Professional Documents
Culture Documents
during the first ten years, after which it will slowly erode. This compares to
a principal and interest payment of about $7.7 million annually.
4) Major Additional Costs to the Tax-Payer: There will be a major loss of
hotel real estate taxes downtown. This study does not address the severe
decline in the value of other downtown hotels, and the resultant reduction in
their real estate taxes, all as a result of opening a new Hilton Hotel that is
not needed nor can be absorbed in the market. Some hotels may close and become
derelict.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY:
Building a Hilton Hotel of 600 units in downtown Fort Worth would result in an
unleveraged, pre-tax loss on total invested capital of 2.88%. This assumes a
total hotel investment of $131,500,000, regardless of funding source. This
study reveals the real economic result of building the hotel, eliminating any
hidden subsidies such as free land, tax abatements, low-cost debt, etc.
Further, a private project without subsidization would result in a 35.52% loss
of investor equity, making this project totally unfeasible to private
developers.
Investment and Return without Subsidization
Est. Land Investment $ 1,500,000
Improvements
$130,000,000 at $216,667 per unit
Total Investment
$131,500,000
Pre Tax Project Return*
Return on Equity**
-2.88%
-35.52%
* after reserves for renovations ** after reserves for renovations, and assuming
75% debt and 25% equity at a 8% pre-tax debt cost; calculated weighted average.
or
or
67.76%
32.24%
14.00%
32.00%
* after reserves for renovations ** after reserves for renovations, and assuming
75% debt and 25% equity at an 8% pre-tax debt cost; calculated weighted
average.
The actual level of quality and acceptance for Hilton Hotel products has been
quantified versus the market average and has been assumed for the Hilton Fort
Worth in developing this financial feasibility study. As an American Automobile
Association four-diamond headquarters hotel, project quality and revenue
performance is set to exceed the typical Hilton-branded property by about 5%.
Operating costs are set at the level of similar Full-Service hotels in the
Southwest.
Cash flow market projection, before-tax and after renovation reserves, would be
available for debt service, income tax and dividends as follows:
Year
Year
Year
Year
Year
Year
Year
Year
Year
Year
%
Occupancy
I
57.5%
II
64.5%
III
66.6%
IV
67.5%
V
68.3%
VI
68.1%
VII
67.8%
VIII
67.6%
IX
66.6%
X
65.3%
Average
Rate
$106.76*
$110.19
$113.73
$117.37
$121.13
$125.00
$129.00
$133.13
$137.12
$141.24
$
REVPAR
$61.36
$71.09
$75.72
$79.17
$82.77
$85.09
$87.48
$89.93
$91.25
$92.20
Total
Revenue
Cash Flow**
21,809,991 $4,712,180
25,268,771 $5,560,745
26,915,342 $6,026,630
28,139,989 $6,270,884
29,420,360 $5,994,718
30,245,309 $5,930,571
31,093,393 $5,578,244
31,965,256 $5,297,359
32,435,394 $6,009,964
32,770,800 $53,597,950***
If actual investment varies from budget, returns would vary accordingly. The
following table and graph illustrate the linear change in financial returns as
capital requirements escalate or decline. Note the negative return on equity.
Effect on Returns of Capital Investment Changes
Variance
(85%)
(90%)
(95%)
Improvements
Per Unit
Total
$184.2
$110.5
$195.0
$117.0
$205.8
$123.5
Land
Total
Cost Investment
$1.5
$112.0
$1.5
$118.5
$1.5
$125.0
DCF Returns
Tot Proj.
Equity
-1.10% -28.40%
-1.70% -30.80%
-2.30% -33.20%
BUDGET
$216.7
$130.0
$1.5
$131.5
-2.88%
-35.52%
(105%)
(110%)
(115%)
(120%)
$227.5
$238.3
$249.2
$260.0
$136.5
$143.0
$149.5
$156.0
$1.5
$1.5
$1.5
$1.5
$138.0
$144.5
$151.0
$157.5
-3.50%
-4.10%
-4.65%
-5.15%
-38.00%
-40.40%
-42.60%
-44.60%.G.
Graphing the projected REVPAR performance of the Hilton Hotel versus the
Downtown Fort Worth lodging market demonstrates a realistic revenue stream:
hotel peaks in Years III through V, then slowly levels off. Versus the
depressed market average, the new hotel dramatically outperforms the area's
REVPAR average:
the
A detailed look at Year III, the first 'going' year shows the following:
Year III - 2007
Total Revenues
Room Revenues
Income Before Fixed Expense
Profit B.T. Before Financing
Cash Flow Before Financing*
Occupancy %
Avg. Rate
$ REVPAR
$26,915,342
$16,583,698
$ 7,533,890 (28.0%)
$ 3,177,773 (11.8%)
$ 6,026,630 (22.4%)
66.6%
$ 113.73
$ 75.72
Occupancy %
51.7
51.4
46.5
52.4
$ REVPAR
44.38
43.41
38.89
47.13
0.6%
-2.1%
Historical CGR%
Past 9 Years Average
Past 4 Years Average
-0.5%
-3.0%
3.6%
0.3%
2. Versus the market average REVPAR projections above, the REVPAR index of the
Hilton Hotel in Downtown Fort Worth generates 192% of the moderate local market
average REVPAR in Years III through V. Thereafter, the REVPAR index declines
due to normal aging. The detailed Hilton Hotel REVPAR projection derivation
commences on page 41.
Hilton Hotel
All Data in '01/02 $s
Year I
Year II Year III
Base: Name, Type & Quality
1.49
1.49
1.49
x Brand Age Adjustment
1.15
1.15
1.15
x Site Value Adjustment
1.15
1.15
1.15
x
x
x
=
Size Adjustment
Other Adjustments
Newness Adjustment
Theoretical REVPAR Index
.83
1.05
.92
158%
$43.29
$68.40
.83
1.05
1.07
184%
$43.29
$79.55
.83
1.05
1.12
192%
$43.29
$83.26
3. Expenses are from the Smith Travel Research Host Reports, year 2001 edition,
typically inflated at 3% annually. Details page 59.
METHODOLOGY
To develop Pro Forma financial results for the proposed project, two major sets
of assumptions are developed. First, the future market's average REVPAR is
forecast on a reasonable and economically-sound basis; the specific performance
of the project is dependent on this overall market forecast and varies from it
only due to specific variables of the project. As survivors of hotel overbuilding of the early 1980's can testify, hotel occupancy and rate are
interdependent on a local market basis and no hotel is immune from the averages.
Second, the specific REVPAR variables of the project are expressed as an index
for each quarter of the forecast, an index that is used to adjust the overall
market dollar REVPAR performance to the specific project.
Market REVPAR Forecast
The Fort Worth / Arlington metropolitan is first projected. We have used this
larger market because the smaller downtown Fort Worth market is ultimately
subject to larger market trends. Market projections are based on growth rates
in real demand (roomnights sold), prices (average daily rates), and supply
(rooms available).
The key in this projection is to stabilize the total market in the future at a
sustainable, average equilibrium for occupancy, a level which we have determined
to be approximately 60% in most large, metro market areas, and lower for smaller
metro areas.
Over the past 20 years, according to the Source Strategies, Inc. database, from
1981 through 2001, overall hotel occupancy in Texas has averaged 58%, and 60% in
Texas metros. This occupancy level is highly relevant as a long-term,
equilibrium occupancy, a level where investors are neutral about adding new
hotel rooms to the market and an average that will reoccur over long periods of
time (e.g. 20 years).
After the total Fort Worth / Arlington metro area is forecast, we forecast the
performance of the local market on a similar basis (see Exhibit III for a
specific listing of existing hotels and motels in this market). Based upon
notably sluggish historical performance in this local market, we expect a 53%
occupancy at the end of the ensuing ten years, well below the typical Texas
metro equilibrium level.
We then compare the relationship of the local area's REVPAR to the entire metro
market REVPAR (as an index), both historically and in the future, to confirm the
reasonableness of the smaller market's projection. Any unusual differences that
may exist relative to each market area are taken into account (e.g. a faster or
slower economic growth outlook). The REVPAR projection of the local market is
then the pro forma market environment of the proposed subject development; the
project will vary from the norm for only project-specific differences, and then
only relatively.
Project Specific Variables
Development of the Project REVPAR Indices
The first variable from the averages to be developed has to do with the fact
that each product type and brand have a typical and identifiable influence on
REVPAR performance. This variable is based on its consumer acceptance, its
product definition, its level of quality, the price it can command from the
The second adjustment used on the dollar value of the local area's REVPAR is the
Brand Age Adjustment. This is made to reflect the average age of similarly
branded hotels on the subject property's performance versus the market average.
In this case the opening dates of Hilton branded properties in similar markets
throughout Texas were examined in order to quantify this factor.
The next step to developing a project REVPAR index is to determine any further
adjustment based on deviation from a normal project Size. If the number of
proposed rooms in the project is significantly above or below the average for
that brand and product-type, its performance will also vary from the norm. A
lower than average number of rooms should increase per room performance and vice
versa. This is due to the fact that consumer demand for a single brand is
demand at the project's site, regardless of the number of rooms offered by the
hotel (a minor exception here would be a convention hotel).
An empirical proof of this evaluation of Size is the major increase in volume
enjoyed by the numerous hotels throughout Texas that have split into two branded
operations, using two different brand names. For example, the Hilton Hotel
Towers Austin added $1,000,000 annually to revenues by splitting off its
adjacent, ground-based rooms as a Super 8 Motel. By creating another brand at
the same site, the Super 8 began to fill demand for budget properties in the
immediate area, while the Hilton Towers kept its current customer base of
upscale consumers. Hence, smaller room counts than average generate higher
occupancy than average. Further proof is the correlation between project size
and occupancy: the smaller the property, the higher the occupancy.
A further, 'Other,' segment adjustment may be made if the proposed product type
is under- or over- supplied in the local market. In other words, a product type
commanding 10% of the Texas market - but zero locally - would command a higher
daily rate or occupancy locally because it is a relatively scarce commodity.
Other adjustments may also include significant quality variances from the
subject hotel brand's average.
Then the REVPAR potential of the subject Site, regardless of brand, is developed
in two ways. First, all other property factors except site are calculated for
nearby competitors, the site factor then being used to bring the calculated
REVPAR into a match with actual REVPAR performance. In other words, combining
all factors including a 'plugged' site factor results in the theoretical REVPAR
projection equalling actual REVPAR for each property studied, revealing the
mathematical value of individual hotel sites.
While there is usually a reasonably consistent pattern of site factors for the
nearby local chain properties selected, these factors often vary because of
unique situations, including: 1) visibility and access differences between
nearby sites; 2) any large variation from the norm in the usual number of rooms
for a local chain property at a site; 3) a nearby property's quality, the
quality of management, last renovation, etc.; and 4) any major new commercial
development nearby (e.g. shopping center, office complex, hospital).
Adjustments can be made for these differences within forecast site factor, based
on industry experience. This is the Segment, or Other adjustment.
With the development of the adjustments for Brand/product type, overall Brand
Age, Segment, project Size, and Site, a revenue projection for the proposed
operation begins to take form by combining these factors into a combined index
%
Occ.
60.4
63.5
52.6
54.9
65.3
66.3
50.6
55.2
63.0
66.4
52.5
58.6
64.9
65.2
54.6
60.4
62.7
65.1
56.1
56.0
65.0
63.1
54.2
58.3
64.4
64.5
52.3
57.0
56.3
63.0
52.2
55.1
61.3
61.5
51.1
55.3
58.5
55.5
46.8
49.7
-1.0%
-3.3%
-3.6%
-8.2%
$
Rate
52.92
52.37
50.95
52.38
52.71
52.85
55.16
55.21
56.88
56.05
57.64
58.28
60.40
59.03
60.93
63.16
62.97
61.88
64.11
66.73
66.66
65.67
67.61
69.71
69.44
66.53
70.68
69.56
72.05
65.28
66.18
69.48
71.75
67.96
68.83
71.57
70.47
67.69
65.93
69.00
3.0%
0.3%
0.0%
-2.5%
$
RPAR
31.95
33.24
26.80
28.77
34.45
35.06
27.89
30.50
35.84
37.24
30.27
34.15
39.17
38.50
33.30
38.14
39.50
40.25
35.96
37.36
43.32
41.40
36.67
40.67
44.72
42.93
36.94
39.66
40.60
41.10
34.55
38.26
43.97
41.81
35.15
39.58
41.19
37.59
30.84
34.27
2.0%
-2.9%
-3.5%
-10.4%
% Growth Vs Yr Ago
Sply
Real
ADR $ Rev
-1.8
0.8
-0.1
2.0
3.5
1.0
4.1
0.4
3.0
6.5
6.0
7.5
5.8
4.8
6.6
7.5
9.3
9.9
10.9
9.2
8.2
9.8
7.4
12.2
12.4
12.7
14.0
11.3
9.7
8.4
6.7
4.8
2.1
0.0
0.8
0.3
6.3
5.3
-4.0
2.6
-0.2
1.1
8.1
6.5
6.0
4.5
10.4
10.8
2.4
4.5
9.4
-0.4
13.2
6.5
7.2
13.8
7.2
12.4
3.5
9.6
-1.6
9.9
13.9
7.5
19.3
6.0
4.4
5.2
-2.6
-9.7
-7.7
-9.9
-0.4
5.9
0.9
6.3
8.3
4.0
5.4
8.1
7.9
7.7
6.1
7.3
4.5 13.0
5.6 12.5
6.2 12.6
5.3 10.1
5.7 16.6
8.4 20.0
4.3
6.7
4.8
9.5
5.2 15.1
5.7
5.3
5.9 19.9
6.1 13.1
5.5 13.1
4.5 18.9
4.2 11.7
1.3 13.8
4.5
8.2
-0.2
9.4
3.8
2.0
-1.9
7.8
-6.4
6.6
-0.1
7.4
-0.4 18.8
4.1 10.3
4.0
8.5
3.0
8.4
-1.8 -4.4
-0.4 -10.0
-4.2 -11.6
-3.6 -13.1
1. Roomnights sold (derived from est. rate and actual revenues) 2. Occupancy
nights sold divided by nights available for sale. 3. Avg. price for roomnights
sold; Directories, Surveys, & experience. 4. $ Revenue per available room per
day (room sales per day)
2. Overall market occupancy will likely continue to erode for a few years until
economic conditions begin to turn and existing supply is absorbed into the
market. We project that occupancy will recover to current levels by 2007/2008,
and eventually rise to a 58% equilibrium level by the end of our projection.
For the next nine years, real demand (room nights sold) is projected at an
average 3% growth rate, higher than the projected net supply growth of 2.3%.
With 2.2% average daily rate inflation, market gross revenues should gain 5.2%
annually during the nine year forecast.
Equilibrium occupancy has been calculated to 58% for the metro at the end of the
nine year projection. These assumptions relative to demand, supply, and
occupancy reflect the fact that over the past 20 years overall occupancy in
Texas has averaged about 58%, a level considered to be 'Equilibrium Occupancy.'
This considers that larger and more successful metro area markets generate
higher overall occupancy and REVPAR numbers than state averages, while rural
areas lag these averages (Source Strategies, Inc. database). 'Equilibrium
Occupancy' is further explained by the fact that new investment money tends to
be attracted to an under-supplied market until market occupancy falls and lower
returns on capital are the result. The equilibrium occupancy point is where
net, new supply is being added at about the same rate as growth in demand, and
where return on investment is in balance with the cost of capital.
Fueled by slow but steady demand growth, the Fort Worth / Arlington metro market
has room for some appropriately-positioned new development, added at rates lower
than new demand. Higher quality new lodging products at or above mid-priced
levels are performing adequately in the market despite overall performance
numbers being depressed by the large number of older, obsolete, budget and
independent hotels. These older, existing competitors (primarily poorly
maintained independent properties) are highly vulnerable to the superior
attractiveness of newly-built lodging. This pattern can be seen in the relative
success of chain operations at or above the mid-priced levels.
Given this growth scenario, room supply consequently grows from 25,014 rooms
currently to 31,066 by the fourth quarter of 2011, 24% higher and representing
6,052 net new rooms (gross new openings, less closings). The realistic scenario
is for the building boom of the last four years to slow to a nominal level,
reacting to sluggish market conditions (a decline that is already evident in the
latest year's numbers). The Fort Worth / Arlington metro area hotel market has
performed at a lower level than Texas averages in recent years, and was
particularly hard hit by the economic downturn of the past year.
Note that REVPAR growth for every individual hotel unit is well below the total
revenue growth of the market, with average REVPAR in our projection growing at
2.8% per annum over the next nine years (above the 2% average of the past nine
years). Revenues are forecast to grow at 5.2% per year on the strength of 3%
growth in demand and 2.2% growth in price (room-rates). Occupancy over the
period is expected to climb 0.7% per year after a short term decline.
If supply should grow 3,100 rooms over forecast (+10%), without demand also
growing faster than forecast, average individual hotel REVPAR would decline by
9% versus forecast, dropping from the forecasted $48 to $44 in 2011.
%
Occ.
