Freedom A strange inner mutation is spreading throughout humanity, according to Marcel.

As odd as it first seems, this mutation is evoked by the awareness that members of humanity are contingent on conditions which make up the framework for their very existence. Man recognizes that at root, he is an existing thing, but he somehow feels compelled to prove his life is more significant than that. He begins to believe that the things he surrounds himself with can make his life more meaningful or valuable. This belief, says Marcel, has thrown man into a ghostly state of quandary caused by a desire to possess rather than to be. All people become a master of defining their individual selves by either their possessions or by their professions. Meaning is forced into life through these venues. Even more, individuals begin to believe that their lives have worth because they are tied to these things, these objects. This devolution creates a situation in which individuals experience the self only as a statement, as an object, I am x. The objectification of the self through ones possessions robs one of her freedom, and separates her from the experiences of her own participation in being. The idolatrous world of perverted possession must be abandoned if the true reality of humanity is to be reached (SZ 285). Perhaps most known for his views on freedom, Marcel gave to existentialism a view of freedom that marries the absolute indeterminacy of traditional existentialism with Marcels view that transcendence out of facticity can only come by depending upon others with the same goals. The result is a type of freedom-by-degrees in which all people are free, since to be free is to be self-governing, but not all people experience freedom that can lead them out of objectification. The experience of freedom cannot be achieved unless the subject extricates herself from the grip of egocentrism, since freedom is not simply doing what desire dictates. The person who sees herself as autonomous within herself has a freedom based on ill-fated egocentrism. She errs in believing freedom to be rooted on independence. Freedom is defined by Marcel in both a negative and positive sense. Negatively, freedom is, The absence of whatever resembles an alienation from oneself, and positively as when, The motives of my action are within the limits of what I can legitimately consider as the structural traits of my self, (TF, 232). Freedom, then, is always about the possibilities of the self, understood within the confines of relationships with others. As an existentialist, Marcels freedom is tied to the raw experiences of the body. However, the phenomenology of Marcelian freedom is characterized by his insistence that freedom is something to be experienced, and the self is fully free when it is submerged in the possibilities of the self and the needs of others. Although all humans have basic, autonomous freedom (Marcel thought of this as capricious freedom), in virtue of their embodiment and consciousness; only those persons who seek to experience being by freely engaging with other free beings can break out of the facticity of the body and into the fulfillment of being. The free act is significant because it contributes to defining the self, By freedom I am given back to myself, (VII vii). At first glance, Marcelian freedom is paradoxical: the more one enters into a self-centered project, the less legitimate it is to say that the act is free, whereas the more the self is engaged with other free individuals, the more the self is free. However, the phenomenological experience of freedom is less paradoxical when it is seen through the lens of the engagement of freedom. Ontologically, we rarely have experiences of the singular self; instead, our experiences are bound to those with whom we interact. Freedom based on the very participation that the free act seeks to affirm is the ground of the true experience of freedom towards which Marcel gravitates.

Man recognizes that at root, he is an existing thing, but he somehow feels compelled to prove his life is more significant than that. He begins to believe that the things he surrounds himself with can make his life more meaningful or valuable. This belief, says Marcel, has thrown man into a dilemma caused by a desire to possess rather than to be. This devolution creates a situation in which individuals experience the self only as a statement, as an object, I am x. The objectification of the self through ones possessions robs one of her freedom, and separates her from the experiences of her own participation in being. To be free is to be self-governing, but not all experience freedom that can lead them out of objectification. The experience of freedom cannot be achieved unless the subject escapes herself from the grip of egocentrism or self-centeredness, since freedom is not simply doing what desire dictates. The person who sees herself as autonomous within herself has a freedom based on ill-fated egocentrism. Freedom is defines negatively and positively: o The absence of whatever resembles an alienation from oneself, (Negatively) So parang to be free means to NOT alienate hence be true to ones self kahit pa sinasabi earlier na hindi din considered na free pag personal desires ang sinusunod. o The motives of my action are within the limits of what I can legitimately consider as the structural traits of my self, (Positively) So still, to be free may legitimacy na nirerequire ang mga actions. Parang theres still moral judgment even personally para maconsider na free ung actions and ung tao. Freedom, then, is always about the possibilities of the self, understood within the confines of relationships with others. Although all humans have basic, autonomous freedom (Marcel thought of this as capricious freedom), in virtue of their embodiment and consciousness; only those persons who seek to experience being by freely engaging with other free beings can break out of the contingency of the body and into the fulfilment of being. The more one enters into a self-centered project, the less legitimate it is to say that the act is free, whereas the more the self is engaged with other free individuals, the more the self is free. Ontologically, we rarely have experiences of the singular self; instead, our experiences are bound to those with whom we interact. o Kumbaga babalikan natin ung third bullet na definition na ang dilemma ng freedom is mas focus ang mga tao sa possession rather sa being which is the experience. SITUATION: o A person na living alone na successful sa career niya and may mga peers siya pero parang wala siyang nabubuong serious and meaningful relationships whether romantically or hindi.

