act No. 9723. Approved on 15 October 2009. Through Republic Act No. 9740. Approved on 30 October 2009. http://www.philstar.com/Article.aspx?articleId=666748&publicationSubCategoryId=200 http://www.philstar.com/Article.aspx?articleId=666748&publicationSubCategoryId=200 G.R. No. L-36142, 31 March 1973.

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13

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The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

CONCURRING OPINION ABAD, J.: I fully concur in the resolution that Justice Lucas Bersamin wrote for the majority. I would want, however, to reply briefly to the charge that the Court has been guilty of "flip-plopping" in this case. Since the Court is a collegial body, the implication is that the majority of its members have collectively flip-flopped in their decisions. But the charge is unfair as it is baseless. The Court is not a living person whose decisions and actions are ruled by the whim of one mind. As a collegial body, the Court acts by consensus among its fifteen members. And total agreement is not always attainable. This is especially true where the political, social, or economic stakes involved are high or affect a great number of people and the views of the individual members are closely divided. The ideal is to have an early consensus among the Courts members in any given dispute. But, given the variety of their learning and experiences as former judges, trial lawyers, government counsels, academicians, and administrators, that is hardly an easy objective. Justices look at cases through different lenses. Disagreements in their conclusions can and often happen. Thus, they are forced to take a vote and the will of the majority prevails. It is when the votes among its members are closely divided as in this case that the decision of the Court could, on a motion for reconsideration, swing to the opposite side and, at times on a second motion for reconsideration, revert to the original side. The losers often malign this as flip-flopping by the Court. This of course is a lie in the sense that it tends to picture the Court as a silly, blundering, idiot which cannot make up its mind. The fact is that the shifts in the Courts decisions in this case were not at all orchestrated as the circumstances will show. They were the product of honest disagreements. Congress passed a number of laws converting sixteen municipalities into cities. The League of Cities assailed these laws as unconstitutional on the ground that the sixteen municipalities involved did not meet the P100 million minimum income requirement of the Local Government Code. For their part, the municipalities countered that their laws constituted valid legislative amendments of such requirement. The Court was divided in its original decision of November 18, 2008 in the case.1awphi1 A majority of six Justices voted to annul the laws, five members dissented, and four took no part (6-5-4), as follows: Majority (annul) 2. J. Carpio 3. J. Martinez 4. J. Morales Minority (uphold) No Part 1. C.J. Puno 2. J. Tinga 3. J. Nachura 4. J. Santiago (on leave) 2. J. Azcuna 3. J. Nazario 4. J. Reyes

1. J. Quisumbing 1. J. Corona

5. J. Velasco 6. J. Brion

5. J. De Castro

Notably, the majority won by just 1 vote. Their lead firmed up, however, with an increase of 2 votes when the Court took up the motion for reconsideration of the sixteen municipalities on March 31, 2009, thus: Majority (annul) 2. J. Carpio 3. J. Martinez 4. J. Morales 5. J. Tinga 6. J. Brion 7. J. Peralta In the above, Justice Velasco opted to leave the majority, but he was quickly replaced by J. Tinga, who decided to take part in the second voting, and Justice Peralta, a newcomer. The minority maintained its five votes because, although Justices Reyes and Azcuna retired, Justice Velasco who changed side and Justice Santiago who now took part replaced them. Chief Justice Puno and Justice Nachura stayed out of it. The vote was 7-5-2. But when on April 28, 2009 the Court acted on the sixteen municipalities second motion for reconsideration, the vote resulted on a tie. Thus: Even votes (annul) Even votes (uphold) 1. J. Carpio 2. J. Martinez 3. J. Morales 4. J. Tinga 5. J. Brion 6. J. Peralta 1. J. Santiago 2. J. Corona 3. J. Nazario 4. J. Velasco (on leave) 5. J. De Castro 6. J. Bersamin No Part 1. C.J. Puno 2. J. Nachura 3. J. Quisumbing Minority (uphold) No Part 1. C.J. Puno 2. J. Nachura 2. J. Corona 3. J. Nazario 4. J. Velasco 5. J. De Castro

1. J. Quisumbing 1. J. Santiago

In the above, the majority lost 1 vote owing to Justice Quisumbing going on leave. On the other hand, the minority gained 1 vote from Justice Bersamin, a newcomer. Three took no part, resulting in a vote of 6-6-3. The Court was divided in its interpretation of this 6-6 result. One group argued that the failure of the minority to muster a majority vote had the effect of maintaining the Courts last ruling. Some argued, however, that since the Constitution required a majority vote for declaring laws passed by Congress unconstitutional, the new voting restored the constitutionality of the subject laws. When a re-voting took place on December 21, 2009 to clear up the issue, the result shifted in favor of the sixteen municipalities, thus: Majority (uphold) Minority (annul) No Part 1. J. Corona 2. J. Velasco 3. J. De Castro 4. J. Bersamin 5. J. Abad 6. J. Villarama 1. J. Carpio 2. J. Morales 3. J. Brion 4. J. Peralta 1. C.J. Puno 2. J. Nachura 3. J. Del Castillo

In the above, two Justices, Tinga and Martinez, from the former majority retired, leaving their group just 4 votes. On the other hand, although two Justices, Santiago and Nazario, also retired from the former minority, two new members, Justices Abad and Villarama, joined their rank. Justice Del Castillo, a new member, did not take part like the rest. The new vote was 6-4-3 (2 vacancies), with the new majority voting to uphold the constitutionality of the laws that converted the sixteen municipalities into cities. But their victory was short-lived. When the Court voted on the motion for reconsideration of the losing League of Cities on August 24, 2010, three new members, Justices Perez, Mendoza, and Sereno, joined the Court. The majority shifted anew, thus: Majority (annul) Minority (uphold) No Part 1. J. Carpio 2. J. Morales 3. J. Brion 4. J. Peralta 5. J. Villarama 6. J. Mendoza 7. J. Sereno Notably, Justice Villarama changed his vote and joined the rank of those who opposed the conversion of the sixteen municipalities into cities. Two new Justices (Mendoza and Sereno) joined the new majority of seven that voted to annul the subject laws. On the other hand, although one of their members left for the other side, the 6 votes of the new minority remained because a new member, Justice Perez, joined it. The sixteen municipalities filed a motion for reconsideration of the new decision and voting took place on February 15, 2011. Justice Mendoza changed side and voted to uphold the constitutionality of the laws of the sixteen municipalities, resulting in a shift in the majority as follows: Majority (uphold) Minority (annul) No Part 1. J. Corona 2. J. Velasco 3. J. De Castro 4. J. Bersamin 5. J. Abad 6. J. Perez 7. J. Mendoza To recapitulate what took place in this case: One. The Justices did not decide to change their minds on a mere whim. The two sides filed motions for reconsideration in the case and the Justices had no options, considering their divided views, but perform their duties and vote on the same on the dates the matters came up for resolution. The Court is no orchestra with its members playing one tune under the baton of a maestro. They bring with them a diversity of views, which is what the Constitution prizes, for it is this diversity that filters out blind or dictated conformity. Two. Of twenty-three Justices who voted in the case at any of its various stages, twenty Justices stood by their original positions. They never reconsidered their views. Only three did so and not on the same occasion, showing no wholesale change of votes at any time. 1. J. Carpio 2. J. Morales 3. J. Brion 4. J. Peralta 5. J. Villarama 6. J. Sereno 1. J. Nachura 2. J. Del Castillo 1. C.J. Corona 2. J. Velasco 3. J. De Castro 4. J. Bersamin 5. J. Abad 6. J. Perez 1. J. Nachura 2. J. Del Castillo

Three. To flip-flop means to vote for one proposition at first (take a stand), shift to the opposite proposition upon the second vote (flip), and revert to his first position upon the third (flop). Not one of the twenty-three Justices flipped-flopped in his vote. Four. The three Justices who changed their votes did not do so in one direction. Justice Velasco changed his vote from a vote to annul to a vote to uphold; Justice Villarama from a vote to uphold to a vote to annul; and Justice Mendoza from a vote to annul to a vote to uphold. Not one of the three flipped-flopped since they never changed their votes again afterwards. Notably, no one can dispute the right of a judge, acting on a motion for reconsideration, to change his mind regarding the case. The rules are cognizant of the fact that human judges could err and that it would merely be fair and right for them to correct their perceived errors upon a motion for reconsideration. The three Justices who changed their votes had the right to do so. Five. Evidently, the voting was not a case of massive flip-flopping by the Justices of the Court. Rather, it was a case of tiny shifts in the votes, occasioned by the consistently slender margin that one view held over the other. This reflected the nearly even soundness of the opposing advocacies of the contending sides. Six. It did not help that in one year alone in 2009, seven Justices retired and were replaced by an equal number. It is such that the resulting change in the combinations of minds produced multiple shifts in the outcomes of the voting. No law or rule requires succeeding Justices to adopt the views of their predecessors. Indeed, preordained conformity is anathema to a democratic system. The charge of flip-flopping by the Court or its members is unfair.

G.R. No. 189793

April 7, 2010

SENATOR BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III and MAYOR JESSE ROBREDO, Petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS represented by its Chairman JOSE A.R. MELO and its Commissioners, RENE V. SARMIENTO, NICODEMO T. FERRER, LUCENITO N. TAGLE, ARMANDO VELASCO, ELIAS R. YUSOPH AND GREGORIO LARRAZABAL, Respondents. DECISION PEREZ, J.: This case comes before this Court by way of a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. In this original action, petitioners Senator Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III and Mayor Jesse Robredo, as public officers, taxpayers and citizens, seek the nullification as unconstitutional of Republic Act No. 9716, entitled "An Act Reapportioning the Composition of the First (1st) and Second (2nd) Legislative Districts in the Province of Camarines Sur and Thereby Creating a New Legislative District From Such Reapportionment." Petitioners consequently pray that the respondent Commission on Elections be restrained from making any issuances and from taking any steps relative to the implementation of Republic Act No. 9716.

Republic Act No. 9716 originated from House Bill No. 4264, and was signed into law by President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo on 12 October 2009. It took effect on 31 October 2009, or fifteen (15) days following its publication in the Manila Standard, a newspaper of general circulation.1 In substance, the said law created an additional legislative district for the Province of Camarines Sur by reconfiguring the existing first and second legislative districts of the province. Prior to Republic Act No. 9716, the Province of Camarines Sur was estimated to have a population of 1,693,821,2 distributed among four (4) legislative districts in this wise: District Municipalities/Cities Libmanan Minalabac Pamplona Pasacao San Fernando Canaman Camaligan Magarao Bombon Calabanga Sangay San Jose Tigaon Tinamba Siruma Buhi Bula Nabua Population 417,304

1st District Del Gallego Ragay Lupi Sipocot Cabusao 2nd District Gainza Milaor Naga Pili Ocampo 3rd District Caramoan Garchitorena Goa Lagonoy Presentacion 4th District Iriga Baao Balatan Bato

474,899

372,548

429,070

Following the enactment of Republic Act No. 9716, the first and second districts of Camarines Sur were reconfigured in order to create an additional legislative district for the province. Hence, the first district municipalities of Libmanan, Minalabac, Pamplona, Pasacao, and San Fernando were combined with the second district municipalities of Milaor and Gainza to form a new second legislative district. The following table3 illustrates the reapportionment made by Republic Act No. 9716: District 1st District Municipalities/Cities Del Gallego Ragay Lupi Sipocot Cabusao Libmanan Minalabac Pamplona Pasacao San Fernando Gainza Milaor Camaligan Magarao Bombon Calabanga Sangay San Jose Tigaon Tinamba Population 176,383

2nd District

276,777

3rd District (formerly 2nd District) Naga Pili Ocampo Canaman 4th District (formerly 3rd District) Caramoan Garchitorena Goa Lagonoy

439,043

372,548

Presentacion Siruma 5th District (formerly 4th District) Iriga Baao Balatan Bato Buhi Bula Nabua 429,070

Republic Act No. 9716 is a well-milled legislation. The factual recitals by both parties of the origins of the bill that became the law show that, from the filing of House Bill No. 4264 until its approval by the Senate on a vote of thirteen (13) in favor and two (2) against, the process progressed step by step, marked by public hearings on the sentiments and position of the local officials of Camarines Sur on the creation of a new congressional district, as well as argumentation and debate on the issue, now before us, concerning the stand of the oppositors of the bill that a population of at least 250,000 is required by the Constitution for such new district.4 Petitioner Aquino III was one of two senators who voted against the approval of the Bill by the Senate. His co-petitioner, Robredo, is the Mayor of Naga City, which was a part of the former second district from which the municipalities of Gainza and Milaor were taken for inclusion in the new second district. No other local executive joined the two; neither did the representatives of the former third and fourth districts of the province. Petitioners contend that the reapportionment introduced by Republic Act No. 9716, runs afoul of the explicit constitutional standard that requires a minimum population of two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) for the creation of a legislative district.5 The petitioners claim that the reconfiguration by Republic Act No. 9716 of the first and second districts of Camarines Sur is unconstitutional, because the proposed first district will end up with a population of less than 250,000 or only 176,383. Petitioners rely on Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution as basis for the cited 250,000 minimum population standard.6 The provision reads: Article VI Section 5. (1) x x x x (2) x x x x (3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative. (4) x x x x (Emphasis supplied). The petitioners posit that the 250,000 figure appearing in the above-cited provision is the minimum population requirement for the creation of a legislative district.7 The petitioners theorize that, save in the case of a newly created province, each legislative district created by Congress must be supported by a minimum population of at least 250,000 in order to be valid.8 Under this view, existing legislative districts may be reapportioned and severed to form new districts, provided each resulting district will represent a population of at least 250,000. On the other hand, if the reapportionment would result in the creation of a legislative seat representing a populace of less than 250,000 inhabitants, the reapportionment must be stricken down as invalid for non-compliance with the minimum population requirement. In support of their theory, the petitioners point to what they claim is the intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution to adopt a population minimum of 250,000 in the creation of additional legislative seats.9 The petitioners argue that when the Constitutional Commission fixed the original number of district seats in the House of Representatives to two hundred (200), they took into account the projected national population of fifty five million (55,000,000) for the year 1986.10 According to the petitioners, 55 million people represented by 200 district representatives translates to roughly 250,000 people for every one (1) representative.11 Thus, the 250,000 population requirement found in Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution is actually based on the population constant used by the Constitutional Commission in distributing the initial 200 legislative seats.

Thus did the petitioners claim that in reapportioning legislative districts independently from the creation of a province, Congress is bound to observe a 250,000 population threshold, in the same manner that the Constitutional Commission did in the original apportionment. Verbatim, the submission is that: 1. Republic Act 9716 is unconstitutional because the newly apportioned first district of Camarines Sur failed to meet the population requirement for the creation of the legislative district as explicitly provided in Article VI, Section 5, Paragraphs (1) and (3) of the Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended thereto; and 2. Republic Act 9716 violates the principle of proportional representation as provided in Article VI, Section 5 paragraphs (1), (3) and (4) of the Constitution.12 The provision subject of this case states: Article VI Section 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations. (2) x x x x (3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative. (4) Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standards provided in this section. On the other hand, the respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General, seek the dismissal of the present petition based on procedural and substantive grounds. On procedural matters, the respondents argue that the petitioners are guilty of two (2) fatal technical defects: first, petitioners committed an error in choosing to assail the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9716 via the remedy of Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court; and second, the petitioners have no locus standi to question the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9716. On substantive matters, the respondents call attention to an apparent distinction between cities and provinces drawn by Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. The respondents concede the existence of a 250,000 population condition, but argue that a plain and simple reading of the questioned provision will show that the same has no application with respect to the creation of legislative districts in provinces.13 Rather, the 250,000 minimum population is only a requirement for the creation of a legislative district in a city. In sum, the respondents deny the existence of a fixed population requirement for the reapportionment of districts in provinces. Therefore, Republic Act No. 9716, which only creates an additional legislative district within the province of Camarines Sur, should be sustained as a perfectly valid reapportionment law. We first pass upon the threshold issues. The respondents assert that by choosing to avail themselves of the remedies of Certiorari and Prohibition, the petitioners have committed a fatal procedural lapse. The respondents cite the following reasons: 1. The instant petition is bereft of any allegation that the respondents had acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion.1avvphi1

2. The remedy of Certiorari and Prohibition must be directed against a tribunal, board, officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial functions. Respondents maintain that in implementing Republic Act No. 9716, they were not acting as a judicial or quasi-judicial body, nor were they engaging in the performance of a ministerial act. 3. The petitioners could have availed themselves of another plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Considering that the main thrust of the instant petition is the declaration of unconstitutionality of Republic Act No. 9716, the same could have been ventilated through a petition for declaratory relief, over which the Supreme Court has only appellate, not original jurisdiction. The respondents likewise allege that the petitioners had failed to show that they had sustained, or is in danger of sustaining any substantial injury as a result of the implementation of Republic Act No. 9716. The respondents, therefore, conclude that the petitioners lack the required legal standing to question the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9716. This Court has paved the way away from procedural debates when confronted with issues that, by reason of constitutional importance, need a direct focus of the arguments on their content and substance. The Supreme Court has, on more than one occasion, tempered the application of procedural rules,14 as well as relaxed the requirement of locus standi whenever confronted with an important issue of overreaching significance to society.15 Hence, in Del Mar v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR)16 and Jaworski v. PAGCOR,17 this Court sanctioned momentary deviation from the principle of the hierarchy of courts, and took original cognizance of cases raising issues of paramount public importance. The Jaworski case ratiocinates: Granting arguendo that the present action cannot be properly treated as a petition for prohibition, the transcendental importance of the issues involved in this case warrants that we set aside the technical defects and take primary jurisdiction over the petition at bar. One cannot deny that the issues raised herein have potentially pervasive influence on the social and moral well being of this nation, specially the youth; hence, their proper and just determination is an imperative need. This is in accordance with the well-entrenched principle that rules of procedure are not inflexible tools designed to hinder or delay, but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate, rather than promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed. (Emphasis supplied) Anent the locus standi requirement, this Court has already uniformly ruled in Kilosbayan v. Guingona,18 Tatad v. Executive Secretary,19 Chavez v. Public Estates Authority20 and Bagong Alyansang Makabayan v. Zamora,21 just to name a few, that absence of direct injury on the part of the party seeking judicial review may be excused when the latter is able to craft an issue of transcendental importance. In Lim v. Executive Secretary,22 this Court held that in cases of transcendental importance, the cases must be settled promptly and definitely, and so, the standing requirements may be relaxed. This liberal stance has been echoed in the more recent decision on Chavez v. Gonzales.23 Given the weight of the issue raised in the instant petition, the foregoing principles must apply. The beaten path must be taken. We go directly to the determination of whether or not a population of 250,000 is an indispensable constitutional requirement for the creation of a new legislative district in a province. We deny the petition. We start with the basics. Any law duly enacted by Congress carries with it the presumption of constitutionality.24 Before a law may be declared unconstitutional by this Court, there must be a clear showing that a specific provision of the fundamental law has been violated or transgressed. When there is neither a violation of a specific provision of the Constitution nor any proof showing that there is such a violation, the presumption of constitutionality will prevail and the law must be upheld. To doubt is to sustain.25 There is no specific provision in the Constitution that fixes a 250,000 minimum population that must compose a legislative district. As already mentioned, the petitioners rely on the second sentence of Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, coupled with what they perceive to be the intent of the framers of the Constitution to adopt a minimum population of 250,000 for each legislative district.

The second sentence of Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution, succinctly provides: "Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative." The provision draws a plain and clear distinction between the entitlement of a city to a district on one hand, and the entitlement of a province to a district on the other. For while a province is entitled to at least a representative, with nothing mentioned about population, a city must first meet a population minimum of 250,000 in order to be similarly entitled. The use by the subject provision of a comma to separate the phrase "each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand" from the phrase "or each province" point to no other conclusion than that the 250,000 minimum population is only required for a city, but not for a province. 26 Plainly read, Section 5(3) of the Constitution requires a 250,000 minimum population only for a city to be entitled to a representative, but not so for a province. The 250,000 minimum population requirement for legislative districts in cities was, in turn, the subject of interpretation by this Court in Mariano, Jr. v. COMELEC.27 In Mariano, the issue presented was the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7854, which was the law that converted the Municipality of Makati into a Highly Urbanized City. As it happened, Republic Act No. 7854 created an additional legislative district for Makati, which at that time was a lone district. The petitioners in that case argued that the creation of an additional district would violate Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution, because the resulting districts would be supported by a population of less than 250,000, considering that Makati had a total population of only 450,000. The Supreme Court sustained the constitutionality of the law and the validity of the newly created district, explaining the operation of the Constitutional phrase "each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand," to wit: Petitioners cannot insist that the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accord with section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution for as of the latest survey (1990 census), the population of Makati stands at only four hundred fifty thousand (450,000). Said section provides, inter alia, that a city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall have at least one representative. Even granting that the population of Makati as of the 1990 census stood at four hundred fifty thousand (450,000), its legislative district may still be increased since it has met the minimum population requirement of two hundred fifty thousand (250,000). In fact, Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution provides that a city whose population has increased to more than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall be entitled to at least one congressional representative.28 (Emphasis supplied) The Mariano case limited the application of the 250,000 minimum population requirement for cities only to its initial legislative district. In other words, while Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution requires a city to have a minimum population of 250,000 to be entitled to a representative, it does not have to increase its population by another 250,000 to be entitled to an additional district. There is no reason why the Mariano case, which involves the creation of an additional district within a city, should not be applied to additional districts in provinces. Indeed, if an additional legislative district created within a city is not required to represent a population of at least 250,000 in order to be valid, neither should such be needed for an additional district in a province, considering moreover that a province is entitled to an initial seat by the mere fact of its creation and regardless of its population. Apropos for discussion is the provision of the Local Government Code on the creation of a province which, by virtue of and upon creation, is entitled to at least a legislative district. Thus, Section 461 of the Local Government Code states: Requisites for Creation. (a) A province may be created if it has an average annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of not less than Twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00) based on 1991 constant prices and either of the following requisites: (i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers, as certified by the Lands Management Bureau; or (ii) a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) inhabitants as certified by the National Statistics Office.

Notably, the requirement of population is not an indispensable requirement, but is merely an alternative addition to the indispensable income requirement. Mariano, it would turn out, is but a reflection of the pertinent ideas that ran through the deliberations on the words and meaning of Section 5 of Article VI. The whats, whys, and wherefores of the population requirement of "at least two hundred fifty thousand" may be gleaned from the records of the Constitutional Commission which, upon framing the provisions of Section 5 of Article VI, proceeded to form an ordinance that would be appended to the final document. The Ordinance is captioned "APPORTIONING THE SEATS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES TO THE DIFFERENT LEGISLATIVE DISTRICTS IN PROVINCES AND CITIES AND THE METROPOLITAN MANILA AREA." Such records would show that the 250,000 population benchmark was used for the 1986 nationwide apportionment of legislative districts among provinces, cities and Metropolitan Manila. Simply put, the population figure was used to determine how many districts a province, city, or Metropolitan Manila should have. Simply discernible too is the fact that, for the purpose, population had to be the determinant. Even then, the requirement of 250,000 inhabitants was not taken as an absolute minimum for one legislative district. And, closer to the point herein at issue, in the determination of the precise district within the province to which, through the use of the population benchmark, so many districts have been apportioned, population as a factor was not the sole, though it was among, several determinants. From its journal,29 we can see that the Constitutional Commission originally divided the entire country into two hundred (200) districts, which corresponded to the original number of district representatives. The 200 seats were distributed by the Constitutional Commission in this manner: first, one (1) seat each was given to the seventy-three (73) provinces and the ten (10) cities with a population of at least 250,000;30 second, the remaining seats were then redistributed among the provinces, cities and the Metropolitan Area "in accordance with the number of their inhabitants on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio."31 Commissioner Davide, who later became a Member and then Chief Justice of the Court, explained this in his sponsorship remark32 for the Ordinance to be appended to the 1987 Constitution: Commissioner Davide: The ordinance fixes at 200 the number of legislative seats which are, in turn, apportioned among provinces and cities with a population of at least 250, 000 and the Metropolitan Area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio. The population is based on the 1986 projection, with the 1980 official enumeration as the point of reckoning. This projection indicates that our population is more or less 56 million. Taking into account the mandate that each city with at least 250, 000 inhabitants and each province shall have at least one representative, we first allotted one seat for each of the 73 provinces, and each one for all cities with a population of at least 250, 000, which are the Cities of Manila, Quezon, Pasay, Caloocan, Cebu, Iloilo, Bacolod, Cagayan de Oro, Davao and Zamboanga. Thereafter, we then proceed[ed] to increase whenever appropriate the number of seats for the provinces and cities in accordance with the number of their inhabitants on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio. (Emphasis supplied). Thus was the number of seats computed for each province and city. Differentiated from this, the determination of the districts within the province had to consider "all protests and complaints formally received" which, the records show, dealt with determinants other than population as already mentioned. Palawan is a case in point. Journal No. 107 of the Constitutional Commission narrates: INTERPELLATION OF MR. NOLLEDO: Mr. Nolledo inquired on the reason for including Puerto Princesa in the northern towns when it was more affinity with the southern town of Aborlan, Batarasa, Brookes Point, Narra, Quezon and Marcos. He stated that the First District has a greater area than the Second District. He then queried whether population was the only factor considered by the Committee in redistricting. Replying thereto, Mr. Davide explained that the Committee took into account the standards set in Section 5 of the Article on the Legislative Department, namely: 1) the legislative seats should be apportioned among the provinces and cities and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with their inhabitants on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio; and 2) the legislative district must be compact, adjacent and contiguous. Mr. Nolledo pointed out that the last factor was not met when Puerto Princesa was included with the northern towns. He then inquired what is the distance between Puerto Princesa from San Vicente. xxxx

Thereupon, Mr. Nolledo stated that Puerto Princesa has a population of 75,480 and based on the apportionment, its inclusion with the northern towns would result in a combined population of 265,000 as against only 186,000 for the south. He added that Cuyo and Coron are very important towns in the northern part of Palawan and, in fact, Cuyo was the capital of Palawan before its transfer to Puerto Princesa. He also pointed out that there are more potential candidates in the north and therefore if Puerto Princesa City and the towns of Cuyo and Coron are lumped together, there would be less candidates in the south, most of whose inhabitants are not interested in politics. He then suggested that Puerto Princesa be included in the south or the Second District. Mr. Davide stated that the proposal would be considered during the period of amendments. He requested that the COMELEC staff study said proposal.33 "PROPOSED AMENDMENT OF MR. NOLLEDO On the districting of Palawan, Mr. Nolledo pointed out that it was explained in the interpellations that District I has a total population of 265,358 including the City of Puerto Princesa, while the Second District has a total population of 186,733. He proposed, however, that Puerto Princesa be included in the Second District in order to satisfy the contiguity requirement in the Constitution considering that said City is nearer the southern towns comprising the Second District. In reply to Mr. Monsods query, Mr. Nolledo explained that with the proposed transfer of Puerto Princesa City to the Second District, the First District would only have a total population of 190,000 while the Second District would have 262,213, and there would be no substantial changes. Mr. Davide accepted Mr. Nolledos proposal to insert Puerto Princesa City before the Municipality of Aborlan. There being no objection on the part of the Members the same was approved by the Body. APPROVAL OF THE APPORTIONMENT AND DISTRICTING OF PALAWAN There being no other amendment, on motion of Mr. Davide, there being no objection, the apportionment and districting for the province of Palawan was approved by the Body.34 The districting of Palawan disregarded the 250,000 population figure. It was decided by the importance of the towns and the city that eventually composed the districts. Benguet and Baguio are another reference point. The Journal further narrates: At this juncture, Mr. Davide informed the Body that Mr. Regalado made a reservation with the Committee for the possible reopening of the approval of Region I with respect to Benguet and Baguio City. REMARKS OF MR. REGALADO Mr. Regalado stated that in the formulation of the Committee, Baguio City and Tuba are placed in one district. He stated that he was toying with the idea that, perhaps as a special consideration for Baguio because it is the summer capital of the Philippines, Tuba could be divorced from Baguio City so that it could, by itself, have its own constituency and Tuba could be transferred to the Second District together with Itogon. Mr. Davide, however, pointed out that the population of Baguio City is only 141,149. Mr. Regalado admitted that the regular population of Baguio may be lower during certain times of the year, but the transient population would increase the population substantially and, therefore, for purposes of business and professional transactions, it is beyond question that population-wise, Baguio would more than qualify, not to speak of the official business matters, transactions and offices that are also there. Mr. Davide adverted to Director de Limas statement that unless Tuba and Baguio City are united, Tuba will be isolated from the rest of Benguet as the place can only be reached by passing through Baguio City. He stated that the Committee would submit the matter to the Body. Upon inquiry of the Chair whether he is insisting on his amendment, Mr. Regalado stated that the Body should have a say on the matter and that the considerations he had given are not on the demographic aspects but on the fact that Baguio City is the summer capital, the venue and situs of many government offices and functions.

On motion of Mr. Davide, there being no objection, the Body approved the reconsideration of the earlier approval of the apportionment and districting of Region I, particularly Benguet. Thereafter, on motion of Mr. Davide, there being no objection, the amendment of Mr. Regalado was put to a vote. With 14 Members voting in favor and none against, the amendment was approved by the Body. Mr. Davide informed that in view of the approval of the amendment, Benguet with Baguio City will have two seats. The First District shall comprise of the municipalities of Mankayan, Buguias, Bakun, Kabayan, Kibungan, Bokod, Atok, Kapangan, Tublay, La Trinidad, Sablan, Itogon and Tuba. The Second District shall comprise of Baguio City alone. There being no objection, the Body approved the apportionment and districting of Region I.35 Quite emphatically, population was explicitly removed as a factor. It may be additionally mentioned that the province of Cavite was divided into districts based on the distribution of its three cities, with each district having a city: one district "supposed to be a fishing area; another a vegetable and fruit area; and the third, a rice growing area," because such consideration "fosters common interests in line with the standard of compactness."36 In the districting of Maguindanao, among the matters discussed were "political stability and common interest among the people in the area" and the possibility of "chaos and disunity" considering the "accepted regional, political, traditional and sectoral leaders."37 For Laguna, it was mentioned that municipalities in the highland should not be grouped with the towns in the lowland. For Cebu, Commissioner Maambong proposed that they should "balance the area and population."38 Consistent with Mariano and with the framer deliberations on district apportionment, we stated in Bagabuyo v. COMELEC39 that: x x x Undeniably, these figures show a disparity in the population sizes of the districts. The Constitution, however, does not require mathematical exactitude or rigid equality as a standard in gauging equality of representation. x x x. To ensure quality representation through commonality of interests and ease of access by the representative to the constituents, all that the Constitution requires is that every legislative district should comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact and adjacent territory. (Emphasis supplied). This 2008 pronouncement is fresh reasoning against the uncompromising stand of petitioner that an additional provincial legislative district, which does not have at least a 250,000 population is not allowed by the Constitution. The foregoing reading and review lead to a clear lesson. Neither in the text nor in the essence of Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution can, the petition find support. And the formulation of the Ordinance in the implementation of the provision, nay, even the Ordinance itself, refutes the contention that a population of 250,000 is a constitutional sine qua non for the formation of an additional legislative district in a province, whose population growth has increased beyond the 1986 numbers. Translated in the terms of the present case: 1. The Province of Camarines Sur, with an estimated population of 1,693,821 in 2007 is based on the formula and constant number of 250,000 used by the Constitutional Commission in nationally apportioning legislative districts among provinces and cities entitled to two (2) districts in addition to the four (4) that it was given in the 1986 apportionment. Significantly, petitioner Aquino concedes this point.40 In other words, Section 5 of Article VI as clearly written allows and does not prohibit an additional district for the Province of Camarines Sur, such as that provided for in Republic Act No. 9786; 2. Based on the pith and pitch of the exchanges on the Ordinance on the protests and complaints against strict conformity with the population standard, and more importantly based on the final districting in the Ordinance on considerations other than population, the reapportionment or the recomposition of the first and second legislative districts in the Province of Camarines Sur that resulted in the creation of a new legislative district is valid even if the population of the new district is 176,383 and not 250,000 as insisted upon by the petitioners. 3. The factors mentioned during the deliberations on House Bill No. 4264, were:

(a) the dialects spoken in the grouped municipalities; (b) the size of the original groupings compared to that of the regrouped municipalities; (c) the natural division separating the municipality subject of the discussion from the reconfigured District One; and (d) the balancing of the areas of the three districts resulting from the redistricting of Districts One and Two.41 Each of such factors and in relation to the others considered together, with the increased population of the erstwhile Districts One and Two, point to the utter absence of abuse of discretion, much less grave abuse of discretion,42 that would warrant the invalidation of Republic Act No. 9716. To be clear about our judgment, we do not say that in the reapportionment of the first and second legislative districts of Camarines Sur, the number of inhabitants in the resulting additional district should not be considered. Our ruling is that population is not the only factor but is just one of several other factors in the composition of the additional district. Such settlement is in accord with both the text of the Constitution and the spirit of the letter, so very clearly given form in the Constitutional debates on the exact issue presented by this petition.1avvphi1 WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. Republic Act No. 9716 entitled "An Act Reapportioning the Composition of the First (1st) and Second (2nd) Legislative Districts in the Province of Camarines Sur and Thereby Creating a New Legislative District From Such Reapportionment" is a VALID LAW. SO ORDERED.