56.2
53.9
46.3
49.2
55.9
53.6
46.5
49.4
54.6
52.4
45.5
47.2
55.1
52.9
45.9
48.3
56.5
54.2
46.8
49.3
57.6
55.3
47.7
50.3
58.7
56.3
48.7
51.2
59.9
57.5
49.6
52.3
61.1
58.6
50.6
53.3
62.3
59.7
51.6
54.3
63.5
60.9
52.6
55.4
0.7%
-0.4%
$
Rate
69.06
66.34
65.27
68.31
69.06
66.34
65.92
68.99
70.44
67.66
67.90
71.06
72.56
69.69
69.94
73.19
74.73
71.78
72.04
75.39
76.97
73.94
74.20
77.65
79.28
76.16
76.42
79.98
81.66
78.44
78.72
82.38
84.11
80.79
81.08
84.85
86.63
83.22
83.51
87.40
89.23
85.71
86.02
90.02
2.2%
1.5%
-1.0%
-3.3%
3.0%
0.3%
% Growth Vs
$
RPAR Sply Real
38.79
2.0 -2.0
35.75
1.0 -2.0
30.23
1.0
0.0
33.59
1.0
0.0
38.60
1.5
1.0
35.57
1.5
1.0
30.68
1.5
2.0
34.10
1.5
2.0
38.45
7.5
5.0
35.44
7.5
5.0
30.87
7.5
5.0
33.52 10.0
5.0
39.99
3.0
4.0
36.86
3.0
4.0
32.10
3.0
4.0
35.38
1.5
4.0
42.20
1.5
4.0
38.90
1.5
4.0
33.72
1.5
3.5
37.16
1.5
3.5
44.33
1.5
3.5
40.85
1.5
3.5
35.41
1.5
3.5
39.03
1.5
3.5
46.56
1.5
3.5
42.91
1.5
3.5
37.20
1.5
3.5
40.99
1.5
3.5
48.90
1.5
3.5
45.07
1.5
3.5
39.07
1.5
3.5
43.05
1.5
3.5
51.36
1.5
3.5
47.33
1.5
3.5
41.03
1.5
3.5
45.22
1.5
3.5
53.94
1.5
3.5
49.71
1.5
3.5
43.09
1.5
3.5
47.49
1.5
3.5
56.65
1.5
3.5
52.21
1.5
3.5
45.26
1.5
3.5
49.88
1.5
3.5
2.8%
1.1%
2.0%
-2.9%
Yr Ago
ADR
-2.0
-2.0
-1.0
-1.0
0.0
0.0
1.0
1.0
2.0
2.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
$Rev
-4.0
-4.0
-1.0
-1.0
1.0
1.0
3.0
3.0
7.1
7.1
8.2
8.2
7.1
7.1
7.1
7.1
7.1
7.1
6.6
6.6
6.6
6.6
6.6
6.6
6.6
6.6
6.6
6.6
6.6
6.6
6.6
6.6
6.6
6.6
6.6
6.6
6.6
6.6
6.6
6.6
6.6
6.6
6.6
6.6
3.
Impact on Downtown Fort Worth Demand of Headquarters Hotel Development
Proponents of a headquarters hotel project tend to adhere to the belief that a
new headquarters hotel in Fort Worth will attract additional conventions to the
Downtown, allowing the city to host larger and more prestigious events.
However, as an objective third party consultancy, our research finds no support
for the premise that a new headquarters hotel as proposed in downtown Fort Worth
would be able to generate a statistically significant portion of the demand
needed to fill its rooms.
Before any notable demand increase will be evident in Downtown from convention
traffic, the city must theoretically be able to compete effectively with other
potential convention locations. This involves promoting attractions to
convention planners that other destinations do not have. However, a
headquarters hotel is really no distinction at all in Texas, as other
municipalities in Texas are also encouraging or currently witnessing the
construction of such a hotel.
Headquarters hotels are being considered, constructed, or are opening in some of
the major Texas metro areas. San Antonio and Dallas are the only major metro in
Texas not to have built a headquarters hotel recently. This is for one simple
reason: hotels have historically been built as for-profit enterprises. That
is, they are built with private equity in response to actual levels of demand
that are generated by attractions that the city has to offer to visitors.
Houston and Austin have pursued and are building headquarters hotels in
historically strong downtown markets. It is ironic to note that Austin has seen
double digit declines in both demand for hotel rooms and in revenues over the
latest year, even though the market has added significant numbers of new hotels.
Houston has just begun a similar decline, with demand decreases over the last
six months, but with at least 2,000 Midscale to Luxury rooms scheduled to open
by 2004. It does not seem to be a smart decision to increase your stock when
the shelves are full and no-one is buying, unless you can make a profit over the
long term. A private shopkeeper would never make this choice, because they have
no large group of tax-payers to bail them out when the bills cannot be paid.
Closer to Fort Worth, Grapevine is soon going to have the Gaylord / Opryland
Hotel and its own convention space (178,000 square feet). Competition for
conventions will no doubt be fiercer than ever in the coming decade and in our
opinion, and having an attached hotel will not be the major deciding factor in
choosing a convention destination, because any municipality able to pass a bond
or taxation initiative can build a massive convention center and headquarters
hotel. Rather, it is the existent attractions (Alamo, Six Flags, Seaworld,
Riverwalk, etc.) that are the main factors in determining a convention
destination. While it is commonly thought that a headquarters hotel will be an
attraction to private convention planners, every major convention destination
typically has enough hotels (including one or more to serve large groups) to
meet demand. Even New Orleans, the premier convention destination in the U.S.,
does not have a headquarters hotel, for the reasons already mentioned above.
There are currently more than 20 hotels in Texas that have more than 500 units
with an upscale to luxury product.
Many of the competing destinations simply have more to offer prospective
conventioneers than downtown Fort Worth. It is not realistic to assume Fort
Worth will begin pulling conventions away from historically popular regional
destinations such as San Antonio, New Orleans, Houston, Austin, or even nearby
Dallas on the merits of its local attractions. It will be enough of a challenge
to compete with the new 1,500 room Gaylord / Opryland complex soon to open in
nearby Grapevine. What can Fort Worth offer visitors to the area that the
Opryland Hotel cannot? It is a relatively short commute for guests staying at
the Opryland Hotel to visit the Fort Worth Stockyards, and enjoy other venues
and experiences that the area has to offer.
According to Debbie Prost, Prost Marketing San Antonio and a respected Texas
research expert on the convention industry, adding a 600 unit, branded
headquarters hotel property cannot be counted on to increase demand in the Fort
Worth market. In her experience, hotels of less than 800 rooms do not typically
generate additional demand in a market. A new 600 room hotel would more likely
capture existing downtown demand at the expense of older hotels in the market.
Stan Hodge, head of research for Texas Department of Economic Development
(Market Texas), is not aware of any historical data or case studies which
support the premise that building a new hotel of this type will notably increase
market demand.
Furthermore, an examination of the last high quality hotel added to the downtown
Fort Worth market illustrates a new hotel's inability to generate demand. The
Courtyard Blackstone by Marriott, a 203 unit property, was added to the market
in 1999. In the Courtyard's first year of operation, demand (room nights sold)
in the Downtown market was up 4.6%, or 19,700 roomnights. On the surface, this
statistic appears to be positive. However, when you consider that Tarrant
County as a whole gained 7.8% in demand for the same period, it is apparent that
the downtown market actually lost ground versus the wider metro market demand
growth.
The actual additional 19,700 roomnights sold in the local market in the year
after the Courtyard's opening would only constitute an occupancy of 26.6%, if we
assume that this property were actually responsible for market demand growth and
absorbed all of this growth. Since the Courtyard actually generated an
occupancy of about 65% in 1999, approximately 28,500 room nights were siphoned
away from other properties in the downtown Fort Worth market that year. Though
the Courtyard Blackstone can be considered a successful project, it did not
become successful without imposing a noteworthy and adverse impact on local
competitors. While a 200 unit Courtyard is not the same as a headquarters
hotel, a 600 unit property is also not large enough to be considered a serious
concern in the convention market.
We further contend that there is no truth to the axiom, "If you build it, they
will come." It makes a good movie, but in the hotel business, hard empirical
data does not support the theory that a new hotel of this nature will generate a
significant portion of its own demand. This position is also supported by
extensive Holiday Inn research which shows that new hotels do not generally
increase demand; hotels typically allow people to stay near where they wish to
be (a destination resort is an exception here).
In order for a new 600 room hotel in downtown Fort Worth to generate a 65%
occupancy without pulling business from existing hotels, an additional 142,350
room nights of demand must be generated in the local market. Even using
estimates provided by the Fort Worth Convention and Visitors Bureau, with
convention center event room nights sold projected to more than double over the
next five years, there is still a serious shortfall in demand growth in the
market when compared to the projected increases in supply due to the
introduction of this property.
No convention hotel is entirely self-supporting; essentially creating demand
after opening through additional guests that come to the market solely because
that hotel is open and serving a convention center. It is much more likely that
the hotel will draw the top-end existing business away from other local
properties.
Part of the ability to attract conventions away from other popular destinations
will entail being very cost competitive. This means the property will not be
able to charge the premium rate levels needed to make a project of this nature
viable. Pressure will be put on all local hotels to lower rates to remain
competitive if a new property of this type is opened, further depressing the
market. Without an increase in local attractions, we see price competition to
be the major selling point for the convention center and the reliant hotel.
In the following local market projection, market average daily rates will remain
flat for a few years after the opening of the new Hilton property. This assumes
that the 600 room headquarters Hilton (15% of total market rooms) will open with
about 22% higher rates than the market average rate of $88. This is offset by
the remaining 85% of the rooms in the market significantly cutting prices in
order to continue and attract guests. Overall, we anticipate average room rates
will drop 5% for existing hotels in the market upon the opening of this hotel
project. The most prevalent concern expressed by hoteliers in the market is the
inevitable detrimental price competition that will take place if a new hotel
such as the proposed Hilton opens. This type of market reaction was already
witnessed to a lesser degree upon the opening of the Courtyard Blackstone in
1999, which introduced a product superior to most of the existing supply and
took business from those properties.
It is our opinion that without a significant increase in the number of actual
attractions and appeal of the downtown Fort Worth area to tourists and
conventioneers, there will be little or no increase in demand due to this
project.
%
RMS
15.3
3.6
EST.
RNS
000S
121
33
%
RNS
19.7
5.4
$
EST.
AMT.
% EST.
$
000s
AMT %OCC
RATE
16,145 30.9 66.0 132.97
3,616 6.9 75.5 109.33
$
RPAR
87.76
82.56
CLARION
COURTYARD
RADISSON HTL
TOTAL MID/UPS
BEST WESTERN
COMFORT INN
FAIRFIELD INN
TOTAL LTD SERV
1
2
1
4
1
1
1
3
.3
.3
.5
1.1
.2
.1
.1
.3
9.0
10.0
15.6
34.7
5.1
3.0
2.5
10.5
38
79
112
228
28
12
21
61
6.1
12.8
18.1
37.0
4.5
1.9
3.4
9.9
1,722 3.3
7,885 15.1
10,055 19.3
19,662 37.7
1,531 2.9
521 1.0
1,829 3.5
3,881 7.4
HOMESTEAD VILL
.1
3.0
28
4.6
MOTEL 6L 6
RAMADA INN
TOTAL BUDGET
TOTAL CHAINS
INDEPENDENTS
1
2
3
13
7
.1
.6
.7
2.9
.4
2.9
18.4
21.3
88.3
11.7
21
76
97
570
48
3.5
12.3
15.8
92.3
7.7
TOTAL MARKET
20
3.3 100.0
617 100.0
52,207 100 51.2 84.57
43.29
* All figures annualized. Includes taxed and est non-tax
room revenues.
34.7
65.3
59.2
54.6
46.0
32.0
71.9
48.1
45.66
99.86
90.05
86.11
54.57
45.07
86.02
63.75
15.83
65.23
53.29
47.00
25.12
14.41
61.87
30.64
2.2
79.4
40.44
32.12
858 1.6
4,258 8.2
5,116 9.8
49,569 94.9
2,638 5.1
60.8
34.3
37.9
53.5
34.0
40.27
55.89
52.48
87.02
55.25
24.48
19.19
19.91
46.52
18.77
1,149
5. The Downtown Fort Worth market has historically trailed most other major
metro downtown / CBD areas in performance. An average REVPAR of $43 is far
below other prominent convention destinations in the state, despite having a mix
of hotels that could support a higher REVPAR level.
Over the last nine years demand growth
growth in supply. Revenue growth over
per year, and REVPAR growth was steady
the metro market. Occupancy fell 0.5%
while metro occupancy dropped 1%.
Over the
compared
annually
over the
past four years, supply in the local market has risen by 2.4% annually,
to a 0.6% decline in demand. This has caused occupancy to fall 3%
in each of the past four years. Average daily rates rose 3.4% per year
period. REVPAR only rose by 0.3% due mainly to waning demand.
In the past two years the negative trend continued, with demand declines
escalating to 3.5% per year, while supply continued to grow 1.4% annually. This
negative supply / demand balance caused occupancy to fall sharply by 4.8% per
year for the period. A 2% annual increase in average daily rates, combined with
falling occupancy, resulted in REVPAR falling by a notable 2.9% per year.
In the last twelve months the local market was essentially a disaster. Demand
continued its precipitous slide (-6.8%), while supply continued to grow at the
historical average pace of 2.4%. Average daily rates were stagnant (+0.7%), and
occupancy dropped a remarkable 8.9%, or a full 5 'points,' to 51.2%. This
combination resulted in REVPAR falling 8.1% in the latest year.
LODGING
MARKET:
#
Room-1
Total
Htls
nites
Rooms
% Growth Vs Yr Ago
Year & and
#
sold Revenue
%
$
$
Quarter Mtls Rooms 000's $ 000's Occ.
Rate
RPAR Sply Real
ADR $ Rev
922
14 2,662
127
7,571
52.4 59.60 31.25
923
14 2,662
147
8,530
60.2 57.89 34.83
924
14 2,662
121
7,066
49.3 58.53 28.85
931
14 2,662
126
7,329
52.6 58.17 30.59
932
14 2,662
150
8,753
61.8 58.47 36.14
0.0 17.9 -1.9 15.6
933
13 2,618
150
8,849
62.1 59.14 36.74 -1.7
1.6
2.2
3.7
934
13 2,618
110
6,706
45.6 61.12 27.84 -1.7 -9.1
4.4 -5.1
941
14 2,962
120
7,106
44.9 59.31 26.66 11.3 -4.9
2.0 -3.0
942
14 2,937
148
8,900
55.3 60.25 33.30 10.3 -1.3
3.0
1.7
943
14 2,895
164
9,886
61.5 60.36 37.12 10.6
9.5
2.1 11.7
944
14 2,895
123
7,929
46.1 64.58 29.77 10.6 11.9
5.7 18.2
951
14 2,866
122
7,970
47.2 65.43 30.90 -3.2
1.7 10.3 12.2
952
14 2,862
149
9,623
57.3 64.43 36.95 -2.6
1.1
6.9
8.1
953
15 2,915
152
9,659
56.7 63.57 36.02
0.7 -7.3
5.3 -2.3
954
15 2,831
134
9,045
51.6 67.28 34.73 -2.2
9.4
4.2 14.1
961
15 2,868
143
9,842
55.5 68.71 38.13
0.1 17.6
5.0 23.5
962
16 2,958
153 10,537
56.8 68.89 39.14
3.4
2.5
6.9
9.5
963
15 2,953
162 10,793
59.7 66.49 39.73
1.3
6.8
4.6 11.7
964
15 2,910
150 10,633
55.9 71.05 39.72
2.8 11.4
5.6 17.6
971
15 2,913
136 10,234
51.9 75.22 39.04
1.6 -5.0
9.5
4.0
972
16 2,992
168 12,082
61.7 71.91 44.38
1.1
9.8
4.4 14.7
973
16 2,991
153 10,838
55.5 70.91 39.39
1.3 -5.9
6.6
0.4
974
16 3,032
153 11,413
54.7 74.74 40.92
4.2
2.0
5.2
7.3
981
17 3,004
160 12,511
59.2 78.22 46.27
3.1 17.5
4.0 22.2
982
17 2,998
179 13,982
65.5 78.29 51.25
0.2
6.3
8.9 15.7
983
17 3,037
187 13,909
66.9 74.43 49.78
1.5 22.3
5.0 28.3
984
17 2,997
153 12,316
55.3 80.77 44.67 -1.2 -0.1
8.1
7.9
991
18 3,041
169 13,719
61.6 81.41 50.13
1.2
5.4
4.1
9.7
992
18 3,185
174 14,858
59.9 85.53 51.26
6.2 -2.7
9.2
6.3
993
18 3,284
185 14,340
61.1 77.68 47.46
8.1 -1.2
4.4
3.1
994
18 3,178
150 11,886
51.3 79.17 40.65
6.0 -1.6 -2.0 -3.5
001
18 3,201
155 12,770
53.7 82.55 44.33
5.3 -8.2
1.4 -6.9
002
18 3,197
172 14,622
59.2 84.95 50.26
0.4 -0.9 -0.7 -1.6
003
18 3,296
188 15,453
61.9 82.33 50.96
0.4
1.7
6.0
7.8
004
18 3,196
137 11,649
46.7 84.84 39.62
0.6 -8.5
7.2 -2.0
011
19 3,222
166 13,869
57.1 83.72 47.83
0.7
7.1
1.4
8.6
012
20 3,257
165 13,982
55.7 84.70 47.18
1.9 -4.1 -0.3 -4.4
013
20 3,356
154 12,640
50.0 81.87 40.94
1.8 -17.7 -0.6 -18.2
014
21 3,298
146 12,607
48.1 86.39 41.55
3.2
6.3
1.8
8.2
021
21 3,305
152 12,977
51.1 85.38 43.63
2.6 -8.3
2.0 -6.4
CGR%Past9yrs 2.4% 1.9%
6.2% -0.5%
4.2%
3.6%
Past 4yrs
2.4% -0.6%
2.7% -3.0%
3.4%
0.3%
2yrs
1.4% -3.5%
-1.5% -4.8%
2.0% -2.9%
1yr
2.4% -6.8%
-6.1% -8.9%
0.7% -8.1%
Wider Market History
CGR%Past9yrs 6.0% 4.8%
8.0% -1.0%
3.0%
2.0%
4yrs
7.4% 3.9%
4.3% -3.3%
0.3% -2.9%
1. Roomnights sold (derived from est. rate and actual revenues). 2. Occupancy
nights sold divided by nights available for sale. 3. Avg. price for roomnights
sold; Directories, Surveys, & experience. 4. $ Revenue per available room per
day (room sales per day)
of 19%, from 3,305 in the latest year to 4,925 in the first quarter of 2012.
