Vda. De Tupas vs. RTC of Negros Occidental (October 3, 1986) FACTS: Epifanio R. Tupas owned lots Nos.

837, 838 and 839 of the Sagay Cadastre, his private capital. On August 2, 1977, he donated the foregoing properties to the Tupas Foundation, Inc., which had thereafter obtained title to said lots. E pifanio R. Tupas died on August 20, 1978, childless, leaving his widow, Partenza Lucerna, as his only surviving compulsory heir. He also left a will dated May 1 8, 1976. Among the assets listed in his will were lots Nos. 837, 838 and 839. Claiming that said donation had left her practically destitute of any inherita nce, Tupas' widow brought suit against Tupas Foundation, Inc. to have the donati on declared inofficious insofar as it prejudiced her legitime, therefore reducib le by one-half. The Trial Court dismissed the complaint because: (1) the proper ties which were disposed of by way of donation one year before the death of Epif anio Tupas were no longer part of his hereditary estate at the time of his death on August 20, 1978; (2) the donated properties were Epifanio's capital or separ ate estate; and (3) Tupas Foundation, Inc. being a stranger and not a compulsory heir, the donation inter vivos made in its favor was not subject to collation u nder Art. 1061, C.C. HELD: The Trial Court is WRONG. A person's prerogative to make donations is subj ect to certain limitations, one of which is that he cannot give by donation more than he can give by will (Art. 752, Civil Code). If he does, so much of what i s donated as exceeds what he can give by will is deemed inofficious and the dona tion is reducible to the extent of such excess, though without prejudice to its taking effect in the donor's lifetime or the donee's appropriating the fruits of the thing donated (Art. 771, Civil Code). Such a donation is, moreover, collati onable, that is, its value is in imputable into the hereditary estate of the don or at the time of his death for the purpose of determining the legitime of the f orced or compulsory heirs and the freely disposable portion of the estate. This is true as well of donations to strangers as of gifts to compulsory heirs, altho ugh the language of Article 1061 of the Civil Code would seem to limit collation to the latter class of donations. `Collationable gifts' should include gifts ma de not only in favor of the forced heirs, but even those made in favor of strang ers, so that in computing the legitimes, the value of the property donated shoul d be considered part of the donor's estate. The fact, therefore, that the donated property no longer actually formed p art of the estate of the donor at the time of his death cannot be asserted to pr event its being brought to collation. Collation contemplates and particularly ap plies to gifts inter vivos. The further fact that the lots donated were admitted ly capital or separate property of the donor is of no moment, because a claim of inofficiousness does not assert that the donor gave what was not his, but that he gave more than what was within his power to give. In order to find out wheth er a donation is inofficious or not, the rules are: (1) determination of the value of the property which remains at the time of the testator's death; (2) determination of the obligations, debts, and charges which have to be paid o ut or deducted from the value of the property thus left; (3) the determination of the difference between the assets and the liabilities, giving rise to the hereditary estate; (4) the addition to the net value thus found, of the value, at the time they wer e made, of donations subject to collation; and

(5) the determination of the amount of the legitimes by getting from the tot al thus found the portion that the law provides as the legitime of each respecti ve compulsory heir. Deducting the legitimes from the net value of the hereditary estate leaves th e freely disposable portion by which the donation in question here must be measu red. If the value of the donation at the time it was made does not exceed that d ifference, then it must be allowed to stand. But if it does, the donation is ino fficious as to the excess and must be reduced by the amount of said excess. In t his case, if any excess be shown, it shall be returned or reverted to the sole c ompulsory heir of the deceased Epifanio R. Tupas.