Artist na kahit na ang liberated niya sa mga artworks niya, hindi siya contented sa buhay niya. Parang ang dami pa rin niyang gusting patunayan although he shows a strong and self fulfilled image kasi successful na siya somehow. Tapos nanggagaling pala sa lack of meaningful relationship and concern niya for others ung emptiness rather ung parang lack of freedom even though he is liberated in his life.

Participation Marcel was an early proponent of what would become a major Sartrean existential tenet: I am my body. For Marcel, the body does not have instrumental value, nor is it simply a part or extension of the self. Instead, the self cannot be eradicated from the body. It is impossible for the self to conceive of the body in any way at all except for as a distinct entity identified with the self (CF 23). Existence is prior, and existence is prior to any abstracting that we do on the basis of our perception. Existence is undoubted, and existence is in opposition to the abstraction of objectivity (TW 225). That we are body, of course, naturally lends us to think of the body in terms of object. But individuals who resort to seeing the self and the world in terms of functionality are ontologically deficient because not only can they not properly respond to the needs of others, but they have become isolated and independent from others. It is our active freedom that prevents us from the snare of objectifying the self, and which brings us into relationships with others. When we are able to act freely, we can move away from the isolated perspective of the problematic man (I am body only,) to that of the participative subject (I am a being among beings) who is capable of interaction with others in the world. Marcelian participation is possible through a special type of reflection in which the subject views herself as a being among beings, rather than as an object. This reflection is secondary reflection, and is distinguished from both primary reflection and mere contemplation. Primary reflection explains the relationship of an individual to the world based on her existence as an object in the world, whereas secondary reflection takes as its point of departure the being of the individual among others. The goal of primary reflection, then, is to problematize the self and its relation to the world, and so it seeks to reduce and conquer particular things. Marcel rejects primary reflection as applicable to ontological matters because he believes it cannot understand the main metaphysical issue involved in existence: the incommunicable experience of the body as mine. Neither does mere contemplation suffice to explain this phenomenon. Contemplation is existentially significant, because it indicates the act by which the self concentrates its attention on its self, but such an act without secondary reflection would result in the same egocentrism that Marcel attempts to avoid through his work. Secondary reflection has as its goal the explication of existence, which cannot be separated from the individual, who is in turn situated among others. For Marcel, an understanding of ones being is only possible through secondary reflection, since it is a reflection whereby the self asks itself how and from what starting point the self is able to proceed (E 14). The existential impetus of secondary reflection cannot be overemphasized for Marcel: Participation which involves the presence of the self to the world is only possible if the temptation to assume the self is wholly distinct from the world is overcome (CF 22). The existential upshot is that secondary reflection allows the individual to seek out others, and it dissolves the dualism of primary reflection by realizing the lived bodys relation to the ego.

Reflexive reflection is the reflection of the exigent self (see 5 below). It occurs when the subject is in communion with others, and is free and also dependent upon others (as discussed in 2). Reflexive reflection is an inward looking that allows the self to be receptive to the call of others. Yet, Marcel does not call on the participative subject to be reflective for receptivitys sake. Rather, the self cannot fully understand the existential position without orientating itself to something other than the self.