Net, the local market area forecast assumes that net new rooms (building less
closing) beyond the 620 rooms plus closures projected increase in the local area
market will not take place because of the constraints of financing and the
general caution regarding Texas real estate in general. If greater building did
occur, then all REVPAR projections would be reduced. For example, REVPAR could
decline by 9% in the first quarter of 2012, from $49 to $45, if an additional
400 (+10%) rooms were built over forecast. The local market projection follows:
PROJECTION:
#Htls
Year &
&
Quarter Mtls
022
21
023
20
024
21
031
21
032
21
033
20
034
22
041
22
042
21
043
20
044
22
051
26
052
25
053
24
054
26
061
26
062
25
063
25
#
Rooms
3,325
3,325
3,325
3,325
3,325
3,325
3,325
3,325
3,325
3,325
3,325
3,925
3,925
3,925
3,925
3,925
3,925
3,925
Room- Total
nights $Rooms
sold1 Revenue
000's
000's
167 14,124
156 12,767
147 12,730
154 13,370
169 14,551
158 13,153
150 13,115
157 13,978
173 15,213
161 13,751
153 13,712
163 13,744
179 14,958
167 13,521
158 13,482
166 13,669
182 14,876
170 13,447
064
26 3,925
161
071
26 3,925
169
072
26 3,925
186
073
25 3,925
174
074
27 3,925
164
081
26 3,925
173
082
26 3,925
190
083
25 3,925
177
084
27 3,925
168
091
27 3,925
176
092
26 3,925
193
093
25 3,925
181
094
27 3,925
171
101
27 3,925
180
102
26 3,925
197
103
26 3,925
184
104
27 3,925
174
111
27 3,925
183
112
27 3,925
201
113
26 3,925
188
114
28 3,925
178
121
28 3,925
187
CGR%Next9yrs 1.9% 2.0%
1st 5yrs
3.5% 2.0%
HISTORY
CGR%Past9yrs 2.4% 1.9%
Past 4yrs
2.4% -0.6%
%
OCC2
55.1
51.0
48.2
51.6
55.9
51.7
48.9
52.6
57.0
52.8
49.9
46.1
50.0
46.3
43.7
47.0
51.0
47.2
$
Rate3
84.70
81.87
86.39
86.66
85.97
83.10
87.69
88.83
88.12
85.18
89.88
84.39
83.71
80.92
85.38
82.28
81.62
78.89
% Growth Vs.
$
RPAR4 Spply Real
46.67
2.1
1.0
41.73 -0.9
1.0
41.62
0.8
1.0
44.68
0.6
1.5
48.08
0.0
1.5
43.00
0.0
1.5
42.88
0.0
1.5
46.71
0.0
2.0
50.27
0.0
2.0
44.95
0.0
2.0
44.83
0.0
2.0
38.90 18.1
3.5
41.87 18.0
3.5
37.44 18.1
3.5
37.33 18.1
3.5
38.69
0.0
2.0
41.64
0.0
2.0
37.24
0.0
2.0
Yr Ago
ADR
0.0
0.0
0.0
1.5
1.5
1.5
1.5
2.5
2.5
2.5
2.5
-5.0
-5.0
-5.0
-5.0
-2.5
-2.5
-2.5
Rev$
1.0
1.0
1.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
4.6
4.5
4.6
4.5
-1.7
-1.7
-1.7
-1.7
-0.6
-0.6
-0.6
13,408
13,942
15,173
13,716
13,676
14,576
15,864
14,340
14,298
15,240
16,585
14,992
14,949
15,933
17,340
15,674
15,629
16,658
18,129
16,388
16,340
17,416
2.5%
1.3%
44.6
48.0
52.0
48.1
45.5
48.9
53.1
49.1
46.4
49.9
54.1
50.1
47.3
50.9
55.2
51.1
48.3
51.9
56.3
52.1
49.2
53.0
0.1%
-1.4%
83.25
82.28
81.62
78.89
83.25
84.33
83.66
80.87
85.33
86.44
85.75
82.89
87.46
88.60
87.90
84.96
89.65
90.82
90.09
87.08
91.89
93.09
0.5%
-0.7%
37.13
39.46
42.48
37.98
37.87
41.26
44.41
39.71
39.60
43.14
46.43
41.51
41.40
45.10
48.54
43.40
43.28
47.15
50.75
45.38
45.25
49.30
0.6%
-2.1%
-2.5
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
2.5
2.5
2.5
2.5
2.5
2.5
2.5
2.5
2.5
2.5
2.5
2.5
2.5
2.5
2.5
2.5
2.5
-0.6
2.0
2.0
2.0
2.0
4.5
4.5
4.5
4.5
4.5
4.5
4.6
4.6
4.5
4.6
4.5
4.5
4.5
4.5
4.6
4.5
4.6
6.2%
2.7%
-0.5%
-3.0%
4.2%
3.4%
3.6%
0.3%
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
2.0
2.0
2.0
2.0
2.0
2.0
2.0
2.0
2.0
2.0
2.0
2.0
2.0
2.0
2.0
2.0
2.0
2.0
2.0
2.0
2.0
2.0
7. The downtown local market REVPAR index dipped slightly below that of the
metro in the mid-1990's. Since 1996, however, local market REVPAR has exceeded
metro REVPAR by a steadily widening margin, posting a 121 REVPAR index in the
latest year:
Year &
Quarter
922
923
924
931
932
933
934
941
942
943
944
951
952
953
954
961
962
963
964
971
972
973
974
981
982
983
984
991
992
993
994
001
002
003
004
011
012
013
014
021
CGR%9yr
4yrs
1yr
37.12
29.77
30.90
36.95
36.02
34.73
38.13
39.14
39.73
39.72
39.04
44.38
39.39
40.92
46.27
51.25
49.78
44.67
50.13
51.26
47.46
40.65
44.33
50.26
50.96
39.62
47.83
47.18
40.94
41.55
43.63
3.6%
0.3%
-8.1%
100
98
90
94
94
104
100
99
99
110
104
102
95
112
114
115
116
121
126
126
115
118
116
114
122
113
121
115
109
135
127
95
98
103
106
119
119
117
121
8. The forecast calls for the local market REVPAR to continue to rise versus
the Fort Worth / Arlington metro REVPAR average until the proposed Hilton is
projected to open. In 2005, the projected opening year, average REVPAR in the
local market will decline notably as competition for available guests
intensifies. In subsequent years, local market REVPAR falls to the historic
lows seen in the mid-1990's:
MARKET REVPAR PROJECTION
Year &
Quarter
022
023
024
031
032
033
034
041
042
043
044
051
052
053
054
061
062
063
064
071
072
073
074
081
082
083
084
091
092
093
094
101
102
103
104
111
CGR%9yr
5yrs
Total
Metro
38.79
35.75
30.23
33.59
38.60
35.57
30.68
34.10
38.45
35.44
30.87
33.52
39.99
36.86
32.10
35.38
42.20
38.90
33.72
37.16
44.33
40.85
35.41
39.03
46.56
42.91
37.20
40.99
48.90
45.07
39.07
43.05
51.36
47.33
41.03
45.22
2.8%
1.1%
Local/Total Market
Local Quarter
Year
Market
Index Index
46.67
120
41.73
117
41.62
138
44.68
133
127
48.08
125
43.00
121
42.88
140
46.71
137
131
50.27
131
44.95
127
44.83
145
38.90
116
130
41.87
105
37.44
102
37.33
116
38.69
109
108
41.64
99
37.24
96
37.13
110
39.46
106
103
42.48
96
37.98
93
37.87
107
41.26
106
100
44.41
95
39.71
93
39.60
106
43.14
105
100
46.43
95
41.51
92
41.40
106
45.10
105
99
48.54
95
43.40
92
43.28
105
47.15
104
99
0.6%
-2.1%
9. Graphing the REVPAR history and projection clearly illustrates the local
market recovery through 2004, and the subsequent decline after the proposed
Hilton opens. We anticipate that the local market will fall back into its
historical level versus the metro market averages:
10. Graphing the occupancy history and projection for both the metro and local
markets clearly illustrates the recent decline in occupancy in both areas. It
also expresses the depressed level of occupancy and very gradual recovery after
the subject hotel opens in 2005:
Ramada
Radisson
Average
Built
1976
1977
Brand Age
Adjustment
1.30
1.27
Hilton
1982
1.15
Clarion
1984
1.11
Renaissance
Courtyard
1985
1992
1.09
.97
3. The Property Size factor - reflecting room count - calls for a notable
negative adjustment for this property; it is assigned 0.83 (83% or a -17%
adjustment). This is due to the fact that the typical Hilton Hotel in similar
markets averaged only 293 rental units per hotel, or 51% smaller than the
proposed 600 unit project. Assigning one third of this size differential as a
penalty results in our -17% factor for larger size.
This factor gives a penalty to the property for being significantly larger than
average. By the same token, were the property to be less than 293 units, it
would earn a premium. The size adjustment is necessary because demand is not
affected by the number of rental rooms offered, the individual consumer only
seeking one room. Customers don't care whether one offers 100, 125 or 150 units
and their behavior and resulting demand should be the same regardless of the
number of rooms. Hence, keeping a project conservatively sized assures a higher
per-unit revenue yield.
The highly-positive effect on revenues and return on capital due to building
small, and not 'over-sizing' projects is best explained by the following study,
a study that can be replicated with any brand, in almost any situation. The net
effect of building small is to run higher occupancy and rate, thereby increasing
brand REVPAR by building a below-average number of rental units.
A STUDY OF THE EFFECT OF HOTEL SIZE ON PERFORMANCE
IN THE TEXAS HOTEL INDUSTRY
THE CASE FOR DOWNSIZING NEW HOTELS
Source Strategies, Inc., has long contended that the number of rooms a developer
offers in a new property is one of the key factors in determining a venture's
relative success or failure. It is every bit as important to size a hotel
project properly as it is to select the appropriate brand, and to have chosen to
develop in a suitable market and location.
For the purposes of this study, we analyzed two separate samplings of hotels.
We first looked at Comfort Inns across Texas as a selected brand sampling: then
we examined all branded hotels built during a set period of time for a wider
sampling.
1) COMFORT INN - ANALYSIS OF SIZING AND ITS IMPACT ON PERFORMANCE
In our initial analysis, we selected a group [55 properties] of Texas Comfort
Inn branded properties ranging in size from 36 to 75 units. The following chart
of performance statistics clearly illustrates the fact that on average, the
smaller property will perform better, in terms of REVPAR and occupancy, than a
larger property of the same brand:
12 Months Ending
Units Occupancy
36-40
66.9
41-45
65.3
46-50
66.5
51-55
62.8
56-60
61.8
61-65
56.6
66-70
44.6
71-75
Combined:
52
43.8
63.2
44.20
55.46
19.38
35.03
Further, properties with lower room counts were clearly able to sustain a higher
level of occupancy. Average occupancy ranged from 66.9% for properties of 36-40
units, downward to a much lower 43.8% average occupancy for properties in the
71-75 unit size bracket.
The above chart and graph clearly illustrate that developers often miss the
mark, building more rooms than 'optimum'. 'Optimum' is defined as generating
the highest return on invested capital, and is closely tied to occupancy and
REVPAR. Analyzing the above data provides a measure of the effect of overbuilding. For the typical range of rooms for Comfort Inn projects occupancy
dropped 23 points (a full 35%) from 67% to 44% as room counts escalated.
The key question is, 'how to apply this principle to a given hotel project.'
Naturally, each project would have to be judged on its individual merits, but
looking at an 'average' project for a single brand and product is very
revealing.
BRANDED HOTELS - ANALYSIS OF SIZING AND ITS IMPACT ON PERFORMANCE
In our second analysis, we looked at a sampling [91 properties] of Texas branded
hotels of less than 135 units which were constructed from 1970-1975. For our
analysis we examined performance results from the year 1985 when all subject
hotels were 10 to 15 years old, to well into their aging life cycles.
The following table of performance statistics from 1985 for branded properties
throughout Texas clearly illustrates the downward curve, with a pronounced and
methodical erosion of performance as room counts increased:
# of Hotels
Combined:
2
3
7
14
29
16
20
91
Units
00-44
45-59
60-74
75-89
90-104
105-119
120-134
98
Occupancy
Rate
REVPAR
70.0
73.9
66.8
62.7
60.9
57.8
55.5
59.8
37.88
36.13
31.10
31.65
32.42
26.25
29.35
30.34
26.50
26.71
20.77
19.86
19.75
15.18
16.28
18.14
The site value is 'plugged' so that projected REVPAR versus market approaches
the actual REVPAR over the past 12 months, as follows:
LOCAL COMPETITION
Radisson Renaiss- Courtyard Clarion
All Data in '01/02 $s
Hotel Worthing Blckstone
Hotel
Base: Name, Type & Quality
1.04
1.60
1.40
.66
x Brand Age Adjustment
1.27
1.09
.97
1.11
x Site Value Adjustment
1.27
1.20
.97
.88
x Size Adjustment
.87
.95
.89
.84
x Other Adjustments
1.00
1.20
1.00
.80
x Newness Adjustment
.84
.85
1.12
.84
= Theoretical REVPAR Index
123%
203%
131%
36%
Ramada
Inn
.47
1.30
1.17
.80
1.00
.74
42%
$43.29
$53.07
$43.29
$87.79
$43.29
$56.84
$43.29
$15.75
$43.29
$18.32
$87.76
100
$57.05
100
$15.83
100
$18.33
100
504
423
.84
.95
203
139
.68
.89
298
158
.53
.84
430
171
0.40
0.80
517
314
.61
.87
Combining all six factors that affect a hotel's REVPAR performance, we calculate
that the proposed Hilton Hotel's REVPAR will achieve 158% of the local market
average REVPAR for Year I, 184% for Year II, and 192% for Years III through V.
In Year VI and thereafter, REVPAR indices will slowly decline:
Hilton Hotel
Year I
Year II Year III
1.49
1.49
1.49
1.15
1.15
1.15
1.15
1.15
1.15
.83
.83
.83
1.05
1.05
1.05
.92
1.07
1.12
158%
184%
192%
$43.29
$68.40
$43.29
$79.55
$43.29
$83.26
COMBINING THE ABOVE MARKET REVPAR PROJECTION AND THE HOTEL'S REVPAR INDEX TO
DEVELOP REVENUES, OCCUPANCY, AND RATE
Using the projected Year III REVPAR index of 192%, the above process would
generate a theoretical REVPAR of $83.26 (in 2002 dollars). This is the result
of the Year III index of 192% (1.92) multiplied by a market average of $43.29.
Therefore, if the property were open today and were in its third year of
operation, it would theoretically be operating at the following level against
last year's market: an $83.26 REVPAR computes to gross room revenues of
approximately $18,233,940 ($83.26 REVPAR times 600 units times 365 days).
Please note that the actual expected affect on the market due to the
introduction of the Hilton Hotel and other new units is fully reflected in
subsequent pro forma market projections and financials.
In current year dollars, this projection for the Hilton Hotel's Year III revenue
breaks down seasonally as follows:
Quarter:
First
Second
Third
Fourth
Year III
Market %
24.9%
26.3%
24.5%
24.4%
100
Seasonal Index
101
106
97
97
100
REVPAR$
$83.93
$87.85
$80.78
$80.55
$83.26
Room Revenue $4,532,372 $4,796,652 $4,458,796 $4,446,120 $18,233,940
In turn, we believe the optimum rate/occupancy mix, in current dollars, would be
as follows:
Quarter:
REVPAR$
ADR - $
Occupancy %
First
$83.93
$125.05
67.1%
Second
$87.85
$125.05
70.3%
Third
$80.78
$125.05
64.6%
Fourth
$80.55
$125.05
64.4%
Year III
$83.26
$125.05
66.6%
343
201
200
198
180
164
160
149
140
104
103
103
89
73
2005
1980
1981
1999
1980
Hilton Radisson Renaiss. Courtyrd Clarion
All Data in 2002 $s
Yr III
Hotel Worthing Blckston
Hotel
Base: Name/Type/Quality
1.49
1.04
1.60
1.40
.66
x Brand Age Adjustment
1.15
1.27
1.09
.97
1.11
x Site Value Adjustment
1.15
1.27
1.20
.97
.88
x Size Adjustment
.83
.87
.95
.89
.84
x Other Adjustments
1.05
1.00
1.20
1.00
.80
x Newness Adjustment
1.12
.84
.85
1.12
.84
= Theoretical REVPAR Index 192%
123%
203%
131%
36%
1974
Ramada
Inn
.47
1.30
1.17
.80
1.00
.74
42%
$43.29
$83.26
$43.29
$53.07
$43.29
$87.79
$43.29
$56.84
$43.29
$15.75
$43.29
$18.32
N/A
N/A
$53.29
100
$87.76
100
$57.05
100
$15.83
100
$18.33
100
600
new
517
25
504
24
203
6
298
25
430
31
4. The theoretical Year III REVPAR of $83.26 by the new, Hilton branded
'headquarters' hotel of 600 units in markets of this type is realistic in
comparison to the results of current competitors.
First, the highest quality property currently in the market, the Four-diamond
Renaissance Hotel, located 8 blocks north of the convention Center and
constructed in 1981, generated a healthy REVPAR of $87.76 in the latest year.
Further, the 517 unit, three-diamond Radisson Hotel built in 1980 along the
north side of the Convention Center generated a REVPAR of $53.29 in the period,
64% of what we expect for the Hilton. Lastly, the new, three-diamond Courtyard
Blackstone Hotel, a 203 unit property built in 1999, generated a REVPAR of
$57.05, 69% of the Hilton projection.
5. In the overall market, any new hotel will have an inordinate advantage over
the old; the playing field here is not level as the lodging consumer almost
always votes for 'new' versus old. From Holiday Inn consumer research, 'new'
means 'clean,' and 'old' means 'dirty' to the consumer; cleanliness is the
number one consumer selection factor in lodging. Hence, a new, high quality
branded '& suite' hotel entry should operate well above the chain market average
occupancy, currently at 53.5% in the local market.
Newness is a major factor in a market where some of the competition in this
market is old, tired, and approaching obsolescence. On average, the 21 hotels
in the local market were constructed in 1981, making the typical hotel in this
market over 20 years old. Further, 13 hotels in the local market were built in
1986 or before (15+ years old).
Many hotels are effectively 'finished' in thirty years because their
construction was wood-frame, their plumbing and wiring of a limited life, but
most importantly, they become stylistically and functionally obsolete compared
to new construction. High-rise downtown hotels are admittedly more resistant to
this trend of decline because of the more durable and expensive construction
methods used in their construction. After a hotel's performance peaks in Years
III-V, an inevitable gradual decline begins, and will continue until the hotel
is obsolete and no longer a viable lodging establishment.
6. The projected 2007 occupancy for the Hilton Hotel of 66.6% and rate of
$113.73 compares reasonably to the Exhibit IV Upscale Hotel Segment brand
averages, which had an average occupancy of 60.2% and a rate of $120.43 in the
latest year. This level of performance reflects the fact that this project will
be in its peak performing years in 2007. Offering a high quality, desirable
product and brand gives the Hilton Hotel an advantage over much of its
competition.