Zaragoza vs. CA, 1 SCRA 309 FACTS: Flavio Zaragoza Cano was the registered owner of certain parcels of land. He had four children: Gloria, Zacariaz, Florentino and Alberta, all surnamed Zar agoza. In 1964, he died without a will and was survived by his four children. In 1981, one of his children, Alberta, filed a complaint against his other child F lorentino for delivery of her inheritance share, consisting of Lots 943 and 871 claiming that she is a natural born Filipino citizen and alleged that her father , in his lifetime, partitioned the afore-cited properties among his four childre n. The shares of her brothers and sister were given to them in advance by way of deed of sale, but without valid consideration, while her share, which consists of lots no. 871 and 943, was not conveyed by way of deed of sale then because sh e became an American citizen and was prohibited to acquire lands in the Philippi nes except by hereditary succession. Florentino contended that the adjudication of Lots 943 and 871 in favor of Alberta, as her inheritance share, had no legal basis since there was no will nor any document that would support the transfer. ISSUE: Whether the partition inter vivos by Flavio Zaragoza Cano of his propertie s, which included Lots 871 and 943, is valid? HELD: YES. It is basic in the law of succession that a partition inter vivos ma y be done for as long as legitimes are not prejudiced. Art. 1080 of the Civil Co de is clear on this. The legitime of compulsory heirs is determined after collat ion, as provided for in Article 1061: Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with o ther compulsory heirs, must bring into the mass of the estate any property or ri ght which he may have received from the decedent, during the lifetime of the lat ter, by way of donation, or any other gratuitous title in order that it may be c omputed in the determination of the legitime of each heir, and in the account of the partition. Unfortunately, collation cannot be done in this case where the o riginal petition for delivery of inheritance share only impleaded one of the oth er compulsory heirs. The petition must therefore be dismissed without prejudice to the institution of a new proceeding where all the indispensable parties are p resent for the rightful determination of their respective legitime and if the le gitimes were prejudiced by the partitioning inter vivos. Buhay De Roma vs. CA, July 23, 1987 FACTS: Candelaria had two legally adopted daughters, Buhay and Rosalinda. She die d intestate in 1971, and administration proceedings were instituted. Buhay was a ppointed administratrix and in due time filed an inventory of the estate. This w as opposed by Rosalinda on the ground that seven parcels of coconut land worth P

10,297.50 earlier donated by Candelaria to Buhay, and the fruits thereof, had no t been included. Rosalinda argued that they are collationable, conformably to A rticle 1061 of the Civil Code. Buhay, for her part, citing Article 1062, claimed she has no obligation to collate because the decedent prohibited such collation and the donation was not officious. ISSUE: Whether the seven parcels of coconut land are subject to collation. HELD: The pertinent portions of the deed of donation are as follows: "IKALAWA. Na alang-alang sa aking pagmamahal, pagtingin at pagsisilbi sa a kin ng aking anak na si BUHAY DE ROMA, kasal kay Arabella Castaneda, may karampa tang gulang, mamamayang Pilipino at naninirahan at may pahatirang-sulat din dito sa Lunsod ng San Pablo sa pamamagitan ng kasulatang ito ay kusangloob kong ibin ibigay, ipinagkakaloob at inililipat sa nabanggit na BUHAY DE ROMA, sa kanyang m ga kahalili at tagapagmana, sa pamamagitan ng pagbibigay na di na mababawing mul i, ang lahat ng mga lagay ng lupa na sinasabi sa itaas, sa ilalim ng kasunduan n a ngayon pa ay siya na ang nagmamay-aring tunay ng mga lupang ito at kanya nang maaring ipalipat ang mga hoja declaratoria ng mga lupang ito sa kanyang pangalan , datapwa't samantalang ako ay nabubuhay, ay ako rin ang makikinabang sa mga map uputi at mamomosesion sa mga nasabing lupa; "IKATLO. Na pinagtibay ko na ako ay marami pang ibang mga pag-aari sa sap at pang aking ikabuhay at sa pagbibigay kong ito ay hindi masisira ang legitima ng mga tao na dapat magmana sa akin, sapagkat ang mga lupang sinasabi sa itaas a y bahagi ng aking kabuhayan na ako ay may layang ipamigay kahit na kaninong tao na kung tawagin ay Libre Disposicion." There is nothing in the above provisions expressly prohibiting the collati on of the donated properties. As the said court correctly observed, the phrase " sa pamamagitan ng pagbibigay na di na mababawing muli" merely described the dona tion as "irrevocable" and should not be construed as an express prohibition agai nst collation. The fact that a donation is irrevocable does not necessarily exem pt the subject thereof from the collation required under Article 1061. The inte ntion to exempt from collation should be expressed plainly and unequivocally as an exception to the general rule announced in Article 1062. The suggestion that there was an implied prohibition because the properties donated were imputable t o the free portion of the decedent's estate merits little consideration. Imputat ion is not the question here, nor is it claimed that the disputed donation is of ficious. The sole issue is whether or not there was an express prohibition to co llate, and there was none.