Early proponent of what would become a major Sartrean existential tenet: I am my body Existence is prior to any abstracting that we do on the basis of our perception. Existence is in opposition to the abstraction of objectivity we are a body, of course, naturally lends us to think of the body in terms of object. Necessity of Freedom for Participation: o When we are able to act freely, we can move away from the isolated perspective of the problematic man (I am body only,) to that of the participative subject (I am a being among beings) who is capable of interaction with others in the world. Marcelian participation is possible through a special type of reflection in which the subject views herself as a being among beings, rather than as an object. This reflection is secondary reflection, and is distinguished from both primary reflection and mere contemplation o Primary reflection Explains the relationship of an individual to the world based on her existence as an object in the world. Problematize the self and its relation to the world, and so it seeks to reduce and conquer particular things. Marcel rejects primary reflection as applicable to ontological matters because he believes it cannot understand the main metaphysical issue involved in existence: the incommunicable experience of the body as mine. o Contemplation Contemplation is existentially significant, because it indicates the act by which the self concentrates its attention on its self, but such an act without secondary reflection would result in the same egocentrism that Marcel attempts to avoid through his work. o Secondary Reflection Secondary reflection has as its goal the explication of existence, which cannot be separated from the individual, who is in turn situated among others. Participation which involves the presence of the self to the world is only possible if the temptation to assume the self is wholly distinct from the world is overcome o Pag hindi na iniintindi na kailangan bang may special purpose ang isang tao sa mundo, possible ang sinasabi nyang participation. SITUATION: o Isang average guy na nabubuhay lang ng normal na hindi kayamanan pero maganda ang career. Tapos by nature, mabait siya pero parang feeling niya may kulang pa rin sa pagkatao niya. Un pala hell realize eventually na di dahil nagiging mabuting tao siya, complete na sya. Kulang pa kasi wala naman siyang tinutulong or kinikilos na para at kasama ang ibang tao. Even more, marerealize niya na makikita niya ang meaning ng buhay niya, hindi lang sa sarili niya kundi sa kung sino siya kasama ang ibang tao.

Presence The term presence is used in various ways in the English language, although each connote a hereness that indicates whether or not a subject was here. One of the differences in how we use the term is in the strength of a things here-ness. Two people sitting in close physical proximity on an airplane might not be present to each other, although people miles away speaking on a phone might have a stronger awareness of being together. There is mystery in presence, according to Marcel, because presence can transcend the objective physical fact of being-with each other. Presence is concerned with recognizing the self as a being-among-beings, and acknowledging the relevance of others experiences to the self, as a being. The notion of presence for Marcel is comprised of two other parallel notions, communion and availability. Together, communion and availability enable an individual to come into a complete participation with another being. Although presence is found throughout Marcels work, he admits that it is impossible to give a rigorous definition of it. Rather than working out a lexical definition of the term, we ought to evoke its meaning through our shared experiences. Marcel demonstrates this by noting how easy it is to find ourselves with others who are not significantly present at all, and at other times we are present to those who are not physically with us at all. The mark of presence is the mutual tie to the other. For Marcel, it means that the self is given to the other, and that givenness is responsively received or reciprocated. (The reciprocity of presence is a necessary condition for it.) Presence is shared, then, in virtue of our openness to each other. This openness is not linguistically based, since it is beyond the physical relation and communication among individuals. Non-linguistic presence is possible for Marcel because of an aspect of presence Marcel calls communion. Communion with other participative beings is renewing to the self as a result of the other giving to me out of who he is, rather than merely by what he says. Marcel almost certainly borrows from Martin Bubers I-Thou in his view of communion, in that Bubers ontological communion is the free expression of those who are able to give and receive freely to each other so that an encounter with the other is possible, and for Marcel this communion is expressed as a free reception of the other to oneself (IB 136). Communion-as-encounter, according to Marcel (GR 273), is encapsulated by the French en, whereas in English, within best represents the envelopment of ones being that occurs in communion. A shared experience allows for a more full understanding of ones own being. If the self is in communion with another, and is present to the other, the self is more present towards the self. Communion with others can give new meaning to experiences that otherwise would have been closed to the self. For interactions in which there is communication without communion, Marcel believes that the self becomes an object to the one with whom the communication is occurring. And, where there is objectification, there cannot be participation, and without the availability of participation, there cannot be presence. A key aspect of communion, then, is the way it limits the objectification of beings. Marcel argues that one cannot have presence withthat is, one cannot welcome or gather to the selfwhatever is purely and simply an object. For objects, the self can take it or leave it, but presence can only be invoked or evoked (VI 208). Presence that results from communion produces a bond between those who are in participation with another, who are receptive to another, and who are committed to sharing in each others experiences. Communion is necessary for presence, but is entwined with Marcels notion of availability, disponibilit. If it is true that participative beings can have communion with each other,