G.R No. 188078

January 25, 2010

VICTORINO B. ALDABA, CARLO JOLETTE S. FAJARDO, JULIO G. MORADA, and MINERVA ALDABA MORADA, Petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent. DECISION CARPIO, J.: The Case

This is an original action for Prohibition to declare unconstitutional Republic Act No. 9591 (RA 9591), creating a legislative district for the city of Malolos, Bulacan, for violating the minimum population requirement for the creation of a legislative district in a city. Antecedents Before 1 May 2009, the province of Bulacan was represented in Congress through four legislative districts. The First Legislative District comprised of the city of Malolos1 and the municipalities of Hagonoy, Calumpit, Pulilan, Bulacan, and Paombong. On 1 May 2009, RA 9591 lapsed into law, amending Malolos City Charter,2 by creating a separate legislative district for the city. At the time the legislative bills for RA 9591 were filed in Congress in 2007, namely, House Bill No. 3162 (later converted to House Bill No. 3693) and Senate Bill No. 1986, the population of Malolos City was 223,069. The population of Malolos City on 1 May 2009 is a contested fact but there is no dispute that House Bill No. 3693 relied on an undated certification issued by a Regional Director of the National Statistics Office (NSO) that "the projected population of the Municipality of Malolos will be 254,030 by the year 2010 using the population growth rate of 3.78 between 1995 to 2000."3 Petitioners, taxpayers, registered voters and residents of Malolos City, filed this petition contending that RA 9591 is unconstitutional for failing to meet the minimum population threshold of 250,000 for a city to merit representation in Congress as provided under Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution. In its Comment to the petition, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) contended that Congress use of projected population is non-justiciable as it involves a determination on the "wisdom of the standard adopted by the legislature to determine compliance with [a constitutional requirement]."4 The Ruling of the Court We grant the petition and declare RA 9591 unconstitutional for being violative of Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution The 1987 Constitution requires that for a city to have a legislative district, the city must have "a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand."5 The only issue here is whether the City of Malolos has a population of at least 250,000, whether actual or projected, for the purpose of creating a legislative district for the City of Malolos in time for the 10 May 2010 elections. If not, then RA 9591 creating a legislative district in the City of Malolos is unconstitutional. House Bill No. 3693 cites the undated Certification of Regional Director Alberto N. Miranda of Region III of the National Statistics Office (NSO) as authority that the population of the City of Malolos "will be 254,030 by the year 2010." The Certification states that the population of "Malolos, Bulacan as of May 1, 2000 is 175,291." The Certification further states that it was "issued upon the request of Mayor Danilo A. Domingo of the City of Malolos in connection with the proposed creation of Malolos City as a lone congressional district of the Province of Bulacan."6 The Certification of Regional Director Miranda, which is based on demographic projections, is without legal effect because Regional Director Miranda has no basis and no authority to issue the Certification. The Certification is also void on its face because based on its own growth rate assumption, the population of Malolos will be less than 250,000 in the year 2010. In addition, intercensal demographic projections cannot be made for the entire year. In any event, a city whose population has increased to 250,000 is entitled to have a legislative district only in the "immediately following election"7 after the attainment of the 250,000 population. First, certifications on demographic projections can be issued only if such projections are declared official by the National Statistics Coordination Board (NSCB). Second, certifications based on demographic projections can be issued only by the NSO Administrator or his designated certifying officer. Third, intercensal population projections must be as of the middle of every year. Section 6 of Executive Order No. 1358 dated 6 November 1993 issued by President Fidel V. Ramos provides: SECTION 6. Guidelines on the Issuance of Certification of Population sizes Pursuant to Section 7, 386, 442, 450, 452, and 461 of the New Local Government Code.

(a) The National Statistics Office shall issue certification on data that it has collected and processed as well as on statistics that it has estimated. (b) For census years, certification on population size will be based on actual population census counts; while for the intercensal years, the certification will be made on the basis of a set of demographic projections or estimates declared official by the National Statistical Coordination Board (NSCB). (c) Certification of population census counts will be made as of the census reference date, such as May 1, 1990, while those of intercensal population estimates will be as of middle of every year. (d) Certification of population size based on projections may specify the range within which the true count is deemed likely to fall. The range will correspond to the official low and high population projections. (e) The smallest geographic area for which a certification on population size may be issued will be the barangay for census population counts, and the city or municipality for intercensal estimates. If an LGU wants to conduct its own population census, during offcensus years, approval must be sought from the NSCB and the conduct must be under the technical supervision of NSO from planning to data processing. (f) Certifications of population size based on published census results shall be issued by the Provincial Census Officers or by the Regional Census Officers. Certifications based on projections or estimates, however, will be issued by the NSO Administrator or his designated certifying officer. (Emphasis supplied) The Certification of Regional Director Miranda does not state that the demographic projections he certified have been declared official by the NSCB. The records of this case do not also show that the Certification of Regional Director Miranda is based on demographic projections declared official by the NSCB. The Certification, which states that the population of Malolos "will be 254,030 by the year 2010," violates the requirement that intercensal demographic projections shall be "as of the middle of every year." In addition, there is no showing that Regional Director Miranda has been designated by the NSO Administrator as a certifying officer for demographic projections in Region III. In the absence of such official designation, only the certification of the NSO Administrator can be given credence by this Court. Moreover, the Certification states that "the total population of Malolos, Bulacan as of May 1, 2000 is 175,291." The Certification also states that the population growth rate of Malolos is 3.78% per year between 1995 and 2000. Based on a growth rate of 3.78% per year, the population of Malolos of 175,291 in 2000 will grow to only 241,550 in 2010. Also, the 2007 Census places the population of Malolos at 223,069 as of 1 August 2007.9 Based on a growth rate of 3.78%, the population of Malolos will grow to only 248,365 as of 1 August 2010. Even if the growth rate is compounded yearly, the population of Malolos of 223,069 as of 1 August 2007 will grow to only 249,333 as of 1 August 2010.10 All these conflict with what the Certification states that the population of Malolos "will be 254,030 by the year 2010." Based on the Certifications own growth rate assumption, the population of Malolos will be less than 250,000 before the 10 May 2010 elections. Incidentally, the NSO has no published population projections for individual municipalities or cities but only for entire regions and provinces.11 Executive Order No. 135 cannot simply be brushed aside. The OSG, representing respondent Commission on Elections, invoked Executive Order No. 135 in its Comment, thus: Here, based on the NSO projection, "the population of the Municipality of Malolos will be 254,030 by the year 2010 using the population growth rate of 3.78 between 1995-2000." This projection issued by the authority of the NSO Administrator is recognized under Executive Order No. 135 (The Guidelines on the Issuance of Certification of Population Sizes), which states: xxx (d) Certification of population size based on projections may specify the range within which the true count is deemed likely to fall. The range will correspond to the official low and high population projections. xxx

(f) Certifications of population size based on published census results shall be issued by the Provincial Census Officers or by the Regional Census Officers. Certifications based on projections or estimates, however, will be issued by the NSO Administrator or his designated certifying officer.12 (Emphasis supplied) Any population projection forming the basis for the creation of a legislative district must be based on an official and credible source. That is why the OSG cited Executive Order No. 135, otherwise the population projection would be unreliable or speculative. Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution provides: Any province that may be created, or any city whose population may hereafter increase to more than two hundred fifty thousand shall be entitled in the immediately following election to at least one Member or such number of members as it may be entitled to on the basis of the number of its inhabitants and according to the standards set forth in paragraph (3), Section 5 of Article VI of the Constitution. xxx. (Emphasis supplied) A city that has attained a population of 250,000 is entitled to a legislative district only in the "immediately following election." In short, a city must first attain the 250,000 population, and thereafter, in the immediately following election, such city shall have a district representative. There is no showing in the present case that the City of Malolos has attained or will attain a population of 250,000, whether actual or projected, before the 10 May 2010 elections. Clearly, there is no official record that the population of the City of Malolos will be at least 250,000, actual or projected, prior to the 10 May 2010 elections, the immediately following election after the supposed attainment of such population. Thus, the City of Malolos is not qualified to have a legislative district of its own under Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution. On the OSGs contention that Congress choice of means to comply with the population requirement in the creation of a legislative district is non-justiciable, suffice it to say that questions calling for judicial determination of compliance with constitutional standards by other branches of the government are fundamentally justiciable. The resolution of such questions falls within the checking function of this Court under the 1987 Constitution to determine whether there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.13 Even under the 1935 Constitution, this Court had already ruled, "The overwhelming weight of authority is that district apportionment laws are subject to review by the courts."14 Compliance with constitutional standards on the creation of legislative districts is important because the "aim of legislative apportionment is to equalize population and voting power among districts."15 WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We DECLARE Republic Act No. 9591 UNCONSTITUTIONAL for being violative of Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 190582

April 8, 2010

ANG LADLAD LGBT PARTY represented herein by its Chair, DANTON REMOTO, Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS Respondent. DECISION DEL CASTILLO, J.:

... [F]reedom to differ is not limited to things that do not matter much. That would be a mere shadow of freedom. The test of its substance is the right to differ as to things that touch the heart of the existing order. Justice Robert A. Jackson West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette1 One unavoidable consequence of everyone having the freedom to choose is that others may make different choices choices we would not make for ourselves, choices we may disapprove of, even choices that may shock or offend or anger us. However, choices are not to be legally prohibited merely because they are different, and the right to disagree and debate about important questions of public policy is a core value protected by our Bill of Rights. Indeed, our democracy is built on genuine recognition of, and respect for, diversity and difference in opinion. Since ancient times, society has grappled with deep disagreements about the definitions and demands of morality. In many cases, where moral convictions are concerned, harmony among those theoretically opposed is an insurmountable goal. Yet herein lies the paradox philosophical justifications about what is moral are indispensable and yet at the same time powerless to create agreement. This Court recognizes, however, that practical solutions are preferable to ideological stalemates; accommodation is better than intransigence; reason more worthy than rhetoric. This will allow persons of diverse viewpoints to live together, if not harmoniously, then, at least, civilly. Factual Background This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, with an application for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, filed by Ang Ladlad LGBT Party (Ang Ladlad) against the Resolutions of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) dated November 11, 20092 (the First Assailed Resolution) and December 16, 20093 (the Second Assailed Resolution) in SPP No. 09-228 (PL) (collectively, the Assailed Resolutions). The case has its roots in the COMELECs refusal to accredit Ang Ladlad as a party-list organization under Republic Act (RA) No. 7941, otherwise known as the Party-List System Act.4 Ang Ladlad is an organization composed of men and women who identify themselves as lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or trans-gendered individuals (LGBTs). Incorporated in 2003, Ang Ladlad first applied for registration with the COMELEC in 2006. The application for accreditation was denied on the ground that the organization had no substantial membership base. On August 17, 2009, Ang Ladlad again filed a Petition5 for registration with the COMELEC. Before the COMELEC, petitioner argued that the LGBT community is a marginalized and under-represented sector that is particularly disadvantaged because of their sexual orientation and gender identity; that LGBTs are victims of exclusion, discrimination, and violence; that because of negative societal attitudes, LGBTs are constrained to hide their sexual orientation; and that Ang Ladlad complied with the 8-point guidelines enunciated by this Court in Ang Bagong BayaniOFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections.6 Ang Ladlad laid out its national membership base consisting of individual members and organizational supporters, and outlined its platform of governance.7 On November 11, 2009, after admitting the petitioners evidence, the COMELEC (Second Division) dismissed the Petition on moral grounds, stating that: x x x This Petition is dismissible on moral grounds. Petitioner defines the Filipino Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender (LGBT) Community, thus: x x x a marginalized and under-represented sector that is particularly disadvantaged because of their sexual orientation and gender identity. and proceeded to define sexual orientation as that which: x x x refers to a persons capacity for profound emotional, affectional and sexual attraction to, and intimate and sexual relations with, individuals of a different gender, of the same gender, or more than one gender." This definition of the LGBT sector makes it crystal clear that petitioner tolerates immorality which offends religious beliefs. In Romans 1:26, 27, Paul wrote:

For this cause God gave them up into vile affections, for even their women did change the natural use into that which is against nature: And likewise also the men, leaving the natural use of the woman, burned in their lust one toward another; men with men working that which is unseemly, and receiving in themselves that recompense of their error which was meet. In the Koran, the hereunder verses are pertinent: For ye practice your lusts on men in preference to women "ye are indeed a people transgressing beyond bounds." (7.81) "And we rained down on them a shower (of brimstone): Then see what was the end of those who indulged in sin and crime!" (7:84) "He said: "O my Lord! Help Thou me against people who do mischief" (29:30). As correctly pointed out by the Law Department in its Comment dated October 2, 2008: The ANG LADLAD apparently advocates sexual immorality as indicated in the Petitions par. 6F: Consensual partnerships or relationships by gays and lesbians who are already of age. It is further indicated in par. 24 of the Petition which waves for the record: In 2007, Men Having Sex with Men or MSMs in the Philippines were estimated as 670,000 (Genesis 19 is the history of Sodom and Gomorrah). Laws are deemed incorporated in every contract, permit, license, relationship, or accreditation. Hence, pertinent provisions of the Civil Code and the Revised Penal Code are deemed part of the requirement to be complied with for accreditation. ANG LADLAD collides with Article 695 of the Civil Code which defines nuisance as Any act, omission, establishment, business, condition of property, or anything else which x x x (3) shocks, defies; or disregards decency or morality x x x It also collides with Article 1306 of the Civil Code: The contracting parties may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy. Art 1409 of the Civil Code provides that Contracts whose cause, object or purpose is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy are inexistent and void from the beginning. Finally to safeguard the morality of the Filipino community, the Revised Penal Code, as amended, penalizes Immoral doctrines, obscene publications and exhibitions and indecent shows as follows: Art. 201. Immoral doctrines, obscene publications and exhibitions, and indecent shows. The penalty of prision mayor or a fine ranging from six thousand to twelve thousand pesos, or both such imprisonment and fine, shall be imposed upon: 1. Those who shall publicly expound or proclaim doctrines openly contrary to public morals; 2. (a) The authors of obscene literature, published with their knowledge in any form; the editors publishing such literature; and the owners/operators of the establishment selling the same; (b) Those who, in theaters, fairs, cinematographs or any other place, exhibit indecent or immoral plays, scenes, acts or shows, it being understood that the obscene literature or indecent or immoral plays, scenes, acts or shows, whether live or in film, which are prescribed by virtue hereof, shall include those which: (1) glorify criminals or condone crimes; (2) serve no other purpose but to satisfy the market for violence, lust or pornography; (3) offend any race or religion; (4) tend to abet traffic in and use of prohibited drugs; and (5) are contrary to law, public order, morals, good customs, established policies, lawful orders, decrees and edicts. 3. Those who shall sell, give away or exhibit films, prints, engravings, sculpture or literature which are offensive to morals. Petitioner should likewise be denied accreditation not only for advocating immoral doctrines but likewise for not being truthful when it said that it "or any of its nominees/party-list representatives have not violated or failed to comply with laws, rules, or regulations relating to the elections." Furthermore, should this Commission grant the petition, we will be exposing our youth to an environment that does not conform to the teachings of our faith. Lehman Strauss, a famous bible teacher and writer in the U.S.A. said in one article

that "older practicing homosexuals are a threat to the youth." As an agency of the government, ours too is the States avowed duty under Section 13, Article II of the Constitution to protect our youth from moral and spiritual degradation.8 When Ang Ladlad sought reconsideration,9 three commissioners voted to overturn the First Assailed Resolution (Commissioners Gregorio Y. Larrazabal, Rene V. Sarmiento, and Armando Velasco), while three commissioners voted to deny Ang Ladlads Motion for Reconsideration (Commissioners Nicodemo T. Ferrer, Lucenito N. Tagle, and Elias R. Yusoph). The COMELEC Chairman, breaking the tie and speaking for the majority in his Separate Opinion, upheld the First Assailed Resolution, stating that: I. The Spirit of Republic Act No. 7941 Ladlad is applying for accreditation as a sectoral party in the party-list system. Even assuming that it has properly proven its under-representation and marginalization, it cannot be said that Ladlads expressed sexual orientations per se would benefit the nation as a whole. Section 2 of the party-list law unequivocally states that the purpose of the party-list system of electing congressional representatives is to enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and under-represented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the House of Representatives. If entry into the party-list system would depend only on the ability of an organization to represent its constituencies, then all representative organizations would have found themselves into the party-list race. But that is not the intention of the framers of the law. The party-list system is not a tool to advocate tolerance and acceptance of misunderstood persons or groups of persons. Rather, the party-list system is a tool for the realization of aspirations of marginalized individuals whose interests are also the nations only that their interests have not been brought to the attention of the nation because of their under representation. Until the time comes when Ladlad is able to justify that having mixed sexual orientations and transgender identities is beneficial to the nation, its application for accreditation under the party-list system will remain just that. II. No substantial differentiation In the United States, whose equal protection doctrine pervades Philippine jurisprudence, courts do not recognize lesbians, gays, homosexuals, and bisexuals (LGBT) as a "special class" of individuals. x x x Significantly, it has also been held that homosexuality is not a constitutionally protected fundamental right, and that "nothing in the U.S. Constitution discloses a comparable intent to protect or promote the social or legal equality of homosexual relations," as in the case of race or religion or belief. xxxx Thus, even if societys understanding, tolerance, and acceptance of LGBTs is elevated, there can be no denying that Ladlad constituencies are still males and females, and they will remain either male or female protected by the same Bill of Rights that applies to all citizens alike. xxxx IV. Public Morals x x x There is no question about not imposing on Ladlad Christian or Muslim religious practices. Neither is there any attempt to any particular religious groups moral rules on Ladlad. Rather, what are being adopted as moral parameters and precepts are generally accepted public morals. They are possibly religious-based, but as a society, the Philippines cannot ignore its more than 500 years of Muslim and Christian upbringing, such that some moral precepts espoused by said religions have sipped [sic] into society and these are not publicly accepted moral norms. V. Legal Provisions But above morality and social norms, they have become part of the law of the land. Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code imposes the penalty of prision mayor upon "Those who shall publicly expound or proclaim doctrines openly contrary to public morals." It penalizes "immoral doctrines, obscene publications and exhibition and indecent shows." "Ang Ladlad" apparently falls under these legal provisions. This is clear from its Petitions paragraph 6F: "Consensual partnerships or

relationships by gays and lesbians who are already of age It is further indicated in par. 24 of the Petition which waves for the record: In 2007, Men Having Sex with Men or MSMs in the Philippines were estimated as 670,000. Moreoever, Article 694 of the Civil Code defines "nuisance" as any act, omission x x x or anything else x x x which shocks, defies or disregards decency or morality x x x." These are all unlawful.10 On January 4, 2010, Ang Ladlad filed this Petition, praying that the Court annul the Assailed Resolutions and direct the COMELEC to grant Ang Ladlads application for accreditation. Ang Ladlad also sought the issuance ex parte of a preliminary mandatory injunction against the COMELEC, which had previously announced that it would begin printing the final ballots for the May 2010 elections by January 25, 2010. On January 6, 2010, we ordered the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to file its Comment on behalf of COMELEC not later than 12:00 noon of January 11, 2010.11 Instead of filing a Comment, however, the OSG filed a Motion for Extension, requesting that it be given until January 16, 2010 to Comment.12 Somewhat surprisingly, the OSG later filed a Comment in support of petitioners application.13 Thus, in order to give COMELEC the opportunity to fully ventilate its position, we required it to file its own comment.14 The COMELEC, through its Law Department, filed its Comment on February 2, 2010.15 In the meantime, due to the urgency of the petition, we issued a temporary restraining order on January 12, 2010, effective immediately and continuing until further orders from this Court, directing the COMELEC to cease and desist from implementing the Assailed Resolutions.16 Also, on January 13, 2010, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) filed a Motion to Intervene or to Appear as Amicus Curiae, attaching thereto its Comment-in-Intervention.17 The CHR opined that the denial of Ang Ladlads petition on moral grounds violated the standards and principles of the Constitution, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). On January 19, 2010, we granted the CHRs motion to intervene. On January 26, 2010, Epifanio D. Salonga, Jr. filed his Motion to Intervene18 which motion was granted on February 2, 2010.19 The Parties Arguments Ang Ladlad argued that the denial of accreditation, insofar as it justified the exclusion by using religious dogma, violated the constitutional guarantees against the establishment of religion. Petitioner also claimed that the Assailed Resolutions contravened its constitutional rights to privacy, freedom of speech and assembly, and equal protection of laws, as well as constituted violations of the Philippines international obligations against discrimination based on sexual orientation. The OSG concurred with Ang Ladlads petition and argued that the COMELEC erred in denying petitioners application for registration since there was no basis for COMELECs allegations of immorality. It also opined that LGBTs have their own special interests and concerns which should have been recognized by the COMELEC as a separate classification. However, insofar as the purported violations of petitioners freedom of speech, expression, and assembly were concerned, the OSG maintained that there had been no restrictions on these rights. In its Comment, the COMELEC reiterated that petitioner does not have a concrete and genuine national political agenda to benefit the nation and that the petition was validly dismissed on moral grounds. It also argued for the first time that the LGBT sector is not among the sectors enumerated by the Constitution and RA 7941, and that petitioner made untruthful statements in its petition when it alleged its national existence contrary to actual verification reports by COMELECs field personnel. Our Ruling We grant the petition. Compliance with the Requirements of the Constitution and Republic Act No. 7941 The COMELEC denied Ang Ladlads application for registration on the ground that the LGBT sector is neither enumerated in the Constitution and RA 7941, nor is it associated with or related to any of the sectors in the enumeration.

Respondent mistakenly opines that our ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani stands for the proposition that only those sectors specifically enumerated in the law or related to said sectors (labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals) may be registered under the party-list system. As we explicitly ruled in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections,20 "the enumeration of marginalized and under-represented sectors is not exclusive". The crucial element is not whether a sector is specifically enumerated, but whether a particular organization complies with the requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941. Respondent also argues that Ang Ladlad made untruthful statements in its petition when it alleged that it had nationwide existence through its members and affiliate organizations. The COMELEC claims that upon verification by its field personnel, it was shown that "save for a few isolated places in the country, petitioner does not exist in almost all provinces in the country."21 This argument that "petitioner made untruthful statements in its petition when it alleged its national existence" is a new one; previously, the COMELEC claimed that petitioner was "not being truthful when it said that it or any of its nominees/party-list representatives have not violated or failed to comply with laws, rules, or regulations relating to the elections." Nowhere was this ground for denial of petitioners accreditation mentioned or even alluded to in the Assailed Resolutions. This, in itself, is quite curious, considering that the reports of petitioners alleged non-existence were already available to the COMELEC prior to the issuance of the First Assailed Resolution. At best, this is irregular procedure; at worst, a belated afterthought, a change in respondents theory, and a serious violation of petitioners right to procedural due process. Nonetheless, we find that there has been no misrepresentation. A cursory perusal of Ang Ladlads initial petition shows that it never claimed to exist in each province of the Philippines. Rather, petitioner alleged that the LGBT community in the Philippines was estimated to constitute at least 670,000 persons; that it had 16,100 affiliates and members around the country, and 4,044 members in its electronic discussion group.22 Ang Ladlad also represented itself to be "a national LGBT umbrella organization with affiliates around the Philippines composed of the following LGBT networks:" Abra Gay Association Aklan Butterfly Brigade (ABB) Aklan Albay Gay Association Arts Center of Cabanatuan City Nueva Ecija Boys Legion Metro Manila Cagayan de Oro People Like Us (CDO PLUS) Cant Live in the Closet, Inc. (CLIC) Metro Manila Cebu Pride Cebu City Circle of Friends Dipolog Gay Association Zamboanga del Norte Gay, Bisexual, & Transgender Youth Association (GABAY) Gay and Lesbian Activists Network for Gender Equality (GALANG) Metro Manila Gay Mens Support Group (GMSG) Metro Manila Gay United for Peace and Solidarity (GUPS) Lanao del Norte Iloilo City Gay Association Iloilo City

 Kabulig Writers Group Camarines Sur Lesbian Advocates Philippines, Inc. (LEAP) LUMINA Baguio City Marikina Gay Association Metro Manila Metropolitan Community Church (MCC) Metro Manila Naga City Gay Association Naga City ONE BACARDI Order of St. Aelred (OSAe) Metro Manila PUP LAKAN RADAR PRIDEWEAR Rainbow Rights Project (R-Rights), Inc. Metro Manila San Jose del Monte Gay Association Bulacan Sining Kayumanggi Royal Family Rizal Society of Transexual Women of the Philippines (STRAP) Metro Manila Soul Jive Antipolo, Rizal The Link Davao City Tayabas Gay Association Quezon Womens Bisexual Network Metro Manila Zamboanga Gay Association Zamboanga City23 Since the COMELEC only searched for the names ANG LADLAD LGBT or LADLAD LGBT, it is no surprise that they found that petitioner had no presence in any of these regions. In fact, if COMELECs findings are to be believed, petitioner does not even exist in Quezon City, which is registered as Ang Ladlads principal place of business. Against this backdrop, we find that Ang Ladlad has sufficiently demonstrated its compliance with the legal requirements for accreditation. Indeed, aside from COMELECs moral objection and the belated allegation of non-existence, nowhere in the records has the respondent ever found/ruled that Ang Ladlad is not qualified to register as a party-list organization under any of the requisites under RA 7941 or the guidelines in Ang Bagong Bayani. The difference, COMELEC claims, lies in Ang Ladlads morality, or lack thereof. Religion as the Basis for Refusal to Accept Ang Ladlads Petition for Registration Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that "[n]o law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." At bottom, what our non-establishment clause calls for is "government neutrality in religious matters."24 Clearly, "governmental reliance on religious justification is inconsistent with this policy of neutrality."25 We thus find that it was grave violation of the non-establishment clause for the COMELEC to utilize the Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad.

Rather than relying on religious belief, the legitimacy of the Assailed Resolutions should depend, instead, on whether the COMELEC is able to advance some justification for its rulings beyond mere conformity to religious doctrine. Otherwise stated, government must act for secular purposes and in ways that have primarily secular effects. As we held in Estrada v. Escritor:26 x x x The morality referred to in the law is public and necessarily secular, not religious as the dissent of Mr. Justice Carpio holds. "Religious teachings as expressed in public debate may influence the civil public order but public moral disputes may be resolved only on grounds articulable in secular terms." Otherwise, if government relies upon religious beliefs in formulating public policies and morals, the resulting policies and morals would require conformity to what some might regard as religious programs or agenda. The non-believers would therefore be compelled to conform to a standard of conduct buttressed by a religious belief, i.e., to a "compelled religion," anathema to religious freedom. Likewise, if government based its actions upon religious beliefs, it would tacitly approve or endorse that belief and thereby also tacitly disapprove contrary religious or non-religious views that would not support the policy. As a result, government will not provide full religious freedom for all its citizens, or even make it appear that those whose beliefs are disapproved are second-class citizens.1avvphi1 In other words, government action, including its proscription of immorality as expressed in criminal law like concubinage, must have a secular purpose. That is, the government proscribes this conduct because it is "detrimental (or dangerous) to those conditions upon which depend the existence and progress of human society" and not because the conduct is proscribed by the beliefs of one religion or the other. Although admittedly, moral judgments based on religion might have a compelling influence on those engaged in public deliberations over what actions would be considered a moral disapprobation punishable by law. After all, they might also be adherents of a religion and thus have religious opinions and moral codes with a compelling influence on them; the human mind endeavors to regulate the temporal and spiritual institutions of society in a uniform manner, harmonizing earth with heaven. Succinctly put, a law could be religious or Kantian or Aquinian or utilitarian in its deepest roots, but it must have an articulable and discernible secular purpose and justification to pass scrutiny of the religion clauses. x x x Recognizing the religious nature of the Filipinos and the elevating influence of religion in society, however, the Philippine constitution's religion clauses prescribe not a strict but a benevolent neutrality. Benevolent neutrality recognizes that government must pursue its secular goals and interests but at the same time strive to uphold religious liberty to the greatest extent possible within flexible constitutional limits. Thus, although the morality contemplated by laws is secular, benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does not offend compelling state interests.27 Public Morals as a Ground to Deny Ang Ladlads Petition for Registration Respondent suggests that although the moral condemnation of homosexuality and homosexual conduct may be religionbased, it has long been transplanted into generally accepted public morals. The COMELEC argues: Petitioners accreditation was denied not necessarily because their group consists of LGBTs but because of the danger it poses to the people especially the youth. Once it is recognized by the government, a sector which believes that there is nothing wrong in having sexual relations with individuals of the same gender is a bad example. It will bring down the standard of morals we cherish in our civilized society. Any society without a set of moral precepts is in danger of losing its own existence.28 We are not blind to the fact that, through the years, homosexual conduct, and perhaps homosexuals themselves, have borne the brunt of societal disapproval. It is not difficult to imagine the reasons behind this censure religious beliefs, convictions about the preservation of marriage, family, and procreation, even dislike or distrust of homosexuals themselves and their perceived lifestyle. Nonetheless, we recall that the Philippines has not seen fit to criminalize homosexual conduct. Evidently, therefore, these "generally accepted public morals" have not been convincingly transplanted into the realm of law.29 The Assailed Resolutions have not identified any specific overt immoral act performed by Ang Ladlad. Even the OSG agrees that "there should have been a finding by the COMELEC that the groups members have committed or are committing immoral acts."30 The OSG argues: x x x A person may be sexually attracted to a person of the same gender, of a different gender, or more than one gender, but mere attraction does not translate to immoral acts. There is a great divide between thought and action. Reduction ad absurdum. If immoral thoughts could be penalized, COMELEC would have its hands full of disqualification cases against both the "straights" and the gays." Certainly this is not the intendment of the law.31

Respondent has failed to explain what societal ills are sought to be prevented, or why special protection is required for the youth. Neither has the COMELEC condescended to justify its position that petitioners admission into the party-list system would be so harmful as to irreparably damage the moral fabric of society. We, of course, do not suggest that the state is wholly without authority to regulate matters concerning morality, sexuality, and sexual relations, and we recognize that the government will and should continue to restrict behavior considered detrimental to society. Nonetheless, we cannot countenance advocates who, undoubtedly with the loftiest of intentions, situate morality on one end of an argument or another, without bothering to go through the rigors of legal reasoning and explanation. In this, the notion of morality is robbed of all value. Clearly then, the bare invocation of morality will not remove an issue from our scrutiny. We also find the COMELECs reference to purported violations of our penal and civil laws flimsy, at best; disingenuous, at worst. Article 694 of the Civil Code defines a nuisance as "any act, omission, establishment, condition of property, or anything else which shocks, defies, or disregards decency or morality," the remedies for which are a prosecution under the Revised Penal Code or any local ordinance, a civil action, or abatement without judicial proceedings.32 A violation of Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code, on the other hand, requires proof beyond reasonable doubt to support a criminal conviction. It hardly needs to be emphasized that mere allegation of violation of laws is not proof, and a mere blanket invocation of public morals cannot replace the institution of civil or criminal proceedings and a judicial determination of liability or culpability. As such, we hold that moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient governmental interest to justify exclusion of homosexuals from participation in the party-list system. The denial of Ang Ladlads registration on purely moral grounds amounts more to a statement of dislike and disapproval of homosexuals, rather than a tool to further any substantial public interest. Respondents blanket justifications give rise to the inevitable conclusion that the COMELEC targets homosexuals themselves as a class, not because of any particular morally reprehensible act. It is this selective targeting that implicates our equal protection clause. Equal Protection Despite the absolutism of Article III, Section 1 of our Constitution, which provides "nor shall any person be denied equal protection of the laws," courts have never interpreted the provision as an absolute prohibition on classification. "Equality," said Aristotle, "consists in the same treatment of similar persons."33 The equal protection clause guarantees that no person or class of persons shall be deprived of the same protection of laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in the same place and in like circumstances.34 Recent jurisprudence has affirmed that if a law neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, we will uphold the classification as long as it bears a rational relationship to some legitimate government end.35 In Central Bank Employees Association, Inc. v. Banko Sentral ng Pilipinas,36 we declared that "[i]n our jurisdiction, the standard of analysis of equal protection challenges x x x have followed the rational basis test, coupled with a deferential attitude to legislative classifications and a reluctance to invalidate a law unless there is a showing of a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution."37 The COMELEC posits that the majority of the Philippine population considers homosexual conduct as immoral and unacceptable, and this constitutes sufficient reason to disqualify the petitioner. Unfortunately for the respondent, the Philippine electorate has expressed no such belief. No law exists to criminalize homosexual behavior or expressions or parties about homosexual behavior. Indeed, even if we were to assume that public opinion is as the COMELEC describes it, the asserted state interest here that is, moral disapproval of an unpopular minority is not a legitimate state interest that is sufficient to satisfy rational basis review under the equal protection clause. The COMELECs differentiation, and its unsubstantiated claim that Ang Ladlad cannot contribute to the formulation of legislation that would benefit the nation, furthers no legitimate state interest other than disapproval of or dislike for a disfavored group. From the standpoint of the political process, the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender have the same interest in participating in the party-list system on the same basis as other political parties similarly situated. State intrusion in this case is equally burdensome. Hence, laws of general application should apply with equal force to LGBTs, and they deserve to participate in the party-list system on the same basis as other marginalized and under-represented sectors. It bears stressing that our finding that COMELECs act of differentiating LGBTs from heterosexuals insofar as the party-list system is concerned does not imply that any other law distinguishing between heterosexuals and homosexuals under different circumstances would similarly fail. We disagree with the OSGs position that homosexuals are a class in themselves for the purposes of the equal protection clause.38 We are not prepared to single out homosexuals as a separate class meriting special or differentiated treatment. We have not received sufficient evidence to this effect, and it is simply unnecessary to make such a ruling today. Petitioner itself has merely demanded that it be recognized under the