Heirs of Joaquin Teves vs. CA, 316 SCRA 632 FACTS: Marcelina Cimafranca and Joaquin Teves had nine children, namely Teotimo, Felicia, Pedro, Andres, Asuncion, Gorgonio, Cresenciano, Arcadia and Maria. Andr es, however, predeceased both his parents and died without issue. After Marcelin a Cimafranca and Joaquin Teves died, intestate and without debts, in 1943 and 19 53, respectively, their children executed extrajudicial settlements purporting t o adjudicate unto themselves the ownership over two parcels of land belonging to their deceased parents and to alienate their shares thereto in favor of their s ister Asuncion Teves. The validity of these settlements executed pursuant to sec tion 1 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court is the primary issue in the present case .

HELD: The extrajudicial settlements executed by the heirs of Joaquin Teves and M arcelina Cimafranca are legally valid and binding. The extrajudicial settlement of a decedent s estate is authorized by section 1 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court . For a partition pursuant to section 1 of Rule 74 to be valid, the following c onditions must concur: (1) the decedent left no will; (2) the decedent left no d ebts, or if there were debts left, all had been paid; (3) the heirs are all of a ge, or if they are minors, the latter are represented by their judicial guardian or legal representatives; (4) the partition was made by means of a public instr ument or affidavit duly filed with the Register of Deeds. The Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement & Sale covering Lot 6409 purports to divide Joaquin Teves estate among only six of his heirs, namely Asuncion, Teotimo , Felisia, Gorgonio, Arcadia and Maria Teves. It does not mention nor bear the s ignatures of either Pedro or Cresenciano Teves although they are both intestate heirs of Joaquin Teves and as such, are entitled to a proportionate share of the decedent s estate. The fact that Cresenciano predeceased Joaquin Teves does not m ean that he or, more accurately, his heirs, lose the right to share in the parti tion of the property for this is a proper case for representation, wherein the r epresentative is raised to the place and degree of the person represented and ac quires the rights which the latter would have if he were living. However, the ac tion of Pedro and Cresenciano had already prescribed because an action for recon veyance based upon an implied trust pursuant to article 1456 of the Civil Code p rescribes in ten years from the registration of the deed or from the issuance of the title. The division of Lot 769-A, on the other hand, was embodied in two ex trajudicial settlements and do not purport to exclude Cresenciano from his parti cipation in Lot 769-A or to cede his share therein in favor of Asuncion. Ricardo Teves has no right to demand partition of Lot 769-A because the two extrajudici al settlements have already effectively partitioned such property. Every act whi ch is intended to put an end to indivision among co-heirs and legatees or devise es is deemed to be a partition, although it should purport to be a sale, an exch ange, a compromise, or any other transaction. The extrajudicial settlements exec uted in 1956 and 1959 adjudicated Lot 769-A in equal shares unto the eight heirs of Marcelina Cimafranca. Such a partition, which was legally made, confers upon each heir the exclusive ownership of the property adjudicated to him. Although Cresenciano, Ricardo s predecessor-in-interest, was not a signatory to the extraju dicial settlements, the partition of Lot 769-A among the heirs was made in accor dance with their intestate shares under the law. The extrajudicial settlements c overing Lot 769-A were never registered. However, in the case of Vda. de Reyes v s. CA, 35 the Court, interpreting section 1 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, up held the validity of an oral partition of the decedent s estate and declared that the non-registration of an extrajudicial settlement does not affect its intrinsi c validity when there are no creditors or the rights of creditors are not affect ed. Santos vs. Santos, October 12, 2000 FACTS: In 1993, Ladislao Santos (Appellant), a resident in the U.S., filed a comp laint for Judicial Partition, with the RTC of Rizal, against his brother, Eliseo Santos and the latter's son, Philip Santos (Appellees), averring that when his and Eliseo Santos' sister, Isidra Santos, died intestate on April 1, 1967, witho ut any issue, they inherited her parcel of land covered by Tax Declaration 1115; that, sometime in 1993, he discovered that Tax Declaration No. 1115 had been ca ncelled by Tax Declaration No. 7892, under the name of his nephew, Appellee Phil ip Santos, and that, on December 16, 1980, Virgilio Santos executed a "Deed of A bsolute Sale of Unregistered Residential Land" on the basis of which Tax Declara tion No. 04-0016 was issued to the Philip Santos. The Appellees insisted that ac quisitive prescription had already set in; and that estoppel barred the instant

