Conspiracy theories and their truth trajectories

Mathijs Pelkmans and Rhys Machold

Abstract: This article aims to reinvigorate analytical debates on conspiracy theories. It argues that definitional attempts to set conspiracy theories apart from other theories are flawed. Blinded by the irrational reputation of conspiracy theories and deluded by the workings of institutionalized power such approaches fail to recognize that there are no inherent differences between the two categories. We argue that assessments of conspiracy theories should focus not on the epistemological qualities of these theories but on their interactions with the socio-political fields through which they travel. Because conspiracy theory is not a neutral term but a powerful label, attention to processes of labeling highlights these larger fields of power, while the theories trajectories illuminate the mechanisms by which truth and untruth are created. As such, this article offers a way forward for assessing both the truth and use value of conspiracy theories in the contemporary world. Keywords: conspiracy, labeling, power, theory, transparency

Blinded by power
As the object of conspiracy theories is secrecy, it is in their nature to attract popular attention. This is certainly true of recent times, which has seen an ever-expanding list of popular books and websites devoted to the topic. The general public seems to be particularly enticed or amused by wacky theories, such as the one that barcodes are intended to control people or the one asserting that NASA faked the first moon landings. If such theories are attractive to most because they offer a frivolous diversion (this is not to deny that some people take them very seriously), alternative claims about the 9/11 attacks have not only attracted attention from the general public, but have also been the subject of

mainstream media documentaries and the object of scholarly investigations.1 Such academic attention is a precarious undertaking for the involved scholars, because of the potential to be seen as a conspiracy theorist unworthy of academic status.2 Conspiracy theories may be intriguing to some and a sign of paranoia to others, but in any case the label conspiracy theory is a powerful one. The mere mentioning of the term may set off alarm bells, pushing the listener to doubt the credibility of the postulated theory. Given the public fascination with, and suspicion of, conspiracy theories, it is amazing that the most powerful theories of conspiracythose that have the largest geopolitical impactare not recognized as such. Over the past several years,

FocaalJournal of Global and Historical Anthropology 59 (2011): 6680 doi:10.3167/fcl.2011.590105

Conspiracy theories and their truth trajectories | 67

we have asked friends and students to name the most powerful conspiracy theory of the past decades. Their answers included the theory that the 9/11 terrorist attacks were committed or allowed by the US government, the idea that Princess Diana was effectively murdered by the British royal family, and many lower profile theories. But they all failed to mention the most powerful conspiracy theory of the last decade, which, beyond doubt, was the theory that Saddam Hussein secretly possessed weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and was conspiring with Al Qaeda to level new attacks on the United States. This powerful conspiracy theory was dramatically displayed by Colin Powell in his famous, and later infamous, address to the United Nations Security Council on 23 February 2003. Although the assertions were not believed by everyone, they proved to be key ingredients for building a coalition of the willing, and thereby for legitimizing the invasion of Iraq in March 2003. The theory unavoidably faded when no WMDs were discovered and substantial ties between Hussein and Al Qaeda turned out to have been nonexistent. Critics have continued to discuss how exactly the theory was the combined result of deliberate government fabrications, intelligence mistakes, and mismanagement of secret service agencies. But most significant for the purpose of this article is that the theory, even after it was disproved, was never labeled a conspiracy theory. Moreover, the Saddam Hussein-Al Qaeda hypothesis was pushed by a government that was itself conspiring at the very moment that it promoted its theory of conspiracy.3 Even if we may never come to know all the details, analysts agree that in its attempt to sell the war, the Bush administration had waged an active campaign of public disinformation and manipulation of key intelligence, aiming to conceal any underlying motives for war and to discredit dissenting voices.4 In addition to this campaign of deliberate mystification, when evidence that undermined the official rationale for war began to emerge, elements within the administration began to seek ways to discredit their opponents (Falk 2005: 49). In response to former US Am-

bassador Joseph Wilsons (2003) op-ed for the New York Times that Iraq had not attempted to acquire ingredients for nuclear weapons from Niger, the identity of Wilsons wife Valerie Plame Wilson as a covert CIA operative was leaked to the media by chief presidential adviser Karl Rove as well as Dick Cheneys chief of staff I. Lewis Scooter Libby (McClellan 2008: 23; Plame Wilson 2007: 142). The Plame scandal and Libbys subsequent conviction gives an account of concealed acts that occurred in the highest spheres of American power with the aim of distorting unfavorable evidence and thus undermining public debate on a major military intervention. Although severely criticized, these acts are not usually thought of as conspiracies. The apparent incapability to recognize the most powerful theories of conspiracy as conspiracy theories and the tendency of some reallife conspiracies never to be labeled as such have important analytical implications. They suggest that our analytical faculty to make critical inferences about how political forces may collude is itself thoroughly influenced by asymmetrical power relations and flows. This problem of being blinded by power also has its reverse side. If there are theories of conspiracy that are patently untrue, yet will never obtain the negative label conspiracy theory one may also assume that there are theories of conspiracy that are true, but will never be seen as true due to the negative connotations of their conspiracy theory label. These insights about the ways in which theories of conspiracy are constructed and consumed as well as the potential of actual conspiracies to occur, show that our present understanding of conspiracy and conspiracy theory requires substantial review. Several authors have reflected on the problematic status of conspiracy theories. In a short commentary, Bayat (2006: 5) sums up the dilemma by stating that [o]nly by acknowledging that real conspiracies can exist, and by refuting ideas that cannot be empirically staved, will we be able to analyze political situations in a manner that is neither politically nave, nor the product of a conspiracist mindset. Arguing