7. The projected REVPAR performance of the Hilton Hotel versus the downtown
Fort Worth market is at a reasonably high level compared to many new hotels of
this quality in similar metro areas. Hotel REVPAR climbs sharply in the Years I
through III then levels off, growing at a more normal inflationary pace. Being
a high quality property, it would perform at a level well above the moderate
REVPAR average of the local market.
8. Graphing the projected occupancy performance of the Hilton Hotel versus the
downtown Fort Worth market demonstrates a realistic pattern: the hotel peaks in
Years III through V at a level well above the local market, then begins to
recede, steadily losing ground to the market average as the property ages:
PRO FORMA
The Hilton REVPAR ratio, 192% of the local market in Years III-V, results in the
following REVPAR stream:
HILTON HOTEL REVPAR PROJECTION
Yr &
Qtr
051
052
053
054
061
062
063
064
071
072
073
074
081
082
Local
Market
38.90
41.87
37.44
37.33
38.69
41.64
37.24
37.13
39.46
42.48
37.98
37.87
41.26
44.41
Subj
Hotel
57.19
64.07
61.03
63.10
68.10
74.96
70.00
71.29
75.77
81.55
72.92
72.71
79.22
85.26
Subject /
Market Index
147
153
163
169
158
176
180
188
192
184
192
192
192
192
192
192
192
083
084
091
092
093
094
101
102
103
104
111
112
113
114
121
122
123
124
39.71
39.60
43.14
46.43
41.51
41.40
45.10
48.54
43.40
43.28
47.15
50.75
45.38
45.25
49.30
53.06
47.44
47.31
76.24
76.02
82.82
89.14
79.71
79.48
85.15
91.64
81.94
81.71
87.53
94.21
84.24
84.00
89.99
96.86
86.60
86.36
192
192
192
192
192
192
189
189
189
189
186
186
186
186
183
183
183
183
51.54
54.52
48.75
48.61
52.96
56.02
50.09
49.95
3.3%
3.0%
92.51
97.86
87.50
87.25
93.47
98.87
88.40
88.15
4.6%
6.8%
179
179
179
179
176
176
176
176
1.2%
3.6%
131
122
123
124
131
132
133
134
*CGR%9yrs
First 5yrs
192
192
189
186
183
179
176
HILTON HOTEL
Resulting
Average RoomYear &
Room
Annual
%
Daily nights
Qtr
Revenues
Basis Occup
Rate
Sold
RNS
20051 $3,088,277
54.0 $106.00 29,135
52 $3,498,030
58.8 $109.00 32,092
53 $3,368,825
57.6 $106.00 31,781
54 $3,482,901 $13,438,032 59.5 $106.00 32,858 125,866
20061 $3,677,192
62.2 $109.39 33,615
62 $4,092,695
66.6 $112.49 36,383
63 $3,864,146
64.0 $109.39 35,324
64 $3,935,142 $15,569,175 65.2 $109.39 35,973 141,295
20071 $4,091,712
67.1 $112.89 36,244
72 $4,452,852
70.3 $116.09 38,358
73 $4,025,289
64.6 $112.89 35,656
74 $4,013,845 $16,583,698 64.4 $112.89 35,555 145,812
20081 $4,277,885
68.0 $116.51 36,718
82 $4,655,457
71.2 $119.80 38,859
83 $4,208,439
65.4 $116.51 36,122
84 $4,196,475 $17,338,256 65.3 $116.51 36,020 147,720
20091 $4,472,528
68.9 $120.23 37,199
92 $4,867,280
72.1 $123.64 39,368
93 $4,399,923
66.3 $120.23 36,595
94 $4,387,415 $18,127,147 66.1 $120.23 36,491 149,652
20101 $4,597,939
68.6 $124.08 37,056
102 $5,003,759
71.8 $127.59 39,217
103 $4,523,298
66.0 $124.08 36,454
104 $4,510,438 $18,635,434 65.9 $124.08 36,351 149,078
20111 $4,726,866
68.4 $128.05 36,914
112 $5,144,066
71.5 $131.68 39,066
113 $4,650,132
65.8 $128.05 36,315
114 $4,636,912 $19,157,975 65.6 $128.05 36,211 148,506
20121 $4,859,408
68.1 $132.15 36,772
122 $5,288,306
71.3 $135.89 38,916
123 $4,780,522
65.5 $132.15 36,175
124 $4,766,932 $19,695,167 65.3 $132.15 36,072 147,936
20131 $4,995,666
68.0 $136.11 36,702
132 $5,342,991
69.9 $139.97 38,174
133 $4,829,956
64.3 $136.11 35,485
134 $4,816,225 $19,984,839 64.1 $136.11 35,384 145,745
20141 $5,047,325
66.7 $140.20 36,002
142 $5,398,242
68.6 $144.16 37,445
143 $4,879,902
63.1 $140.20 34,808
144 $4,866,029 $20,191,497 62.9 $140.20 34,709 142,963
*CGR % First 9 yrs
4.6% 1.4%
3.2%
1.4%
First 5 Years
6.8% 3.5%
3.2%
3.4%
*from hotel opening
Annual Basis
Occ.
Rate
57.5% $106.76
64.5% $110.19
66.6% $113.73
67.5% $117.37
68.3% $121.13
68.1% $125.00
67.8% $129.00
67.6% $133.13
66.6% $137.12
65.3% $141.24
Operating Costs
Profitability and returns reflect the above revenue projections and the
following other critical assumptions: - operating costs per occupied room
approximate Full Service hotels of similar type, size, rate, occupancy and
geography, (Smith Travel Research's Host Report for 2000 data, and Source
Strategies data).
Full Service Hotel operating cost estimates take into account the lower costs of
the West South Central United States, which had an average Per Occupied Roomsonly Cost of $26.66 in 2000 - versus a national average of $32.30 - or 82.5% of
the U.S. average. Subsequent cost comparisons have been adjusted to reflect
this 17.5% lower-cost environment that may be expected in operating a Full
Service hotel in a West South Central area of the U.S. such as Texas.
- Specific Food, Beverage, Other Revenue assumptions, and cost assumptions for
all revenue items in the study are as follows:
Food Volume: was set at 38% of Room Sales, which equates to 23.4% of total
project revenues. This is 5 points above the norm for Full Service urban hotels
in 2000 in the West South Central region of the U.S., as published in the 2001
Host Report, Smith Travel Research. It reflects the fact that Urban convention
headquarters hotels will run 15% higher than other urban hotels.
Beverage / Other F&B Volume: was set at 10% of Room Sales, which equates to
6.2% of total project revenues. This was slightly higher than the norm of 9.5%
for U.S. urban hotels.
Other Volume: was set at 10% of room revenues, and 6.2% of total revenues,
about the norm for U.S. hotels of more than 500 units.
Telecommunications Volume: was set at 4.3% of room revenues, and 2.6% of total
revenues, the norm for U.S. Urban hotels.
Rooms-only Expense was set at $32.43 Per Occupied Room for 2000 ($37.60 when
inflated to 2005 dollars), and compares reasonably to the Host Report sample for
the following types of Full-Service operations. Note that the cost per occupied
room is set lower than the typical resort and urban costs nationwide.
This lower rooms cost is a product of a lower cost structure in Fort Worth due
to the depressed hotel market in the local area. We assigned a 5% lower rooms
cost for this Fort Worth property when compared to other Texas Full Service
urban and resort destinations (San Antonio, Houston, Dallas, Grapevine, Austin)
This lower than normal cost is readily supported by Source Strategies research
into actual financial records of existing hotel properties.
Host Report Sample
2000 Basis 2005 Basis
West South Central
$26.66
$30.91
U.S. Urban* 30.58 35.45
Resort*
33.82 39.21
Roomcount 300 to 500*
26.08 30.23
Roomcount Over 500*
34.14 39.58
*adjusted to the South West Central U.S.
Food & Beverage Expense was set at 73% of Food and Beverage revenues. This
compares to the Host Report sample for the following types of Full-Service
operations:
2000 Basis
71.4%
71.6%
73.7%
73.1%
2000 Basis
61.6%
59.1%
59.6%
- versus room revenues, a 5% franchise royalty fee; 7.5% marketing expense Year
I and thereafter, including franchise reservation and brand advertising/frequent
traveler fees (in addition to royalties), and property advertising; also, a 4%
management fee.
- an on-going reserve for renovations is taken and subtracted from project cash
flows; such renovation reserves and investments insure that future revenue
streams continues by maintaining product quality at the highest levels.
Reserves are set at $12,440,587 for the first ten years, or $20,734 per unit;
Reserves are based on an extensive 2000 study, CapEx, by the International
Society of Hospitality Consultants. The study shows that required reserves
average 5.5% over a 20 year period. However, average expenditures vary by year,
with peak spending occurring in year ten at over 12% of gross revenues (details
in Exhibit VII).
- An initial capital investment of $130,000,000 allocated to improvements plus
an assumed land value of $1,500,000 (actual land cost may vary depending upon
final architectural building plans and fair market value of land required). The
estimated improvement capital estimate of $216,667 per unit appears adequate for
a hotel of Hilton/AAA four diamond quality, in our experience.
Should capital needs prove to be greater or less, then returns would change
proportionately. The estimates of necessary capital include:
Assumed Land Value
Improvements
Total
$
1,500,000
$ 130,000,000
$ 131,500,000
The pro forma profit and cash flow statements are shown overleaf:
Open 1/1/05
$1,500,000
# Rooms: 600
$216,667
Hilton Hotel
QUARTER
Rmnites Sold
Rmnites Avail
First
29,135
54,000
Second
32,092
54,600
Third
31,781
55,200
Fourth
32,858
55,200
Occupancy %
Avg Rate
REVPAR
54.0%
106.00
$57.19
58.8%
109.00
$64.07
57.6%
106.00
$61.03
59.5%
106.00
$63.10
Year
125,866
219,000
57.5%
$106.76
$61.36
%
Revenues
13,438,072
61.6%
5,106,467
23.4%
1,343,807
6.2%
577,837
2.6%
1,343,807
6.2%
$21,809,991
100.0%
169,467
34,980
160,460
56,773
113,546
207,480
25,995
107,618
876,320
333,757
1,210,076
163,206
33,688
158,905
54,675
109,351
209,760
25,535
105,717
860,837
330,522
1,191,360
168,737
34,829
164,290
56,528
113,056
209,760
26,152
108,269
881,622
341,723
1,223,346
651,028
134,381
629,330
218,100
436,200
832,200
101,543
420,389
3,423,172
1,309,006
4,732,178
3.0%
0.6%
2.9%
1.0%
2.0%
3.8%
0.5%
1.9%
15.7%
6.0%
21.7%
F & B Expense
Payroll
592,956
Other
489,188
Total F & B Exp 1,082,144
671,621
554,088
1,225,709
646,807
533,616
1,180,423
668,726
551,699
1,220,425
2,580,110
2,128,591
4,708,700
11.8%
9.8%
21.6%
100,044
96,347
99,612
384,329
1.8%
Departmental Profits
Rooms
1,980,914 2,287,952 2,177,426 2,259,602
F & B
400,245
453,344
436,595
451,390
Other
353,303
400,174
385,389
398,449
Total
$2,734,462 $3,141,470 $2,999,410 $3,109,442
8,705,894
1,741,574
1,537,315
11,984,784
39.9%
8.0%
7.0%
55.0%
Other, Expense
88,326
-Undistributed Op Expense
Admin & General
350,863
Marketing
375,925
Franchise Fees
154,416
Energy
205,505
Property Ops &
225,555
Tot Admin & Gen 1,312,263
397,411
425,797
174,901
232,769
255,478
1,486,358
382,728
410,065
168,439
224,169
246,039
1,431,441
395,698
423,962
174,147
231,766
254,377
1,479,950
1,526,699
1,635,749
671,904
894,210
981,450
5,710,011
7.0%
7.5%
3.1%
4.1%
4.5%
26.2%
1,655,113
139,921
1,567,969
134,751
1,629,492
139,318
6,274,772
537,523
28.8%
2.5%
1,298,666
1,515,192
1,433,218
1,490,174
5,737,249
26.3%
Open 1/1/05
$1,500,000
# Rooms: 600
$216,667
QUARTER
Rmnites Sold
Rmnites Avail
Occupancy %
Avg Rate
REVPAR
Hilton Hotel
First
29,135
54,000
54.0%
106.00
$57.19
Second
32,092
54,600
58.8%
109.00
$64.07
Third
31,781
55,200
57.6%
106.00
$61.03
Fourth
32,858
55,200
59.5%
106.00
$63.10
Year
125,866
219,000
57.5%
$106.76
$61.36
%
Revenues
13,438,072
61.6%
5,106,467
23.4%
1,343,807
6.2%
577,837
2.6%
1,343,807
6.2%
$21,809,991
100.0%
1,298,666
1,515,192
1,433,218
1,490,174
5,737,249
26.3%
-Fixed: Insur
43,620
Property Tax
163,575
Deprec SL 39 Yr
833,333
Tot Fixed Expen 1,040,528
43,620
163,575
833,333
1,040,528
43,620
163,575
833,333
1,040,528
43,620
163,575
833,333
1,040,528
174,480
654,300
3,333,334
4,162,113
0.8%
3.0%
15.3%
19.1%
474,663
392,689
449,645
1,575,136
7.2%
833,333
(49,072)
833,333
(49,072)
833,333
(49,072)
3,333,334
(196,290)
15.3%
-0.9%
4,712,180
21.6%
Cash Before
Fin & Tax
1,042,399
1,258,924
1,176,950
1,233,906
Exhibits:
I
II
Local market
By Segment and Brand, Past Five
Years, Annual Basis
III
IV
VI
VII
VIII
IX
XI
EXHIBIT I
LODGING MARKET: FORT WORTH / ARLINGTON METROPOLITAN AREA
#
Hotels
YRQ Motels
--- -----901
119
902
124
903
139
904
126
*TOTAL 1990
#
Rooms
-----14,902
15,128
15,662
15,337
Rnights
sold 1
(000s)
------754.2
825.2
858.9
681.8
3,120.2
$ Rooms
Revenues
(000 s)
---------35,978
40,195
42,227
32,906
151,306
%
OCC2
---56.2
59.9
59.6
48.3
56.0
$
Rate3
----47.70
48.71
49.16
48.26
48.49
$
RPAR4
----26.83
29.20
29.31
23.32
27.17
911
912
913
914
*TOTAL 1991
129
131
130
126
15,371
15,161
15,116
14,972
673.7
777.0
844.5
718.6
3,013.8
33,261
39,554
42,455
35,290
150,560
48.7
56.3
60.7
52.2
54.5
49.37
50.91
50.27
49.11
49.96
24.04
28.67
30.53
25.62
27.22
921
922
923
924
*TOTAL 1992
125
127
126
122
14,843
14,977
14,922
14,592
696.5
822.9
871.3
706.1
3,096.8
35,859
43,549
45,633
35,977
161,018
52.1
60.4
63.5
52.6
57.2
51.49
52.92
52.37
50.95
51.99
26.84
31.95
33.24
26.80
29.74
931
932
933
934
*TOTAL 1993
127
127
130
121
14,748
14,711
15,036
14,577
729.1
874.8
917.7
678.1
3,199.7
38,187
46,113
48,502
37,408
170,210
54.9
65.3
66.3
50.6
59.4
52.38
52.71
52.85
55.16
53.20
28.77
34.45
35.06
27.89
31.58
941
942
943
944
*TOTAL 1994
129
130
130
128
15,039
15,229
15,185
15,177
747.7
873.2
928.2
733.2
3,282.3
41,281
49,665
52,028
42,265
185,239
55.2
63.0
66.4
52.5
59.3
55.21
56.88
56.05
57.64
56.44
30.50
35.84
37.24
30.27
33.48
951
952
953
954
*TOTAL 1995
128
137
144
143
15,104
15,688
16,169
16,093
796.5
925.9
970.2
809.1
3,501.7
46,425
55,924
57,277
49,299
208,925
58.6
64.9
65.2
54.6
60.8
58.28
60.40
59.03
60.93
59.66
34.15
39.17
38.50
33.30
36.30
961
962
963
964
*TOTAL 1996
144
148
150
151
16,234
16,604
16,940
17,150
882.2
947.8
1,013.8
885.1
3,729.0
55,726
59,678
62,733
56,742
234,879
60.4
62.7
65.1
56.1
61.0
63.16
62.97
61.88
64.11
62.99
38.14
39.50
40.25
35.96
38.45
971
972
973
974
*TOTAL 1997
154
163
167
168
17,449
18,150
18,623
19,015
879.1
1,073.3
1,080.2
948.9
3,981.6
58,667
71,549
70,938
64,151
265,305
56.0
65.0
63.1
54.2
59.6
66.73
66.66
65.67
67.61
66.63
37.36
43.32
41.40
36.67
39.69
#
Rooms
-----19,060
19,639
20,442
20,426
Rnights
sold 1
(000s)
------1,000.7
1,150.9
1,213.7
982.2
4,347.6
$ Rooms
Revenues
(000 s)
---------69,758
79,921
80,746
69,425
299,850
%
OCC2
---58.3
64.4
64.5
52.3
59.9
$
Rate3
----69.71
69.44
66.53
70.68
68.97
$
RPAR4
----40.67
44.72
42.93
36.94
41.29
991
992
993
994
*TOTAL 1999
201
204
209
216
21,377
22,077
23,033
23,287
1,096.9
1,132.0
1,334.1
1,118.4
4,681.4
76,306
81,559
87,084
74,014
318,963
57.0
56.3
63.0
52.2
57.1
69.56
72.05
65.28
66.18
68.13
39.66
40.60
41.10
34.55
38.92
001
002
003
004
*TOTAL 2000
221
222
227
228
23,797
24,211
24,974
24,837
1,179.5
1,350.1
1,413.5
1,167.1
5,110.1
81,944
96,864
96,056
80,325
355,189
55.1
61.3
61.5
51.1
57.2
69.48
71.75
67.96
68.83
69.51
38.26
43.97
41.81
35.15
39.79
011
012
013
014
*TOTAL 2001
229
233
237
241
24,928
24,713
24,985
25,030
1,240.6
1,314.6
1,276.6
1,077.2
4,908.9
88,792
92,642
86,415
71,014
338,863
55.3
58.5
55.5
46.8
54.0
71.57
70.47
67.69
65.93
69.03
39.58
41.19
37.59
30.84
37.26
021
240
*TOTAL 2002 YTD
25,014
1,118.2
1,118.2
77,159
77,159
49.7
49.7
69.00
69.00
34.27
34.27
47,091.3
2,917,468
57.6
61.95
35.70
*TOTAL
1.