action for partition. According to Appellees, Virgilio Santos was already in pos session of the subject property since after the death of Isidra Santos on April 1, 1967. Thereafter, Philip Santos took possession of the subject property on De cember 16, 1980 upon its sale on said date. They reasoned out that more than 13 years had lapsed from April 1, 1967 to December 16, 1980; and that more than 12 years had lapsed from the time Philip Santos took possession of the property on December 16, 1980 up to the time Ladislao Santos filed the action for partition on May 13, 1993. Further, it was argued that the possession of Virgilio Santos c ould be tacked with the possession of Philip Santos bringing to a total of 26 ye ars the time that elapsed before the filing of the case in 1993. These 26 years of inaction call for the application of the principle of estoppel by laches. HELD: Considering that there was no proof that Ladislao Santos executed any "Com bined Deed of Partition" in tandem with the Eliseo Santos, a co-ownership still subsisted between the brothers over the Isidra property. Article 494 of the Civ il Code states that, "prescription does not run in favor of a co-owner or co-hei r against his co-owners or his co-heirs so long as he expressly or impliedly rec ognizes the co-ownership." In Adile vs. Court of Appeals, it was held: ". . . Prescription, as a mode of terminating a relation of co-ownership, must h ave been preceded by repudiation (of the co-ownership). The act of repudiation, in turn, is subject to certain conditions: (1) a co-owner repudiates the co-owne rship; (2) such an act of repudiation is clearly made known to the other co-owne rs; (3) the evidence thereon is clear and conclusive; and (4) he has been in pos session through open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the pro perty for the period required by law." There was no showing that Eliseo Santos had complied with these requisites . The SC was not convinced that Eliseo had repudiated the co-ownership, and even if he did, there was no showing that the same had been clearly made known to La dislao. Under Article 1119 of the New Civil Code, acts of possessory character e xecuted in virtue of license or tolerance of the owners shall not be available f or the purposes of possession. Indeed, Filipino family ties being close and well -knit as they are, and considering that Virgilio Santos was the ward of Isidra S antos ever since when Virgilio Santos was still an infant, it was but natural th at the Appellant did not interpose any objection to the continued stay of Virgil io Santos and his family on the property and even acquiesced thereto. Appellant must have assumed too, that his brother, the Appellee Eliseo Santos, allowed his son to occupy the property and use the same for the time being. Hence, such pos session by Virgilio Santos and Philip Santos of the property did not constitute a repudiation of the co-ownership by the Appellee Eliseo Santos and of his privi es for that matter. Penultimately, the action for partition is not barred by lac hes. An action to demand partition is imprescriptible or cannot be barred by lac hes. Each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the common property. Crucillo vs. IAC, 317 SCRA 351 FACTS: Balbino A. Crucillo was married to Juana Aure. They had eight (8) children , namely, Elena, Maximino, Perpetua, Santiago, Adelaida, Miguel, Rafael, and Vic ente, all surnamed Crucillo. Balbino A. Crucillo died intestate in 1909. Juana A ure died on November 19, 1949. Balbino A. Crucillo left, among other things, two (2) parcels of unregistered land situated at General Luna Street, Mendez-Nunez, Cavite. He was survived by his heirs, who became co-owners of the aforesaid lot s and thereafter, entered into the possession thereof with each one of them poss essing their respective shares and exercising acts of ownership. Rafael had sold two other lots belonging to the estate. Nicasio Sarmiento (son of Perpetua Cruc illo) has caused a residential lot situated at Gen. Trias St., Mendez, Cavite to

be registered in his name alone, Miguel Crucillo is in exclusive possession of a residential lot located at General Trias St., Mendez, Cavite. An agricultural land located at Sitio Niko, Mendez, Cavite, covered by Tax Declaration No. 1179 is owned in common by Vicente Crucillo, Buenaventurada Sarmiento (daughter of th e deceased Perpetua Crucillo), Adelaida Crucillo, and Atty. Conrado Crucillo (so n of the deceased Santiago Crucillo). Another agricultural land situated at Pulo ng Munti, is owned in common by the Heirs of Elena Crucillo, Adelaida Crucillo, and Nicasio Sarmiento. Still another property covered by Tax Declaration No. 653 is owned in common by Buenaventurada Sarmiento and Vicente Crucillo, whose shar e was acquired by Miguel Crucillo. Additionally, Primitiva Mendoza is in possess ion of an agricultural land in Pulong Munti and also in Niko, Mendez, Cavite, wh ile Carlomagno Crucillo possesses an agricultural land at Sitio Maykiling, Mende z, Cavite, Miguel Crucillo is exclusively occupying an agricultural land at Pulo ng Munti and Ulo ng Bukal, and the remaining portion another agricultural land a fter the other portion thereof had been sold by Rafael Crucillo. ISSUE: Whether or not there was a partition of the disputed property? HELD: From the foregoing facts, it can be gleaned unerringly that the heirs of B albino A. Crucillo agreed to orally partition subject estate among themselves, a s evinced by their possession of the inherited premises, their construction of i mprovements thereon, and their having declared in their names for taxation purpo ses their respective shares. These