68 | Mathijs Pelkmans and Rhys Machold

along similar lines Coady states that the errors of excessive willingness and excessive unwillingness to believe in conspiracy theory correspond to two epistemic vices, which I have called paranoia and naivety respectively (2006a: 10). Coady postulates that a middle ground position of realism that does not suffer from either is most appropriate. Acknowledging the difficulties and arguing for realism is only the first step. It neither says anything about the claims of any specific theory, nor does it offer a strategy to assess disputed (and undisputed) theories of conspiracy. This article emphasizes the second aspect: the need to chart an analytical strategy that is capable of capturing both the truth and use value of theories of conspiracy. What distinguishes conspiracy theories from other theories is the precise manner in which such theories are embedded in socio-political fields. Apart from studying the situational truth-value, the use value of these theories equally requires attention. If in some cases conspiracy theories serve as commentaries on the world, or as interrogations of obscure power mechanisms, in other cases they serve the political status quo. Anthropologists have tended to focus on the former, that is, on conspiracy theorizing as subaltern strategies to make sense of impersonal and opaque forces. Their comparisons of conspiracy theories to witchcraft, shamanism, and other occult cosmologies (Sanders and West 2003: 6; Silverstein 2002: 647) have rightly drawn attention to the sense-making effects of conspiracy theorizing. However, we argue that in doing so they reveal a lingering functionalism that fails to interrogate systematically the links between power and truth. Because conspiracy theories can also be potent tools in discrediting opponents and in rallying supporters, the convergence of truth and use value needs to be at the center of analysis. A fruitful assessment of conspiracy theories should thus not restrict its analysis to the postulated claims but study the socio-political trajectories or routes of those claims. As such we offer new insight in how we should go about analyzing a world in which conspiracies occur, in which conspiracy theorizing is rampant, in

which the label conspiracy theory is a vital political tool, and in which there is a dire need of dispassionate analysis of conspiracies and conspiracy theories.

Conspiracy theories as (mischievous) theories

On the face of it, there is nothing mysterious about the terms under review: conspiracies, theories, and conspiracy theories. If we define theories as postulated explanations of phenomena in the world, then to name something a theory does not in itself offer an assessment of its epistemic status. It only means that this explanation has not gained the status yet of fact5 and is thus open to falsification. In providing a definition of conspiracy and we restrict ourselves to political conspiracieswe can be equally brief, as a conspiracy refers to activities that are planned or carried out in secret by (at least two) political actors. Usually the term conspiracy denotes activities that are illegal or at least controversial and therefore need to be hidden from public scrutiny.6 Given these rather straightforward meanings, putting the two terms together should be equally uncomplicated. Indeed, in its most basic formulation, a (political) conspiracy theory is an explanation which postulates that an event is the (at least partly intended) effect of activities that have been secretly planned and carried out by several actors (see Basham 2003: 91; Coady 2006b: 11617; Griffin 2007: 8). For many observers the basic definitions outlined above are unsatisfactory, because they do not reveal anything about the theories truth-value and their perceived low performance in this regard. Aiming to account for this poor performance, several philosophers have tried to isolate the epistemological deficiencies of conspiracy theories. Among these, the most frequently mentioned are 1) that conspiracy theories rely excessively on errant data; 2) that conspiracy theories are difficult to falsify because contradictory evidence will be interpreted as affirmation of the existence of a conspiracy; and 3) that their theorists suffer

Conspiracy theories and their truth trajectories | 69

from the so-called fundamental attribution error. Brian Keeleys frequently cited text Of conspiracy theories argues that the negative status of conspiracy theories is deserved, and that this is partly due to epistemological deficiencies in conspiracy theorizing. He stresses their reliance on errant data, which serves to tie together seemingly unrelated events (1999: 117). Keeley finds this problematic, presumably arguing from a point of view that on the whole such seemingly unrelated events really are unrelated. Moreover, while errant data are given primary explanatory power, by invoking a conspiracy hypothesis, large amounts of evidence are thrown into question (ibid.: 120). This means that conspiracy theories become immune to falsification, as evidence against them tends to be used as evidence for the existence of the conspiracy they allege. One problem with this reasoning is that data is only errant in relation to a particular perspective; in this case, only if we assume that the official account is the correct account. Another problem is that new theories by definition aim to incorporate data previously unaccounted for, and the falsification of such new theories will thus require the gathering of even more data. Major scientific breakthroughs, such as Darwins theory of evolution or Copernicuss heliocentric theory, relied almost exclusively on what at the time counted as errant data. In that sense one can argue that conspiracy theorists potentially make a valuable contribution to the advancement of knowledge (even if this potential is rarely realized). The philosopher Clarke (2002) argues that the fundamental problem with conspiracy theories is that for individuals who become committed to conspiracy theories it is increasingly difficult to overcome the fundamental attribution error. This means, essentially, that they will attach disproportional weight to data that is in line with their theory at the expense of data that contradicts the theory.7 Although the statement is not necessarily incorrect, the attribution error is characteristic of any committed theorist rather than of the committed conspiracy theo-

rist per se (see also Coady 2006b). It can be stated that it may be equally difficult for someone committed to non-conspiratorial accounts to accept a rival conspiratorial account, not least because of the suspect status of conspiracy theories and the negative associations of the label. For example, a 2006 Harris poll found that 50 percent of Americans continued to believe that Saddam Hussein possessed WMDs prior to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, despite an extensive formal investigation that found no evidence of such arsenals (Hanley 2006: 1).8 This indicates that individuals committed to the idea that WMDs were the primary reason for the invasion were reluctant to adjust their views in light of contradictory evidence, and instead found new ways to justify their original theory.9 We argue that rather than convincingly distilling the epistemological essences of conspiracy theorizing, these contributions have been more successful in revealing the dispositions of their authors. Keeley (1999: 126) writes from an essentially conservative standpoint in the sense that he assumes official accounts to be generally true and that therefore general distrust of conspiracy theorizing is warranted. But suggesting that distrust is justified in most cases is not a logical but a statistical qualification, which is hardly helpful in sketching an analytical strategy for assessing the truth value of individual theories of conspiracy. The central problem is that the authors cited above start with the conclusionthat conspiracy theories are likely to be falseand then work their way backward to see if epistemological differences can be found between (false) conspiracy theories and (true) official accounts. This strategy has little value if we acknowledge that some theories of conspiracies are true. Although there are many examples of fantastical conspiracy theories that contain little evidence of real conspiracies, high profile historical examples of conspiratorial behavior underline that the wholesale dismissal of anything labeled a conspiracy theory is equally out of touch with reality. This brings us back to the realist position. One peculiarity of the attempt to pinpoint the epistemological characteristics of conspir-