2.
3.
4.
Roomnights sold (derived from est. rate and actual room revenues)
Occupancy: nights sold divided by nights available for sale(x 100)
Average price for each roomnight sold;from Directories and surveys
$ Revenue per available room per day (room sales per day)
#
ROOMS
-----2,648
2,778
2,794
2,778
RNIGHTS
SOLD 1
(000S)
------127.2
116.5
145.0
121.9
510.6
$ ROOMS
REVENUES
(000 S)
---------7,223
6,488
8,047
6,791
28,549
%
OCC2
---53.4
46.1
56.4
47.7
50.9
$
Rate3
----56.76
55.69
55.50
55.71
55.91
$
RPAR4
----30.31
25.66
31.31
26.57
28.44
911
912
913
914
*TOTAL 1991
15
14
14
15
2,782
2,528
2,528
2,542
107.5
119.5
117.2
105.8
450.1
6,059
6,977
6,852
6,224
26,112
42.9
51.9
50.4
45.3
47.5
56.35
58.39
58.46
58.80
58.02
24.20
30.33
29.46
26.61
27.58
921
922
923
924
*TOTAL 1992
14
14
14
14
2,528
2,662
2,662
2,662
104.1
127.0
147.3
120.7
499.2
6,270
7,571
8,530
7,066
29,437
45.8
52.4
60.2
49.3
52.0
60.22
59.60
57.89
58.53
58.97
27.56
31.25
34.83
28.85
30.68
931
932
933
934
*TOTAL 1993
14
14
13
13
2,662
2,662
2,618
2,618
126.0
149.7
149.6
109.7
535.1
7,329
8,753
8,849
6,706
31,638
52.6
61.8
62.1
45.6
55.5
58.17
58.47
59.14
61.12
59.13
30.59
36.14
36.74
27.84
32.84
941
942
943
944
*TOTAL 1994
14
14
14
14
2,962
2,937
2,895
2,895
119.8
147.7
163.8
122.8
554.1
7,106
8,900
9,886
7,929
33,821
44.9
55.3
61.5
46.1
52.0
59.31
60.25
60.36
64.58
61.04
26.66
33.30
37.12
29.77
31.71
951
952
953
954
*TOTAL 1995
14
14
15
15
2,866
2,862
2,915
2,831
121.8
149.3
151.9
134.4
557.5
7,970
9,623
9,659
9,045
36,297
47.2
57.3
56.7
51.6
53.3
65.43
64.43
63.57
67.28
65.10
30.90
36.95
36.02
34.73
34.67
961
962
963
964
*TOTAL 1996
15
16
15
15
2,868
2,958
2,953
2,910
143.2
153.0
162.3
149.7
608.2
9,842
10,537
10,793
10,633
41,804
55.5
56.8
59.7
55.9
57.0
68.71
68.89
66.49
71.05
68.74
38.13
39.14
39.73
39.72
39.19
971
972
973
974
*TOTAL 1997
15
16
16
16
2,913
2,992
2,991
3,032
136.1
168.0
152.8
152.7
609.6
10,234
12,082
10,838
11,413
44,567
51.9
61.7
55.5
54.7
56.0
75.22
71.91
70.91
74.74
73.11
39.04
44.38
39.39
40.92
40.94
#
ROOMS
-----3,004
2,998
3,037
2,997
RNIGHTS
SOLD 1
(000S)
------159.9
178.6
186.9
152.5
677.9
$ ROOMS
REVENUES
(000 S)
---------12,511
13,982
13,909
12,316
52,717
%
OCC2
---59.2
65.5
66.9
55.3
61.7
$
Rate3
----78.22
78.29
74.43
80.77
77.77
$
RPAR4
----46.27
51.25
49.78
44.67
48.00
991
992
993
994
*TOTAL 1999
18
18
18
18
3,041
3,185
3,284
3,178
168.5
173.7
184.6
150.1
677.0
13,719
14,858
14,340
11,886
54,803
61.6
59.9
61.1
51.3
58.5
81.41
85.53
77.68
79.17
80.95
50.13
51.26
47.46
40.65
47.32
001
002
003
004
*TOTAL 2000
18
18
18
18
3,201
3,197
3,296
3,196
154.7
172.1
187.7
137.3
651.8
12,770
14,622
15,453
11,649
54,494
53.7
59.2
61.9
46.7
55.4
82.55
84.95
82.33
84.84
83.60
44.33
50.26
50.96
39.62
46.33
011
012
013
014
*TOTAL 2001
19
20
20
21
3,222
3,257
3,356
3,298
165.7
165.1
154.4
145.9
631.1
13,869
13,982
12,640
12,607
53,099
57.1
55.7
50.0
48.1
52.7
83.72
84.70
81.87
86.39
84.14
47.83
47.18
40.94
41.55
44.30
021
21
*TOTAL 2002 YTD
3,305
152.0
152.0
12,977
12,977
51.1
51.1
85.38
85.38
43.63
43.63
7,114.1
500,314
54.4
70.33
38.28
*TOTAL
1.
2.
3.
4.
Roomnights sold (derived from est. rate and actual room revenues)
Occupancy: nights sold divided by nights available for sale(x 100)
Average price for each roomnight sold;from Directories and surveys
$ Revenue per available room per day (room sales per day)
EXHIBIT II
BRAND
CHAINS
RENAISSAN
TOT UPSCALE
%
RMS
EST.
RNS
000S
%
RNS
$
AMT.
000s
1
1
.5
.5
15.3
15.3
121
121
19.7
19.7
RESIDENCE
TOT SUITES
1
1
.1
.1
3.6
3.6
33
33
5.4
5.4
CLARION
COURTYARD
RADIS HTL
TOT MID/UPS
1
2
1
4
.3
.3
.5
1.1
9.0
10.0
15.6
34.7
38
79
112
228
6.1
12.8
18.1
37.0
BEST WEST
COMFO INN
FAIRFIELD
TOT LTD SVE
1
1
1
3
.2
.1
.1
.3
5.1
3.0
2.5
10.5
28
12
21
61
4.5
1.9
3.4
9.9
1,531
521
1,829
3,881
HOMESTEAD
TOT EXT STA
1
1
.1
.1
3.0
3.0
28
28
4.6
4.6
MOTEL 6
RAMAD INN
TOT BUDGET
1
2
3
.1
.6
.7
2.9
18.4
21.3
21
76
97
3.5
12.3
15.8
TOT CHAINS
13
2.9
88.3
570
92.3
2
5
7
.0
.3
.4
1.5
10.2
11.7
7
41
48
1.1
6.6
7.7
1,229
1,409
2,638
617 100.0
52,207
INDEPENDENTS
$100+
LT 60
TOT INDEP
TOT MARKET
20
3.3 100.0
%
AMT
16,145 30.9
16,145 30.9
EST.
%OCC
EST.
$
RATE
$
RPAR
66.0 132.97
66.0 132.97
87.76
87.76
75.5 109.33
75.5 109.33
82.56
82.56
34.7
65.3
59.2
54.6
45.66
99.86
90.05
86.11
15.83
65.23
53.29
47.00
2.9
1.0
3.5
7.4
46.0
32.0
71.9
48.1
54.57
45.07
86.02
63.75
25.12
14.41
61.87
30.64
1,149
1,149
2.2
2.2
79.4
79.4
40.44
40.44
32.12
32.12
858
4,258
5,116
1.6
8.2
9.8
60.8
34.3
37.9
40.27
55.89
52.48
24.48
19.19
19.91
49,569 94.9
53.5
87.02
46.52
2.4
2.7
5.1
39.2 175.51
33.2 34.58
34.0 55.25
68.71
11.49
18.77
100
51.2
43.29
3,616
3,616
6.9
6.9
1,722 3.3
7,885 15.1
10,055 19.3
19,662 37.7
84.57
* All figures annualized. Includes taxed and est non-tax room revenues.
Independents are categorized by price: $100+, $60-99.99, and under $60)
BRAND
-----
# *
#* RMS
HTL 000S
--- ----
%
RMS
----
EST.
RNS
000S
------
%
RNS
----
$
AMT.
%
000s
AMT
-------- ----
EST.
$
RATE
-----
$
RPAR
----
17,647 31.7
17,647 31.7
73.0 131.37
73.0 131.37
95.93
95.93
6.5
6.5
78.4 105.18
78.4 105.18
82.48
82.48
2,337 4.2
8,981 16.2
10,817 19.5
22,135 39.8
46.6 46.08
72.8 101.89
64.3 89.13
62.2 85.06
21.49
74.18
57.32
52.89
EST.
%OCC
----
CHAINS
RENAISSAN
TOT UPSCALE
1
1
.5
.5
15.6
15.6
134
134
20.3
20.3
RESIDENCE
TOT SUITES
1
1
.1
.1
3.7
3.7
34
34
5.2
5.2
CLARION
COURTYARD
RADIS HTL
TOT MID/UPS
1
2
1
4
.3
.3
.5
1.1
9.2
10.3
16.0
35.5
51
88
121
260
7.7
13.3
18.3
39.3
COMFO INN
FAIRFIELD
TOT LTD SVE
1
1
2
.1
.1
.2
3.1
2.5
5.6
13
22
35
1.9
3.3
5.2
580
1,832
2,412
1.0
3.3
4.3
35.1
74.7
52.9
45.76
82.96
69.40
16.04
61.98
36.71
HOMESTEAD
TOT EXT STA
1
1
.1
.1
3.0
3.0
26
26
3.9
3.9
1,010
1,010
1.8
1.8
72.7
72.7
38.86
38.86
28.23
28.23
DAYS INN
MOTEL 6
RAMAD INN
TOT BUDGET
1
1
2
4
.1
.1
.6
.8
3.0
3.0
18.8
24.8
13
24
90
127
1.9
3.6
13.6
19.1
481
.9
940 1.7
5,075 9.1
6,496 11.7
36.0
67.3
40.7
43.3
37.37
39.82
56.25
51.27
13.45
26.81
22.87
22.19
TOT CHAINS
13
2.9
88.3
616
93.0
53,313 95.9
59.2
86.50
51.24
1
1
3
5
.0
.2
.2
.4
.3
5.2
6.2
11.7
2
20
24
46
.3
3.1
3.7
7.0
283
1,196
802
2,280
.5
2.2
1.4
4.1
50.8 152.42
33.3 58.83
33.2 33.08
33.7 49.12
77.50
19.61
10.97
16.56
663 100.0
55,593
100
INDEPENDENTS
$100+
$60-99
LT 60
TOT INDEP
TOT MARKET
18
3.2 100.0
3,613
3,613
56.3
83.88
* All figures annualized. Includes taxed and est non-tax rooms revenues.
Independents are categorized by price: $100+, $60-99.99, and under $60)
47.19
BRAND
----CHAINS
RESIDENCE
TOT SUITES
# *
#* RMS
HTL 000S
--- ----
%
RMS
----
EST.
RNS
000S
------
%
RNS
----
$
AMT.
%
000s
AMT
-------- ----
EST.
%OCC
----
EST.
$
RATE
-----
$
RPAR
----
6.2
6.2
77.0
77.0
99.39
99.39
76.54
76.54
2,238 4.2
8,347 15.5
1,441 2.7
11,325 21.0
23,352 43.4
47.1
69.5
43.5
68.0
60.7
43.66
99.28
58.58
88.27
81.01
20.58
69.05
25.49
60.02
49.17
1
1
.1
.1
3.7
3.7
34
34
5.1
5.1
CLARION
COURTYARD
HOLID INN
RADIS HTL
TOT MID/UPS
1
2
1
1
5
.3
.3
.2
.5
1.3
9.3
10.3
4.8
16.1
40.5
51
84
25
128
288
7.7
12.7
3.7
19.4
43.5
COMFO INN
FAIRFIELD
TOT LTD SVE
1
1
2
.1
.1
.2
3.1
2.5
5.6
13
22
35
2.0
3.3
5.3
600
1,640
2,240
1.1
3.0
4.2
35.8
74.7
53.3
46.33
74.31
63.97
16.60
55.49
34.10
HOMESTEAD
TOT EXT STA
1
1
.1
.1
3.1
3.1
23
23
3.5
3.5
893
893
1.7
1.7
65.1
65.1
38.37
38.37
24.97
24.97
DAYS INN
MOTEL 6
RAMAD INN
TOT BUDGET
1
1
2
4
.1
.1
.6
.8
3.1
3.0
19.0
25.0
15
24
92
132
2.3
3.6
13.9
19.8
545 1.0
916 1.7
5,163 9.6
6,624 12.3
42.7
68.8
41.4
44.8
35.73
38.01
56.03
50.37
15.24
26.13
23.19
22.57
TOT CHAINS
13
2.5
77.9
512
77.2
36,462 67.7
56.0
71.25
39.91
2
3
5
.5
.2
.7
16.0
6.1
22.1
130
22
151
19.6
3.3
22.8
16,709 31.0
683 1.3
17,391 32.3
69.1 128.86
30.4 31.54
58.5 114.94
89.06
9.59
67.20
INDEPENDENTS
$100+
LT 60
TOT INDEP
TOT MARKET
18
3.2 100.0
663 100.0
3,352
3,352
53,853
100
56.6
81.22
* All figures annualized. Includes taxed and est non-tax rooms revenues.
Independents are categorized by price: $100+, $60-99.99, and under $60)
45.93
BRAND
----CHAINS
RESIDENCE
TOT SUITES
# *
#* RMS
HTL 000S
--- ----
%
RMS
----
EST.
RNS
000S
------
%
RNS
----
$
AMT.
%
000s
AMT
-------- ----
79.4 100.62
79.4 100.62
79.95
79.95
53.8
83.3
57.4
71.8
66.4
42.82
99.91
59.41
87.68
76.46
23.05
83.18
34.10
62.92
50.79
.1
.1
4.0
4.0
35
35
5.1
5.1
CLARION
COURTYARD
HOLID INN
RADIS HTL
TOT MID/UPS
1
1
1
1
4
.3
.1
.2
.5
1.1
9.9
4.6
5.0
17.1
36.6
59
42
32
135
268
8.5
6.2
4.6
19.7
39.0
COMFO INN
FAIRFIELD
TOT LTD SVE
1
1
2
.1
.1
.2
3.3
2.7
6.0
15
24
38
2.2
3.4
5.6
682
1,696
2,377
1.3
3.1
4.4
41.1
79.6
58.4
45.92
72.06
61.95
18.86
57.36
36.19
HOMESTEAD
TOT EXT STA
1
1
.1
.1
3.2
3.2
28
28
4.1
4.1
1,147
1,147
2.1
2.1
79.3
79.3
40.44
40.44
32.06
32.06
DAYS INN
MOTEL 6
RAMAD INN
TOT BUDGET
1
1
2
4
.1
.1
.6
.8
3.2
3.2
20.3
26.7
16
24
120
160
2.3
3.5
17.5
23.4
604 1.1
874 1.6
6,848 12.7
8,326 15.4
44.2
69.0
53.9
54.5
38.24
36.13
56.85
51.89
16.90
24.93
30.65
28.30
TOT CHAINS
12
2.3
76.5
530
77.2
35,838 66.5
62.9
67.63
42.52
2
3
5
.5
.2
.7
17.0
6.5
23.5
130
27
157
18.9
3.9
22.8
17,224 31.9
863 1.6
18,088 33.5
69.3 132.48
37.2 32.58
60.5 115.56
91.81
12.13
69.89
TOT MARKET
17
3.0 100.0
686 100.0
6.5
6.5
$
RPAR
----
1
1
INDEPENDENTS
$100+
LT 60
TOT INDEP
3,502
3,502
EST.
$
RATE
-----
EST.
%OCC
----
2,508 4.6
4,226 7.8
1,879 3.5
11,874 22.0
20,487 38.0
53,926
100
62.3
78.56
* All figures annualized. Included taxed and est non-tax rooms revenues.
Independents are categorized by price: $100+, $60-99.99, and under $60)
48.95
BRAND
----CHAINS
RESIDENCE
TOT SUITES
# *
#* RMS
HTL 000S
--- ----
%
RMS
----
EST.
RNS
000S
------
%
RNS
----
$
AMT.
%
000s
AMT
-------- ----
EST.
%OCC
----
EST.
$
RATE
-----
$
RPAR
----
7.5
7.5
83.9
83.9
95.16
95.16
79.87
79.87
1,362 2.9
3,885 8.3
1,551 3.3
10,589 22.6
17,387 37.1
33.8
84.9
50.4
69.4
58.9
37.00
96.96
55.83
80.88
73.81
12.52
82.31
28.14
56.11
43.49
1
1
.1
.1
4.0
4.0
37
37
5.8
5.8
CLARION
COURTYARD
HOLID INN
RADIS HTL
TOT MID/UPS
1
1
1
1
4
.3
.1
.2
.5
1.1
9.9
4.3
5.0
17.2
36.5
37
40
28
131
236
5.8
6.3
4.4
20.7
37.2
COMFO INN
FAIRFIELD
TOT LTD SVE
1
1
2
.1
.1
.2
3.3
2.7
6.0
15
23
38
2.4
3.6
6.1
685
1,591
2,276
1.5
3.4
4.9
42.8
77.4
58.4
44.24
69.56
59.34
18.95
53.81
34.64
HOMESTEAD
TOT EXT STA
1
1
.1
.1
3.3
3.3
30
30
4.7
4.7
1,037
1,037
2.2
2.2
84.1
84.1
34.49
34.49
29.00
29.00
DAYS INN
MOTEL 6
RAMAD INN
TOT BUDGET
1
1
2
4
.1
.1
.6
.8
3.3
3.2
20.5
27.0
16
21
112
149
2.5
3.3
17.7
23.5
581 1.2
719 1.5
6,086 13.0
7,387 15.8
43.9
60.5
49.8
50.4
37.05
33.92
54.35
49.61
16.25
20.53
27.07
24.99
TOT CHAINS
12
2.3
76.7
490
77.3
31,585 67.4
58.2
64.51
37.57
1
3
4
.5
.2
.7
16.9
6.5
23.3
118
25
144
18.7
4.0
22.7
14,456 30.9
803 1.7
15,259 32.6
64.0 122.10
35.7 31.56
56.2 106.09
78.20
11.28
59.60
INDEPENDENTS
$100+
LT 60
TOT INDEP
TOT MARKET
16
3.0 100.0
633 100.0
3,498
3,498
46,844
100
57.8
73.95
* All figures annualized. Included taxed and est non-tax rooms revenues.