are indications that the heirs of Balbino A. Crucillo agreed to divide subject estate among themselves, for why should they c onstruct improvements thereon, pay the taxes therefor, and exercise other acts o f ownership, if they did not firmly believe that the property was theirs. It is certainly foolhardy for petitioners to claim that no oral partition was made whe n their acts showed otherwise. Moreover, it is unbelievable that the possession of the heirs was by mere tolerance, judging from the introduction of improvement s thereon and the length of time that such improvements have been in existence. Then too, after exercising acts of ownership over their respective portions of t he contested estate, petitioners are stopped from denying or contesting the exis tence of an oral partition. The oral agreement for the partition of the property owned in common is valid, binding and enforceable on the parties. Nor vs. CA, 325 SCRA 652 FACTS: During their lifetime, the spouses Julian C. Viado and Virginia P. Viado o wned several pieces of property, among them a house and lot located at 147 Isaro g Street, La Loma, Quezon City. Virginia P. Viado died in 1982. Julian C. Viado Nilo Viado, Leah Via died three years later. Surviving them were their children do Jacobs, and petitioners Rebecca Viado, married to Jose Non, and Delia Viado. Nilo Viado and Leah Viado Jacobs both died on 22 April 1987. Nilo Viado left beh ind as his own sole heirs the respondents his wife Alicia Viado and their two ch ildren Cherri Viado and Fe Fides Viado. Petitioners and respondents shared, sinc e 1977, a common residence at the Isarog property. Soon, however, tension escala ted between petitioner Rebecca Viado and respondent Alicia Viado after the forme r had asked that the property be equally divided between the two families to mak e room for the growing children. Respondents, forthwith, claimed absolute owners hip over the entire property and demanded that petitioners vacate the portion oc cupied by the latter. Asserting co-ownership over the property in question, peti tioners, filed a case for partition. Respondents predicated their claim of abso lute ownership over the subject property on two documents a deed of donation exe cuted by the late Julian Viado covering his one-half conjugal share of the Isaro g property in favor of Nilo Viado and a deed of extrajudicial settlement in whic h Julian Viado, Leah Viado Jacobs (through a power of attorney in favor of Nilo

Viado) and petitioner Rebecca Viado waived in favor of Nilo Viado their rights a nd interests over their share of the property inherited from Virginia Viado. Pet itioners, attacked the validity of the foregoing instruments, contending that th e late Nilo Viado employed forgery and undue influence to coerce Julian Viado to execute the deed of donation. Petitioner Rebecca Viado, in her particular case, averred that her brother Nilo Viado employed fraud to procure her signature to the deed of extrajudicial settlement. She added that the exclusion of her retard ate sister, Delia Viado, in the extrajudicial settlement, resulted in the latter 's preterition that should warrant its annulment. HELD: The exclusion of petitioner Delia Viado, alleged to be a retardate, from t he deed of extrajudicial settlement verily has the effect of preterition. This k ind of preterition, however, in the absence of proof of fraud and bad faith, doe s not justify a collateral attack on Transfer Certificate of Title No. 373646. T he relief instead rests on Article 1104 of the Civil Code to the effect that whe re the preterition is not attended by bad faith and fraud, the partition shall n ot be rescinded but the preterited heir shall be paid the value of the share per taining to her. The appellate court had thus acted properly in ordering the rema nd of the case for further proceedings to make the proper valuation of the Isaro g property and ascertainment of the amount due to petitioner Delia Viado. Pada-Kilario vs. CA, January 19, 2000 FACTS: Jacinto Pada had 6 children, namely, Marciano, Ananias, Amador, Higino, Va lentina and Ruperta. He died intestate. His estate included a parcel of land den ominated as Cadastral Lot No. 5581. It is the northern portion of Cadastral Lot No. 5581 which is the subject of the instant controversy. During the lifetime of Jacinto Pada, his half-brother, Feliciano Pada, obtained permission from him to build a house on the northern portion of Cadastral Lot No. 5581. When Feliciano died, his son, Pastor, continued living in the house together with his 8 childr en. Petitioner Verona Pada-Kilario, one of Pastor's children, has been living in that house since 1960. In 1951, the heirs of Jacinto Pada entered into an extra -judicial partition of his estate. For this purpose, they executed a private doc ument which they, however, never registered in the Office of the Registrar of De eds of Leyte. At the execution of the extra-judicial partition, Ananias was hims elf present while his other brothers were represented by their children. Their s isters, Valentina and Ruperta, both died without any issue. Marciano was represe nted by his daughter, Maria; Amador was represented by his daughter, Concordia; and Higino was represented by his son, Silverio who is the private respondent in this case. It was to both Ananias and Marciano, represented by his daughter, Ma ria, that