70 | Mathijs Pelkmans and Rhys Machold

acy theorizing is that these presumed epistemological characteristics turn out to be sociological ones when scrutinized. The issue of the fundamental attribution error is ultimately about the relation between theory and theorizerabout how data are interpreted and given weight by social actors. And the complaint about errant data points at the situational positioning of conspiracy theories, because the interaction between competing theories defines to what extent data is errant. In his Introduction to Conspiracy Theories: The philosophical Debate, David Coady incorporates this situational positioning into his definition of conspiracy theory, arguing that a conspiracy theory is an explanation that is contrary to an explanation that has official status at the time and place in question (2006a: 3). This is a valuable definitional addition for two reasons. First because conspiracies are by definition secretive and concocted by powerful (but not allpowerful) actors who are often able to significantly alter political realities and influence official accounts. Second because it illuminates the political field, in which conspiracy theories are up against their official counterparts whose credibility is primarily derived from the social status and institutionalized power that the holders of these accounts possess. It clarifies why many conspiracy theories have such a hard time being taken seriously even if they have substantial data at their disposal. This definitional addition is nevertheless problematic because it restricts analysis to a specific sub-category of theories that deal with conspiracy. It only deals with subaltern conspiracy theorizing, explicitly excluding theories of conspiracy that have official status. In doing so it forecloses the possibility to analyze how theories of conspiracy differently mesh with fields of power. It also fixes the official, which is problematic in two distinct ways. First because what counts as official today may not be official tomorrow, and second because there may be competing notions of what counts as official. From Coadys perspective the theory about Iraqs possession of WMDs should be defined as a conspiracy theory in Iraq but not in

the United States where it was the official account. Likewise, if in the future US government officials turn out to have been involved in the 9/11 attacks and if this is affirmed by the then acting administration, then what are now seen as conspiracy theories will no longer count as such. That is, the distinction between official and unofficial reveals insight in the power relationships that are involved in naming and labeling theories, but does not offer substantial information about the characteristics of conspiracy theories. Using the official/non-official distinction as a priori criterion unduly simplifies the power grid, and prohibits analyzing the ways in which the power dimension impinges on the ways in which theories of conspiracy gain or lose their truth-value. The central problem with Coadys analysis (in this resembling Clarke and Keeley) is that it assumes that conspiracy theories can be straightforwardly identified and defined, and thus oblivious to the fact that it is the power-infused process of labeling that makes conspiracy theories recognizable as such. The irony is that once theories have been labeled as conspiracy theories, they are less likely to have their truth claims recognized. To recapitulate, the truth-value of conspiracy theories cannot convincingly be assessed from a purely epistemological perspective, while assumptions about the subaltern status of conspiracy theorizing limit our understanding of the power dimension involved. Analytic attention should therefore focus on the practice of labeling, an aspect that has received surprisingly little attention. In order to advance, however, we first need to have a clearer picture of the use value that conspiracy theories offer to different actors (their creators, consumers, and adversaries). This entails discussing the various scales of theorizing and the contexts in which this theorizing occurs.

The potency of conspiracy theorizing

Although the scholars discussed above focus on the presumed illogical characteristics of conspiracy theories, their discomfort largely rests

Conspiracy theories and their truth trajectories | 71

on a normative assessment. Keeley in particular is concerned with the degree of skepticism that conspiracy theories place on public institutions. From his point of view, conspiracy theories should be considered unwarranted as a category, even if conspiracies do occur, because a commitment to conspiracy theorizing makes it difficult to believe anything by fundamentally challenging institutional credibility (Keeley 1999: 121ff.). Apart from the fact that neither full commitment nor complete rejection of conspiracy theorizing is advisable, one can also turn Keeleys argument around to infer that the frequency of conspiracy theories is indicative of the opaqueness of the dominant power structures in a given society. As Coady notes: The extent to which it is rational to be sceptical of conspiracy theories partly depends on the extent to which it is rational to suppose that the official institutions responsible for gathering and disseminating information in ones society are trustworthy (2006a: 10). The important point here is that the credibility of a conspiracy theory is derived from a combination of operational characteristics as well as contextual ones. That is, theories of conspiracy cannot be evaluated in a vacuum; instead they require a more dynamic approach that analyzes their sociopolitical locations and routes. Even though no extensive political geographical mapping of conspiracy theorizing has been carried out, fragmentary ethnographic evidence suggests that the intensity of conspiracy theorizing correlates with the organizational features of societies. Conspiracy theorizing flourishes in situations of societal distress produced by conflict or political transformations (Silverstein 2002: 650), and when there is a palpable discrepancy between political rhetoric and experienced social reality (see, e.g., Sanders and Wests 2003 valuable suggestion that transparency rhetoric may actually trigger conspiracy theorizing). Basham draws on this last point to illustrate the contemporary eruption of conspiracy theorizing in the West, asserting (rather boldly) that theres no denying that we live in a remarkably secretive, hierarchically organized civilization [and that] on the face of things there