Independents are categorized by price: $100+, $60-99.99, and under $60)
42.71
EXHIBIT III
CITY
----
#
TAXABLE
YRQ RMS
BRAND
REVENUE
--- ---- ----------FORT WORTH
612 MAIN ST
012
39
151,287
013
39
215,689
014
39
296,684
021
39
295,544
E
3
ZIP
S EST
--T AVG.
GROSS
ADJ 1
DAILY
REVENUE FACTOR 2 RATE
-------- ------ - ----76102 ASHTON HOTEL
156,253 1.033
185.00
224,447 1.041
165.77
299,299 1.009
185.77
298,593 1.010
185.77
YR
4
OP
%
-OCC $ 5
EST REVPAR
--- -----01
24 44.03
38 62.55
45 83.42
46 85.07
991
992
993
994
001
002
003
004
011
012
013
014
021
298
298
298
298
298
298
298
298
298
298
298
298
298
991
992
993
994
001
002
003
004
011
012
013
014
021
41
187
247
185
189
187
247
186
189
187
247
185
189
601 MAIN ST
COURT
231,651
COURT 1,095,289
COURT 1,413,664
COURT
990,634
COURT 1,074,407
COURT 1,051,161
COURT 1,461,372
COURT
871,561
COURT 1,133,093
COURT
837,540
COURT 1,069,026
COURT
850,067
COURT 1,011,012
991
992
993
994
001
002
003
004
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
200 W 3RD ST
69,035
71,259
62,427
76,691
63,282
70,268
65,057
65,711
AVG
ADJ 1
-----
.000
CHISM/DA 80
56 25.21
53 25.02
47 18.87
44 18.84
45 19.61
55 26.54
53 23.95
28 12.55
50 23.00
46 21.11
37 17.14
25 10.91
31 14.19
1.120
1.060
56
54
50
60
49
53
49
47
79.77
81.44
70.57
86.69
73.13
80.31
73.54
72.38
98
1.040
#
TAXABLE
YRQ RMS
BRAND
REVENUE
--- ---- ----------FORT WORTH
200 W 3RD ST
011
10
72,648
012
10
69,493
013
10
57,298
014
10
56,169
021
10
57,756
E
3
ZIP
S EST
--T AVG.
GROSS
ADJ 1
DAILY
REVENUE FACTOR 2 RATE
-------- ------ - ----76102 ETTA'S PLACE
75,554
.000
155.87
72,273
.000
155.87
59,590
.000
158.21
58,416
.000
158.21
60,066
.000
158.21
306 W 7TH ST
19,735
15,935
13,010
13,655
10,843
CITY
----
YR
4
OP
%
-OCC $ 5
EST REVPAR
--- -----98
54 83.95
51 79.42
41 64.77
40 63.50
42 66.74
AVG
ADJ 1
-----
01
.000
1.150
ADDR
----
011
012
013
014
021
21
21
21
21
21
991
992
993
994
001
002
003
004
011
012
013
014
021
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
991
992
993
994
001
002
003
004
011
012
013
014
021
517
517
517
517
517
517
517
517
517
517
517
517
517
815 MAIN ST
RADIS 2,412,524
RADIS 2,740,019
RADIS 1,805,353
RADIS 2,263,994
RADIS 2,009,827
RADIS 2,300,000
RADIS 2,025,500
RADIS 1,527,855
RADIS 1,884,896
RADIS 1,439,430
RADIS 1,925,792
RADIS 1,966,181
RADIS 1,760,267
1.150
991
992
993
430
430
430
1701
RAMAD
RAMAD
RAMAD
1.158
COMMERCE
728,944
788,637
777,449
66
53
58
75
59
33.49
27.24
30.14
41.58
32.78
1.040
E
3
ZIP
S EST
--T AVG.
#
TAXABLE
GROSS
ADJ 1
DAILY
YRQ RMS
BRAND
REVENUE
REVENUE FACTOR 2 RATE
--- ---- ------------------ ------ - ----FORT WORTH
1701 COMMERCE S 76102 RAMADA HOTEL FMR
994 430 RAMAD
593,495
813,432 1.371
54.28
001 430 RAMAD
617,665
750,484 1.215
55.37
002 430 RAMAD
690,858 1,078,988 1.562
61.94
003 430 RAMAD
668,992 1,009,070 1.508
52.92
004 430 RAMAD
397,719
570,027 1.433
54.51
011 430 RAMAD
917,085 1,007,440 1.099
56.56
012 430 RAMAD
569,777
779,429 1.368
56.56
013 430 RAMAD
559,193
698,876 1.250
57.41
014 430 RAMAD
377,727
569,639 1.508
53.41
021 430 RAMAD
750,000
825,000 1.100 1 58.41
CITY
----
YR
4
OP
%
-OCC $ 5
EST REVPAR
--- -----HILTON 02 74
38 20.56
35 19.39
45 27.57
48 25.51
26 14.41
46 26.03
35 19.92
31 17.67
27 14.40
36 21.32
AVG
ADJ 1
-----
1.015
1.100
ADDR
----
991
992
993
994
001
002
003
004
011
012
013
014
021
504
504
504
504
504
504
504
504
504
504
504
504
504
991
992
993
994
001
002
003
004
011
012
013
014
021
151
151
151
151
167
167
167
167
167
167
167
167
167
991
992
993
994
001
60
60
60
60
60
200 MAIN ST
4,512,390
4,511,994
4,319,304
RENAS 3,256,027
RENAS 3,795,233
RENAS 4,362,976
RENAS 4,726,737
RENAS 3,700,297
RENAS 4,061,862
RENAS 4,369,190
RENAS 3,037,422
RENAS 4,414,290
RENAS 3,978,027
2000
HOLID
HOLID
HOLID
HOLID
BWEST
BWEST
BWEST
BWEST
BWEST
BEACH ST
340,348
363,983
371,241
306,676
276,156
304,306
294,570
189,810
316,052
368,993
422,424
258,718
295,642
3434 E LANCASTE
47,610
51,781
53,024
47,978
50,731
33
34
36
32
34
9.17
9.73
9.85
8.94
9.65
72
1.158
1.229
CITY
----
ADDR
----
YR
4
OP
%
-OCC $ 5
EST REVPAR
--- -----72
36 10.61
37 10.26
34
9.61
32
9.33
34
9.97
32
8.69
32
8.39
32
8.36
AVG
ADJ 1
-----
.000
ZIP
--#
TAXABLE
GROSS
ADJ 1
YRQ RMS
BRAND
REVENUE
REVENUE FACTOR
--- ---- ------------------ -----FORT WORTH
3434 E LANCASTE 76103 CENTURY
002
60
56,553
57,905 1.024
003
60
55,290
56,643 1.024
004
60
51,669
53,053 1.027
011
60
48,940
50,389 1.030
012
60
52,973
54,422 1.027
013
60
46,487
47,973 1.032
014
60
44,775
46,298 1.034
021
60
43,708
45,157 1.033
991
992
993
994
001
002
003
004
011
012
013
014
021
99
99
99
99
99
99
99
99
99
99
99
99
99
014
021
44
44
991
992
993
994
001
002
003
004
011
012
013
014
021
96
96
96
96
96
96
96
96
96
96
96
96
96
991
992
993
35
35
35
2425
COMFO
COMFO
COMFO
COMFO
COMFO
COMFO
COMFO
COMFO
COMFO
COMFO
COMFO
COMFO
COMFO
SCOTT AVE
132,872
147,477
160,448
109,701
142,137
149,513
149,377
75,738
131,798
93,459
95,907
88,700
135,000
1815 E LANCASTE
12,000
12,500
1236
MTL 6
MTL 6
MTL 6
MTL 6
MTL 6
MTL 6
MTL 6
MTL 6
MTL 6
MTL 6
MTL 6
MTL 6
MTL 6
E
S
T
3
EST
AVG.
DAILY
2 RATE
- ----MOTEL
29.08
27.52
28.35
28.89
28.89
27.41
26.41
26.41
6.92
7.58
69
69
70
67
68
74
72
60
63
63
62
59
60
24.85
27.40
26.14
24.67
26.33
30.22
28.54
23.31
25.18
25.47
25.41
23.27
23.76
6.76
6.83
7.60
1.229
87
2.400
79
1.001
69
2.000
E
3
YR
ZIP
S EST
4
OP
--T AVG.
%
-#
TAXABLE
GROSS
ADJ 1
DAILY OCC $ 5
YRQ RMS
BRAND
REVENUE
REVENUE FACTOR 2 RATE EST REVPAR
--- ---- ------------------ ------ - ----- --- -----FORT WORTH
2009 EAST LANCA 76103 VALLEY VIEW MOTEL
69
994
35
10,652
21,304
.000
21.82
30
6.62
001
35
10,648
21,296
.000
22.26
30
6.76
002
35
10,000
20,000
.000 1 22.84
27
6.28
003
35
15,131
30,262
.000
22.38
42
9.40
004
35
11,955
23,910
.000
23.05
32
7.43
011
35
13,911
27,822
.000
23.49
38
8.83
012
35
14,751
29,502
.000
23.49
39
9.26
013
35
17,703
35,406
.000
23.84
46 11.00
014
35
15,988
31,976
.000
23.84
42
9.93
021
35
15,916
31,832
.000
23.84
42 10.11
CITY
----
ADDR
----
991
992
993
994
001
002
003
004
011
012
013
014
021
121
119
158
118
121
119
158
119
121
119
158
118
121
991
992
993
994
001
002
003
004
011
012
013
014
021
98
98
98
98
98
98
98
98
98
98
98
98
98
991
992
993
994
001
81
81
81
81
81
AVG
ADJ 1
-----
2.000
130
90
83.87
85.79
78.46
63.33
72.56
89.46
80.16
72.09
79.06
86.83
79.63
72.81
76.18
1.030
1.243
DAYS
S UNIVERSI
111,257
131,291
155,037
114,834
110,201
124,965
122,119
90,528
94,382
90,367
94,388
88,875
102,812
1505
FAIRF
FAIRF
FAIRF
FAIRF
FAIRF
S UNIVERSI
389,556
398,772
387,863
381,293
398,701
1.040
1551
DAYS
DAYS
DAYS
DAYS
DAYS
DAYS
E
ZIP
S
--T
#
TAXABLE
GROSS
ADJ 1
YRQ RMS
BRAND
REVENUE
REVENUE FACTOR 2
--- ---- ------------------ ------ FORT WORTH
1505 S UNIVERSI 76107 FAIRFIELD
002
81 FAIRF
447,347
475,749 1.063
003
81 FAIRF
477,833
489,227 1.024
004
81 FAIRF
393,788
400,920 1.018
011
81 FAIRF
431,961
466,534 1.080
012
81 FAIRF
469,633
488,560 1.040
013
81 FAIRF
443,849
461,511 1.040
014
81 FAIRF
423,124
445,402 1.053
021
81 FAIRF
395,101
433,753 1.098
CITY
----
ADDR
----
1660
HOMES
HOMES
HOMES
HOMES
HOMES
HOMES
HOMES
HOMES
HOMES
HOMES
HOMES
HOMES
HOMES
RIVER RUN
137,542
138,160
165,536
146,470
119,516
200,051
189,819
185,735
167,818
212,809
233,510
162,242
160,000
3
EST
4
AVG.
%
DAILY OCC $ 5
RATE EST REVPAR
----- --- -----INN S UNIVERSITY
81.67
79 64.54
81.02
81 65.65
83.45
64 53.80
86.05
74 64.00
86.05
77 66.28
87.34
71 61.93
87.34
68 59.77
83.34
71 59.50
021
72
70
71
64
55
72
71
75
72
83
81
78
76
YR
OP
--
AVG
ADJ 1
-----
97
1.040
9244 96
28.76
29.56
26.21
24.29
19.75
29.47
28.46
27.58
27.41
33.04
34.53
30.81
30.05
2.100
991
992
993
994
001
002
003
004
011
012
013
014
021
98
98
98
98
98
98
98
98
98
98
98
98
98
991
992
993
994
001
002
003
004
011
012
013
014
021
182
182
182
178
178
178
178
178
178
178
178
178
178
401 S UNIVERSTY
RAMAD
291,162
RAMAD
340,454
RAMAD
321,349
RAMAD
299,187
RAMAD
220,222
RAMAD
344,659
RAMAD
396,050
RAMAD
304,251
RAMAD
277,600
RAMAD
338,093
RAMAD
341,529
RAMAD
341,272
RAMAD
274,413
1.056
991
992
993
994
001
002
003
120
120
120
120
120
120
120
1701
RESID
RESID
RESID
RESID
RESID
RESID
RESID
1.300
S UNIVERSI
681,142
783,582
685,489
627,156
563,150
772,628
673,577
E
3
ZIP
S EST
4
--T AVG.
%
#
TAXABLE
GROSS
ADJ 1
DAILY OCC $ 5
YRQ RMS
BRAND
REVENUE
REVENUE FACTOR 2 RATE EST REVPAR
--- ---- ------------------ ------ - ----- --- -----FORT WORTH
1701 S UNIVERSI 76107 RESIDENCE INN S UNIVERSITY
004 120 RESID
655,009
837,238 1.278
107.28
71 75.84
011 120 RESID
703,899
894,520 1.271
105.24
79 82.83
012 120 RESID
730,902
959,483 1.313
105.24
83 87.86
013 120 RESID
634,496
940,874 1.483
111.89
76 85.22
014 120 RESID
642,635
835,816 1.301
111.89
68 75.71
021 120 RESID
576,962
879,772 1.525
108.89
75 81.46
CITY
----
ADDR
----
YR
OP
--
AVG
ADJ 1
-----
83
1.300
FOOTNOTES:
--------1. Factor used to adjust taxable to gross revenues. Area factor used
if property data not available. Taxable equals 89% of gross Statewide.
2. A number or a 'Y' indicates quarter's revenues were estimated.
3. Estimated Average Daily Rate (e.g. 60-85% of 'rack single');
4. Occupancy derived from calculated roomnights sold (gross room revenues divided by Average Daily Rate), divided by roomnights available.
5. Total REVenues Per Available Room per day, or 'REVPAR';
Prepared from State Comptroller, chain directories and private records.
Includes all quarterly reports exceeding $14,000 (otherwise omitted).
EXHIBIT IV
PERIOD: TWELVE MONTHS ENDING MARCH 31, 2002
LODGING MARKET: EL PASO, GALVESTON, CORPUS CHRISTI, FORT WORTH, WACO, TYLER,
SAN ANTONIO, AUSTIN, DALLAS, AND HOUSTON
# *
EST.
$
EST.
#* RMS
%
RNS
%
AMT.
%
EST.
$
$
BRAND
HTL 000S
RMS 000S
RNS 000s
AMT %OCC
RATE
RPAR
------- ---- ---- ------ ---- -------- ---- ---- -------CHAINS
FOURSEAS
3 1.1
.5
253
.5
57,197 1.6 65.7 226.46 148.82
WESTIN
7 3.3
1.5
691
1.5
103,800 2.9 58.2 150.17
87.38
TOT LUXURY
10 4.3
1.9
944
2.0
160,996 4.5 60.0 170.59 102.40
ADMS MARK
DOUBLTREE
HILTON
HYATT
INT-C
MARRIOTT
OMNI
RENAISSAN
WYNDHAM
TOT UPSCALE
3 2.9
7 2.7
17 5.0
7 4.9
2
.7
18 7.1
10 3.7
6 2.5
10 3.7
80 33.1
1.3
1.2
2.2
2.2
.3
3.2
1.6
1.1
1.7
14.7
550
594
1,148
1,072
139
1,709
769
516
763
7,260
1.2
1.3
2.5
2.3
.3
3.6
1.6
1.1
1.6
15.5
53,148 1.5
68,995 1.9
117,705 3.3
151,999 4.3
17,260
.5
225,155 6.3
86,736 2.4
62,948 1.8
90,414 2.5
874,359 24.6
52.8
61.3
63.1
60.4
53.2
65.8
57.6
57.0
56.0
60.2
96.62
116.24
102.55
141.82
123.87
131.75
112.74
121.94
118.47
120.43
50.98
71.30
64.69
85.72
65.86
86.72
64.98
69.51
66.30
72.47
DOUBL STE
EMBASSY
HAWTHORN
HOMEWOOD
OTH SUITE
RADIS STE
RESIDENCE
STAYB
TOT SUITES
2
.5
15 3.4
12 1.2
18 1.9
29 4.5
2
.3
30 3.4
6
.7
113 15.9
.2
1.5
.5
.8
2.0
.1
1.5
.3
7.1
137
802
231
451
832
73
863
157
3,546
.3
1.7
.5
1.0
1.8
.2
1.8
.3
7.6
19,139
.5
98,139 2.8
18,713
.5
45,953 1.3
71,417 2.0
6,530
.2
87,312 2.5
13,987
.4
361,189 10.2
71.6
64.0
52.6
66.5
50.3
62.0
70.5
65.8
61.2
139.84
122.42
81.10
101.81
85.80
89.33
101.21
88.81
101.85
100.07
78.30
42.67
67.70
43.14
55.39
71.32
58.46
62.29
4 POINTS
CLARI
COURTYARD
CROWNPLZA
HILT GARD
HOLID INN
OTHER MUP
RADIS HTL
RED LION
SHERATON
TOT MID/UPS
2
.5
7 1.1
37 5.2
6 1.9
4
.5
51 11.9
3 1.1
12 3.6
1
.3
8 2.4
131 28.6
.2
.5
2.3
.9
.2
5.3
.5
1.6
.1
1.1
12.7
98
204
1,256
419
113
2,528
181
710
57
516
6,081
.2
.4
2.7
.9
.2
5.4
.4
1.5
.1
1.1
13.0
7,974
.2
11,493
.3
113,502 3.2
34,817 1.0
10,138
.3
193,612 5.4
15,000
.4
59,648 1.7
4,301
.1
46,032 1.3
496,517 14.0
52.7
50.5
66.5
60.2
59.6
58.3
45.1
53.6
51.7
58.2
58.3
81.00
56.37
90.40
83.10
89.72
76.60
83.01
84.03
75.96
89.15
81.65
42.67
28.44
60.08
49.99
53.46
44.63
37.43
45.08
39.28
51.87
47.63
2.7
1.0
1.7
2.2
1.0
.3
.5
.6
1.2
.4
.8
1.0
.4
.1
.2
.2
610
230
392
481
193
69
94
119
1.3
.5
.8
1.0
.4
.1
.2
.3
48,200
15,770
24,010
33,304
13,936
4,369
6,323
9,076
1.4
.4
.7
.9
.4
.1
.2
.3
61.7
64.8
62.6
60.8
55.5
56.7
49.4
58.9
79.00
68.54
61.27
69.19
72.28
63.23
67.24
75.96
48.75
44.45
38.33
42.08
40.09
35.84
33.25
44.72
8
.9
108 10.8
.4
4.8
192
2,381
.4
5.1
13,238
168,225
.4
4.7
60.0
60.4
68.89
70.66
41.35
42.65
AMERI STS
BRADFORD
CANDLWOOD
COMFO STE
HAWTH LTD
MAINSTAY
QUAL STES
SPRNGHILL
TOWNPLACE
TOT MIN STE
21
7
14
33
10
4
6
5
BRAND
AMERIHOST
BEST WEST
CNTRY INN
COMFO INN
CTRY HRTH
DOUBL CLB
DRURY INN
FAIRFIELD
HAMPTON
HOLID EXP
LA QUINTA
SHONEYS
SLEEP INN
WINGATE
TOT LTD SVE
# *
#* RMS
HTL 000S
3
.2
73 5.4
12
.8
49 3.6
1
.0
5 1.0
14 2.1
26 2.5
50 5.3
48 3.6
71 9.2
8
.8
8
.7
11 1.1
379 36.3
%
RMS
.1
2.4
.3
1.6
.0
.4
.9
1.1
2.4
1.6
4.1
.3
.3
.5
16.2
EST.