Cadastral Lot No. 5581 was allocated during the said partition. When A nanias died, his daughter, Juanita, succeeded to his right as co-owner of said p roperty. Later on, it was contended that the extra-judicial partition of the es tate of Jacinto Pada executed in 1951 was invalid and ineffectual since no speci al power of attorney was executed by either Marciano, Amador or Higino in favor of their respective children who represented them in the extra-judicial partitio n. Moreover, it was effectuated only through a private document that was never r egistered in the office of the Registrar of Deeds of Leyte. HELD: The extrajudicial partition of the estate of Jacinto Pada among his heirs mad e in 1951 is valid, albeit executed in an unregistered private document. No law requires partition among heirs to be in writing and be registered in order to be valid. The requirement in Sec. 1, Rule 74 of the Revised Rules of Court that a partition be put in a public document and registered, has for its purpose the pr otection of creditors and the heirs themselves against tardy claims. The object of registration is to serve as constructive notice to others. It follows then th

at the intrinsic validity of partition not executed with the prescribed formalit ies is not undermined when no creditors are involved. Without creditors to take into consideration, it is competent for the heirs of an estate to enter into an agreement for distribution thereof in a manner and upon a plan different from th ose provided by the rules from which, in the first place, nothing can be inferre d that a writing or other formality is essential for the partition to be valid. The partition of inherited property need not be embodied in a public document so as to be effective as regards the heirs that participated therein. The requirem ent of Article 1358 of the Civil Code that acts which have for their object the creation, transmission, modification or extinguishment of real rights over immov able property, must appear in a public instrument, is only for convenience, noncompliance with which does not affect the validity or enforceability of the acts of the parties as among themselves. And neither does the Statute of Frauds unde r Article 1403 of the New Civil Code apply because partition among heirs is not legally deemed a conveyance of real property, considering that it involves not a transfer of property from one to the other but rather, a confirmation or ratifi cation of title or right of property that an heir is renouncing in favor of anot her heir who accepts and receives the inheritance. The extrajudicial partition which the heirs of Jacinto Pada executed voluntarily and spontaneously in 1951 h as produced a legal status. When they discussed and agreed on the division of th e estate of Jacinto Pada, it is presumed that they did so in furtherance of thei r mutual interests. As such, their division is conclusive, unless and until it i s shown that there were debts existing against the estate which had not been pai d. No showing, however, has been made of any unpaid charges against the estate o f Jacinto Pada. Thus, there is no reason why the heirs should not be bound by th eir voluntary acts. Garcia vs. Calalimar, April 17, 1989 FACTS: Gelacio Garcia died intestate, leaving a parcel of unregistered land. On h is death the property was inherited by his nephews, nieces, grandnephews who are the descendants of his late brothers, Pedro, Simeon, Buenaventura and Marcos. I n 1954, the heirs, Juanita Bertomo, Joaquin Garcia, Porfirio Garcia, Dioscoro Ga rcia, Flora Garcia, Consolacion Garcia, Remedios Garcia, Trinidad Garcia, Baltaz ar Garcia signed a document entitled, "Extrajudicial Partition and Deed of Sale. On December 17, 1954 another group of heirs, Rosario Garcia, Margarita Garcia, Dolores Rufino, Resurreccion Tagarao, Serafin Tagarao, Buenaventura Tagarao, For tunata Garcia and Simeon Garcia, also sold to the spouses Jose Calaliman and Pac iencia Trabadillo their shares, rights, interest and participation in the same p arcel of land. The Deed of Sale was registered in the Register of Deeds. The Pet itioners came to know that their co-heirs were selling the property on December 3, 1954 when one of the heirs, Juanito Bertomo, asked Petitioner Paz Garcia to s ign a document prepared in the Municipality of Tubungan. On December 26, 1954 F rancisco Garcia wrote the respondents giving them notice of his desire to exerci se the right of legal redemption and that he would resort to court action if den ied the right. The respondents did not reply. Hence, Francisco Garcia went to th e Office of the Register of Deeds on March 24, 1955 and there found two document s of sale regarding the same parcel of land. In 1955, Francisco Garcia and the other heirs (Petitioners), filed a case for legal redemption. The Respondents cl aimed that the 30-day period prescribed in Article 1088 of the New Civil Code fo r petitioners to exercise the right to legal redemption had already elapsed at t hat time and that the requirement of Article 1088 of the New Civil Code that not ice must be in writing was deemed satisfied because written notice would be supe rfluous, the purpose of the law having been fully served when petitioner Francis co Garcia went to the Office of the Register of Deeds and saw for himself, read and understood the contents of the deeds.