same basis as all other groups similarly situated, and that the COMELEC made "an unwarranted and impermissible classification not justified by the circumstances of the case." Freedom of Expression and Association Under our system of laws, every group has the right to promote its agenda and attempt to persuade society of the validity of its position through normal democratic means.39 It is in the public square that deeply held convictions and differing opinions should be distilled and deliberated upon. As we held in Estrada v. Escritor:40 In a democracy, this common agreement on political and moral ideas is distilled in the public square. Where citizens are free, every opinion, every prejudice, every aspiration, and every moral discernment has access to the public square where people deliberate the order of their life together. Citizens are the bearers of opinion, including opinion shaped by, or espousing religious belief, and these citizens have equal access to the public square. In this representative democracy, the state is prohibited from determining which convictions and moral judgments may be proposed for public deliberation. Through a constitutionally designed process, the people deliberate and decide. Majority rule is a necessary principle in this democratic governance. Thus, when public deliberation on moral judgments is finally crystallized into law, the laws will largely reflect the beliefs and preferences of the majority, i.e., the mainstream or median groups. Nevertheless, in the very act of adopting and accepting a constitution and the limits it specifies including protection of religious freedom "not only for a minority, however small not only for a majority, however large but for each of us" the majority imposes upon itself a self-denying ordinance. It promises not to do what it otherwise could do: to ride roughshod over the dissenting minorities. Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic society, and this freedom applies not only to those that are favorably received but also to those that offend, shock, or disturb. Any restriction imposed in this sphere must be proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. Absent any compelling state interest, it is not for the COMELEC or this Court to impose its views on the populace. Otherwise stated, the COMELEC is certainly not free to interfere with speech for no better reason than promoting an approved message or discouraging a disfavored one. This position gains even more force if one considers that homosexual conduct is not illegal in this country. It follows that both expressions concerning ones homosexuality and the activity of forming a political association that supports LGBT individuals are protected as well. Other jurisdictions have gone so far as to categorically rule that even overwhelming public perception that homosexual conduct violates public morality does not justify criminalizing same-sex conduct.41 European and United Nations judicial decisions have ruled in favor of gay rights claimants on both privacy and equality grounds, citing general privacy and equal protection provisions in foreign and international texts.42 To the extent that there is much to learn from other jurisdictions that have reflected on the issues we face here, such jurisprudence is certainly illuminating. These foreign authorities, while not formally binding on Philippine courts, may nevertheless have persuasive influence on the Courts analysis. In the area of freedom of expression, for instance, United States courts have ruled that existing free speech doctrines protect gay and lesbian rights to expressive conduct. In order to justify the prohibition of a particular expression of opinion, public institutions must show that their actions were caused by "something more than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint."43 With respect to freedom of association for the advancement of ideas and beliefs, in Europe, with its vibrant human rights tradition, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has repeatedly stated that a political party may campaign for a change in the law or the constitutional structures of a state if it uses legal and democratic means and the changes it proposes are consistent with democratic principles. The ECHR has emphasized that political ideas that challenge the existing order and whose realization is advocated by peaceful means must be afforded a proper opportunity of expression through the exercise of the right of association, even if such ideas may seem shocking or unacceptable to the authorities or the majority of the population.44 A political group should not be hindered solely because it seeks to publicly debate controversial political issues in order to find solutions capable of satisfying everyone concerned.45 Only if a political party incites violence or puts forward policies that are incompatible with democracy does it fall outside the protection of the freedom of association guarantee.46 We do not doubt that a number of our citizens may believe that homosexual conduct is distasteful, offensive, or even defiant. They are entitled to hold and express that view. On the other hand, LGBTs and their supporters, in all likelihood, believe with equal fervor that relationships between individuals of the same sex are morally equivalent to heterosexual relationships. They, too, are entitled to hold and express that view. However, as far as this Court is concerned, our

democracy precludes using the religious or moral views of one part of the community to exclude from consideration the values of other members of the community. Of course, none of this suggests the impending arrival of a golden age for gay rights litigants. It well may be that this Decision will only serve to highlight the discrepancy between the rigid constitutional analysis of this Court and the more complex moral sentiments of Filipinos. We do not suggest that public opinion, even at its most liberal, reflect a clear-cut strong consensus favorable to gay rights claims and we neither attempt nor expect to affect individual perceptions of homosexuality through this Decision. The OSG argues that since there has been neither prior restraint nor subsequent punishment imposed on Ang Ladlad, and its members have not been deprived of their right to voluntarily associate, then there has been no restriction on their freedom of expression or association. The OSG argues that: There was no utterance restricted, no publication censored, or any assembly denied. [COMELEC] simply exercised its authority to review and verify the qualifications of petitioner as a sectoral party applying to participate in the party-list system. This lawful exercise of duty cannot be said to be a transgression of Section 4, Article III of the Constitution. xxxx A denial of the petition for registration x x x does not deprive the members of the petitioner to freely take part in the conduct of elections. Their right to vote will not be hampered by said denial. In fact, the right to vote is a constitutionallyguaranteed right which cannot be limited. As to its right to be elected in a genuine periodic election, petitioner contends that the denial of Ang Ladlads petition has the clear and immediate effect of limiting, if not outrightly nullifying the capacity of its members to fully and equally participate in public life through engagement in the party list elections. This argument is puerile. The holding of a public office is not a right but a privilege subject to limitations imposed by law. x x x47 The OSG fails to recall that petitioner has, in fact, established its qualifications to participate in the party-list system, and as advanced by the OSG itself the moral objection offered by the COMELEC was not a limitation imposed by law. To the extent, therefore, that the petitioner has been precluded, because of COMELECs action, from publicly expressing its views as a political party and participating on an equal basis in the political process with other equally-qualified party-list candidates, we find that there has, indeed, been a transgression of petitioners fundamental rights. Non-Discrimination and International Law In an age that has seen international law evolve geometrically in scope and promise, international human rights law, in particular, has grown dynamically in its attempt to bring about a more just and humane world order. For individuals and groups struggling with inadequate structural and governmental support, international human rights norms are particularly significant, and should be effectively enforced in domestic legal systems so that such norms may become actual, rather than ideal, standards of conduct. Our Decision today is fully in accord with our international obligations to protect and promote human rights. In particular, we explicitly recognize the principle of non-discrimination as it relates to the right to electoral participation, enunciated in the UDHR and the ICCPR. The principle of non-discrimination is laid out in Article 26 of the ICCPR, as follows: Article 26 All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. In this context, the principle of non-discrimination requires that laws of general application relating to elections be applied equally to all persons, regardless of sexual orientation. Although sexual orientation is not specifically enumerated as a

status or ratio for discrimination in Article 26 of the ICCPR, the ICCPR Human Rights Committee has opined that the reference to "sex" in Article 26 should be construed to include "sexual orientation."48 Additionally, a variety of United Nations bodies have declared discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation to be prohibited under various international agreements.49 The UDHR provides: Article 21. (1) Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely chosen representatives. Likewise, the ICCPR states: Article 25 Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, without any of the distinctions mentioned in article 2 and without unreasonable restrictions: (a) To take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives; (b) To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the electors; (c) To have access, on general terms of equality, to public service in his country. As stated by the CHR in its Comment-in-Intervention, the scope of the right to electoral participation is elaborated by the Human Rights Committee in its General Comment No. 25 (Participation in Public Affairs and the Right to Vote) as follows: 1. Article 25 of the Covenant recognizes and protects the right of every citizen to take part in the conduct of public affairs, the right to vote and to be elected and the right to have access to public service. Whatever form of constitution or government is in force, the Covenant requires States to adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to ensure that citizens have an effective opportunity to enjoy the rights it protects. Article 25 lies at the core of democratic government based on the consent of the people and in conformity with the principles of the Covenant. xxxx 15. The effective implementation of the right and the opportunity to stand for elective office ensures that persons entitled to vote have a free choice of candidates. Any restrictions on the right to stand for election, such as minimum age, must be justifiable on objective and reasonable criteria. Persons who are otherwise eligible to stand for election should not be excluded by unreasonable or discriminatory requirements such as education, residence or descent, or by reason of political affiliation. No person should suffer discrimination or disadvantage of any kind because of that person's candidacy. States parties should indicate and explain the legislative provisions which exclude any group or category of persons from elective office.50 We stress, however, that although this Court stands willing to assume the responsibility of giving effect to the Philippines international law obligations, the blanket invocation of international law is not the panacea for all social ills. We refer now to the petitioners invocation of the Yogyakarta Principles (the Application of International Human Rights Law In Relation to Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity),51 which petitioner declares to reflect binding principles of international law. At this time, we are not prepared to declare that these Yogyakarta Principles contain norms that are obligatory on the Philippines. There are declarations and obligations outlined in said Principles which are not reflective of the current state of international law, and do not find basis in any of the sources of international law enumerated under Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice.52 Petitioner has not undertaken any objective and rigorous analysis of these alleged principles of international law to ascertain their true status. We also hasten to add that not everything that society or a certain segment of society wants or demands is automatically a human right. This is not an arbitrary human intervention that may be added to or subtracted from at will. It is unfortunate that much of what passes for human rights today is a much broader context of needs that identifies many social desires as rights in order to further claims that international law obliges states to sanction these innovations. This

has the effect of diluting real human rights, and is a result of the notion that if "wants" are couched in "rights" language, then they are no longer controversial.1avvphi1 Using even the most liberal of lenses, these Yogyakarta Principles, consisting of a declaration formulated by various international law professors, are at best de lege ferenda and do not constitute binding obligations on the Philippines. Indeed, so much of contemporary international law is characterized by the "soft law" nomenclature, i.e., international law is full of principles that promote international cooperation, harmony, and respect for human rights, most of which amount to no more than well-meaning desires, without the support of either State practice or opinio juris.53 As a final note, we cannot help but observe that the social issues presented by this case are emotionally charged, societal attitudes are in flux, even the psychiatric and religious communities are divided in opinion. This Courts role is not to impose its own view of acceptable behavior. Rather, it is to apply the Constitution and laws as best as it can, uninfluenced by public opinion, and confident in the knowledge that our democracy is resilient enough to withstand vigorous debate. WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The Resolutions of the Commission on Elections dated November 11, 2009 and December 16, 2009 in SPP No. 09-228 (PL) are hereby SET ASIDE. The Commission on Elections is directed to GRANT petitioners application for party-list accreditation. SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 136781. October 6, 2000]

VETERANS FEDERATION PARTY, ALYANSANG BAYANIHAN NG MGA MAGSASAKA, MANGGAGAWANG BUKID AT MANGINGISDA, ADHIKAIN AT KILUSAN NG ORDINARYONG TAO PARA SA LUPA, PABAHAY AT KAUNLARAN, and LUZON FARMERS PARTY, petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, PAG-ASA, SENIOR CITIZENS, AKAP AKSYON, PINATUBO, NUPA, PRP, AMIN, PAG-ASA, MAHARLIKA, OCW-UNIFIL, PCCI, AMMA-KATIPUNAN, KAMPIL, BANTAY-BAYAN, AFW, ANG LAKAS OCW, WOMEN-POWER, INC., FEJODAP, CUP, VETERANS CARE, 4L, AWATU, PMP, ATUCP, NCWP, ALU, BIGAS, COPRA, GREEN, ANAKBAYAN, ARBA, MINFA, AYOS, ALL COOP, PDP-LABAN, KATIPUNAN, ONEWAY PRINT, AABANTE KA PILIPINAS -- All Being Party-List Parties/Organizations -- and Hon. MANUEL B. VILLAR, JR. in His Capacity as Speaker of the House of Representatives, respondents. DECISION PANGANIBAN, J.:* Prologue To determine the winners in a Philippine-style party-list election, the Constitution and Republic Act (RA) No. 7941 mandate at least four inviolable parameters. These are: First, the twenty percent allocation - the combined number of all party-list congressmen shall not exceed twenty percent of the total membership of the House of Representatives, including those elected under the party list. Second, the two percent threshold - only those parties garnering a minimum of two percent of the total valid votes cast for the party-list system are qualified to have a seat in the House of Representatives; Third, the three-seat limit - each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it actually obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three seats; that is, one qualifying and two additional seats. Fourth, proportional representation - the additional seats which a qualified party is entitled to shall be computed in proportion to their total number of votes. Because the Comelec violated these legal parameters, the assailed Resolutions must be struck down for having been issued in grave abuse of discretion. The poll body is mandated to enforce and administer election-related laws. It has no power to contravene or amend them. Neither does it have authority to decide the wisdom, propriety or rationality of the acts of Congress. Its bounden duty is to craft rules, regulations, methods and formulas to implement election laws -- not to reject, ignore, defeat, obstruct or circumvent them. In fine, the constitutional introduction of the party-list system - a normal feature of parliamentary democracies - into our presidential form of government, modified by unique Filipino statutory parameters, presents new paradigms and novel questions, which demand innovative legal solutions convertible into mathematical formulations which are, in turn, anchored on time-tested jurisprudence. The Case Before the Court are three consolidated Petitions for Certiorari (with applications for the issuance of a temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction) under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, assailing (1) the October 15, 1998 Resolution69[1] of the Commission on Elections (Comelec), Second Division, in Election Matter 98-065;70[2] and (2) the January 7, 1999 Resolution71[3] of the Comelec en banc, affirming the said disposition. The assailed Resolutions ordered the proclamation of thirty-eight (38) additional party-list representatives "to complete the full complement of 52 seats in the House of Representatives as provided under Section 5, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and R.A. 7941. The Facts and the Antecedents

* 69 70 71

Our 1987 Constitution introduced a novel feature into our presidential system of government -- the party-list method of representation. Under this system, any national, regional or sectoral party or organization registered with the Commission on Elections may participate in the election of party-list representatives who, upon their election and proclamation, shall sit in the House of Representatives as regular members.72[4] In effect, a voter is given two (2) votes for the House -- one for a district congressman and another for a party-list representative.73[5] Specifically, this system of representation is mandated by Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, which provides: Sec. 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected by a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations. (2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives including those under the party-list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector. Complying with its constitutional duty to provide by law the selection or election of party-list representatives, Congress enacted RA 7941 on March 3, 1995. Under this statutes policy declaration, the State shall "promote proportional representation in the election of representatives to the House of Representatives through a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the House of Representatives. Towards this end, the State shall develop and guarantee a full, free and open party system in order to attain the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives by enhancing their chances to compete for and win seats in the legislature, and shall provide the simplest scheme possible. (italics ours.) The requirements for entitlement to a party-list seat in the House are prescribed by this law (RA 7941) in this wise: Sec. 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. -- The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum (20%) of the total number of the members of the House of Representatives including those under the party-list. For purposes of the May 1998 elections, the first five (5) major political parties on the basis of party representation in the House of Representatives at the start of the Tenth Congress of the Philippines shall not be entitled to participate in the party-list system. In determining the allocation of seats for the second vote, the following procedure shall be observed: (a) The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections. (b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each; Provided, That those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes; Provided, finally, That each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats. Pursuant to Section 18 of RA 7941, the Comelec en banc promulgated Resolution No. 2847, prescribing the rules and regulations governing the election of party-list representatives through the party-list system. Election of the Fourteen Party-List Representatives On May 11, 1998, the first election for party-list representation was held simultaneously with the national elections. A total of one hundred twenty-three (123) parties, organizations and coalitions participated. On June 26, 1998, the Comelec en

72 73

banc proclaimed thirteen (13) party-list representatives from twelve (12) parties and organizations, which had obtained at least two percent of the total number of votes cast for the party-list system. Two of the proclaimed representatives belonged to Petitioner APEC, which obtained 5.5 percent of the votes. The proclaimed winners and the votes cast in their favor were as follows:74[6] Party/Organization/ Coalition 1. APEC Number of Percentage of Votes ObtainedTotal Votes 503,487 5.5% 3.51% 3.41% 3.33% 2.79% 2.61% 2.60% 2.57% 2.54% 2.36% 2.13% 2.07% Nominees

2. ABA 321,646 3. ALAGAD 312,500 4. VETERANS 304,802 FEDERATION 5. PROMDI 255,184 6. AKO 239,042 7. NCSCFO 238,303 8. ABANSE! PINAY 235,548 9. AKBAYAN 232,376 10. BUTIL 215,643 11. SANLAKAS 194,617 12. COOP-NATCCO 189,802

Rene M. Silos Melvyn D. Eballe Leonardo Q. Montemayor Diogenes S. Osabel Eduardo P. Pilapil Joy A.G. Young Ariel A. Zartiga Gorgonio P. Unde Patricia M. Sarenas Loreta Ann P. Rosales Benjamin A. Cruz Renato B. Magtubo Cresente C. Paez

After passing upon the results of the special elections held on July 4, 18, and 25, 1998, the Comelec en banc further determined that COCOFED (Philippine Coconut Planters Federation, Inc.) was entitled to one party-list seat for having garnered 186,388 votes, which were equivalent to 2.04 percent of the total votes cast for the party-list system. Thus, its first nominee, Emerito S. Calderon, was proclaimed on September 8, 1998 as the 14th party-list representative.75[7] On July 6, 1998, PAG-ASA (Peoples Progressive Alliance for Peace and Good Government Towards Alleviation of Poverty and Social Advancement) filed with the Comelec a "Petition to Proclaim [the] Full Number of Party-List Representatives provided by the Constitution." It alleged that the filling up of the twenty percent membership of party-list representatives in the House of Representatives, as provided under the Constitution, was mandatory. It further claimed that the literal application of the two percent vote requirement and the three-seat limit under RA 7941 would defeat this constitutional provision, for only 25 nominees would be declared winners, short of the 52 party-list representatives who should actually sit in the House. Thereafter, nine other party-list organizations76[8] filed their respective Motions for Intervention, seeking the same relief as that sought by PAG-ASA on substantially the same grounds. Likewise, PAG-ASAs Petition was joined by other party-list organizations in a Manifestation they filed on August 28, 1998. These organizations were COCOFED, Senior Citizens, AKAP, AKSYON, PINATUBO, NUPA, PRP, AMIN, PCCI, AMMA-KATIPUNAN, OCW-UNIFIL, KAMPIL, MAHARLIKA, AFW, Women Power, Inc., Ang Lakas OCW, FEJODAP, CUP, Veterans Care, Bantay Bayan, 4L, AWATU, PMP, ATUCP, ALU and BIGAS. On October 15, 1998, the Comelec Second Division promulgated the present assailed Resolution granting PAG-ASA's Petition. It also ordered the proclamation of herein 38 respondents who, in addition to the 14 already sitting, would thus total 52 party-list representatives. It held that "at all times, the total number of congressional77[9] seats must be filled up by eighty (80%) percent district representatives and twenty (20%) percent party-list representatives." In allocating the 52 seats, it disregarded the two percent-vote requirement prescribed under Section 11 (b) of RA 7941. Instead, it identified three "elements of the party-list system," which should supposedly determine "how the 52 seats should be filled up." First, "the system was conceived to enable the marginalized sectors of the Philippine society to be represented in the House of Representatives." Second, "the system should represent the broadest sectors of the Philippine society." Third, "it should encourage [the] multi-party system. (Boldface in the original.) Considering these elements, but ignoring the two percent threshold requirement of RA 7941, it concluded that "the party-list groups ranked Nos. 1 to 51 x x x should have at least one representative. It thus disposed as follows:

74 75 76 77

"WHEREFORE, by virtue of the powers vested in it by the Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. 881), Republic Act No. 7941 and other election laws, the Commission (Second Division) hereby resolves to GRANT the instant petition and motions for intervention, to include those similarly situated. ACCORDINGLY, the nominees from the party-list hereinbelow enumerated based on the list of names submitted by their respective parties, organizations and coalitions are PROCLAIMED as party-list representatives, to wit: 1. SENIOR CITIZENS 2. AKAP 3. AKSYON 4. PINATUBO 5. NUPA 6. PRP 7. AMIN 8. PAG-ASA 9. MAHARLIKA 10. OCW-UNIFIL 11. FCL 12. AMMA-KATIPUNAN 13. KAMPIL 14. BANTAY BAYAN 15. AFW 16. ANG LAKAS OCW 17. WOMENPOWER, INC. 18. FEJODAP 19. CUP 20. VETERANS CARE 21. 4L 22. AWATU 23. PMP 24. ATUCP 25. NCWP

26. ALU 27. BIGAS 28. COPRA 29. GREEN 30. ANAKBAYAN 31. ARBA 32. MINFA 33. AYOS 34. ALL COOP 35. PDP-LABAN 36. KATIPUNAN 37. ONEWAY PRINT 38. AABANTE KA PILIPINAS to complete the full complement of 52 seats in the House of Representatives as provided in Section 5, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and R.A. 7941. The foregoing disposition sums up a glaring bit of inconsistency and flip-flopping. In its Resolution No. 2847 dated June 25, 1996, the Comelec en banc had unanimously promulgated a set of Rules and Regulations Governing the Election of x x x Party-List Representatives Through the Party-List System. Under these Rules and Regulations, one additional seat shall be given for every two percent of the vote, a formula the Comelec illustrated in its Annex A. It apparently relied on this method when it proclaimed the 14 incumbent party-list solons (two for APEC and one each for the 12 other qualified parties). However, for inexplicable reasons, it abandoned said unanimous Resolution and proclaimed, based on its three elements, the Group of 38 private respondents.78[10] The twelve (12) parties and organizations, which had earlier been proclaimed winners on the basis of having obtained at least two percent of the votes cast for the party-list system, objected to the proclamation of the 38 parties and filed separate Motions for Reconsideration. They contended that (1) under Section 11 (b) of RA 7941, only parties, organizations or coalitions garnering at least two percent of the votes for the party-list system were entitled to seats in the House of Representatives; and (2) additional seats, not exceeding two for each, should be allocated to those which had garnered the two percent threshold in proportion to the number of votes cast for the winning parties, as provided by said Section 11. Ruling of the Comelec En Banc Noting that all the parties -- movants and oppositors alike - had agreed that the twenty percent membership of party-list representatives in the House "should be filled up, the Comelec en banc resolved only the issue concerning the apportionment or allocation of the remaining seats. In other words, the issue was: Should the remaining 38 unfilled seats allocated to party-list solons be given (1) to the thirteen qualified parties that had each garnered at least two percent of the total votes, or (2) to the Group of 38 - herein private respondents - even if they had not passed the two percent threshold? The poll body held that to allocate the remaining seats only to those who had hurdled the two percent vote requirement "will mean the concentration of representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives to thirteen organizations representing two political parties, three coalitions and four sectors: urban poor, veterans, women and peasantry x x x. Such strict application of the 2% 'threshold' does not serve the essence and object of the Constitution

78

and the legislature -- to develop and guarantee a full, free and open party system in order to attain the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives x x x. Additionally, it "will also prevent this Commission from complying with the constitutional and statutory decrees for party-list representatives to compose 20% of the House of Representatives. Thus, in its Resolution dated January 7, 1999, the Comelec en banc, by a razor-thin majority -- with three commissioners concurring79[11] and two members80[12] dissenting -- affirmed the Resolution of its Second Division. It, however, held in abeyance the proclamation of the 51st party (AABANTE KA PILIPINAS), "pending the resolution of petitions for correction of manifest errors. Without expressly declaring as unconstitutional or void the two percent vote requirement imposed by RA 7941, the Commission blithely rejected and circumvented its application, holding that there were more important considerations than this statutory threshold. Consequently, several petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, with prayers for the issuance of temporary restraining orders or writs of preliminary injunction, were filed before this Court by the parties and organizations that had obtained at least two per cent of the total votes cast for the party-list system.81[13] In the suits, made respondents together with the Comelec were the 38 parties, organizations and coalitions that had been declared by the poll body as likewise entitled to party-list seats in the House of Representatives. Collectively, petitioners sought the proclamation of additional representatives from each of their parties and organizations, all of which had obtained at least two percent of the total votes cast for the party-list system. On January 12, 1999, this Court issued a Status Quo Order directing the Comelec to CEASE and DESIST from constituting itself as a National Board of Canvassers on 13 January 1999 or on any other date and proclaiming as winners the nominees of the parties, organizations and coalitions enumerated in the dispositive portions of its 15 October 1998 Resolution or its 7 January 1999 Resolution, until further orders from this Court. On July 1, 1999, oral arguments were heard from the parties. Atty. Jeremias U. Montemayor appeared for petitioners in GR No. 136781; Atty. Gregorio A. Andolana, for petitioners in GR No. 136786; Atty. Rodante D. Marcoleta for petitioners in GR No. 136795; Attys. Ricardo Blancaflor and Pete Quirino Quadra, for all the private respondents; Atty. Porfirio V. Sison for Intervenor NACUSIP; and Atty. Jose P. Balbuena for Respondent Comelec. Upon invitation of the Court, retired Comelec Commissioner Regalado E. Maambong acted as amicus curiae. Solicitor General Ricardo P. Galvez appeared, not for any party but also as a friend of the Court. Thereafter, the parties and the amici curiae were required to submit their respective Memoranda in amplification of their verbal arguments.82[14] The Issues The Court believes, and so holds, that the main question of how to determine the winners of the subject party-list election can be fully settled by addressing the following issues: 1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives mentioned in Section 5 (2), Article VI of the Constitution, mandatory or is it merely a ceiling? In other words, should the twenty percent allocation for party-list solons be filled up completely and all the time? 2. Are the two percent threshold requirement and the three-seat limit provided in Section 11 (b) of RA 7941 constitutional? 3. If the answer to Issue 2 is in the affirmative, how should the additional seats of a qualified party be determined?

The Courts Ruling

79 80 81 82

The Petitions are partly meritorious. The Court agrees with petitioners that the assailed Resolutions should be nullified, but disagrees that they should all be granted additional seats. First Issue: Whether the Twenty Percent Constitutional Allocation Is Mandatory The pertinent provision83[15] of the Constitution on the composition of the House of Representatives reads as follows: Sec. 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected by a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations. (2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives including those under the party-list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector. Determination of the Total Number of Party-List Lawmakers Clearly, the Constitution makes the number of district representatives the determinant in arriving at the number of seats allocated for party-list lawmakers, who shall comprise "twenty per centum of the total number of representatives including those under the party-list." We thus translate this legal provision into a mathematical formula, as follows: No. of district representatives ---------------------------------- x .20 = No. of party-list .80 representatives This formulation84[16] means that any increase in the number of district representatives, as may be provided by law, will necessarily result in a corresponding increase in the number of party-list seats. To illustrate, considering that there were 208 district representatives to be elected during the 1998 national elections, the number of party-list seats would be 52, computed as follows: 208 -------- x .20 = 52 .80 The foregoing computation of seat allocation is easy enough to comprehend. The problematic question, however, is this: Does the Constitution require all such allocated seats to be filled up all the time and under all circumstances? Our short answer is No. Twenty Percent Allocation a Mere Ceiling The Constitution simply states that "[t]he party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives including those under the party-list. According to petitioners, this percentage is a ceiling; the mechanics by which it is to be filled up has been left to Congress. In the exercise of its prerogative, the legislature enacted RA 7941, by which it prescribed that a party, organization or coalition participating in the party-list election must obtain at least two percent of the total votes cast for the system in order to qualify for a seat in the House of Representatives. Petitioners further argue that the constitutional provision must be construed together with this legislative requirement. If there is no sufficient number of participating parties, organizations or coalitions which could hurdle the two percent vote threshold and thereby fill up the twenty percent party-list allocation in the House, then naturally such allocation cannot be

83 84

filled up completely. The Comelec cannot be faulted for the "incompleteness," for ultimately the voters themselves are the ones who, in the exercise of their right of suffrage, determine who and how many should represent them. On the other hand, Public Respondent Comelec, together with the respondent parties, avers that the twenty percent allocation for party-list lawmakers is mandatory, and that the two percent vote requirement in RA 7941 is unconstitutional, because its strict application would make it mathematically impossible to fill up the House party-list complement. We rule that a simple reading of Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, easily conveys the equally simple message that Congress was vested with the broad power to define and prescribe the mechanics of the party-list system of representation. The Constitution explicitly sets down only the percentage of the total membership in the House of Representatives reserved for party-list representatives. In the exercise of its constitutional prerogative, Congress enacted RA 7941. As said earlier, Congress declared therein a policy to promote "proportional representation" in the election of party-list representatives in order to enable Filipinos belonging to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors to contribute legislation that would benefit them. It however deemed it necessary to require parties, organizations and coalitions participating in the system to obtain at least two percent of the total votes cast for the party-list system in order to be entitled to a party-list seat. Those garnering more than this percentage could have "additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes. Furthermore, no winning party, organization or coalition can have more than three seats in the House of Representatives. Thus the relevant portion of Section 11(b) of the law provides: (b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the partylist system shall be entitled to one seat each; Provided, That those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes; Provided, finally, That each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats. Considering the foregoing statutory requirements, it will be shown presently that Section 5 (2), Article VI of the Constitution is not mandatory. It merely provides a ceiling for party-list seats in Congress. On the contention that a strict application of the two percent threshold may result in a mathematical impossibility, suffice it to say that the prerogative to determine whether to adjust or change this percentage requirement rests in Congress.85 [17] Our task now, as should have been the Comelecs, is not to find fault in the wisdom of the law through highly unlikely scenarios of clinical extremes, but to craft an innovative mathematical formula that can, as far as practicable, implement it within the context of the actual election process. Indeed, the function of the Supreme Court, as well as of all judicial and quasi-judicial agencies, is to apply the law as we find it, not to reinvent or second-guess it. Unless declared unconstitutional, ineffective, insufficient or otherwise void by the proper tribunal, a statute remains a valid command of sovereignty that must be respected and obeyed at all times. This is the essence of the rule of law. Second Issue: The Statutory Requirement and Limitation The Two Percent Threshold In imposing a two percent threshold, Congress wanted to ensure that only those parties, organizations and coalitions having a sufficient number of constituents deserving of representation are actually represented in Congress. This intent can be gleaned from the deliberations on the proposed bill. We quote below a pertinent portion of the Senate discussion: SENATOR GONZALES: For purposes of continuity, I would want to follow up a point that was raised by, I think, Senator Osmea when he said that a political party must have obtained at least a minimum percentage to be provided in this law in order to qualify for a seat under the party-list system. They do that in many other countries. A party must obtain at least 2 percent of the votes cast, 5 percent or 10 percent of the votes cast. Otherwise, as I have said, this will actually proliferate political party groups and those who have not really been given by the people sufficient basis for them to represent their constituents and, in turn, they will be able to get to the Parliament through the backdoor under the name of the party-list system, Mr. President."86[18]

85 86

A similar intent is clear from the statements of the bill sponsor in the House of Representatives, as the following shows: MR. ESPINOSA. There is a mathematical formula which this computation is based at, arriving at a five percent ratio which would distribute equitably the number of seats among the different sectors. There is a mathematical formula which is, I think, patterned after that of the party list of the other parliaments or congresses, more particularly the Bundestag of Germany.87[19] Moreover, even the framers of our Constitution had in mind a minimum-vote requirement, the specification of which they left to Congress to properly determine. Constitutional Commissioner Christian S. Monsod explained: MR. MONSOD. x x x We are amenable to modifications in the minimum percentage of votes. Our proposal is that anybody who has two-and-a-half percent of the votes gets a seat. There are about 20 million who cast their votes in the last elections. Two-and-a-half percent would mean 500,000 votes. Anybody who has a constituency of 500,000 votes nationwide deserves a seat in the Assembly. If we bring that down to two percent, we are talking about 400,000 votes. The average vote per family is three. So, here we are talking about 134,000 families. We believe that there are many sectors who will be able to get seats in the Assembly because many of them have memberships of over 10,000. In effect, that is the operational implication of our proposal. What we are trying to avoid is this selection of sectors, the reserve seat system. We believe that it is our job to open up the system and that we should not have within that system a reserve seat. We think that people should organize, should work hard, and should earn their seats within that system.88[20] The two percent threshold is consistent not only with the intent of the framers of the Constitution and the law, but with the very essence of "representation." Under a republican or representative state, all government authority emanates from the people, but is exercised by representatives chosen by them.89[21] But to have meaningful representation, the elected persons must have the mandate of a sufficient number of people. Otherwise, in a legislature that features the party-list system, the result might be the proliferation of small groups which are incapable of contributing significant legislation, and which might even pose a threat to the stability of Congress. Thus, even legislative districts are apportioned according to "the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio"90[22] to ensure meaningful local representation. All in all, we hold that the statutory provision on this two percent requirement is precise and crystalline. When the law is clear, the function of courts is simple application, not interpretation or circumvention.91[23] The Three-Seat-Per-Party Limit An important consideration in adopting the party-list system is to promote and encourage a multiparty system of representation. Again, we quote Commissioner Monsod: MR. MONSOD. Madam President, I just want to say that we suggested or proposed the party list system because we wanted to open up the political system to a pluralistic society through a multiparty system. But we also wanted to avoid the problems of mechanics and operation in the implementation of a concept that has very serious shortcomings of classification and of double or triple votes. We are for opening up the system, and we would like very much for the sectors to be there. That is why one of the ways to do that is to put a ceiling on the number of representatives from any single party that can sit within the 50 allocated under the party list system. This way, we will open it up and enable sectoral groups, or maybe regional groups, to earn their seats among the fifty. x x x.92[24] Consistent with the Constitutional Commission's pronouncements, Congress set the seat-limit to three (3) for each qualified party, organization or coalition. "Qualified" means having hurdled the two percent vote threshold. Such three-seat limit ensures the entry of various interest-representations into the legislature; thus, no single group, no matter how large its membership, would dominate the party-list seats, if not the entire House. We shall not belabor this point, because the validity of the three-seat limit is not seriously challenged in these consolidated cases.