RNS
000S
44
1,113
150
743
12
218
476
555
1,273
833
2,002
160
137
222
7,938
%
RNS
.1
2.4
.3
1.6
.0
.5
1.0
1.2
2.7
1.8
4.3
.3
.3
.5
16.9
BUDG STES
CROSSLAND
EXT AMERI
HOMEGATE
HOMESTEAD
STUDIO +
SUBUR LDG
SUNST
WELLESLEY
X.EXT
TOT EXT STA
10 3.6
8 1.1
12 1.4
5
.6
11 1.5
16 1.4
15 2.0
8 1.1
11 1.3
42 5.6
138 19.6
1.6
.5
.6
.3
.7
.6
.9
.5
.6
2.5
8.7
787
289
372
88
387
331
501
281
276
1,386
4,699
1.7
.6
.8
.2
.8
.7
1.1
.6
.6
3.0
10.0
23,615
8,996
16,745
3,603
16,345
16,319
15,405
9,162
15,624
44,850
170,664
BAYMONT
DAYS INN
ECONOLODG
HO JO
MICROTEL
MOTEL 6
OTHER BUD
QUALITY
RAMAD INN
RAMAD LTD
RED ROOF
SUPER 8
TOT BUDGET
10 1.1
74 5.9
21 1.2
22 1.9
17
.9
62 6.9
41 3.5
14 1.3
23 3.9
27 1.9
22 2.9
65 4.2
399 35.7
.5
2.6
.5
.8
.4
3.1
1.6
.6
1.7
.8
1.3
1.9
15.9
234
1,067
229
323
174
1,585
641
243
541
335
618
850
6,840
.5
2.3
.5
.7
.4
3.4
1.4
.5
1.2
.7
1.3
1.8
14.6
11,640
48,771
9,772
15,840
7,909
65,010
25,963
13,125
29,121
16,092
29,308
40,034
312,585
82.1
39,689
TOT INDEP
17.9
7,157
779 40.2
$
AMT.
%
000s
AMT
2,781
.1
63,019 1.8
9,207
.3
42,681 1.2
657
.0
16,026
.5
35,245 1.0
36,460 1.0
92,520 2.6
59,119 1.7
130,181 3.7
7,931
.2
7,244
.2
13,832
.4
516,903 14.5
EST.
%OCC
66.4
56.0
53.1
56.2
66.3
62.3
63.4
61.5
65.5
62.7
59.5
56.7
51.5
56.5
59.9
EST.
$
RATE
63.03
56.63
61.39
57.46
56.58
73.50
74.01
65.65
72.65
70.99
65.04
49.63
52.70
62.35
65.12
$
RPAR
41.87
31.70
32.60
32.29
37.49
45.78
46.94
40.36
47.58
44.53
38.68
28.15
27.15
35.24
38.99
.7
.3
.5
.1
.5
.5
.4
.3
.4
1.3
4.8
59.3
70.7
75.0
40.5
71.2
65.4
68.9
70.9
56.3
68.0
65.7
29.99
31.13
45.04
40.86
42.21
49.36
30.73
32.65
56.56
32.35
36.32
17.79
22.02
33.79
16.53
30.05
32.31
21.18
23.16
31.85
21.98
23.86
.3
1.4
.3
.4
.2
1.8
.7
.4
.8
.5
.8
1.1
8.8
59.1
49.6
51.4
46.6
50.5
62.7
50.1
50.7
38.0
48.3
58.5
55.4
52.5
49.73
45.70
42.75
48.98
45.41
41.02
40.50
53.96
53.87
48.05
47.41
47.10
45.70
29.38
22.67
21.97
22.84
22.93
25.72
20.28
27.34
20.47
23.22
27.75
26.12
24.00
59.0
77.14
45.53
15.3
48.8
68.82
33.59
57.2
75.87
43.39
492,565 13.9
100
* ALL FIGURES ANNUALIZED. INCLUDES TAXED AND EST NON-TAX ROOM REVENUES.
INDEPENDENTS ARE CATEGORIZED L=LARGE ($100+ AVERAGE DAILY RATE), M=MEDIUM ($6099 ADR), AND S=SMALL (UNDER $60 ADR).
EXHIBIT V
A STUDY OF THE EFFECT OF HOTEL SIZE ON PERFORMANCE
IN THE TEXAS HOTEL INDUSTRY
THE CASE FOR DOWNSIZING NEW HOTELS
11/30/99
By Douglas W. Sutton and Bruce H. Walker
Source Strategies has long contended that the number of rooms a developer offers
in a new property is one of the key factors in determining a venture's relative
success or failure. It is every bit as important to size a hotel project
properly as it is to select the appropriate brand, and to develop in a suitable
market and location. We have previously conducted extensive studies of the
lodging market that support our hotel sizing contention, and we have taken this
opportunity to re-examine the issue using our extensive database of hotel and
motel performance for the State of Texas.
Before delving into the numbers that define the role of room count in a hotel's
performance, we should first highlight the basic industry theory of 'rightsizing' a property. The premise offered by many inexperienced developers is "If
I can make a profit constructing a 50 unit hotel in a given market, it would be
twice as profitable to develop 100 units." In virtually all cases nothing could
be farther from the truth. At some point adding rooms to a project reaches a
point of diminishing returns, and the investment in the additional units cannot
be economically justified.
To illustrate this point, mentally divide our hypothetical 100 unit project into
two 50 unit hotels. The initial 50 units may perform very well, with
occupancies over 70% and a very strong rate structure. However, the second 50
units are only utilized when there is overflow from the first hotel because its
rooms are 100% occupied. Effectively, the second 50 units may only attain an
occupancy of 30% or less. This low level of occupancy may prompt the general
manager to lower rates to bolster occupancy, but this is a losing battle.
Ultimately, overbuilding causes REVPAR erosion in the property, and in the
market as a whole.
Today's developers and lenders would not seriously consider involvement in a 50
unit project operating at this low level, but often times they accomplish the
same end by pushing for more units in a project than the market can effectively
support. If we now mentally put these two 50 unit properties back together (one
operating at 70%, the other at 30% occupancy), what we end up with is an
oversized 100 unit hotel that is running a mediocre 50% occupancy.
Over-sizing a hotel makes it difficult, if not impossible, to be competitive in
a marketplace. There are a finite number of roomnights sold to be divided among
existing hotels in the market, and developing a more conservatively sized
property helps insure that a profitable level of those roomnights can be
captured. Building a hotel is not the 'Field of Dreams'.... If you build it they won't come.... With the exception of destination resorts and some unique
convention hotels, people do not go someplace because there is a hotel. Rather,
they stay in a hotel because they want to be near someplace.
Builders who construct too many units usually put themselves in unenviable
financial situations. Many hotels which we see put up for sale were developed
with far too many units. The owners, having had difficulty getting a return on
their investment, are often trying to get out from under a bad investment.
There are even drastic cases of properties bulldozing entire wings to provide
additional parking, because those extra units are a financial burden, remaining
unsold the vast majority of the time.
Now that we've outlined the basic economic benefits of 'building small', let's
look into hotel performance numbers and see if they support this development
principle. We analyzed two separate hotel samplings: First we will look at
Comfort Inns across Texas as a selected brand sampling. Then we will look at
all branded hotels built during a given period of time for a more diverse
sampling.
Occupancy
66.9
65.3
66.5
62.8
61.8
56.6
44.6
43.8
63.2
Average
Daily
Rate
55.25
57.34
57.38
56.02
54.26
55.33
45.71
44.20
55.46
REVPAR
36.95
37.45
38.17
35.20
33.55
31.33
20.41
19.38
35.03
Looking only at occupancy, the following graph gives a clear depiction of the
notable negative impact of larger room counts on a hotel's ability to maintain
an acceptable level of roomnights sold. Properties with lower room counts were
clearly able to sustain a higher level of occupancy. Average occupancy ranged
from 66.9% for properties of 36-40 units, downward to a much lower 43.8% average
occupancy for properties in the 71-75 unit size bracket.
When looking at REVPAR, the following graph follows a very similar performance
curve, ranging from an average REVPAR of $36.95 for properties of 36-40 units,
downward to a mediocre $19.38 average REVPAR for properties in the 71-75 unit
size bracket. Note that the downward slide in both graphs did not begin until
room counts exceeded 50 units. Prior to that, a mild upward trend is
experienced. This appears to indicate that, on average, 50 units is the
'optimum' size for a Comfort Inn in Texas markets (excluding high priced areas).
Of course, this is an average number for this type of market. Each project must
be examined on an individual basis to determine the proper size to develop
within its given market.
The above chart and graphs clearly illustrates that Developers often missed the
mark, building more rooms than 'optimum.' 'Optimum' is defined as generating
the highest return on invested capital, and is closely tied to occupancy and
REVPAR generation.
Analyzing the above data provides a measure of the effect of over building. For
the typical range of rooms for Comfort Inn projects (40-75 rooms) outside of
higher priced areas, the occupancy dropped 23.1 points (a full 35%) from 66.9%
to 43.8% as room counts escalated. With a 35 unit increase in rooms from the
36-40 unit size bracket to the 71-75 unit size bracket, a resulting 35% drop in
occupancy is experienced.
The key question, is how to apply this principle to a given hotel project.
Naturally, each project would have to be judged on its individual merits, but
looking at an 'average' project for a single brand and product is very
revealing. All are Comfort Inns. All are very similar products in similar
market environments, leaving size as the major variable in performance.
In our sampling, the average project is 52 units in size. At this size, the
average occupancy is 62.8%. If we built 36% fewer rooms (38 units) our average
occupancy would rise a moderate 6.5% to 66.9%. Conversely, if we built 36% more
than average, (71 units) our average occupancy plummets by 42.5% to 43.8%.
Clearly there are some basic economic principles at work. Comfort Inns are
conservatively-sized. Building smaller than the average of 52 units yields
slightly higher occupancies, but the ability to charge ever higher rates as size
decreases is marginal. As rates rise, some consumers perceive lost value and
will stay at another property. On the other side of the coin, properties built
larger than the average 52 units suffer serious occupancy declines. At some
point the need for additional units that was envisioned by the optimistic
developer is simply not there, and the extra rooms only serve to depress the
overall performance of the property.
BRANDED HOTELS - ANALYSIS OF SIZING AND ITS IMPACT ON PERFORMANCE
In our second analysis, we selected a sampling of all Texas branded hotels
constructed from 1970-1975; 91 properties across Texas, predominantly 'Full
Service'. Our sampling was limited to hotels of less than 135 units. We once
again excluded those properties located in exclusive, higher priced markets.
For our analysis we examined performance results from the year 1985 when all
subject hotels were 10 to 15 years old, well into their aging life cycles.
The following chart of performance statistics from 1985 for branded properties
throughout Texas clearly illustrates the downward curve, with definite erosion
in performance measures as room count increases:
# of
Units Occupancy
00-44
70.0
45-59
73.9
60-74
66.8
75-89
62.7
90-104
60.9
105-119
57.8
120-134
55.5
98
59.8
Average
Daily
Rate
37.88
36.13
31.10
31.65
32.42
26.25
29.35
30.34
REVPAR
26.50
26.71
20.77
19.86
19.75
15.18
16.28
18.14
With occupancy declines being the strongest indicator of the negative impact of
building too large, the following graph provides a clear picture of the
descending performance slide as room counts increase. Once again, properties
with lower room counts were more insulated from market competition and were
therefore able to be more competitive in both favorable and depressed market
environments. Average occupancy ranged from 70% for properties of 44 units or
less, downward to a much lower 55.5% average occupancy for properties in the
120-134 unit size bracket, after peaking at 73.9% in the 45-59 size range.
As with the Comfort Inn analysis, the above data provides a measure of the
effect of over building. However, since a number of varying brands are
considered in this sample, the typical range in size of these projects ranges
from about 40 to 135. This is a wider range than the Comfort sampling, since
many of the brands in this sample typically have larger room counts than a
Comfort Inn. This is partially due to some brands' ability to support higher
room counts, and partially due to the tendency to overbuild in the early 1970s,
when all hotels in this sample were constructed.
While the 52 unit average for our Comfort Inn sample is reasonably close to
optimum sizing for that brand, the 98 unit average for this analysis appears to
be oversized. In our assessment, the optimum average number of rooms for this
sampling would have been 60 to 70 units, depending upon brand. In 1985, this
roomcount supported occupancies near 70%, with an average REVPAR of almost $27.
Compare this to the average capacity of 98 units attaining a much lower average
occupancy of 60.9% and REVPAR below $20. Clearly this lower level of
performance can be attributed to over-sizing projects in the early 1970s.
Looking at our average (oversized) roomcount of 98 units, increasing the size by
30% (135 units) would cause occupancy to slide 10% from 60.9% to 55.5%. On the
other hand, making the average project smaller (60 units, or 75% smaller) would
improve occupancy to 73.9%, or a healthy 21% increase.
For the sake of comparison, let us assume that the average property was more
appropriately sized at about 60 units. If the project size were increased to
135 units, the largest range in our sample, occupancy would suffer a significant
33% decline from optimum levels.
Of course this assumes that locational differences are not significant. We
believe this is true; the large sample and clear correlation between size and
performance support this conclusion.
SUMMARY
The data is clear. In most cases, small hotels outperform large hotels, with
the exception of higher-priced markets where competitive barriers to entry exist
(e.g. lack of land, excessive land cost, building restrictions, etc.).
Common sense explains this occurrence: a successful 100 room hotel will
inevitably prompt the development of one or more new, small hotels of similar
quality in the immediate area. In a competitive market environment, the smaller
hotel has a distinct advantage and wins - almost every time.
EXHIBIT VI
START-UP PERFORMANCE OF NEW HOTELS AND MOTELS
A new study by Source Strategies, Inc., utilizing all new chain hotels opened in
Texas between 1990 and 1994, shows that new hotels and motels provide their peak
performance in Years III through V, when they typically reach 112% of their 20year average REVPAR performance level.
In other words, the newness of a property is an advantage on the order of a 12%
premium in Years III through V - versus the average REVPAR that would otherwise
be expected for that property over a twenty-year period. That's because the
consumer almost always picks new over old because, to them, 'new' means 'clean'
and 'new' means 'value.' Perhaps this is not news to many, but it is highly
important to those who forecast the performance of new properties.
Here's what the graph looks like for the first twelve years for new properties
opened in the moderately-good and improving markets of the 1990's. The years
after peak are projected based on two major previous studies: one by La Quinta
in the early 1980's and the second last year by Source Strategies, Inc.
Year I at 92% of the 20 Year Average, Year II at 107%
The study found that a property could expect a REVPAR at Year I of 92% of the
twenty-year average for a project. In Year II, this would move to 107% and to
112% in Years' III through V.
For example, if over the twenty-year span of the project, we expect a
hypothetical new hotel to generate 105% of the market average REVPAR, this means
that in Year I it would generate 97% of market (105% times 92%), and in Year II
112% (105% times Year II's 107%), and then peak at 118% for Years III-V.
Study Method
The underlying design for this study was to determine what effect a property's
age had on its REVPAR during the first five years of operation.
From two other studies, we know that properties will decline at 1.67% per year,
versus the market average, over long periods of time. The second study sample
consisted of all new Texas development in the early 1980's, a time of major
under-supply. Consequently, the first few years performance of this group of
hotels and motels was probably be overstated - versus the current, more-normal
times. The current study confirmed that belief.
The current study's design was to develop the REVPAR index for every new chain
property (each new property's REVPAR, divided by the REVPAR of all nearby hotels
and motels). Then all the resulting indices were averaged.
This process was done for each year of development, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993 and
1994, in order to obtain data for "Year I," "Year II" and so on. These were
averaged as well to obtain an over-all, average Year I result.
This process produced the graph curve shown above, and is reflective of the
particular mix of chain properties, a mix which produced REVPAR slightly above
the market average. To eliminate the effect of a specific mix of chains, the
scale was moved down slightly, so that the application of the year-by-year
REVPAR indices to any project would result in averaging 100 of the first twenty
years of the project.