is a serious prior probability of global conspiracy (2003: 92). Anthropologists of the former Soviet Union have argued that the abrupt and disorientating changes that accompanied the collapse of the Soviet empire were matched with an upsurge in conspiracy theorizing (Grant 1999: 243; Oushakine 2009: 74, 105). This had partly to do with the legacy of an opaque and secretive political system that had espoused many truths that suddenly were unmasked as persistent lies. In that context any official account was likely to be approached with distrust. Such distrust was also a commentary on postSoviet reality. Confronted with inexplicable fluctuations in political and economic life, many people were reasonably suspicious that larger and hidden agendas lurked behind the adverse economic changes. These bottom-up theories challenged the fantastical official discourse that the crisis was only a temporary side effect of a transition toward an affluent free market society. Instead they blamed the persistent economic crisis on secret deals made between the mafia and the government. As such these theories nicely dovetail with Jakob Rigis assessment that the post-Soviet fragmentation of power produced a chaotic mode of domination: political decisions were often the outcome of the murky confluence of contacts, money, and coercion, and conspiracies ha[d] become a major part of politics (Rigi 2004: 145).10 In a study of conspiracy theorizing in Algeria in the 1990s, Silverstein describes a situation in which while the death count continues to mount, the war remains shrouded in a haze of uncertainty and dearth of verifiable information (2001, 2002: 645). The conspiracy theorists he describes disregarded official announcements, instead accumulating information about the family backgrounds, economic activities, and political connections of people involved in major political and economic deals and scandals in order to find out who would have benefited most. This information enabled them to make informed guesses about the specific forces influencing political deals, assassinations, and high-level crimes. Although Silverstein does not use the term, one might call this a type of street

72 | Mathijs Pelkmans and Rhys Machold

realpolitika rational evaluation of the various potential gains of different actors in the absence of other mechanisms for asserting the reliability of information about political events.11 The question of how conspiratorial our society is (Basham 2003: 97), therefore, remains of central importance to evaluating the claims of conspiracy theories. To borrow the phrase of George Marcus (1999), we may be dealing with paranoia within reason. An important issue, then, is to identify indicators that inform us about when paranoia concerning the powers that be is reasonable and potentially revealing, and when theories of conspiracy slip into the unreasonable and fantastical. At this point it is useful to highlight that conspiracy theorizing addresses conspiratorial behavior at vastly different scales. Petty conspiracies, which occur all the time, refer to political deals that are made behind the scenes. Such everyday conspiracies are perhaps little more than a reminder that complete transparency is never possible (Comaroff and Comaroff 2003: 288; Schumann 2007: 840). By contrast, theories of world conspiracies posit the existence of secretly operating powerful groups that are to be blamed for perennial misery, global crises, and persistent inequalities and injustice. The alleged existence of a conspiring World Jewry by leaders of Nazi Germany, the supposed secret agenda of the United Nations by many born-again Christians in the US, and the suspected all-embracive hidden power of the Freemasonry are well-known examples of global conspiracy theories.12 But the most theoretically interesting field of conspiracy is theorizing that addresses conspiracies, which supersede the petty without extrapolating suspicions to a global scale. Hellinger terms these operational conspiracies, that is, conspiratorial behavior that seeks to prevent or encourage a significant shift in power among political actorsindividuals, groups, or states (2003: 209f.). The boundaries among the categoriespetty, operational, and globalare, however, far from solid. Conspiracy theorizing in post-Soviet contexts is a case in point. In the 1990s most inhabitants of the newly independent Republic of

Georgia experienced a severe decline in their living standards while observing that specific groups of peoplewell-connected businessmen and politicianswere living tremendously wealthy lifestyles. This asymmetric accumulation of wealth occurred while numerous industries were shut down. The government monotonously explained this state of affairs by presenting it as a temporary discomfort on the road to capitalism, which would ultimately lead to a stable free market system that would be beneficial to all. However, many citizens realistically suspected that free market rhetoric also served as a guise behind which all kinds of secret and illegal deals were concocted between power-holders. One of the many examples that residents brought up was the collapse of the local tobacco industry, which suspiciously coincided with the occurrence of repeated fires that burned down several local tobacco-processing factories. Residents interpreted these events as having been secretly planned by the son-in-law of the then president Eduard Shevardnadze, who was the major importer of cigarettes from Turkey and thus the main beneficiary of a collapse of the tobacco industry. Such theories were more convincing than the official account that these local industries had simply gone bankrupt,13 and incidentally corresponded with Burawoy and Krotovs (1992) suggestion that the immediate post-Soviet era saw a rise of mercantile capitalism rather than of a capitalist mode of production. However, these realistic conspiracy theories tended to mix with more fantastical accounts. In the case of Georgia, reasonable suspicion of political involvement was increasingly channeled to the countrys historical and cultural Other, the neighboring country of Turkey, which was blamed for the downfall of the Georgian economy. Stories circulated that the Turks were selling poisonous consumer goods including cigarettes in a concerted effort to destroy the Georgian people and take advantage of the countrys natural riches (Pelkmans 2006: 18693).14 The boundary between reasonable and unreasonable conspiracy theorizing is porous, but the element that seems to provide the best indication for assessing this issue is the slippage from

Conspiracy theories and their truth trajectories | 73

distrust to disgust. That is to say, suspicion of conspiracy theorizing seems particularly warranted when the theories serve to seal the boundaries around an imagined community, or when they are overwhelmingly used as a means to scapegoat targeted groups.15 It is important to note that scapegoating through conspiracy theorizing is itself a powerful tool, especially when it feeds on pre-existing dispositions and conceptions. As Hannah Arendt (1973: 354) notes, The most efficient fiction of Nazi propaganda was the story of a Jewish world conspiracy that derived its effectiveness from the long-standing myths about Jewish power dating back to the late eighteenth century that were reinforced by the growing prominence of Jews during the Interbellum. This official theory of conspiracy also had built into it a critical self-replicating mechanism whereby any avoidance of the Jewish question served as evidence that Jews were the true representatives of the powers that be and that the Jewish issue was the symbol of hypocrisy and dishonesty of the whole system (ibid.). The issue of use value is also taken up in the volume Transparency and conspiracy edited by anthropologists Harry West and Todd Sanders, in which the authors argue that conspiracy theorizing can be seen as a means to contest the rationales of often corrupt or secretive political institutions that operate behind an impenetrable faade (2003: 16). Sanders and West argue that the creation of conspiracy theories is a tool of social empowerment of the relative powerless in relation to the (false) claims of transparency and accountability that have become the legitimizing tropes of modern political power (ibid.: 16f.). Perhaps somewhat typical for anthropologists the authors avoid engaging with the issue of credibility and truth-value of conspiracy theories. They refrain from dismissing conspiracy theories as fantasies (presumably not wishing to be seen as reductionist positivists) and in a few instances imply that conspiracy theories may reveal more about the world than the transparency stories of those in power (ibid.: 15). Yet they avoid making statements about the truthfulness of (some) conspiracy theories and in-