87 88 89 90 91 92

Third Issue: Method of Allocating Additional Seats Having determined that the twenty percent seat allocation is merely a ceiling, and having upheld the constitutionality of the two percent vote threshold and the three-seat limit imposed under RA 7941, we now proceed to the method of determining how many party-list seats the qualified parties, organizations and coalitions are entitled to. The very first step - there is no dispute on this - is to rank all the participating parties, organizations and coalitions (hereafter collectively referred to as "parties") according to the votes they each obtained. The percentage of their respective votes as against the total number of votes cast for the party-list system is then determined. All those that garnered at least two percent of the total votes cast have an assured or guaranteed seat in the House of Representatives. Thereafter, "those garnering more than two percent of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes." The problem is how to distribute additional seats "proportionally," bearing in mind the three-seat limit further imposed by the law. One Additional Seat Per Two Percent Increment One proposed formula is to allocate one additional seat for every additional proportion of the votes obtained equivalent to the two percent vote requirement for the first seat.93[25] Translated in figures, a party that wins at least six percent of the total votes cast will be entitled to three seats; another party that gets four percent will be entitled to two seats; and one that gets two percent will be entitled to one seat only. This proposal has the advantage of simplicity and ease of comprehension. Problems arise, however, when the parties get very lop-sided votes -- for example, when Party A receives 20 percent of the total votes cast; Party B, 10 percent; and Party C, 6 percent. Under the method just described, Party A would be entitled to 10 seats; Party B, to 5 seats and Party C, to 3 seats. Considering the three-seat limit imposed by law, all the parties will each uniformly have three seats only. We would then have the spectacle of a party garnering two or more times the number of votes obtained by another, yet getting the same number of seats as the other one with the much lesser votes. In effect, proportional representation will be contravened and the law rendered nugatory by this suggested solution. Hence, the Court discarded it. The Niemeyer Formula Another suggestion that the Court considered was the Niemeyer formula, which was developed by a German mathematician and adopted by Germany as its method of distributing party-list seats in the Bundestag. Under this formula, the number of additional seats to which a qualified party would be entitled is determined by multiplying the remaining number of seats to be allocated by the total number of votes obtained by that party and dividing the product by the total number of votes garnered by all the qualified parties. The integer portion of the resulting product will be the number of additional seats that the party concerned is entitled to. Thus: No. of remaining seats to be allocated No. of additional --------------------------- x No. of votes of = seats of party Total no. of votes of party concerned concerned qualified parties (Integer.decimal) The next step is to distribute the extra seats left among the qualified parties in the descending order of the decimal portions of the resulting products. Based on the 1998 election results, the distribution of party-list seats under the Niemeyer method would be as follows: Party Number of Guaranteed Votes Seats 1. APEC 503,487 2. ABA 321,646 3. ALAGAD 312,500 4. VETERANS 304,802 FEDERATION 5. PROMDI 255,184 6. AKO 239,042 1 7. NCSCFO 238,303 8. ABANSE! PINAY 235,548 9. AKBAYAN 232,376 10. BUTIL 215,643 11. SANLAKAS 194,617 Additional Seats 1 1 3.66 1 3.55 1 3.47 1 2.72 1 1 1 1 1 2.90 1 2.71 2.68 2.64 2.45 2.21 1 1 1 Extra Seats 5.73 1 Total 1 5 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 7

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12. COOP-NATCCO 189,802 13. COCOFED 186,388 Total 3,429,338

1 1 13

2.16 2.12 32

3 3 7 52

However, since Section 11 of RA 7941 sets a limit of three (3) seats for each party, those obtaining more than the limit will have to give up their excess seats. Under our present set of facts, the thirteen qualified parties will each be entitled to three seats, resulting in an overall total of 39. Note that like the previous proposal, the Niemeyer formula would violate the principle of "proportional representation," a basic tenet of our party-list system. The Niemeyer formula, while no doubt suitable for Germany, finds no application in the Philippine setting, because of our three-seat limit and the non-mandatory character of the twenty percent allocation. True, both our Congress and the Bundestag have threshold requirements -- two percent for us and five for them. There are marked differences between the two models, however. As ably pointed out by private respondents,94[26] one half of the German Parliament is filled up by party-list members. More important, there are no seat limitations, because German law discourages the proliferation of small parties. In contrast, RA 7941, as already mentioned, imposes a three-seat limit to encourage the promotion of the multiparty system. This major statutory difference makes the Niemeyer formula completely inapplicable to the Philippines. Just as one cannot grow Washington apples in the Philippines or Guimaras mangoes in the Arctic because of fundamental environmental differences, neither can the Niemeyer formula be transplanted in toto here because of essential variances between the two party-list models. The Legal and Logical Formula for the Philippines It is now obvious that the Philippine style party-list system is a unique paradigm which demands an equally unique formula. In crafting a legally defensible and logical solution to determine the number of additional seats that a qualified party is entitled to, we need to review the parameters of the Filipino party-list system. As earlier mentioned in the Prologue, they are as follows: First, the twenty percent allocation - the combined number of all party-list congressmen shall not exceed twenty percent of the total membership of the House of Representatives, including those elected under the party list. Second, the two percent threshold - only those parties garnering a minimum of two percent of the total valid votes cast for the party-list system are qualified to have a seat in the House of Representatives; Third, the three-seat limit - each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it actually obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three seats; that is, one qualifying and two additional seats. Fourth, proportional representation - the additional seats which a qualified party is entitled to shall be computed in proportion to their total number of votes. The problem, as already stated, is to find a way to translate proportional representation into a mathematical formula that will not contravene, circumvent or amend the above-mentioned parameters. After careful deliberation, we now explain such formula, step by step. Step One. There is no dispute among the petitioners, the public and the private respondents, as well as the members of this Court, that the initial step is to rank all the participating parties, organizations and coalitions from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they each received. Then the ratio for each party is computed by dividing its votes by the total votes cast for all the parties participating in the system. All parties with at least two percent of the total votes are guaranteed one seat each. Only these parties shall be considered in the computation of additional seats. The party receiving the highest number of votes shall thenceforth be referred to as the first party. Step Two. The next step is to determine the number of seats the first party is entitled to, in order to be able to compute that for the other parties. Since the distribution is based on proportional representation, the number of seats to be allotted to the other parties cannot possibly exceed that to which the first party is entitled by virtue of its obtaining the most number of votes.

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For example, the first party received 1,000,000 votes and is determined to be entitled to two additional seats. Another qualified party which received 500,000 votes cannot be entitled to the same number of seats, since it garnered only fifty percent of the votes won by the first party. Depending on the proportion of its votes relative to that of the first party whose number of seats has already been predetermined, the second party should be given less than that to which the first one is entitled. The other qualified parties will always be allotted less additional seats than the first party for two reasons: (1) the ratio between said parties and the first party will always be less than 1:1, and (2) the formula does not admit of mathematical rounding off, because there is no such thing as a fraction of a seat. Verily, an arbitrary rounding off could result in a violation of the twenty percent allocation. An academic mathematical demonstration of such incipient violation is not necessary because the present set of facts, given the number of qualified parties and the voting percentages obtained, will definitely not end up in such constitutional contravention. The Court has previously ruled in Guingona Jr. v. Gonzales95[27] that a fractional membership cannot be converted into a whole membership of one when it would, in effect, deprive another party's fractional membership. It would be a violation of the constitutional mandate of proportional representation. We said further that "no party can claim more than what it is entitled to x x x. In any case, the decision on whether to round off the fractions is better left to the legislature. Since Congress did not provide for it in the present law, neither will this Court. The Supreme Court does not make the law; it merely applies it to a given set of facts. Formula for Determining Additional Seats for the First Party Now, how do we determine the number of seats the first party is entitled to? The only basis given by the law is that a party receiving at least two percent of the total votes shall be entitled to one seat. Proportionally, if the first party were to receive twice the number of votes of the second party, it should be entitled to twice the latter's number of seats and so on. The formula, therefore, for computing the number of seats to which the first party is entitled is as follows: Number of votes of first party -------------------- = Total votes for party-list system

Proportion of votes of first party relative to total votes for party-list system

If the proportion of votes received by the first party without rounding it off is equal to at least six percent of the total valid votes cast for all the party list groups, then the first party shall be entitled to two additional seats or a total of three seats overall. If the proportion of votes without a rounding off is equal to or greater than four percent, but less than six percent, then the first party shall have one additional or a total of two seats. And if the proportion is less than four percent, then the first party shall not be entitled to any additional seat. We adopted this six percent bench mark, because the first party is not always entitled to the maximum number of additional seats. Likewise, it would prevent the allotment of more than the total number of available seats, such as in an extreme case wherein 18 or more parties tie for the highest rank and are thus entitled to three seats each. In such scenario, the number of seats to which all the parties are entitled may exceed the maximum number of party-list seats reserved in the House of Representatives. Applying the above formula, APEC, which received 5.5% of the total votes cast, is entitled to one additional seat or a total of two seats. Note that the above formula will be applicable only in determining the number of additional seats the first party is entitled to. It cannot be used to determine the number of additional seats of the other qualified parties. As explained earlier, the use of the same formula for all would contravene the proportional representation parameter. For example, a second party obtains six percent of the total number of votes cast. According to the above formula, the said party would be entitled to two additional seats or a total of three seats overall. However, if the first party received a significantly higher amount of votes -- say, twenty percent -- to grant it the same number of seats as the second party would violate the statutory mandate of proportional representation, since a party getting only six percent of the votes will have an equal number of

95

representatives as the one obtaining twenty percent. The proper solution, therefore, is to grant the first party a total of three seats; and the party receiving six percent, additional seats in proportion to those of the first party. Formula for Additional Seats of Other Qualified Parties Step Three The next step is to solve for the number of additional seats that the other qualified parties are entitled to, based on proportional representation. The formula is encompassed by the following complex fraction: No. of votes of concerned party -----------------Total no. of votes Additional seats for party-list system No. of additional for concerned = ----------------------x seats allocated to party No. of votes of the first party first party -----------------Total no. of votes for party list system In simplified form, it is written as follows: No. of votes of concerned party No. of additional ------------------ x seats allocated to No. of votes of the first party first party

Additional seats for concerned = party

Thus, in the case of ABA, the additional number of seats it would be entitled to is computed as follows: No. of votes of ABA No. of additional -------------------- x seats allocated to No. of votes of the first party first party (APEC)

Additional seats for concerned = party (ABA)

Substituting actual values would result in the following equation: Additional seats 321,646 for concerned = ----------- x 1 = party (ABA) 503,487

.64 or 0 additional seat, since rounding off is not to be applied

Applying the above formula, we find the outcome of the 1998 party-list election to be as follows: Organization %age of Initial No. Additional Total Garnered Total Votes of Seats Seats 1. APEC 503,487 5.50% 1 1 2. ABA 321,646 3.51% 1 321,646 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.64 1 3. ALAGAD 312,500 3.41% 1 312,500 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.62 1 4. VETERANS 304,802 3.33% 1 304,802 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.61 1 FEDERATION 5. PROMDI 255,184 2.79% 1 255,184 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.51 1 6. AKO 239,042 2.61% 1 239,042 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.47 1 7. NCSFO 238,303 2.60% 1 238,303 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.47 8. ABANSE! 235,548 2.57% 1 321,646 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.47 1 PINAY 9. AKBAYAN! 232,376 2.54% 1 232,376 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.46 1 10. BUTIL 215,643 2.36% 1 215,643 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.43 11. SANLAKAS 194,617 2.13% 1 194,617 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.39 1 12. COOP189,802 2.07% 1 189,802 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.38 Votes

1 1

NATCCO 13. COCOFED 186,388

2.04% 1

186,388 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.37

Incidentally, if the first party is not entitled to any additional seat, then the ratio of the number of votes for the other party to that for the first one is multiplied by zero. The end result would be zero additional seat for each of the other qualified parties as well. The above formula does not give an exact mathematical representation of the number of additional seats to be awarded since, in order to be entitled to one additional seat, an exact whole number is necessary. In fact, most of the actual mathematical proportions are not whole numbers and are not rounded off for the reasons explained earlier. To repeat, rounding off may result in the awarding of a number of seats in excess of that provided by the law. Furthermore, obtaining absolute proportional representation is restricted by the three-seat-per-party limit to a maximum of two additional slots. An increase in the maximum number of additional representatives a party may be entitled to would result in a more accurate proportional representation. But the law itself has set the limit: only two additional seats. Hence, we need to work within such extant parameter. The net result of the foregoing formula for determining additional seats happily coincides with the present number of incumbents; namely, two for the first party (APEC) and one each for the twelve other qualified parties. Hence, we affirm the legality of the incumbencies of their nominees, albeit through the use of a different formula and methodology. In his Dissent, Justice Mendoza criticizes our methodology for being too strict. We say, however, that our formula merely translated the Philippine legal parameters into a mathematical equation, no more no less. If Congress in its wisdom decides to modify RA 7941 to make it less strict, then the formula will also be modified to reflect the changes willed by the lawmakers. Epilogue In sum, we hold that the Comelec gravely abused its discretion in ruling that the thirty-eight (38) herein respondent parties, organizations and coalitions are each entitled to a party-list seat, because it glaringly violated two requirements of RA 7941: the two percent threshold and proportional representation. In disregarding, rejecting and circumventing these statutory provisions, the Comelec effectively arrogated unto itself what the Constitution expressly and wholly vested in the legislature: the power and the discretion to define the mechanics for the enforcement of the system. The wisdom and the propriety of these impositions, absent any clear transgression of the Constitution or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, are beyond judicial review.96[28] Indeed, the Comelec and the other parties in these cases - both petitioners and respondents - have failed to demonstrate that our lawmakers gravely abused their discretion in prescribing such requirements. By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction.97[29] The Comelec, which is tasked merely to enforce and administer election-related laws,98[30] cannot simply disregard an act of Congress exercised within the bounds of its authority. As a mere implementing body, it cannot judge the wisdom, propriety or rationality of such act. Its recourse is to draft an amendment to the law and lobby for its approval and enactment by the legislature. Furthermore, a reading of the entire Constitution reveals no violation of any of its provisions by the strict enforcement of RA 7941. It is basic that to strike down a law or any of its provisions as unconstitutional, there must be a clear and unequivocal showing that what the Constitution prohibits, the statute permits.99[31] Neither can we grant petitioners prayer that they each be given additional seats (for a total of three each), because granting such plea would plainly and simply violate the proportional representation mandated by Section 11 (b) of RA 7941. The low turnout of the party-list votes during the 1998 elections should not be interpreted as a total failure of the law in fulfilling the object of this new system of representation. It should not be deemed a conclusive indication that the

96 97 98 99

requirements imposed by RA 7941 wholly defeated the implementation of the system. Be it remembered that the party-list system, though already popular in parliamentary democracies, is still quite new in our presidential system. We should allow it some time to take root in the consciousness of our people and in the heart of our tripartite form of republicanism. Indeed, the Comelec and the defeated litigants should not despair. Quite the contrary, the dismal result of the first election for party-list representatives should serve as a challenge to our sectoral parties and organizations. It should stir them to be more active and vigilant in their campaign for representation in the State's lawmaking body. It should also serve as a clarion call for innovation and creativity in adopting this novel system of popular democracy. With adequate information dissemination to the public and more active sectoral parties, we are confident our people will be more responsive to future party-list elections. Armed with patience, perseverance and perspicacity, our marginalized sectors, in time, will fulfill the Filipino dream of full representation in Congress under the aegis of the party-list system, Philippine style. WHEREFORE, the Petitions are hereby partially GRANTED. The assailed Resolutions of the Comelec are SET ASIDE and NULLIFIED. The proclamations of the fourteen (14) sitting party-list representatives - two for APEC and one each for the remaining twelve (12) qualified parties - are AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 147589. June 26, 2001] ANG BAGONG BAYANI-OFW LABOR PARTY (under the acronym OFW), represented herein by its secretary-general, MOHAMMAD OMAR FAJARDO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; CITIZENS DRUG WATCH; MAMAMAYAN AYAW SA DROGA; GO! GO! PHILIPPINES; THE TRUE MARCOS LOYALIST ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES; PHILIPPINE LOCAL AUTONOMY; CITIZENS MOVEMENT FOR JUSTICE, ECONOMY, ENVIRONMENT AND PEACE; CHAMBER OF REAL ESTATE BUILDERS ASSOCIATION; SPORTS & HEALTH ADVANCEMENT FOUNDATION, INC.; ANG LAKAS NG OVERSEAS CONTRACT WORKERS (OCW); BAGONG BAYANI ORGANIZATION and others under Organizations/Coalitions of Omnibus Resolution No. 3785; PARTIDO NG MASANG PILIPINO; LAKAS NUCD-UMDP; NATIONALIST PEOPLES COALITION; LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO; AKSYON DEMOKRATIKO; PDP-LABAN; LIBERAL PARTY; NACIONALISTA PARTY; ANG BUHAY HAYAANG YUMABONG; and others under Political Parties of Omnibus Resolution No. 3785. respondents.

DECISION PANGANIBAN, J.: The party-list system is a social justice tool designed not only to give more law to the great masses of our people who have less in life, but also to enable them to become veritable lawmakers themselves, empowered to participate directly in the enactment of laws designed to benefit them. It intends to make the marginalized and the underrepresented not merely passive recipients of the States benevolence, but active participants in the mainstream of representative democracy. Thus, allowing all individuals and groups, including those which now dominate district elections, to have the same opportunity to participate in party-list elections would desecrate this lofty objective and mongrelize the social justice mechanism into an atrocious veneer for traditional politics.
The Case

Before us are two Petitions under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, challenging Omnibus Resolution No. 3785i[1] issued by the Commission on Elections (Comelec) on March 26, 2001. This Resolution approved the participation of 154 organizations and parties, including those herein impleaded, in the 2001 party-list elections. Petitioners seek the disqualification of private respondents, arguing mainly that the party-list system was intended to benefit the marginalized and underrepresented; not the mainstream political parties, the non-marginalized or overrepresented.
The Factual Antecedents

With the onset of the 2001 elections, the Comelec received several Petitions for registration filed by sectoral parties, organizations and political parties. According to the Comelec, [v]erifications were made as to the status and capacity of these parties and organizations and hearings were scheduled day and night until the last party w[as] heard. With the number of these petitions and the observance of the legal and procedural requirements, review of these petitions as well as deliberations takes a longer process in order to arrive at a decision and as a result the two (2) divisions promulgated a separate Omnibus Resolution and individual resolution on political parties. These numerous petitions and processes observed in the disposition of these petition[s] hinder the early release of the Omnibus Resolutions of the Divisions which were promulgated only on 10 February 2001.ii[2] Thereafter, before the February 12, 2001 deadline prescribed under Comelec Resolution No. 3426 dated December 22, 2000, the registered parties and organizations filed their respective Manifestations, stating their intention to participate in the party-list elections. Other sectoral and political parties and organizations whose registrations were denied also filed Motions for Reconsideration, together with Manifestations of their intent to participate in the party-list elections. Still other registered parties filed their Manifestations beyond the deadline. The Comelec gave due course or approved the Manifestations (or accreditations) of 154 parties and organizations, but denied those of several others in its assailed March 26, 2001 Omnibus Resolution No. 3785, which we quote: We carefully deliberated the foregoing matters, having in mind that this system of proportional representation scheme will encourage multi-partisan [sic] and enhance the inability of small, new or sectoral parties or organization to directly participate in this electoral window. It will be noted that as defined, the party-list system is a mechanism of proportional representation in the election of representatives to the House of Representatives from national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof registered with the Commission on Elections. However, in the course of our review of the matters at bar, we must recognize the fact that there is a need to keep the number of sectoral parties, organizations and coalitions, down to a manageable level, keeping only those who substantially comply with the rules and regulations and more importantly the sufficiency of the Manifestations or evidence on the Motions for Reconsiderations or Oppositions.iii[3] On April 10, 2001, Akbayan Citizens Action Party filed before the Comelec a Petition praying that the names of [some of herein respondents] be deleted from the Certified List of Political Parties/Sectoral Parties/Organizations/Coalitions Participating in the Party List System for the May 14, 2001 Elections and that said certified list be accordingly amended. It also asked, as an alternative, that the votes cast for the said respondents not be counted or canvassed, and that the latters nominees not be proclaimed.iv[4] On April 11, 2001, Bayan Muna and Bayan Muna-Youth also filed a Petition for Cancellation of Registration and Nomination against some of herein respondents.v[5]

On April 18, 2001, the Comelec required the respondents in the two disqualification cases to file Comments within three days from notice. It also set the date for hearing on April 26, 2001,vi[6] but subsequently reset it to May 3, 2001.vii[7] During the hearing, however, Commissioner Ralph C. Lantion merely directed the parties to submit their respective memoranda.viii[8] Meanwhile, dissatisfied with the pace of the Comelec, Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party filed a Petitionix[9] before this Court on April 16, 2001. This Petition, docketed as GR No. 147589, assailed Comelec Omnibus Resolution No. 3785. In its Resolution dated April 17, 2001,x[10] the Court directed respondents to comment on the Petition within a nonextendible period of five days from notice.xi[11] On April 17, 2001, Petitioner Bayan Muna also filed before this Court a Petition,xii[12] docketed as GR No. 147613, also challenging Comelec Omnibus Resolution No. 3785. In its Resolution dated May 9, 2001,xiii[13] the Court ordered the consolidation of the two Petitions before it; directed respondents named in the second Petition to file their respective Comments on or before noon of May 15, 2001; and called the parties to an Oral Argument on May 17, 2001. It added that the Comelec may proceed with the counting and canvassing of votes cast for the party-list elections, but barred the proclamation of any winner therein, until further orders of the Court. Thereafter, Commentsxiv[14] on the second Petition were received by the Court and, on May 17, 2001, the Oral Argument was conducted as scheduled. In an Order given in open court, the parties were directed to submit their respective Memoranda simultaneously within a non-extendible period of five days.xv[15]
Issues:

During the hearing on May 17, 2001, the Court directed the parties to address the following issues: 1. Whether or not recourse under Rule 65 is proper under the premises. More specifically, is there no other plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law? 2. Whether or not political parties may participate in the party-list elections.

3. Whether or not the party-list system is exclusive to marginalized and underrepresented sectors and organizations. 4. Whether or not the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating Omnibus Resolution No. 3785.xvi[16]
The Courts Ruling

The Petitions are partly meritorious. These cases should be remanded to the Comelec which will determine, after summary evidentiary hearings, whether the 154 parties and organizations enumerated in the assailed Omnibus Resolution satisfy the requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941, as specified in this Decision.
First Issue: Recourse Under Rule 65

Respondents contend that the recourse of both petitioners under Rule 65 is improper because there are other plain, speedy and adequate remedies in the ordinary course of law.xvii[17] The Office of the Solicitor General argues that petitioners should have filed before the Comelec a petition either for disqualification or for cancellation of registration, pursuant to Sections 19, 20, 21 and 22 of Comelec Resolution No. 3307-Axviii[18]dated November 9, 2000.xix[19] We disagree. At bottom, petitioners attack the validity of Comelec Omnibus Resolution 3785 for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion, insofar as it allowed respondents to participate in the party-list elections of 2001. Indeed, under both the Constitutionxx[20] and the Rules of Court, such challenge may be brought before this Court in a verified petition for certiorari under Rule 65. Moreover, the assailed Omnibus Resolution was promulgated by Respondent Commission en banc; hence, no motion for reconsideration was possible, it being a prohibited pleading under Section 1 (d), Rule 13 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure.xxi[21]

The Court also notes that Petitioner Bayan Muna had filed before the Comelec a Petition for Cancellation of Registration and Nomination against some of herein respondents.xxii[22] The Comelec, however, did not act on that Petition. In view of the pendency of the elections, Petitioner Bayan Muna sought succor from this Court, for there was no other adequate recourse at the time. Subsequent events have proven the urgency of petitioners action; to this date, the Comelec has not yet formally resolved the Petition before it. But a resolution may just be a formality because the Comelec, through the Office of the Solicitor General, has made its position on the matter quite clear. In any event, this case presents an exception to the rule that certiorari shall lie only in the absence of any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy.xxiii[23] It has been held that certiorari is available, notwithstanding the presence of other remedies, where the issue raised is one purely of law, where public interest is involved, and in case of urgency.xxiv[24] Indeed, the instant case is indubitably imbued with public interest and with extreme urgency, for it potentially involves the composition of 20 percent of the House of Representatives. Moreover, this case raises transcendental constitutional issues on the party-list system, which this Court must urgently resolve, consistent with its duty to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines, or rules.xxv[25] Finally, procedural requirements may be glossed over to prevent a miscarriage of justice, when the issue involves the principle of social justice x x x when the decision sought to be set aside is a nullity, or when the need for relief is extremely urgent and certiorari is the only adequate and speedy remedy available.xxvi[26]
Second Issue: Participation of Political Parties

In its Petition, Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party contends that the inclusion of political parties in the party-list system is the most objectionable portion of the questioned Resolution.xxvii[27] For its part, Petitioner Bayan Muna objects to the participation of major political parties.xxviii[28] On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General, like the impleaded political parties, submits that the Constitution and RA No. 7941 allow political parties to participate in the party-list elections. It argues that the party-list system is, in fact, open to all registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations.xxix[29] We now rule on this issue. Under the Constitution and RA 7941, private respondents cannot be disqualified from the party-list elections, merely on the ground that they are political parties. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides that members of the House of Representatives may be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations. Furthermore, under Sections 7 and 8, Article IX (C) of the Constitution, political parties may be registered under the partylist system. Sec. 7. No votes cast in favor of a political party, organization, or coalition shall be valid, except for those registered under the party-list system as provided in this Constitution. Sec. 8. Political parties, or organizations or coalitions registered under the party-list system, shall not be represented in the voters' registration boards, boards of election inspectors, boards of canvassers, or other similar bodies. However, they shall be entitled to appoint poll watchers in accordance with law.xxx[30] During the deliberations in the Constitutional Commission, Comm. Christian S. Monsod pointed out that the participants in the party-list system may be a regional party, a sectoral party, a national party, UNIDO,xxxi[31] Magsasaka, or a regional party in Mindanao."xxxii[32] This was also clear from the following exchange between Comms. Jaime Tadeo and Blas Ople:xxxiii[33] MR. TADEO. Naniniwala ba kayo na ang party list ay pwedeng paghati-hatian ng UNIDO, PDP-Laban, PNP, Liberal at Nacionalista? MR. OPLE. Maaari yan sapagkat bukas ang party list system sa lahat ng mga partido. Indeed, Commissioner Monsod stated that the purpose of the party-list provision was to open up the system, in order to give a chance to parties that consistently place third or fourth in congressional district elections to win a seat in Congress.xxxiv[34] He explained: The purpose of this is to open the system. In the past elections, we found out that there

were certain groups or parties that, if we count their votes nationwide, have about 1,000,000 or 1,500,000 votes. But they were always third or fourth place in each of the districts. So, they have no voice in the Assembly. But this way, they would have five or six representatives in the Assembly even if they would not win individually in legislative districts. So, that is essentially the mechanics, the purpose and objectives of the party-list system. For its part, Section 2 of RA 7941 also provides for a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, x x x. Section 3 expressly states that a party is either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties. More to the point, the law defines political party as an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform, principles and policies for the general conduct of government and which, as the most immediate means of securing their adoption, regularly nominates and supports certain of its leaders and members as candidates for public office. Furthermore, Section 11 of RA 7941 leaves no doubt as to the participation of political parties in the party-list system. We quote the pertinent provision below: x x x xxx xxx

For purposes of the May 1998 elections, the first five (5) major political parties on the basis of party representation in the House of Representatives at the start of the Tenth Congress of the Philippines shall not be entitled to participate in the party-list system. x x x xxx x x x

Indubitably, therefore, political parties even the major ones -- may participate in the party-list elections.
Third Issue: Marginalized and Underrepresented

That political parties may participate in the party-list elections does not mean, however, that any political party -- or any organization or group for that matter -- may do so. The requisite character of these parties or organizations must be consistent with the purpose of the party-list system, as laid down in the Constitution and RA 7941. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, provides as follows: (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations. (2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives including those under the party list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector. (Emphasis supplied.) Notwithstanding the sparse language of the provision, a distinguished member of the Constitutional Commission declared that the purpose of the party-list provision was to give genuine power to our people in Congress. Hence, when the provision was discussed, he exultantly announced: On this first day of August 1986, we shall, hopefully, usher in a new chapter to our national history, by giving genuine power to our people in the legislature.xxxv[35] The foregoing provision on the party-list system is not self-executory. It is, in fact, interspersed with phrases like in accordance with law or as may be provided by law; it was thus up to Congress to sculpt in granite the lofty objective of the Constitution. Hence, RA 7941 was enacted. It laid out the statutory policy in this wise: SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. -- The State shall promote proportional representation in the election of representatives to the House of Representatives through a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the

House of Representatives. Towards this end, the State shall develop and guarantee a full, free and open party system in order to attain the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives by enhancing their chances to compete for and win seats in the legislature, and shall provide the simplest scheme possible.
The Marginalized and Underrepresented to Become Lawmakers Themselves

The foregoing provision mandates a state policy of promoting proportional representation by means of the Filipino-style party-list system, which will enable the election to the House of Representatives of Filipino citizens, 1. 2. who belong to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties; and who lack well-defined constituencies; but

3. who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole. The key words in this policy are proportional representation, marginalized and underrepresented, and lack [of] welldefined constituencies. Proportional representation here does not refer to the number of people in a particular district, because the party-list election is national in scope. Neither does it allude to numerical strength in a distressed or oppressed group. Rather, it refers to the representation of the marginalized and underrepresented as exemplified by the enumeration in Section 5 of the law; namely, labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals. However, it is not enough for the candidate to claim representation of the marginalized and underrepresented, because representation is easy to claim and to feign. The party-list organization or party must factually and truly represent the marginalized and underrepresented constituencies mentioned in Section 5.xxxvi[36] Concurrently, the persons nominated by the party-list candidate-organization must be Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties. Finally, lack of well-defined constituenc[y] refers to the absence of a traditionally identifiable electoral group, like voters of a congressional district or territorial unit of government. Rather, it points again to those with disparate interests identified with the marginalized or underrepresented. In the end, the role of the Comelec is to see to it that only those Filipinos who are marginalized and underrepresented become members of Congress under the party-list system, Filipino-style. The intent of the Constitution is clear: to give genuine power to the people, not only by giving more law to those who have less in life, but more so by enabling them to become veritable lawmakers themselves. Consistent with this intent, the policy of the implementing law, we repeat, is likewise clear: to enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, x x x, to become members of the House of Representatives. Where the language of the law is clear, it must be applied according to its express terms.xxxvii[37] The marginalized and underrepresented sectors to be represented under the party-list system are enumerated in Section 5 of RA 7941, which states: SEC. 5. Registration. -- Any organized group of persons may register as a party, organization or coalition for purposes of the party-list system by filing with the COMELEC not later than ninety (90) days before the election a petition verified by its president or secretary stating its desire to participate in the party-list system as a national, regional or sectoral party or organization or a coalition of such parties or organizations, attaching thereto its constitution, by-laws, platform or program of government, list of officers, coalition agreement and other relevant information as the COMELEC may require: Provided, that the sector shall include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals. While the enumeration of marginalized and underrepresented sectors is not exclusive, it demonstrates the clear intent of the law that not all sectors can be represented under the party-list system. It is a fundamental principle of statutory construction that words employed in a statute are interpreted in connection with, and their meaning is ascertained by

reference to, the words and the phrases with which they are associated or related. Thus, the meaning of a term in a statute may be limited, qualified or specialized by those in immediate association.xxxviii[38]
The Party-List System Desecrated by the OSG Contentions

Notwithstanding the unmistakable statutory policy, the Office of the Solicitor General submits that RA No. 7941 does not limit the participation in the party-list system to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors of society.xxxix[39] In fact, it contends that any party or group that is not disqualified under Section 6xl[40]of RA 7941 may participate in the elections. Hence, it admitted during the Oral Argument that even an organization representing the super rich of Forbes Park or Dasmarias Village could participate in the party-list elections.xli[41] The declared policy of RA 7941 contravenes the position of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). We stress that the party-list system seeks to enable certain Filipino citizens specifically those belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties to be elected to the House of Representatives. The assertion of the OSG that the party-list system is not exclusive to the marginalized and underrepresented disregards the clear statutory policy. Its claim that even the super-rich and overrepresented can participate desecrates the spirit of the partylist system. Indeed, the law crafted to address the peculiar disadvantages of Payatas hovel dwellers cannot be appropriated by the mansion owners of Forbes Park. The interests of these two sectors are manifestly disparate; hence, the OSGs position to treat them similarly defies reason and common sense. In contrast, and with admirable candor, Atty. Lorna PatajoKapunanxlii[42] admitted during the Oral Argument that a group of bankers, industrialists and sugar planters could not join the party-list system as representatives of their respective sectors.xliii[43] While the business moguls and the mega-rich are, numerically speaking, a tiny minority, they are neither marginalized nor underrepresented, for the stark reality is that their economic clout engenders political power more awesome than their numerical limitation. Traditionally, political power does not necessarily emanate from the size of ones constituency; indeed, it is likely to arise more directly from the number and amount of ones bank accounts. It is ironic, therefore, that the marginalized and underrepresented in our midst are the majority who wallow in poverty, destitution and infirmity. It was for them that the party-list system was enacted -- to give them not only genuine hope, but genuine power; to give them the opportunity to be elected and to represent the specific concerns of their constituencies; and simply to give them a direct voice in Congress and in the larger affairs of the State. In its noblest sense, the party-list system truly empowers the masses and ushers a new hope for genuine change. Verily, it invites those marginalized and underrepresented in the past the farm hands, the fisher folk, the urban poor, even those in the underground movement to come out and participate, as indeed many of them came out and participated during the last elections. The State cannot now disappoint and frustrate them by disabling and desecrating this social justice vehicle. Because the marginalized and underrepresented had not been able to win in the congressional district elections normally dominated by traditional politicians and vested groups, 20 percent of the seats in the House of Representatives were set aside for the party-list system. In arguing that even those sectors who normally controlled 80 percent of the seats in the House could participate in the party-list elections for the remaining 20 percent, the OSG and the Comelec disregard the fundamental difference between the congressional district elections and the party-list elections. As earlier noted, the purpose of the party-list provision was to open up the system,xliv[44] in order to enhance the chance of sectoral groups and organizations to gain representation in the House of Representatives through the simplest scheme possible.xlv[45] Logic shows that the system has been opened to those who have never gotten a foothold within it -- those who cannot otherwise win in regular elections and who therefore need the simplest scheme possible to do so. Conversely, it would be illogical to open the system to those who have long been within it -- those privileged sectors that have long dominated the congressional district elections. The import of the open party-list system may be more vividly understood when compared to a student dormitory open house, which by its nature allows outsiders to enter the facilities. Obviously, the open house is for the benefit of outsiders only, not the dormers themselves who can enter the dormitory even without such special privilege. In the same vein, the open party-list system is only for the outsiders who cannot get elected through regular elections otherwise; it is not for the non-marginalized or overrepresented who already fill the ranks of Congress. Verily, allowing the non-marginalized and overrepresented to vie for the remaining seats under the party-list system would not only dilute, but also prejudice the chance of the marginalized and underrepresented, contrary to the intention of the

law to enhance it. The party-list system is a tool for the benefit of the underprivileged; the law could not have given the same tool to others, to the prejudice of the intended beneficiaries. This Court, therefore, cannot allow the party-list system to be sullied and prostituted by those who are neither marginalized nor underrepresented. It cannot let that flicker of hope be snuffed out. The clear state policy must permeate every discussion of the qualification of political parties and other organizations under the party-list system.
Refutation of the Separate Opinions