HELD: The issue had been squarely settled in the case of Castillo v. Samonte, wh ere the SC observed: "Both the letter and spirit of the new Civil Code argue aga inst any attempt to widen the scope of the notice specified in Article 1088 by i ncluding therein any other kind of notice, such as verbal or by registration. If the intention of the law had been to include verbal notice or any other means o f information as sufficient to give the effect of this notice, then there would have been no necessity or reasons to specify in Article 1088 of the New Civil Co de that the said notice be made in writing for, under the old law, a verbal noti ce or information was sufficient." In the interpretation of a related provision (Article 1623 of the New Civil Code) written notice is indispensable, actual kno wledge of the sale acquired in some other manners by the redemptioner, notwithst anding. He or she is still entitled to written notice, as exacted by the Code, t o remove all uncertainty as to the sale, its terms and its validity, and to quie t any doubt that the alienation is not definitive. The law not having provided f or any alternative, the method of notifications remains exclusive, though the Co de does not prescribe any particular form of written notice nor any distinctive method for written notification of redemption. Landayan vs. Bacani, September 30, 1982 FACTS: Teodoro Abenojar died intestate. In 1949, private respondents Maxima Andra da, the surviving spouse of the deceased, and Severino Abenojar, representing hi mself as "the only forced heir and descendant" of the deceased, executed an "ext ra-judicial agreement of partition" adjudicating between themselves the properti es of the deceased. In 1968, petitioners, the Landayans, filed a complaint in th e Court of First Instance seeking a judicial declaration that they are legal hei rs of the deceased and that the extra-judicial agreement is null and void. Petit ioners alleged that they are the legitimate children of the deceased's only chil d while respondent Severino is the illegitimate child of their (petitioners') mo ther. Respondents denied petitioner's allegation claiming that Severino is an ac knowledged natural child of the deceased and that petitioners' mother is the spu rious child of the deceased. Respondents also alleged that petitioners' cause of action had prescribed 18 years having already elapsed from the time of executio n of the document of partition to the time of filing of the complaint The trial court issued an order declaring petitioner's action barred by prescription and d ismissed the complaint as a consequence thereof. Hence, this petition. HELD: Should it be proved that Severino Abenojar is, indeed, not a legal heir of Teodoro Abenojar, the portion of the deed of extra-judicial partition adjudicat ing certain properties of Teodoro Abenojar in his favor shall be deemed inexiste nt and void from the beginning in accordance with Articles 1409, par. (7) and 11 05 of the Civil Code. By the express provision of Article 1410 of the Civil Code , the action to seek a declaration of the nullity of the same does not prescribe . Mendoza vs. IAC, July 30, 1987 FACTS: Buenaventura, Nicolasa and Teresa, all surnamed Gabuya, are the legitimate children of the spouses Evaristo Gabuya and Susana Sabandija, who died intestat e many years ago, the first in 1926 and the second in 1912. Both Nicolasa and Te resa died single, the first in 1943 and the second in 1964. Modesta Gabuya is th e illegitimate daughter of Nicolasa. Lot Nos. 3506 and 3597 of the Cebu Cadastr e were some of the original properties left by the late Evaristo Gabuya. In 1969 , Modesta Gabuya accompanied by Atty. Elias S. Mendoza went to the house of Buen