stead focus on the importance of such theories for those who hold on to them. Intriguingly, both Silverstein (2002) and Sanders and West (2003) invoke EvansPritchards famous argument that Zande witchcraft serves to make sense of unfortunate events. Witchcraft theories do not attempt to offer a general explanation for why trees fall or granaries collapse but rather explain why this particular tree fell or that granary collapsed at the exact moment when specific persons were sitting beneath them (Evans-Pritchard 1937: 69f.; see Silverstein 2002: 647f.; Sanders and West 2003: 13ff.). This was Evans-Pritchards attempt to understand the logic and rationality of witchcraft from within, while simultaneously stressing that witches, as the Azande conceive them, cannot exist (1937: 36). Similarly, Sanders and West aim to understand conspiracy theorizing from within, and they argue that the chapters in their volume show that conspiracy ideas [are] discourses that construct truths in contradistinction to the (also constructed) truths of discourses of transparency (2003: 15). This move allows them to focus on the importance of conspiracy theories to those who hold on to them. It also allows them to avoid making statements about the truthfulness of conspiracy theories. This admirable relativist position grants everyone their own truths and rightly acknowledges that every truth is constructed, but it unfortunately also sidelines the issue that some conspiracy theories are nonsense while others correctly identify secretly colluding powers. Even if Silverstein as well as Sanders and West deny that they are functionalists,16 their explanations still impute stable (sense-making, emotional, social) functions to conspiracy theorizing, while evading the question of how truth and untruth are produced in asymmetric fields of power. We should not blame this avoidance solely on a residual functionalist tendency in anthropology. An equally important reason is that the authors (like the philosophers discussed above) start their analysis with too many assumptions about the concept of conspiracy theory. This can be seen from their invocation of the witchcraft metaphor and their suggestion to see conspiracy

74 | Mathijs Pelkmans and Rhys Machold

theories as occult cosmologies (Sanders and West 2003: 6). Even though Sanders and West suggest that there may be more truth in such cosmologies than we usually assume, and even if they refrain from translating Evans-Pritchards statement into clearly, conspiracies cannot exist, we are still by and large in the realm of fantasy. The reason for this is that they only pay attention to those conspiracy theories that were constructed by the relative powerless and were already labeled conspiracy theories precisely because they seem fantastical and irrational. But as we argued above, conspiracy theories should not be seen as a category in and of itself. After all, conspiracy theories start their trajectory just like other theories, and only later do they become (labeled as) conspiracy theories. The contextualization of conspiracy theories is a good step forward. It allows for making inferences about the relative likelihood that conspiracy theorizing occurs and the usefulness of conspiracy theorizing as indexes of, and commentaries on, the obscurity of dominant power. At best, this only partially answers some of the questions concerning the use- and truth-value of conspiracy theories. One of the outstanding difficulties is that neither contexts nor conspiracy theories can be treated as stable objects: theories are not at rest in fixed contexts. Instead we should conceptualize the relationship between conspiracy theory and context as the theory moving through a socio-political landscape. In this process of moving, the theories are attributed or withheld value, meanwhile influencing the landscape through which they travel. It is only through such a dynamic approach, which emphasizes the social interactions in which the status of theories is defined, that we can make inferences about truth and use value in ways that overcome the functionalist biases detected above.

Traveling theories and the power of labeling

To obtain a good impression of conspiracy theory trajectories it is worthwhile to reiterate the

fate of the theories about 9/11. Within the first days of the attack at least three theories were advanced: 1) the attacks were the work of Al Qaeda; 2) the attacks were an inside job and high government officials were complicit in it; 3) the attacks were the result of collaboration between Al Qaeda and Saddam Hussein. In first instance these were all unsubstantiated speculations as no evidence had been brought forward yet. Nevertheless, right from the start it was predictable in which direction each of these theories would travel. The first account was bound to have the strongest claim to truth despite weaknesses in the evidence.17 The account that it was an inside job would struggle to be taken seriously, notwithstanding some compelling evidence in favor of it.18 And the third one continued to be credible to a significant group of US citizens despite its extremely feeble evidence, which anyway was acknowledged to have been false in 2003.19 What is more, it was already predictable which theory would be labeled a conspiracy theory, even though all three theories alleged conspiracies and both the second and third suggested the secret involvement of national governments in triggering the tragedy. Expectedly, only the second theory would be labeled a conspiracy theory. The reasons for these different trajectories can be found in the political clout that the different theories could attract, and in the ways in which the theories resonated with popular ideas about the national and international political landscape. The trajectory of a theory depends on its location in a given field of power, as well as on the strength of its claim to truth. The various ways in which theories of conspiracy are perceived as situated along two axes, the truth-axis and the power-axis can be displayed through a heuristic diagram (see Figure 1). In the top-half of the diagram we see how theories of conspiracy that are designed by the relatively powerful will be labeled along the truth-axis. If the claim to truth is strongfor example due to an ability to muster convincing evidencethese theories will be labeled facts. If the evidence is debatable this will at most turn the theories into contested facts. An ob-