The Separate Opinions of our distinguished colleagues, Justices Jose C. Vitug and Vicente V. Mendoza, are anchored mainly on the supposed intent of the framers of the Constitution as culled from their deliberations. The fundamental principle in constitutional construction, however, is that the primary source from which to ascertain constitutional intent or purpose is the language of the provision itself. The presumption is that the words in which the constitutional provisions are couched express the objective sought to be attained.xlvi[46] In other words, verba legis still prevails. Only when the meaning of the words used is unclear and equivocal should resort be made to extraneous aids of construction and interpretation, such as the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission or Convention, in order to shed light on and ascertain the true intent or purpose of the provision being construed.xlvii[47] Indeed, as cited in the Separate Opinion of Justice Mendoza, this Court stated in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretaryxlviii[48] that the debates and proceedings of the constitutional convention [may be consulted] in order to arrive at the reason and purpose of the resulting Constitution x x x only when other guides fail as said proceedings are powerless to vary the terms of the Constitution when the meaning is clear. Debates in the constitutional convention are of value as showing the views of the individual members, and as indicating the reason for their votes, but they give us no light as to the views of the large majority who did not talk, much less of the mass or our fellow citizens whose votes at the polls gave that instrument the force of fundamental law. We think it safer to construe the constitution from what appears upon its face. The proper interpretation therefore depends more on how it was understood by the people adopting it than in the framers understanding thereof. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, relative to the party-list system, is couched in clear terms: the mechanics of the system shall be provided by law. Pursuant thereto, Congress enacted RA 7941. In understanding and implementing party-list representation, we should therefore look at the law first. Only when we find its provisions ambiguous should the use of extraneous aids of construction be resorted to. But, as discussed earlier, the intent of the law is obvious and clear from its plain words. Section 2 thereof unequivocally states that the party-list system of electing congressional representatives was designed to enable underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole x x x. The criteria for participation is well defined. Thus, there is no need for recourse to constitutional deliberations, not even to the proceedings of Congress. In any event, the framers deliberations merely express their individual opinions and are, at best, only persuasive in construing the meaning and purpose of the constitution or statute. Be it remembered that the constitutionality or validity of Sections 2 and 5 of RA 7941 is not an issue here. Hence, they remain parts of the law, which must be applied plainly and simply.
Fourth Issue: Grave Abuse of Discretion

From its assailed Omnibus Resolution, it is manifest that the Comelec failed to appreciate fully the clear policy of the law and the Constitution. On the contrary, it seems to have ignored the facet of the party-list system discussed above. The OSG as its counsel admitted before the Court that any group, even the non-marginalized and overrepresented, could field candidates in the party-list elections. When a lower court, or a quasi-judicial agency like the Commission on Elections, violates or ignores the Constitution or the law, its action can be struck down by this Court on the ground of grave abuse of discretion.xlix[49] Indeed, the function of all judicial and quasi-judicial instrumentalities is to apply the law as they find it, not to reinvent or second-guess it.l[50] In its Memorandum, Petitioner Bayan Muna passionately pleads for the outright disqualification of the major political parties Respondents Lakas-NUCD, LDP, NPC, LP and PMP on the ground that under Comelec Resolution No. 4073, they have been accredited as the five (six, including PDP-Laban) major political parties in the May 14, 2001 elections. It

argues that because of this, they have the advantage of getting official Comelec Election Returns, Certificates of Canvass, preferred poll watchers x x x. We note, however, that this accreditation does not refer to the party-list election, but, inter alia, to the election of district representatives for the purpose of determining which parties would be entitled to watchers under Section 26 of Republic Act No. 7166. What is needed under the present circumstances, however, is a factual determination of whether respondents herein and, for that matter, all the 154 previously approved groups, have the necessary qualifications to participate in the party-list elections, pursuant to the Constitution and the law. Bayan Muna also urges us to immediately rule out Respondent Mamamayan Ayaw sa Droga (MAD), because it is a government entity using government resources and privileges. This Court, however, is not a trier of facts.li[51] It is not equipped to receive evidence and determine the truth of such factual allegations. Basic rudiments of due process require that respondents should first be given an opportunity to show that they qualify under the guidelines promulgated in this Decision, before they can be deprived of their right to participate in and be elected under the party-list system.
Guidelines for Screening Party-List Participants

The Court, therefore, deems it proper to remand the case to the Comelec for the latter to determine, after summary evidentiary hearings, whether the 154 parties and organizations allowed to participate in the party-list elections comply with the requirements of the law. In this light, the Court finds it appropriate to lay down the following guidelines, culled from the law and the Constitution, to assist the Comelec in its work. First, the political party, sector, organization or coalition must represent the marginalized and underrepresented groups identified in Section 5 of RA 7941. In other words, it must show -- through its constitution, articles of incorporation, bylaws, history, platform of government and track record -- that it represents and seeks to uplift marginalized and underrepresented sectors. Verily, majority of its membership should belong to the marginalized and underrepresented. And it must demonstrate that in a conflict of interests, it has chosen or is likely to choose the interest of such sectors. Second, while even major political parties are expressly allowed by RA 7941 and the Constitution to participate in the party-list system, they must comply with the declared statutory policy of enabling Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors x x x to be elected to the House of Representatives. In other words, while they are not disqualified merely on the ground that they are political parties, they must show, however, that they represent the interests of the marginalized and underrepresented. The counsel of Aksyon Demokratiko and other similarly situated political parties admitted as much during the Oral Argument, as the following quote shows: JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: I am not disputing that in my question. All I am saying is, the political party must claim to represent the marginalized and underrepresented sectors? ATTY. KAPUNAN: Yes, Your Honor, the answer is yes.lii[52] Third, in view of the objectionsliii[53] directed against the registration of Ang Buhay Hayaang Yumabong, which is allegedly a religious group, the Court notes the express constitutional provision that the religious sector may not be represented in the party-list system. The extent of the constitutional proscription is demonstrated by the following discussion during the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission: MR. OPLE. x x x In the event that a certain religious sect with nationwide and even international networks of members and supporters, in order to circumvent this prohibition, decides to form its own political party in emulation of those parties I had mentioned earlier as deriving their inspiration and philosophies from well-established religious faiths, will that also not fall within this prohibition? MR. MONSOD. If the evidence shows that the intention is to go around the prohibition, then certainly the Comelec can pierce through the legal fiction.liv[54] The following discussion is also pertinent:

MR. VILLACORTA. When the Commissioner proposed EXCEPT RELIGIOUS GROUPS, he is not, of course, prohibiting priests, imams or pastors who may be elected by, say, the indigenous community sector to represent their group. REV. RIGOS. Not at all, but I am objecting to anybody who represents the Iglesia ni Kristo, the Catholic Church, the Protestant Church et cetera.lv[55] Furthermore, the Constitution provides that religious denominations and sects shall not be registered.lvi[56] The prohibition was explained by a memberlvii[57] of the Constitutional Commission in this wise: [T]he prohibition is on any religious organization registering as a political party. I do not see any prohibition here against a priest running as a candidate. That is not prohibited here; it is the registration of a religious sect as a political party.lviii[58] Fourth, a party or an organization must not be disqualified under Section 6 of RA 7941, which enumerates the grounds for disqualification as follows: (1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association organized for religious purposes; (2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal; (3) It is a foreign party or organization; (4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political party, foundation, organization, whether directly or through any of its officers or members or indirectly through third parties for partisan election purposes; (5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections; (6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition; (7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or (8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered.lix[59] Note should be taken of paragraph 5, which disqualifies a party or group for violation of or failure to comply with election laws and regulations. These laws include Section 2 of RA 7941, which states that the party-list system seeks to enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties x x x to become members of the House of Representatives. A party or an organization, therefore, that does not comply with this policy must be disqualified. Fifth, the party or organization must not be an adjunct of, or a project organized or an entity funded or assisted by, the government. By the very nature of the party-list system, the party or organization must be a group of citizens, organized by citizens and operated by citizens. It must be independent of the government. The participation of the government or its officials in the affairs of a party-list candidate is not only illegallx[60] and unfair to other parties, but also deleterious to the objective of the law: to enable citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors and organizations to be elected to the House of Representatives. Sixth, the party must not only comply with the requirements of the law; its nominees must likewise do so. Section 9 of RA 7941 reads as follows: SEC. 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. No person shall be nominated as party-list representative unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period of not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election, able to read and write, a bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the election. In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election. Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of thirty (30) during his term shall be allowed to continue in office until the expiration of his term. Seventh, not only the candidate party or organization must represent marginalized and underrepresented sectors; so also must its nominees. To repeat, under Section 2 of RA 7941, the nominees must be Filipino citizens who belong to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties. Surely, the interests of the youth cannot be fully represented by a retiree; neither can those of the urban poor or the working class, by an industrialist. To allow otherwise is to betray the State policy to give genuine representation to the marginalized and underrepresented.

Eighth, as previously discussed, while lacking a well-defined political constituency, the nominee must likewise be able to contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole. Senator Jose Lina explained during the bicameral committee proceedings that the nominee of a party, national or regional, is not going to represent a particular district x x x.lxi[61]
Epilogue

The linchpin of this case is the clear and plain policy of the law: to enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the House of Representatives. Crucial to the resolution of this case is the fundamental social justice principle that those who have less in life should have more in law. The party-list system is one such tool intended to benefit those who have less in life. It gives the great masses of our people genuine hope and genuine power. It is a message to the destitute and the prejudiced, and even to those in the underground, that change is possible. It is an invitation for them to come out of their limbo and seize the opportunity. Clearly, therefore, the Court cannot accept the submissions of the Comelec and the other respondents that the party-list system is, without any qualification, open to all. Such position does not only weaken the electoral chances of the marginalized and underrepresented; it also prejudices them. It would gut the substance of the party-list system. Instead of generating hope, it would create a mirage. Instead of enabling the marginalized, it would further weaken them and aggravate their marginalization. In effect, the Comelec would have us believe that the party-list provisions of the Constitution and RA 7941 are nothing more than a play on dubious words, a mockery of noble intentions, and an empty offering on the altar of people empowerment. Surely, this could not have been the intention of the framers of the Constitution and the makers of RA 7941. WHEREFORE, this case is REMANDED to the Comelec, which is hereby DIRECTED to immediately conduct summary evidentiary hearings on the qualifications of the party-list participants in the light of the guidelines enunciated in this Decision. Considering the extreme urgency of determining the winners in the last party-list elections, the Comelec is directed to begin its hearings for the parties and organizations that appear to have garnered such number of votes as to qualify for seats in the House of Representatives. The Comelec is further DIRECTED to submit to this Court its compliance report within 30 days from notice hereof. The Resolution of this Court dated May 9, 2001, directing the Comelec to refrain from proclaiming any winner during the last party-list election, shall remain in force until after the Comelec itself will have complied and reported its compliance with the foregoing disposition. This Decision is immediately executory upon the Commission on Elections receipt thereof. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.

i ii iii ivG.R. No. 177271

May 4, 2007

BANTAY REPUBLIC ACT OR BA-RA 7941, represented by MR. AMEURFINO E. CINCO, Chairman, AND URBAN POOR FOR LEGAL REFORMS (UP-LR), represented by MRS. MYRNA P. PORCARE, SecretaryGeneral, Petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, BIYAHENG PINOY, KAPATIRAN NG MGA NAKAKULONG NA WALANG SALA (KAKUSA), BARANGAY ASSOCIATION FOR NATIONAL ADVANCEMENT AND TRANSPARENCY (BANAT), AHON PINOY, AGRICULTURAL SECTOR ALLIANCE OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (AGAP), PUWERSA NG BAYANING ATLETA (PBA), ALYANSA NG MGA GRUPONG HALIGI NG AGHAM AT TEKNOLOHIYA PARA SA MAMAMAYAN, INC. (AGHAM), BABAE PARA SA KAUNLARAN (BABAE KA), AKSYON SAMBAYANAN (AKSA), ALAY SA BAYAN NG MALAYANG PROPESYUNAL AT REPORMANG KALAKAL (ABAY-PARAK), AGBIAG TIMPUYOG ILOCANO, INC. (AGBIAG!), ABANTE ILONGGO, INC. (ABA ILONGGO), AANGAT TAYO (AT), AANGAT ANG KABUHAYAN (ANAK), BAGO NATIONAL CULTURAL SOCIETY OF THE PHILIPPINES (BAGO), ANGAT ANTAS-KABUHAYAN PILIPINO MOVEMENT (AANGAT KA PILIPINO), ARTS BUSINESS AND SCIENCE PROFESSIONAL (ABS), ASSOSASYON NG MGA MALILIIT NA NEGOSYANTENG GUMAGANAP INC. (AMANG), SULONG BARANGAY MOVEMENT, KASOSYO PRODUCERS CONSUMER EXCHANGE ASSOCIATION, INC. (KASOSYO), UNITED MOVEMENT AGAINST DRUGS (UNI-MAD), PARENTS ENABLING PARENTS (PEP), ALLIANCE OF NEOCONSERVATIVES (ANC), FILIPINOS FOR PEACE, JUSTICE AND PROGRESS MOVEMENT (FPJPM), BIGKIS PINOY MOVEMENT (BIGKIS), 1-UNITED TRANSPORT KOALISYON (1-UNTAK), ALLIANCE FOR BARANGAY CONCERNS (ABC), BIYAYANG BUKID, INC., ALLIANCE FOR NATIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY (ANAD), AKBAY PINOY OFW-NATIONAL INC., (APOI), ALLIANCE TRANSPORT SECTOR (ATS), KALAHI SECTORAL PARTY (ADVOCATES FOR OVERSEAS FILIPINO) AND ASSOCIATION OF ADMINISTRATORS, PROFESSIONALS AND SENIORS (AAPS), Respondents. DECISION GARCIA, J.: Before the Court are these two consolidated petitions for certiorari and mandamus to nullify and set aside certain issuances of the Commission on Elections (Comelec) respecting party-list groups which have manifested their intention to participate in the party-list elections on May 14, 2007. In the first petition, docketed as G.R. No. 177271, petitioners Bantay Republic Act (BA-RA 7941, for short) and the Urban Poor for Legal Reforms (UP-LR, for short) assail the various Comelec resolutions accrediting private respondents Biyaheng Pinoy et al., to participate in the forthcoming party-list elections on May 14, 2007 without simultaneously determining whether or not their respective nominees possess the requisite qualifications defined in Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7941, or the "Party-List System Act" and belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sector each seeks to represent. In the second, docketed as G.R. No. 177314, petitioners Loreta Ann P. Rosales, Kilosbayan Foundation and Bantay Katarungan Foundation impugn Comelec Resolution 07-0724 dated April 3, 2007 effectively denying their request for the release or disclosure of the names of the nominees of the fourteen (14) accredited participating party-list groups mentioned in petitioner Rosales previous letter-request. While both petitions commonly seek to compel the Comelec to disclose or publish the names of the nominees of the various party-list groups named in the petitions,1 the petitioners in G.R. No. 177271 have the following additional prayers: 1) that the 33 private respondents named therein be "declare[d] as unqualified to participate in the party-list elections as sectoral organizations, parties or coalition for failure to comply with the guidelines prescribed by the [Court] in [Ang Bagong Bayani v. Comelec2]" and, 2) correspondingly, that the Comelec be enjoined from allowing respondent groups from participating in the May 2007 elections. In separate resolutions both dated April 24, 2007, the Court en banc required the public and private respondents to file their respective comments on the petitions within a non-extendible period of five (5) days from notice.

Apart from respondent Comelec, seven (7) private respondents3 in G.R. No. 177271 and one party-list group4 mentioned in G.R. No. 177314 submitted their separate comments. In the main, the separate comments of the private respondents focused on the untenability and prematurity of the plea of petitioners BA-RA 7941 and UPLR to nullify their accreditation as party-list groups and thus disqualify them and their respective nominees from participating in the May 14, 2007 party-list elections. The facts: On January 12, 2007, the Comelec issued Resolution No. 7804 prescribing rules and regulations to govern the filing of manifestation of intent to participate and submission of names of nominees under the party-list system of representation in connection with the May 14, 2007 elections. Pursuant thereto, a number of organized groups filed the necessary manifestations. Among these and ostensibly subsequently accredited by the Comelec to participate in the 2007 elections - are 14 party-list groups, namely: (1) BABAE KA; (2) ANG KASANGGA; (3) AKBAY PINOY; (4) AKSA; (5) KAKUSA; (6) AHON PINOY; (7) OFW PARTY; (8) BIYAHENG PINOY; (9) ANAD; (10) AANGAT ANG KABUHAYAN; (11) AGBIAG; (12) BANAT; (13) BANTAY LIPAD; (14) AGING PINOY. Petitioners BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR presented a longer, albeit an overlapping, list. Subsequent events saw BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR filing with the Comelec an Urgent Petition to Disqualify, thereunder seeking to disqualify the nominees of certain party-list organizations. Both petitioners appear not to have the names of the nominees sought to be disqualified since they still asked for a copy of the list of nominees. Docketed in the Comelec as SPA Case No 07-026, this urgent petition has yet to be resolved. Meanwhile, reacting to the emerging public perception that the individuals behind the aforementioned 14 partylist groups do not, as they should, actually represent the poor and marginalized sectors, petitioner Rosales, in G.R. No. 177314, addressed a letter5 dated March 29, 2007 to Director Alioden Dalaig of the Comelecs Law Department requesting a list of that groups nominees. Another letter6 of the same tenor dated March 31, 2007 followed, this time petitioner Rosales impressing upon Atty. Dalaig the particular urgency of the subject request. Neither the Comelec Proper nor its Law Department officially responded to petitioner Rosales requests. The April 13, 2007 issue of the Manila Bulletin, however, carried the front-page banner headline "COMELEC WONT BARE PARTY-LIST NOMINEES",7 with the following sub-heading: "Abalos says party-list polls not personality oriented." On April 16, 2007, Atty. Emilio Capulong, Jr. and ex-Senator Jovito R. Salonga, in their own behalves and as counsels of petitioner Rosales, forwarded a letter8 to the Comelec formally requesting action and definitive decision on Rosales earlier plea for information regarding the names of several party-list nominees. Invoking their constitutionally-guaranteed right to information, Messrs. Capulong and Salonga at the same time drew attention to the banner headline adverted to earlier, with a request for the Comelec, "collectively or individually, to issue a formal clarification, either confirming or denying the banner headline and the alleged statement of Chairman Benjamin Abalos, Sr. xxx" Evidently unbeknownst then to Ms. Rosales, et al., was the issuance of Comelec en banc Resolution 07-07249 under date April 3, 2007 virtually declaring the nominees names confidential and in net effect denying petitioner Rosales basic disclosure request. In its relevant part, Resolution 07-0724 reads as follows: RESOLVED, moreover, that the Commission will disclose/publicize the names of party-list nominees in connection with the May 14, 2007 Elections only after 3:00 p.m. on election day. Let the Law Department implement this resolution and reply to all letters addressed to the Commission inquiring on the party-list nominees. (Emphasis added.) According to petitioner Rosales, she was able to obtain a copy of the April 3, 2007 Resolution only on April 21, 2007. She would later state the observation that the last part of the "Order empowering the Law Department to implement this resolution and reply to all letters inquiring on the party-list nominees is apparently a fool-proof bureaucratic way to distort and mangle the truth and give the impression that the antedated Resolution of April 3, 2007 is the final answer to the two formal requests of Petitioners".10

The herein consolidated petitions are cast against the foregoing factual setting, albeit petitioners BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR appear not to be aware, when they filed their petition on April 18, 2007, of the April 3, 2007 Comelec Resolution 07-0724. To start off, petitioners BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR would have the Court cancel the accreditation accorded by the Comelec to the respondent party-list groups named in their petition on the ground that these groups and their respective nominees do not appear to be qualified. In the words of petitioners BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR, Comelec xxx committed grave abuse of discretion when it granted the assailed accreditations even without simultaneously determining whether the nominees of herein private respondents are qualified or not, or whether or not the nominees are likewise belonging to the marginalized and underrepresented sector they claim to represent in Congress, in accordance with No. 7 of the eight-point guidelines prescribed by the Honorable Supreme in the Ang Bagong Bayani11 case which states that, "not only the candidate party or organization must represent marginalized and underrepresented sectors; so also must its nominees." In the case of private respondents, public respondent Comelec granted accreditations without the required simultaneous determination of the qualification of the nominees as part of the accreditation process of the party-list organization itself. (Words in bracket added; italization in the original)12 The Court is unable to grant the desired plea of petitioners BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR for cancellation of accreditation on the grounds thus advanced in their petition. For, such course of action would entail going over and evaluating the qualities of the sectoral groups or parties in question, particularly whether or not they indeed represent marginalized/underrepresented groups. The exercise would require the Court to make a factual determination, a matter which is outside the office of judicial review by way of special civil action for certiorari. In certiorari proceedings, the Court is not called upon to decide factual issues and the case must be decided on the undisputed facts on record.13 The sole function of a writ of certiorari is to address issues of want of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion and does not include a review of the tribunals evaluation of the evidence.14 Not lost on the Court of course is the pendency before the Comelec of SPA Case No. 07-026 in which petitioners BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR themselves seek to disqualify the nominees of the respondent party-list groups named in their petition. Petitioners BA-RA 7941s and UP-LRs posture that the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion when it granted the assailed accreditations without simultaneously determining the qualifications of their nominees is without basis. Nowhere in R.A. No. 7941 is there a requirement that the qualification of a party-list nominee be determined simultaneously with the accreditation of an organization. And as aptly pointed out by private respondent Babae Para sa Kaunlaran (Babae Ka), Section 4 of R.A. No. 7941 requires a petition for registration of a party-list organization to be filed with the Comelec "not later than ninety (90) days before the election" whereas the succeeding Section 8 requires the submission "not later than forty-five (45) days before the election" of the list of names whence party-list representatives shall be chosen. Now to the other but core issues of the case. The petition in G.R. No. 177314 formulates and captures the main issues tendered by the petitioners in these consolidated cases and they may be summarized as follows: 1. Whether respondent Comelec, by refusing to reveal the names of the nominees of the various partylist groups, has violated the right to information and free access to documents as guaranteed by the Constitution; and 2. Whether respondent Comelec is mandated by the Constitution to disclose to the public the names of said nominees. While the Comelec did not explicitly say so, it based its refusal to disclose the names of the nominees of subject party-list groups on Section 7 of R.A. 7941. This provision, while commanding the publication and the posting in polling places of a certified list of party-list system participating groups, nonetheless tells the Comelec not to show or include the names of the party-list nominees in said certified list. Thus:

SEC. 7. Certified List of Registered Parties.- The COMELEC shall, not later than sixty (60) days before election, prepare a certified list of national, regional, or sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions which have applied or who have manifested their desire to participate under the party-list system and distribute copies thereof to all precincts for posting in the polling places on election day. The names of the party-list nominees shall not be shown on the certified list. (Emphasis added.) And doubtless part of Comelecs reason for keeping the names of the party list nominees away from the public is deducible from the following excerpts of the news report appearing in the adverted April 13, 2007 issue of the Manila Bulletin: The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) firmed up yesterday its decision not to release the names of nominees of sectoral parties, organizations, or coalitions accredited to participate in the party-list election which will be held simultaneously with the May 14 mid-term polls. COMELEC Chairman Benjamin S. Abalos, Sr. said he and [the other five COMELEC] Commissioners --believe that the party list elections must not be personality oriented. Abalos said under [R.A.] 7941 , the people are to vote for sectoral parties, organizations, or coalitions, not for their nominees. He said there is nothing in R.A. 7941 that requires the Comelec to disclose the names of nominees. xxx (Words in brackets and emphasis added) Insofar as the disclosure issue is concerned, the petitions are impressed with merit. Assayed against the non-disclosure stance of the Comelec and the given rationale therefor is the right to information enshrined in the self-executory15 Section 7, Article III of the Constitution, viz: Sec.7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. Complementing and going hand in hand with the right to information is another constitutional provision enunciating the policy of full disclosure and transparency in Government. We refer to Section 28, Article II of the Constitution reading: Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest. The right to information is a public right where the real parties in interest are the public, or the citizens to be precise. And for every right of the people recognized as fundamental lies a corresponding duty on the part of those who govern to respect and protect that right. This is the essence of the Bill of Rights in a constitutional regime.16 Without a governments acceptance of the limitations upon it by the Constitution in order to uphold individual liberties, without an acknowledgment on its part of those duties exacted by the rights pertaining to the citizens, the Bill of Rights becomes a sophistry. By weight of jurisprudence, any citizen can challenge any attempt to obstruct the exercise of his right to information and may seek its enforcement by mandamus.17 And since every citizen by the simple fact of his citizenship possesses the right to be informed, objections on ground of locus standi are ordinarily unavailing.18 Like all constitutional guarantees, however, the right to information and its companion right of access to official records are not absolute. As articulated in Legaspi, supra, the peoples right to know is limited to "matters of public concern" and is further subject to such limitation as may be provided by law. Similarly, the policy of full

disclosure is confined to transactions involving "public interest" and is subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law. Too, there is also the need of preserving a measure of confidentiality on some matters, such as military, trade, banking and diplomatic secrets or those affecting national security.19 The terms "public concerns" and "public interest" have eluded precise definition. But both terms embrace, to borrow from Legaspi, a broad spectrum of subjects which the public may want to know, either because these directly affect their lives, or simply because such matters naturally whet the interest of an ordinary citizen. At the end of the day, it is for the courts to determine, on a case to case basis, whether or not at issue is of interest or importance to the public. If, as in Legaspi, it was the legitimate concern of a citizen to know if certain persons employed as sanitarians of a health department of a city are civil service eligibles, surely the identity of candidates for a lofty elective public office should be a matter of highest public concern and interest. As may be noted, no national security or like concerns is involved in the disclosure of the names of the nominees of the party-list groups in question. Doubtless, the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing the legitimate demands of the petitioners for a list of the nominees of the party-list groups subject of their respective petitions. Mandamus, therefore, lies. The last sentence of Section 7 of R.A. 7941 reading: "[T]he names of the party-list nominees shall not be shown on the certified list" is certainly not a justifying card for the Comelec to deny the requested disclosure. To us, the prohibition imposed on the Comelec under said Section 7 is limited in scope and duration, meaning, that it extends only to the certified list which the same provision requires to be posted in the polling places on election day. To stretch the coverage of the prohibition to the absolute is to read into the law something that is not intended. As it were, there is absolutely nothing in R.A. No. 7941 that prohibits the Comelec from disclosing or even publishing through mediums other than the "Certified List" the names of the party-list nominees. The Comelec obviously misread the limited non-disclosure aspect of the provision as an absolute bar to public disclosure before the May 2007 elections. The interpretation thus given by the Comelec virtually tacks an unconstitutional dimension on the last sentence of Section 7 of R.A. No. 7941. The Comelecs reasoning that a party-list election is not an election of personalities is valid to a point. It cannot be taken, however, to justify its assailed non-disclosure stance which comes, as it were, with a weighty presumption of invalidity, impinging, as it does, on a fundamental right to information.20 While the vote cast in a party-list elections is a vote for a party, such vote, in the end, would be a vote for its nominees, who, in appropriate cases, would eventually sit in the House of Representatives. The Court is very much aware of newspaper reports detailing the purported reasons behind the Comelecs disinclination to release the names of party-list nominees. It is to be stressed, however, that the Court is in the business of dispensing justice on the basis of hard facts and applicable statutory and decisional laws. And lest it be overlooked, the Court always assumes, at the first instance, the presumptive validity and regularity of official acts of government officials and offices. It has been repeatedly said in various contexts that the people have the right to elect their representatives on the basis of an informed judgment. Hence the need for voters to be informed about matters that have a bearing on their choice. The ideal cannot be achieved in a system of blind voting, as veritably advocated in the assailed resolution of the Comelec. The Court, since the 1914 case of Gardiner v. Romulo,21 has consistently made it clear that it frowns upon any interpretation of the law or rules that would hinder in any way the free and intelligent casting of the votes in an election.22 So it must be here for still other reasons articulated earlier. In all, we agree with the petitioners that respondent Comelec has a constitutional duty to disclose and release the names of the nominees of the party-list groups named in the herein petitions. WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 177271 is partly DENIED insofar as it seeks to nullify the accreditation of the respondents named therein. However, insofar as it seeks to compel the Comelec to disclose or publish the names of the nominees of party-list groups, sectors or organizations accredited to participate in the May 14,

2007 elections, the same petition and the petition in G.R. No. 177314 are GRANTED. Accordingly, the Comelec is hereby ORDERED to immediately disclose and release the names of the nominees of the party-list groups, sectors or organizations accredited to participate in the May 14, 2007 party-list elections. The Comelec is further DIRECTED to submit to the Court its compliance herewith within five (5) days from notice hereof. This Decision is declared immediately executory upon its receipt by the Comelec. No pronouncement as to cost. SO ORDERED.

v vi vii viii ix x xi xii xiii xiv xv xvi xvii xviii xix xx xxi xxii xxiii xxiv xxv xxvi xxvii xxviiiG.R. No. 172103

April 13, 2007

CITIZENS BATTLE AGAINST CORRUPTION (CIBAC), Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS GARCIA, (COMELEC), represented by CHAIRMAN BENJAMIN ABALOS, SR., Respondent. The Case Before us is a Petition for Certiorari1 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing the March 7, 2006 Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Resolution No. 06-0248,2 which rejected the Motion for Proclamation of the Second Nominees of Citizens Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC), et al. under the party-list system in connection with the May 2004 National and Local Elections. The Facts The COMELEC, sitting en banc as the National Board of Canvassers for the Party-List System, issued Resolution No. NBC 04-0043 promulgated on June 2, 2004, which proclaimed petitioner CIBAC as one of those which qualified to occupy a seat in Congress having received the required two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list representatives. Based on Party-List Canvass Report No. 19,4 CIBAC received a total

number of 493,546 votes out of the 12,627,852 votes cast for all the party-list participants, which, by applying the formula adopted by the Supreme Court in Veterans Federation Party v. COMELEC,5 resulted in a percentage of 3.9084.6 In the computation for additional seats for the parties, the COMELEC adopted a simplified formula of one additional seat per additional 2%, thereby foreclosing the chances of CIBAC to gain an additional seat under the party-list system for having received less than what was prescribed by the poll body.7 On June 22, 2004, petitioner CIBAC, together with Luzon Farmers Party (BUTIL) and Partido ng Manggagawa (PM), filed a Joint Motion for Immediate Proclamation8 entreating the COMELEC en banc to recognize their entitlement to an additional seat and that their second nominees be immediately proclaimed. They based their claim on Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC (Ang Bagong Bayani and Bayan Muna), applying the following Veterans formula: 1awphi1.nt Additional Seats = Votes Cast for Qualified Party Votes Cast for First Party for First Party9x Allotted SeatsOn March 7, 2006, the COMELEC en banc issued the challenged Resolution No. 06-0248 contained in the Excerpt from the Minutes of the Regular En Banc Meeting of the COMELEC,10 which adopted the March 6, 2006 Memorandum of the Supervisory Committee relative to the Urgent Motion to Resolve the Motion for Proclamation of the Second Nominees of CIBAC, BUTIL, and PM party-lists, in connection with the May 2004 elections for party-list representatives. The pertinent portion reads: "On 01 May 2004, Commissioner Mehol K. Sadain, then CIC on Party-List Concerns, acting on queries from several party-list candidates regarding the formula to be used by the Commission in determining the additional seats for party list winners in the 10 May 2004 elections, issued a memorandum on the matter to the Commission en-banc. As a result, on the [sic] 08 May 2004, the Commission en banc promulgated Resolution No. 6835 (Annex A) the resolutory portion of which reads RESOLVES, to adopt the simplified formula of one additional seat per additional two percent (underscoring supplied) of the total party-list votes in the proclamation of the party-list winners in the coming 10 May 2004 National and Local Elections. The Party List Canvass Report No. 22 of the National Board of Canvassers, (Annex B) shows that CIBAC, BUTIL and PM have the following percentage of total votes garnered: CIBAC - 3.8638 BUTIL - 3.3479 PM - 3.4947 Following the simplified formula of the Commission, after the first 2% is deducted from the percentage of votes of the above-named party-lists, they are no longer entitled to an additional seat. It is worth mentioning that the Commission, consistent with its formula, denied the petition for a seat of ABA-AKO and ANAD after garnering a percentage of votes of 1.9900 and 1.9099 respectively. For consideration." Considering the foregoing, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to adopt the recommendation of the Supervisory Committee to deny the foregoing Motion of CIBAC, BUTIL and PM party-lists for proclamation of second nominees, following the simplified formula of the Commission on the matter per Comelec Resolution No. 6835 promulgated 08 May 2004. The Issues Undeterred, CIBAC filed the instant Petition for Certiorari11 before this Court, raising two issues, viz:1^vvphi1.net A.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, IN ADOPTING THE SIMPLIFIED FORMULA OF ONE ADDITIONAL SEAT PER ADDITIONAL TWO PERCENT OF THE TOTAL PARTY-LIST VOTES IN THE PROCLAMATION OF THE PARTY-LIST WINNERS IN THE MAY 10, 2004 NATIONAL AND LOCAL ELECTION, THUS, ADJUDGING THE PETITIONER HEREIN AS ENTITLED ONLY TO ONE (1) SEAT, ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION. B. WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER CIBAC, AND OTHER PARTY-LIST GROUPS SIMILARLY SITUATED, ARE ENTITLED TO ONE (1) ADDITIONAL SEAT BASED ON THE FORMULA CRAFTED BY THE SUPREME COURT IN THE CASES OF ANG BAGONG BAYANI AND BAYAN MUNA.12 In gist, the core issue is whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it denied petitioner CIBAC an additional seat in the House of Representatives under the party-list system by using the simplified formula instead of the claimed Ang Bagong Bayani and Bayan Muna formula. Petitioner CIBAC asseverates that the COMELEC committed a serious departure from settled jurisprudence amounting to grave abuse of discretion when it mistakenly relied on the "simplified formula" as the basis for its resolution. Moreover, it stressed that the COMELEC simplified formula runs counter to the Ang Bagong Bayani and Bayan Muna formula which used the "number of allotted seats for the first party" as multiplier. If the Ang Bagong Bayani and Bayan Muna formula were applied, CIBAC would be entitled to one additional seat, thus: Additional seats =495,193 x 3 1,203,305= 1.2345Lastly, petitioner faults the COMELEC for its failure to act on and so dismiss the petitions for disqualification filed by the other party-list groups which could have enabled the COMELEC to "make an accurate determination of the votes that each party-list group has actually obtained." It therefore asks the Court to set aside the assailed COMELEC Resolution No. 06-0248; and direct the COMELEC to declare CIBAC as entitled to one (1) additional seat and to immediately proclaim Ma. Blanca Kim Bernardo-Lokin, its second nominee, as member of the House of Representatives. The Courts Ruling Entitlement to an additional seat In deciding the controversy at hand, a second look at the enabling law, Republic Act No. (R.A.) 7941, "An Act Providing for the Election of Party-List Representatives through the Party-List System, and Appropriating Funds Therefor," is in order. The objective of the law was made clear in Section 2, thus: Declaration of Policy.The State shall promote proportional representation in the election of representatives to the House of Representatives through a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the House of Representatives. Towards this end, the State shall develop and guarantee a full, free and open party system in order to attain the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives by enhancing their chances to compete for and win seats in the legislature, and shall provide the simplest scheme possible. (Emphasis supplied.) In determining the number of seats a party-list is entitled to, Sec. 11 prescribes that: The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the partylist system shall be entitled to one seat each: provided, that those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes: provided, finally, that each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats (emphasis supplied).