and so encounter one another, then there must be another component to presence that enables a once-objectified person to respond to the encounter of communion. The ability to yield to that which is encountered, and so to pledge oneself to another, is the component of presence that Marcel calls availability (HV 23). Availability can be understood as being at hand, or handiness, so that a person is ready to respond to another when called upon. The available subject seeks out other available subjects as individuals whose experiences can compliment and more fully speak to her. Of course, for anothers experiences to speak to the subject, she must be open to the influence and needs of the other. But this openness cannot result in the objectification of the subject by the other. To be available is not to be possessed as an object. Rather, to be available means that that the best use the subject can make of her freedom is to place it in the others hands, as a free response to who the other is. The subject is not an object to be disposed of, then, but a fellow subject in need of the influence of the experiences of the other. The positive result of living an available life is that it makes the subject more fully aware of herself than she would be if she did not have the relationship. No longer does the subject have to struggle with her facticity, but she can find contentment through the mutual presencefrom the communion and availability she has with a community of beings, all of whom are committed to the same end. Just as the joints of the skeleton are conjoined and adapted to bones, Marcel contends that the individual life finds its justification and its meaning by being inwardly conjoined, adapted, and oriented towards something other than itself (V I, 201-2). There are, certainly, detriments to the life of presence that Marcel explicates. He penned as many words on unavailability, indisponibilit as he did availability, and with good reason: obstacles frequently occur when individuals attempt to coalesce their experiences to emerge as stronger, more cohesive beings. Almost all occurrences of unavailability result form an individual seeking fulfillment through the objectification of the self. To be unavailable is to be preoccupied with the self as an object, to be self-centered in such a way as to exclude the possibility of engaging with others as subjects (BH 74, 78). The unavailable person is characterized by an absorption with her self, whether with her own successes and accomplishments or her own problems. She can feel temporary satisfaction by wallowing in herself, but she only experiences herself as object, and so cannot be whole. Whatever brief satisfaction the unavailable individual has, it is short-lived because she becomes encumberedfor Marcel, used upby all of the things by which she attempts to define herself: job, family, poor health, indebtedness, etc. Marcel compares the encumbered, unavailable life, to a hand-written draft of a manuscript. Just as the clutter of editing marks on a draft disables the author from figuring out what is important to the central ideas, the encumbered self no longer has access to her own point of view. The result is frustration, apathy, or distrust in oneself or others. The weight of encumbrance renders the self incapable of presence, and so the self becomes opaque. The opaque person ceased to let his presence pass into the world, and so has blocked the experiences of others to help inform and shape his own.

The term presence is used in various ways in the English language, although each connote a here-ness that indicates whether or not a subject was here. Example: Two people sitting in close physical proximity on an airplane might not be present to each other, although people miles away speaking on a phone might have a stronger awareness of being together. Presence is concerned with recognizing the self as a being-among-beings, and acknowledging the relevance of others experiences to the self, as a being.

The notion of presence for Marcel is comprised of two other parallel notions, communion and availability. Marcel demonstrates this by noting how easy it is to find ourselves with others who are not significantly present at all, and at other times we are present to those who are not physically with us at all. o it means that the self is given to the other This openness is not linguistically based, since it is beyond the physical relation and communication among individuals. o Communion with other participative beings is renewing to the self as a result of the other giving to me out of who he is, rather than merely by what he says. The ability to yield to that which is encountered, and so to pledge oneself to another, is the component of presence that Marcel calls availability o being at hand, or handiness, so that a person is ready to respond to another when called upon SITUATION: Ung sa EXAMPLE NA DIN