Conspiracy theories and their truth trajectories | 75

Theories of Conspiracy

+
Fact Contested Fact

Power
Fact Mistake

Theory

Truth

+
Conspiracy Theory Theory

Conspiracy Theory

Figure 1

vious example of this scenario are the 9/11 attacks. The official version that these have been committed by Al Qaeda has virtually achieved the status of fact, even if not accepted by everyone. Not all theories of conspiracy produced by the powerful are, of course, able to uphold their claim to truth. But if they are disproved then those theories will still not be labeled a conspiracy theory. Instead they will linger on as (unfortunate) mistakes. The clearest contemporary example of this is the theory that alleged the hidden production of WMDs by Saddam Hussein in cooperation with Al Qaeda. The theory was espoused not only by the US government, but also by most governments of the forty-nine members of the original Coalition of the Willing. After it had been disproved, it was still not considered a conspiracy theory. If we move down the power-axis we see a different pattern with regard to theories produced by ordinary citizens. In fact, it matters very little whether a powerless theory is true or not. Theories of conspiracy produced by those who are not in power tend to remain conspiracy theories, no matter their location along the truth-axis. A good example are the efforts of the 9/11 Truth movement. Its authors have produced numerous volumes on the faults in the official account, developing a range of potential explanations including knowledge of, but minimal control over, the events of 9/11 (Griffin 2004), to theories that posit full-blown

complicity in the events (Meyssan 2002). However, these theories continue to be easily dismissed as conspiracy theories. So far we have looked at the possible trajectories from the perspective of the theories. Equally important is to see how conspiracy theory can be molded into a political tool. The subaltern subject has little to gain from trying to label official accounts conspiracy theories as the frustrated attempts by David Griffin testify. In his book Debunking 9/11 Debunking Griffin tries to turn the tables on the prevailing assumptions of conspiracy theories by attacking what he calls the Defenders of the Official Conspiracy Theory. He argues that the official account, which posits that the conspirators were Osama bin Laden and other members of al-Qaeda, is a conspiracy theory based on far weaker evidence than the alternative theories produced by the 9/11 Truth movement (Griffin 2007: 8). Griffin repeats this claim throughout the book, and it is this repetition that reveals the impossibility of creating a level playing field in which the strength and the weaknesses of competing theories of conspiracy can be publicly assessed. As long as Griffin and his associates do not have the political clout to shed the conspiracy theory label that has been glued to them, the defenders of the official conspiracy theory will hardly feel pressured to answer challenges to their account.20 Only if subaltern theorists are able to claim truthwhich demands a vertical shift along the power-axiscan their theories status be altered. A telling example is the unfolding of the Iran-Contra affair, in which even with considerable political power and overwhelming evidence Congress members struggled to reveal the full extent of the conspiracies at hand. The clandestine operations were eventually exposed not due to the work of the theorists per se but rather stemmed from failures in the operations themselves.21 Although their office protected the members of Congress from being labeled conspiracy theorists, the apparent unlikelihood of the Iran-Contra scandal required a certain suspension of belief to seriously engage with the issues it raised (Wroe 1991: 223). The

76 | Mathijs Pelkmans and Rhys Machold

power differential that this aura of implausibility created between the official story and the theory of conspiracy was successfully manipulated to the advantage of those who were involved in the illegal operations. As Independent Counsel Lawrence E. Walsh asserts in his final report, efforts to expose the extent of the operations faced determined efforts by high-ranking Reagan administration officials to deceive congress and the public about their knowledge and support for the operations (1994: xv). Walsh proceeds to point out that the strategy was largely successful because most evidence of the cover up was discovered only when it could no longer be used for most persecutions (ibid.). The Iran-Contra affair thus provides a number of insights into the potential trajectories of theories of conspiracy. First we saw that power differentials between the defenders and challengers of the official story created an uneven playing field that allowed members of the Reagan administration to influence and steer the path of investigations. Nevertheless, because both White House officials and Congress members enjoy a high political standing, the challengers of the official account could not be accused of promoting a conspiracy theory. Finally, their ability to assert and substantiate truth claims through legal proceedings made it possible to transform conspiracy evidence into fact. But despite the theorists success in exposing much of the original conspiracy, we also saw that power asymmetries ultimately prevented prosecution of those involved in the cover up. This discussion indirectly suggests that when power differentials are relatively small, then the conspiracy theory label may have unpredictable and therefore risky effects. We can see this clearly in a recent theory of conspiracy in US politics. In the run-up to the 2008 presidential elections John McCain and especially Sarah Palin alleged a potential conspiracy by repeatedly accusing Barack Obama of palling around with terrorists. The message that they aimed to get across was not only that Obama had disreputable friends, but to suggest that Obamas presidential ticket might be part of a conspiracy to damage US interests. The McCain-Palin team

was able to level these attacks because they could tap into suspicions among a substantial part of the American electorate concerning Obamas background, suspicions largely based on his Muslim-sounding middle name Hussein, and his attendance of a Muslim school in Indonesia.22 Given our claim that the label conspiracy theory is an extremely powerful one, why did Obama not dismiss the unsubstantiated allegations by arguing that this was a conspiracy theory, a reflection of a paranoid mind-set? A potential reason is that the label conspiracy theory will only stick if the power differentials are large enough. This was obviously not the case in the relation between the two contestants, and therefore the label might have backfired.23 Obama certainly sought to diminish the (false) claims launched by his opponents, but he also had to be extremely cautious not to appear condescending or arrogant to the American electorate. This cautiousness was reflected in his handling of Sarah Palins numerous gaffes and lack of foreign policy knowledge that were consistently underemphasized by the Obama campaign for these very same political reasons.

Conclusion: Conspiracy truth in fields of power

Conspiracy theories have a stigma attached to them that on the face of it seems well deserved. But this stigma is assigned to a constructed rather than a natural object. Because there are no persistent epistemological differences between conspiracy theories and other theories, arguing that the stigma is deserved is an empty statement. We have demonstrated that attention should focus instead on the contextualized trajectories of theories of conspiracy as these illuminate both the labeling of specific theories and the fields of power through which they travel. Theories of conspiracy that are communicated by the powerful will never be labeled conspiracy theories even if they are demonstrably false, whereas theories that are expressed by the relatively powerless will only rarely succeed in shedding the negative associations of the label.