The Court, in the leading case of Veterans, listed the four (4) inviolable parameters to determine the winners in a Philippine-style party-list election mandated by the Constitution and R.A. 7941, as follows: First, the twenty percent allocationthe combined number of all party-list congressmen shall not exceed twenty percent of the total membership of the House of Representatives, including those elected under the party list. Second, the two percent thresholdonly those parties garnering a minimum of two percent of the total valid votes cast for the party-list system are "qualified" to have a seat in the House of Representatives. Third, the three-seat limiteach qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it actually obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three seats; that is, one "qualifying" and two additional seats. Fourth, proportional representationthe additional seats which a qualified party is entitled to shall be computed "in proportion to their total number of votes."13 (Emphasis supplied.) In determining the number of additional seats for each party-list that has met the 2% threshold, "proportional representation" is the touchstone to ascertain entitlement to extra seats. The correct formula in ascertaining the entitlement to additional seats of the first party and other qualified partylist groups was clearly explicated in Veterans: [H]ow do we determine the number of seats the first party is entitled to? The only basis given by the law is that a party receiving at least two percent of the total votes shall be entitled to one seat. Proportionally, if the first party were to receive twice the number of votes of the second party, it should be entitled to twice the latters number of seats and so on. The formula, therefore, for computing the number of seats to which the first party is entitled is as follows: Number of votes of first party Total votes for party-list system=Proportion of votes of first party relative to total votes for party-list systemIf the proportion of votes received by the first party without rounding it off is equal to at least six percent of the total valid votes cast for all the party list groups, then the first party shall be entitled to two additional seats or a total of three seats overall. If the proportion of votes without a rounding off is equal to or greater than four percent, but less than six percent, then the first party shall have one additional or a total of two seats. And if the proportion is less than four percent, then the first party shall not be entitled to any additional seat. We adopted the six percent bench mark, because the first party is not always entitled to the maximum number of additional seats. Likewise, it would prevent the allotment of more than the total number of available seats, such as in an extreme case wherein 18 or more parties tie for the highest rank and are thus entitled to three seats each. In such scenario, the number of seats to which all the parties are entitled may exceed the maximum number of party-list seats reserved in the House of Representatives. xxxx Formula for Additional Seats of Other Qualified Parties The next step is to solve for the number of additional seats that the other qualified parties are entitled to, based on proportional representation. x x x xxxx In simplified form, it is written as follows: 1vvphi1.nt

Additional seats for concerned party=No. of votes of concerned party No. of votes of the first partyxNo. of additional seats allocated to first party (Emphasis supplied.)x x x x The above formula does not give an exact mathematical representation of the number of additional seats to be awarded since, in order to be entitled to one additional seat, an exact whole number is necessary. In fact, most of the actual mathematical proportions are not whole numbers and are not rounded off for the reasons explained earlier. To repeat, rounding off may result in the awarding of a number of seats in excess of that provided by the law. Furthermore, obtaining absolute proportional representation is restricted by the three-seat-per-party limit to a maximum of two additional slots. An increase in the maximum number of additional representatives a party may be entitled to would result in a more accurate proportional representation. But the law itself has set the limit: only two additional seats. Hence, we need to work within such extant parameter.14 (Emphasis supplied.) On June 25, 2003, the formula was put to test in Ang Bagong Bayani and Bayan Muna.1vvphi1.nt In determining the additional seats for the other qualified partiesBUHAY, AMIN, ABA, COCOFED, PM, SANLAKAS, and ABANSE! PINAYthe following computation was made: Applying the relevant formula in Veterans to BUHAY, we arrive at 0.51: Additional Seats=Votes Cast for Qualified Party Votes Cast for First Partyx Allotted Seats for First Party=290,760 1,708,253x 3=0.51Since 0.51 is less than one, BUHAY is not entitled to any additional seat.15 From a scrutiny of the Veterans and Ang Bagong Bayani and Bayan Muna formulae in determining the additional seats for party-list representatives, it is readily apparent that the Veterans formula is materially different from the one used in Ang Bagong Bayani and Bayan Muna. In Veterans, the multiplier used was "the [number] of additional seats allocated to the first party," while in the Ang Bagong Bayani and Bayan Muna formula, the multiplier "allotted seats for first party" was applied. The dissimilarity in the multiplier used spells out a big difference in the outcome of the equation. This divergence on the multiplier was pointed out and stressed by respondent COMELEC. Nevertheless, petitioner insists that the correct multiplier is the ALLOTTED seats for the first party referring to the three (3) seats won by Bayan Muna which emerged as the winning first party, as allegedly prescribed in Ang Bagong Bayani and Bayan Muna. On this issue, petitioner ratiocinates this way: It cannot be emphasized enough that the formula in the Ang Bagong Bayani and Bayan Muna cases rendered in 2003, effectively modified the earlier Veterans formula, with the clear and explicit use of the "allotted seats for the first party". Considering that the first party, Bayan Muna, was allotted to the maximum three (3) seats under the law, it is therefore clear that the multiplier to be used is three (3), the allotted seats for the first party.16 However, this postulation is bereft of merit and basis.1awphi1.nt A careful perusal of the four corners of Ang Bagong Bayani and Bayan Muna betrays petitioners claim as it did not mention any revision or reshaping of the Veterans formula. As a matter of fact, the Court had in mind the application of the original Veterans formula in Ang Bagong Bayani and Bayan Muna. This conclusion is based on the aforequoted formula in Ang Bagong Bayani and Bayan Muna, as follows: Applying the relevant formula in Veterans to BUHAY, we arrive at 0.51: Additional Seats= Votes Cast for Qualified Party Votes Cast for First Partyx Allotted Seats for First Party= 290,760 1,708,253x 3= 0.51The phrase "applying the relevant formula in Veterans to BUHAY" admits of no other conclusion than that the Court merely applied the Veterans formula to Ang Bagong Bayani and Bayan Muna in

resolving the additional seats by the other qualified party-list groups. However, it appears that there was an inaccurate presentation of the Veterans formula as the Court used the multiplier "allotted seats for the first party" in Ang Bagong Bayani and Bayan Muna instead of the "[number] of additional seats allocated to the first party" prescribed in the Veterans formula. It is apparent that the phrase "[number] of additional" was omitted, possibly by inadvertence from the phrase "allotted seats for First Party." The disparity is material, substantial, and significant since the multiplier "[number] of additional seats allocated to the First Party" prescribed in the Veterans formula pertains to a multiplier of two (2) seats, while the multiplier "allotted seats for the first party" in Ang Bagong Bayani and Bayan Muna formula can mean a multiplier of maximum three (3) seats, since the first party can garner a maximum of three (3) seats. Moreover, footnote 37 of Ang Bagong Bayani and Bayan Muna states that "for a discussion of how to compute additional nominees for parties other than the first, see Veterans x x x." It clarifies the confusion created by the imprecise formula expressed in Ang Bagong Bayani and Bayan Muna. Thus, the Court rules that the claimed Ang Bagong Bayani and Bayan Muna formula has not modified the Veterans formula. As a matter of fact, there was really no other formula approved by the Court other than the Veterans formula in fixing the number of additional seats for the other qualified party-list groups. Also, in Partido ng Manggagawa v. COMELEC, the Court found that the confusion in the computation of additional seats for the other qualified party-list groups arose "[from] the way the Veterans formula was cited in the June 25, 2003 Resolution of the Court in Ang Bagong Bayani." We reiterated that "the prevailing formula for the computation of additional seats for party-list winners is the formula stated in the landmark case of Veterans x x x."17 Applying the Veterans formula in petitioners case, we reach the conclusion that CIBAC is not entitled to an additional seat. Party-List Canvass Report No. 2018 contained in the petition shows that the first party, Bayan Muna, garnered the highest number of votes, that is, a total of 1,203,305 votes. Petitioner CIBAC, on the other hand, received a total of 495,190 votes. It was proclaimed that the first party, Bayan Muna, was entitled to a maximum of three (3) seats19 based on June 2, 2004 Resolution No. NBC 04-004 of the COMELEC. A computation using the Veterans formula would therefore lead us to the following result: 1awphi1.nt No. of votes of concerned party No. of votes of the first partyx No. of additional seats allocated to the first party (Emphasis supplied.)= Additional Seats for concerned partyApplying this formula, the result is as follows:495,190 1,203,305x 2=0.41152493 x 2=0.82304986This is a far cry from the claimed Ang Bagong Bayani and Bayan Muna formula which used the multiplier "allotted seats for the first party," viz: Additional Seats=Votes Cast for Qualified Party Votes Cast for First Partyx Allotted Seats for First PartyApplying the Ang Bagong Bayani and Bayan Muna formula to CIBAC, it yields the following result:Additional seats=495,190 1,203,305x 3 = 1.2345Unfortunately, it is the Veterans formula that is sanctioned by the Court and not the Ang Bagong Bayani and Bayan Muna formula that petitioner alleges. Since petitioner CIBAC got a result of 0.82304986 only, which is less than one (1), then it did not obtain or reach a whole number. Petitioner has not convinced us to deviate from our ruling in Veterans that "in order to be entitled to one additional seat, an exact whole number is necessary." Clearly, petitioner is not entitled to an additional seat. COMELECs application of Ang Bagong Bayani and Bayan Muna is incorrect The Court laments the fact that the COMELEC insisted in using a simplified formula when it is fully aware of the ruling in the Veterans case. The COMELEC explained that it "merely based its judgment on Comelec Resolution No. 6835 which cited Supreme Court Resolution20 dated 20 November 2003 granting BUHAYs Motion for Reconsideration and entitling it to one additional seat for having garnered more than four percent (4%) of the total number of votes validly cast for the party-list system, thus recognizing once again the simplified formula."

However, in said Resolution, the Court, in granting BUHAY an additional seat, meant to apply it on that specific case alone, not being a precedentpro hac vice (for this one particular occasion); thus, this Resolution cannot be applied as a precedent to future cases. The simplified formula having already been abandoned, the COMELEC should have used and adhered to the Veterans formula. The Court has consistently reminded the COMELEC of its "function to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election." As judicial decisions form part of the law of the land, the COMELEC cannot just ignore or be oblivious to the rulings issued by the Court. Basic is the rule that lower courts and quasi-judicial tribunals must bow to the decisions and resolutions of the highest court of the land. The COMELEC is not an exception. It cannot do otherwise. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed March 7, 2006 Comelec Resolution No. 060248 is hereby AFFIRMED only insofar as it denied petitioner CIBACs motion for the proclamation of its second nominee to an additional seat under the 2004 party-list elections. The portion of Comelec Resolution No. 060248, which adopted and applied the "simplified formula of the Commission on the matter per Comelec Resolution No. 6835 promulgated 08 May 2004," is annulled and set aside. Respondent Comelec is ordered to strictly apply the Veterans formula in determining the entitlement of qualified party-list groups to additional seats in the party-list system. No costs. SO ORDERED. G.R. No. 164702 March 15, 2006

PARTIDO NG MANGGAGAWA (PM) and BUTIL FARMERS PARTY (BUTIL), Petitioners, vs. The HON. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (COMELEC), represented by its HON. CHAIRMAN BENJAMIN ABALOS, SR., Respondent. DECISION PUNO, J.: The petition at bar involves the formula for computing the additional seats due, if any, for winners in party-list elections. The antecedents are undisputed. Several party-list participants sent queries to the respondent COMELEC regarding the formula to be adopted in computing the additional seats for the party-list winners in the May 10, 2004 elections. In response, the respondent Commission issued Resolution No. 6835,1 adopting the simplified formula of "one additional seat per additional two percent of the total party-list votes." The resolution reads: Considering that the simplified formula has long been the one adopted by the Commission and is now the formula of choice of the Supreme Court in its latest resolution on the matter, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to adopt the simplified formula of one additional seat per additional two percent of the total party-list votes in the proclamation of the party-list winners in the coming May 10, 2004 National and Local Elections.2 (emphasis supplied) In finding that this simplified formula is the "formula of choice of the Supreme Court," respondent Commission quoted the memorandum of Commissioner Mehol K. Sadain, Commissioner-In-Charge for Party-List concerns, viz: By way of review, following is a highlight of the legal discourse on the two [percent] vote requirement for the party-list system and the corollary issue on additional seat allocation.

Section 11(b) and Section 12 of R.A. 7941 (Party-List System Act) provide that "the parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each, provided that those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes xxx. The COMELEC shall tally all the votes for the parties, organizations, or coalitions on a nationwide basis, rank them according to the number of votes received and allocate party-list representatives proportionately according to the percentage of votes obtained by each party, organization or coalition as against the total nationwide votes cast for the party-list system." These provisions of [the] statute were transformed into the following formulas by the Supreme Court in Veterans Federation Party vs. COMELEC (G.R. Nos. 136781, 136786 & 136795, October 6, 2000). For the party-list candidate garnering the highest number of votes, the following formula was adopted: Number of votes of first party Total votes for party-list system=Proportion of votes of first party relative to total votes for the party-list systemAnd for the additional seats of other parties who reached the required two percent mark, the following formula applies: Additional seats concerned party= No. of votes of concerned party No. of votes of first partyx No. of additional seats allocated to the first partyThe applicability of these formulas was reiterated in the June 25, 2003 Resolution of the Supreme Court in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party vs. COMELEC, et al. (G.R. No. 147589) and Bayan Muna vs. COMELEC, et al. (G.R. No. 147613) penned by Justice Artemio Panganiban, wherein the Court declared that party-list BUHAY was not entitled to an additional seat even if it garnered 4.46 [percent] of the total party-list votes, contrary to BUHAY's contention which was based on the COMELEC simplified formula of one additional seat per an additional two percent of the total partylist votes. However, on November 10, 2003,3 the Supreme Court promulgated a Resolution in the same case, this time penned by Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr., granting BUHAY's motion for reconsideration of the June 25, 2003 Resolution, to wit: It is thus established in the Resolution of 25 June 2003 that, like APEC, BUTIL, CIBAC and AKBAYAN, BUHAY had obtained more than four percent (4%) of the total number of votes validly cast for the party-list system and obtained more than 0.50 for the additional seats. Accordingly, just like the first four whose additional nominees are now holding office as member of the House of Representatives, BUHAY should be declared entitled to one additional seat. Effectively, the Supreme Court, with Justices Jose Vitug and Panganiban registering separate opinions, adopted the simplified COMELEC formula of one additional seat per additional two percent of the total party-list votes garnered when it declared BUHAY entitled to one additional seat and proceeded to order the COMELEC to proclaim BUHAY's second nominee.4 (emphasis supplied) Party-List Canvass Report No. 205 showed that the total number of votes cast for all the party-list participants in the May 10, 2004 elections was 12,721,952 and the following parties, organizations and coalitions received at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system, to wit: RankParty-List GroupVotes ReceivedPercentage to Total Votes Cast (%)1Bayan Muna (BAYAN MUNA)1,203,3059.45852Association of Philippine Electric Cooperatives (APEC)934,9957.34953Akbayan! Citizen's Action Party (AKBAYAN!)852,4736.70084Buhay Hayaan Yumabong (BUHAY)705,7305.54735Anakpawis (AP)538,3964.23206Citizen's Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC)495,1933.89247Gabriela Women's Party (GABRIELA)464,5863.65188Partido ng Manggagawa (PM)448,0723.52209Butil Farmers Party (BUTIL)429,2593.374210Alliance of Volunteer Educators (AVE)343,4982.700011Alagad (ALAGAD)340,9772.680212Veterans Freedom Party (VFP)340,7592.678513Cooperative Natcco Network Party (COOP-NATCCO)270,9502.129814Anak Mindanao (AMIN)269,7502.120415Ang Laban ng Indiginong Filipino (ALIF)269,3452.117216An Waray (AN

WARAY)268,1642.1079Based on the simplified formula, respondent Commission issued Resolution No. NBC 04-0046 proclaiming the following parties, organizations and coalition as winners and their qualified nominees as representatives to the House of Representatives: BAYAN MUNA (BAYAN MUNA) - 3 seats 1. Saturnino C. Ocampo 2. Teodoro A. Casio, Jr. 3. Joel G. Virador ASSOCIATION OF PHILIPPINE ELECTRIC COOPERATIVES (APEC) - 3 seats 1. Edgar L. Valdez 2. Ernesto G. Pablo 3. Sunny Rose A. Madamba AKBAYAN! CITIZEN'S ACTION PARTY (AKBAYAN!) - 3 seats 1. Loreta Ann P. Rosales 2. Mario Joyo Aguja 3. Ana Theresa Hontiveros-Baraquel BUHAY HAYAAN YUMABONG (BUHAY) - 2 seats 1. Rene M. Velarde 2. Hans Christian M. Seeres ANAKPAWIS (AP) - 2 seats 1. Crispin B. Beltran 2. Rafael V. Mariano CITIZEN'S BATTLE AGAINST CORRUPTION (CIBAC) - 1 seat Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva GABRIELA WOMEN'S PARTY (GABRIELA) - 1 seat Liza Largoza-Maza PARTIDO NG MANGGAGAWA (PM) - 1 seat Renato B. Magtubo BUTIL FARMERS PARTY (BUTIL) - 1 seat

Benjamin A. Cruz ALLIANCE OF VOLUNTEER EDUCATORS (AVE) - 1 seat Eulogio R. Magsaysay ALAGAD (ALAGAD) - 1 seat xxx VETERANS FREEDOM PARTY (VFP) - 1 seat Ernesto S. Gidaya COOPERATIVE NATCCO NETWORK PARTY (COOP-NATCCO) - 1 seat Guillermo P. Cua AN WARAY (AN WARAY) - 1 seat Florencio G. Noel ANAK MINDANAO (AMIN) - 1 seat Mujiv S. Hataman7 Subsequently, ALIF was also proclaimed as "duly-elected party-list participant and its nominee, Hadji Acmad M. Tomawis, as elected representative to the House of Representatives."8 On June 22, 2004, petitioners PM and BUTIL, together with CIBAC, filed a Joint Motion for Immediate Proclamation9 with the respondent Commission en banc. They prayed that they be declared as entitled to one (1) additional seat each and their respective second nominees be proclaimed as duly elected members of the House of Representatives. As basis, they cited the formula used by the Court in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC,10 viz: Additional Seats =Votes Cast for Qualified Party Votes Cast for First PartyxAllotted Seats for First PartyOn June 25, 2004, petitioners and CIBAC filed a Supplement to the Joint Motion (For Immediate Proclamation)11 to justify their entitlement to an additional seat, as follows: 5. To compute the additional seats that movants are entitled to using the Veterans formula of the Supreme Court in the aforesaid Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party and Bayan Muna cases, and Party List Canvass Report No. 20, the following process is done: Bayan Muna is the "First Party" with 1,203,305 votes. To determine the number of seats allocated to the first party, we use the Veterans formula, to wit: Number of votes of first party Total Votes for party-list system= Proportion of votes of first party relative to total votes for party-list systemApplying this formula, we arrive at 9.4585% 1,203,305 12,721,952= 9.4585%6. Having obtained 9.4585%, the first party, Bayan Muna, is allotted three (3) seats. 7. The number of additional seats that the movants are entitled to are determined as follows:

Additional Seats= Votes Cast for Qualified Party Votes Cast for First Partyx Allotted Seats for First Party For BUTIL, the computation is as follows:Additional Seats= 429,259 1,203,305x 3= 1.0701For CIBAC, the computation is:Additional Seats= 495,193 1,203,305x 3= 1.2345For PM, the computation is:Additional Seats= 448,072 1,203,305x 3= 1.11718. All the foregoing results are greater than one (1); therefore, the movant-party list organizations are entitled to one (1) additional seat each.12 On July 31, 2004, respondent Commission en banc, issued Resolution No. NBC 04-011,13 viz: This pertains to the 06 July 2004 Memorandum of the Supervisory Committee, National Board of Canvassers, submitting its comment/recommendation on the petition filed by Luzon Farmers Party (BUTIL), Citizens Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC), Partido ng Manggagawa (PM) and Gabriela Women's Party for additional seat and to immediately proclaim their respective second nominees to the House of Representatives, and the letter of Atty. Ivy Perucho, Legal counsel of the CIBAC, relative to the Joint Motion for Immediate Proclamation filed by BUTIL, CIBAC, PM requesting to calendar for resolution the said Joint Motion. The Memorandum of the Supervisory Committee reads: "This has reference to the Urgent Motion for Resolution (re: Joint Motion for Immediate Proclamation dated 22 June 2004) filed on July 1, 2004 by movants Luzon Farmers Party (BUTIL), Citizens Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC) and Partido ng Manggagawa (PM), NBC Case No. 04-197 (195) and a similar motion filed by party-list Gabriela Women's Party (NBC No. 04-200) through counsel, praying to declare that the herein movants are entitled to one (1) additional seat each, and to immediately proclaim the second nominees, to wit: x x x The Supreme Court, in its latest Resolution promulgated on November 10, 2003 (sic) in Ang Bagong BayaniOFW Labor Party vs. Comelec, et al. (G.R. No. 147589) and Bayan Muna vs. Comelec, et al. (G.R. No. 147613), laid down a simplified formula of one additional seat per additional two (2) percent of the total party list votes. The same simplified formula was adopted by the Commission in its Resolution No. 6835 promulgated 08 May 2004, to quote: "The additional seats of other parties who reached the required two percent mark, the following formula applies: Additional seats for concerned party= No. of votes of concerned party No. of votes of the first partyx No. of additional seats allocated to first partyThe aforenamed party-list organizations have not obtained the required additional two (2) percent of the total party-list votes for them to merit an additional seat. For your Honors' consideration." xxx Considering the foregoing, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to direct the Supervisory Committee to cause the re-tabulation of the votes for Citizens Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC), Luzon Farmers Party (BUTIL), Partido ng Manggagawa (PM) and Gabriela Women's Party (Gabriela) and to submit its comment/recommendation, together with the tabulated figures of the foregoing parties, for appropriate action of the Commission. Let the Supervisory Committee implement this resolution and to furnish copies hereof to the parties concerned for their information and guidance. SO ORDERED.14 (emphases supplied)

For failure of the respondent Commission to resolve the substantive issues raised by petitioners and to cause the re-tabulation of the party-list votes despite the lapse of time, petitioners PM and BUTIL filed the instant petition on August 18, 2004. They seek the issuance of a writ of mandamus to compel respondent Commission: a) to convene as the National Board of Canvassers for the Party-List System; b) to declare them as entitled to one (1) additional seat each; c) to immediately proclaim their respective second nominees; d) to declare other similarly situated party-list organizations as entitled to one (1) additional seat each; and e) to immediately proclaim similarly situated parties' second nominees as duly elected representatives to the House of Representatives.15 They submit as sole issue: WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT COMELEC EN BANC, AS THE NATIONAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS FOR THE PARTY-LIST SYSTEM, COULD BE COMPELLED BY THE HONORABLE COURT TO MECHANICALLY APPLY THE FORMULA STATED IN ITS 25 JUNE 2003 RESOLUTION REITERATED IN THE 20 NOVEMBER 2003 RESOLUTION IN ANG BAGONG BAYANI CASES IN THE DETERMINATION OF QUALIFIED PARTY-LIST ORGANIZATIONS AND IN THE PROCLAMATION OF THEIR RESPECTIVE NOMINEES.16 We shall first resolve the procedural issues. Respondent Commission, through the Office of the Solicitor General, submits that petitioners' recourse to a petition for mandamus with this Court is improper. It raises the following procedural issues: (a) the proper remedy from the assailed resolution of the respondent Commission is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court; (b) the instant action was filed out of time; and (c) failure to file a motion for reconsideration of the assailed resolution with the respondent Commission is fatal to petitioners' action.17 In assailing petitioners' recourse to a petition for mandamus, respondent Commission relies on Section 7, Article IX(A) of the 1987 Constitution which provides that "any decision, order or ruling" of the respondent Commission "may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof." It contends that in Aratuc v. COMELEC18 and Dario v. Mison,19 this provision was construed as the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 and not the appeal by certiorari under Rule 45. Respondent Commission further contends that its duty to proclaim the second nominees of PM and BUTIL is not ministerial but discretionary, hence, it is not subject to the writ of mandamus. The arguments fail to impress. Under the Constitution, this Court has original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus.20 We have consistently ruled that where the duty of the respondent Commission is ministerial, mandamus lies to compel its performance.21 A purely ministerial act, as distinguished from a discretionary act, is one which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done.22 The case at bar is one of mandamus over which this Court has jurisdiction for it is respondent Commission's ministerial duty to apply the formula as decided by this Court after interpreting the existing law on party-list representation. It is given that this Court has the ultimate authority to interpret laws and the Constitution.23 Respondent Commission has no discretion to refuse enforcement of any decision of this Court under any guise or guile. In any event, it is the averments in the complaint, and not the nomenclature given by the parties, that determine the nature of the action.24 Though captioned as a Petition for Mandamus, the same may be treated as a petition for certiorari and mandamus considering that it alleges that the respondent Commission acted contrary to prevailing jurisprudence, hence, with grave abuse of discretion and without jurisdiction. In previous rulings,25 we have treated differently labeled actions as special civil actions for certiorari under Rule 65 for reasons such as "justice, equity and fairplay"26 and "novelty of the issue presented and its far-reaching effects."27 The petition at bar involves the rightful representation in the House of Representatives of the marginalized groups by the partylist winners and their constitutional claim merits more than a disposition based on thin technicality.

Next, respondent Commission contends that the petition at bar was filed belatedly. Under Article IX(A), Section 7 of the Constitution and Rule 64, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, the instant petition must be filed within thirty (30) days from receipt of the notice of the decision, order or ruling to be reviewed. Since more than 30 days have lapsed from the time PM and BUTIL allegedly received notice of respondent Commission's Resolution No. 6835, it is urged that the instant petition was filed out of time.28 Again, the contention is without merit. We have interpreted Article IX(A), Section 7 of the Constitution and Rule 64, Section 3 of the Rules of Court to mean final orders, rulings and decisions of the respondent Commission rendered in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers.29 Before resolving whether Resolution No. 6835 was rendered in the exercise of respondent Commission's adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers, we recapitulate the pertinent events. On May 8, 2004, respondent Commission issued Resolution No. 6835. On June 2, 2004, it also issued Resolution No. NBC 04-004 holding petitioners entitled to only one (1) nominee each on the basis of Resolution No. 6835. On June 22, 2004, petitioners filed a Joint Motion for Immediate Proclamation with party-list coparticipant CIBAC, claiming entitlement to an additional seat using the formula stated in Ang Bagong Bayani. Thereafter, they filed their Supplement to the Joint Motion (For Immediate Proclamation). On July 1, 2004, they filed an Urgent Motion for Resolution (Re: Joint Motion for Immediate Proclamation dated 22 June 2004) and again, on July 12, 2004, they filed their Motion to Resolve (Re: Joint Motion for Immediate Proclamation filed on 22 June 2004). In response, respondent Commission en banc issued Resolution No. NBC 04-011 quoted above, which directed the Supervisory Committee "to cause the re-tabulation of the votes" of CIBAC, GABRIELA and petitioners PM and BUTIL. The resolution referred to the Memorandum of the Supervisory Committee which adopted the simplified formula in Resolution No. 6835. Without further ado, petitioners BUTIL and PM filed the instant petition on August 18, 2004 or eighteen (18) days after the promulgation of Resolution No. NBC 04-011. Clearly, the instant petition was timely filed. We hold that Resolution No. 6835 was not rendered in the exercise of respondent COMELEC's quasi-judicial powers. Its issuance was not brought about by a matter or case filed before the respondent Commission. Rather, it was issued by the respondent Commission in the exercise of its administrative function to enforce and administer election laws to ensure an orderly election. Finally, respondent Commission contends that petitioners' failure to file a motion for reconsideration of Resolution No. 6835 is fatal. Again, the argument is without merit. Under Rule 13, Section 1(d) of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, a motion for reconsideration of an en banc ruling, order or decision of the respondent Commission is not allowed. Moreover, the issue of what formula applies in determining the additional seats to be allocated to party-list winners is a pure question of law that is a recognized exception to the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies.30 We shall now resolve the substantive issue: the formula for computing the additional seats due, if any, for winners in party-list elections. Petitioners cite the formula crafted by the Court in the landmark case of Veterans Federation Party v. COMELEC.31 They allege that the June 25, 2003 Resolution of the Court in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW v. COMELEC32 "reiterated that the additional seats for qualified party-list organizations shall be computed in accordance with the above formula in Veterans" and that the November 20, 2003 Resolution33 of the Court in the same case "had not departed from its 25 June 2003 Resolution."34 A review of the pertinent legal provisions and jurisprudence on the party-list system is appropriate. The Constitution provides: Art. VI, Section 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the

provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations. (emphasis supplied) Pursuant to the Constitution's mandate, Congress enacted R.A. No. 7941, also known as the "Party-List System Act," to "promote proportional representation in the election of representatives to the House of Representatives through a party-list system." The law provides as follows: Section 11. Number of Party-List Representatives.-- xxx In determining the allocation of seats for the second vote, the following procedure shall be observed: (a) The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections. (b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each: Provided, That those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in the proportion of their total number of votes: Provided, finally, That each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats. Section 12. Procedure in Allocating Seats for Party-List Representatives.-- The COMELEC shall tally all the votes for the parties, organizations, or coalitions on a nationwide basis, rank them according to the number of votes received and allocate party-list representatives proportionately according to the percentage of votes obtained by each party, organization, or coalition as against the total nationwide votes cast for the party-list system. (emphases supplied) These provisions on the party-list system were put to test in the May 11, 1998 elections. In the landmark case of Veterans,35 several petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, with prayers for the issuance of temporary restraining orders or writs of preliminary injunction, were filed by some parties and organizations that had obtained at least two percent of the total party-list votes cast in the May 11, 1998 party-list elections, against COMELEC and 38 other parties, organizations and coalitions which had been declared by COMELEC as entitled to party-list seats in the House of Representatives. The following issues were raised: 1) whether the twenty percent constitutional allocation is mandatory; 2) whether the two percent threshold requirement and the threeseat limit under Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 is constitutional; and 3) how the additional seats of a qualified party should be determined. In said case, the Court set the "four inviolable parameters" of the party-list system under the Constitution and R.A. No. 7941, to wit: First, the twenty percent allocation -- the combined number of all party-list congressmen shall not exceed twenty percent of the total membership of the House of Representatives, including those elected under the party list. Second, the two percent threshold -- only those parties garnering a minimum of two percent of the total valid votes cast for the party-list system are "qualified" to have a seat in the House of Representatives. Third, the three-seat limit -- each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it actually obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three seats; that is, one "qualifying" and two additional seats. Fourth, proportional representation -- the additional seats which a qualified party is entitled to shall be computed "in proportion to their total number of votes." Likewise, the Court spelled out the formula for allocating the seats for party-list winners, thus:

Step One. There is no dispute among the petitioners, the public and the private respondents, as well as the members of this Court, that the initial step is to rank all the participating parties, organizations and coalitions from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they each received. Then the ratio for each party is computed by dividing its votes by the total votes cast for all the parties participating in the system. All parties with at least two percent of the total votes are guaranteed one seat each. Only these parties shall be considered in the computation of additional seats. The party receiving the highest number of votes shall thenceforth be referred to as the "first" party. Step Two. The next step is to determine the number of seats the first party is entitled to, in order to be able to compute that for the other parties. Since the distribution is based on proportional representation, the number of seats to be allotted to the other parties cannot possibly exceed that to which the first party is entitled by virtue of its obtaining the most number of votes. xxx Now, how do we determine the number of seats the first party is entitled to? x x x The formula x x x is as follows: Number of votes of first party Total votes for Party-list system= Proportion of votes of first party relative to total votes for party-list systemIf the proportion of votes received by the first party without rounding it off is equal to at least six percent of the total valid votes cast for all the party list groups, then the first party shall be entitled to two additional seats or a total of three seats overall. If the proportion of votes without a rounding off is equal to or greater than four percent, but less than six percent, then the first party shall have one additional or a total of two seats. And if the proportion is less than four percent, then the first party shall not be entitled to any additional seat. xxx Step Three. The next step is to solve for the number of additional seats that the other qualified parties are entitled to, based on proportional representation. The formula is encompassed by the following complex fraction: Additional seats for concerned party= No. of votes of concerned party Total No. of votes for party-list system No. of votes of first party Total No. of votes for party-list systemx No. of additional seats allocated to the first partyIn simplified form, it is written as follows: Additional seats for concerned party= No. of votes of concerned party No. of votes of first partyx No. of additional seats allocated to the first party36(emphases supplied) Applying this formula, the Court found the outcome of the May 11, 1998 party-list elections as follows: OrganizationVotes Garnered%age of Total VotesInitial No. of SeatsAdditional SeatsTotal1. APEC 503,487 5.50% 1 1 22. ABA 321,646 3.51% 1 321,646/503,487 * 1 = 0.64 13. ALAGAD 312,500 3.41% 1 312,500/503,487 * 1 = 0.62 14. VETERANS FEDERATION304,802 3.33% 1 304,802/503,487 * 1 = 0.61 15. PROMDI 255,184 2.79% 1 255,184/503,487 * 1 = 0.51 16. AKO 239,042 2.61% 1 239,042/503,487 * 1 = 0.47 17. NCSFO 238,303 2.60% 1 238,303/503,487 * 1 = 0.47 18. ABANSE!PINAY 235,548 2.57% 1 235,548/503,487 * 1 = 0.47 19. AKBAYAN! 232,376 2.54% 1 232,376/503,487 * 1 = 0.46 110. BUTIL 215,643 2.36% 1 215,643/503,487 * 1 = 0.43 111. SANLAKAS 194,617 2.13% 1 194,617/503,487 * 1 = 0.39 112. COOPNATCCO 189,802 2.07% 1 189,802/503,487 * 1 = 0.38 113. COCOFED 186,388 2.04% 1 186,388/503,487 * 1 = 0.37 137The case of Ang Bagong Bayani arose during the May 14, 2001 party-list elections. Two petitions for certiorari were filed by several party-list candidates: (a) to challenge a resolution of the COMELEC approving the participation of some 154 organizations and parties in the May 14, 2001 party-list elections; and (b) to disqualify certain parties classified as "political parties" and "organizations/coalitions" by COMELEC. In a Decision dated June 26, 2001, the Court established the eight-point guideline38 for the screening of party-list participants. The case was then remanded to the COMELEC for the immediate conduct of summary evidentiary hearings to

implement the eight-point guideline. In due time, COMELEC submitted its compliance reports to the Court. Based on the compliance reports, the Court issued several resolutions proclaiming BAYAN MUNA with its three nominees and AKBAYAN!, BUTIL, APEC and CIBAC, with one nominee each, as party-list winners.39 Subsequently, several motions for proclamation were filed by other party-list participants. In resolving the motions, the Court had to consider, among others, the effect of the disqualification after the elections of many party-list participants to the total votes cast for the party-list elections. In the previous case of Labo v. COMELEC,40 this Court ruled that the votes cast for an ineligible or disqualified candidate cannot be considered "stray" except when the electorate is fully aware in fact and in law of a candidate's disqualification so as to bring such awareness within the realm of notoriety but nonetheless cast their votes in favor of the ineligible candidate. In its Resolution dated June 25, 2003, the Court held that the Labo doctrine cannot be applied to the party-list system in view of Sec. 10 of R.A. No. 7941 which expressly provides that the votes cast for a party, a sectoral organization or a coalition "not entitled to be voted for shall not be counted." The Court then proceeded to determine the number of nominees the party-list winners were entitled, thus:41 We shall now determine the number of nominees each winning party is entitled to, in accordance with the formula in Veterans. For purposes of determining the number of its nominees, BAYAN MUNA (the party that obtained the highest number of votes) is considered the first party. The applicable formula is as follows: Number of votes of first party Total votes for party-list system= Proportion of votes of first party relative to total votes for party-list systemApplying this formula, we arrive at 26.19 percent: xxx Having obtained 26.19 percent, BAYAN MUNA is entitled to three (3) seats. This finding is pursuant to our ruling in Veterans x x x. xxx [W]e shall compute only the additional seat or seats to be allocated, if any, to the other qualified parties -BUHAY, AMIN, ABA, COCOFED, PM, SANLAKAS and ABANSE! PINAY. Applying the relevant formula in Veterans to BUHAY, we arrive at 0.51: Additional Seats= Votes Cast for Qualified Party Votes Cast for First Partyx Allotted Seats for First Party= 290,760 1,708,253x 3 = 0.51Since 0.51 is less than one, BUHAY is not entitled to any additional seat. It is entitled to only one qualifying seat like all the other qualified parties that are ranked below it, as shown in Table No. 3: Table No. 3 RankParty-listVotesPercentage (%)Additional Seats2APEC802,06012.29n/c3AKBAYAN! 377,8525.79n/c4BUTIL330,2825.06n/c5CIBAC323,8104.96n/c6BUHAY290,7604.460.517AMIN252,0513.860.44 8ABA242,1993.710.429COCOFED229,1653.510.4010PM216,8233.320.3811SANLAKAS151,0172.310.2612AB ANSE! PINAY135,2112.070.24The additional seats for APEC, AKBAYAN!, BUTIL and CIBAC, if any, were not determined in the Court's Resolution dated June 25, 2003, as there was a separate pending motion filed by BAYAN MUNA to set aside the resolution of the COMELEC proclaiming APEC, AKBAYAN!, BUTIL and CIBAC's respective additional nominees. Dissatisfied by the Court's June 25, 2003 Resolution, BUHAY filed a motion to have it declared as entitled to one (1) additional seat. On November 20, 2003, in the same case of Ang Bagong Bayani,42 the Court computed the additional seats for APEC, AKBAYAN!, BUTIL and CIBAC in accordance with the formula stated in the Court's Resolution dated June 25, 2003, and found the results as follows:

APEC -- 1.40AKBAYAN -- 0.66BUTIL -- 0.58CIBAC -- 0.56Then, the Court resolved pro hac vice to grant BUHAY's motion, reasoning that: It is thus established in the Resolution of 25 June 2003 that, like APEC, BUTIL, CIBAC and AKBAYAN, BUHAY had obtained more than four percent (4%) of the total number of votes validly cast for the party-list system and obtained more than 0.50 for the additional seats. Accordingly, just like the first four whose additional nominees are now holding office as member of the House of Representatives, BUHAY should be declared entitled to additional seat.43 In light of all these antecedents, we deny the petition. The formula in the landmark case of Veterans prevails. First, the June 25, 2003 Resolution of the Court in Ang Bagong Bayani referred to the Veterans case in determining the number of seats due for the party-list winners. The footnote on said resolution in computing the additional seats for the party-list winners states: "[f]or a discussion of how to compute additional nominees for parties other than the first, see Veterans, supra, at pp. 280-282. x x x."44 The Court likewise held that: We also take this opportunity to emphasize that the formulas devised in Veterans for computing the number of nominees that the party-list winners are entitled to cannot be disregarded by the concerned agencies of government, especially the Commission on Elections. These formulas ensure that the number of seats allocated to the winning party-list candidates conform to the principle of proportional representation mandated by the law.45 (emphases supplied) Second, in the November 20, 2003 Resolution in Ang Bagong Bayani, the Court gave an additional seat to BUHAY only because it was similarly situated to APEC, BUTIL, CIBAC and AKBAYAN which "had obtained more than four percent (4%) of the total number of votes validly cast for the party-list system and obtained more than 0.50 for the additional seats." Well to note, the grant of an additional seat to BUHAY was pro hac vice, thus: ACCORDINGLY, the Court hereby RESOLVES, pro hac vice 1. To consider closed and terminated the issue regarding the proclamation by the COMELEC of the additional nominees of APEC, BUTIL, CIBAC and AKBAYAN, such nominees having taken their oath and assumed office; 2. To DECLARE that BUHAY is entitled to one (1) additional seat in the party-list system in the elections of May 2001 and; 3. To ORDER the COMELEC to proclaim BUHAY's second nominee. SO ORDERED.46 (emphasis supplied) Pro hac vice is a Latin term meaning "for this one particular occasion."47 A ruling expressly qualified as pro hac vice cannot be relied upon as a precedent to govern other cases. It was therefore erroneous for respondent Commission to apply the November 20, 2003 Resolution and rule that the formula in Veterans has been abandoned. The confusion in the petition at bar must have been created by the way the Veterans formula was cited in the June 25, 2003 Resolution of the Court in Ang Bagong Bayani.48 Be that as it may, we reiterate that the prevailing formula for the computation of additional seats for party-list winners is the formula stated in the landmark case of Veterans, viz: Additional seats for concerned party= No. of votes of concerned party No. of votes of the first partyx No. of additional seats allocated to first party49 Applying said formula to the undisputed figures in Party-List Canvass Report No. 20, we do not find petitioners entitled to any additional seat.

Thus: Additional seats for PM= 448,072 1,203,305x 2 = 0.74Additional seats for BUTIL= 429,259 1,203,305x 2 = 0.71IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED.

xxix xxx xxxi xxxii xxxiii xxxiv xxxv xxxvi xxxvii xxxviii xxxix xl xli xlii xliii xliv xlv xlvi xlvii xlviii xlix l[G.R. No. 137329. August 9, 2000] ROGELIO M. TORAYNO SR., GENEROSO ELIGAN and JACQUELINE M. SERIO, petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and VICENTE Y. EMANO, respondents. The Constitution and the law requires residence as a qualification for seeking and holding elective public office, in order to give candidates the opportunity to be familiar with the needs, difficulties, aspirations, potentials for growth and all matters vital to the welfare of their constituencies; likewise, it enables the electorate to evaluate the office seekers' qualifications and fitness for the job they aspire for. Inasmuch as Vicente Y. Emano has proven that he, together with his family, (1) had actually resided in a house he bought in 1973 in Cagayan de Oro City; (2) had actually held office there during his three terms as provincial governor of Misamis Oriental, the provincial capitol being located therein; and (3) has registered as voter in the city during the period required by law, he could not be deemed "a stranger or newcomer" when he ran for and was overwhelmingly voted as city mayor. Election laws must be liberally construed to give effect to the popular mandate. The Case Before us is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking to set aside the January 18, 1999 Resolution[1] of the Commission on Elections (Comelec) en banc in SPA No. 98-298, which upheld the July 14, 1998 Resolution[2] of the Comelec First Division. The assailed Resolutions ruled that Private Respondent Vicente Y. Emano possessed the minimum period of residence to be eligible to vote in Cagayan de Oro City, as well as be voted mayor thereof. The Facts The pertinent facts of the case, as culled from the records, are as follows.

During the 1995 elections, Vicente Y. Emano ran for, was elected, and proclaimed provincial governor of Misamis Oriental. It was his third consecutive term as governor of the province. In his Certificate of Candidacy dated March 12, 1995, his residence was declared to be in Tagoloan, Misamis Oriental. On June 14, 1997, while still the governor of Misamis Oriental, Emano executed a Voter Registration Record in Cagayan de Oro City (geographically located in the Province of Misamis Oriental), a highly urbanized city, in which he claimed 20 years of residence. On March 25, 1998, he filed his Certificate of Candidacy for mayor of the city, stating therein that his residence for the preceding two years and five months was at 1409 San Jose Street, Capistrano Subdivision, Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City. Among those who ran for the mayorship of the city in 1998, along with Emano, was Erasmo B. Damasing, counsel of herein petitioners. On May 15, 1998, Petitioners Rogelio M. Torayno Sr., Generoso Q. Eligan and Jacqueline M. Serio, all residents of Cagayan de Oro City, filed a Petition before the Comelec, docketed as SPA No. 98-298, in which they sought the disqualification of Emano as mayoral candidate, on the ground that he had allegedly failed to meet the one-year residence requirement. Prior to the resolution of their Petition, the Comelec proclaimed private respondent as the duly elected city mayor. Thus, on May 29, 1998, petitioners filed another Petition before the Comelec, this time for quo warranto,[3] in which they sought (1) the annulment of the election of private respondent; and (2) the proclamation of Erasmo B. Damasing, who had garnered the next highest number of votes, as the duly elected mayor of the city. In its Resolution dated July 14, 1998, the Comelec First Division denied the Petition for Disqualification. Upon petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration and Motion for Consolidation, the two cases were consolidated.[4] Ruling of the Comelec As earlier stated, the Comelec en banc upheld the findings and conclusions of the First Division, holding that "[t]he records clearly show that the respondent is an actual resident of Cagayan de Oro City for such a period of time necessary to qualify him to run for mayor therein. This fact is clearly established by the respondent having a house in the city which has been existing therein since 1973 and where his family has been living since then." Additionally, it ruled: "There is nothing in the law which bars an elected provincial official from residing and/or registering as a voter in a highly urbanized city whose residents are not given the right to vote for and be elected to a position in the province embracing such highly urbanized city as long as he has complied with the requirements prescribed by law in the case of a qualified voter. "Neither can the list of voters submitted as evidence for the petitioners showing that the respondent was a registered voter as of March 13, 1995 in Precinct No. 12, Barangay Poblacion, Tagoloan, Misamis Oriental bolster the petitioner's argument that the respondent is not a resident [or a] registered voter in Cagayan de Oro City since registration in said Precinct No. 12 does not preclude the respondent from registering anew in another place." Hence, this recourse[5] before this Court. Issues In their Memorandum,[6] petitioners submit that the main issue is whether the "Comelec gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in issuing the questioned Resolutions." Allegedly, the resolution of this issue would depend on the following:[7] "1. Whether or not private respondent Emano's

(a) remaining as governor of Misamis Oriental until he filed his certificate of candidacy for mayor of Cagayan de Oro City on March 25, 1998 in the May 11, 1998 election; (b) asserting under oath [that he was] qualified to act as governor of said province until said date; and (c) admitting, in sworn statements, [that he was] a resident of Misamis Oriental, precluded him from acquiring a bona fide domicile of choice for at least one (1) year in Cagayan de Oro City prior to the May 11, 1998 elections, as to disqualify him for being a candidate for city mayor of said City. 2. Differently stated, whether or not Emano's securing a residence certificate in Cagayan de Oro City, holding offices as governor of Misamis Oriental in the Capitol Building located in Cagayan de Oro City and having a house therein where [he had] stay[ed] during his tenure as governor, and registering as a voter in said City in June 1997, would be legally sufficient, as against the undisputed facts above enumerated, to constitute a change of his domicile of birth in Tagoloan, Misamis Oriental in favor of a new domicile of choice in Cagayan de Oro City for at least one (1) year for purposes of qualifying him to run for city mayor in the May 11, 1998 elections. 3. Whether or not Erasmo Damasing, the candidate for mayor of Cagayan de Oro City in the May 11, 1998 elections, who received the second highest number of votes, can be declared winner, considering that respondent Emano was disqualified to run for and hold said office and considering that his disqualification or ineligibility had been extensively brought to the attention and consciousness of the voters prior to the May 11, 1998 election as to attain notoriety, notwithstanding which they still voted for him." Petitioners are seeking the resolution of essentially two questions: (1) whether private respondent had duly established his residence in Cagayan de Oro City at least one year prior to the May 11, 1998 elections to qualify him to run for the mayorship thereof; and (2) if not, whether Erasmo Damasing, the candidate who had received the second highest number of votes, should be proclaimed mayor of the city. The Courts Ruling The Petition has no merit. Preliminary Matter: Locus Standi of Petitioners Although not raised by the parties, the legal standing of the petitioners was deliberated upon by the Court. We note that petitioners pray, among others, for judgment "declaring Atty. Erasmo B. Damasing as entitled to be proclaimed winner as mayor in the May 11, 1998 elections in Cagayan de Oro City."[8] And yet, Damasing is not a party to the instant "Petition for Certiorari pursuant to Rule[s] 64 and 65" brought before us. Under the Rules of Court, a quo warranto may be brought only by (1) the solicitor general or (2) a public prosecutor or (3) a person claiming to be entitled to the public office or position usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by another.[9] A reading of the Rules shows that petitioners, none of whom qualify under any of the above three categories, are without legal standing to bring this suit. However, the present Petition finds its root in two separate cases filed before the Comelec: (1) SPC 98-298 for disqualification and (2) EPC 98-62 for quo warranto. Under our election laws and the Comelec Rules of Procedure, any voter may file a petition to disqualify a candidate on grounds provided by law,[10] or to contest the election of a city officer on the ground of ineligibility or disloyalty to the Republic.[11] The petitioners herein, being "duly-registered voters" of Cagayan de Oro City, therefore satisfy the requirement of said laws and rules. [12] Main Issue: Residence Qualification for Candidacy

Petitioners argue that private respondent maintains his domicile in Tagoloan, Misamis Oriental, not in Cagayan de Oro City, as allegedly shown by the following facts: (1) he had run and won as governor of the province of Misamis Oriental for three consecutive terms immediately preceding the 1998 elections; (2) in the pleadings he filed in connection with an election protest against him relating to the 1995 election, he had stated that he was a resident of Tagoloan, Misamis Oriental; (3) he had fully exercised the powers and prerogatives of governor until he filed his Certificate of Candidacy for mayor on March 25, 1998. Petitioners claim that in discharging his duties as provincial governor, private respondent remained a resident of the province. They aver that residence is a continuing qualification that an elective official must possess throughout his term. Thus, private respondent could not have changed his residence to Cagayan de Oro City while he was still governor of Misamis Oriental. Petitioners further contend that the following were not sufficient to constitute a change of domicile: having a house in Cagayan de Oro City, residing therein while exercising one's office as governor (the city being the seat of government of the province), securing a residence certificate and registering as voter therein. Private respondent, on the other hand, alleges that he actually and physically resided in Cagayan de Oro City while serving as provincial governor for three consecutive terms, since the seat of the provincial government was located at the heart of that city.[13] He also avers that one's choice of domicile is a matter of intention, and it is the person concerned who would be in the best position to make a choice. In this case, Emano decided to adopt Cagayan de Oro City as his place of residence after the May 1995 elections. In fact, in January 1997, he secured his Community Tax Certificate at the City Treasurer's Office, stating therein that he was a resident of 1409 San Jose Street, Capistrano Subdivision, Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City. During the general registration of voters in June 1997, he registered in one of the precincts of Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City. This meant that, at the time, Emano had been a voter of the city for the minimum period required by law. No one has ever challenged this fact before any tribunal. Private respondent contends further that his transfer of legal residence did not ipso facto divest him of his position as provincial governor. First, there is no law that prevents an elected official from transferring residence while in office. Second, an elective official's transfer of residence does not prevent the performance of that official's duties, especially in private respondent's case in which the seat of government became his adopted place of residence. Third, as ruled in Frivaldo v. Comelec,[14] the loss of any of the required qualifications for election merely renders the official's title or right to office open to challenge. In Emano's case, no one challenged his right to the Office of Provincial Governor when he transferred his residence to Cagayan de Oro City. Naturally, he continued to discharge his functions as such, until he filed his candidacy for mayor in March 1998. Lastly, Emano urges that the sanctity of the people's will, as expressed in the election result, must be respected. He is not, after all, a stranger to the city, much less to its voters. During his three terms as governor of Misamis Oriental, his life and actuations have been closely interwoven with the pulse and beat of Cagayan de Oro City. Public Respondent Comelec relies essentially on Romualdez-Marcos v. Comelec[15] in its Memorandum[16]which supports the assailed Resolutions, and which has been filed in view of the solicitor general's Manifestation and Motion in Lieu of Comment.[17] Thus, the poll body argues that "x x x the fact of residence x x x ought to be decisive in determining whether or not an individual has satisfied the Constitution's residency qualification requirement."
Law on Qualifications of Local Elective Officials

The pertinent provision sought to be enforced is Section 39 of the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991,[18] which provides for the qualifications of local elective officials, as follows: "SEC. 39. Qualifications. - (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province x x x where he intends to be elected; a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election; and able to read and write Filipino or any other local

language or dialect." Generally, in requiring candidates to have a minimum period of residence in the area in which they seek to be elected, the Constitution or the law intends to prevent the possibility of a "stranger or newcomer unacquainted with the conditions and needs of a community and not identified with the latter from [seeking] an elective office to serve that community."[19] Such provision is aimed at excluding outsiders "from taking advantage of favorable circumstances existing in that community for electoral gain."[20] Establishing residence in a community merely to meet an election law requirement defeats the purpose of representation: to elect through the assent of voters those most cognizant and sensitive to the needs of the community. This purpose is "best met by individuals who have either had actual residence in the area for a given period or who have been domiciled in the same area either by origin or by choice."[21]
Facts Showing Change of Residence

In the recent en banc case Mamba-Perez v. Comelec,[22] this Court ruled that private respondent therein, now Representative Rodolfo E. Aguinaldo of the Third District of Cagayan, had duly proven his change of residence from Gattaran, Cagayan (part of the First District) to Tuguegarao, Cagayan (part of the Third District in which he sought election as congressman). He proved it with the following facts: (1) in July 1990, he leased and lived in a residential apartment in Magallanes Street, Tuguegarao, Cagayan; (2) in July 1995, he leased another residential apartment in Kamias Street, Tanza, Tuguegarao, Cagayan; (3) the January 18, 1998 Certificate of Marriage between Aguinaldo and his second wife, Lerma Dumaguit; (4) the Certificate of Live Birth of his second daughter; and (5) various letters addressed to him and his family showed that he had been a resident of Tuguegarao for at least one year immediately preceding the May 1998 elections. The Court also stated that it was not "of much importance that in his [Aguinaldo's] certificates of candidacy for provincial governor in the elections of 1988, 1992, and 1995, private respondent stated that he was a resident of Gattaran."[23] In the case at bar, the Comelec found that private respondent and his family had actually been residing in Capistrano Subdivision, Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City, in a house he had bought in 1973. Furthermore, during the three terms (1988-1998) that he was governor of Misamis Oriental, he physically lived in that city, where the seat of the provincial government was located. In June 1997, he also registered as voter of the same city. Based on our ruling in Mamba-Perez, these facts indubitably prove that Vicente Y. Emano was a resident of Cagayan de Oro City for a period of time sufficient to qualify him to run for public office therein. Moreover, the Comelec did not find any bad faith on the part of Emano in his choice of residence. Petitioners put much emphasis on the fact that Cagayan de Oro City is a highly urbanized city whose voters cannot participate in the provincial elections. Such political subdivisions and voting restrictions, however, are simply for the purpose of parity in representation. The classification of an area as a highly urbanized or independent component city, for that matter, does not completely isolate its residents, politics, commerce and other businesses from the entire province -- and vice versa -- especially when the city is located at the very heart of the province itself, as in this case. Undeniably, Cagayan de Oro City was once an integral part of Misamis Oriental and remains a geographical part of the province. Not only is it at the center of the province; more important, it is itself the seat of the provincial government. As a consequence, the provincial officials who carry out their functions in the city cannot avoid residing therein; much less, getting acquainted with its concerns and interests. Vicente Y. Emano, having been the governor of Misamis Oriental for three terms and consequently residing in Cagayan de Oro City within that period, could not be said to be a stranger or newcomer to the city in the last year of his third term, when he decided to adopt it as his permanent place of residence. Significantly, the Court also declared in Mamba-Perez that "although private respondent declared in his certificates of candidacy prior to the May 11, 1998 elections that he was a resident of Gattaran, Cagayan, the fact is that he was actually a resident of the Third District not just for one (1) year prior to the May 11, 1998 elections but for more than seven (7) years since July 1990. His claim that he ha[s] been a resident of Tuguegarao since July 1990 is credible considering that he was governor from 1988 to 1998 and, therefore, it would be convenient for him to maintain his residence in Tuguegarao, which is the capital of the province of Cagayan."

Similarly in the instant case, private respondent was actually and physically residing in Cagayan de Oro City while discharging his duties as governor of Misamis Oriental. He owned a house in the city and resided there together with his family. He even paid his 1998 community tax and registered as a voter therein. To all intents and purposes of the Constitution and the law, he is a resident of Cagayan de Oro City and eligible to run for mayor thereof. To petitioners' argument that Emano could not have continued to qualify as provincial governor if he was indeed a resident of Cagayan de Oro City, we respond that the issue before this Court is whether Emano's residence in the city qualifies him to run for and be elected as mayor, not whether he could have continued sitting as governor of the province. There was no challenge to his eligibility to continue running the province; hence, this Court cannot make any pronouncement on such issue. Considerations of due process prevent us from adjudging matters not properly brought to us. On the basis, however, of the facts proven before the Comelec, we hold that he has satisfied the residence qualification required by law for the mayorship of the city. We stress that the residence requirement is rooted in the desire that officials of districts or localities be acquainted not only with the metes and bounds of their constituencies but, more important, with the constituents themselves -- their needs, difficulties, aspirations, potentials for growth and development, and all matters vital to their common welfare. The requisite period would give candidates the opportunity to be familiar with their desired constituencies, and likewise for the electorate to evaluate the former's qualifications and fitness for the offices they seek. In other words, the actual, physical and personal presence of herein private respondent in Cagayan de Oro City is substantial enough to show his intention to fulfill the duties of mayor and for the voters to evaluate his qualifications for the mayorship. Petitioners' very legalistic, academic and technical approach to the residence requirement does not satisfy this simple, practical and common-sense rationale for the residence requirement.
Interpretation to Favor Popular Mandate

There is no question that private respondent was the overwhelming choice of the people of Cagayan de Oro City. He won by a margin of about 30,000 votes.[24] Thus, we find it apt to reiterate the principle that the manifest will of the people as expressed through the ballot must be given fullest effect. In case of doubt, political laws must be interpreted to give life and spirit to the popular mandate.[25] Verily, in Frivaldo v. Comelec,[26] the Court held: "x x x [T]his Court has repeatedly stressed the importance of giving effect to the sovereign will in order to ensure the survival of our democracy. In any action involving the possibility of a reversal of the popular electoral choice, this Court must exert utmost effort to resolve the issues in a manner that would give effect to the will of the majority, for it is merely sound public policy to cause elective offices to be filled by those who are the choice of the majority. To successfully challenge a winning candidate's qualifications, the petitioner must clearly demonstrate that the ineligibility is so patently antagonistic to constitutional and legal principles that overriding such ineligibility and thereby giving effect to the apparent will of the people would ultimately create greater prejudice to the very democratic institutions and juristic traditions that our Constitution and laws so zealously protect and promote." In the same vein, we stated in Alberto v. Comelec[27] that "election cases involve public interest; thus, laws governing election contests must be liberally construed to the end that the will of the people in the choice of public officials may not be defeated by mere technical objections." Indeed, "it would be far better to err in favor of popular sovereignty than to be right in complex but little understood legalisms."[28] In sum, we hold that Respondent Comelec cannot be faulted with abuse, much less grave abuse, of discretion in upholding private respondent's election. Corollary Issue: Effect of Disqualification of Winner on Second Placer

With the resolution of the first issue in the positive, it is obvious that the second one posited by petitioners has become academic and need not be ruled upon. WHEREFORE, the Petition is DISMISSED and the assailed Comelec Resolutions AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners. SO ORDERED. G.R. No. 179271 April 21, 2009

BARANGAY ASSOCIATION FOR NATIONAL ADVANCEMENT AND TRANSPARENCY (BANAT), Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (sitting as the National Board of Canvassers), Respondent. ARTS BUSINESS AND SCIENCE PROFESSIONALS, Intervenor. AANGAT TAYO, Intervenor. COALITION OF ASSOCIATIONS OF SENIOR CITIZENS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (SENIOR CITIZENS), Intervenor. x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x G.R. No. 179295 April 21, 2009

BAYAN MUNA, ADVOCACY FOR TEACHER EMPOWERMENT THROUGH ACTION, COOPERATION AND HARMONY TOWARDS EDUCATIONAL REFORMS, INC., and ABONO, Petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent. DECISION CARPIO, J.: The Case Petitioner in G.R. No. 179271 Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) in a petition for certiorari and mandamus,1 assails the Resolution2 promulgated on 3 August 2007 by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in NBC No. 07-041 (PL). The COMELECs resolution in NBC No. 07-041 (PL) approved the recommendation of Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, Head of the National Board of Canvassers (NBC) Legal Group, to deny the petition of BANAT for being moot. BANAT filed before the COMELEC En Banc, acting as NBC, a Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List Representatives Provided by the Constitution. The following are intervenors in G.R. No. 179271: Arts Business and Science Professionals (ABS), Aangat Tayo (AT), and Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizens in the Philippines, Inc. (Senior Citizens). Petitioners in G.R. No. 179295 Bayan Muna, Abono, and Advocacy for Teacher Empowerment Through Action, Cooperation and Harmony Towards Educational Reforms (A Teacher) in a petition for certiorari with mandamus and prohibition,3 assails NBC Resolution No. 07-604 promulgated on 9 July 2007. NBC No. 07-60 made a partial proclamation of parties, organizations and coalitions that obtained at least two percent of the total votes cast under the Party-List System. The COMELEC announced that, upon completion of the canvass of the party-list results, it would determine the total number of seats of each winning party, organization, or coalition in accordance with Veterans Federation Party v. COMELEC5 (Veterans). Estrella DL Santos, in her capacity as President and First Nominee of the Veterans Freedom Party, filed a motion to intervene in both G.R. Nos. 179271 and 179295.

The Facts The 14 May 2007 elections included the elections for the party-list representatives. The COMELEC counted 15,950,900 votes cast for 93 parties under the Party-List System.6 On 27 June 2002, BANAT filed a Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List Representatives Provided by the Constitution, docketed as NBC No. 07-041 (PL) before the NBC. BANAT filed its petition because "[t]he Chairman and the Members of the [COMELEC] have recently been quoted in the national papers that the [COMELEC] is duty bound to and shall implement the Veterans ruling, that is, would apply the Panganiban formula in allocating party-list seats."7 There were no intervenors in BANATs petition before the NBC. BANAT filed a memorandum on 19 July 2007. On 9 July 2007, the COMELEC, sitting as the NBC, promulgated NBC Resolution No. 07-60. NBC Resolution No. 07-60 proclaimed thirteen (13) parties as winners in the party-list elections, namely: Buhay Hayaan Yumabong (BUHAY), Bayan Muna, Citizens Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC), Gabrielas Women Party (Gabriela), Association of Philippine Electric Cooperatives (APEC), A Teacher, Akbayan! Citizens Action Party (AKBAYAN), Alagad, Luzon Farmers Party (BUTIL), Cooperative-Natco Network Party (COOP-NATCCO), Anak Pawis, Alliance of Rural Concerns (ARC), and Abono. We quote NBC Resolution No. 07-60 in its entirety below: WHEREAS, the Commission on Elections sitting en banc as National Board of Canvassers, thru its SubCommittee for Party-List, as of 03 July 2007, had officially canvassed, in open and public proceedings, a total of fifteen million two hundred eighty three thousand six hundred fifty-nine (15,283,659) votes under the Party-List System of Representation, in connection with the National and Local Elections conducted last 14 May 2007; WHEREAS, the study conducted by the Legal and Tabulation Groups of the National Board of Canvassers reveals that the projected/maximum total party-list votes cannot go any higher than sixteen million seven hundred twenty three thousand one hundred twenty-one (16,723,121) votes given the following statistical data: Projected/Maximum Party-List Votes for May 2007 Elections i.Total party-list votes already canvassed/tabulated15,283,659ii.Total party-list votes remaining uncanvassed/ untabulated (i.e. canvass deferred)1,337,032iii.Maximum party-list votes (based on 100% outcome) from areas not yet submitted for canvass (Bogo, Cebu; Bais City; Pantar, Lanao del Norte; and Pagalungan, Maguindanao)102,430Maximum Total Party-List Votes16,723,121WHEREAS, Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7941 (Party-List System Act) provides in part: The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the partylist system shall be entitled to one seat each: provided, that those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes: provided, finally, that each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats. WHEREAS, for the 2007 Elections, based on the above projected total of party-list votes, the presumptive two percent (2%) threshold can be pegged at three hundred thirty four thousand four hundred sixty-two (334,462) votes; WHEREAS, the Supreme Court, in Citizens Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC) versus COMELEC, reiterated its ruling in Veterans Federation Party versus COMELEC adopting a formula for the additional seats of each party, organization or coalition receving more than the required two percent (2%) votes, stating that the same shall be determined only after all party-list ballots have been completely canvassed; WHEREAS, the parties, organizations, and coalitions that have thus far garnered at least three hundred thirty four thousand four hundred sixty-two (334,462) votes are as follows:

RANKPARTY/ORGANIZATION/ COALITIONVOTES RECEIVED1BUHAY1,163,2182BAYAN MUNA972,7303CIBAC760,2604GABRIELA 610,4515APEC538,9716A TEACHER476,0367AKBAYAN470,8728ALAGAD423,0769BUTIL405,05210COOPNATCO390,02911BATAS386,36112ANAK PAWIS376,03613ARC338,19414ABONO337,046WHEREAS, except for Bagong Alyansang Tagapagtaguyod ng Adhikaing Sambayanan (BATAS), against which an URGENT PETITION FOR CANCELLATION/REMOVAL OF REGISTRATION AND DISQUALIFICATION OF PARTY-LIST NOMINEE (With Prayer for the Issuance of Restraining Order) has been filed before the Commission, docketed as SPC No. 07-250, all the parties, organizations and coalitions included in the aforementioned list are therefore entitled to at least one seat under the party-list system of representation in the meantime. NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of the powers vested in it by the Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code, Executive Order No. 144, Republic Act Nos. 6646, 7166, 7941, and other election laws, the Commission on Elections, sitting en banc as the National Board of Canvassers, hereby RESOLVES to PARTIALLY PROCLAIM, subject to certain conditions set forth below, the following parties, organizations and coalitions participating under the Party-List System: 1Buhay Hayaan YumabongBUHAY2Bayan MunaBAYAN MUNA3Citizens Battle Against CorruptionCIBAC4Gabriela Womens PartyGABRIELA5Association of Philippine Electric CooperativesAPEC6Advocacy for Teacher Empowerment Through Action, Cooperation and Harmony Towards Educational Reforms, Inc.A TEACHER7Akbayan! Citizens Action PartyAKBAYAN8AlagadALAGAD9Luzon Farmers PartyBUTIL10Cooperative-Natco Network PartyCOOP-NATCCO11Anak PawisANAKPAWIS12Alliance of Rural ConcernsARC13AbonoABONOThis is without prejudice to the proclamation of other parties, organizations, or coalitions which may later on be established to have obtained at least two percent (2%) of the total actual votes cast under the Party-List System. The total number of seats of each winning party, organization or coalition shall be determined pursuant to Veterans Federation Party versus COMELEC formula upon completion of the canvass of the party-list results. The proclamation of Bagong Alyansang Tagapagtaguyod ng Adhikaing Sambayanan (BATAS) is hereby deferred until final resolution of SPC No. 07-250, in order not to render the proceedings therein moot and academic. Finally, all proclamation of the nominees of concerned parties, organizations and coalitions with pending disputes shall likewise be held in abeyance until final resolution of their respective cases. Let the Clerk of the Commission implement this Resolution, furnishing a copy thereof to the Speaker of the House of Representatives of the Philippines. SO ORDERED.8 (Emphasis in the original) Pursuant to NBC Resolution No. 07-60, the COMELEC, acting as NBC, promulgated NBC Resolution No. 07-72, which declared the additional seats allocated to the appropriate parties. We quote from the COMELECs interpretation of the Veterans formula as found in NBC Resolution No. 07-72: WHEREAS, on July 9, 2007, the Commission on Elections sitting en banc as the National Board of Canvassers proclaimed thirteen (13) qualified parties, organization[s] and coalitions based on the presumptive two percent (2%) threshold of 334,462 votes from the projected maximum total number of party-list votes of 16,723,121, and were thus given one (1) guaranteed party-list seat each; WHEREAS, per Report of the Tabulation Group and Supervisory Committee of the National Board of Canvassers, the projected maximum total party-list votes, as of July 11, 2007, based on the votes actually canvassed, votes canvassed but not included in Report No. 29, votes received but uncanvassed, and maximum votes expected for Pantar, Lanao del Norte, is 16,261,369; and that the projected maximum total votes for the thirteen (13) qualified parties, organizations and coalition[s] are as follows:

Party-ListProjected total number of votes1BUHAY1,178,7472BAYAN MUNA977,4763CIBAC755,9644GABRIELA621,7185APEC622,4896A TEACHER492,3697AKBAYAN462,6748ALAGAD423,1909BUTIL409,29810COOPNATCO412,92011ANAKPAWIS370,16512ARC375,84613ABONO340,151WHEREAS, based on the above Report, Buhay Hayaan Yumabong (Buhay) obtained the highest number of votes among the thirteen (13) qualified parties, organizations and coalitions, making it the "first party" in accordance with Veterans Federation Party versus COMELEC, reiterated in Citizens Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC) versus COMELEC; WHEREAS, qualified parties, organizations and coalitions participating under the party-list system of representation that have obtained one guaranteed (1) seat may be entitled to an additional seat or seats based on the formula prescribed by the Supreme Court in Veterans; WHEREAS, in determining the additional seats for the "first party", the correct formula as expressed in Veterans, is: Number of votes of first party Total votes for party-list system= Proportion of votes of first party relative to total votes for party-list systemwherein the proportion of votes received by the first party (without rounding off) shall entitle it to additional seats: Proportion of votes received by the first partyAdditional seatsEqual to or at least 6%Two (2) additional seatsEqual to or greater than 4% but less than 6%One (1) additional seatLess than 4%No additional seatWHEREAS, applying the above formula, Buhay obtained the following percentage: 1,178,747 16,261,369= 0.07248 or 7.2%which entitles it to two (2) additional seats. WHEREAS, in determining the additional seats for the other qualified parties, organizations and coalitions, the correct formula as expressed in Veterans and reiterated in CIBAC is, as follows: Additional seats for a concerned party= No. of votes of concerned party No. of votes of first partyx No. of additional seats allocated to first partyWHEREAS, applying the above formula, the results are as follows: Party ListPercentageAdditional SeatBAYAN MUNA1.651CIBAC1.281GABRIELA1.051APEC1.051A TEACHER0.830AKBAYAN0.780ALAGAD0.710BUTIL0.690COOPNATCO0.690ANAKPAWIS0.620ARC0.630ABONO0.570NOW THEREFORE, by virtue of the powers vested in it by the Constitution, Omnibus Election Code, Executive Order No. 144, Republic Act Nos. 6646, 7166, 7941 and other elections laws, the Commission on Elections en banc sitting as the National Board of Canvassers, hereby RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to proclaim the following parties, organizations or coalitions as entitled to additional seats, to wit: Party ListAdditional SeatsBUHAY2BAYAN MUNA1CIBAC1GABRIELA1APEC1This is without prejudice to the proclamation of other parties, organizations or coalitions which may later on be established to have obtained at least two per cent (2%) of the total votes cast under the party-list system to entitle them to one (1) guaranteed seat, or to the appropriate percentage of votes to entitle them to one (1) additional seat. Finally, all proclamation of the nominees of concerned parties, organizations and coalitions with pending disputes shall likewise be held in abeyance until final resolution of their respective cases.