aventura Gabuya to see the titles of these two parcels of land so that they be r econstituted. Some days later, Modesta Gabuya and Elias S. Mendoza visited him a gain at his house and Modesta took the titles but this time Buenaventura went wi th them to the Cebu Capitol Building. Buenaventura and Modesta signed a documen t and acknowledged before Atty. Salvador B. Mendoza but the latter did not read to the signatories the contents of the document. This document turned out to be an Extra-judicial settlement of the Estate of Evaristo Gabuya whereby Buenavent ura and Modesta appeared to have divided and partitioned between themselves pro indiviso and share and share alike [1/2 each] Lot Nos. 3506 and 3597. Prior to the execution of the Extra-Judicial Settlement document, a Deed of Absolute Sale was executed by Modesta Gabuya in favor of the spouses Atty. and Mrs. Elias S. Mendoza covering her alleged one-half [1/2] undivided share in Lot No. 3597 for a consideration of P10,000.00 and that Atty. Elias S. Mendoza and Modesta Gabuya had respectively asked from Buenaventura Gabuya the partition of the lots but B uenaventura refused to do so claiming that Modesta Gabuya is not entitled to inh erit from the estate of his late father Evaristo Gabuya. HELD: Under the Civil Code of Spain, the law in force at the time of the death i n 1943 of Nicolasa Gabuya, the mother of Modesta, full successional rights were granted only to legitimate and legitimated children. Acknowledged natural childr en were given limited successional rights in that they were entitled to inherit only from the acknowledging parent while illegitimate children who did not posse ss the status of natural children had no successional rights whatsoever. Modesta Gabuya, not having been acknowledged in the manner provided by law by her mothe r, Nicolasa, was not entitled to succeed the latter. The extrajudicial settlemen t of the estate of Evaristo Gabuya is, therefore, null and void insofar as Modes ta Gabuya is concerned per Article 1105 of the New Civil Code which states: "A partition which includes a person believed to be an heir, but who is not, sha ll be void only with respect to such person." Since the ownership of the one-half [1/2] pro indiviso portion of Lot No. 3597 never passed on to Modesta Gabuya, it follows that the sale thereof to peti tioners-spouses Elias and Eustiquia Mendoza is likewise null and void. Aznar Brothers Realty Company vs. CA, March 7, 2000 In the instant case, private respondents have set up the defense of owners hip and questioned the title of AZNAR to the subject lot, alleging that the Extr ajudicial Partition with Deed of Absolute Sale upon which petitioner bases its t itle is null and void for being simulated and fraudulently made. Private respond ents claim that not all the known heirs of Crisanta Maloloy-on participated in t he extrajudicial partition, and that two persons who participated and were made parties thereto were not heirs of Crisanta. This claim, even if true, would not warrant rescission of the deed. Under Article 1104 of the Civil Code, "[a] partition made with preterition of any of t he compulsory heirs shall not be rescinded, unless it be proved that there was b ad faith or fraud on the part of the persons interested; but the latter shall be proportionately obliged to pay to the person omitted the share which belongs to him." In the present case, no evidence of bad faith or fraud is extant from the records. As to the two parties to the deed who were allegedly not heirs, Articl e 1105 is in point; it provides: "A partition which includes a person believed t o be an heir, but who is not, shall be void only with respect to such person. In other words, the participation of non-heirs does not render the partition void i n its entirety but only to the extent corresponding to them. The Extrajudicial P artition with Deed of Absolute Sale is a notarized document. As such, it has in its favor the presumption of regularity, and it carries the evidentiary weight c

onferred upon it with respect to its due execution. It is admissible in evidence without further proof of authenticity and is entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. He who denies its due execution has the burden of proving that co ntrary to the recital in the Acknowledgment he never appeared before the notary public and acknowledged the deed to be his voluntary act. Whoever alleges forger y has the burden of proving the same. Forgery cannot be presumed but should be p roved by clear and convincing evidence. Private respondents failed to discharge this burden of proof; hence, the presumption in favor of the questioned deed sta nds.

?? ?? ?? ?? Atty. Lanie Yangyang Cases Page 2 e Unauthorized copying for transcription purpose is highly coendemneedd