Conspiracy theories and their truth trajectories | 77

The key point is that the negative connotation of conspiracy theory adds constraints in competitions for truth with official accounts. As suggested, the conspiracy theory label is simultaneously a tool for those in control, and an obstacle for those challenging the political status quo. This Janus-faced potential of ideational powermanifest in the case of conspiracy theoriescan be compared to other systems of ideas. A century and a half ago, Marx hinted at some of these same issues in his critique of religion. Marx compared religion to the sigh of the oppressed creaturewithout dismissing entirely the radical potential of religion ([1844] 2002). Similarly, conspiracy theorizing can be seen as a means to render an inexplicable world comprehensible. But it may also address and thereby challenge real conspiracies. We suggest that it is important that anthropologists (and social scientists more generally) focus not only on the sense-making value of conspiracy theorizing, but take serious the truth claims and assess these while paying attention to the distorting effects of the fields of power through which theories travel. If for Marx religion was a tool for oppression because the the ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas, then we see the inversion of this principle in the case of conspiracy theorizing. The conspiracy theory label is a tool for oppression because its irrational connotations will push subaltern theories that allege an official conspiracy to the margins, where it easily becomes the subject of ridicule. There are no compelling reasons for why we should embrace conspiracy theorizing just as there are no good reasons to dismiss them out of hand. As with other theories we need to be cautious, but we should be especially cautious when political theories are dismissed as conspiracy theorizing. Mathijs Pelkmans, PhD, is lecturer in Anthropology at the London School of Economics. He is the author of Defending the Border: Identity, Religion, and Modernity in the Republic of Georgia (2006, Cornell University Press) and editor of Conversion after Socialism: Disruptions, Mod-

ernisms, and Technologies of Faith in the Former Soviet Union (2010, Berghahn Books). Email: m.e.pelkmans@lse.ac.uk. Rhys Machold is a PhD student in Security and Global Governance at the Balsillie School of International Affairs in Waterloo, Canada. He completed his BA in Arts and Science and Political Science at McMaster University in 2008 and finished his MSc in Global Politics at the London School of Economics in 2009. Email: rmachold@balsillieschool.ca.

Notes
1. For example the BBC 2007 documentary 9/11: The Conspiracy Files and the contributions to the Journal of 9/11 Studies, http://www .journalof911studies.com. 2. It is not accidental that the most outspoken academic critics of the official 9/11 account, such as David Ray Griffin and Graeme MacQueen, are retired. 3. We use the non-normative term theories of conspiracy when talking about any account of conspiratorial behavior, irrespective of how they have been labeled in popular and political discourse. 4. Falk (2005: 49), for example, contends that the Bush administration was only able to win popular support for the war by confusing the public, misleadingly suggesting that Iraq had played a role in the 9/11 attacks and presenting it as an ally of Al Qaeda. 5. We use the term fact here not in an objectivist sense of truth, but rather to refer to statements about phenomenas in the world that are overwhelmingly held to be true, and therefore not (or no longer) the object of scrutinizing efforts. 6. Hellingers (2003: 209) comprehensive definition of conspiracy reads: group behavior involving three analytically distinct but interrelated characteristics: secrecy; vulnerability to defeat by exposure; and one or a combination of illegality, deception, betrayal of legitimate purpose of an authorized activity, and contradiction of generally accepted moral codes of behavior. 7. For psychologists the fundamental attribution error is a cognitive failure in which humans tend to attribute the cause to dispositional fac-

78 | Mathijs Pelkmans and Rhys Machold

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

tors, thereby underestimating situational factors. See also Clarke (2002: 144). There is a hidden irony in this example. One might say that these American respondents were caught between two theories with conspiratorial elements: the question was whether they should believe the theory that their own government had deliberately misled them by withholding the true motives for invasion, or the official (US government) account that a foreign power had been secretly preparing for an attack on their country. For example many right-wing pundits argued that a lack of evidence of WMDs was actually evidence that Saddam Hussein had exported them to another country or otherwise found ways to conceal or destroy them. See also Ledeneva (2006) who offers an excellent analysis of the pervasiveness of brokering, political wheeling and dealing, and interpersonal protectionism in Russias economy. Silverstein (2002) additionally argues that conspiracy theorizing ultimately fetishizes agency and is characterized by an excess of truth, aspects to we will return. Many academic analyses pay lip service to the reality of petty conspiracies, but nevertheless take global conspiracy theorizing as the prototype. Daniel Pipes (1997) adopts this approach to level the sweeping statement that conspiracy theorizing is a pathology, an effect of a paranoid mind-set, therein echoing Hofstadters (1964) claim that conspiracy theorizing is the paranoid style in politics. This is not to deny that many industries with roots in the Soviet Union were poorly prepared for functioning in a market economy, but to stress that the market was often used to hide all kinds of other factors that contributed to the economic crisis. Inhabitants were acutely aware of this. Rigi (2009) makes a similar observation in his discussion of conspiracy theorizing about the war in Chechnya. In the mid-1990s theories of conspiracy alleged that secret deals among the elite, such as between rebel leaders and Russian generals, were the root cause of the war, and people were often able to substantiate these claims with (fragmentary) evidence (Rigi 2009: 5455). A decade later the allegations had greatly expanded in scope with entire groups, the Chechen nation, the Muslim community,

15.

16.

17.

18. 19.

20.

21.

22.

23.

or the Russian people being accused of conspiring, often with the Jew as the master plotter and leader (ibid.: 56). Such instances resonate with Silversteins (2002) argument about the fetishization of agency, but he unduly generalizes this feature to conspiracy theorizing in general. Silverstein distances himself from functionalism twice in his text (2002: 665, 667n7) but because he does not substantiate his own presumably different position, the rhetorical move backfires. On the weaknesses of the Al Qaeda hypothesis, see Hodges (2007: 1718) and Krebs and Lobasz (2007: 41213). See, among others, Falk (2004: viiix) and Griffin (2007). Hodges (2007: 8) cites a 2004 study by the Program on International Policy Attitudes at the University of Maryland showing that at the time 57 percent of Americans continued to believe that Iraq was giving support to Al Qaeda and 20 percent of Americans also continued to believe that Iraq played a direct role in the 9/11 attacks. This is not to say they have been completely silent, but that The 9/11 Commission Report as well as NIST are able to rely, at least rhetorically, on dismissing criticisms of the official account as radical conspiracism. The first of these took place in 1986 when a plane carrying military supplies to the contras was downed by Nicaraguan forces and a surviving crew member revealed his identity as a CIA operative and the second occurred when illegal sales of weapons from the United States to Iran were reported in a Lebanese newspaper later that year. These rumors gained new momentum in 2009 as part of the so-called birther hypothesis, which posits that Obama was not in fact born in America and that a conspiracy to cover up his true roots was necessary in order to (falsely) legitimate his claims to the presidency. From the Iran-Contra case we might additionally infer that the conspiracy theory label will not generally be applied to actors that wield a high degree of political power.