Let the National Board of Canvassers Secretariat implement this Resolution, furnishing a copy hereof to the Speaker of the House of Representatives of the Philippines. SO ORDERED.9 Acting on BANATs petition, the NBC promulgated NBC Resolution No. 07-88 on 3 August 2007, which reads as follows: This pertains to the Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List Representatives Provided by the Constitution filed by the Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT). Acting on the foregoing Petition of the Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) party-list, Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, Head, National Board of Canvassers Legal Group submitted his comments/observations and recommendation thereon [NBC 07-041 (PL)], which reads: COMMENTS / OBSERVATIONS: Petitioner Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT), in its Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List Representatives Provided by the Constitution prayed for the following reliefs, to wit: 1. That the full number -- twenty percent (20%) -- of Party-List representatives as mandated by Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution shall be proclaimed. 2. Paragraph (b), Section 11 of RA 7941 which prescribes the 2% threshold votes, should be harmonized with Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution and with Section 12 of the same RA 7941 in that it should be applicable only to the first party-list representative seats to be allotted on the basis of their initial/first ranking. 3. The 3-seat limit prescribed by RA 7941 shall be applied; and 4. Initially, all party-list groups shall be given the number of seats corresponding to every 2% of the votes they received and the additional seats shall be allocated in accordance with Section 12 of RA 7941, that is, in proportion to the percentage of votes obtained by each party-list group in relation to the total nationwide votes cast in the party-list election, after deducting the corresponding votes of those which were allotted seats under the 2% threshold rule. In fine, the formula/procedure prescribed in the "ALLOCATION OF PARTY-LIST SEATS, ANNEX "A" of COMELEC RESOLUTION 2847 dated 25 June 1996, shall be used for [the] purpose of determining how many seats shall be proclaimed, which partylist groups are entitled to representative seats and how many of their nominees shall seat [sic]. 5. In the alternative, to declare as unconstitutional Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7941 and that the procedure in allocating seats for party-list representative prescribed by Section 12 of RA 7941 shall be followed. R E C O M M E N D A T I O N: The petition of BANAT is now moot and academic. The Commission En Banc in NBC Resolution No. 07-60 promulgated July 9, 2007 re "In the Matter of the Canvass of Votes and Partial Proclamation of the Parties, Organizations and Coalitions Participating Under the Party-List System During the May 14, 2007 National and Local Elections" resolved among others that the total number of seats of each winning party, organization or coalition shall be determined pursuant to the Veterans Federation Party versus COMELEC formula upon completion of the canvass of the party-list results."1awphi1

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the National Board of Canvassers RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to approve and adopt the recommendation of Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, Head, NBC Legal Group, to DENY the herein petition of BANAT for being moot and academic. Let the Supervisory Committee implement this resolution. SO ORDERED.10 BANAT filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus assailing the ruling in NBC Resolution No. 07-88. BANAT did not file a motion for reconsideration of NBC Resolution No. 07-88. On 9 July 2007, Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher asked the COMELEC, acting as NBC, to reconsider its decision to use the Veterans formula as stated in its NBC Resolution No. 07-60 because the Veterans formula is violative of the Constitution and of Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A. No. 7941). On the same day, the COMELEC denied reconsideration during the proceedings of the NBC.11 Aside from the thirteen party-list organizations proclaimed on 9 July 2007, the COMELEC proclaimed three other party-list organizations as qualified parties entitled to one guaranteed seat under the Party-List System: Agricultural Sector Alliance of the Philippines, Inc. (AGAP),12 Anak Mindanao (AMIN),13 and An Waray.14 Per the certification15 by COMELEC, the following party-list organizations have been proclaimed as of 19 May 2008: Party-ListNo. of Seat(s)1.1Buhay31.2Bayan Muna21.3CIBAC21.4Gabriela21.5APEC21.6A Teacher11.7Akbayan11.8Alagad11.9Butil11.10Coop-Natco [sic]11.11Anak Pawis11.12ARC11.13Abono11.14AGAP11.15AMIN1The proclamation of Bagong Alyansang Tagapagtaguyod ng Adhikaing Sambayanan (BATAS), against which an Urgent Petition for Cancellation/Removal of Registration and Disqualification of Party-list Nominee (with Prayer for the Issuance of Restraining Order) has been filed before the COMELEC, was deferred pending final resolution of SPC No. 07-250. Issues BANAT brought the following issues before this Court: 1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives provided in Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution mandatory or is it merely a ceiling? 2. Is the three-seat limit provided in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional? 3. Is the two percent threshold and "qualifier" votes prescribed by the same Section 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional? 4. How shall the party-list representatives be allocated?16 Bayan Muna, A Teacher, and Abono, on the other hand, raised the following issues in their petition: I. Respondent Commission on Elections, acting as National Board of Canvassers, committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it promulgated NBC Resolution No. 07-60 to implement the First-Party Rule in the allocation of seats to qualified party-list organizations as said rule: A. Violates the constitutional principle of proportional representation. B. Violates the provisions of RA 7941 particularly:

1. The 2-4-6 Formula used by the First Party Rule in allocating additional seats for the "First Party" violates the principle of proportional representation under RA 7941. 2. The use of two formulas in the allocation of additional seats, one for the "First Party" and another for the qualifying parties, violates Section 11(b) of RA 7941. 3. The proportional relationships under the First Party Rule are different from those required under RA 7941; C. Violates the "Four Inviolable Parameters" of the Philippine party-list system as provided for under the same case of Veterans Federation Party, et al. v. COMELEC. II. Presuming that the Commission on Elections did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it implemented the First-Party Rule in the allocation of seats to qualified party-list organizations, the same being merely in consonance with the ruling in Veterans Federations Party, et al. v. COMELEC, the instant Petition is a justiciable case as the issues involved herein are constitutional in nature, involving the correct interpretation and implementation of RA 7941, and are of transcendental importance to our nation.17 Considering the allegations in the petitions and the comments of the parties in these cases, we defined the following issues in our advisory for the oral arguments set on 22 April 2008: 1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives in Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution mandatory or merely a ceiling? 2. Is the three-seat limit in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional? 3. Is the two percent threshold prescribed in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 to qualify for one seat constitutional? 4. How shall the party-list representative seats be allocated? 5. Does the Constitution prohibit the major political parties from participating in the party-list elections? If not, can the major political parties be barred from participating in the party-list elections?18 The Ruling of the Court The petitions have partial merit. We maintain that a Philippine-style party-list election has at least four inviolable parameters as clearly stated in Veterans. For easy reference, these are: First, the twenty percent allocation the combined number of all party-list congressmen shall not exceed twenty percent of the total membership of the House of Representatives, including those elected under the party list; Second, the two percent threshold only those parties garnering a minimum of two percent of the total valid votes cast for the party-list system are "qualified" to have a seat in the House of Representatives; Third, the three-seat limit each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it actually obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three seats; that is, one "qualifying" and two additional seats; Fourth, proportional representation the additional seats which a qualified party is entitled to shall be computed "in proportion to their total number of votes."19

However, because the formula in Veterans has flaws in its mathematical interpretation of the term "proportional representation," this Court is compelled to revisit the formula for the allocation of additional seats to party-list organizations. Number of Party-List Representatives: The Formula Mandated by the Constitution Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides: Section 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations. (2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives including those under the party-list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector. The first paragraph of Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941 reads: Section 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum (20%) of the total number of the members of the House of Representatives including those under the party-list. xxx Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution states that the "House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law." The House of Representatives shall be composed of district representatives and party-list representatives. The Constitution allows the legislature to modify the number of the members of the House of Representatives.1avvphi1.zw+ Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution, on the other hand, states the ratio of party-list representatives to the total number of representatives. We compute the number of seats available to party-list representatives from the number of legislative districts. On this point, we do not deviate from the first formula in Veterans, thus: Number of seats available to legislative districts .80 x .20 = Number of seats available to party-list representativesThis formula allows for the corresponding increase in the number of seats available for party-list representatives whenever a legislative district is created by law. Since the 14th Congress of the Philippines has 220 district representatives, there are 55 seats available to party-list representatives. 220 .80x .20 =55After prescribing the ratio of the number of party-list representatives to the total number of representatives, the Constitution left the manner of allocating the seats available to party-list representatives to the wisdom of the legislature. Allocation of Seats for Party-List Representatives: The Statutory Limits Presented by the Two Percent Threshold and the Three-Seat Cap

All parties agree on the formula to determine the maximum number of seats reserved under the Party-List System, as well as on the formula to determine the guaranteed seats to party-list candidates garnering at least two-percent of the total party-list votes. However, there are numerous interpretations of the provisions of R.A. No. 7941 on the allocation of "additional seats" under the Party-List System. Veterans produced the First Party Rule,20 and Justice Vicente V. Mendozas dissent in Veterans presented Germanys Niemeyer formula21 as an alternative. The Constitution left to Congress the determination of the manner of allocating the seats for party-list representatives. Congress enacted R.A. No. 7941, paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section 11 and Section 12 of which provide: Section 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. x x x In determining the allocation of seats for the second vote,22 the following procedure shall be observed: (a) The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections. (b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each: Provided, That those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes: Provided, finally, That each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats. Section 12. Procedure in Allocating Seats for Party-List Representatives. The COMELEC shall tally all the votes for the parties, organizations, or coalitions on a nationwide basis, rank them according to the number of votes received and allocate party-list representatives proportionately according to the percentage of votes obtained by each party, organization, or coalition as against the total nationwide votes cast for the party-list system. (Emphasis supplied) In G.R. No. 179271, BANAT presents two interpretations through three formulas to allocate party-list representative seats. The first interpretation allegedly harmonizes the provisions of Section 11(b) on the 2% requirement with Section 12 of R.A. No. 7941. BANAT described this procedure as follows: (a) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty percent (20%) of the total Members of the House of Representatives including those from the party-list groups as prescribed by Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, Section 11 (1st par.) of RA 7941 and Comelec Resolution No. 2847 dated 25 June 1996. Since there are 220 District Representatives in the 14th Congress, there shall be 55 Party-List Representatives. All seats shall have to be proclaimed. (b) All party-list groups shall initially be allotted one (1) seat for every two per centum (2%) of the total party-list votes they obtained; provided, that no party-list groups shall have more than three (3) seats (Section 11, RA 7941). (c) The remaining seats shall, after deducting the seats obtained by the party-list groups under the immediately preceding paragraph and after deducting from their total the votes corresponding to those seats, the remaining seats shall be allotted proportionately to all the party-list groups which have not secured the maximum three (3) seats under the 2% threshold rule, in accordance with Section 12 of RA 7941.23 Forty-four (44) party-list seats will be awarded under BANATs first interpretation.

The second interpretation presented by BANAT assumes that the 2% vote requirement is declared unconstitutional, and apportions the seats for party-list representatives by following Section 12 of R.A. No. 7941. BANAT states that the COMELEC: (a) shall tally all the votes for the parties, organizations, or coalitions on a nationwide basis; (b) rank them according to the number of votes received; and, (c) allocate party-list representatives proportionately according to the percentage of votes obtained by each party, organization or coalition as against the total nationwide votes cast for the party-list system.24 BANAT used two formulas to obtain the same results: one is based on the proportional percentage of the votes received by each party as against the total nationwide party-list votes, and the other is "by making the votes of a party-list with a median percentage of votes as the divisor in computing the allocation of seats."25 Thirty-four (34) party-list seats will be awarded under BANATs second interpretation. In G.R. No. 179295, Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher criticize both the COMELECs original 2-4-6 formula and the Veterans formula for systematically preventing all the party-list seats from being filled up. They claim that both formulas do not factor in the total number of seats alloted for the entire Party-List System. Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher reject the three-seat cap, but accept the 2% threshold. After determining the qualified parties, a second percentage is generated by dividing the votes of a qualified party by the total votes of all qualified parties only. The number of seats allocated to a qualified party is computed by multiplying the total party-list seats available with the second percentage. There will be a first round of seat allocation, limited to using the whole integers as the equivalent of the number of seats allocated to the concerned party-list. After all the qualified parties are given their seats, a second round of seat allocation is conducted. The fractions, or remainders, from the whole integers are ranked from highest to lowest and the remaining seats on the basis of this ranking are allocated until all the seats are filled up.26 We examine what R.A. No. 7941 prescribes to allocate seats for party-list representatives. Section 11(a) of R.A. No. 7941 prescribes the ranking of the participating parties from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections. Table 1. Ranking of the participating parties from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes garnered during the elections.27 RankPartyVotes GarneredRankPartyVotes Garnered1BUHAY1,169,23448KALAHI88,8682BAYAN MUNA979,03949APOI79,3863CIBAC755,68650BP78,5414GABRIELA621,17151AHONBAYAN78,4245APEC61 9,65752BIGKIS77,3276A TEACHER490,37953PMAP75,2007AKBAYAN466,11254AKAPIN74,6868ALAGAD423,14955PBA71,5449COO P-NATCCO409,88356GRECON62,22010BUTIL409,16057BTM60,99311BATAS385,81058A SMILE58,71712ARC374,28859NELFFI57,87213ANAKPAWIS370,26160AKSA57,01214ABONO339,99061BAG O55,84615AMIN338,18562BANDILA54,75116AGAP328,72463AHON54,52217AN WARAY321,50364ASAHAN MO51,72218YACAP310,88965AGBIAG!50,83719FPJPM300,92366SPI50,47820UNIMAD245,38267BAHANDI46,61221ABS235,08668ADD45,62422KAKUSA228,99969AMANG43,06223KABATAA N228,63770ABAY PARAK42,28224ABA-AKO218,81871BABAE KA36,51225ALIF 217,82272SB34,83526SENIOR CITIZENS213,05873ASAP34,09827AT197,87274PEP33,93828VFP196,26675ABA ILONGGO33,90329ANAD188,52176VENDORS33,69130BANAT177,02877ADD-TRIBAL32,89631ANG KASANGGA170,53178ALMANA32,25532BANTAY169,80179AANGAT KA PILIPINO29,13033ABAKADA166,74780AAPS26,271341UTAK164,98081HAPI25,78135TUCP162,64782AAWAS22,94636COCOFED155,92083SM20,74437AGHAM146 ,03284AG16,91638ANAK141,81785AGING PINOY16,72939ABANSE! PINAY130,35686APO16,42140PM119,05487BIYAYANG BUKID16,24141AVE110,76988ATS14,16142SUARA110,73289UMDJ9,44543ASSALAM110,44090BUKLOD

FILIPINA8,91544DIWA107,02191LYPAD8,47145ANC99,63692AAKASOSYO8,40646SANLAKAS97,37593KASAPI6,22147ABC90,058TOTAL15,950,900The first clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 states that "parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each." This clause guarantees a seat to the two-percenters. In Table 2 below, we use the first 20 party-list candidates for illustration purposes. The percentage of votes garnered by each party is arrived at by dividing the number of votes garnered by each party by 15,950,900, the total number of votes cast for all party-list candidates. Table 2. The first 20 party-list candidates and their respective percentage of votes garnered over the total votes for the party-list.28 RankPartyVotes GarneredVotes Garnered over Total Votes for Party-List, in %Guaranteed Seat 1BUHAY1,169,2347.33%12BAYAN MUNA979,0396.14%13CIBAC755,6864.74%14GABRIELA621,1713.89%15APEC619,6573.88%16A TEACHER490,3793.07%17AKBAYAN466,1122.92%18ALAGAD423,1492.65%19COOPNATCCO409,8832.57%110BUTIL409,1602.57%111BATAS29 385,8102.42%112ARC374,2882.35%113ANAKPAWIS370,2612.32%114ABONO339,9902.13%115AMIN338,18 52.12%116AGAP328,7242.06%117AN WARAY321,5032.02%1 Total 1718YACAP310,8891.95%019FPJPM300,9231.89%020UNIMAD245,3821.54%0From Table 2 above, we see that only 17 party-list candidates received at least 2% from the total number of votes cast for party-list candidates. The 17 qualified party-list candidates, or the two-percenters, are the party-list candidates that are "entitled to one seat each," or the guaranteed seat. In this first round of seat allocation, we distributed 17 guaranteed seats. The second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 provides that "those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes." This is where petitioners and intervenors problem with the formula in Veterans lies. Veterans interprets the clause "in proportion to their total number of votes" to be in proportion to the votes of the first party. This interpretation is contrary to the express language of R.A. No. 7941. We rule that, in computing the allocation of additional seats, the continued operation of the two percent threshold for the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 is unconstitutional. This Court finds that the two percent threshold makes it mathematically impossible to achieve the maximum number of available party list seats when the number of available party list seats exceeds 50. The continued operation of the two percent threshold in the distribution of the additional seats frustrates the attainment of the permissive ceiling that 20% of the members of the House of Representatives shall consist of party-list representatives. To illustrate: There are 55 available party-list seats. Suppose there are 50 million votes cast for the 100 participants in the party list elections. A party that has two percent of the votes cast, or one million votes, gets a guaranteed seat. Let us further assume that the first 50 parties all get one million votes. Only 50 parties get a seat despite the availability of 55 seats. Because of the operation of the two percent threshold, this situation will repeat itself even if we increase the available party-list seats to 60 seats and even if we increase the votes cast to 100 million. Thus, even if the maximum number of parties get two percent of the votes for every party, it is always impossible for the number of occupied party-list seats to exceed 50 seats as long as the two percent threshold is present. We therefore strike down the two percent threshold only in relation to the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941. The two percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of "the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives."30 In determining the allocation of seats for party-list representatives under Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941, the following procedure shall be observed:

1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections. 2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each. 3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in paragraph 1, shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes until all the additional seats are allocated. 4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats. In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be included because they have already been allocated, at one seat each, to every two-percenter. Thus, the remaining available seats for allocation as "additional seats" are the maximum seats reserved under the Party List System less the guaranteed seats. Fractional seats are disregarded in the absence of a provision in R.A. No. 7941 allowing for a rounding off of fractional seats. In declaring the two percent threshold unconstitutional, we do not limit our allocation of additional seats in Table 3 below to the two-percenters. The percentage of votes garnered by each party-list candidate is arrived at by dividing the number of votes garnered by each party by 15,950,900, the total number of votes cast for party-list candidates. There are two steps in the second round of seat allocation. First, the percentage is multiplied by the remaining available seats, 38, which is the difference between the 55 maximum seats reserved under the PartyList System and the 17 guaranteed seats of the two-percenters. The whole integer of the product of the percentage and of the remaining available seats corresponds to a partys share in the remaining available seats. Second, we assign one party-list seat to each of the parties next in rank until all available seats are completely distributed. We distributed all of the remaining 38 seats in the second round of seat allocation. Finally, we apply the three-seat cap to determine the number of seats each qualified party-list candidate is entitled. Thus: Table 3. Distribution of Available Party-List Seats RankPartyVotes GarneredVotes Garnered over Total Votes for Party List, in % (A)Guaranteed Seat (First Round) (B)Additional Seats (Second Round) (C)(B) plus (C), in whole integers (D)Applying the three seat cap (E)1BUHAY1,169,2347.33%12.793N.A.2BAYAN MUNA979,0396.14%12.333N.A.3CIBAC755,6864.74%11.802N.A.4GABRIELA 621,1713.89%11.482N.A.5APEC619,6573.88%11.482N.A.6A Teacher490,3793.07%11.172N.A.7AKBAYAN466,1122.92%11.112N.A.8ALAGAD423,1492.65%11.012N.A.931 COOPNATCCO409,8832.57%112N.A.10BUTIL409,1602.57%112N.A.11BATAS385,8102.42%112N.A.12ARC374,288 2.35%112N.A.13ANAKPAWIS370,2612.32%112N.A.14ABONO339,9902.13%112N.A.15AMIN338,1852.12%11 2N.A.16AGAP328,7242.06%112N.A.17AN WARAY321,5032.02%112N.A.18YACAP310,8891.95%011N.A.19FPJPM300,9231.89%011N.A.20UNIMAD245,3821.54%011N.A.21ABS235,0861.47%011N.A.22KAKUSA228,9991.44%011N.A.23KABATAAN228,6 371.43%011N.A.24ABA-AKO218,8181.37%011N.A.25ALIF217,8221.37%011N.A.26SENIOR CITIZENS213,0581.34%011N.A.27AT197,8721.24%011N.A.28VFP196,2661.23%011N.A.29ANAD188,5211.18 %011N.A.30BANAT177,0281.11%011N.A.31ANG KASANGGA170,5311.07%011N.A.32BANTAY169,8011.06%011N.A.33ABAKADA166,7471.05%011N.A.341UTAK164,9801.03%011N.A.35TUCP162,6471.02%011N.A.36COCOFED155,9200.98%011N.A.Total1755Appl ying the procedure of seat allocation as illustrated in Table 3 above, there are 55 party-list representatives from the 36 winning party-list organizations. All 55 available party-list seats are filled. The additional seats allocated to

the parties with sufficient number of votes for one whole seat, in no case to exceed a total of three seats for each party, are shown in column (D). Participation of Major Political Parties in Party-List Elections The Constitutional Commission adopted a multi-party system that allowed all political parties to participate in the party-list elections. The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission clearly bear this out, thus: MR. MONSOD. Madam President, I just want to say that we suggested or proposed the party list system because we wanted to open up the political system to a pluralistic society through a multiparty system. x x x We are for opening up the system, and we would like very much for the sectors to be there. That is why one of the ways to do that is to put a ceiling on the number of representatives from any single party that can sit within the 50 allocated under the party list system. x x x. xxx MR. MONSOD. Madam President, the candidacy for the 198 seats is not limited to political parties. My question is this: Are we going to classify for example Christian Democrats and Social Democrats as political parties? Can they run under the party list concept or must they be under the district legislation side of it only? MR. VILLACORTA. In reply to that query, I think these parties that the Commissioner mentioned can field candidates for the Senate as well as for the House of Representatives. Likewise, they can also field sectoral candidates for the 20 percent or 30 percent, whichever is adopted, of the seats that we are allocating under the party list system. MR. MONSOD. In other words, the Christian Democrats can field district candidates and can also participate in the party list system? MR. VILLACORTA. Why not? When they come to the party list system, they will be fielding only sectoral candidates. MR. MONSOD. May I be clarified on that? Can UNIDO participate in the party list system? MR. VILLACORTA. Yes, why not? For as long as they field candidates who come from the different marginalized sectors that we shall designate in this Constitution. MR. MONSOD. Suppose Senator Taada wants to run under BAYAN group and says that he represents the farmers, would he qualify? MR. VILLACORTA. No, Senator Taada would not qualify. MR. MONSOD. But UNIDO can field candidates under the party list system and say Juan dela Cruz is a farmer. Who would pass on whether he is a farmer or not? MR. TADEO. Kay Commissioner Monsod, gusto ko lamang linawin ito. Political parties, particularly minority political parties, are not prohibited to participate in the party list election if they can prove that they are also organized along sectoral lines. MR. MONSOD. What the Commissioner is saying is that all political parties can participate because it is precisely the contention of political parties that they represent the broad base of citizens and that all sectors are represented in them. Would the Commissioner agree? MR. TADEO. Ang punto lamang namin, pag pinayagan mo ang UNIDO na isang political party, it will dominate the party list at mawawalang saysay din yung sector. Lalamunin mismo ng political parties ang party list system. Gusto ko lamang bigyan ng diin ang "reserve." Hindi ito reserve seat sa marginalized sectors. Kung titingnan

natin itong 198 seats, reserved din ito sa political parties. MR. MONSOD. Hindi po reserved iyon kasi anybody can run there. But my question to Commissioner Villacorta and probably also to Commissioner Tadeo is that under this system, would UNIDO be banned from running under the party list system? MR. VILLACORTA. No, as I said, UNIDO may field sectoral candidates. On that condition alone, UNIDO may be allowed to register for the party list system. MR. MONSOD. May I inquire from Commissioner Tadeo if he shares that answer? MR. TADEO. The same. MR. VILLACORTA. Puwede po ang UNIDO, pero sa sectoral lines. xxxx MR. OPLE. x x x In my opinion, this will also create the stimulus for political parties and mass organizations to seek common ground. For example, we have the PDP-Laban and the UNIDO. I see no reason why they should not be able to make common goals with mass organizations so that the very leadership of these parties can be transformed through the participation of mass organizations. And if this is true of the administration parties, this will be true of others like the Partido ng Bayan which is now being formed. There is no question that they will be attractive to many mass organizations. In the opposition parties to which we belong, there will be a stimulus for us to contact mass organizations so that with their participation, the policies of such parties can be radically transformed because this amendment will create conditions that will challenge both the mass organizations and the political parties to come together. And the party list system is certainly available, although it is open to all the parties. It is understood that the parties will enter in the roll of the COMELEC the names of representatives of mass organizations affiliated with them. So that we may, in time, develop this excellent system that they have in Europe where labor organizations and cooperatives, for example, distribute themselves either in the Social Democratic Party and the Christian Democratic Party in Germany, and their very presence there has a transforming effect upon the philosophies and the leadership of those parties. It is also a fact well known to all that in the United States, the AFL-CIO always vote with the Democratic Party. But the businessmen, most of them, always vote with the Republican Party, meaning that there is no reason at all why political parties and mass organizations should not combine, reenforce, influence and interact with each other so that the very objectives that we set in this Constitution for sectoral representation are achieved in a wider, more lasting, and more institutionalized way. Therefore, I support this [Monsod-Villacorta] amendment. It installs sectoral representation as a constitutional gift, but at the same time, it challenges the sector to rise to the majesty of being elected representatives later on through a party list system; and even beyond that, to become actual political parties capable of contesting political power in the wider constitutional arena for major political parties. x x x 32 (Emphasis supplied) R.A. No. 7941 provided the details for the concepts put forward by the Constitutional Commission. Section 3 of R.A. No. 7941 reads: Definition of Terms. (a) The party-list system is a mechanism of proportional representation in the election of representatives to the House of Representatives from national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof registered with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). Component parties or organizations of a coalition may participate independently provided the coalition of which they form part does not participate in the party-list system. (b) A party means either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties.

(c) A political party refers to an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform, principles and policies for the general conduct of government and which, as the most immediate means of securing their adoption, regularly nominates and supports certain of its leaders and members as candidates for public office. It is a national party when its constituency is spread over the geographical territory of at least a majority of the regions. It is a regional party when its constituency is spread over the geographical territory of at least a majority of the cities and provinces comprising the region. (d) A sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of the sectors enumerated in Section 5 hereof whose principal advocacy pertains to the special interests and concerns of their sector, (e) A sectoral organization refers to a group of citizens or a coalition of groups of citizens who share similar physical attributes or characteristics, employment, interests or concerns. (f) A coalition refers to an aggrupation of duly registered national, regional, sectoral parties or organizations for political and/or election purposes. Congress, in enacting R.A. No. 7941, put the three-seat cap to prevent any party from dominating the party-list elections. Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits major political parties from participating in the party-list system. On the contrary, the framers of the Constitution clearly intended the major political parties to participate in party-list elections through their sectoral wings. In fact, the members of the Constitutional Commission voted down, 19-22, any permanent sectoral seats, and in the alternative the reservation of the party-list system to the sectoral groups.33 In defining a "party" that participates in party-list elections as either "a political party or a sectoral party," R.A. No. 7941 also clearly intended that major political parties will participate in the party-list elections. Excluding the major political parties in party-list elections is manifestly against the Constitution, the intent of the Constitutional Commission, and R.A. No. 7941. This Court cannot engage in socio-political engineering and judicially legislate the exclusion of major political parties from the party-list elections in patent violation of the Constitution and the law. Read together, R.A. No. 7941 and the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission state that major political parties are allowed to establish, or form coalitions with, sectoral organizations for electoral or political purposes. There should not be a problem if, for example, the Liberal Party participates in the party-list election through the Kabataang Liberal ng Pilipinas (KALIPI), its sectoral youth wing. The other major political parties can thus organize, or affiliate with, their chosen sector or sectors. To further illustrate, the Nacionalista Party can establish a fisherfolk wing to participate in the party-list election, and this fisherfolk wing can field its fisherfolk nominees. Kabalikat ng Malayang Pilipino (KAMPI) can do the same for the urban poor. The qualifications of party-list nominees are prescribed in Section 9 of R.A. No. 7941: Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. No person shall be nominated as party-list representative unless he is a natural born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period of not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the elections, able to read and write, bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the election. In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election. Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of thirty (30) during his term shall be allowed to continue until the expiration of his term. Under Section 9 of R.A. No. 7941, it is not necessary that the party-list organizations nominee "wallow in poverty, destitution and infirmity"34 as there is no financial status required in the law. It is enough that the

nominee of the sectoral party/organization/coalition belongs to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors,35 that is, if the nominee represents the fisherfolk, he or she must be a fisherfolk, or if the nominee represents the senior citizens, he or she must be a senior citizen. Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 mandates the filling-up of the entire 20% allocation of party-list representatives found in the Constitution. The Constitution, in paragraph 1, Section 5 of Article VI, left the determination of the number of the members of the House of Representatives to Congress: "The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, x x x." The 20% allocation of party-list representatives is merely a ceiling; party-list representatives cannot be more than 20% of the members of the House of Representatives. However, we cannot allow the continued existence of a provision in the law which will systematically prevent the constitutionally allocated 20% party-list representatives from being filled. The three-seat cap, as a limitation to the number of seats that a qualified partylist organization may occupy, remains a valid statutory device that prevents any party from dominating the partylist elections. Seats for party-list representatives shall thus be allocated in accordance with the procedure used in Table 3 above. However, by a vote of 8-7, the Court decided to continue the ruling in Veterans disallowing major political parties from participating in the party-list elections, directly or indirectly. Those who voted to continue disallowing major political parties from the party-list elections joined Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno in his separate opinion. On the formula to allocate party-list seats, the Court is unanimous in concurring with this ponencia. WHEREFORE, we PARTIALLY GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the Resolution of the COMELEC dated 3 August 2007 in NBC No. 07-041 (PL) as well as the Resolution dated 9 July 2007 in NBC No. 07-60. We declare unconstitutional the two percent threshold in the distribution of additional party-list seats. The allocation of additional seats under the Party-List System shall be in accordance with the procedure used in Table 3 of this Decision. Major political parties are disallowed from participating in party-list elections. This Decision is immediately executory. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.

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