Year I
41.97
35.38
119
Opened 1991
8 Chain hotels
Local Market Average
Index New Chain/Market
Year I
32.06
29.96
107
Year IV
54.17
39.71
136
Year V
59.45
43.31
137
Year VI
66.16
48.87
135
Year IV
44.18
33.04
134
Year V
46.26
33.70
137
(Peak)
Year VI
Year IV
41.74
Year V
Year VI
Year I
25.07
30.60
82
Opened 1993
16 Chain hotels
Local Market Average
Index New Chain/Market
Year I
24.51
30.70
80
est
135
33.62
109
34.36
37.49
est
116
111
111
(Peak)
Above assumes Year V is "flat" and Year VI index declines by 1.67%
Year II Year III
29.15
33.19
31.88
35.27
91
94
(Peak)
est
109
Year IV
Year V
Year VI
est
94
(Peak)
est
93
est
91
Above assumes Year III and IV are Peak, and Year V and Year VI index
declines by 1.67% annually
Opened 1994
29 Chain hotels
Local Market Average
Index New Chain/Market
Year I
30.40
38.68
79
Year IV
Year V
Year VI
est
89
est
87
est
86
Above assumes Year III and Year IV Peak equals Year II plus 4%, as above,
and Year V and Year VI index declines by 1.67% annually
COMBINED INDICES
Year I
Average of Raw Data
93
Adjusted 100 over 20 years
92
Peak
Year II Year III
108
113
107
112
Year IV
113
112
Year V
113
112
Year VI
111
110
EXHIBIT VII
CapEx: A STUDY OF CAPITAL EXPENDITURES IN THE US HOTEL INDUSTRY
THE FOLLOWING IS A SUMMARY OF THE INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY OF HOSPITALITY
CONSULTANTS' 2000 "CAPEX STUDY, A STUDY OF CAPITAL EXPENDITURES IN THE US HOTEL
INDUSTRY" AS IT APPLIES TO LIMITED SERVICE PROPERTIES:
The objective of our historical analysis in CapEx 2000 was to determine what has
been spent in the past to maintain a hotel in good, competitive condition.
Hotel owners and management companies were contacted to provide data for the
study.
Definition of CapEx
"Capital Expenditure" is defined as: investments of cash or the creation of
liability to acquire or improve an asset, e.g., land, buildings, building
additions, site improvements, machinery, equipment; Comparatively, the "reserve
for replacement" for a hotel asset has been narrowly defined as the funds set
aside for the periodic replacement of furniture, fixtures and equipment (FF&E).
The reserve was not contemplated to fund the replacement of major building
components, such as roofs, elevators, and chillers.
For this study the term has been defined as: the cost of replacing worn out
FF&E, as well as the cost of;
- updating design and decor
- curing functional and economic obsolescence...
- complying with franchisors' brand requirements
- technology improvements
- product change to meet market demands
- adhering to government regulatory requirements
- replacing all short and long lived building components due to wear and tear
Although many equity investors frequently argue against the necessity of a
reserve, particularly if the investor does not plan to hold the property for
greater than five years, the requirement for and amount of reserves are
typically contractual issues between ownership, lender, manager, and/or
franchisor/franchisee.
Significant Findings of CapEx 2000
The average amount spent per year by limited-service hotels in the survey was
determined to be 5.5% of total revenue for the time period covered by CapEx 2000
(1988-1998). As these limited-service hotels have matured, CapEx has increased,
underscoring one of our principal findings that CapEx requirements increase as a
hotel ages.
CapEx Spending is highly dependent upon a hotel's point in its life cycle. The
following chart shows the range of CapEx spending (as a percentage of total
revenues) over a 25-year time period; the table following the chart identifies
the specific ranges of CapEx spending as a%age of total revenues by year.
Percentage Range of
CapEx Spending by Year
Year
Range Minimum
Range Maximum
1
1.65%
4.51%
2
1.72%
3.29%
3
1.48%
3.15%
4
1.31%
3.64%
5
3.21%
6.23%
6
4.80%
6.77%
7
4.15%
5.85%
8
3.60%
5.23%
9
4.83%
7.01%
10
8.43%
11.94%
11
4.66%
6.55%
12
5.42%
9.36%
13
4.66%
9.93%
14
4.66%
7.82%
15
3.35%
5.72%
16
5.12%
12.40%
17
5.10%
10.50%
18
2.51%
9.72%
19
2.93%
8.10%
20
2.37%
8.68%
21
2.37%
6.99%
22
3.20%
6.84%
23
5.07%
16.98%
24
3.45%
12.88%
25
5.05%
10.24%
As the data indicates, CapEx spending increases over time for all (U.S.) hotels,
with large differences in both the level of CapEx spending and timing across
different hotels. The data illustrates that, over time, the minimum and maximum
levels of CapEx spending generally widens as a hotel increases in age.
For limited-service hotels, the first major increase in spending occurs in the
sixth year, which likely represents the replacement of soft goods. The first
major spike occurs in year 10, which is likely to be the result of a rooms and
corridors renovation. Smaller spikes in CapEx spending occur in the following
years, with the next major spending spike occurring in year 17, which is likely
building and some mechanical renovation and replacement.
The following series of tables illustrates limited-service CapEx spending levels
in various demographic categories:
CapEx 2000- Limited Service Hotels by Location
Location
All Properties
Airport
Urban
Small City/Hwy
Suburban
Average
Age
12.0 yrs
9.8 yrs
15.2 yrs
9.2 yrs
10.5 yrs
Capex/Total
Revenue
5.5%
5.4%
4.3%
5.1%
5.7%
CapEx per
Room per Year
$1,111
$1,268
$ 820
$ 773
$1,172
Average
Capex/Total
CapEx per
Daily Rate
All Properties
< $60
$60-$80
> $80
12.0
12.7
12.5
12.0
Age
yrs
yrs
yrs
yrs
Revenue
5.5%
5.0%
6.3%
5.3%
Average
Age
12.0 yrs
8.7 yrs
10.3 yrs
20.0 yrs
Capex/Total
Revenue
5.5%
3.3%
5.4%
6.9%
CapEx per
Room per Year
$1,111
$ 475
$1,107
$1,360
Average
Daily Rate
All Properties
> 15 yrs old
5-15 yrs old
< 5 yrs old
Capex/Total
Revenue
5.5%
6.5%
4.8%
3.0%
CapEx per
Room per Year
$1,111
$1,372
$ 897
$ 547
Overall, the study details the varying levels of capital required to keep a
hotel competitive in its life cycle. Historically, many operators have held no
more than 3-4% of gross revenues in reserve, a level which may be sufficient for
FF&E replacement, but is woefully inadequate for other required expenditures.
EXHIBIT VIII
HISTORICAL EXAMINATION OF SAN ANTONIO
CENTRAL BUSINESS DISTRICT: IMPACT OF CONVENTION CENTER
RENOVATION & THEME PARK OPENINGS
This section has been prepared to illustrate the fact that convention
renovations/expansions do not necessarily have any impact on Room Nights Sold
(RNS). For this case study we looked at the San Antonio Central Business
District and the impact that historical events, such as theme park openings, as
well as convention center renovations/expansion, have had on RNS.
Approaching the question of impact on a historical timeline, we found that both
theme parks opened following a decline in annual RNS contribution from
conventions in San Antonio. Seaworld opened in the 2nd quarter of 1988
following an 8% decline in RNS from conventions in 1987, and a 4% decline in RNS
contribution in 1986. While the CBD market saw a total decline in RNS of 11% in
1986, it saw a 7% increase in RNS in 1987. Following the opening of Seaworld,
both convention RNS (+28%) and CBD RNS (+21%) saw significant increases. Part
of these increases were driven by the openings of significant demand generators,
while part of the increases were natural continuations of a growing hotel market
which was recovering ground lost in previous years.
In 1991, preceeding the opening of Fiesta Texas, convention RNS declined 4%
versus the year before, while CBD RNS increased 2%. Following the opening of
Fiesta Texas in the first quarter of 1992, CBD RNS rose 7% while convention RNS
rose 3%.
Summary: It is our opinion that the opening of theme parks as economic
generators for RNS, both for tourism and conventions, is significant. This is
particularly true when examined in terms of the synergy that attractions like
the San Antonio Riverwalk, the Alamo, and large theme parks have in attracting
visitors.
The expansion of the San Antonio Convention Center began with much fanfare on
the 2nd quarter of 1998, following two years of declines in convention RNS (-2%
per year). While the expansion was underway, RNS from conventions rose 10% in
1998 and fell 10% in 1999. The expansion was completed in the 4th quarter of
1999, after which the renovation of the existing convention center space was
begun. The renovation of the convention center finished in the 2nd quarter of
2001.
TABLE I
ACTUAL
ANNUAL ACTUAL ANN. ACTUAL ANNUAL
CONVENT. CONVENT. %GAIN
CBD
%GAIN METRO
%GAIN
YEAR
ATTEND.
RNS
/LOSS
RNS /LOSS RNS
/LOSS
1980
270.4
432.7
867.9
2,648.4
81
320.3
512.5
18%
961.4
11% 3,034.3
15%
82
332.0
531.1
4%
997.4
4% 3,018.8
-1%
83
372.1
595.4
12% 1,070.8
7% 2,952.0
-2%
84
384.3
614.8
3% 1,169.9
9% 3,216.9
9%
85
374.8
599.7
-2% 1,247.2
7% 3,689.4
15%
86
361.5
578.4
-4% 1,108.5
-11% 3,348.7
-9%
87
333.8
534.1
-8% 1,182.7
7% 3,504.7
5%
SEAWORLD 88
387.9
685.3
28% 1,435.1
21% 4,292.1
22%
89
443.9
728.6
6% 1,644.6
15% 4,566.3
6%
1990
521.3
797.1
9% 1,740.5
6% 4,684.9
3%
91
536.7
764.8
-4% 1,780.4
2% 4,831.0
3%
FIESTA TX 92
513.2
786.6
3% 1,904.8
7% 5,095.0
5%
93
94
95
96
97
Begin Exp 98
Exp/Renov 99
2000
Finis Ren 01
576.7
489.0
512.1
575.7
572.0
607.9
552.2
515.5
524.7
976.7
947.8
982.1
959.5
944.8
1,038.5
939.0
921.5
903.0
24%
-3%
4%
-2%
-2%
10%
-10%
-2%
-2%
1,963.8
1,922.2
1,937.1
2,061.1
2,107.8
2,263.4
2,305.4
2,487.0
2,380.4
3%
-2%
1%
6%
2%
7%
2%
8%
-4%
5,296.9
5,364.8
5,386.3
5,674.5
5,816.2
6,238.1
6,326.6
6,712.7
6,696.5
4%
1%
0%
5%
2%
7%
1%
6%
0%
The data above indicates that while the CBD tends to trend with the metro area
in annual gains and losses of RNS, the convention center follows its own path,
as convention center business is in our opinion driven by advertising and
promotion through the San Antonio Convention and Visitors Bureau. Growth in RNS
coincides across all three market areas when a major economic generator like a
theme park opens, not when a convention center is expanded.
While convention center RNS has grown steadily since 1985, it has not kept pace
with the CBD's growth in RNS. Since 1980, convention RNS have averaged 44.3% of
total CBD RNS. However, this percentage has been declining steadily since the
beginning of the history studied, as follows:
TABLE II
YEARS
80-84
85-89
90-94
95-99
2000
2001
% OF
CBD
RNS
52.9
47.5
45.8
45.7
37.1
37.9
Even after the expansion of the convention center it is clear that convention
RNS are not able to keep pace with the wider RNS growth in the San Antonio CBD
market.
It is our opinion that conventions and RNS through conventions are dependent on
outside economic factors. In other words, the economy of a nation or of a metro
area with significant attractions will influence the number of RNS generated
through conventions. Convention Centers do not in themselves cause Room Nights
Sold to be generated. Rather, convention planners choose destinations based on
the attractions that exist in an area, not simply the availability of facilities
in that area. Furthermore, the construction of a 1,000 room hotel in San
Antonio (the Marriott Rivercenter) did not significantly effect either CBD
REVPAR nor RNS because it opened at a time when demand for hotel rooms was very
high. Rather than creating demand for its rooms, it filled demand that was
created by the opening of Seaworld and natural market growth.
1) SEAWORLD OPENS 2) FIESTA TEXAS OPENS 3) CC EXPANSION BEGINS
FINISHES & RENOV. BEGINS 5) RENOVATION FINISHES
4)
CC EXP.
TABLE III
RNS PROJECTIONS WITH FORECAST FOR CONVENTION RNS
ACTUAL
ACTUAL
ACTUAL
CONVENT. CONVENT. %GAIN
CBD
%GAIN METRO
YEAR
ATTEND.
RNS
/LOSS
RNS /LOSS RNS
02
574
952
5%
2,389
0%
7,136
03
363
993
4%
2,465
3%
7,340
04
405
1,004
1%
2,564
4%
7,561
05
399
1,031
3%
2,654
4%
7,787
06
385
1,073
4%
2,737
3%
8,021
07
357
1,113
4%
2,819
3%
8,261
08
775
1,144
3%
2,903
3%
8,509
09
798
1,173
3%
2,990
3%
8,765
2010
822
1,208
3%
3,080
3%
9,027
%GAIN
/LOSS
7%
3%
3%
3%
3%
3%
3%
3%
3%
We have also graphed the projections of RNS growth for conventions, CBD, and
Metro.
Looking at the history and the projection of just the estimated convention RNS,
it is clear that expectations for growth in this market are stable and realistic
in comparison with the past. However, previous graphs illustrate that as a
percentage of total CBD RNS, convention roomnights are shrinking. This is
essentially because of increased competition with other convention destinations,
and the ease of expanding the San Antonio CBD hotel room supply. More and more
it is the leisure traveler who is taking advantage of lodging and facilities
that were originally developed to be used by convention delegates.
CONCLUSIONS
It is obvious from Table I that RNS from conventions are not clearly tied to
growth in the CBD market, and vice versa. Typically, for the opening of a theme
park there is a large increase in RNS which is independent of barriers between
different markets in the San Antonio Metro.
However, in light of the lack of RNS increases following the renovation of the
convention center or following the completed expansion of the convention center,
it must be noted that there is no proven increase in roomnights sold based on
convention center expansion. While the convention business throughout the U.S.
is suffering significantly after the fall of the World Trade Centers and the
continuing economic woes the country is enduring, it may also have simple
reached its peak in San Antonio. In other words, were a convention
'headquarters' hotel be built alongside the expanded center, it would likely not
significantly increase the number of convention RNS expected to be generated by
the C&VB in the future.
Hilton Hotel
Compound
Growth
Year
2
3
4
8
9
10 Yr 2-10
Rmnites Sold
141,295
145,812
147,720
147,936
145,745
142,963
1.4%
Rmnites Avai
219,000
219,000
219,000
219,000
219,000
219,000
0.0%
Occupancy %
64.5%
66.6%
67.5%
67.6%
66.6%
65.3%
1.4%
Avg Rate*
$110.19
$113.73
$117.37
$133.13
$137.12
$141.24
3.2%
REVPAR
$71.09
$75.72
$79.17
$89.93
$91.25
$92.20
4.6%
149,652
149,078
148,506
219,000
219,000
219,000
68.3%
68.1%
67.8%
$121.13
$125.00
$129.00
$82.77
$85.09
$87.48
3,328,945
4.6%
732,738
754,720
777,362
151,247
155,784
160,458
842,173
864,111
886,620
291,863
299,465
307,266
583,725
598,931
614,532
1,113,655
1,142,665
1,172,429
130,039
133,549
137,153
538,362
552,892
567,815
4,383,801
4,502,117
4,623,634
1,751,720
1,797,352
1,844,169
6,135,522
6,299,469
6,467,803
3,480,412
3,578,003
3,678,331
Other
2,466,157 2,626,858
3,119,714 3,165,598 3,198,333
Total F & B 5,455,439 5,810,928
6,901,187 7,002,688 7,075,101
2,746,380
4.6%
6,075,325
4.6%
2,871,340
2,951,853
3,034,623
6,351,752
6,529,856
6,712,954
Oth Expense
445,278
474,294
495,874
563,282
571,566
577,477
4.6%
518,436
532,973
547,918
Departmental Profits
Rooms
10,214,552 10,923,551 11,445,268 11,991,625 12,335,965 12,690,172
13,054,525 13,228,893 13,342,620
4.9%
F & B
2,017,765 2,149,247 2,247,038 2,349,278 2,415,152 2,482,874
2,552,494 2,590,035 2,616,818
4.6%
Other
1,781,114 1,897,175 1,983,496 2,073,746 2,131,894 2,191,672
2,253,127 2,286,266 2,309,907
4.6%
Total
14,013,430 14,969,973 15,675,802 16,414,649 16,883,011 17,364,718
17,860,146 18,105,194 18,269,345
4.8%
Hilton Hotel
Compound
Growth
Year
2
3
4
8
9
10 Yr 2-10
Rmnites Sold
141,295
145,812
147,720
147,936
145,745
142,963
1.4%
Rmnites Avai
219,000
219,000
219,000
219,000
219,000
219,000
0.0%
Occupancy %
64.5%
66.6%
67.5%
67.6%
66.6%
65.3%
1.4%
Avg Rate*
$110.19
$113.73
$117.37
$133.13
$137.12
$141.24
3.2%
REVPAR
$71.09
$75.72
$79.17
$89.93
$91.25
$92.20
4.6%
149,652
149,078
148,506
219,000
219,000
219,000
68.3%
68.1%
67.8%
$121.13
$125.00
$129.00
$82.77
$85.09
$87.48
8,624,674
5.4%
1,718,314
1,769,863
1,822,959
2,206,527
2,268,398
2,332,005
906,357
931,772
957,899
1,196,637
1,227,808
1,259,790
1,313,382
1,347,595
1,382,697
7,341,216
7,545,436
7,755,349
9,073,433
9,337,575
9,609,369
Management
787,807
Income Bef
9,101,224
Fixed
Fee 622,767
663,348
693,530
799,394
807,660
4.6%
6,975,796 7,533,890 7,931,144
9,188,633 9,222,564
5.4%
Charges
-Fixed: Insu
202,150
215,323
225,120
255,722
259,483
262,166
4.6%
Property Tax
758,063
807,460
844,200
958,958
973,062
983,124
4.6%
Deprec SL 39 3,333,334 3,333,334 3,333,334
3,333,334 3,333,334 3,333,334
0.0%
Tot Fixed Ex 4,293,547 4,356,117 4,402,653
4,548,014 4,565,879 4,578,624
1.1%
Net Income B 2,682,249 3,177,773 3,528,490
4,553,211 4,622,754 4,643,940
12.8%
Tax & Financing
725,086
745,417
766,319
8,348,347
8,592,158
8,843,050
235,363
241,962
248,747
882,611
907,359
932,802
3,333,334
3,333,334
3,333,334
4,451,308
4,482,656
4,514,883
3,897,039
4,109,502
4,328,167