References
Arendt, Hannah. 1973. The origins of totalitarianism. New York: Harvest Books.

Conspiracy theories and their truth trajectories | 79

Basham, Lee. 2003. Malevolent global conspiracy. Journal of Social Philosophy 34 (1): 91103. Bayat, Asef. 2006. Conspiracies and theories. ISIM Review 18: 5. Burawoy, Michael, and Pavel Krotov 1992. The Soviet transition from socialism to capitalism: Worker control and economic bargaining in the wood industry. American Sociological Review 57 (1): 1638. Clarke, Steve. 2002. Conspiracy theories and conspiracy theorizing. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 32 (2): 13150. Coady, David. 2006a. An introduction to the philosophical debate about conspiracy theories. In Conspiracy theories: The philosophical debate, ed. David Coady, 112. Burlington, VT: Ashgate. . 2006b. Conspiracy theories and official stories. In Conspiracy theories: The philosophical debate, ed. David Coady, 11528 . Burlington, VT: Ashgate. Comaroff, Jean, and John Comaroff. 2003 Transparent fictions, or the conspiracies of a liberal imaginationAn afterword. In Transparency and Conspiracy, ed. Harry West and Todd. Sanders, 28799. Durham: Duke University Press. Evans-Pritchard, E. E. 1937. Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic among the Azande. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Falk, Richard. 2004. Foreword. In D. Griffin, The New Pearl Harbor, viix. Northampton: Olive Branch Press. . 2005. Demystifying Iraq? New Centennial Review 5 (1): 4362. Grant, Bruce. 1999. The return of the repressed: Conversations with three Russian entrepreneurs. In Paranoia within reason: A casebook on conspiracy as explanation, ed. George Marcus, 24168. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Griffin, David. 2004. The New Pearl Harbor. Northampton: Olive Branch Press. . 2007. Debunking 9/11 debunking. Northampton: Olive Branch Press. Hellinger, Daniel. 2003. Paranoia, conspiracy, and hegemony in American politics. In Transparency and conspiracy, ed. Harry West and Todd Sanders, 20432. Durham: Duke University Press. Hodges, Adam. 2007. The political economy of truth in the war on terror discourse: Competing visions of an Iraq/al Qaeda connection. Social Semiotics 17: 1520. Hofstadter, Richard. 1964. The paranoid style in

American politics. Harpers Magazine (November): 7786. Keeley, Brian. 1999. Of conspiracy theories. Journal of Philosophy 96 (3): 10926. Krebs, R. R., and J. K. Lobasz. 2007. Fixing the meaning of 9/11: Hegemony, coercion, and the road to war in Iraq. Security Studies 16 (3): 40951. Ledeneva, Alena. 2006. How Russia really works: The informal practices that shaped post-Soviet politics and business. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Marcus, George. 1999. Introduction: The paranoid style now. In Paranoia within Reason: A casebook on conspiracy as explanation, ed. George Marcus, 112. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Marx, Karl. [1844] 2002. Critique of Hegels philosophy of right. In Marx on Religion, ed. John Raines, 17081. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. McClellan, Scott. 2008. What happened: Inside the Bush Whitehouse and Washingtons culture of deception. New York: Public Affairs. Meyssan, Thierry. 2002. 9/11: The big lie. London: Carnot. Oushakine, Serguei. 2009. Stop the Invasion! Money, patriotism, and conspiracy in Russia. Social Research 76 (1): 71116. Pelkmans, Mathijs. 2006. Defending the border: Identity, religion, and modernity in the Republic of Georgia. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Plame Wilson, Valery. 2007. Fair Game: My life as a spy, my betrayal by the White House. New York: Simon & Schuster. Pipes, Daniel. 1997. How the paranoid style flourishes and where it comes from. New York: Simon & Schuster. Rigi, Jakob. 2004. Chaos, conspiracy, and spectacle: the Russian war against Chechnya. In State, Sovereignty, War: Civil Violence in Emerging Global Realities, ed. Bruce Kapferer, 13746. Oxford: Berghahn Books. . 2009. Post-Soviet formation of the Russian state and the war in Chechnya: Exploring the chaotic form of sovereignty. In Crisis of the State: War and social upheaval, ed. Bruce Kapferer and Bjorn Enge Bertelsen, 5382. New York: Berghahn Books. Sanders, Todd, and Harry West. 2003. Power revealed and concealed in the New World Order. In Transparency and Conspiracy, ed. Harry West and Todd Sanders, 137. Durham: Duke University Press.

80 | Mathijs Pelkmans and Rhys Machold

Schumann, William. 2007. Transparency, governmentality and negation: Democratic practice and open government policy in the national assembly for Wales. Anthropological Quarterly 80 (3): 83762. Silverstein, Paul. 2001. Regimes of (un)truth: Conspiracy theory and the transnationalization of the Algerian Civil War. Middle East Report 214: 610.

. 2002. An excess of truth: Violence, conspiracy theorizing and the Algerian civil war. Anthropological Quarterly 75 (4): 64374. Walsh, Lawrence E. 1994. Iran-Contra: The final report. New York: Times Books. Wilson, Joseph C. 2003. What I didnt find in Africa. New York Times, July 6. Wroe, Ann. 1991. Lives, lies and the Iran-Contra affair. London: I.B. Tauris.